LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations coordinates among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

• Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation

• Ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations

• Promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse

• Perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements

• Report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This is our tenth quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation in compliance with our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978. OFS has two complementary missions: 1) the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan, and 2) U.S. participation, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner nations, in the NATO-led Resolute Support mission (Resolute Support) to develop the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs and to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The objective of Resolute Support is the establishment of self-sustaining Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and Ministries of Defense and Interior Affairs that together seek to maintain security in Afghanistan.

This quarterly report describes activities of the U.S. Government in support of OFS as well as the work of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development to promote U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan during the period from July 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017. We have organized the information in this report by the five strategic oversight areas set out in the FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan: security, governance and civil society, humanitarian assistance and development, stabilization and infrastructure, and support to mission. This report also features oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and partner oversight agencies during the same period, and ongoing and planned oversight work.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS.

Glenn A. Fine  
Acting Inspector General  
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick  
Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Ann Calvaresi Barr  
Inspector General  
U.S. Agency for International Development
On the Cover

Top row: Camp Commando medical clinic, Kabul (DoD photo); F-16 Fighting Falcons taxi on the flightline at Bagram Airfield (DoD photo); U.S. Marines fire a non-explosive illumination round from an 81mm mortar to deter enemy activity (U.S. Marine Corps photo); An Afghan Air Force A-29 Super Tucano maintainer performs an avionics check in the cockpit of the aircraft at Kabul Air Wing (U.S. Air Force photo). Bottom row: Afghan National Army soldiers conduct military operations in urban terrain training at Camp Shorabak (U.S. Marine Corps photo); A U.S. Air Force C-17 loadmaster prepares the first two Afghan Air Force UH-60 helicopters to be delivered to Kandahar Air Field (U.S. Air Force photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present the tenth Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes key events in Afghanistan this quarter and also describes completed, ongoing, and planned oversight work conducted by Lead IG and partner agencies relating to OFS.

On August 21, 2017, the United States adopted a “conditions-based” strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia to combat terrorist groups and bolster Afghan security forces, with the goal of pressuring the Taliban to reconcile with the Afghan government. The strategy outlined several measures, such as eliminating timelines, deploying about 3,000 more U.S. troops, increasing pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens, and providing U.S. troops greater leeway to target Taliban insurgents.

During the quarter, Taliban insurgents continued to attack Afghan forces and fight for control of districts, and ISIS-K terrorists launched high-profile attacks across the country. Internal political tensions increased in Afghanistan, and corruption remained a key challenge to governance despite positive steps by Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice Center.

When producing this report, we were notified that information that was previously publicly released regarding attrition, casualties, readiness, and personnel strength of Afghan forces that we had included in prior Lead IG reports was now classified. In addition, we were advised that ratings of Afghan government capabilities were now classified. We are not able to include that information in the public version of this report, but we are including this information in the classified appendix to this report.

With regard to our oversight work, during this quarter, two Lead IG investigations resulted in guilty pleas from a contractor employee receiving kickbacks and a government employee soliciting bribes. Thirty-one investigations are ongoing, involving allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. Government officials; theft and diversion of Government funds or equipment; trafficking in persons; and other offenses. In addition, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners released nine reports and continued 41 oversight projects this quarter.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to conducting effective oversight of OFS. We especially thank the dedicated OIG employees who perform this important oversight work.

Glenn A. Fine
Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
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FY 2018 OVERSIGHT PLAN

This quarterly report to Congress covers Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and U.S. activity in Afghanistan according to the five Strategic Oversight Areas (SOAs) included in the FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan. These areas are Security, Governance and Civil Society, Humanitarian Assistance and Development, Stabilization and Infrastructure, and Support to Mission.

- **Security** focuses on determining the degree to which OFS is accomplishing its missions of counterterrorism, and training, advising and assisting the Afghan security forces.

- **Governance and Civil Society** focuses on the ability of the Afghan government, at all levels, to represent and serve its citizens.

- **Humanitarian Assistance and Development** focuses on ensuring that the population’s basic needs are met, transitioning to peaceful coexistence in communities, and providing long-term development supporting health, education, and the empowerment of women.

- **Stabilization and Infrastructure** focuses on efforts to provide the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to pursue sustainable livelihoods in peaceful communities with effective economic systems and essential public services.

- **Support to Mission** focuses on administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable the United States to conduct military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is issued pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which require that the designated Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) IG is the designated Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Inspector General for OFS.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for oversight of all overseas contingency operations. Although humanitarian assistance and development efforts sponsored by USAID fall outside the OFS mission, this report provides a brief summary of those efforts to illustrate the whole-of-government approach taken by the United States to support the Afghan people. The USAID IG conducts audits and investigations of its programs in Afghanistan and coordinates those activities, as appropriate, with other oversight entities. A summary of USAID oversight work is included in this report.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from July 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017. The methodology for obtaining information used in this report and for drafting the report can be found in Appendix A. A classified appendix to this report will be provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
UNITED STATES ANNOUNCES REVISED STRATEGY

On August 21, 2017, President Donald Trump announced a strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia, stating, “From now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.”

The expressed goal of the strategy is to break the stalemate on the battlefield and convince Taliban leaders that they cannot achieve military victory, which would “drive them” to an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process.

The Administration’s strategy explicitly removed any timelines and shifted to a “conditions-based” approach. The President stated that the strategy would direct “all instruments of American power—diplomatic, economic, and military—toward a successful outcome.” The President also called for increased pressure on Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens along its border with Afghanistan and for increased economic and development assistance from India. Lastly, the new approach expanded the rules of engagement to allow U.S. forces more authority to target Taliban militants and support Afghan forces.

Under the Administration’s strategy, the United States is sending about 3,000 more troops to Afghanistan to bolster the train, advise, and assist mission. U.S. advisors will have the authority to accompany Afghan conventional forces at the brigade and battalion levels to more closely mentor Afghan troops. Since 2014, U.S. advisors mentored the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) at the tactical level, and advised conventional forces only at the corps level except in limited circumstances.

By the close of the quarter, the White House and the DoD had yet to release significant details on how the United States will implement the strategy and how it will measure and report its progress. In a series of congressional hearings after the quarter ended, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the strategy and its framework in greater detail, but in the unclassified hearing they did not outline clear metrics and how conditions and metrics will be measured.

SECURITY

This quarter, in a change from previous policy, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) classified the quarterly ratings that NATO-led Resolute Support mission (Resolute Support) generates to measure progress of capacity-building training in the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI). Coalition advisors assign ratings that evaluate the attainment of milestones, which advisors and their Afghan counterparts establish by mutual agreement. Last quarter, the Resolute Support ratings assessment showed a decline in ministerial capabilities from February to May 2017. Resolute Support predicted significant improvement by September 2017, but the command is no longer releasing that data to the public.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Additionally, USFOR-A classified key personnel statistics that indicate the authorized and assigned troop levels, attrition and casualty rates, operational readiness, and sustainability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). While President Ghani asked for the classification of casualty numbers, it is unclear if the additional data on Afghan forces that was previously unclassified is now being classified at his request or if Resolute Support or USFOR-A officials chose to classify that data. The Afghan government and USFOR-A regularly released this data in previous quarters and Lead IG included it in previous reports. Last quarter, USFOR-A provided unclassified personnel statistics indicating that high attrition and turnover continued to challenge the ANDSF but stated that coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts were taking action to address the issue. An assessment of the actions taken to address high attrition and turnover, as well as the current statistics, are now classified and not available for this public report to Congress. Instead, this data, as well as information related to ministry progress towards milestones, are available in a classified appendix to this report.

Combat Continued Across Afghanistan

The Taliban continued to target provincial and district centers but shifted its strategy in the face of ANDSF counterattacks. This quarter, ANDSF based in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand succeeded in retaking some district centers from the Taliban and repelled new Taliban attacks. In response, the Taliban targeted ANDSF personnel and facilities in the southern provinces, while launching attacks to claim district centers elsewhere in the country. For example, the Taliban overtook two district centers in northern Faryab province and one district center in Paktiya province in eastern Afghanistan. In most cases, the ANDSF recaptured these districts within days or weeks of the Taliban attack.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) also continued to be a threat in Afghanistan. In July, U.S. officials reported that a U.S. airstrike killed Abu Sayed, who had been the leader of ISIS-K in Afghanistan, and several other members of his group. USFOR-A officials stated that Abu Sayed’s death, which followed the recent deaths of other ISIS-K leaders, likely affected the group’s command and control capability. ISIS-K had not named a new leader by the quarter’s end. In addition, ISIS-K suffered defeats in fighting with the Taliban. However, ISIS-K continued to launch high-profile attacks across the country and in Kabul, where it attacked a cricket stadium, the Iraqi embassy, and a Shia mosque.

During the quarter, the DoD expanded its airpower capacity in Afghanistan. The DoD increased the number of multi-role F-16 fighters operating in Afghanistan from 12 to 18 and, for the first time in 5 years, based air refueling tankers in Afghanistan. U.S. forces conducted 957 airstrikes in Afghanistan, compared to 312 airstrikes during the same period 1 year ago. The increase in airstrikes, by both the Afghan and U.S. air forces, corresponded with a marked increase in airstrike-related civilian casualties according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA reported that 234 Afghans were killed or injured as a result of airstrikes during the quarter, an increase from 232 casualties during the first 6 months of 2017. The DoD disputed UNAMA’s assessment and claimed the number of civilian casualties is inflated because UNAMA uses a different assessment methodology than Resolute Support.

**ANDSF Development**

While strong recruiting efforts maintained Afghan National Army (ANA) force levels at approximately 170,000 troops, large numbers of soldiers continued to leave the ANA early or failed to reenlist due to frustration over pay, living conditions, poor leadership, quality of medical care, and deployment cycles. The 170,000 force strength is less than...
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As of September, the ANA had conducted standardized assessments of 300 soldiers, and the MoI had begun its initial assessment of ANP general officers.

Meanwhile, the ASSF continued as the most effective fighting force within the ANDSF despite often conducting operations outside of its special operations mission set. The Afghan government moved ahead with plans to nearly double the size of the ASSF.

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) sought to improve accountability in the Afghan Local Police (ALP) by attaching conditions to the funding it provides to the ALP. This quarter, CSTC-A released the draft of this year’s Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter, which links U.S. financial support to reforms and good governance processes within the ALP.

The DoD supported expansion of the AAF. In September, the DoD awarded a contract to procure an additional 30 MD-530 helicopters for the AAF, which will significantly expand the existing fleet of 25 attack helicopters. This is part of a planned $6.8 billion effort to address ANDSF lift and aerial fires capability gaps and to replace Afghanistan’s Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters with U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawks—a transition that began during the quarter that will be explored further in this report.

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**AUGUST 16**
One U.S. soldier died as a result of wounds suffered during a partnered operation with Afghan forces against ISIS-K in Nangarhar province

**AUGUST 21**
President Trump announced a new strategy in Afghanistan

**AUGUST 25**
ISIS-K suicide bombers and gunman attacked a Shia Mosque in Kabul, killing more than 20 and wounding 90 civilians

**SEPTEMBER 6**
Taliban suicide bomber detonated explosives at the entrance to Bagram Airfield

**SEPTEMBER 15**
A car packed with explosives rammed a NATO convoy in Kandahar province, killing one NATO soldier and wounding two others

**SEPTEMBER 27**
As Secretary Mattis arrived in Kabul for a meeting with the NATO Secretary General, insurgents fired rockets at the city’s international airport. In response, the U.S. launched two missiles, one of which missed its target, killing two Afghan civilians and wounding 11 others
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Corruption remained a significant obstacle to governance and development in Afghanistan. Afghanistan ranked 169 out of 176 nations in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, the latest report from Transparency International. This represents only a small improvement since 2015, when Transparency International ranked Afghanistan as the second most corrupt nation in the world. The group stated that corruption in Afghanistan interferes with the distribution of humanitarian aid and prevents sustainable development.26

Afghanistan continued to fight corruption during the quarter and convicted several powerful military and business officials.27 In July and August 2017, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) tried seven major cases and sentenced a lieutenant general and an oil company executive to prison. Since June 2016, Afghan government agencies and banks referred 323 cases to the ACJC, which has held 21 primary court trials and convicted 83 defendants.28

Political tensions deepened during the quarter. A coalition of political parties—several of which are rivals—held its first meeting and criticized President Ghani’s handling of electoral reform and security (especially in light of the mass casualties of the May 31 bombing in Kabul). The Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan, a coalition of non-Pashtun political parties mainly aligned with First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, called for the government to allow his return from his self-imposed exile awaiting the disposition of charges that he ordered the kidnapping and sexual assault of a rival.29 Separately, armed supporters of political strongmen in Takhar and Balkh provinces clashed multiple times, resulting in at least 30 civilian fatalities.30
President Ghani signed an Afghan-initiated compact, supported by USFOR-A and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, that includes more than 200 benchmarks in the areas of governance, economics, peace and reconciliation, and security. General John W. Nicholson, Jr., Commander, USFOR-A and Resolute Support, stated that the United States will hold Afghanistan accountable for meeting the benchmarks, though U.S. officials did not publicly state what, if any, enforcement mechanisms they would use.

President Trump’s strategy seeks to “regionalize” the effort to stabilize Afghanistan by putting more pressure on Pakistan to eliminate safe havens for militants and terrorist groups and by encouraging India to provide more economic and development assistance to Afghanistan. Pakistan reacted to the strategy announcement by arguing that it is not receiving credit for the sacrifices it is making to fight terrorism.

**HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT**

This quarter, USAID and its implementing partners provided food, cash, non-food items, and other emergency services to the more than 270,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan and more than 376,000 undocumented and deported persons returning from Pakistan, Iran, and other countries. However, barriers to access and safety concerns impeded aid workers’ efforts to deliver aid and assess the impact and efficiency of these programs. Low crop yields in Afghanistan during the quarter led to alarming levels of food insecurity among IDPs, particularly in provinces with high concentrations of IDPs.
KEY CHALLENGES

This list is derived from Lead IG analysis of information from the DoD, UN, and open sources. Information on each challenge is included within the sections of the report.

Many of the key challenges in Afghanistan remained the same as challenges outlined in previous Lead IG reports. The ANDSF continued to face a resilient enemy in the Taliban, which launched attacks across the country. ISIS-K conducted high-profile suicide attacks despite suffering heavy losses at the hands of U.S. and Afghan forces. Pakistan allegedly continued to provide sanctuary for the Taliban.

The Afghan National Unity Government still faced difficulty agreeing on and implementing policy reforms. While there were some signs of progress, such as the recent prosecution of several high-ranking officials, corruption remained rampant across the government and in the security forces. In addition, ANDSF casualty and attrition rates, according to available data, were still dangerously high and undermined the capacity of the ANDSF to secure territory.

In addition to the ongoing challenges, Afghanistan faced several developing challenges this quarter as President Ghani continued to implement the ANDSF Road Map to restructure and reform elements of the ANDSF.

Doubling the size of the Afghan Special Security Forces
Afghanistan’s plan to nearly double the size of the ASSF may affect current and long-term force strength and sustainment of the ANDSF in general. The increase includes moving two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades from the ANA to Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, developing additional commando companies, expanding training programs, expanding the National Mission Units and the Special Mission Wing (SMW), and establishing a National Mission Brigade.

- The increase in the ASSF from 12,000 to 22,000 troops will be offset by a corresponding reduction in ANA end strength, which may dilute the capabilities of the ANA and the ASSF.
- In Afghanistan, a country of roughly 32 million people with one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world, the available pool of qualified persons needed to grow the ASSF to approximately 22,000 troops is limited.
- Initially proposed as a 4-year project, it is unclear how long the transition will take and what the security implications will be in the short run given the ASSF’s current high operational tempo.

Building an Afghan Territorial Army
During the quarter, Resolute Support reported on Afghanistan’s plan to create a new “hold force,” called the Afghan Territorial Army (ATA). The proposed ATA units would be part of the ANA and comprise local recruits who are vetted, trained, and overseen by the MoD. The Afghan government and Resolute Support are developing pilot ATA units.
• Afghanistan has experimented with an assortment of militia forces and models to serve as a hold force. The Afghan government and USFOR-A will need to outline how the ATA will improve upon past and existing militias such as the ALP.

• The MoD will need to implement effective mechanisms to prevent local strongmen from coopting ATA forces for their personal use and to prevent ATA units from engaging in the corrupt or predatory behavior demonstrated by some ALP units.

• The long-term fate of the ALP is in question as there are outstanding policy decisions regarding how the proposed ATA will impact ALP operations, including whether ALP will be folded into the ATA or whether ALP will be disbanded, and, if so, how current ALP members will be disarmed and integrated into the labor force.

**Transitioning to Black Hawk Helicopters**

On September 18, 2017, the first two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters for the Afghan Air Force (AAF) arrived at Kandahar Air Field. The DoD is fielding a planned 159 refurbished and upgraded UH-60s to replace the AAF’s and SMWs’s fleet of Russian-made Mi-17s.

• As Mi-17 pilots are taken offline to train on UH-60s, there will be a shortage of active Afghan helicopter pilots.

• The current Mi-17 attrition rate may result in a shortfall in Afghan airlift capacity, depending on the pace of introduction of UH-60s.

• Given that the AAF and SMW rely heavily on U.S. contractors to maintain their existing helicopters, the transition to an entirely new and unfamiliar platform will require a long-term contractor-based maintenance plan and funding.
In addition, USAID supported a variety of education, health, and gender programs in Afghanistan during the quarter. For example, USAID implemented an early-grade reading program and held a job fair to promote civil services careers for Afghan women. Despite this progress, insecurity, corruption, lack of resources, and lack of ministerial capacity continued to hamper USAID’s efforts to provide development assistance. In addition, weak enforcement of corruption and harassment laws also negatively affected the ability of Afghan citizens, particularly women, to access public services.

**STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

USAID worked to support economic growth in Afghanistan through firm-level private sector development, trade facilitation, macroeconomic policy support, and other programs. For example, USAID promoted trade facilitation efforts, aided access of agricultural products to markets, and sought to improve farm water management. However, Afghan farmers faced many barriers, such as limited access to credit and investment, tariffs, bribes, and poor infrastructure. These factors hindered a wide range of USAID programs, such as ongoing efforts to develop Afghanistan’s mining sector.

**SUPPORT TO MISSION**

The Lead IG “support to mission” Strategic Oversight Area (SOA) concerns administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable the United States to conduct military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population. For example, this SOA can include the security of U.S. personnel and property on U.S. installations, or grant and contract management.

The Lead IG also includes congressional funding for OFS in this section. The FY 2018 U.S. Government budget began under a continuing resolution that funded most Federal agencies at roughly the previous fiscal year’s enacted levels until December 8, 2017. Congress continued to deliberate on appropriations for the President’s FY 2018 Budget, which requested a total of $639.1 billion for the DoD. This amount includes $64.6 billion in requested Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding, of which $45.9 billion is designated for OFS. Within the OFS budget, $4.9 billion is for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), the funding stream through which the United States provides the ANDSF with a majority of its financial support. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 request for the DoS and USAID includes $12 billion in OCO funding, of which $1.7 billion would support operations in Afghanistan.

**LEAD IG OVERSIGHT**

During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partners released nine reports that related directly, or in part, to OFS matters. Table 1 lists the released reports by agency.

**DoD OIG:** An audit found that the DoD did not effectively manage the Global Discovery Program’s ATR 42-500 aircraft that was intended to be used for counternarcotics missions in Afghanistan. During the more than 7-year program, DoD personnel purchased equipment, contracted for modifications to the aircraft, modified the aircraft, subsequently had the modifications removed from the aircraft, and returned the aircraft to its original form. The DoD received no benefit for its more than 7 years’ work and wasted $64.8 million in funds.

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<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
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<td>Afghan Ministry of Interior Headquarters Project: Phase 2 Experienced Lengthy Delays, Increased Costs, and Construction Deficiencies that Need to be Addressed (SIGAR-17-65-IP)</td>
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*Source: Lead IG*
**DoD OIG:** Another audit found that the CSTC-A did not provide effective oversight of ammunition that the DoD procured and provided to the Afghan security forces. CSTC-A officials stated that they could not perform physical inspections beyond the corps or zone level to validate ministry-provided ammunition reports due to understaffing and security limitations.

Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners had 41 ongoing and 20 planned oversight projects for Afghanistan, as of September 30, 2017. These projects relate to building Afghan capacity, counternarcotics, contracts, and contract management, and intelligence activities.

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it conducts stabilization and aid activities in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan related to these programs. USAID OIG activities are included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs. USAID OIG issued one non-OFS-related report and three non-OFS-related financial audits during this period.

**USAID OIG:** An audit found that USAID lacked adequate guidance and plans for making Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contributions, and did not have policies and procedures for verifying that the payments were used for their intended purposes. The audit also found that USAID had not adequately measured and reported on how the Trust Fund assists in achieving development objectives, despite requirements for each mission to collect, maintain, and review performance results.

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**INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE ACTIVITY**

During the quarter, two Lead IG investigations resulted in guilty pleas from a contractor employee receiving kickbacks and a Government employee soliciting bribes.

As of September 30, 2017, there were 31 open investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations. The OFS-related investigations involved allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. Government officials; theft and diversion of Government funds or equipment; trafficking in persons; and other offenses. In addition, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 38 fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan for 449 participants.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The OIGs’ hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review. During this quarter, the Lead IG hotline investigator received and coordinated numerous complaints, which resulted in the opening of 44 cases. The cases were referred within the DoD OIG and the Service IG entities.
The ANA 215th Corps color guard marches the Afghan national colors during a graduation ceremony at Camp Shorabak. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

**REPORT STRUCTURE**

This report examines key activities in OFS and Afghanistan and is organized in three chapters:

- Key activities in OFS and Afghanistan this quarter, with information organized in sections aligned with the five SOAs adopted by the Lead IG;
- Completed Oversight Activities; and
- Ongoing and Planned Oversight Activities.

**METHODOLOGY**

To fulfill their congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. Federal agencies provide written responses to quarterly data call questions from Lead IG agencies, and the DoD, DoS, and USAID provide comments to draft reports, which Lead IG agencies consider in editing the reports.

The source of information is shown in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except for references to Lead IG agencies and oversight partner agency audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations in the report, the Lead IG agencies have not independently verified and assessed all the data included in this report. For details of the methodology, see Appendix A.

In addition to the unclassified quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies produce an appendix containing classified information related to OFS that includes ANDSF force strength, ministry progress towards milestones, equipment readiness, and mission results of the ASSF. The classified Appendix is provided separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
Afghan National Army soldiers conduct military operations in urban terrain training. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

KEY EVENTS THIS QUARTER

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MISSION
U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as OFS: counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and ISIS-K in Afghanistan; and support for NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, which seeks to build the capacity of the MoD and MoI and to strengthen the ANDSF. OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and transitioned to a NATO-led train, advise, and assist role, while continuing counterterrorism operations. At that point, the Afghan government assumed full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan with limited U.S. or coalition support on the battlefield.

HISTORY
U.S. combat operations began on October 7, 2001 to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and international coalition partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, the Taliban regrouped and launched increasingly deadly attacks to recapture lost territory. The deteriorating security situation resulted in a surge in U.S. troop strength from 37,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 from 2010 to 2011. The surge reversed Taliban momentum and enabled a gradual reduction of U.S. forces to 16,100 by December 31, 2014, when the NATO-led combat mission ended and OFS began. By the end of 2016, roughly 11,000 U.S. troops remained in Afghanistan. However, since the launch of OFS, Afghan forces have struggled against a resilient Taliban and have suffered extensive casualties. As a result, the U.S. announced a new “conditions-based” strategy on August 21, 2017, which includes the deployment of about 3,000 additional U.S. troops.

Make-Up of the NATO-Led Coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four NATO “Framework Nations”</th>
<th>Other Top NATO Contributors</th>
<th>Major Non-NATO Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead Regional Train, Advise, Assist Commands (TAACs)</td>
<td>Romania: 588 Troops</td>
<td>Georgia: 870 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States-TAACs East and South 6,941 Troops</td>
<td>United Kingdom: 500 Troops</td>
<td>Australia: 270 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy-TAAC West 1,037 Troops</td>
<td>Czech Republic: 216 Troops</td>
<td>Armenia: 121 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany-TAAC North 980 Troops</td>
<td>Poland: 192 Troops</td>
<td>Mongolia: 120 Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey-TAAC Capital (Kabul) 558 Troops</td>
<td>Netherlands: 100 Troops</td>
<td>8 Other Partner Countries: 275 Troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Other NATO Countries: 691 Troops

Sources: See endnotes, page 120
KEY DEVELOPMENT: NEW STRATEGY

On August 21, 2017, President Trump announced the broad parameters of a strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia. The President stated that the United States’ primary interest in Afghanistan continues to be preventing the nation from being a safe haven for terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies. The President outlined five core pillars of U.S. strategy going forward:

• Enacting a conditions-based rather than time-based approach;
• Integrating “all instruments of American power—diplomatic, economic, and military—toward a successful outcome”;
• Requiring that Pakistan stop providing safe haven for terrorist organizations;
• Asking India to increase its already sizeable economic and development assistance in Afghanistan; and
• Expanding the rules of engagement to allow commanders in the field to “fully and swiftly wage battle against the enemy.”

President Trump stated that rather than nation building or using “American military might to construct democracies in faraway lands,” the United States will prioritize “killing terrorists.” The President added: “From now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.”

The President said that the United States would continue to support the Afghan military against the Taliban, but did not identify what would constitute an end of the war in Afghanistan. “Someday, after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But nobody knows if or when that will ever happen,” the President said.

Strategy Expands U.S. Forces’ Operational Authorities

The Administration’s strategy provided the DoD and military officials more authority to advise Afghan conventional forces at the tactical level and to expand the use of force against the Taliban. The most notable unclassified change is that U.S. forces no longer need to be in immediate proximity of or in contact with an enemy in order to call in air strikes.

The expansion of operational authorities and rules of engagement is the latest evolution in a series of adjustments made to OFS since it began on January 1, 2015. At that time, U.S. forces could only engage the Taliban or conduct air strikes in cases of self-defense, when intelligence indicated U.S. forces faced imminent danger, or when Taliban militants supported al Qaeda operations. Additionally, U.S. forces had limited authority to provide “combat enabler support” to Afghan conventional forces. In support of the counterterrorism mission, the United States could conduct offensive operations against al Qaeda. In June 2016, President Obama expanded the existing combat enabler authority...
and further authorized U.S. troops to accompany Afghan conventional forces in select circumstances and conduct air strikes to support Afghan offensive operations. Under the new strategy, U.S. forces are authorized to advise Afghan conventional forces down to the tactical level as U.S. forces have done with the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF).

**Key Metrics of New U.S. Strategy Are Undefined at This Time**

While the Administration emphasized that its Afghanistan strategy will focus on conditions rather than timelines, neither the DoD nor the White House publicly described the metrics that will be used to assess the conditions.

On September 21, 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani stated that an element of Afghanistan’s security plan is to bring 80 percent of Afghan territory under the control of the government. Neither President Ghani nor the DoD provided an explanation of how that percentage was determined.

On September 24, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis told reporters that he was not prepared to discuss metrics, “because I need to get to Afghanistan, and I need to sit down in Brussels with the other nations and talk with them together about what the metrics are, and make certain we all put our heads together on this.”

On October 3, 2017, Secretary Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford testified before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and discussed the broad outlines of the Administration’s strategy. The Secretary of Defense described the strategy as “R4+S,” or regionalize, realign, reinforce, reconcile, and sustain. “Regionalize” adopts a “geographic framework” involving Pakistan and India, and considering Russia, China and Iran. “Realign” sends advisors to the tactical level to support and assist more Afghan units and call in NATO fire support as needed. “Reinforce” adds more U.S. troops to the Resolute Support mission to protect the advisors. “Reconcile” signals the desired outcome for the military operations, which is to drive the Taliban and other militants to reconcile with the Afghan national government for a stabilized country. General Dunford added that corruption is “the single greatest roadblock to progress,” and will be tackled as part of implementing the strategy.

According to Secretary Mattis and General Dunford, the removal of timelines sends a message to the Taliban that they cannot simply wait out the United States and the international community. Secretary Mattis and General Dunford explained that an effectively open-ended military commitment, coupled with increased mentoring of Afghan forces at the tactical level and increased air support, will ultimately convince the Taliban they cannot win on the battlefield and therefore must engage in reconciliation talks.

“First, we have to remove from the Taliban a sense that they don’t have to negotiate on this,” said Secretary Mattis during the House Armed Services Committee hearing. “Once they get that through their head, then we’re going to peel off some of them.”
More Troops Deploy, but Numbers Kept Classified

In support of his strategy, the President announced the United States will send additional troops to Afghanistan to bolster the counterterrorism and train, advise, and assist missions. He stated that he would not discuss specific troop numbers, and Secretary Mattis also declined to provide an exact number.\(^{15}\)

Pentagon officials said the number of additional troops is about 3,000.\(^{16}\) On September 18, 2017, Secretary Mattis said that the DoD would not seek any additional funding for the troop increase under the continuing resolution that runs through December 8, 2017. The new troops will join the 11,000 U.S. forces already in the country. In 2016, the administration of President Obama set a cap of 8,400 troops, which President Trump’s administration continued, but that number did not account for troops on short-term assignments, as well as others performing specific tasks other than the core tasks of the train, advise, and assist, and counterterrorism missions, such as retrograde of equipment. On August 30, 2017, the DoD detailed its revised system for accounting for troops in theater, which disclosed that the United States had approximately 11,000 troops in Afghanistan.\(^{17}\)

With the change in the troop accounting policy and deployment of additional troops, as many as 14,000 U.S. forces could be on the ground in Afghanistan at any given time.

The Administration’s strategy calls for growing the train, advise, and assist mission and pushing advisors down below corps level through Expeditionary Advisory Packages that will accompany ANA conventional forces at the brigade and battalion level.\(^{18}\) While the
number of advisors in theater will increase, much of the troop surge will consist of combat support and force protection assets to support the additional advisors.\textsuperscript{19}

While DoD noted that the deployment assets to assist recovery efforts in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria delayed the initial transport of additional troops to Afghanistan, DoD stated the overall delay would be minimal.\textsuperscript{20}

Because NATO’s “force generation process” takes place in October and November, by the end of the quarter, NATO had not determined how many troops it would deploy to Afghanistan and how many troops each country would contribute in 2018. However, 17 NATO troop contributing nations gave information indications they would provide a combined 500 additional troops to the Resolute Support mission.\textsuperscript{21}

As of the end of the quarter, there were approximately 35,000 U.S. troops, civilians, and contractors in Afghanistan along with 7,000 international forces, as shown in Figure 1.

**Pakistan under Pressure**

President Trump stated that Pakistan would have to stop providing “safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.”\textsuperscript{22}

“Pakistan has much to gain from partnering with our effort in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists,” added the President.\textsuperscript{23} Afghan President Ghani echoed those remarks in September, saying that he hoped “that this time Pakistanis get the message loud and clear that business as usual cannot continue.”\textsuperscript{24} President Ghani stated he was offering a “comprehensive dialogue” with Pakistan and that he was optimistic that Pakistan would change its behavior because “Pakistan has never had this type of dialogue with the United States.”\textsuperscript{25}
SECURITY

Implementing the ANDSF Road Map

In late 2016, the government of Afghanistan announced a 4-year security strategy to reform, reorganize, and strengthen the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), with a goal of securing 80 percent of the population within 4 years. President Ghani began to implement the plan, now referred to as the ANDSF Road Map, in 2017. The Road Map consists of four main lines of effort:

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities**: Increase the size and strength of the ANDSF’s most effective fighting units, specifically special operations and air forces.
- **Leadership Development**: Emphasize the development of honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals through improved instruction, education, and training, as well as merit-based selection.
- **Unity of Command/Effort**: Review command and control structures to improve the unity of command and effort between Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units.
- **Counter Corruption**: Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce the corruption that has weakened the ANDSF.

According to the DoD, the U.S. strategy works in tandem with the Road Map, which was originally to be completed within four years, but DoD eliminated the timeline with the change to a conditions-based strategy. Support to Afghanistan will be conditioned upon the Afghan government meeting Road Map benchmarks as well as rooting out corruption and continuing political, economic, and military reforms.

Increasing Afghan Special Forces

A central component of the Road Map is the doubling of the number of ASSF personnel by expanding the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command from a division with two brigades to a corps with four brigades. That process includes moving two Mobile Strike Force Vehicle Brigades from the conventional army to the ASSF, growing additional commando companies, establishing a National Mission Brigade, and expanding the capacity of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command School of Excellence. The plan developed in 2016 to transition the Special Mission Wing (SMW) from Mi-17 to UH-60 helicopters has been included in the Road Map.

The ASSF has proven to be one of the only consistently reliable branches of the ANDSF, according to Resolute Support officials. As a result, the MoD regularly deploys these forces for missions traditionally carried out by conventional forces in a more established military. Increasing the number of special operations forces would decrease their high operational tempo.
A goal of the Road Map is to make the expanded ASSF the primary offensive force. Conventional forces will be tasked with “consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure.” However, no publicly releasable information discusses how long it will take to train the new special forces soldiers or how moving elite soldiers from the ANA to the ASSF will affect the ANA's capability.

In addition to increasing the size of the ASSF, the ANDSF Road Map calls for the migration of the Afghan National Civil Order Police and the paramilitary components of the Afghan Border Police from the MoI to the MoD. The MoI would retain its relatively small, very capable quick-reaction paramilitary units. These realignments would allow the MoI to focus its efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law.

Resolute Support officials described the transfer plans for these units from the MoI to the MoD as having reached “the final stages of pre-transfer preparation and are being collated into a single collaborative transfer plan.” The Afghan Border Police transfer process will lay the groundwork for the subsequent transfer of Afghan National Civil Order Police, which is still in the conceptual planning phase. Resolute Support did not provide a timeline or milestones for the transition.

A New Afghan Hold Force is Under Review

One of the problems identified over the last several years by USFOR-A is that the ANDSF struggle with holding territory after ASSF units clear out militants. To address that deficiency, the Afghan government and USFOR-A are developing plans to create an Afghan Territorial Army (ATA) to hold areas cleared by the ASSF. The proposed ATA would comprise local recruits vetted, trained, and overseen by the MoD and the ANA, and they would deploy into largely pacified areas to prevent the return of militants. The Afghan government and NATO are in the process of developing pilot programs to begin in 2018.

“The most effective local security forces comprise locally recruited personnel, who are far more likely to be accepted by their communities, and if effectively led, could greatly enhance security and reduce abuses and corruption,” a Resolute Support spokesman told the New York Times about the proposed ATA.

There are few publicly available details on the proposed ATA program. However, Human Rights Watch, the Afghanistan Analysts Network, and the New York Times raised concerns about the concept and questioned how it will be more effective than the current Afghan Local Police (ALP), an MoI program that they note has been criticized for corruption or abusing local populations in some parts of Afghanistan, but that has been said to be successful elsewhere. Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Analysts Network expressed concern that like some ALP units, ATA forces could be coopted by local strongmen. There are also questions about whether the ATA will absorb ALP personnel or whether ALP units will be disbanded and how those troops will be disarmed and integrated into the local economy.
In addition, while analysts generally view the MoD as a better functioning and less corrupt ministry than the MoI, they also raise concerns about whether the MoD can more effectively oversee militia forces.37

**Black Hawks for the Afghan Air Force and Special Mission Wing**

Under the ANDSF Road Map, Afghanistan is expanding the Afghan Air Force (AAF), including the SMW, which is the air component that supports the ASSF. As part of the growth and modernization of the AAF, the United States is providing refurbished and upgraded UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to Afghanistan to replace the fleet of Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters.38 Congress appropriated the initial $815 million in funding for this transition in the Fiscal Year 2017 budget.

On September 18, 2017, the first two of a planned 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters arrived at Kandahar Air Field, with Afghan pilot training programs expected to begin shortly thereafter. While the Black Hawks will primarily be used for transporting cargo, troops, and casualties, 58 of the helicopters scheduled for future delivery will be configured for aerial fires missions.39

The AAF currently has 47 Mi-17 pilots, some of whom have begun training on UH-60s. As pilots and crews go through training, they are unable to fly Mi-17 missions, which raises concerns about the gap in airlift capacity that could create in the transition process.

According to the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan, human capital is the primary limiting factor of AAF growth and the transition to UH-60s: “While part of
the initial cadre of UH-60A pilots come from the Afghan Mi-17 community, the greatest challenge staffing the UH-60 crews will come from the uncertainty in the recruiting-accessions-training pipeline capacity...for new Afghan aircrew.**40**

The task force stated that during the quarter, 26 of the AAF’s 46 Mi-17 helicopters were in service, and flight hours exceeded the 30-hour monthly cap that is in place to ensure proper maintenance and inspections. “Alternative lift options continue to be explored to ensure the fleet endures until UH-60s become available,” stated the task force.**41**

In February 2017 congressional testimony, General Nicholson also acknowledged that the possibility of a widened gap in ANDSF lift capability could require “U.S. aviation and authorities to bridge the gap.”**42** DoD stated it is accelerating the fielding of UH-60s and training of Afghan pilots to mitigate this risk.

Developments in the Conflict: The Fight Against the Taliban

As the quarter began, the Taliban’s spring/summer offensive was underway. In early July, fighting was taking place in 21 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, according to the Afghan Minister of Defense, and in 7 of those provinces, the ANDSF faced “fierce fighting.”**43** Resolute Support estimated there were between 25,000 and 35,000 full and part-time Taliban fighters in Afghanistan at the end of the quarter.**44**

The key focus of the Taliban’s efforts during the quarter, as in the past, was to expand its influence either through outright capture of provincial and district centers, or through shadow governance and providing social services. Assessments of which districts remained under Taliban control or influence varied: Resolute Support reported that the Taliban failed to capture any district or provincial capitals in the fourth quarter, while media reports quoted Afghan officials saying that the Taliban captured a small number of districts.**45** Afghan and international media reported that in many cases, ANDSF were able to recapture district capitals from the Taliban within a few days or weeks.**46** USFOR-A reported that at the end of August, 54 of Afghanistan’s 405 districts were under insurgent control or influence, an increase from 45 districts six months ago. Similarly, the number of districts under Afghan government control or influence declined from 243 districts in February 2017 to 231 districts in August 2017.**47**

As noted previously, the Afghan government stated a goal of securing 80 percent of the population under government control by 2020. At the end of this quarter, 64 percent of Afghans lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence, as shown in Figure 2. By comparison, in the second and third quarters, 65 percent of the population lived in areas under Afghan government control or influence. During the fourth quarter, 11 percent of the population lived in areas under insurgent control or influence, and 25 percent lived in areas that are contested.**48**

In past quarters, districts under Taliban control were concentrated in Afghanistan’s southern provinces, such as Uruzgan and Helmand, as well as the northeastern province of Kunduz. In this quarter, however, the ANDSF prevented Taliban territorial gains in these
provinces but were unable to defend district centers in other parts of the country, such as Paktiya and Faryab provinces.49 (See the infographic on pages 26-27.)

Even when the Taliban was not able to capture and hold district centers, its attacks on ANDSF checkpoints and installations allowed it to steal weapons and ammunition. The Taliban also relied on criminal networks and the black market for weapons and supplies.50

SOUTH

In Afghanistan’s southern provinces, the Taliban began the quarter with a focus on attacking ANDSF personnel and facilities, rather than conquering and holding territory. For instance, a July 26 attack on an ANA outpost in Kandahar left 39 Afghan soldiers dead or wounded.51 The ANDSF required NATO support to repel some of these Taliban attacks. On July 20, the Taliban mounted a coordinated attack on a town about 25 miles north of Helmand province’s capital, Lashkar Gah.52 Aided by U.S. airstrikes, the ANDSF withstood the attack. However, Resolute Support confirmed that one of those airstrikes killed an unspecified number of Afghan security personnel and that it was investigating the incident.53 Also in July, ANDSF succeeded in defending central Helmand and expanding the security zone around Lashkar Gah.54 To support the increased level of fighting by ANDSF in the southern provinces, USFOR-A deployed an additional 100 Marines to Helmand province in early August.55

Facing continuing U.S. and Afghan airstrikes in Helmand, the Taliban turned its focus from the battlefield to larger-scale attacks that commanded maximum media attention, such as suicide bombings.56 Three suicide bombings in August and one in September,
TALIBAN BATTLES FOR CONTROL OF DISTRICT CENTERS
The Taliban captured districts in northwestern and eastern Afghanistan during the quarter, a notable shift from earlier in the year, when Taliban attacks focused more on district centers in the country’s southern provinces. However, the ANDSF recaptured many district centers within days or weeks of the Taliban attacks.

**SAR-E PUL PROVINCE**

**A Joint Taliban-ISIS Attack?**

An August 3-5 attack on the town of Mirza Wulang, in the Sayed district of Sar-e Pul province, raised concerns that the Taliban may have begun collaborating with ISIS-K to execute attacks. District residents reported that fighters, carrying the flags of both the Taliban and ISIS-K, killed at least 36 people and torched homes, forcing hundreds of families to flee the village. However, further scrutiny of the attack suggests that any cooperation between ISIS-K and the Taliban in Mirza Wulang was likely a reflection of local tribal networks, rather than explicit collaboration between the groups’ leaders. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) interviewed dozens of displaced Mirza Wulang residents and concluded that a local, self-proclaimed ISIS-K commander and a local Taliban commander—who appear to be related—were behind the attack. The U.N. Special Representative to Afghanistan later emphasized that it was largely a Taliban attack. Elsewhere in Afghanistan, ISIS-K and the Taliban remained in conflict. For instance, on September 23, the Taliban fought ISIS-K militants in the Qush Tepah district in Jowzjan, which borders Sayed district.

**FARYAB PROVINCE**

**The Taliban Gains Ground in Faryab**

The border province of Faryab is situated along multiple commercial, criminal, and smuggling routes that connect central Asian states and Afghanistan’s interior provinces. The Taliban has been present in Faryab for many years, and continue to seek to control of the province’s urban centers. In the fourth quarter, the Taliban succeeded in overtaking two of Faryab’s district centers, in Kohistan and Ghormach, though was unable to maintain control of Kohistan for more than a few weeks.

**PAKTIYA PROVINCE**

**Taliban and ANDSF Battle for Control of Key Border District**

Located on a key highway that connects Khost and Gardez, control of Jani Khel is critical for the stability of several districts in Paktiya, including Gardez, Jadran, and Shwack. Taliban forces, reportedly with the assistance of the Haqqani Network, took control of Jani Khel in August 2016. The ANDSF recaptured Jani Khel in September 2016, but have struggled to maintain control of the city. During the quarter, Jani Khel changed hands four times.

The repeated loss of Jani Khel demonstrates the difficulties that the ANDSF face in holding territory in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces. Jani Khel is a stronghold of the Haqqani Network, a capable and well-equipped branch of the Afghan insurgency that has led and reinforced Taliban attacks in the district. Meanwhile, ANDSF commanders in the district say that they are under-manned and receive insufficient support from the government. During prior attacks on Jani Khel, the district governor reported that requests to regional and national authorities for reinforcements went unanswered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q4: TALIBAN TAKE CONTROL</th>
<th>Q4: BATTLE, BUT ANDSF EVENTUALLY REGAIN CONTROL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khamyab (Jowzjan)</td>
<td>Kohistan (Faryab)</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 21</td>
<td>July 22-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanakhan (Ghazni)</td>
<td>Taywarah (Ghor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 24</td>
<td>July 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghormach (Faryab)</td>
<td>Mirza Olang, Sayad (Sar-e Pul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 13</td>
<td>August 3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapa Dara (Kunar)</td>
<td>Jani Khel (Paktiya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 25</td>
<td>July 25-August 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See endnotes, page 120
targeting ANDSF and NATO operations, killed 18 Afghan civilians and soldiers and wounded more than 40, and killed 2 U.S. service members and wounded 4.⁵⁷

**NORTH**

In Afghanistan’s northern provinces, the Taliban renewed efforts to capture the provincial capital of Kunduz. Heavy clashes in July in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces centered on control of the Kunduz-Kabul highway, the main route to the Afghan capital. The Taliban continued to threaten in the Kunduz-Baghlan area, but its attacks diminished in August as the ANA mounted offensive operations that reportedly killed dozens of insurgents.⁵⁸ Overall, Resolute Support reported that enemy activity in Kunduz had declined during the reporting period, compared to previous quarters. Resolute Support attributed the decreased enemy attacks to increased operations by ASSF.⁵⁹

**WEST**

In particularly violent attacks, the Taliban overran three of western Afghanistan’s district centers during the quarter. By September 30, Afghan security forces had recaptured two of these centers, executing at least 24 missions in the 5 provinces within Train, Advise, and Assist Command-West (TAAC-West).⁶⁰ According to media reports, one attack was particularly brutal, as the Taliban killed up to 30 ANP, set fire to government buildings, and shot as many as 40 doctors and patients in the area’s only hospital.⁶¹ In addition, the ANDSF continued its mission to protect the Salma Dam in Herat (also known as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam) which had come under heavy attack at the end of the third quarter.⁶²

**EAST**

The Jani Khel district of Paktiya province, a district along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, known as a Haqqani network stronghold, changed hands four times in heavy fighting during the quarter.⁶³ In addition, Taliban suicide bombers struck 3 times outside Bagram Airfield, located about 30 miles north of Kabul (August 3 and September 6 and 11). These attacks killed one NATO soldier and wounded several others. The Taliban claimed that its September 6 attack was revenge for a leaflet distributed by U.S. forces that some Muslims considered offensive.⁶⁴ Major General James B. Linder, Commander, Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan, issued a formal apology for the leaflet (although DoD officials stated there was no clear linkage between the leaflets and the Taliban-claimed attack).⁶⁵ In Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, the presence of ISIS-K limited Taliban activity. However, NATO maintained that the Taliban remained a threat to the provincial government of Nangarhar.⁶⁶

**KABUL-CENTRAL**

Following the May 31 truck bombing attack that killed 150 people, Kabul remained a target for Taliban and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) attacks. The ANDSF responded to the incident by creating a single truck entry point to the expanded security zone around Kabul’s “green zone” which houses most embassies.⁶⁷
However, security challenges remained throughout the capital city. USFOR-A reported that between July 1 and September 19, there were five Taliban-associated high profile attacks in Kabul, all involving suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices or suicide bombers. A sixth high profile attack, claimed by ISIS-K, killed five people on September 29, when a suicide bomber attacked a Shia mosque as worshipers gathered for a religious commemoration. In addition, USFOR-A reported 25 direct fire incidents, 5 indirect fire incidents, 26 explosions, and 2 mine strikes in Kabul during the same period. Towards the end of the quarter, insurgents fired rockets at Secretary of Defense Mattis’s plane as it landed at Kabul International Airport. Both ISIS-K and the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

**Airstrikes**

The U.S. Air Force continued to expand air capacity during the reporting period. The U.S. Air Force increased the number of multi-role F-16 fighters operating in Afghanistan from 12 to 18 and, for the first time in 5 years, based air refueling tankers in Afghanistan. The Commander of U.S. Air Forces Central Command said the intent was to “optimize the placement of the air assets” throughout the country to “better support the Afghans and our own force.”

U.S. airstrike activity remained elevated in the fourth quarter, but declined compared to the previous quarter, as shown in Figure 3. The U.S. Air Force reported that it released 1,267 weapons in Afghanistan during the quarter, a small increase compared to the previous quarter. The U.S. Air Force initially reported that it had released more weapons during the quarter, but revised the total downward, stating that the initial report contained an error in how it calculated the number of weapons released during September. Figure 3 below compares U.S. air support in 2017 to the previous two years.

**Figure 3. U.S. Airstrikes in Afghanistan, 2015-2017**

The increase in airstrikes, by both the Afghan and U.S. air forces, corresponded with a marked increase in airstrike-related casualties. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that between July and September, airstrikes killed or injured 234 Afghan civilians, an increase from 232 casualties during the first six months of 2017. UNAMA stated that 39 percent of airstrike casualties during the quarter were due to airstrikes by international military forces. Overall, however, UNAMA attributed 22 percent of documented civilian casualties in the fourth quarter to pro-government forces.  

Resolute Support and DoD disputed UNAMA’s numbers and its methodology for calculating civilian casualties and attributing them to ANDSF, coalition forces, or anti-government forces. Resolute Support claimed that civilian casualties caused by U.S. and coalition actions have decreased in 2017 despite a significant increase in airstrikes.  

Lead IG agencies cannot verify UNAMA’s or Resolute Support’s data, but do recognize that UNAMA has been reporting on civilian casualties in Afghanistan since 2007 and its data and methodology are widely accepted by the international community.

**Building Trust With the Pakistani Military**

Resolute Support stated that, “trust and cooperation between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan remains fragile.” Yet, NATO and the militaries of Pakistan and Afghan continued to pursue communication throughout the quarter. In particular, NATO facilitated eight tripartite conferences during the quarter that focused on counterterrorism operations and information sharing. In addition, Pakistani and Afghan corps commanders completed “hotline” telephone calls and personal visits, which Resolute Support said improved mutual understanding and communication.

The Administration’s strategy places renewed emphasis on Pakistan to combat Taliban operating within and alongside its borders. In testimony to the House of Representatives, Secretary Mattis emphasized that the United States continues to seek a productive relationship with Pakistan. Resolute Support stated that since President Trump announced the strategy, there have been “no discernable changes in [Pakistan Military] liaison officer behavior” at Resolute Support headquarters and that all planned engagements remained on track.

Pakistan, in turn, emphasized that its citizens have suffered considerable casualties in its fight against extremists on its own territory. Pakistan is constructing a wall it said is aimed at stopping illicit cross-border traffic. On October 1, 2017, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff and the head of Pakistan’s main intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, met with Afghan President Ghani in Kabul for talks that were reportedly “candid” and “constructive.” President Ghani’s office issued a statement that the Afghan president believed “the time has come to take practical steps toward creating an atmosphere of mutual trust.” Pakistan was reportedly prepared to renew its offer to help train the Afghan security services.
**Afghan and NATO Forces Killed in Action**

As stated previously in this report, ANDSF casualty figures are now classified at President Ghani’s request. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in July, when USFOR-A last publicly released that data, that ANDSF casualties in the first 4 months of 2017 (2,531 killed, 4,238 wounded) were consistent with the same period of 2016, a year in which 6,700 Afghan forces died. Afghan casualty figures for the fourth quarter are available in the classified appendix to this report.

While U.S. and NATO casualties have decreased significantly since the peak of the war, international troops are still suffering casualties in Afghanistan. In July, one U.S. soldier died from wounds sustained in an indirect fire attack in Helmand province. In August, two U.S. soldiers died in an attack on a NATO convoy on Kandahar, and another U.S. soldier died from injuries sustained from an improvised explosive device in Nangarhar province. Also in August, one Georgian soldier died as a result of a suicide attack in Kabul (three Georgian and two U.S. soldiers were wounded in the attack). In September, one Romanian soldier died as a result of a suicide attack in Kandahar.

**OFS Counterterrorism Mission**

ISIS-K claimed credit for several high profile attacks during the fourth quarter. USFOR-A said that despite heavy losses, the group ended the quarter with roughly 1,000 fighters, the same number it had at the beginning of the quarter. During July and August, the ASSF, with the support of coalition forces, conducted offensive operations in Nangarhar province that, according to USFOR-A, “degraded terrorist manpower and disrupted their freedom of movement.”

In particular, U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism forces continued to target ISIS-K leadership. A U.S. airstrike on July 11 killed Abu Sayed, the head of ISIS-K in Afghanistan, and several other members of his group. Abu Sayed was a veteran fighter who had made a career in militancy and “rose through the ranks of at least three militant groups, constantly evolving his affiliation to the latest ‘version’ of the most violent extremist strands.” Despite his battlefield experience, his appointment exacerbated a schism within ISIS-K between the group’s Central Asian fighters and Pakistani leaders.

USFOR-A said that ISIS-K had yet to name a new leader after the killing of Abu Sayed and that the deaths of three leaders in one year is “almost certainly negatively impacting their command and control.” According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network, ISIS-K lost significant numbers of founding and second-generation leaders in air strikes. In April 2017, a partnered raid by U.S. and Afghan special operations forces killed Abdul Hasib, Abu Sayed’s predecessor; the previous leader, Hafiz Saeed, was killed by a U.S. drone strike in July 2016. An airstrike on August 10 killed Abdul Rahman, who was the leader of ISIS-K in Kunar province and considered a primary candidate to replace Abu Sayed.
According to General Nicholson, operations killed more than 2,000 ISIS-K fighters in Nangarhar in 2017. Pressure by the U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism campaign in southern Nangarhar province also pushed ISIS-K into other areas in the country. ISIS-K consolidated its presence in Kunar province and expanded into Nuristan, Ghor, Herat, Jowzjan, and Sar-e Pul provinces. In addition, in July the Pakistani military launched an operation against ISIS-K in the Khyber agency of western Pakistan, which pushed the terrorists across the border into Nangarhar province.

Although USFOR-A officials stated that operations against ISIS-K had degraded its manpower, officials acknowledged that ISIS-K can quickly recover from these losses. According to USFOR-A, ISIS-K recruited in eastern and western Afghanistan and exploited rifts between other militant groups to maintain a force of approximately 1,000 fighters. USFOR-A said that estimating these numbers was difficult because of “the challenge of properly discriminating between ‘seasonal fighters’ and long-term, ideologically aligned fighters, and the difficulty of accurately counting insurgents that may have loyalties to multiple groups.”

USFOR-A officials also stated that ISIS-K is overstretched and unable to sustain significant offensives and could be further hampered by operations in Pakistan against their haven. In addition, the Taliban continued to target ISIS-K militants despite sporadic rumors of collusion between the groups.

Yet, during the quarter, ISIS-K fighters continued to launch high profile attacks across the country and in Kabul, including:

- A suicide attack outside the Iraqi embassy in Kabul on July 30 that killed two people.
- A suicide attack on a Shia mosque in western Herat province on August 1 that killed more than 90 people and wounded dozens more.
- An attack by gunmen and suicide bombers on a Shia mosque in Kabul on August 25 that killed more than 20 and wounded 90.
- A suicide attack near a cricket stadium in Kabul on September 13, killing three and wounding five others.
- A suicide attack at a mosque in Kabul killed five people on September 29.

Al Qaeda maintains a small presence in Afghanistan, though USFOR-A did not provide any unclassified information about operations against al Qaeda during the quarter.

**Resolute Support: Train, Advise, and Assist Mission**

According to the DoD, Resolute Support focuses on developing systems, processes, and organizational structures in the MoD and MoI that will support a sustainable ANDSF that is capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. Resolute Support’s efforts comprise eight key areas, referred to as “essential functions” (EFs) that ministries should be able to
ISIS-K, HIT AT HOME, STRIKES NATIONWIDE

As U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism forces launched attacks against ISIS-K in its heartland of Nangarhar province, the group increased its activity elsewhere and continued to launch attacks in Kabul. Determining whether new ISIS-K activity outside Nangarhar is a function of fighters being driven from the province, a growth of ideological support for ISIS-K, or local militants simply exploiting the ISIS brand remains a challenge.

SAR-E PUL
Self-proclaimed ISIS-K militants and Taliban attacked remote village area on August 5, killing up to 50 civilians, mostly Shia.

HERAT
ISIS-K suicide bombers killed up to 90 in an attack on a Shia mosque on August 1.

KUNAR
A U.S. airstrike on July 11 killed ISIS-K leader Abu Sayed at his headquarters in Kunar.

KABUL
ISIS-K launched suicide attacks at the Iraqi embassy on July 30, at a Shia mosque on August 25, and at a cricket stadium on September 13.

Sources: See endnotes, page 120
perform. In addition, USFOR-A established the Resolute Support Gender Office, which provides guidance on gender-related issues across all EFs.\textsuperscript{107} The EFs are listed in Table 2, with a fuller description contained in Appendix C.

A senior U.S. or coalition official typically serves as lead for each EF with all coalition advisors, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, aligned under the EF lead. The EF lead manages advisory efforts at the ministerial level and at regional levels (such as ANA corps or ANP zone).\textsuperscript{108}

The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which is statutorily responsible for providing U.S. security assistance to the ANDSF, seeks to incentivize greater accountability for and more effective use of DoD-provided security assistance, such as direct contributions of ASFF to pay ANA salaries as well as equipment, supplies, and services, by entering into annual “commitment letters” with the MoD and the MoI. The relevant Afghan minister and CSTC-A commander sign the letters, which include rewards and penalties based on performance metrics in the letters.\textsuperscript{109}

**Resolute Support Classifies Ratings of Afghan Ministries’ Progress Toward EF Goals**

Resolute Support uses a rating system that measures MoD/MoI progress toward attainment of institutional capacity to independently perform the EFs. Coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts establish these milestones by mutual agreement. Every six months, Resolute Support advisors review the action plans to determine if the ministries are on track to achieve the milestones. Advisors evaluate ministerial progress and capability using a rating scale that ranges from a low of one, which notes that the Afghan organization has agreed to a specific action, to a high of five, noting that the Afghan organization can effectively apply and sustain the capability.\textsuperscript{110}

### Table 2. Resolute Support Essential Functions

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Essential Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions and Adherence to Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Sustain the Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Ability</td>
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Resolute Support regularly modifies reporting and assessment processes, which makes it difficult to accurately identify and track trends in ministerial progress over time. In addition, as noted earlier, this quarter USFOR-A classified the results of the EF rating system. Last quarter, the Resolute Support ratings assessment indicated that ministerial progress toward the milestones declined from February to May 2017. Resolute Support predicted significant improvement by the end of this quarter. However, the Lead IG cannot provide a public assessment of progress in this unclassified report as the assessment data are no longer available in a publicly releasable format.

**Building Ministerial Capacity**

Strengthening the ability of Afghan institutions to execute their security missions remained a key focus of U.S. engagement with the Afghan government through Resolute Support. However, corruption remains pervasive throughout the ANDSF. Secretary Mattis, in testimony to Congress in early October 2017, described corruption as a “strategic vulnerability.” In addition, U.S. Government oversight agencies have documented deep
and persistent deficiencies in Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) processes, including inability to account for ANDSF absenteeism, corruption in the distribution of ANDSF salaries, and poor implementation of electronic record-keeping systems, among other serious problems.\textsuperscript{115}

Corruption and ineffectiveness within the MoI in particular have been a growing concern for Afghan and NATO leaders for several years. Appointments in the MoI or its police services can be obtained by bribe rather than merit, security commanders skim salaries from their subordinates, and corrupt officials arrange for salaries to be paid to thousands of “ghost policemen” who do not exist.\textsuperscript{116} Earlier this year, President Ghani described the MoI as the “heart of corruption in the security sector.”\textsuperscript{117}

An additional challenge for ministerial capacity-building this quarter was the pending restructuring of security forces within the MoI and MoD. As a part of the Road Map, the paramilitary portions of the Afghan Border Police and the Afghan National Civil Order Police, which also performs paramilitary duties, are to be transferred from the MoI to the MoD.\textsuperscript{118} According to CSTC-A, the transfer began on October 31, 2017, and is scheduled to be completed no later than January 2018.\textsuperscript{119} The DoD said that “these realignments consolidate the combat capabilities of the ANDSF under the MoD and allow the MoI to focus its efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{120} Resolute Support reported that plans to transfer the Afghan Border Police to the MoD are in the “deliberate planning phase.”\textsuperscript{121} In preparation for the transfer, MoD and MoI leaders met weekly to discuss planning and logistics.\textsuperscript{122} According to Resolute Support, the Afghan Border Police transfer is expected to produce model processes and lessons learned for the subsequent transfer of the Afghan National Civil Order Police.\textsuperscript{123}

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS**

- **NEW LEADERSHIP AT MOI AND MOD**
  Resolute Support noted the appointment of top officials at the MoI and MoD during the quarter, stating that the new acting Minister of Interior Affairs has “made a very good initial impression.” Resolute Support expressed hope that the new minister’s arrival, along with the appointment of a new deputy minister, a deputy minister of security, and other officials, will lead to tangible reforms at the MoI, particularly in the police force.\textsuperscript{124} Though DoD officials noted that past leadership changes were also met with optimism, reforms did not follow.\textsuperscript{125} At MoD, the new acting minister, along with a newly-appointed Chief of General Staff, were leading a comprehensive review of all commanders in the ANA, down to the company level.\textsuperscript{126}

- **BUDGET PLANNING AND EXECUTION**
  Resolute Support continued to help MoI and MoD staff institute and sustain foundational administrative processes to plan and execute budgets. This quarter, Resolute Support advisors focused their efforts on ensuring that Afghan officials can develop and complete procurement documents in a timely manner, so that contracts can be awarded before the Afghan fiscal year ends in December.\textsuperscript{127}

- **ESTABLISHING INTERNAL CONTROLS**
  CSTC-A advisors worked with MoI and MoD officials, particularly the ministries’ Inspector General (IG) staff, to build IG staff capacity and establish internal procedures for oversight, audit, and other internal controls. At both ministries, efforts were underway to implement a Ministerial Internal Control Program designed to facilitate methodical review of ministry functional areas, identify and assess process/activity risk, and implement internal controls and risk mitigation strategies.\textsuperscript{128} At the MoI, advisors and their Afghan counterparts worked to reorganize the MoI IG team so that IG staff are distributed across the organization.\textsuperscript{129}
I LEAD IG REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS

KEY EVENTS THIS QUARTER

**ADDRESSING CORRUPTION**

Corruption remained a significant problem in Afghanistan, which ranks 169 out of 176 nations in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 by Transparency International. U.S. and coalition advisors reported that the Afghan government made small, yet notable, progress this quarter in efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute corruption in the MoI and MoD. CSTC-A advisors worked with the Major Crimes Task Force, an elite investigative unit within the MoI, to boost its professionalism and investigative capacity. The initial focus of the advisory efforts were on gross violations of human rights and MoI and MoD ability to address and remediate those cases. The advisory team added new staff, including law enforcement and legal advisors, and expanded its assistance to focus on countering corruption and development of policies on human rights and protection of children in conflict. CSTC-A stated that it expected the minister of defense to soon sign the Policy for the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict, making the ANA one of the first militaries in the world to have a written policy on the issue.130

Advisors continued to stand up a Counter Corruption Advisory Group (CCAG) that advised the MoD and MoI on rooting out corruption. This group advised the Afghans on coordinating investigations across Afghan security institutions, Resolute Support, and other international partners. The majority of CCAG’s efforts were directed towards advising on Afghan law, judicial security, finance, and financial forensics staff. Additionally, CCAG advisors embedded at the TAACs advised key leaders of the ANA Corps on issues such as contract fraud inquiry and contract fraud investigation. Advisors assisted MoD lawyers in drafting a Policy to Prevent and Combat Corruption, which, once signed by the minister of defense, will “re-emphasize” the importance of combating corruption.131 At the MoI, CCAG advisors assisted in the drafting of a Proposed Terms of Reference, which addresses how the MoI will support Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) operations and develops concepts for the creation of an Afghan Counter-Corruption Academy. Although CCAG has still not reached full operational capability due to fluctuations in manpower, the CCAG continues to develop, grow, and mature in support of counter-corruption efforts within the MoD and MoI.

Meanwhile, the ACJC heard more cases than prior quarters. In a three-week period in July and August, the ACJC tried seven cases, including a case involving a major general accused of stealing from soldiers and a case involving a politically-connected oil company executive; both received 9-year prison sentences.132

ACJC International Prosecutorial Advisor David Frend speaks during the weekly Counter-Corruption forum where donors, mentors, and concerned organizations come together to monitor the ACJC’s progress. (DoD Photo)
FORCE MANAGEMENT

CSTC-A reported that “MoD and MoI lack the capacity to manage their own force structures” and require ongoing assistance to perform cost-based analyses and identify appropriate personnel and equipment solutions in a resource-constrained environment. CSTC-A stated that its Concept Development Directorate worked with MoI and MoD staff to assess and identify gaps in current capacity and ultimately develop tashkils (staffing requirements) that accurately represent the ministries’ needs for personnel and equipment.

USFOR-A advisory efforts focused on leadership development among MoD civilian and military personnel. Resolute Support emphasized that “the long-term solution to a self-sustaining, unsupervised system...is a critical mass of competent, empathetic leaders who embrace the importance of properly caring for their people.” The advisory team and the MoD’s Leadership Development Working Group developed plans to evaluate military leaders and institute merit-based promotions and career paths. USFOR-A advisors were also working to implement similar merit-based promotion procedures at MoI. In particular, Resolute Support can review Afghan candidates for senior ANDSF officer positions through a High Officer Board.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

For many years, the MoI and MoD have struggled to keep track of equipment and salary payments to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. USFOR-A reported progress in implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, a web-based data management system to track personnel authorized to be in the force, establish whether they are in actual approved billets, and to then compute their pay, assuming they are reported separately as being present for duty. Additionally, all ANDSF were required to be biometrically enrolled in a pay and allocation system to help eliminate “ghost soldiers.” The advisory team said that it seeks to have the payroll system operable for selected Kabul-based units in both the MoI and MoD beginning in November 2017.

SUSTAINMENT

USFOR-A advisory efforts also focused on building the Afghan government’s supply chain management and distribution capacity. Advisors worked with ANA personnel to conduct a material handling equipment inventory and trained senior ANA logistics officers.
KEY EVENTS THIS QUARTER

**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS**
Resolute Support's strategic communications advisory efforts focused on strengthening both external and internal communications. At the ministry level, Resolute Support reported that the Government Media and Information Center made “significant strides in becoming the government’s communications hub.” Government staff used the center to hold conferences, press conferences, and interviews.

With the assistance of international advisors, MoD commanders at both the ministry and corps level demonstrated improved ability to engage with the media and local leaders. Ministry staff also received training in the use of multimedia platforms, such as radio, social media, and handbills for messaging.

The MoD expanded its Radios in a Box program to 86 broadcast stations that provide news, public affairs, and entertainment programming in Afghanistan. The program provides mobile radio broadcasting kits to be operated by Afghans to promote pro-government messages. MoD staff have also received training on Adobe software to produce information operations products, which Resolute Support advisors hope will reduce MoD reliance on international advisors to create such products.

**KEY CHALLENGES**

**TRAINING FOR AFGHAN MINISTRY STAFF**
CSTC-A reported that in some cases, MoI and MoD staff did not have the requisite education or training to execute their jobs. The MoI did not train its auditors and inspectors, hindering the MoI IG’s audits, inspections, and case documentation, and undermining cases when they are brought before a court for prosecution. Advisors also noted that many staff were hired based on personal relationships, rather than merit, and that some staff in the MoI OIG were illiterate. Furthermore, CSTC-A noted that budget and planning staff lacked the qualified, educated procurement personnel needed to handle the increasing workload and support efforts to expand reforms and reduce reliance on advisors and other Resolute Support staff.

In some cases, there simply were not enough staff to implement reforms downrange. For example, Resolute Support reported that many ANA personnel who were trained and assigned to operate Radios in a Box were later slotted into other roles, which undermined the effectiveness of the MoD’s information operations. In addition, the devices required constant maintenance (only 45 were fully mission capable in September 2017) and sufficient staff to operate them.

**LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND DISSATISFACTION AMONG AFGHAN STAFF**
CSTC-A noted that dissatisfaction among MoI staff hindered effectiveness, particularly among the strategic communications and budget planning staff. For example, in the MoI’s strategic communications team, staff dissatisfaction with their leadership and a recent salary cut has undermined the ability of the MoI strategic communications team to play a meaningful role in ministry operations.

CSTC-A identified “lack of communication between procurement personnel and requirement owners” and one of the most significant challenges that affected budget and planning assistance.

**IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN DEPLOYED UNITS**
Many advisors reported difficulties in expanding headquarters-based reform efforts to components elsewhere in the country. For example, advisors that support the MoD’s Ministerial Internal Control Program reported that “the program remains stagnant at the Corps and Zone levels.” At the MoI, not all zone-level IG positions are filled, none of the zone-level IG staff have received any training, and they receive limited cooperation from zone commanders. Capacity to support information operations was also limited. Corps and brigade commanders began to integrate information operations into their planning, but at the tactical level only.

Given the slow expansion of reforms to regional components, it was unclear if recently developed policies, such as the Policy to Combat Corruption and the Policy for the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict would be fully implemented.

**INSUFFICIENT ADVISORY STAFF**
Resolute Support reported an ongoing need to increase advisory staff for some EFs. For instance, CSTC-A stated that the cohort of four advisors in the MoD was not enough to provide sufficient support to the MoD audit and investigation functions and that “full sustainability...is not possible without additional dedicated advisors.”
Building ANDSF Capacity

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANDSF ROAD MAP–LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

This year, President Ghani announced plans, collectively referred to as the “ANDSF Road Map,” to reform and strengthen the ANDSF over the next four years. The four principal lines of effort in the Road Map are: 1) increasing fighting capabilities, 2) leadership development, 3) unity of command and effort, and 4) counter-corruption.\(^{158}\)

The Road Map’s goal of developing strong ANDSF leadership requires all components to move toward fair and objective promotion systems to ensure that commanders are promoted based on merit rather than nepotism and graft. In April 2017, the ANA established a Leadership Development Working Group to assess army commanders using standardized evaluations. As of mid-September, more than 300 individuals at 4 ANA corps had gone through this new process.\(^{159}\)

In late July, the MoI conducted its first High Ranking Officer Board process, which it said was designed to institutionalize merit-based promotions for senior police leaders, and the Minister of Interior Affairs ordered a freeze on changes in leadership assignments until the Board completes its work. After the initial assessment of general officers is completed, the MoI plans to institute a similar process for mid-level officers. As of September, the Board had identified 42 candidates for 14 provincial and zone general officer-level police positions, and their selections were awaiting formal appointment by President Ghani.\(^{160}\)

This quarter, Resolute Support advisors reportedly worked with the MoD and MoI to establish an overarching ANDSF promotion board to assist the President of Afghanistan in making fair and transparent selections from among the candidates for senior military and police positions.\(^{161}\) Advisors cited the need for a critical mass of competent leaders as a long-term solution to developing a self-sustaining Afghan force that can maintain its authorized end strength.\(^{162}\)

ANA FACES PERSONNEL CHALLENGES AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM

According to Resolute Support, a high rate of attrition has prevented the ANA from achieving its authorized end strength.\(^{163}\) Large numbers of soldiers continued to leave the ANA early or choose not to reenlist due to unsatisfactory pay, living conditions, poor leadership, inadequate medical care, implementation of leave policies, and deployment cycles.\(^{164}\) Nearly 70 percent of total attrition came in the form of soldiers being dropped from the rolls after being absent without leave for more than 30 days.\(^{165}\) Resolute Support stated that despite the raw attrition rate of approximately 50,000 soldiers per year, recruitment rates have enabled the ANA to maintain an end strength of approximately 170,000 for the past several years. As of May 15, 2017, the last time that USFOR-A publicly released this information, the ANA’s \textit{tashkil} authorized 195,000 soldiers.\(^{166}\) Last year, in accordance with Resolute Support’s recommendation, the ANA instituted re-contracting bonuses, which increased retention for those soldiers who serve the full duration of their enlistment.\(^{167}\)
Audit: Lax Oversight of Ammunition

On September 22, 2017, the DoD OIG completed an audit (DODIG-2017-122) that found CSTC-A did not provide effective oversight of ammunition that was procured by the DoD and provided to the ANDSF. Instead, CSTC-A limited its oversight to evaluating monthly ammunition consumption and inventory reports that the ministries agreed to provide in the commitment letters. Specifically, the audit found that CSTC-A did not:

- Define the roles and responsibilities for the personnel involved in evaluating ministry ammunition reporting;
- Define the criteria necessary to objectively evaluate the ministries’ ammunition reporting; and
- Obtain and review the Ministry IGs’ inspection results of each ministry’s on-hand ammunition inventories when assessing the accuracy of ammunition reports provided by the ministries.

In addition, the audit found that CSTC-A enforced only one penalty during Afghan fiscal year 1395 (December 21, 2015, through December 20, 2016), even though CSTC-A determined the ministries did not meet the commitment letter reporting requirements on 36 of 55 assessments. This occurred because CSTC-A officials believed enforcing penalties would have a negative effect on ANDSF operational readiness.

CSTC-A officials stated that they could not perform physical inspections beyond the corps or zone level to validate ministry-provided ammunition reports due to understaffing and security limitations. Therefore, CSTC-A’s oversight was limited to evaluating the ministries’ monthly consumption and inventory reports that are required by the commitment letters. Specifically, CSTC-A officials stated their reviews focused on whether reports were submitted because they did not have the resources available to assess and evaluate the data.

The audit determined that, because CSTC-A was unable to verify the ANDSF consumption data, CSTC-A did not have assurance that the $702 million spent to procure ammunition in FYs 2015 and 2016 supported actual requirements and was used for its intended purposes. Additionally, the audit advised that CSTC-A might not be able to validate future ammunition requirements for the ANDSF without accurate consumption data.

The audit recommended that CSTC-A develop a long-term strategy to improve ANDSF ammunition reporting. That strategy would include defining responsibilities for personnel who provide ammunition oversight, establishing criteria to evaluate compliance with ammunition reporting requirements, and developing procedures to review ministry IGs’ inspection reports when assessing the accuracy of ammunition reports.

(continued on next page)
Audit: Lax Oversight of Ammunition  (continued from previous page)

Although CSTC-A provided a list of planned actions to improve oversight of ammunition, it did not fully address specific recommendations made in the audit report. As a result, the DoD OIG requested that CSTC-A provide additional comments to resolve the recommendations.168

The audit was one in a series of audits related to U.S. direct assistance funding to Afghanistan. Previous DoD OIG oversight work evaluated controls over MoD and MoI fuel contracts and examined the contract management process implemented by the MoD and the MoI to award contracts funded by the U.S. Government.169

CSTC-A carries out a separate audit program to evaluate MoD and MoI operations.

While the ANA’s overall personnel count has remained relatively steady, the fact that the force loses 30 percent of its personnel a year to desertion, casualties, and separation has caused problems beyond maintaining numbers. According to a June 2017 DoD report, “[a]t’s attrition levels remain high, the ANDSF becomes younger and less experienced as new personnel replace those with combat experience.”170 The rapid turnover rate means that at any given time, nearly one third of ANA soldiers have less than one year of experience, and consistently robust recruitment numbers are necessary to maintain end strength. For comparison, whereas the ANA needs to recruit 50,000 soldiers to maintain an army of 170,000, the U.S. Army’s 2016 recruitment goal is 62,000 soldiers to maintain a much larger force of 460,000.171

While maintaining overall personnel numbers has been a challenge across the ANA, this has not been the case within the general officer corps, which stood at approximately 200 percent of its authorized end strength as of mid-2017. Some of these surplus generals, many of whom exceed the mandatory retirement criteria under Afghan law, have been placed in the active reserve due to the lack of positions available on the tashkil. Others have been assigned to positions associated with a lower rank, in some cases as low as lieutenant.172

In summer 2017, at the direction of President Ghani, the Afghan MoD formed a joint initiative with Resolute Support to reduce the number of general officers. The commission’s recommendations included revising the mandatory retirement criteria, including lower age, time in rank, and time in service cutoffs. They also recommended offering a one-time bonus consisting of a cash payout and increase in pension calculation for generals and colonels who agree to retire over the next 16 months. Resolute Support estimated that this policy, if approved, would result in the retirement of nearly 2,000 colonels and more than 200 generals. In addition to clearing the ranks of surplus general officers, advisors viewed this policy as necessary to maintain mid-level officers by ensuring their potential for upward mobility. Resolute Support stated that it expected the MoI to launch a similar endeavor in the near future.173
ANP INTRODUCES PERSONNEL REFORMS

As with the ANA, balancing attrition with retention was an area of concern for the ANP. Resolute Support reported that while new leadership within the ANP made positive statements about increasing operational capability, improving living conditions, and rooting out corruption, these affirmations had yet to result in actual measurable change on the ground. Resolute Support identified the following areas as needing improvement in order to increase retention: leave entitlements, operational training cycles, service conditions, individual assignments, and the development of a career management system to identify and develop talent within the ANP ranks.174

While the Afghan government is transferring certain national security units from the ANP to the ANA, under an Afghan presidential order, the government is training a select group of ANA non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as police officers to bring leadership and experience to the local ANP units. As of the end of the quarter, 67 army NCOs had been trained and assigned to Kabul and into district chief of police positions around the country. An additional 191 NCOs were in training and expected to be assigned to police units in November 2017. On September 15, Resolute Support said it was too early to assess the effectiveness of this program.175

FINANCIAL COMMITMENT LETTER SEEKS TO IMPROVE ALP ACCOUNTABILITY

This quarter, CSTC-A released the draft of the Afghan Fiscal Year 1396 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letter for the MoI, which provides specific requirements for the ALP. Commitment letters are one tool by which the command establishes annual performance expectations and may impose monetary penalties if recipients of U.S. assistance fail to meet those expectations.176 Human rights organizations have criticized U.S. support for local police forces that have been accused of human rights violations, including abuse of civilians and sexual exploitation of young boys.177 This quarter, the DoD OIG continued its investigation of alleged sexual abuse of young children by members of the ANDSF, which would constitute a violation of the so-called “Leahy Laws” that generally prohibit the use of U.S. funding to assist foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights. A final report was scheduled to be released before the end of the year.178

This year’s letter required the ALP to validate that none of its personnel performed duties outside the scope of prescribed activities by December 20, 2017. Specifically, this prohibited the ALP from acting as “local power brokers,” a trend which ALP leadership reported had increased from March to August 2017. Coalition advisors to the ALP recommended reducing the tashkil in districts misusing ALP forces leading up to the December deadline. Advisors also recommended monetary penalties against the MoI for failing to meet the goal of having 95 percent of ALP personnel formally trained by May 31, 2017. As of August 28, only 86 percent had met this requirement.179

To deter payroll fraud through the use of “ghost police,” the commitment letter stated that only those ALP members validated in either the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System or its eventual successor, the Afghan Pay and Personnel System, will
be paid. As of August 25, approximately 80 percent of the ALP were electronically slotted into valid positions.\(^{180}\)

The commitment letter also required the ALP to conduct a complete inventory of all on-hand equipment in at least two police zones per quarter by December 20, 2017. These inventories will compare ALP tashkils against actual stocks of vehicles, firearms, ammunition, uniforms, personal protection equipment, and other equipment. Resolute Support reported that as of September 4, ALP had accounted for 83 percent of its assigned equipment.\(^{181}\)

**ANDSF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY SHOWS GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT**

This quarter, Resolute Support said that it was unable to rate the ANDSF’s capability to plan and conduct operations independently as “sustainable” due to the low quality in the strategic planning documents generated by the ANDSF components. Specifically, advisors identified the need to focus on developing leadership skills in the areas of joint planning, enabler integration, and offensive maneuver. In the past, Resolute Support blamed poor leadership for these shortcomings. This quarter, the advisors reported that many incompetent ANA leaders had been removed, but their replacements, while viewed as improvements, were still new and not yet acclimated to their new roles.\(^{182}\)

The ANA continued to be a reactive rather than a proactive force and struggled to seize the initiative from insurgent forces, reported Resolute Support. As in previous quarters, the ANA made efforts to reduce the use of checkpoints, which provide a sense of security for local populations but offer little tactical advantage. Advisors worked with the ANA to shift forces away from static checkpoints and toward proactive maneuvers.\(^{183}\) However, according to some DoD officials, Afghan leaders believe that checkpoints can be useful in maintaining security in areas that have been cleared of insurgents.\(^{184}\) The ANA and ANP do not conduct counterterrorism operations directly but rather work to secure areas under government control and force the enemy into increasingly remote locations. This sets the conditions for the ASSF to kill or capture high-value enemy targets.\(^{185}\)

Resolute Support reported mixed results across the ANA corps in their execution of established schedules for soldiers to train, fight, rest, and repeat, known as “operational readiness cycles.” These cycles are critical to building a sustainable force and mitigating attrition. This was the first year that all ANA corps implemented a readiness cycle, though some have reportedly struggled to maintain it. Advisors reported that ANDSF leadership failed to prioritize efforts to ensure sufficient time for training before and rest after operations in the field.\(^{186}\)

Resolute Support reported that the ANA has proven increasingly adept at integrating airpower into its operations, as demonstrated during the quarter in Helmand and Kunduz provinces. Resolute Support also noted that the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command and AAF demonstrated greater strategic planning capabilities than their conventional and ground unit peers.\(^{187}\)
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MAINTAIN EFFECTIVENESS DESPITE MISUSE

The ANDSF training facility at Camp Morehead near Kabul planned to add a new 800-man, 14-week cmdo training course this fall as part of the ANDSF Road Map effort to grow the ASSF from its current size of 12,000 to 22,000 over the next 4 years. According to a senior ASSF official, the cmdo training program had a washout rate of approximately 20 percent due to the strenuous physical demands and literacy requirements. Although substantial, this is lower than the washout rates of 50 to 70 percent that are typical in U.S. special operations programs.

As reported in previous quarters, the ASSF’s most significant challenge remained overuse in operations outside of its intended mission set of short-duration, intelligence-driven operations against critical enemy targets and networks. The use of ASSF in tasks more appropriate to the ANA, such as holding terrain and population centers, degraded these units’ availability and readiness to conduct threat-focused counterterrorism operations.

Despite some improvement this quarter, such misuse also remained the greatest challenge for the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the ASSF’s aviation component. According to Resolute Support, ANDSF leadership continued to task the SMW with combat missions supporting non-ASSF units, often on short notice and with insufficient planning time.

From July 1 to September 10, the SMW supported 253 counterterrorism missions and 5 counternarcotics missions, planned and executed with minimal advisor involvement. This was an increase from the previous quarter, which advisors attributed to the increased activity of the fighting season. The SMW also received more requests for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance from the AAF in support of conventional force airstrikes.

The SMW led the AAF in maintenance capability, performing 88 percent of major maintenance inspections on the Mi-17 helicopters independently over the past year. The SMW slowly improved its logistical capabilities but will remain dependent on DoD contractor logistical support for repair parts. (Advisory efforts focused on developing the Afghans’ long-term ability to use the DoD supply system, as there is no local source for parts for the U.S.-built aircraft that are part of the aviation modernization.) Coalition advisors stated that the SMW was most effective in short-range tactical functions and still required coalition support for long-range sustainment tasks, such as planning, programming, budgeting, engineering, and logistics. The SMW also relied on coalition close air support for night operations due to the limited number of Afghan pilots and crews capable of operating with night vision goggles.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE PROVIDES SUPPORT TO GROUND OPERATIONS

This quarter, the U.S. 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan reported that the AAF was able to provide full coverage of the country with the A-29, a light attack aircraft that can provide support to ground forces and strike strategic targets. Aircrew training continued this quarter with 16 prospective A-29 pilots in the aircrew training
pipeline. Advisors and MoD leaders continued to emphasize the importance of effective targeting to avoid civilian casualties and efficient use of limited aircraft.\textsuperscript{195}

The Mi-17 remained the primary tactical lift helicopter of the AAF, and aircraft utilization rates this quarter exceeded the upper limit of 30 hours per month due to the active fighting season. The fleet included 46 Mi-17s, but only 26 of these were available for AAF operations this quarter, 3 of which are designated as presidential aircraft. Many of the unavailable Mi-17s were in the process of undergoing major repairs and overhaul, and one Mi-17 crashed on September 6.\textsuperscript{196}

The MD-530 is the AAF’s primary short-range, quick response attack helicopter, frequently called upon by ANA corps commanders for light attack and close air support. This quarter, MD-530 crews took on greater responsibility for air strike operations. As of September 20, the AAF had 59 active MD-530 pilots with 5 additional pilots in training.\textsuperscript{197}

This quarter, the AAF executed its first operational nighttime airdrops with the C-208 cargo plane. Of the 16 total C-208 crews, 3 were qualified to perform cargo airdrops, and 5 aircraft were modified for this purpose. The C-130 is the AAF’s heavy-lift aircraft for transporting troops and materiel. At the end of this quarter, the AAF lacked sufficient C-130 aircrews to execute all airlift requirements, but additional aircrews were in training. The DoD’s Afghan aviation modernization plan does not include procurement of any additional C-130s, so all 69 trained C-130 maintainers will be shifted to other aircraft. The AAF would then rely entirely on contractor support for the relatively small number of C-130s for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{198}

Air-to-ground integration is critical for AAF combat elements and ANA units to work effectively together while mitigating civilian casualties, according to coalition aviation advisors. AAF personnel embedded in the ANA as Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators are tasked with serving as this link for joint air and ground operations. However, ANA units have not used these coordinators as intended, and advisors noted the “significant need for improvement” in employing these tactical coordinators alongside conventional ground forces, except for those detailed to Afghan National Army Special Operations Command.\textsuperscript{199}

Table 3.

AAF Operations by Aircraft, from June 1-August 31, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total Missions</th>
<th>Combat/Operational Missions</th>
<th>Air Strikes</th>
<th>Passengers Moved</th>
<th>Tons of Cargo Moved</th>
<th>Casualties Evacuated</th>
<th>Human Remains Recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>24,536</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10,280</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{Source: U.S. 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan response to Lead IG request for information, 9/20/2017; OSDP vetting comment, 11/7/2017.}
AFGHAN AIR FORCE MODERNIZATION

This quarter, the AAF took possession of the first 2 of a planned 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Replacing the fleet of 46 Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters with U.S.-made Black Hawks is part of a major modernization of the AAF fleet set to take place through 2024. The DoD’s FY 2017 appropriation included the first $814.5 million of a planned $6.8 billion to begin this transition, and the budget request for FY 2018 included an additional $709.8 million to continue the process.

In September, the U.S. Army awarded a contract that will be used to procure an additional 30 MD-530 helicopters over the next several years to expand the AAF’s existing fleet of 25. Last quarter, the AAF received four new A-29s. This brought the total A-29 fleet size to 12, with another 7 in the United States for training Afghan pilots abroad and an additional 6 aircraft planned. The modernization will also include procurement and delivery of 32 armed variants of the C-208 over the next 5 to 6 years. The AAF currently has a fleet of 24 unarmed C-208s.

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

During the reporting period, President Ghani signed an Afghan-initiated compact, supported by USFOR-A and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, intended to demonstrate Afghanistan’s commitment to creating a peaceful, stable, and prosperous society. According to the DoS, the Kabul Compact was “an important factor upon which the United States relied when developing key components of the U.S. South Asia Policy, launched by President Trump on August 21.” Under the Kabul Compact, Afghanistan adopted more than 200 benchmarks tied to global standards for progress in the areas of governance, economic development, peace and reconciliation, and security.
On August 23, President Ghani convened the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Compact Executive Committee, with the Special Chargé d’Affaires, Ambassador Hugo Llorens, and the Resolute Support and USFOR-A Commander, General Nicholson, representing the United States. The committee received updates from working groups committed to achieving the benchmarks and a description of how the working groups would monitor progress towards the benchmarks. DoS officials noted that the compact was not legally binding, although General Nicholson stated that the Afghans would be held accountable for achieving the compact’s benchmarks.

An alliance of northern-based, political parties that formed in opposition to President Ghani’s administration in June remained in place during the reporting period. In August, the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan held its first gathering, at which Atta-Mohammad Noor, Governor of Balkh province and one of the leaders of the Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami political party, criticized President Ghani’s handling of electoral reform and security in the country. Governor Noor also called for the unconditional return of Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum. Vice President Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, has reportedly been in self-imposed exile in Turkey since May 2017 ostensibly for medical reasons but actually, according to press accounts, due to the outstanding charges that he was responsible for the kidnapping and sexual assault of an elderly political rival in November 2016. In July 2017, Vice President Dostum attempted to return to Afghanistan but the Afghan government reportedly denied permission for his plane to land and he diverted to Turkmenistan. Following the episode, the deputy speaker of the Afghan Parliament said that the government’s actions would increase the political tensions to a breaking point.

The next Afghan parliamentary elections—originally scheduled to take place in 2015—are scheduled for July 2018 and the next presidential election is scheduled for April 2019. USAID reported that the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, which administers the country’s elections, completed its countrywide polling center assessment during the reporting period. Local media reported that the International Election Commission was unable to assess polling centers in 33 out of Afghanistan’s 398 districts due to security concerns. USAID reported that preparation for the parliamentary elections will be a challenge. Holding the elections on time is a benchmark in the governance focus area of the Kabul Compact.

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS**

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY**

USAID reported that the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan held a forum on the national election to promote political stakeholder engagement in the electoral process and plans to conduct biometric voter registration for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

**ELECTIONS MANAGEMENT**

During the quarter, USAID provided technical assistance and financial support to electoral management bodies, in preparation for the upcoming July 2018 parliamentary elections. (Through its Afghan Civic Engagement Program, USAID provided support to Afghan government officials at the provincial and municipal levels in order to enhance the government’s response to the needs of its citizens, increase revenue at the municipality level, and to plan, coordinate, and budget effectively.)

USAID also coordinated and supported capacity building within the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, as well the Deputy Ministry of Municipalities.
In 2015, Resolute Support helped Afghanistan establish an Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC) to “eliminate communication gaps between the ministries responsible for administering justice,” including investigators, prosecutors, and the courts. In August, the ACJC investigated, tried, and convicted Major General Mohammad Moeen Faqir, the former commander of Helmand province and Addul Ghafar Dawi, a prominent Afghan businessman. Faqir was convicted for misuse of authority in staff and property, and embezzlement of fuel and funds. Dawi was convicted of using his influence with the Ministry of Transport and Aviation to illegally secure contracts that allowed him to divert $34 million, and connections in the Kabul Bank scandal to avoid repaying $17 million in loans. In July and August 2017, the ACJC tried seven major cases. Since its launch in October 2016, the ACJC has received 323 cases and held 21 primary court trials. While these convictions and trials bring visibility to the ACJC, it is not yet clear if the ACJC will be able to deter large-scale corruption in the Afghan government. Department of State (DoS) officials reported that the Afghan government is attempting to combat lower level corruption by implementing transparency initiatives in ministries that have had problems with corruption in the past, such as the Ministry of Education.

**Peace Process Stalled**

DoS officials reported that there was little movement in the Afghan peace process during the reporting period. The Taliban continued to decline peace talks. The DoS stated that it continued to work to convince the Taliban to come to the negotiating table. DoS officials said that they were working to convene a meeting of the “6+1” group on Afghanistan in order to coordinate international efforts to further the Afghanistan peace process. The group includes the United States, Pakistan, China, Russia, India, Iran, and Afghanistan.

**The Roles of Pakistan and India in the Administration’s Strategy**

The Administration’s South Asia strategy explicitly seeks to “regionalize” and leverage the interests of neighboring countries to help stabilize Afghanistan. The strategy puts a greater emphasis on inducing Pakistan to eliminate safe havens for terrorist groups and the Afghan Taliban, and it calls for India to invest more in development and economic assistance in Afghanistan.

Regionalization, however, risks complicating matters by exacerbating tensions between India and Pakistan, and potentially pushing Pakistan into a stronger relationship with China, India’s most powerful rival. Tensions between India and Pakistan date back to 1947 when the two countries, which had been a single colony under British rule, were partitioned and became independent. Their bitter rivalry is a central factor inhibiting the achievement of U.S. goals in Afghanistan, according to the Congressional Research Service. Pakistan views India as an existential threat and frames security concerns and policies through that lens. Pakistani leaders believe it is in their national interest to use unconventional means, including support for jihadist groups such as the Taliban, as a strategic foil.
Secretary Mattis, during a September visit to New Delhi, said that India has been a strong supporter of the counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. He pointed to India’s investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in development and economic assistance in Afghanistan and highlighted India’s training of ANDSF officers.  

“They’ve been a great asset, and we would see them continuing along the lines they have already chosen, and looking for any other areas that they may believe appropriate to the relationship with Afghanistan,” added Mattis.

Indian officials declined to commit immediately to additional economic aid, and ruled out sending any troops. “There shall not be boots from India on the ground,” said India’s Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman at a press briefing after her meeting with Secretary Mattis on September 26. Even though India said it will not send troops to Afghanistan, the new U.S. strategy and India’s willingness to consider increasing financial support to Afghanistan have caused anxiety in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s national security committee released a statement critical of President Trump’s South Asia strategy, especially the call for more Indian involvement in Afghanistan. “The Committee stressed that India cannot be a net security provider in the South Asia region when it has conflictual relationships with all its neighbors and is pursuing a policy of destabilizing Pakistan from the east and the west,” read the statement.

Official comments from Pakistan emphasized that the country is doing everything it can to combat terrorism and is paying a high price for doing so. “We would like to see

**KEY CHALLENGES**

- **ELECTIONS MANAGEMENT**
  USAID stated that completion of all required activities in preparation for the July 2018 parliamentary elections, including implementing biometric voter registration and obtaining widespread buy-in from political stakeholders, will be a challenge.

- **LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY**
  USAID stated that the existing legal framework for municipalities and provinces, originally developed by the Taliban government, does not provide written guidance for how municipalities should operate. The national government still retains significant authority over the governance of the provinces, impeding the ability of the provinces to effectively conduct projects and activities.

- **INSECURITY**
  USAID further reported that security concerns prevented land travel and limited air travel options constrained civil society program operations.
effective and immediate U.S. military efforts to eliminate sanctuaries harboring terrorists and miscreants on the Afghan soil including those responsible for fomenting terror in Pakistan. The Afghan war cannot be fought in Pakistan,” the statement said.234

The Administration has not yet provided details on the steps the United States plans to take to pressure Pakistan. Additionally, it is not clear how much leverage the United States has over Pakistan today.

Congress placed conditions on aid to Pakistan through the Coalition Support Fund, which is its main source of military assistance.235 Funding for Pakistan reached an all-time high of $3.5 billion in 2011. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 set this funding at $900 million. Of this FY 2016 funding, $300 million had been withheld because the Secretary of Defense did not make the requisite certification that Pakistan had taken sufficient counterterrorism actions against the Haqqani Network and the Taliban. The DoD announced in July 2017 that the United States would withhold an additional $50 million due to Pakistan’s continued failure to take sufficient action against the Haqqani Network.236

The U.S. relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated, according to analysts, and Pakistan has already prepared for weaker U.S. ties.237 Pakistan and China have enjoyed what both countries refer to as an “all-weather” friendship over more than four decades. China is the primary supplier of arms to Pakistan. Moreover, in 2015 China provided Pakistan with $34 billion in new investment and $12 billion in concessional loans for infrastructure projects.238 Pakistani officials and analysts warned in the wake of President Trump’s speech that if the United States takes a harder line on Pakistan, the country could turn to Russia and China for support.239

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Humanitarian Assistance

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees are a particular focus of humanitarian assistance efforts in Afghanistan. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
estimates that there were more than 270,000 IDPs in Afghanistan, down from 511,000 in 2016, and more than 376,000 undocumented and deported persons returning to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, as of September 30. The three provinces reporting the highest number of displaced people in 2017 were Kunduz, Nangarhar, and Badghis.

Both high levels of violence and natural disasters cause internal displacement. USAID reported that intensified attacks on district centers displaced more than 50,000 people in August. While the numbers of civilian casualties (5,243 at mid-year) were about the same as in 2016, a record year for civilian casualties, the percentage of affected women and children increased. The United Nations reported that more than 8,000 civilians died or were injured during the first nine months of 2017. In addition, avalanches, flooding, landslides, and other hazards affected nearly 109,000 Afghans in 33 provinces from January to September, according to the IOM.

Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>$29.8</td>
<td>$19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>$66.0</td>
<td>$46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$96.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>$65.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.

Safety of aid workers and humanitarian access continued to be a concern. Military operations, ongoing hostilities, and violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities, are the primary constraints that inhibit the humanitarian community’s ability to access beneficiaries. From January through September, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported 258 incidents against humanitarian workers, facilities, and activities in Afghanistan. During the same period, OCHA reported 103 incidents against health workers or health facilities, with the highest number of incidents reported in Badghis and Nangarhar provinces. Armed groups in southern Nangarhar provinces restricted humanitarian access in areas under their control. USAID reported that, on average, reported incidents against humanitarian workers and activities during the first eight months of 2017 was well above the previous 3-year average.

Crop production remained lower than 2016 and below the 5-year average, due to delayed rain, the lack of use of certified seed and quality fertilizer, the increased cultivation of poppy, and a pest attack reported in the western part of Afghanistan. The Food Security and Agriculture Cluster, an international coordinating body, conducted assessments in 2017 and found alarming levels of food insecurity among all vulnerable groups needing immediate life-saving support. The assessments revealed clear gaps in response to food needs of prolonged IDPs and severely food insecure people living in the worst affected areas of the country—particularly provinces with protracted caseloads of IDPs, according to USAID. These vulnerable groups are showing emergency thresholds of food insecurity and they include the severest cases of food insecure populations of the country.
USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID Food for Peace (FFP), and the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration are the primary U.S. government offices responsible for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. The majority of OFDA funding in Afghan-supported shelter and settlements (14 percent of OFDA funding), humanitarian coordination and information management (14 percent), logistics support and relief management (29 percent), and health (11 percent). Most of the funding for FFP supported food assistance through local and regional food procurement (61 percent) with 32 percent supporting food vouchers and cash transfers. U.S. in-kind food aid accounted for 7 percent of FFP assistance.249

Table 5.
Status of Cumulative FY 2017 USAID Funds for Afghanistan as of September 30, 2017 (in millions/rounded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commodity Credit Corporation Fund (no year)</td>
<td>$2.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Disaster Assistance (FY 2016)-OCO</td>
<td>$20.0</td>
<td>$12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts and Donations</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Expenses</td>
<td>$0.5</td>
<td>$0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Expenses (OCO)</td>
<td>$93.0</td>
<td>$35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Disaster Assistance (FY 2017)</td>
<td>$20.0</td>
<td>$3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Disaster Assistance (FY 2017)-OCO</td>
<td>$53.8</td>
<td>$0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$189.6</td>
<td>$52.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.

USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID Food for Peace (FFP), and the DoS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration are the primary U.S. government offices responsible for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. The majority of OFDA funding in Afghan-supported shelter and settlements (14 percent of OFDA funding), humanitarian coordination and information management (14 percent), logistics support and relief management (29 percent), and health (11 percent). Most of the funding for FFP supported food assistance through local and regional food procurement (61 percent) with 32 percent supporting food vouchers and cash transfers. U.S. in-kind food aid accounted for 7 percent of FFP assistance.249

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS-DEVELOPMENT**

**EDUCATION**
USAID’s education program supports community-based education and accelerated learning programs for out-of-school children, particularly girls and other marginalized populations. During the quarter, USAID worked with the Ministry of Education and provincial education directorates to develop and implement a national early-grade reading program, print and distribute 135 million textbooks and teacher’s guides, improve ministry management capabilities related to human resources, payroll, and information systems, and support to increase the availability of affordable private schools.250 USAID’s higher education program supported reform and capacity-building at the Ministry of Higher Education to improve the quality of academic undergraduate and graduate education across 11 public higher education institutions and the American University of Afghanistan.251

**HEALTH**
USAID’s Office of Health and Nutrition led workshops with health sector partners on “Demystifying USAID’s Off-budget Support” during the quarter, to help align donor resources and exchange sustainability plans. According to USAID, the purpose of the workshop was to educate key stakeholders on off-project funding mechanisms and to gain information on stakeholder priorities.252

**GENDER**
USAID also reported that its “Promote: Women in Government” project held a civil service job fair, facilitating the interaction among approximately 500 women, recent graduates of a 12-month civil service training internship, and 50 officials from 25 government ministries and independent agencies, in order to identify career opportunities for women in the government sector.253
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

The ARTF is the largest World Bank-administered multi-donor trust fund and the greatest single source of on-budget support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. Since ARTF was established in 2002, USAID has disbursed $3.1 billion or almost 32 percent of the $9.6 billion as of August 2017. USAID’s main objectives in Afghanistan include increasing economic growth; maintaining gains in health, education, and women’s rights; and helping improve the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan Government.254

A USAID OIG audit report, “USAID Planning and Monitoring Gaps Weaken Accountability for Results Through the ARTF,” issued in August 2017, found that USAID lacked adequate guidance and plans for making ARTF contributions. USAID did not have policies and procedures for verifying that ad hoc payments were used for their intended purposes, increasing the risk of funds being disbursed without prudent safeguards.255 USAID OIG also found that USAID had not adequately measured or reported how ARTF assists in achieving development objectives, despite requirements for each mission to collect, maintain, and review performance results.256

Auditors also determined that USAID’s agreement with the World Bank stipulates that any donor may review or evaluate activities financed by ARTF. However, in contrast to ARTF’s other top donors—which regularly assess the overall performance of activities across the ARTF portfolio—USAID has not formally conducted an evaluation of ARTF activities. In addition, USAID Agreement Officer’s Representatives did not meet essential oversight responsibilities, such as monitoring the progress of investment window projects and maintaining adequate files. While the mission has taken some recent actions to improve planning and monitoring, their success or failure hinges on effective implementation, consistent follow through, and sustained support from senior leadership in headquarters.257

**KEY CHALLENGES-DEVELOPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Ministry of Education’s third National Education Strategic Plan may not achieve some of its targets on time because of a delay in finalizing the Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan project, according to USAID. The World Bank will manage the EQRA project, funded by various donors through the ARTF.258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

USAID reported that insecurity, corruption, shortage of resources, and weak management of capacity of the Ministry of Education were major challenges to USAID’s education program.259

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For activities related to supporting women in Afghanistan, USAID reported that the greatest needs for improving women’s participation in society are insecurity, access to education, access to health care, access to justice, enforcement of anti-violence and anti-harassment laws, political will, and women’s empowerment activities that provide the technical training necessary for them to gain job experience, leadership positions in government, and business development services.260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HEALTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF and the World Health Organization stated that the conflict prevented them from providing Polio vaccinations to more than 130,000 children under the age of 5. Armed groups did not grant the vaccination teams permission to work in areas under their control in Kandahar, Kunar, and Nangarhar provinces. In other areas, active conflict made the work of the Polio vaccination teams impossible.261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
USAID’s economic growth initiatives range from firm-level private sector development to trade facilitation and to supporting macroeconomic policy reform priorities of the government. In October, the World Bank predicted that economic growth in Afghanistan is expected to increase from 2.6 percent in 2017 to 3.4 percent in 2018, provided political stability continues and there is no further deterioration in security.

### Key Events This Quarter

#### Stabilization and Infrastructure

USAID's economic growth initiatives range from firm-level private sector development to trade facilitation and to supporting macroeconomic policy reform priorities of the government. In October, the World Bank predicted that economic growth in Afghanistan is expected to increase from 2.6 percent in 2017 to 3.4 percent in 2018, provided political stability continues and there is no further deterioration in security.

#### Key Developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the quarter, USAID organized a cross-industry export promotion event in New Delhi to improve business links between India and Afghanistan. In addition, USAID agriculture programs fostered the expansion of new, low cost technologies that increased the value of high value crops, such as melons and grapes, by getting them to market earlier, in better condition and with less pest losses, according to USAID. USAID also reported that its commercial trade facilitation resulted in $3 million in fruit exports and work in &quot;on-farm&quot; water management resulting in less water used per hectare with increased productivity and more land under cultivation. USAID also hosted the “Passage to Prosperity: India-Afghanistan Trade and Investment Show” event in India, with 200 Afghan and more than 950 Indian businesses finalizing transactions worth nearly $240 million.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGRICULTURE</th>
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<td>USAID stated that the greatest challenges to agricultural development were: access to credit and investment through the entire sector from farmers to exporters; tariff and non-tariff (bribes and extortion) costs; and the lack of a distribution system to allow products to move safely and efficiently from farmers to consumers.</td>
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<th>Extracting Sector</th>
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<td>USAID reported that it is arranging for commercial law experts from the U.S Department of Commerce to assist and advise the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum on policy and regulatory reforms that would remove barriers to private sector investment in the extractives sector so that the ministry would be able to more transparently and expeditiously solicit, review and award mining projects. Additionally, USAID reported that it would engage the United States Geological Survey to conduct fresh geological surveys and to analyze, for the first time, massive amounts data produced by past geological surveys to identify and quantify Afghan mineral deposits.</td>
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#### Key Challenges

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<th>MINISTERIAL CAPACITY</th>
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<td>The lack of government capacity and cooperation impeded past USAID efforts to develop the extractives sector. USAID reported that acting ministers at the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum were not given authority to make important legal and contractual decisions and that the government did not show the will to exploit the country’s massive mineral resources. Insecurity, lack of enabling infrastructure, warlordism, powerful local mafias, and legal barriers to mining investments also impeded development of the extractives sector.</td>
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The Special Inspection General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) conducts extensive oversight and auditing of stabilization and infrastructure programs in Afghanistan and issues a quarterly report as well as individual audit reports. Their latest unclassified reports are available on their website: https://www.sigar.mil/
SUPPORT TO MISSION

Support to Mission focuses on administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable the United States to conduct military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population. Efforts range from funding to logistical support to U.S. installations to contract management.²⁷⁰

FY 2018 Begins with a Continuing Resolution

Congress has yet not enacted an FY 2018 budget, and a continuing resolution funds most Federal agencies and programs at their FY 2017 enacted levels minus a reduction of 0.6791 percent until December 8, 2017. OCO funds are exempt from this reduction. However, the DoD cannot use continuing resolution funding to start new programs, enter into multi-year contracts, or increase production rates, which affects the execution of OFS.²⁷¹

DoD Status of Funds

The President’s Budget for FY 2018 requests a total of $639.1 billion for the DoD, of which $64.6 billion is designated for OCOs, including $45.9 billion for OFS and related missions.

Figure 4.

| Total DoD War-Related Appropriations and Obligations Since September 11, 2001 |
| $1.69 trillion appropriated, $1.45 trillion obligated |

Within the budget for OFS, $3.7 billion is for U.S. military pay and benefits, $5.0 billion for DoD procurement of major end items, such as vehicles and aircraft, and $36.7 billion for “Operation and Maintenance,” a budget category that covers a wide range of day-to-day operational costs, as well as civilian and contractor salaries.  

**Afghan Security Force Fund (ASFF)**

The Operation and Maintenance account for OFS includes the ASFF, the primary funding stream through which the United States supports the ANDSF. The ANDSF receives a majority of its financial support from this fund, which Congress provides through two-year appropriations. The total amount estimated necessary to sustain the ANDSF during FY 2018 is $6.2 billion, of which the President’s Budget calls for the United States to contribute $4.9 billion via the ASFF. This reflects an upward trend over the past 2 years, due primarily to the modernization of the AAF (see pages 46-47). Previous budget requests included $4.3 billion for the ASFF in FY 2017 and $3.8 billion in FY 2016. In FY 2018, the Afghan government is expected to contribute $500 million to fund the ANDSF, and other international partners will provide $789 million.

From the start of the current Afghan fiscal year (December 2016) through August 21, 2017, the United States expended $400 million in ASFF funding on ANA salaries and other personnel costs. This included $145 million in salaries and $221 million in incentive pay. The total estimated ANA salary and incentive costs to the United States is $610 million for this Afghan fiscal year and $1.8 billion over the next 3 years.

From the start of FY 2017 through April 30 (the most recent date for which figures were available), the DoD obligated $41.8 billion in support of OFS. Since 2001, the DoD has spent a total of $679.8 billion on operations in Afghanistan, including $95.3 billion for OFS, which began on January 1, 2015. In total, since 2001, Congress appropriated $1.69 trillion and the DoD obligated $1.45 trillion for war-related expenses in Afghanistan, Iraq, and related operations, as well as for homeland security missions under Operation Noble Eagle.

**DoS and USAID Status of Funds**

The President’s FY 2018 budget request for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies includes a total of $40.3 billion for the DoS and USAID, a reduction of $17.2 billion (-30 percent) compared to the funding enacted for FY 2017. For FY 2018, the

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**Table 6. DoS and USAID OCO Funding for Afghanistan and Pakistan (in millions)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>$1,637.6</td>
<td>$1,853.9</td>
<td>$1,791.0</td>
<td>$2,129.8</td>
<td>$1,705.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>$586.0</td>
<td>$821.6</td>
<td>$590.6</td>
<td>$578.2</td>
<td>$417.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$2,223.6</td>
<td>$2,675.5</td>
<td>$2,381.6</td>
<td>$2,708.0</td>
<td>$2,123.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

budget request includes $12 billion in OCO funding, a reduction of $8.8 billion (-42 percent) compared to the funding enacted for FY 2017. Of the $12 billion requested, $5.6 billion would support efforts to defeat ISIS and other terrorist organizations. These OCO funds would also support stabilization in liberated areas and support counter-ISIS operations.

From FY 2014 to 2017, the DoS and USAID expended more than $7.4 billion in Afghanistan and nearly $2.6 billion in Pakistan. The FY 2018 budget request includes $1.7 billion in OCO funds for Afghanistan and $417.4 million for Pakistan, as shown in Table 6.

OCO funds for Afghanistan and Pakistan have been allocated to support Diplomatic and Consular Programs, Worldwide Security Protection, Economic Support Fund, International Narcotics Control, and Law Enforcement programs, and, in Afghanistan only, Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance.

Between FY 2001 and FY 2017, total funding for the DoS and USAID grew by $37.1 billion (168%). Figure 5 provides the funding levels for enduring funds and OCO funds in the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs for FY 2001-2017. The funding level for FY 2018 is the Administration’s request, which is pending before the Congress.

Figure 5.

DoS/USAID Enduring and OCO Funding from FY 2001-FY 2018

**DoD Report on the Cost of War to the Individual Taxpayer**

This quarter, as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017, the DoD issued a report on the estimated cost to each U.S. taxpayer of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. This report compiled the DoD’s estimated OCO obligations from FY 2001 through 2018 and divided those amounts by the number of taxpayers, as indicated by Internal Revenue Service filing statistics, to arrive at annual and cumulative totals.278

The report estimated that the cumulative cost of war in Afghanistan to an individual who paid federal income taxes every year since 2001 was $3,785. The total costs of OCO to someone who has paid taxes since 2001 was $7,740. The report estimated that in FY 2018, the cost to the average taxpayer will be $219 for OFS and $281 for all OCO. The cost per taxpayer of the war in Afghanistan peaked in FY 2011 at $490.279

**Update on Department-wide Audit of the Department of Defense**

On September 27, 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis formally announced that the DoD was ready to undergo a full financial statements audit in FY 2018.280 However, senior DoD officials said the DoD is unlikely to pass its first Department-wide audit with a clean opinion. The Deputy Secretary of Defense commented that, “what we do next with auditor findings and recommendations is the most important part of the process.”281

**KEY DEVELOPMENTS**

- **INSPECTORS GENERAL PUBLISH PLAN FOR COORDINATED OVERSIGHT**

  On October 1, 2017, the Lead IG published the FY 2018 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for OCO, which included the FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan. This is the third such plan submitted to Congress describing the Lead IG and partner agencies’ whole-of-government oversight of U.S. Government activities, including those related to the security; governance and civil society; humanitarian assistance and development; stabilization and infrastructure; and support to mission. This comprehensive approach was designed to help ensure effective oversight across agency jurisdictional lines and to assist Congress and agency leadership in making informed program, policy, and funding decisions.282

- **CONTINUING RESOLUTION COMPLICATES OFS FUNDING**

  FY 2018 is the ninth consecutive fiscal year that has begun with the DoD operating under a continuing resolution. According to a DoD spokesperson, these short-term, stopgap funding measures prevent the Federal Government from shutting down but also inhibit budget predictability and impose restrictions on new programs and contracts. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Dana W. White stated that continuing resolutions waste millions of dollars in administrative costs and “hurt the readiness of our forces and their equipment.” She added, “The longer the CR lasts, the more damage [it does].”283

- **TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REMAINS A CONCERN FOR U.S. CONTRACTORS**

  The U.S. Government’s ability to adhere to its own policies to detect and combat trafficking in persons in OFS is limited by the labor practices of countries in the region and by constraints on DoD oversight of U.S. contractors and companies operating overseas. Contractors supporting U.S. military, diplomatic, or humanitarian operations in Afghanistan may rely on foreign workers from impoverished or developing countries who are vulnerable to labor abuses and trafficking. The DoS lists Afghanistan as a Tier 2 country for trafficking in persons, which means that the Afghan government does not fully comply with minimal standards for the prosecution, protection, and prevention of trafficking but is making efforts to come into compliance.284
COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN U.S. SUPPORT CONTRACTS OVERSEAS

Trafficking in persons, or human trafficking, refers to the subjection of men, women, and children to exploitative conditions that can be tantamount to slavery. As commonly used, the term includes compelled labor and sex trafficking, under conditions also referred to as modern slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage.285 Combating trafficking in persons (CTIP) is a significant challenge worldwide. CTIP is a significant challenge worldwide. The International Labour Organization estimated that in 2012, roughly 21 million people were subjected to various forms of trafficking, and that in 2014 forced labor and related trafficking generated approximately $150 billion in illegal profits.286

The U.S. Government plays a leading role in international efforts to combat trafficking in persons.287 Key efforts include foreign country reporting and blacklisting, foreign aid restrictions, the awarding of trade preferences, financial sanctions, and preventing U.S. Government participation in trafficking overseas.288 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, including amendments to strengthen CTIP contracting provisions, remains the cornerstone of U.S. policy to combat human trafficking.289

When the U.S. Government conducts military, diplomatic, or humanitarian operations overseas, however, it often relies upon contracts for services such as construction, security, and maintenance. Despite a zero tolerance policy, the Government’s ability to detect and fully combat trafficking in persons in OCO environments has often been limited.290

Labor practices of countries within South Asia, the Middle East, and Persian Gulf regions, the theater of operation for OFS, present particular trafficking risks to laborers seeking employment there, including employment on U.S. contracts. These workers often come from impoverished or developing countries, where job opportunities and wages are poor. The methods used to recruit these workers often make them vulnerable to a variety of labor abuses in their home country, in transit, or in the country of employment.291 Labor practices regarding wages, hours, housing, access to identity documents, and availability of return travel can be indications that human trafficking is occurring.292 The Lead IG and its partner agencies seek to assess compliance with CTIP requirements and identify opportunities for improvement in overseas contracting practices. For example, the DoS, USAID, and DoD OIGs have issued several CTIP-related reports in recent years. The DoD OIG is currently evaluating DoD efforts to combat trafficking at DoD facilities in Kuwait, which supports counter-ISIS efforts in Iraq and Syria. The Air Force Audit Agency has several planned reviews of contract administration in a contingency environment, which include CTIP provisions.293
Migrations and Department of State Tier Rankings for Trafficking Victims Protection Act Compliance in Selected Countries

The DoS publishes its annual “Trafficking in Persons Report,” which assesses levels of human trafficking in each country. The report assigns tier rankings, with a narrative justification, based on an evaluation of each country’s compliance with minimal standards for the prosecution, protection, and prevention of trafficking, and the country’s efforts to ensure compliance.\(^{294}\)

Table 7 shows a distribution of migrants and rankings for Gulf countries, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Many Gulf nations are source countries, transit countries, or destination countries for migrant labor. In several cases, migrants comprise a majority of the host nation’s total population. Where host countries with large migrant populations do not fully comply with U.S. standards, foreign workers face a greater risk of trafficking.\(^{295}\)

Table 7.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>7,826,981</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>1,600,955</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>2,028,053</td>
<td>2 Watch List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>729,357</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>9,060,433</td>
<td>2 Watch List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>1,112,032</td>
<td>2 Watch List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2 Watch List</td>
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* Data does not include the number of foreign workers in each country but rather reflect the number of overall migrants, including children, to each country.

** Tier 1 countries fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Tier 2 countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance. Tier 2 Watch List countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance, but have significant or increasing numbers of victims and insufficient evidence of compliance improvement. Tier 3 refers to countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.


(continued on next page)
In its 2017 annual Trafficking in Persons Report, the DoS ranked the country of Afghanistan as Tier 2, meaning the country does not fully comply with minimal standards for the prosecution, protection, and prevention of trafficking, but is making significant efforts to do so. The country was upgraded from its 2016 ranking of Tier 2 Watch List, based on its demonstrated increased compliance efforts.

A 2014 Government Accountability Office report found that some foreign workers employed on large U.S. contracts in Afghanistan paid recruitment fees to subcontractors or recruitment agencies. In one particular contract, the prime contractor used several subcontractors to supply labor, including one that hired workers through more than 10 recruitment agencies in Dubai. In an 18-month period, more than 1,900 subcontractor employees reported to the prime contractor that they had paid fees for their jobs, including to recruitment agencies used by the subcontractor. The last month of data showed that 82 workers reported paying an average of approximately $3,000 to secure employment—equivalent to approximately five-month’s salary.

Despite CTIP compliance improvements in Afghanistan, significant challenges remain. Sex trafficking of minors is one of the most severe forms of trafficking in persons. In Afghanistan, a practice known as bacha bazi, men exploit boys for social and sexual entertainment. Although outlawed by the Afghan government, the practice continues. Afghan official complicity remains a serious problem, particularly in the sexual exploitation and recruitment of children by Afghan security forces. Forced labor and child labor are prevalent in the brickmaking, carpet, coal, and poppy industries. Debt bondage of children is still practiced to repay often insurmountable family debts, which can be inherited and passed on to future generations. The victims of trafficking are often charged with moral crimes, and rehabilitation and reintegration services are lacking. Afghan men, women, and children often pay intermediaries to find employment outside of Afghanistan. In seeking such employment, Afghan women and girls are subjected to sex trafficking and domestic servitude in Pakistan, Iran, and India. Men and boys are subjected to forced labor and debt bondage primarily in Iran, Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, and the Gulf states.

Improving Government Visibility and Authority Over U.S. Contracts Overseas
The U.S. Government faces limits in its ability to oversee the full range of contractor and subcontractor activities in U.S contracts overseas, and is making efforts to improve the visibility and oversight of contractor and subcontractor labor activities. Federal agencies normally enter into contracts directly with “prime” contractors to perform services and deliver products. In turn, a prime contractor may enter into subcontracts to furnish supplies and services needed by the prime contractor to fulfill the contract. Under Federal acquisition regulations and contracting laws, the Federal agency holds the prime contractor responsible for the performance of its subcontractors. The agency thus has limited visibility over the subcontract. This is particularly true for overseas contracting, where host-nation laws and labor practices apply, and where large numbers of foreign workers may be employed.
Laws Strengthen CTIP but Implementing Provisions Could be Clarified

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2013, which amended the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, sought to strengthen CTIP contracting provisions by requiring greater monitoring of subcontractor recruiting and employment practices in U.S contracts overseas. New anti-trafficking provisions prohibit misleading recruitment practices, charging employees recruitment fees, failing to provide return transportation upon contract completion, providing or arranging inadequate housing, and failing to provide written employment contracts in a language the employee understands. Additionally, contractors are now required to certify that they have implemented compliance plans pursuant to Federal acquisition regulation requirements, and must monitor, detect, and terminate contracts if subcontractors engage in prohibited practices. Contractors and subcontractors are also required to post their compliance plans at the worksite, immediately disclose any alleged trafficking violations, and provide government agencies with reasonable access of facilities.

Strengthened provisions in U.S. law and Federal acquisition requirements also prohibit charging workers recruitment fees, but agency implementing policies are less clear. Federal acquisition regulations prohibit contractors, their employees, and their agents from charging employees recruitment fees, but they do not define what constitutes a fee. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 prohibits the charging of “unreasonable” placement or recruiting fees, described as being equal to or greater than the employee’s monthly salary. Within the DoD, U.S. Central Command acquisition instructions for Iraq and Afghanistan prohibit the use of firms that charge illegal recruiting fees, but these fees are undefined. USAID procurement guidance repeats the prohibition on recruitment fees, but does not define them. A DoS procurement information bulletin that provides guidance on monitoring contracts for CTIP compliance prohibits charging employees recruitment fees, and defines acceptable recruitment costs, which the contractor may, with approval, include in the contract cost.

The U.S. Government continues efforts to reduce trafficking risks in its contracts overseas. Strengthening anti-trafficking law and CTIP contracting provisions has improved oversight of contractors, prohibited certain recruitment and employment practices, and required greater disclosure by contractors. The DoS and international labor organizations continue to highlight the significant scope and human costs of trafficking, to encourage increased preventative practices, and to raise public awareness of exploitation that offends universal concepts of human dignity.
COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

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Outreach 66
Completed Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports 67
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COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As required by Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG is responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting on oversight of overseas contingency operations. This section of the report provides information on Lead IG staffing to perform these oversight functions; outreach efforts by Lead IG agencies; completed Lead IG oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations during the 3-month period, July 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017; Lead IG investigative activity; and the OIGs’ hotline activities.

USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan that do not involve OFS-related programs or activities, and coordinates these efforts as appropriate with other audit and law enforcement organizations. USAID OIG’s oversight activity is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs.

LEAD IG AGENCY STAFFING

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees as well as contractors to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and perform other functions, such as strategic planning and reporting. Oversight teams from the Lead IG agencies regularly travel to Afghanistan and other locations in the region on a temporary basis to conduct the fieldwork for their projects.

OUTREACH

Outreach and coordination continue to be important aspects of Lead IG’s mission. During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies held high-level meetings with oversight partners to coordinate oversight efforts and participated in activities to share the Lead IG model with new audiences. Senior Lead IG officials, representing the DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG, regularly meet with policy officials, collect information, and conduct research related to activities in Afghanistan.

In September, the DoD Deputy IG for Overseas Contingency Operations was interviewed on the television program Government Matters, regarding how the Lead IG was established, opportunities for collaborating with multiple offices of inspectors general, and oversight planning and reporting responsibilities.
COMPLETED AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION REPORTS

Lead IG and partner agencies released nine reports relating to OFS during the period July 1, 2017, to September 30, 2017. These projects examined internal control capability management; the Global Discovery Program and DoD counternarcotics agreements; ammunition oversight; audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs programs in Pakistan; and contract management and oversight projects.

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it conducts efforts in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. As a result, USAID OIG conducts audits in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with Lead IG and other audit organizations. USAID OIG released one report this quarter related to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

Final Reports

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

*Evaluation of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability*

DODIG-2017-105, August 4, 2017

The DoD OIG evaluated U.S. and coalition efforts to enable the Afghan MoD to develop its oversight and internal control capability. This evaluation examined whether CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD have established and implemented effective controls over the contract management process.

This report is classified.

*The Global Discovery Program and DoD Counternarcotics Agreements*

DODIG-2017-119, September 11, 2017

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the DoD effectively managed the Global Discovery Program and counternarcotics agreements between the DoD and the Department of Justice (DoJ). The DoD OIG conducted this audit in response to congressional requests following a March 2016 DoJ OIG audit on Drug Enforcement Administration aviation operations in Afghanistan. The DoJ OIG audit included information on the Global Discovery Program for an ATR 42-500 aircraft, which was intended for use in counternarcotics missions in Afghanistan.

The DoD OIG found that the DoD did not effectively manage the Global Discovery Program for the ATR 42-500 aircraft. Specifically, the Command did not track the program funding, clearly define requirements for the aircraft, or effectively oversee the program. Additionally, the Command decided not to cancel the program, despite knowing that the...
Drug Enforcement Administration was significantly reducing personnel in Afghanistan. As a result, the Command wasted at least $64.8 million by procuring an aircraft that was never used in Afghanistan. The DoD OIG also found that the Command did not effectively manage 13 counternarcotics agreements valued at $41.5 million. Specifically, the Command did not track agreements, provide effective oversight, or follow standard operating procedures on performance metrics.

The DoD OIG recommended that the DoD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD-P) review the circumstances that led to ineffective management of the Global Discovery Program and, if appropriate, initiate action to hold personnel accountable. Additionally, the DoD OIG recommended that the OUSD-P review whether the Command has the proper personnel and controls to effectively oversee the counternarcotics program. Finally, the DoD OIG recommended that the Command develop processes for counternarcotics agreements, including tracking of signed agreements, tracking of funding, and ensuring compliance with existing standard operating procedures on performance metrics.

These recommendations are considered resolved and will be closed when the actions are fully implemented.

**CSTC-A Oversight of Ammunition Provided to Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces**

DODIG-2017-122, September 22, 2017

The DoD OIG reviewed whether the CSTC-A provided effective oversight of ammunition provided to the ANDSF. Specifically, the DoD OIG focused on ammunition that was procured by the DoD and provided to the ANDSF.

The DoD OIG determined that CSTC-A did not provide effective oversight of ammunition that was procured by the DoD and provided to the ANDSF. CSTC-A officials stated that they could not perform physical inspections beyond the corps or zone level to validate ministry-provided ammunition reports due to understaffing and security limitations. Therefore, CSTC-A limited its oversight to evaluating monthly consumption and inventory reports the ministries agreed to provide in commitment letters. This occurred because CSTC-A focused on its advisory mission through mentoring Afghan officials but did not develop an effective strategy to oversee the ministries' compliance with commitment letter requirements. In addition, CSTC-A only enforced one penalty, even though CSTC-A determined the ministries did not meet commitment letter reporting requirements on 36 of 55 assessments. This occurred because CSTC-A officials believed enforcing penalties outlined in the commitment letter would have a negative effect on ANDSF operational readiness. The DoD OIG also concluded that without consistent, timely, and accurate reporting from the ministries, CSTC-A cannot account for all ammunition consumed by the ANDSF. In addition, since CSTC-A was unable to verify the ministries’ consumption data, CSTC-A did not have assurance that the $702 million spent to procure ammunition in FYs 2015 and 2016 supported actual requirements and was used for its intended purposes.
The DoD OIG recommended that the Commanding General, CSTC-A, develop and document a long-term strategy to improve the Afghan ministries’ ammunition reporting. The strategy should include clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the personnel involved with providing oversight of ammunition, criteria to evaluate the ministries’ compliance with ammunition-commitment letter requirements, and procedures to review Ministry Inspectors General inspection results when assessing the accuracy of ammunition reports. In addition, commitment letters should include consequences for the ministries’ noncompliance that would not affect operational readiness and that CSTC-A would be willing to consistently enforce. At the time of this report, management agreed the report was accurate but did not address whether they agreed or disagreed with the recommendations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Invoice Review Process for the Afghanistan Life Support Services Contract
AUD-MERO-17-47, July 5, 2017

In Afghanistan, the DoS is responsible for providing life support services—such as food services and fire protection—to U.S. Government Chief of Mission personnel. The services are provided through the Afghanistan Life Support Services contract. The contract is a multiple award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contract with a ceiling value of $750 million and a period of performance of up to 5 years (1-base year and 4 option years). The contract is executed through a series of task orders for specific services. It is funded and managed by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether 1) the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs was following Federal requirements, Department guidance, and its own standard operating procedures when reviewing Afghanistan Life Support Services contract invoices; 2) contract oversight by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs was effective; and 3) the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs had been assigned sufficient numbers of qualified staff members to oversee the contract.

The DoS OIG made two recommendations to the Bureau: 1) improve the clarity of quality assurance reports that are used to evaluate contractor performance; and 2) develop invoice-review training for incoming contracting officer’s representatives for this contract to prepare newly assigned staff members for this important oversight role.

The Bureau concurred with both recommendations. The DoS OIG considers the first recommendation resolved pending further action and the second resolved.

Compliance Follow-up Audit of Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Programs in Pakistan
AUD-MERO-17-46, July 26, 2017

The DoS OIG conducted this compliance follow-up audit to determine the extent to which the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs implemented the recommendations from the DoS OIG’s October 2014 audit report and incorporated those
recommendations into other key programs in Pakistan, including counternarcotics and the rule of law programs.

The DoS OIG found that the Bureau took actions or provided clarifying information to close seven of the eight recommendations from the 2014 report. Three of the eight recommendations involved program management, and one of the three remains open. Specifically, OIG confirmed that the Bureau has implemented a monitoring and evaluation framework as recommended in the 2014 report, but has not completed actions to conduct a joint evaluation of the program with the government of Pakistan. Accordingly, this recommendation remains resolved pending further action. With respect to the five financial management recommendations contained in the 2014 report, OIG confirmed that the Bureau has revised its Financial Management Handbook to include new requirements for requesting sub-obligation terminal date extensions, monitoring and reviewing unliquidated obligations and sub-obligations, and reconciling funding advances. The Bureau also reprogrammed funds of more than $86 million that the DoS OIG determined could be used for other purposes. As a result, OIG considers all five recommendations related to financial management closed.

During this compliance follow-up audit, the DoS OIG found that the Bureau did not have formal standard operating procedures for defining specific partner equipment needs and assessing partner requests, nor had it completed updated project descriptions, goals, objectives, and performance measures for its Law Enforcement and Border Security program. The DoS OIG therefore made new recommendations to address these issues. Additionally, the Bureau has incorporated some, but not all, of the recommended actions from the 2014 report into its counternarcotics and rule of law programs in Pakistan. Further, the DoS OIG reported in 2014, that although the Bureau de-obligated and reprogrammed the $86.2 million, it still maintained significant levels of unliquidated obligations in its Pakistan program. As a result, $11.3 million in funds covering the three programs was canceled and was not used at the end of FY 2016, and as of the time of this audit up to $55.2 million in funds, including $8.7 million in funds not sub-obligated, were at risk of being canceled at the end of FY 2017 if no action was taken. According to the Bureau, $481,000 in funds were canceled.

Based on confirmation of implementing actions and new information provided by the Bureau, the DoS OIG closed seven of the eight recommendations from its October 2014 audit report. The single open recommendation pertaining to conducting annual evaluations of the Law Enforcement Reform program remained resolved, pending further action.

The DoS OIG made seven new recommendations. Of those, the DoS OIG recommended that the Bureau develop and implement formal, written standard operating policies and program management goals and objectives for defining specific partner equipment needs and assessing partner requests the Law Enforcement and Border Security program.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs concurred with all seven recommendations offered. OIG considered six recommendations resolved pending further action and one recommendation closed.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

GAO-17-667R, August 10, 2017

In response to U.S. House of Representatives Report 114-537, the GAO conducted this review of U.S.-funded equipment for the ANDSF to outline all major weapon systems and equipment procured for the ANDSF. The report described equipment that the DoD and DoS have funded for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP)—collectively known as the ANDSF. To conduct this review, GAO reviewed security agreements, key legislation, and DoD and DoS information related to U.S. Government efforts to equip the ANDSF, including funding data, manuals addressing the procurement process, and other DoD documents. Additionally, GAO analyzed DoD and DoS data on key equipment, which is defined as U.S.-funded weapons and equipment that the DoD considers critical to ANDSF missions. Furthermore, GAO selected key equipment and categorized it using information from DoD and industry documents and interviews with knowledgeable officials in the OUSD-P, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DoD implementing agencies, and the DoS. Key equipment described in the report was authorized for procurement or transfer through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for the ANA, ANP, and Afghan Local Police, and does not include items such as small vehicles and trailers, medical supplies, spare parts, small arms ammunition, or training manuals. Additionally, GAO reported on overall funding and disbursement data related to key equipment based on the fiscal years when the DoD authorized the equipment for procurement or transfer.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: DOD Spent $457.7 Million on Intelligence Capacity-Building Programs, but Impact Cannot be Fully Addressed Because of a Lack of Performance Metrics
SIGAR-17-57-AR, July 27, 2017

SIGAR conducted the audit to determine the extent to which 1) Imperatis Corporation and New Century Consulting, Limited, successfully performed the tasks required by the contracts to develop the ANDSF intelligence capability; 2) the Army Contracting Command awarded the legacy and Afghanistan Source Operations Management contracts in accordance with Federal and DoD regulations; and 3) the Army Research Laboratory and Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office properly monitored contract performance and the Defense Contract Management Agency-monitored contract costs. In the course of the audit, SIGAR reviewed one task order and four contracts, valued at $536.1 million.

SIGAR found that the legacy contracts did not have performance metrics to track progress toward the goal of improving the intelligence capabilities of intelligence officers from the Afghan MoD and MoI. This occurred because the DoD awarded the Legacy contracts as research and development contracts, which have fewer oversight requirements than standard
services contracts. With respect to the Afghanistan Source Operations Management contract, SIGAR found that although the DoD had included some performance metrics, they were not clear enough to assess the overall success of the contract. Finally, the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office did not independently and objectively monitor contract performance; instead, it relied on contractor-provided data.

SIGAR made two recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: 1) review Army Contracting Command, Army Research Laboratory, and Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office award and oversight of the legacy and Afghanistan Source Operations Management contracts to identify remedies to provide better oversight controls and performance measurements for future research and development contracts; and 2) review ongoing ANDSF intelligence training and mentoring contracts and incorporate into the contracts, requirements to enable the measurement and verification of contractor performance and contract outcomes.

The OUSD-P concurred with both recommendations.

Afghan Ministry of Interior Headquarters Project: Phase 2 Experienced Lengthy Delays, Increased Costs, and Construction Deficiencies that Need to be Addressed
SIGAR-17-65-IP, September 11, 2017

SIGAR conducted this inspection of the construction of the MoI Headquarters to assess whether 1) construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the headquarters building was being used and maintained.

SIGAR found that the second phase of construction experienced lengthy delays and cost increases because of the need for three contracts to complete the project. The first contract was terminated because of missed critical deadlines and deficient work. The second contract resulted in the demolition of work performed by the first contractor, and the subsequent construction of the headquarters building. The third contract was the result of a change in construction standards directed by the CSTC-A, which were more closely aligned with Western construction standards.

SIGAR made three recommendations to the CSTC-A Commander and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General and Chief of Engineers: 1) take immediate steps to replace the noncertified fire doors that were installed in the headquarters, communications buildings, and gatehouse that do not meet the fire-rating standards, as required in the contract; 2) obtain a refund from Yuksel Insaat for deficient workmanship or direct the contractor to correct the issues identified in the report involving noncompliance with the contract and poor workmanship; and 3) clarify the project oversight team’s responsibility for ensuring that all three phases of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers inspection process are performed and documented so that all definable features of work are completed in accordance with the contract.
The OUSD-P, CSTC-A, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided written comments to a draft of this report. CSTC-A and OUSD-P stated that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers would address the recommendations. In its comments, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers stated that it is conducting a further review of the first recommendation and would report back to SIGAR within 90 days (by December 2017). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers partially concurred with the second recommendation and concurred with the third recommendation.

Reconstruction of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan
SIGAR-17-62-LL, September 21, 2017

This is the second in a series of lessons learned reports focused on evaluating Afghan reconstruction. SIGAR conducted this project to examine the U.S. efforts to create, train, advice, assist, and equip the ANDSF. The report analyzed in detail how the U.S. Government prepared to develop the Afghan security forces, the changing resource requirements of the Afghan security forces, and systemic challenges within and between the U.S. Government and coalition partners. Since 2002, the United States has devoted more than $70 billion to create and sustain the Afghan security forces.

SIGAR generated 11 findings: 1) the U.S. Government was ill-prepared to conduct Security Sector Assistance programs because of bureaucratic inertia and poor resourcing; 2) initial U.S. plans favored combat operations over training the Afghan security forces; 3) early partnerships with local militias undermined the creation of the Afghan Army and Police; 4) critical capabilities, such as intelligence and aviation, were not part of the original U.S., Afghan, and NATO plans; 5) there was a lack of an interagency and multilateral agreed-upon Security Sector Assistance framework; 6) providing advanced weapons and management systems to a largely illiterate and uneducated Afghan force created long-term dependencies; 7) the lag in building the Afghan ministerial governing capacity delayed planning and oversight of the ANDSF; 8) police development was not prioritized; the constant turnover of U.S. and NATO trainers negatively impacted the training mission’s institutionary memory; 9) the ANDSF’s success was measured by tangible indicators like staffing and equipment, and not by intangible indicators, such as corruption and the will to fight; 10) the ANDSF’s readiness was determined by politically constrained timelines and did not take into account the resiliency of the Afghan insurgency; and 11) as security worsened, efforts to build ANDSF were secondary to counterinsurgency combat operations.

SIGAR also highlighted 11 lessons: 1) the U.S. Government is not optimized to conduct Security Sector Assistance missions; 2) successful operations cannot employ a monolithic approach—every country is different; 3) the programs should stay away from the business of empowering specific political groups; 4) western materiel creates high dependencies; 5) Security Sector Assistance assessments lack an analysis of intangible factors, such as leadership and corruption; 6) law enforcement professionals are best suited to develop
police forces; 7) the U.S. Government should fulfill staffing shortfalls in light of national caveats that relate to trainers; 8) Security Sector Assistance is a whole-of-government mission; 9) specialized units, such as the Afghan Special Forces, take away the best officers from the conventional forces; 10) Security Sector Assistance programs should prioritize rule of law capabilities and correction programs; and 11) Security Sector Assistance training is not career enhancing.

SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Congress and executive branch shape and probe U.S. Security Sector Assistance programs continuously throughout reconstruction efforts to establish a more institutionalized and integrative approach to Security Sector Assistance. Additionally, SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Government create a commission to review institutional roles and responsibilities supporting Security Sector Assistance, analyze each agency and military service’s capabilities and deploy those capabilities surgically, and create a lead agency for all future police-development activities.

This lessons-learned report concluded in September, and although the U.S. and coalition forces remain committed to not repeating mistakes of the past; there has not been any formal response to these individual recommendations.

**U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

USAID OIG completed one non-OFS-related performance audit on USAID-funded activities in Afghanistan from July 1, 2017, to September 30, 2017. The USAID OIG also completed the following non-OFS related financial audits during the quarter:

- ACA Financial Audit on Development Alternatives, Inc.
- ACA Financial Audit on AECOM International Development, Inc.
- ACA Financial Audit on Tetra Tech ARD

**USAID Planning and Monitoring Gaps Weaken Accountability for Results Through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund**

8-306-17-004-P, August 16, 2017

USAID OIG conducted this audit to determine whether USAID/Afghanistan adopted effective and consistent practices to provide reasonable assurance that activities implemented through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contribute to achieving USAID’s objectives in Afghanistan. Specifically, the OIG assessed USAID’s practices related to: 1) policy, criteria, and plans to guide the use of fund contributions; 2) data collection and reporting on the fund’s performance; and 3) oversight of Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund-funded activities.

USAID OIG found that USAID lacked adequate guidance and plans for making Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contributions. USAID did not have policies and procedures for verifying that payments were used for their intended purposes, increasing the risk of funds being disbursed without prudent safeguards.
Additionally, USAID OIG found that USAID has not adequately measured or reported on how the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund assists in achieving development objectives, despite requirements for each mission to collect, maintain, and review performance results. The mission did not report results from 91 percent of fund contributions in its annual reports for 2013-2015. USAID/Afghanistan has not defined, measured, or linked fund performance results to its development objectives, limiting the mission’s ability to assess progress in meeting its objectives, identifying and examining performance trends, and establishing reasonable expectations for succeeding years.

USAID OIG also determined that, under its agreement with the World Bank, USAID may review or evaluate activities financed by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. However, in contrast to the fund’s other top donors—which regularly assess the overall performance of activities across the portfolio—USAID has not formally conducted an evaluation of Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund activities. In addition, agreement officer’s representatives did not meet essential oversight responsibilities, such as monitoring the progress of projects and maintaining adequate files.

The report contained 11 recommendations to improve USAID’s use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Management decisions were made on all 11 recommendations and final action was taken on five. In two cases, USAID OIG disagreed with the management decisions taken by USAID.

### DoD OIG’s Compendium of Unimplemented Recommendations

This quarter, the DoD OIG issued its first *Compendium of Open Office of Inspector General Recommendations* to the DoD. The Compendium summarized all recommendations issued by the DoD OIG to DoD components that remained open as of March 31, 2017. The Compendium contained a total of 1,298 open recommendations that were issued to 46 DoD components in 288 DoD OIG audit and evaluation reports. DoD management had previously agreed to take corrective action on 1,251 of those recommendations. For the remaining 47 open recommendations, the DoD OIG and DoD components had not agreed on an acceptable corrective action that met the intent of the DoD OIG recommendation. Of the 1,298 open recommendations, 58 had associated potential monetary benefits, which, if implemented, could have potentially saved the DoD $33.6 billion. Collectively, five components (Army, Air Force, Navy; Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) had 733 open recommendations, which represent 56 percent of all open recommendations.

(continued on next page)
The Compendium noted that timely implementation of agreed-upon corrective actions is critical for DoD components to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD programs and operations. Furthermore, implementing agreed-upon corrective actions in a timely manner helps DoD components achieve integrity and accountability goals, reduce costs, manage risks, realize monetary benefits, and improve management processes.

The DoD and its senior managers reacted positively to the Compendium. Because of the Compendium, the DoD OIG received numerous responses discussing actions that DoD organizations are taking, or will take, to address open recommendations. The DoD OIG is evaluating these responses to determine whether the recommendations can be closed or whether additional action is needed to fully address the recommendations.

Eighty-seven, or six percent of the total unimplemented recommendations highlighted in the Compendium, stemmed from previously submitted reports on the two current OCOs: OIR and OFS. The 87 open recommendations were issued to 13 DoD components through 24 reports.

Table 8.
Unimplemented Recommendations by DoD Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Component</th>
<th>Number of Unimplemented Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Air Force</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUSD Acquisitions, Technology &amp; Logistics</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows the four DoD components with the most open recommendations. These four components collectively have 69 open recommendations, which represent 79 percent of all open recommendations. Because of the scope of OCO projects, the majority of recommendations from OCO reports are typically directed to U.S. CENTCOM and DoD service components.

Timely implementation of agreed-upon corrective actions is critical to effect positive change on the Department’s programs and operations. This is especially true in the fast-paced environment of OCOs. Of the 87 open recommendations, DoD management agreed to take corrective action on all but four. These four recommendations are considered unresolved until DoD management agrees to implement the recommendation or an alternative corrective action, or another outcome is decided during a formal resolution process.
INVESTIGATIONS

The Lead IG agencies use forward-deployed criminal investigators to the region to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS, the criminal investigation component of the DoD OIG), opened a new office in Kabul, Afghanistan, just outside the U.S. Embassy within the NATO Resolute Support compound, in late August 2017. The two Special Agents assigned to the office will initiate new criminal investigations and coordinate current fraud investigations with law enforcement partners, as well as support continental United States investigations that require operational assistance in theater. The DoS OIG maintains a regional office in Germany from which investigators travel to Afghanistan.

USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan that do not involve OFS-related programs or activities, and coordinates these efforts as appropriate with other audit and law enforcement organizations. USAID OIG’s oversight activity is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs. USAID OIG has a team of two Foreign Service special agents and two Foreign Service National investigators in Afghanistan who are supported by an investigative analyst in Washington.

Investigative Activity

During the quarter, Lead IG investigations resulted in two guilty pleas from an employee of an American contractor in Afghanistan receiving kickbacks and a U.S. Government employee based in Afghanistan soliciting bribes. In addition, the Lead IG investigative components and the military investigative organizations initiated 13 OFS-related investigations, involving allegations of procurement or program fraud, theft, and trafficking in persons. They closed seven investigations during the period.

As of September 30, 2017, there were 31 open investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations. The OFS-related investigations involved allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. Government officials; theft and diversion of Government funds or equipment; trafficking in persons; and other offenses. In addition, the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group conducted 38 fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan for 449 participants.

A consolidated depiction of the OFS-related activities of these investigative components during this quarter is shown in the dashboard on the following page.

**FORMER EMPLOYEE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR IN AFGHANISTAN PLEADS GUILTY TO ACCEPTING OVER $250,000 IN KICKBACKS FROM SUBCONTRACTOR**

The DCIS, along with SIGAR and the Army Criminal Investigation Command Major Procurement Fraud Unit, investigated Nebraska McAlpine, a former project manager for an American defense contractor (the prime contractor) in Kabul, Afghanistan. McAlpine admitted that he and an Afghan executive agreed that, in exchange for
ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP
OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL
As of September 30, 2017

OPEN INVESTIGATIONS
31

Q4 FY 2017 RESULTS

- Arrests: 2
- Criminal Charges: 14
- Criminal Convictions: 3
- Savings/Recoveries: 2
- Suspensions/Debarments: 2/2
- Job Terminations: —
- Personnel Actions: —
- Other Administrative: 2

Q4 FY 2017 BRIEFINGS

- No. of Briefings: 38
- No. of Attendees: 449

*Some investigations are being worked jointly by more than one agency. Therefore, the total number of open cases by FCWG Agency may not equal the total number of open investigations. Note: Cumulative since Jan. 1, 2015*
OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

McAlpine would ensure that the prime contractor awarded lucrative subcontracts to the executive’s companies. McAlpine repeatedly told his supervisors that these companies should be awarded “sole source” subcontracts—allowing them to supply services to the prime without having to competitively bid. This arrangement, McAlpine admitted, caused the prime contractor to pay more than $1.6 million to the subcontractor to assist with maintaining the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior ultra-high-frequency radio communications system. McAlpine, who accepted more than $250,000 in kickbacks, pleaded guilty in Federal court on July 18, 2017. He is due to be sentenced by the end of the year.

FORMER EMPLOYEE OF U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN AFGHANISTAN PLEADS GUILTY TO SOLICITING APPROXIMATELY $320,000 IN BRIBES FROM CONTRACTORS

DCIS, along with the FBI, SIGAR, and the Army Criminal Investigation Command-Major Procurement Fraud Unit, investigated Mark Miller, a former U.S. Army Corps of Engineers employee based in Afghanistan, for seeking and receiving bribe payments.

Miller worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from 2005 until 2015, including in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2012. While in Afghanistan, Miller was the site manager and a contracting officer representative for several construction projects. On July 26, 2017, Miller pleaded guilty to soliciting approximately $320,000 in bribes from Afghan contractors in return for his assistance with U.S. Government contracts. Miller admitted that on December 10, 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a contract worth approximately $2.9 million to an Afghan construction company for the construction of a road from eastern Afghanistan to the Pakistani border. Miller oversaw the Afghan company’s work on this road project, verified that the company performed the work called for by the contract, and authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers progress payments to the company. This contract later increased in value to approximately $8 million. Miller admitted that in the course of overseeing the contract with the Afghan company, he solicited approximately $280,000 in bribes from the owners of the company in return for assisting the company in connection with the road project, including making sure the contract was not terminated. Furthermore, after the contract was no longer active, he solicited an additional $40,000 in bribes in return for the possibility of future contract work and other benefits. Miller is scheduled to be sentenced by the end of the year.

FRAUD AND CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP SPONSORS TRAINING INTO FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FRAUD

Security Administration, and actual case studies from the working group. The training was attended by more than 50 investigative personnel from agencies such as: DCIS, FBI, SIGAR, DoS OIG, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Army Criminal Investigation Command Division.

**USAID OIG Investigative Activity in Afghanistan**

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it conducts stabilization and aid activities in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan related to these programs. Information regarding USAID OIG activities is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs.

During the quarter, USAID OIG received 12 new allegations concerning its operations in Afghanistan, totaling 63 allegations since the beginning of the fiscal year. USAID OIG closed 17 cases during the quarter for a total count of 35 cases closed over the course of the fiscal year.

As of September 30, 2017, USAID OIG had 26 open investigations involving Afghanistan-related programs and operations. In addition, USAID OIG conducted 11 fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan for 43 participants, for a total of 36 briefings to 420 attendees this fiscal year.

**USAID TERMINATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT IN AFGHANISTAN DUE TO CORRUPTION RESULTS IN SAVINGS OF OVER $134 MILLION**

USAID OIG and SIGAR received allegations of corruption affecting an ongoing procurement for construction of five power substations located in southern Afghanistan. Initially, allegations centered on a $2 million bribe paid by the apparent winner of the contract, China Energy Engineering Group, to an individual facilitating the award process. Senior Afghan government officials, including the President, initially learned of the allegations and initiated an investigation unbeknownst to USAID-Afghanistan, USAID OIG, or SIGAR. Once USAID OIG learned of the allegations, USAID OIG and SIGAR coordinated with host government officials to obtain further details. Afghan government officials provided further information about the $2 million bribe allegation, as well as new allegations involving the Chief Executive Officer of the Afghan government-owned utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat.

The chief executive officer had allegedly sold an apartment located in Kabul to a company representative involved in the procurement. USAID OIG and SIGAR interviewed the chief executive officer who confessed to the sale of the apartment and receipt of $80,000 from the company representative. The Afghan government also informed USAID OIG and SIGAR that it received allegations implicating the Afghan Minister of Economy and his son in the solicitation of bribes from the China Energy Engineering Group and other contractors seeking USAID-funded contracts.
In July 2017, USAID OIG referred the evidence collected thus far to the USAID mission director and he terminated the award to China Energy Engineering Group, valued at $134,982,989. Following the loss of project funding, the Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat chief executive officer resigned and the Afghan government immediately removed the Minister of Economy from his position within the government. USAID OIG and SIGAR continue to investigate the various allegations and will pursue further remedies and prosecutions if warranted.

**USAID RECOVERS $414,686 FROM VOLUNTEERS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH ALLIANCE, FOLLOWING INDICTMENT OF THEIR FORMER PROCUREMENT MANAGER**

In July 2017, USAID/Afghanistan issued a bill of collection to the Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance following the indictment of its former procurement manager. USAID OIG and SIGAR worked with the Afghanistan Attorney General’s Office to collect evidence demonstrating that the procurement manager steered numerous contracts to his own company while working on a USAID-funded project. Based on evidence provided, the Attorney General’s Office prosecutor indicted the individual and the trial date is pending.

Subsequently, USAID/Afghanistan issued a bill of collection to the Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance for $414,686, the total value of the contracts awarded to the individual’s company, Afghan Focus Logistics Service Company. The contracts were awarded as part of two USAID-funded projects, Capacity Building and Change Management Program and the follow-on project, Capacity Building and Change Management Program II.

**CONTRACT STEERING IN AFGHANISTAN LEADS TO USAID DEBARMENT**

USAID OIG initiated a joint investigation with SIGAR into allegations that an Afghan national fraudulently utilized the company name and credentials of his former employer to obtain contracts from a USAID-funded project. The individual, a former Oriental Consultants employee, posed as the operations manager of the company and utilized a false name to obtain several delivery orders from Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) for translation services under a multiple-award blanket-purchase agreement. DAI awarded the blanket-purchase agreement as part of the USAID-funded Stability in Key Areas-North Project. Simultaneously, the individual represented Beta Consultancy Services, which also received several delivery orders under the same blanket-purchase agreement. USAID OIG reviewed DAI’s procurement files and discovered Oriental Consultants and Beta Consultancy Services proposals contained identical verbiage. Interviews of DAI staff indicated that a former DAI employee likely conspired with the individual and improperly awarded the blanket-purchase agreement to both companies.

USAID OIG failed to locate the former employee and the owner of Oriental Consultants refused to cooperate with the Afghanistan Attorney General’s Office. As a result, the Attorney General’s Office refused to accept the case for prosecution. In January 2017, USAID OIG referred the information to USAID/Afghanistan and in September 2017,
it issued a bill of collection for $2,605.79, the total value of the 10 delivery orders DAI awarded to both companies. At the same time, USAID OIG referred the individual to USAID’s Suspension & Debarment Official, who debarred the individual for three years in September 2017.

**HOTLINE ACTIVITY**

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The OIGs’ hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review.

DoD OIG hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer these complaints to the appropriate entity in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG employs an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts received among the Lead IG agencies and others, as appropriate. During the reporting period, the investigator received and coordinated numerous complaints, which subsequently resulted in the opening of 44 cases. The cases were referred within the DoD OIG, other Lead IG agencies, and the Service IG entities. Some complaints include numerous allegations that result in multiple cases.

As noted in Figure 6, the majority of the complaints received during this quarter related to personal misconduct and other personnel matters, criminal allegations, and procurement or contract administration irregularities.

![Figure 6. Hotline Activity](image)
ON GOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

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Ongoing Oversight Activities  88
Planned Projects  98
ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

This section of the report discusses the ongoing Lead IG strategic planning process, as well as ongoing and planned audit, inspection, and evaluation work. The ongoing and planned oversight projects related to OFS activities, as of September 30, 2017, are listed in separate tables.

USAID OIG had ongoing efforts in Afghanistan that do not involve OFS-related programs or activities. These ongoing and planned oversight projects review USAID efforts in Afghanistan related to agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. These projects are listed in separate tables.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

FY 2018 Oversight Plan

The effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects. The FY 2018 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, effective October 1, 2017, was included in the FY 2018 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations. The plan organizes OFS-related oversight projects into strategic oversight areas.

SECURITY

The Security strategic oversight area focuses on determining the degree to which OFS is accomplishing its missions of counterterrorism, and training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security forces in activities that may include the following:

- Establishing transitional public order
- Countering illegal combatants and criminal elements
- Protecting key personnel and facilities
- Establishing and strengthening relationships with host-nation military and police
- Enforcing cessation of hostilities and promoting peace processes
- Disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants
- Building or enhancing the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan security institutions and sustainability of such institutions
GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The Governance and Civil Society strategic oversight area focuses on the ability of the Afghan government, at all levels, to represent and serve its citizens. Activities may include the following:

- Building or enhancing Afghan governance capacity, including the capacity to sustainably resource its activities and services
- Promoting inclusive and effective democracy, and civil participation and empowerment
- Promoting reconciliation, peaceful resolution of conflict, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces, and other rule of law efforts
- Fostering sustainable and appropriate reconstruction activities
- Fostering fair distribution of resources and provision of essential services
- Countering and reducing corruption, inequality, and extremism

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The Humanitarian Assistance and Development strategic oversight area focuses on ensuring that the population’s basic needs are met, transitioning to peaceful coexistence in communities, and providing long-term development supporting health, education, and the empowerment of women. Activities may include the following:

- Providing food, water, medical care, emergency relief, and shelter to people affected by crisis
- Building resilience by supporting community-based mechanisms that incorporate disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness, and supporting coherent and coordinated national disaster preparedness and humanitarian response systems
- Supporting healthcare, education, and the empowerment of women
- Assisting and protecting returning Afghan refugees
- Strengthening Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb returning refugees
- Helping refugee-assisting communities in Pakistan and Iran to preserve asylum space for Afghan refugees
STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The Stabilization and Infrastructure strategic oversight area focuses on efforts to provide the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to pursue sustainable livelihoods in peaceful communities with effective economic systems and essential public services. Activities may include the following:

- Repairing or building infrastructure and buildings such as schools, hospitals, and government facilities
- Establishing or reestablishing public utilities that provide services such as water and electricity
- Removing explosive remnants of war
- Promoting an economic system that fosters basic commerce, free markets, and employment generation through sound legal frameworks, outside investment, and the reduction of corruption

SUPPORT TO MISSION

The Support to Mission strategic oversight area focuses on administrative, logistical, and management efforts that enable the United States to conduct military operations, empower host-nation governance, and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population. Activities may include the following:

- Security of U.S. personnel and property on U.S. installations
- Occupational health and safety of personnel on U.S. installations
- Logistical support to U.S. installations
- Grant and contract management
- Program administration

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of September 30, 2017, the Lead IG agencies and its partner agencies have 41 ongoing projects directly related to OFS. Figure 7 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area, and the discussion that follows highlights some of the ongoing projects by these strategic areas. Table 9 lists the project title and objective for each of these projects.

There are no ongoing projects related to humanitarian assistance and development this quarter. USAID OIG non-OFS-related projects are listed on page 96.

SECURITY

The DoD OIG is conducting performance audits of U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy readiness and U.S. direct funding provided to Afghanistan. DoD OIG is also conducting evaluations of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance supporting counterterrorism in Afghanistan and of U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist the AAF.
The **DoS OIG** is conducting a performance audit of the antiterrorism assistance program in countries under the DoS Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs.

The **GAO** is conducting performance audits related to institutionalizing advise-and-assist lessons learned and ANDSF equipment and capability.

**SIGAR** is conducting several performance audits, inspections, and special projects associated with OFS-related budgets, spending, and procurement; the AAF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-provided aircraft; inspections of various military installation and Afghan support structures and crossing points; and internal controls and program management.

**GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

The **DoS OIG** is conducting an assessment of allegations of child sexual abuse by members of the ANDSF.

The **DoS OIG** is conducting a performance audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aviation Program.

**SIGAR** is conducting an evaluation of fuel accountability in Afghanistan.

**STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

The **DoS OIG** is conducting performance audits of several construction projects in Afghanistan.

**SUPPORT TO MISSION**

The **DoD OIG** is conducting several performance audits related to equipment management, military facilities, and logistics oversight.

The **Army Audit Agency** is conducting performance audits related to obligations and expenditures for OFS and of downrange civilian overtime pay and entitlements.

The **Naval Audit Service** is conducting performance audits related to Navy and Marine Corps financial data reported for OFS.

The **DoS OIG** is conducting performance audits of explosive-detection dogs in Afghanistan and of invoice-review processes and procedures for Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs OCO contracts.

The **GAO** is conducting performance audits of contingency funds needed for base needs and equipment management.

**SIGAR** is conducting performance audits of various contracts and procurement processes and procedures.
Table 9.
Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of September 30, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Downrange Civilian Overtime Pay and Entitlements</td>
<td>To audit the Army’s downrange civilian overtime pay and entitlements program to determine whether overtime was effectively managed and downrange entitlements (including danger and post differential pay) were accurately paid to civilians deployed in support of OFS and OIR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Army’s Reporting of Obligations and Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
<td>To audit the Army’s reporting of obligations and expenditures for OFS to determine the accuracy of the information reported in the OFS Cost of War report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
<td>To answer a number of specific questions, including the DoD implementation of Title 10 Leahy Laws regarding human rights violations, raised by several members of Congress and congressional staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supporting Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To evaluate the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance supporting counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan to determine if U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process is supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>To evaluate the U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Afghan Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Army Accountability of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-Furnished Property in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To audit the Army to determine whether the Army provided effective oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-furnished property in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Invoice Review and Payment</td>
<td>To audit DoD’s oversight of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program’s invoice review and payment processes to determine whether the DoD adequately monitored contractor performance and conducted sufficient invoice reviews for services provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Facilities Evaluation Follow-up Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. military-occupied facilities supporting OFS comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Audit of U.S. Direct Funding Provided to Afghanistan</td>
<td>To audit the U.S. direct funding provided to Afghanistan to determine whether the DoD has provided effective oversight of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The auditors will also follow up on the status of the implementation of recommendations from five prior DoD OIG audit reports in this series.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Embassy Kabul Construction and Commissioning</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations’ Embassy Kabul construction and commissioning followed DoS policies and guidance governing the affirmation of substantial completion and final acceptance of construction projects at U.S. Embassy Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Construction of the New Embassy Compound–Islamabad</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoS is effectively administering the construction contracts for the new embassy compound in Islamabad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Follow-up Review of Explosives-Detection Dogs in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is managing and overseeing the Explosives-Detection Dog Program in accordance with DoS guidance and selected contractors are complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Invoice Review Process for Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts–Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether invoice review policies and procedures, training, staffing, invoice review practices, and accountability measures at the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs are sufficient to 1) support overseas contingency operations; and 2) ensure invoice payments are reviewed in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aviation Program</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is administering its aviation program, including key internal controls such as inventory management, aviation asset usage, aircraft maintenance and asset disposal, in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Countries Under the DoS Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism have 1) developed specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented goals and objectives; 2) developed and implemented an evaluation process to assess host country performance; and 3) established letters of agreement with host countries for sustaining the Antiterrorism Assistance Programs. The audit will also assess the Bureaus’ contract monitoring and oversight and invoice review processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Equipment and Capability</strong></td>
<td>To audit the performance of the ANDSF’s equipment and capability and summarize how such weapon systems and equipment support ANDSF capability given the evolving security situation and overall strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposal of Excess Equipment in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To audit the performance of the disposal of excess equipment in Afghanistan activities to determine 1) the volume/value of new/otherwise useable equipment being disposed in Afghanistan; 2) the procedures the DoD has to ensure that items designated for disposal are not in demand elsewhere in Afghanistan; and 3) to what extent are potential future orders/requirements in Afghanistan considered in decisions to dispose of new/useable items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contingency Funds for Base Needs</strong></td>
<td>To audit the performance of the contingency funds for base needs processes to determine 1) to what extent the DoD tracks its obligation of overseas contingency operations funds used for base requirements; and 2) how overseas contingency operations funds authorized for base requirements in Fiscal Year 2016 were obligated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalizing Advise-and-Assist Lessons Learned</strong></td>
<td>To determine to what extent the DoD has 1) modified its approach for planning for, training, and utilizing U.S. military personnel to advise and assist partner forces based on lessons learned from advise-and-assist efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; 2) incorporated lessons learned from challenges the DoD has faced in providing and utilizing U.S. military personnel to carry out their assigned advise-and-assist missions in support of geographic combatant commands; 3) incorporated lessons learned from past challenges it has experienced in providing key enablers for the advise-and-assist missions, including air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; or other enabling capabilities; and 4) assessed and institutionalized specific lessons from OIR, OFS, and other past and present advise-and-assist missions in various geographic combatant commands to identify and implement necessary changes to doctrine, training, and force structure to support ongoing and future advise-and-assist missions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reliability of Marine Corps Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</strong></td>
<td>To audit the reliability of Marine Corps' financial data reported for OFS and determine the accuracy of the Marine Corps’ obligations and disbursements supporting OFS as reported in the Cost of War report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of the Navy Overseas Contingency Operations</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Department of the Navy overseas contingency operations to determine if the Department’s Navy’s obligations and disbursements supporting Overseas Contingency Operations are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and that internal controls were in place and functioning as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</strong></td>
<td>To audit the DoD’s oversight of infrastructure projects transferred to the Afghan government to determine the 1) extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior’s Complex Support Structures</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the Ministry of Interior’s Complex support structures to determine whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II project to determine whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III project to determine whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV to determine whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison</strong></td>
<td>To inspect the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command to determine whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support Unit, and Army Support Command</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment of Afghan Border Crossing Points</strong></td>
<td>To audit Afghan Border Crossing Points’ non-intrusive inspection equipment to 1) determine the quantity, types, and costs of non-intrusive inspection equipment purchased with Department funding for installation and use at Afghanistan’s border crossing points; and 2) assess the extent to which such equipment is currently being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense</strong></td>
<td>To audit the DoD’s efforts to advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to determine the 1) extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD’s advisory efforts, including funding; the number of advisors and contractors; their assigned locations; and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>and Interior</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its MD-530 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To audit the performance of the AAF’s use and maintenance of its MD-530 fleet to 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530s currently in its fleet, including DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the AAF can operate and maintain the MD-530, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Effect of Absent-Without-Leave Afghan Military Trainees on Afghan Reconstruction Programs</strong></td>
<td>To audit the effect of absent-without-leave Afghan military trainees on Afghan reconstruction programs to 1) determine how many Afghan military trainees have gone absent-without-leave while training in the United States; the trainees rank, specialty, command, the program(s) supported by the training effort; and the impact on the program(s) by the loss of these students (financial, operational, morale, etc.); 2) identify the disposition of these trainees and obtain justifications for DoS to provide immigration status; and 3) determine the extent to which this issue has impacted the U.S. Government’s reconstruction effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lessons Learned Review of the G222 (C-27A) Aircraft Program</strong></td>
<td>To perform a lessons learned review of the G222 (C-27A) Aircraft Program to 1) determine the total amount spent to procure, operate, sustain, and dispose of the G222s; 2) review future plans (disposal or otherwise) for the G222s; and 3) evaluate what processes and controls have been put in place to prevent similar challenges from affecting future Afghan Air Force purchases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processes and Procedures for Blood Type Collection of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces Personnel</strong></td>
<td>To review the processes and procedures for blood type collection of ANDSF personnel to 1) identify the entity responsible for the collection of ANDSF soldiers’ blood types, and determine how these blood types are captured and then recorded in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System and the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System; 2) determine who is responsible for paying for the collection of blood samples for ANDSF soldiers and how payment for services is collected; 3) identify CSTC-A’s role, if any, in collecting and recording blood types for ANDSF soldiers; and 4) assess the processes used to ensure that recorded blood types for ANDSF soldiers are accurate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</strong></td>
<td>To audit the implementation and effectiveness of on-budget assistance to 1) determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s</strong></td>
<td>To review lessons learned for the Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW)’s use and maintenance of its PC-12s and assess 1) the extent to which the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its A-29 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Afghan Air Force use and maintenance of its A-29 fleet 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the AAF can operate and maintain the A-29 currently in its fleet, including DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</strong></td>
<td>To audit Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units to 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotics police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary Evaluation of Fuel Accountability Issues in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To audit the performance of the 1) prior work regarding efforts to procure, distribute, and account for fuel in Afghanistan, as well as related investigative work; 2) current challenges associated with overseeing and accounting for fuel; and 3) ongoing initiatives to ensure appropriate accountability of fuel procurement and distribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD Procurement of Humvees for the ANDSF</strong></td>
<td>To examine the processes used to develop the requirement for providing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces with Humvees in 2017, and compare and evaluate the selected course(s) of action to available alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AISS–ATEMP Contract Follow-Up–Vehicle Spare Part Cost</strong></td>
<td>To review the ATEMP contract to 1) determine Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ requirements for the purchase of spare parts for vehicle maintenance under the National Army’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract; 2) describe weaknesses in ANHAM FZCO’s purchasing practices, and identify the steps taken to minimize the impact of spare part cost increases; 3) determine the costs of spare parts purchased by Afghanistan Integrated Support Services over the course of the contract and compare costs of those spare parts to spare parts purchased through the Foreign Military Sales system; and 4) assess additional costs paid by the CSTC-A for Afghanistan Integrated Support Services’ maintenance practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alaska Tents</strong></td>
<td>To review the Alaska Tents program to determine 1) the requirements generation and procurement processes related to the purchase of Alaska Structures for the ANDSF; and 2) the cost of purchasing these structures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ongoing USAID Office of Inspector General Projects in Afghanistan

As of September 30, 2017, USAID OIG had 12 ongoing non-OFS-related projects in Afghanistan. Table 10 provides the project title and objective for each of these ongoing projects.

Table 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on ICF Macro, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To audit Demographic and Health Surveys, AID-OAA-C-13-00095, for the period from September 9, 2013, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on New York University</strong></td>
<td>To audit Assessment of Learning and Outcomes and Social Effects in Community-Based Education, AID-306-G-13-00004, for the period from January 1, 2014, to August 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Partnership for Supply Chain Management</strong></td>
<td>To audit Partnership for Supply Chain Management, AID-GPO-I-03-05-00032, for the period from June 1, 2009, to September 26, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on International Relief and Development</strong></td>
<td>To audit Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support, 306-C-00-11-00512, for the period from April 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Chemonics International, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To audit 1) Regional Agriculture Development Program West AID-306-C-14-00007, for the period from August 10, 2014, to December 31, 2015; 2) Promote-Component 3 (Women in Government Program), AID-306-TO-15-00044, for the period from April 21, 2015, to December 31, 2015; 3) Famine Early Warning System Network III, AID-OAA-TO-12-00003, for the period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015; 4) Regional Agriculture Development Program, 306-C-13-00018, for the period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015; and 5) Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project, AID-306-TO-13-00009, for the period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Financial Audit on Roots of Peace</td>
<td>To audit Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development, AID-306-C-12-00006, for the period from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership</td>
<td>To audit USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership to determine if USAID/Afghanistan has 1) adequately verified the achievement of completed indicators under the New Development Partnership for any payments made to date; and 2) adopted internal policies and procedures to adequately verify the achievement of New Development Partnership indicators contained in the July 25, 2015, New Development Partnership results framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up Audit of USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan</td>
<td>To audit USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Strategy for Afghanistan to determine the extent that the USAID has used its multi-tiered monitoring strategy to manage programs and serve as the basis for informed decision-making.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLANNED PROJECTS

Planned OFS Projects
As of September 30, 2017, the Lead IG agencies and partners have 20 planned oversight projects related to OFS. The discussion that follows highlights some of these planned projects by oversight area. Some projects related to more than one SOA. Table 11 provides the project title and objective for each of the planned projects.

SECURITY
The DoD OIG will conduct performance audits of several OFS-related contracts, a summary report of the recommendations from OCO Intel evaluations, an evaluation of DoD biometric-enabled Intel operations for OFS, and an assessment of U.S. and coalition efforts to enable the Afghan Ministry of Interior to develop oversight and internal control capability.

SIGAR will conduct performance audits of the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles as well as various OFS-related contracts. SIGAR is also conducting inspections of numerous military installations and facilities.

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
DoS OIG will conduct an inspection of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s programs and operations.

The Air Force Audit Agency will conduct performance audits of Air Expeditionary Wing contract administration and equipment allowances.

SIGAR will conduct lessons learned assessments of governance in Afghanistan.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
SIGAR will conduct a performance audit of DoD’s gender-advising programs for the Ministries of Defense and Interior and inspections of various facilities in Afghanistan.

STABILIZATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SIGAR will conduct a special project regarding commander’s emergency response program bridges in Baglan, and performance audits of various OFS-related contracts.
SUPPORT TO MISSION

The **DoD OIG** will conduct performance audits of theater linguist support for OFS, DoD military payroll for combat zone entitlements, and several OFS-related contracts.

The **DoS OIG** will conduct performance audits of Embassy Kabul physical security features, the aviation working capital fund, and DoS armored vehicle procurement processes.

Table 11.

**Planned Oversight Projects, as of September 30, 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Administration in a Contingency Environment, 380th Air Expeditionary Wing</td>
<td>To determine whether Wing personnel properly managed contract activities in the area of responsibility. Specifically, evaluate whether personnel 1) properly planned, competed, and awarded contingency contracts, including trafficking-in-persons clauses; 2) provided oversight and quality assurance over contractor performance, including trafficking in persons; and 3) appropriately responded to potential trafficking in persons violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Contingency-Allowance Equipment, 455th Air Expeditionary Wing</td>
<td>To determine whether Wing personnel properly managed emergency contingency-allowance equipment. The auditors will discuss and examine topics related to accountability, maintenance, and authorizations during the planning phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Contingency-Allowance Equipment, 380th Air Expeditionary Wing</td>
<td>To determine whether Wing personnel properly managed emergency contingency-allowance equipment. The auditors will discuss and examine topics related to accountability, maintenance, and authorizations during this planning phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Report of Recommendations from OCO Intel Evaluations</td>
<td>To determine if recommendations from LIG OCO intelligence evaluations affecting OIR and OFS have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of DoD Biometric-Enabled Intel Operations for OFS</td>
<td>To determine whether biometric-enabled intelligence effectively supports the OFS Commander’s requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Military Facility Follow-Up Evaluation-Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine if U.S. military occupied facilities comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical, fire protection, and fuel systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Interior to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</td>
<td>To determine whether the U.S. Government and coalition train, advise, and assist efforts will enable the Afghan Ministry of Interior and subordinate organizations to develop a transparent and accountable oversight capability that helps the Ministry of Interior run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Theater Linguist Support for OIR and OFS</td>
<td>To evaluate policies and procedures affecting the recruitment, hiring, and employment of military and contract linguists on the conduct of the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and OFS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title

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<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Cybersecurity</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD has implemented adequate cybersecurity controls to protect the Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle command and control system from unauthorized access and use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Department of Defense Military Payroll for Combat Zone Entitlements</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the DoD Military Components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service accurately calculated hostile fire pay/imminent danger pay, family separation allowance, and combat zone tax exclusion for combat zone deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of DoD’s Requirements Management and Contract Oversight of the Afghan Mi-17 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether DoD is getting the best value from the contract used to acquire and sustain the Mi-17 aircraft, which is in excess of $1 billion. Since the contract is in a bridge year and the DoD is expected to acquire additional helicopters for the Afghan Air Force in the next two years, the audit will also identify contract requirements that can be improved to ensure the DoD will have the best return on investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Follow-up Audit on the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s Planning and Execution of Civil-Military Operations</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Commander, U.S. Africa Command; and Commander, CJTF-HOA implemented the agreed-upon corrective actions for recommendations 1, 2, and 3 of DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2014-005, “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. Host-Tenant Agreements for Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the U.S. Navy has effectively developed host-tenant agreements and cost-allocation methodologies for reimbursement of support services provided at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the National Maintenance Strategy Contract in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether DoD effectively developed the requirements for the National Maintenance Strategy contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy Readiness</strong></td>
<td>To determine if the U.S. Air Force C-5 squadrons have adequate mission-capable aircraft and training to support U.S. Transportation Command readiness mission requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Audit of Embassy Kabul Physical Security Features</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations and other DoS stakeholders managed the construction of physical security features at U.S. Embassy Kabul’s newly constructed facilities to ensure that they met industry standards and contract requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of the Aviation Working Capital Fund</em></td>
<td>To determine whether the fees collected by the Aviation Working Capital Fund cost center were sufficient to cover all costs required to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Audit of DoS Armored Vehicle Procurement Process</em></td>
<td>To audit DoS contractors to determine if armoring services they are providing to the Department comply with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Assistance to Improve Governance in Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>To 1) identify DoD, DoS, and USAID programs focused on improving governance in Afghanistan; 2) assess how these efforts contributed to improvements in government institutions in Afghanistan; and 3) determine lessons for future governance efforts in conflict-affected countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An AAF maintainer works on the engine of an Mi-17 helicopter. (U.S. Air Force photo)
Planned USAID Office of Inspector General Projects in Afghanistan

USAID OIG is planning to start 16 non-OFS related projects in Afghanistan by the end of FY 2018. Table 12 provides the project title and objective for each of these planned projects.

Table 12.
Planned USAID Office of Inspector General Oversight Projects in Afghanistan, as of September 30, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</strong></td>
<td>To audit 1) the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity; and 2) Installation of Turbine Generator Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam Hydropower Plant Projects, SOAG-306-05-000, from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Purdue University</strong></td>
<td>To audit the Strengthening Afghanistan Agricultural Faculties, Grant 306-A-00-11-00516, for the period from July 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Financial Audit of KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation</td>
<td>To audit Challenge Tuberculosis, Cooperative Agreement AID-OAA-A-14-00029, for the period from January 1, 2015, to September 28, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Financial Audit of Tetra Tech ARD</td>
<td>To audit the 1) Initiative to Strengthen Local Administration, Contract AID-306-C-15-00005, for the period October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016; and 2) Women’s Leadership Development, Contract AID-306-TO-14-00031, for the period October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Financial Audit of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</td>
<td>To audit the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity for the period of January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Financial Audit of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</td>
<td>To audit the Kajaki Dam Hydropower Plant Project, Implementation Letter #56 for the period of January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2015.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

An Afghan Air Force maintainer checks the tail rotor during a helicopter inspection at Kandahar Airfield. (U.S. Air Force photo)
APPENDIX A
Methodology for Preparing This Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report is issued pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The DoD IG is the designated Lead IG for OFS. The DoS IG is the Associate Lead IG for the operation.

The USAID IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for overseas contingency operations, but USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities. However, the USAID OIG does conduct audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. USAID OIG coordinates those activities as appropriate, with other oversight entities.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This unclassified report covers the period from July 1, 2017, through September 30, 2017.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG gathers data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. Data and information used in this report are attributed to their source in endnotes to the text or notes to the tables and figures. Except for references to Lead IG and oversight partner agency audits or investigations in the text or in sidebars, the Lead IG has not independently verified and assessed all the data included in this report.

In addition to the unclassified quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies produce an appendix containing classified information related to OFS that contains information related to ANDSF force strength, ministry progress towards milestones, equipment readiness, and mission results of the Afghan Special Forces. The classified Appendix is provided separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

Data Call
Each quarter, the Lead IG directs a series of questions, or data calls, to federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. Lead IG coordinates with SIGAR, which also issues a data call to support its quarterly report, in developing the OFS data call to avoid duplication and minimize the burden on reporting agencies while maximizing the collective yield of the data calls. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these data calls to develop sections of the OFS quarterly report, as well as to inform decisions concerning future audits and evaluations. Various DoD commands and offices and DoS offices participated in the data call for OFS this quarter.

Open-Source Research
This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Information publicly released by U.S. agencies included in the data call
- Congressional testimonies
- Press conferences, especially DoD and DoS Briefings
- Congressional Research Service
- UN (and relevant branches)
- Reports issued by non-governmental organizations
- Media reports

Materials collected through open source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency data calls. However, the Lead IG agencies have not tested, verified, or independently assessed the assertions made by these agencies.

Report Production

The Lead IG is responsible for assembling and producing this report. It coordinates with the DoS OIG and the USAID OIG, which drafted sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies. Every Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

The Lead IG agencies provide the offices who have responded to the data call with opportunities to verify and clarify the content of the report. During the first review, the Lead IG asks agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG incorporates agency comments and sends the report back to the agencies for a final review. Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency.

APPENDIX B

Classified Appendix to this Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Quarterly Report to Congress

This appendix on counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan is classified and has been delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.
APPENDIX C

Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EFs) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces. These EFs are:

**Essential Function 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**
EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective Afghanistan National Defense Security Force (ANDSF) in the future. EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

**Essential Function 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight**
Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan administers measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

**Essential Function 3: Civilian Governance of the Afghan Security Institutions and Adherence to Rule of Law**
An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF’s ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

**Essential Function 4: Force Generation**
EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation train, advise, and assist mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive fivefold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

**Essential Function 5: Sustain the Force**
EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on point of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.
Essential Function 6: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns
EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council, the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

Essential Function 7: Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes
EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant MoD for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence, and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability
EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

Resolute Support Gender Office
In addition to the eight EFs, the Resolute Support Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA and ANP levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.

# ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
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<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<td>ATA</td>
<td>Afghan Territorial Army</td>
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<td>CCAG</td>
<td>Counter Corruption Advisory Group</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CTIP</td>
<td>Combating Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<td>DAI</td>
<td>Development Alternatives, Inc.</td>
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<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DoS OIG</td>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>kandaks</td>
<td>battalions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom's Sentinel</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>OUSD-P</td>
<td>Under-Secretary of Defense-Policy Office</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<td>SOA</td>
<td>Strategic Oversight Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Train, Advise, and Assist Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>tashkil</td>
<td>the official list of ANDSF personnel and equipment requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

2. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, “Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 10/03/2017.
4. DoD News Transcript, “Media Availability with Secretary Mattis en Route to India,” 9/24/2017; Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, “Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 10/03/2017.
5. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, “Political and Security Situation in Afghanistan,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 10/03/2017.
16. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Afghanistan: Reported US Air and Drone Strikes 2017,” 10/13/2017. (Note: The source states that airstrike figures were provided to BIJ by USFOR-A via email.).
Key Events This Quarter

47. USAFOR-A, Responses to SIGAR Request for Information, 3/1/2017 and 10/2/2017.
73. Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Afghanistan: Reported US Air and Drone Strikes 2017,” 10/13/2017. (Note: The source states that airstrike figures were provided to BIJ by USFOR-A via email).
114. Remarks by Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 10/3/2017.
144. Resolute Support, Response to SIGAR Request for Information, 8/31/2017.
211. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
213. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
214. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
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216. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
228. DoD News Transcript, “Media Availability with Secretary Mattis en Route to India,” 9/24/2017.
231. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
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252. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
253. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
254. USAID OIG, Congressional Notification, 8/17/2017.
256. USAID OIG, Congressional Notification, 8/17/2017.
257. USAID OIG, Congressional Notification, 8/17/2017.
258. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
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267. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
268. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.
269. USAID, Response to USAID OIG Request for Information.


TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OIR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, CONTACT:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HOTLINE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOTLINE
oighotline@state.gov
1-800-409-9926 OR 202-647-3320

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT HOTLINE
ighotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 OR 202-712-1023