LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

APRIL 1, 2017–JUNE 30, 2017
LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations coordinates among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

• develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation

• ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations

• promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse

• perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements

• report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to the United States Congress on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This is our ninth quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation, discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978. Two complementary missions constitute OFS: 1) the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—Khorasan, and their affiliates in Afghanistan, and 2) U.S. participation, with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partner nations, in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (Resolute Support) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The objectives of Resolute Support are the establishment of a self-sustaining Afghan National Army and other elements of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the Afghan National Police and other elements of the Ministry of the Interior, which together seek to maintain security in Afghanistan.

This quarterly report updates information on significant events involving OFS and the NATO-led efforts to build and strengthen Afghan security forces during the period from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017. This report, as in past reports, features oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and partner oversight agencies during the same period, and ongoing and planned oversight work, as of June 30, 2017.

Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on OFS. Collectively, we strive to continue our reporting on this critical mission and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of programs conducted in support of it.

Glenn A. Fine
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
On the cover: (clockwise from top left) U.S. Army AH-64E Apache helicopters depart from Jalalabad Airfield (DoD photo); U.S. Marine mortarmen fire a 120mm mortar from Bost Airfield (U.S. Marine Corps photo); U.S. soldiers conduct a sling load from Bagram Airfield (DoD photo); an Afghan Special Security Forces soldier scans terrain (DoD photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present the ninth Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to the United States Congress on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes the quarter’s key events and describes completed, ongoing, and planned Lead IG and partner agency oversight work relating to OFS. It includes a Lead IG Focus section that discusses the resilience of the Taliban, the dominant insurgent group in Afghanistan.

Beginning this quarter, we are also issuing a classified appendix to the report, which discusses classified information related to OFS counterterrorism operations. We are distributing this classified appendix to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.

The conflict in Afghanistan intensified this quarter as the Taliban mounted widespread attacks against Afghan military facilities. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, continued to mount suicide attacks and replenish its forces, despite aggressive U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operations that killed hundreds of its fighters and destroyed its facilities. DoD officials reported no change in the percentage of the population (66 percent) under Afghan government control or influence.

In a series of meetings during May and June, U.S. and NATO officials agreed to increase the number of coalition troops who are assisting the Afghan security institutions. At the end of the quarter, a potential increase in U.S. troop levels remained under review by the Administration.

We reported mixed progress in OFS capacity-building efforts. We also identified challenges that prevent Afghan army and police forces from reaching the point where they can provide security in Afghanistan without coalition assistance.

This quarter, the Lead IG agencies and their partners continued their oversight of OFS, releasing 6 reports and conducting 41 ongoing oversight projects. The Lead IG agencies also have 33 OFS-related investigations relating to alleged procurement fraud, corruption, and trafficking in persons.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to conducting oversight of OFS. We recognize that this oversight relies on the hard work and expertise of the OIG employees, and we appreciate their dedication to this important mission.
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This report is issued pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which require that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) IG is the designated Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). The Department of State (DoS) IG is the Associate Lead Inspector General for OFS. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for oversight of all overseas contingency operations. While USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, the USAID IG conducts audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. The USAID IG coordinates those activities, as appropriate, with other oversight entities. Therefore, a summary of USAID oversight work is included in this report.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This report covers the period from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017. The methodology for obtaining information used in this report and for drafting the report can be found in Appendix A. A classified appendix will be provided to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis at the Resolute Support Headquarters in Kabul, April 24, 2017. (DoD photo)

U.S. STRATEGY REVIEW UNDERWAY AT THE END OF THE QUARTER

In June 2017 congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis acknowledged that “[w]e are not winning in Afghanistan right now.”¹ According to this testimony, “winning” was defined as achieving a state of security where the Afghan government, with international help, could reduce violence to a point where “local security forces can handle it.” Secretary Mattis stated that a residual international force would remain to train Afghan forces and maintain “high-end capability” to respond to emerging threats.²

Secretary Mattis also testified that he believed a new strategy for Afghanistan would be discussed with Congress by mid-July.³ He subsequently announced that, to support development of a new strategy, the President had delegated authority to the DoD to increase troop levels in Afghanistan.⁴ As of the end of the quarter, however, the new strategy remained under review at the highest levels of the Administration.⁵

INSURGENCY INTENSIFIES AS TALIBAN FOCUSES ON MILITARY TARGETS

The intensity of conflict in Afghanistan increased this quarter as the Taliban insurgency mounted attacks in key northern and southern provinces as it launched its spring campaign. The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan, known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K), remained a significant threat to Afghanistan’s security, despite the combined efforts of Afghan and U.S. forces to defeat it.⁶ The June 2017 UN report on the situation in Afghanistan stated that the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) continued to face “an intensifying insurgency” and described the conflict as “unrelenting.” The UN reported that the number of security incidents during the first 3 months of 2017 was the highest recorded since 2001, and that the number
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of incidents that occurred from March to May 2017 increased for that 3-month period by 2 percent compared to the same period in 2016. Moreover, the UN reported near record numbers of civilians killed and injured as a result of armed conflict during the first 6 months of 2017.

U.S. air support to the Afghan security forces returned to a level of intensity not seen since 2012, when more than 60,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in the country. U.S. aircraft dropped over 1,600 munitions during the first 6 months of 2017, compared to 545 and 298 during similar periods in 2016 and 2015, respectively.

Early this quarter, the Taliban announced that its spring campaign would target foreign forces and Afghan security forces rather than focusing on high profile attacks and offensive operations in Helmand province as it did previously. In line with that strategy, the Taliban launched the single deadliest attack on Afghan security forces since 2001 when 10 insurgents stormed the largest Afghan National Army (ANA) base in northern Afghanistan on April 21, killing 144 Afghans and wounding 65. In the wake of the attack, the Afghan Minister of Defense and ANA Chief of Staff resigned. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also replaced four of the six ANA Corps commanders.

The Taliban continued to target military facilities in the northern provinces, raising the possibility of an attempt to capture Kunduz City, which had briefly fallen to the Taliban in September 2015. According to Afghan media sources, General John W. Nicholson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Resolute Support, committed
U.S. forces to the defense of Kunduz City and deployed additional U.S. troops there to assist Afghan security forces, seeking to assure the local population that Kunduz City would not fall to insurgents. Additionally, the Afghan government reinforced the 209th ANA Corps in Kunduz with special operations forces from other regions.

At the same time, the Taliban launched multiple attacks against military targets across southern Afghanistan. The ANDSF withstood Taliban offensives in some areas and quickly recaptured lost ground in others. USFOR-A reported no change in the number of districts or percentage of the population under Taliban control or influence since February 2017.

**ISIS-K REMAINS A THREAT DESPITE HEAVY LOSSES**

U.S. and Afghan forces continued to mount air and ground attacks against ISIS-K. According to a May 19 USFOR-A press release, Afghan and U.S. forces have killed over 750 ISIS-K fighters since early March 2017, destroying tunnel complexes, command centers, and logistics nodes in the process. The most significant attack occurred on April 13, when the United States dropped the largest conventional bomb in its inventory on an ISIS-K complex in Nangarhar province. A combined U.S.-Afghan raid in the Achin district of Nangarhar on April 27 killed Sheikh Abdul Hasib, the head of ISIS-K, several other high ranking ISIS-K leaders, and up to 35 ISIS-K fighters.

Despite successful offensive operations against it, however, ISIS-K demonstrated continuing ability to mount suicide attacks and replenish its forces. It orchestrated one suicide bombing in Kabul during each month of the quarter. In addition, on May 17, it staged a coordinated attack by four fighters on an Afghan television station in Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province, that resulted in six Afghans killed and four wounded. USFOR-A estimated that 900 ISIS-K fighters remained in Afghanistan at the end of the quarter, a number that has not decreased since March 2017. It recruits from a variety of sources, reportedly enlisting fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other Central Asian countries.
countries, while sponsoring madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan that focus on developing children to become future terrorists. DoD officials reported limited ISIS-K presence in 6 of 34 provinces but largely confined to southern Nangarhar province.

**OTHER COUNTRIES IN REGION EXERT INFLUENCE ON CONFLICT**

With external actors continuing to influence the conflict in Afghanistan, Secretary Mattis emphasized that Afghan strategy required a regional approach. Pakistan remained the most influential external actor affecting both Afghan stability and the OFS mission. In an effort to advance a regional approach, Resolute Support officials facilitated nine meetings between Afghan generals and their Pakistani counterparts this quarter to address border security issues, discuss counter terrorist groups, and reduce the threat from improvised explosive devices.

Despite the existence of “tension and suspicion” between the two sides, Headquarters Resolute Support reported that participation in the meetings was “willing if not cordial” until the massive truck bombing in Kabul that killed at least 300 Afghans on May 31. After that, the military-to-military relationship deteriorated as Afghan intelligence sources held the Pakistan-supported Haqqani Network responsible for the attack and the Afghan media blamed the Pakistani government for the event. Afghan government officials and ANDSF general officers became openly hostile toward their Pakistani counterparts and refused to attend events scheduled for Resolute Support, Pakistani, and Afghan military officers.

Russia, China, and Iran continued to develop their relationships with both the Afghan government and the Taliban. Russia hosted a meeting in Moscow on April 14, attended by top diplomats from Afghanistan, China, and several Central Asian countries, for the stated purpose of promoting a national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. However, USFOR-A characterized the talks as primarily an attempt by Russia to marginalize western influence in the region. USFOR-A also reported that Russia may be providing...
weapons and equipment to the Taliban, as well as advising it on combat tactics to employ against ISIS-K.\textsuperscript{32} USFOR-A noted that the Taliban and ISIS-K continued to attack each other in Nangarhar province.\textsuperscript{33}

China increased its level of military and economic support to Afghanistan this quarter, and the Chinese and Afghan foreign ministers met for the stated purpose of promoting the peace process.\textsuperscript{34} According to DoD officials, China’s involvement is most likely driven by its security concerns, primarily that violent extremism will spread across the Afghan border into China.\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, Iran sought to increase its influence in the region through government partnerships, bilateral trade, and cultural and religious ties.\textsuperscript{36}

On June 6, just 1 week after the massive truck bombing in Kabul, President Ghani hosted a 1-day peace conference in Kabul that included representatives from 26 countries, including the United States, Russia, Pakistan, India, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{37} According to DoD officials, the widely-attended conference represented a “significant step forward” in the peace process and enabled the Afghan government to reassert its leadership, thereby taking the initiative away from Russia.\textsuperscript{38} Following the conference, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan issued a joint statement on their commitment to the “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” peace process and their broader commitment to peace and stability as well as to regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{39}

**NATO CONSIDERS TROOP BUILD-UP**

NATO representatives met several times this quarter to discuss the security situation in Afghanistan and a possible increase in troop levels, following General Nicholson’s suggestion made before Congress in February that the number of coalition advisors should increase.\textsuperscript{40} At a NATO heads-of-state meeting on May 25, some of the leaders announced their willingness to increase force contributions and, at a NATO conference in mid-June, 15 nations pledged additional troops.\textsuperscript{41}
On June 29, the NATO Secretary General confirmed that NATO would increase its presence in Afghanistan in order to strengthen the professionalism and capabilities of Afghan security forces. However, as the quarter ended, the United States had not issued a new strategy on Afghanistan and had not specified a higher troop number.

**PRESIDENT GHANI PURSUES “ROAD MAP” TO STRENGTHEN ANDSF OVER NEXT 4 YEARS**

In late 2016, President Ghani directed the development of a “Road Map” to reform and strengthen the ANDSF over the next 4 years. The Road Map seeks to improve the ANDSF in four key areas: fighting capability, leadership development, unity of command, and countering corruption. The Ghani administration announced the Road Map in early 2017 and said that it will be implemented in several phases through 2020. Key elements of the Road Map call for the expansion of the Afghan special operations forces as the primary strike force and the reorientation of the Afghan National Police (ANP) toward a traditional law enforcement role.

**MOD AND MOI MADE PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS BUT FACE CONTINUING CHALLENGES**

Headquarters Resolute Support reported mixed progress in building capacity of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). The MoD implemented its internal control program at headquarters and has already identified high risk areas. Both ministries continued to validate and refine their personnel management systems to
KEY CHALLENGES

This list is derived from Lead IG analysis of information from the DoD, UN, and open sources. Information on each challenge is included within the sections of the report.

SECURITY

- The ANDSF face an intensified insurgency as the Taliban mount country-wide attacks on military targets.
- Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary and support to the Taliban.
- The Afghan-Pakistani military-to-military relationship has grown hostile with decreasing opportunities for collaboration on security matters.
- The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan is able to conduct suicide attacks and regenerate its forces despite aggressive U.S. and Afghan efforts to eliminate it.
- Civilian casualties continue at record high numbers.

GOVERNANCE

- Russia, Iran, and China seek to increase their influence in Afghan governance and security.
- Political tensions are increasing with widespread calls for government reform in the wake of the deadly bombing attack in Kabul on May 31.

BUILDING CAPACITY OF AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

- Attrition, due to personnel not reenlisting or leaving the ranks before their enlistments end, prevents Afghan security forces from reaching authorized strength.
- The ANDSF continues to experience high casualty rates.
- Weak leadership and corruption remain the two significant impediments to strengthening ANDSF capabilities. Middle management in the Ministry of Interior is described as “truly corrupt.”

accurately record information on soldiers and police, with the goal of ensuring that salary payments are legitimate. Additionally U.S. command authorities reported progress by Afghan security forces in managing materiel inventories, planning security operations, and utilizing intelligence. However, challenges in all these areas remain. Resolute Support reported limited or sporadic progress in achieving the five strategic goals identified by the MoI last summer to enhance overall ANP performance. Additionally, Headquarters Resolute Support indicated that endemic corruption continued to impede MoI capacity-building efforts. The MoI strategic communications organization is staffed with over 150 professionals, but
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USFOR-A reported that the MoI does very little to counter Taliban communications efforts and is largely reactive in nature.\textsuperscript{52}

USFOR-A noted that a lack of trust between the MoD and the MoI continued to inhibit sharing of intelligence information and that, while the Afghans have learned to operate intelligence-gathering equipment, they have failed to maintain it properly.\textsuperscript{53} The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a subordinate command responsible for much of the train, advise, and assist effort, reported no progress in the ministries’ ability to manage their own force structures—a critical discipline that is required to assign the right mix of personnel and equipment to military units.\textsuperscript{54}

HIGH TURNOVER AND HIGH CASUALTY RATES CONTINUE TO PLAGUE ANDSF

Attrition remains the most significant issue impacting the ANDSF’s efforts to reach authorized end strength.\textsuperscript{55} During the 12-month period ending April 30, 2017, about 50,300 personnel were separated or dropped from ANA rolls, and about 52,600 recruits were added. This equates to an annual personnel turnover rate of 30 percent, indicating that at any time almost one-third of ANA soldiers have less than 1 year of experience.\textsuperscript{56} The attrition rate in the MoI was slightly better, with about 36,200 losses and 36,800 additions, representing an annual turnover rate of 24 percent.\textsuperscript{57} Although DoD officials emphasized that the attrition rate decreased in 2017, the latest strength figures show little overall increase in ANDSF personnel (1.1 percent) from April 2016 to April 2017.\textsuperscript{58} To increase retention, Resolute Support worked with its Afghan partners to root out ineffective and corrupt leaders and to develop skilled, well-trained officers.\textsuperscript{59} In the ANA, this involved the institution of formal selection boards for senior officers and commissioned officers to support merit-based advancement.\textsuperscript{60}
The ANDSF demonstrated improved planning capacity leading into its 2017 summer campaign, Operation Khalid, which is the first operation that is part of President Ghani’s 4-Year Plan. Afghan planners designated the principal and supporting efforts, allocated resources, and conducted formal planning briefs with minimal advisor assistance. However, the ANDSF continued to suffer high casualty rates. Although the number of personnel killed or wounded during planned operations has decreased, casualties during routine patrols have increased since 2015. The primary cause of ANDSF casualties remained direct fire attacks, although improvised explosive devices and insider attacks also represented significant threats to the force.

LEAD IG REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT

During the period April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners released 6 reports that related directly, or in part, to OFS matters. See Table 1.

Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners had 41 ongoing and 11 planned oversight projects for Afghanistan, as of June 30, 2017. These projects relate to building Afghan capacity, counternarcotics, contracts and contract management, and intelligence activities. In addition,

Table 1.
Oversight Reports Issued This Quarter, as of 6/30/2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Controlled and -Occupied Military Facilities Inspection-Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (DODIG-2017-087)</td>
<td>June 2, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Assistance Report: Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan (AUD-MERO-17-37)</td>
<td>May 15, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietary Textiles: Afghan National Army: DOD May Have Spent Up To $28 Million More Than Needed to Procure Camouflage Uniforms That May Be Inappropriate for the Afghan Environment (SIGAR-17-48-SP)</td>
<td>June 20, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leahy Laws: DoD and State Implementation of the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan (SIGAR-17-47-IPc) (Classified)</td>
<td>June 10, 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lead IG
the Lead IG agencies had 33 ongoing OFS-related investigations, with over half related to procurement or program fraud or corruption.

The DoD OIG, the entity that tracks hotline activities among the Lead IG agencies and other OFS-related organizations, received and coordinated 31 contacts related to OFS and opened 43 cases during the quarter. Some contacts include multiple allegations that result in multiple cases. These contacts were referred within the DoD OIG, to the Lead IG agencies, or to other investigative organizations for review and, as appropriate, investigation.

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it conducts stabilization and aid activities in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan related to these programs. Information regarding USAID OIG activities is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. Government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs.

For more information on Lead IG and partner oversight, see the Completed Oversight Activities and Ongoing and Planned Oversight sections of this report, beginning on page 72 and page 84 respectively.

REPORT METHODOLOGY

To fulfill the congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. The source of information is shown in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except for references to Lead IG agencies and oversight partner agency audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations in the report, the Lead IG agencies have not independently verified and assessed all the data included in this report. For details of the methodology, see Appendix A.

CLASSIFIED APPENDIX

For the first time, the Lead OIG has drafted an appendix containing classified information related to OFS. This classified report, attached here as Appendix B, discusses coalition forces in support of the U.S. counterterrorism mission; coalition forces in support of the counterterrorism train, advise and assist mission; and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) strength, equipment readiness, and operational missions and results.

For the preparation of this appendix, NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan responded to Lead IG questions on personnel, equipment, ASSF missions, and ASSF mission results, for the period April 1, 2017, through June 1, 2017. Appendix B will be provided separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees.
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At a Glance

Operation Freedom's Sentinel

Mission

U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as OFS: counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its affiliates, and ISIS-K in Afghanistan; and support for NATO's Resolute Support Mission, which seeks to build the capacity of the MoD and MoI and to strengthen the ANDSF. OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended 13 years of combat operations in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and transitioned to a NATO-led train, advise, and assist role, while continuing U.S. counterterrorism operations. At that point, the Afghan government assumed full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan with limited U.S. or coalition support on the battlefield.

History

U.S. combat operations began on October 7, 2001, to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime, which harbored the al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and its coalition of international partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, NATO-led forces, which had retained interim responsibility for national security, encountered persistent efforts by Taliban forces to recapture lost territory. The deteriorating security situation resulted in a surge in U.S. troop strength from 30,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 from 2010 to 2011. The surge reversed Taliban momentum and enabled a gradual reduction of U.S. forces to 16,100 by December 31, 2014, when the NATO-led combat mission ended and OFS began. The U.S. troop ceiling dropped to 8,400 in January 2017.

Contractor Support in Afghanistan

Since the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan, the DoD has relied on contractors to provide a wide range of services to support U.S. troops, from transportation, construction, and base support to intelligence analysis, translation services, and private security. As of April 2017, there were approximately 25,000 personnel serving under DoD contracts in Afghanistan, down from about 117,000 contractor personnel at the end of the U.S. troop surge in 2011. Approximately 36 percent of contractor personnel were U.S. citizens, 41 percent were Afghan citizens, and the remainder were third-country nationals.
“WE ARE NOT WINNING,”
AS INSURGENCY INTENSIFIES

This quarter, the DoD and the United Nations expressed growing concern with the security situation in Afghanistan. The June 2017 DoD report, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, stated that continued Taliban attacks across the country, coupled with the Taliban’s ability to capture rural areas, “undermine public confidence in the Afghan Government’s ability to provide security.”¹ In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 13, Secretary Mattis stated, “we are not winning in Afghanistan right now.” However, Secretary Mattis stated “we will correct this as soon as possible,” and described “winning” as reducing the threat and violence levels in Afghanistan to the point where “local [Afghan] security forces can handle it.”²

In his June 2017 report, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres observed that “the security situation in Afghanistan remained intensely volatile” and that the number of security incidents in the first 5 months of 2017 exceeded the number during a similar period in 2016. The UN report said the ANDSF continued to face “an intensifying insurgency” and described the conflict as “unrelenting.” During a 3-month period from March 1, 2017, to May 31, 2017, the UN recorded 6,252 security-related incidents—a 2 percent increase over the same period in 2016.³ In his June 13 testimony, Secretary Mattis described Taliban activity as “surging right now,” explaining that the Taliban “had a good year last year and they’re trying to have a good one this year.”⁴

The U.S. air support in Afghanistan returned to a level of intensity this year not seen since 2012, when over 60,000 U.S. troops were stationed in the country. According to the U.S. Air Force, 1,634 munitions were dropped by U.S. aircraft during the first 6 months of 2017, compared to 1,692 during the same period in 2012. Comparable figures for 2015 and 2016 were 298 and 545, respectively. This quarter, 1,177 munitions were dropped, virtually the same as during the April-June quarter in 2012. Quarterly figures for 2015 and 2016 were 181 and 245, respectively.⁵

Despite the intensity of conflict this quarter, USFOR-A reported no change in the number of districts or percentage of the population under Taliban control or influence since February 2017. At that time, the Afghan government controlled or influenced 243 of the country’s 407 districts, while the Taliban controlled or influenced 45 districts. The number of contested districts, where neither side had control or influence, stood at 119.

In population terms, 21.4 million Afghans live in districts under government control (66 percent of the population), with about 3 million Afghans under Taliban control or influence (9.2 percent). The remaining 8.2 million (24.8 percent) live in contested districts.⁶

Taliban Focuses on Military Targets

In April 2017, the Taliban announced its spring campaign strategy, which appeared to shift from the strategy it had followed during the first quarter of 2017. Rather than focusing on high profile attacks and offensive operations in southern Helmand province, the Taliban
described its spring offensive as targeting “foreign forces, their military infrastructure and intelligence, and the elimination of [Afghan security forces],” according to media sources. Named “Operation Mansouri” after the Taliban leader killed by a U.S. airstrike in May 2016, the spring offensive promised assaults on international and Afghan forces coupled with efforts to strengthen Taliban governance in areas it already controlled.

**Major Attack at Afghan Army Base**

On April 21, in what the Taliban described as a “prelude” to its spring campaign, 10 Taliban fighters wearing ANA uniforms and driving military vehicles stormed the largest ANA base in northern Afghanistan. The base serves as headquarters of the 209th ANA Corps in the city of Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh province. After breaching multiple layers of security by using false identification and claiming a medical emergency, the insurgents detonated explosives and fired indiscriminately at hundreds of unarmed ANA soldiers until nine attackers either triggered suicide vests or were killed by Afghan security forces. One insurgent was captured. Although estimates varied, the DoD reported that 144 were killed and 65 injured. The attack constituted the deadliest single Taliban attack on Afghan security forces since 2001.

The attack had an immediate impact on Afghan security leadership. The Afghan Minister of Defense and ANA Chief of Staff resigned 3 days later, and President Ghani replaced four ANA Corps commanders, including the commander of the 209th Corps, which is headquartered at the base. Amid ongoing Afghan government investigations into the incident, 24 ANA officers were removed in connection with the incident.

**Control of Kunduz Remains a Taliban Objective**

The Taliban continued to attack ANDSF facilities in the northern provinces during the quarter, leading some Afghan political leaders to express concern about deteriorating security in that part of the country. (See infographic on pages 18 and 19.) On April 25, the Taliban struck three security checkpoints in Takhar province, which borders Kunduz province to the east, killing eight ANP and closing access to districts that were attacked. However, eight Taliban fighters were killed in the hours-long firefight, and ANDSF reinforcements were deployed to counter Taliban gains in the area. On May 3, Afghan airstrikes killed 11 Taliban fighters in Takhar province. Another 67 Taliban fighters were reportedly killed by Afghan security forces in that province during battles on May 4.

Heavy clashes between ANDSF and Taliban forces in early May closed a major highway in northern Kunduz province, where the Taliban continued to target Kunduz City, the provincial capital that it briefly captured in September 2015. On May 6, following the highway closure, Taliban fighters captured the Qal‘ah-ye Zal district just outside Kunduz City, overrunning district security checkpoints and the police headquarters. Fighting between Taliban and Afghan forces continued on the outskirts of Kunduz City until May 16 when Afghan security forces regained control of the district. Media sources reported that the Taliban destroyed numerous government buildings and forced thousands of Afghans to flee during the attack.
According to media sources, the Taliban offensives prompted USFOR-A to deploy additional troops to Kunduz province in late May to assist Afghan security forces. In an address to Afghan soldiers that was reported by TOLOnews, General Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and USFOR-A, stated that American forces were committed to the defense of Kunduz and assured the Afghans that, because of improving performance by Afghan security forces, Kunduz City would not fall to insurgents this year. In early June, the Taliban attacked Imam Sahib district, which borders Kunduz City to the north but were repulsed by the ANDSF, assisted by coalition forces, after nearly one week of fighting. According to media sources, ANDSF clearing operations in the district killed or injured nearly 200 Taliban, including several top Taliban leaders.

Week of Deadly Attacks in Kabul but No Claim of Responsibility

The period from May 31 to June 3 was especially lethal for Afghan citizens in Kabul: a massive truck bomb exploded in the center of the city, a protest demonstration turned deadly, and suicide bombers struck a funeral ceremony for one of the demonstrators. Violence over the 5-day period killed over 160 Afghans and wounded over 500.

In the largest single attack since 2001, a suicide bomber drove a tanker truck loaded with explosives into Kabul’s heavily guarded diplomatic quarter during the morning rush hour on May 31. According to a Headquarter Resolute Support news release, the bomber triggered the explosives after Afghan security forces prevented the vehicle from entering the Green Zone, which houses the U.S. Embassy and Resolute Support headquarters. The blast killed more than 300 Afghans and damaged several embassies in the area. Although the Afghan intelligence agency accused the Haqqani Network of orchestrating the attack, both the Taliban and Haqqani Network denied responsibility.

More than 1,000 Afghans staged demonstrations in Kabul for over a week following the attack to protest the failure of the Afghan government to provide adequate security. Clashes between the ANP and demonstrators resulted in dozens of casualties, including up to seven deaths. During a funeral for one of the slain demonstrators on June 3, up to 20 people were killed and over 80 were wounded when 3 suicide bombers detonated explosives hidden in their shoes. No group claimed responsibility for the attack at the funeral.
TALIBAN FOCUS IN THE NORTH—

In addition to maintaining a stronghold in Afghanistan’s southern provinces, the Taliban has continually sought to expand its control and influence in the north, particularly in the province of Kunduz. In September 2015, the Taliban captured Kunduz City, the provincial capital, in its first seizure of a provincial capital in Afghanistan since 2001. Afghan security forces recaptured the city in mid-October 2015. In October 2016, Taliban fighters staged a coordinated attack from four directions on Kunduz City, overrunning several neighborhoods and planting their flag in the city center before being driven out by Afghan security forces.

Why Kunduz?
Kunduz is strategically important to the Taliban for a number of reasons.

- Kunduz is dominated by ethnic Pashtuns—the Taliban’s main constituency—in the otherwise predominantly Tajik and Uzbek north. Starting in 2012, increasing numbers of Pashtuns migrated to Kunduz from the south in an effort by the Afghan government, according to one Afghan military analyst, to dilute the power of other ethnicities in the area. However, the Taliban in Kunduz recruited fighters from all ethnic groups, thereby countering its image as a southern, Pashtun nationalist group.

- Kunduz is a transportation hub, located at the juncture of highways that link the capital of Kabul to other parts of Afghanistan’s north—primarily to Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of neighboring Balkh province, and Sher Khan Bandar, a city on the border with Tajikistan. Taxing travelers on stretches of highway that it controls provides the Taliban a source of revenue.

- Drug smuggling routes pass through Kunduz. The border with Tajikistan is porous and enables transport of Afghan opium and heroin to Central Asia and ultimately to Europe. Control of Kunduz would provide the Taliban control over one of the most important drug smuggling routes in the region.

Russia May Be Aiding Taliban in Kunduz
Russia has acknowledged contact with the Taliban for the claimed purpose of supporting the Taliban fight against ISIS-K, thereby suppressing expansion of ISIS-K into Central Asia. Media sources report that Kunduz is of particular interest to Russia because of Kunduz’s location on the border with Tajikistan, a Russian ally, and Russian concern with the Afghan government’s limited control over Kunduz.

Taliban Attacks Targets in and around Kunduz this Quarter
- Balkh Province. On April 21, Taliban fighters stormed an ANA base in Mazar-e-Sharif, killing 144 and injuring 65.
- Takhar Province. On April 25, Taliban fighters attacked three security checkpoints in Darqad and Khwaja Bahaudin districts, killing 8 ANP. Counterattacks by Afghan forces reportedly cleared the area of Taliban in early May.
- Kunduz Province. In early May, the Taliban captured Qal‘ah-ye Zal district, northwest of Kunduz City, and closed a major highway from Kunduz City to eastern Khanabad district. Heavy fighting between Taliban and Afghan security forces around Kunduz City continued into mid-May, when Afghan security forces retook the district. On June 4, Taliban fighters stormed Imam Sahib district, which is located north of Kunduz City on the border with Tajikistan. After several days of clashes, Afghan security forces with U.S. support reportedly cleared the district of Taliban.

Sources: See endnotes, page 120
KUNDUZ A MAJOR TARGET
TALIBAN RESILIENCE

Note: The following feature article examines the factors that have contributed to the persistence of the Taliban insurgency, which has maintained its strength in the face of long-standing opposition by Afghan and international security forces. This narrative reflects Lead IG analysis based on information from credible sources cited.

Despite 16 years of U.S.-supported counterinsurgency operations and ANDSF capacity-building efforts, the Taliban remains a formidable and resilient force. Despite considerable casualties, the Taliban continues country-wide attacks in areas under Afghan government control, while retaining control of large swaths of urban and rural Afghanistan. According to the UN, the number of security incidents in Afghanistan during 2016-2017 reached its highest level since 2007. Armed clashes between government security forces and the Taliban comprised 63 percent of all security incidents in Afghanistan during that period, and represented a 22 percent increase in such clashes from the same period in 2015-2016.

DoD officials estimate that the Afghan government maintains control or influence over most of the country’s population. As of May 2017, officials reported that the Afghan government maintained control or influence over approximately 11 percent of the population, with the remainder being contested. In testimony to Congress in June 2017, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis described Taliban activity as “surging right now,” explaining that the Taliban “had a good year last year and they’re trying to have a good one this year.” Secretary Mattis also acknowledged that the U.S. was “not winning in Afghanistan right now,” and promised a new strategy by July 2017. As of the end of the quarter, the strategy had not been announced.

According to military and civilian officials, several factors have allowed the Taliban to remain resilient, even though it lacks popular support. These include a weak and corrupt Afghan government; the external support and sanctuary it receives from Afghanistan’s neighbors; a revenue stream based on the opium trade, illegal mineral extraction, extortion, and other criminal means; and the ability to recruit fighters from a number of different sources. Accordingly, the Taliban sees no need to abandon its insurgency and engage in peace negotiations with regional partners.

This Lead IG Focus expands on each of these factors.

Government Weaknesses and Corruption Give the Taliban an Advantage

The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. However, the Taliban continues to contest some district centers, threaten provincial capitals, and temporarily seize lines of communication throughout the country. The Taliban has repeatedly returned to areas lost to the ANDSF. While the Taliban has been unable to hold those areas, it has conducted attacks that undermine public confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to provide security.
The World Bank reported that 39 percent of Afghans in 2013-2014 were living in poverty, fueled by unemployment. The report also stated that real gross domestic product increased only marginally from 2015 to 2016, and that per capita income declined when measured against population growth. Afghanistan’s greatest economic challenge is to find sustainable sources of growth.37

Corruption, which touches every aspect of national life, undermines efforts to improve governance. In April 2017, Ambassador Hugo Llorens, Special Chargé d’Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, stated that while Afghanistan had made real progress toward democracy and prosperity, webs of corruption in the government and business sectors continue to hold the country back from its full potential.38 Opium production—a source of criminal activity and corruption—stands near record levels.39

The Afghan government faces a number of challenges in building effective security forces to counter the Taliban. Heavy casualties and persistent capability gaps limit the ability of Afghan soldiers and police to respond effectively to the Taliban threat, DoD officials have concluded. ANDSF casualty rates have increased every year since 2014 and are described as unsustainable.40 About one-third of the Afghan force does not re-enlist each year; full recruitment to cover attrition might dilute the force’s quality.41 U.S. officials have repeatedly cited deficiencies in ANDSF leadership as a major challenge.42 Structurally, the ANDSF suffers from capability gaps in aviation, casualty evacuation, personnel management, logistics, and sustainment.

(continued on next page)
Taliban Resistance (continued from previous page)

The Afghan Taliban Receives External Support
The Afghan Taliban obtains safe haven and support in Pakistan, which increases the cost of the Resolute Support Mission in terms of lives, time, and money. In February 2017, General Nicholson testified to Congress that by providing sanctuaries, Pakistan gives the Taliban a strategic advantage, allowing it to determine the pace and venue of the conflict, and to retreat to safety. Despite U.S. pressure, Pakistan has countenanced the Taliban’s use of its territory against Afghanistan in an attempt to shape the region and maneuver against India.

Iranian and Russian aid to the Taliban in the form of communications and materiel support is thought to be increasing. Iranian aid to the Taliban while also engaging the Afghan government on issues of water rights, trade, and security. Ambassador Richard Olson, former Ambassador to Pakistan and former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, maintained that the Russians and Iranians do not believe the United States plans to stay in Afghanistan and assume, like the Taliban, that they can wait until the United States withdraws from the country.

General Nicholson and General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command, have testified that Russia, claiming concerns about ISIS and the potential it has to move into the Central Asian states, has created a narrative whereby it is necessary to partner with the Taliban to address those threats. General Nicholson said Russia has undermined NATO by asserting that only the Taliban is fighting ISIS-K. Secretary Mattis stated, “We have seen Russian activity vis-a-vis the Taliban. I’m not willing to say at this point if that has manifested into weapons and that sort of thing. But certainly, what they’re up to there, in light of their other activities, gives us concern.”

In April 2017, the Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan denied that Russia had a hidden agenda in Afghanistan, or the will to compete with the United States there. He stated that Russia, like the United States, is fighting against ISIS, but that the Taliban is a force that should not be ignored when negotiations are considered.

Criminal Enterprise Fuels the Insurgency
Criminal activities such as narcotics, kidnapping, and illegal mining have allowed the Taliban to become economically self-sustaining. The Taliban levies taxes on local economies, including the drug trade, and extorts businesses and organizations. In his February testimony to Congress, General Nicholson observed that the Taliban is a “narco-insurgency.”

In October 2016, the UN reported “pervasive involvement” of the Taliban in the narcotics economy of Afghanistan. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that the Taliban would receive $400 million from the illicit narcotics economy in 2016, approximately 50 percent of its income, and that total area of Afghanistan under opium poppy cultivation had increased 10 percent over 2015. Opium traffickers provide weapons, funding, and support to the insurgents, who in turn, traffic drugs to finance their operations.

Additionally, the Taliban directly controls illegal mining sites and extorts sums of money from licensed Afghan mining operations, generating significant income. According to one analyst, the Taliban stood to earn $200 to $300 million annually from Afghan mining operations, constituting
its second largest source of revenue after narcotics. By contrast, the Afghan government reportedly earned only $30 million from mining revenues in 2015. The U.S. Institute of Peace reported that this industrial-scale mineral looting occurs openly and is undertaken with impunity because of corruption in Afghan government agencies charged with overseeing the extractive sectors, main highways, and borders. Continued Taliban gains in territorial control or influence have allowed further exploitation of the mining sector, drug trade, and other illicit commodities.

**The Taliban Recruits from Several Sources**

In addition to its traditional methods of recruiting from among anti-government individuals, the economically disaffected, and tribal areas where young men are pressed into service, the Taliban has been professionalizing its recruiting efforts to garner more educated recruits and to encourage the defections of Afghan government officials. The Taliban receives recruits from Pakistan where a network of religious schools known as madrassas attract underprivileged youth to fight in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In 2013, the Taliban began publicizing efforts to recruit Afghan government officials, particularly from the ANDSF. This marked a departure from its previous efforts to bring Afghan government supporters “to justice” rather than to offer them an opportunity for engagement. One goal of this changed approach was an attempt to contrast the Taliban’s increasing strength and organizational depth with alleged Afghan government weakness. While the Taliban has acknowledged risk in trying to recruit government officials into its ranks—and the strategy’s effect on ANDSF attrition remains unknown—publicizing such defections serves to portray the Taliban’s power as increasing and the government’s power as decreasing.

**The Taliban Is Unlikely to End the Insurgency Soon**

In May 2016, following the death of Taliban leader Akhtar Mansour, the Taliban appointed Haibatullah Akhundzada as its head. Several UN member states viewed the appointment as strengthening the internal cohesion of the Taliban movement. In addition to the factors discussed above, this cohesion has proved to be an obstacle to potential negotiations because a majority of Taliban power brokers continue to believe they can win the conflict militarily.

In his February 2017 testimony to Congress, General Nicholson said that neither the Taliban nor the ANDSF is currently capable of fundamentally altering the operational environment. General Nicholson added that Taliban and senior leaders of the Haqqani Network remain insulated from pressure and enjoy freedom of action within Pakistan safe havens. He explained that as long as they enjoy external enablement, they have no incentive to reconcile with the Afghan government.

Military operations have failed to compel, and Afghan and international efforts have failed to persuade, the Taliban to negotiate an end to its insurgency against the Afghan government. In May, the Taliban categorically rejected peace talks, equating that to surrender. At the opening of the June 2017 “Kabul Process,” Afghan President Ghani again invited the Taliban to give up the insurgency and join the peace process. The factors discussed in this Focus suggest that the Afghan government will need to achieve significant changes in the balance of power in order to persuade the Taliban to negotiate an end to its insurgency.
ANDSF Mount Successful Operations in South, but Region Remains Volatile

According to USFOR-A and Afghan media sources, the ANDSF mounted a series of operations in southern provinces this quarter that inflicted significant casualties on insurgents. At the same time, the Taliban continued offensives and suicide attacks throughout the south, demonstrating its ability to launch multiple attacks in widespread locations over a short time period.56

Brigadier General Roger Turner, who led the 300-strong Marine task force that deployed to Helmand province in late April 2017, said at the end of June that he had already seen improvements in the 215th ANA Corps, which is responsible for security in the province. Brigadier General Turner noted that, a year ago, the Afghan forces would not have been able to launch the type of ground offensive against the Taliban that they did this quarter. Still, he viewed the situation in Helmand as a difficult stalemate.57 USFOR-A acknowledged that the ANDSF would likely not be able to prevent the Taliban from making gains in rural, lightly populated areas.68

Illustrating the Taliban’s reach and ANDSF capabilities, fighting in the south included:

Helmand Province

- On April 16, Afghan security forces destroyed four bomb-making factories in one district of Helmand province and mounted a second operation in concert with coalition forces in a second Helmand district that reportedly resulted in “a large number” of Taliban deaths.69
- The ANDSF remained on the offensive into May, killing 27 Taliban in a police operation in Helmand on May 3 and destroying a Taliban command and control center on May 9.70
- Despite its lack of territorial gains in Helmand, the Taliban staged a deadly suicide attack outside a bank in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah on June 22. At least 29 Afghan soldiers and government workers were killed and 50 injured as a car bomb exploded while they were lining up to withdraw funds.71

Kandahar Province

- Airstrikes by the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in early April killed at least 30 Taliban fighters in Kandahar province.72 However, the Taliban intensified its offensives against military targets in the province, making it second to Nangarhar among the 34 Afghan provinces in the number of attacks experienced during April and May.73
- The Taliban captured, but then retreated from, an ANA base on May 23 and attacked a second base with hundreds of insurgents on May 26. Dozens of Afghan soldiers and Taliban fighters were reportedly killed in the two attacks, but the bases remained under ANDSF control.74

USFOR-A acknowledged that the ANDSF would likely not be able to prevent the Taliban from making gains in rural, lightly populated areas.
Zabul Province

- In April, ANDSF clearance operations in Zabul province killed 31 insurgents.75
- On May 21, the Taliban killed at least 20 Afghan police during an attack on the capital of Zabul province, overrunning 4 security check points.76

Ghazni Province

- An Afghan news source reported that nearly 200 Taliban fighters attacked an ANDSF contingent in Ghazni province on April 15, but were driven back and 20 Taliban were killed.77
- The ANDSF repulsed a Taliban attack on May 4, reportedly killing at least 7 insurgents; a second attack on May 20, killing 25 insurgents; and a third attack on June 1, killing 13.78

Uruzgan Province—On April 25, an Afghan airstrike killed 23 insurgents in the capital of Uruzgan province, which borders Helmand to the northeast.79

Paktika Province—The ANDSF repulsed a Taliban attack on a police headquarters in Paktika province on June 17, killing 7 insurgents, but losing 6 ANP personnel in the battle.80

Figure 1.

Taliban’s Reach and ANDSF Capabilities in Southern Provinces
ISIS-K Continues Suicide Attacks Despite U.S.-Afghan Offensives

U.S. and Afghan forces mounted a series of offensive operations against ISIS-K this quarter, focusing on locations in Nangarhar province, which has served as ISIS-K’s base of operations. According to a USFOR-A press release on May 19, Afghan and U.S. forces have killed hundreds of ISIS-K fighters since early March 2017, destroying tunnel complexes, command centers, and logistics nodes in the process.81

Despite these efforts, the DoD’s chief spokesperson cautioned, during an interview with Voice of America on June 22, that the ISIS-K problem in Afghanistan is “not getting better.”82 That assessment reflected the continuing ability of ISIS-K to replenish its forces and to mount suicide attacks in Kabul and coordinated attacks in Nangarhar province.83 ISIS-K attacks this quarter included the following:

• On April 12, a suicide bomber on foot exploded his vest near the gates of the MoD compound in Kabul. Five people were killed and three wounded.84
• On May 3, a suicide car bomber attacked a U.S. military convoy in Kabul, killing 8 Afghan civilians and wounding at least 29 others, including 3 U.S. service members.85
• On May 17, 4 ISIS-K fighters attacked an Afghan state television station in Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province, killing 6 and wounding 24.86
• On June 15, ISIS-K gunmen and a suicide bomber struck a Shia mosque in Kabul, killing 4 people and wounding 5.87

Details on partnered U.S. and Afghan operations to counter ISIS-K are provided in the Counterterrorism section of this report, page 41.

THE AFGHAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP REMAINS A KEY FACTOR TO STABILITY

Pakistan remained the most influential external actor affecting both Afghan stability and the OFS mission.88 According to Steven J. Hadley, a former U.S. national security advisor, no strategy for peace and stability in Afghanistan can succeed without “reducing Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and the Haqqani Network.”89 The June 2017 DoD report, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, emphasized that elements of the Pakistani government support the Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani Network and provide them sanctuary and freedom of movement in Pakistan.89 In congressional testimony, Daniel R. Coats, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, stated that the Pakistani government has failed to curb the Taliban in Pakistan.91

U.S. officials said that Pakistan is likely to continue its relationship with the Taliban.92 In his May 2017 congressional testimony, Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, emphasized that Pakistan views all security concerns “through the lens of an Indian threat to the state of Pakistan” and holds the Taliban “in
reserve” to counter potential Indian influence in Afghanistan. Specifically, Pakistan fears that an India-allied Afghanistan could bring war or permit insurgent forces to operate on Pakistan’s western frontier, thereby detracting from its readiness to address the danger it perceives from India, to its east; India is also seen as aiding Pakistani separatists. Moreover, a Pakistan-supported Taliban could help Pakistan push back on what it sees as Afghanistan’s claims on its territory, and Afghanistan-based terrorist groups have been accused of striking Pakistani targets. If Afghanistan leans toward India, according to Lieutenant General Stewart, Pakistan will no longer support a stable and secure Afghanistan that could undermine Pakistan’s interests. This view suggests that Pakistan prefers continued conflict in Afghanistan over a secure Afghanistan that might align with India.

Some Rivalry, Cooperation Among Insurgent Factions

While Taliban and ISIS-K fighters continued their attacks on Afghan security forces, some insurgent groups encountered friction between and within their own organizations. Comprised largely of disaffected Pakistani and Taliban members, ISIS-K overran the Taliban in parts of Nangarhar province in 2015, and since that time the groups have competed for resources and territorial control. In May and June, ISIS-K and the Taliban battled over areas in Nangarhar province, including the Tora Bora complex of caves and tunnels that had once sheltered Osama bin Laden. As of June 21, however, the ANDSF had intervened, recaptured Tora Bora, and turned back ISIS-K. According to USFOR-A, the fighting between ISIS-K and Taliban factions distracted those insurgents from launching attacks on ANDSF and coalition forces.

Media sources reported that rival Taliban groups in mid-June exchanged suicide bombing attacks in Helmand province, leaving 21 dead on both sides. After the mainline Taliban organization, headed by Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, detonated a truck bomb that killed 11 fighters loyal to a break-away Taliban faction led by Mullah Rasool, the Rasool faction retaliated with a suicide bomb in the same location that killed 10 mainline Taliban fighters. According to the New York Times, clashes between the two groups occurred in various Afghan provinces this quarter, with some Afghan government officials reporting that the Rasool group received government assistance in fighting mainline Taliban.

At the same time, USFOR-A reported that the Taliban occasionally cooperated tactically with some of the 20 extremist groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan regions. That cooperation involved sharing training and logistics resources with groups having similar ideologies and possible linkage along religious, tribal, or ethnic lines. USFOR-A stated that the potential convergence of insurgent groups represents a continuing threat to ANDSF capacity-building efforts.
Though some analysts believe Pakistan’s fear of India is unjustified, others argue Pakistan will not assist efforts to reconcile with the Taliban until it “feels confident” that bringing the Taliban into the Afghan political fold is in its best interest. Until that time, it appears that Pakistan may assist the United States with counterterrorism operations while simultaneously providing safe haven to those Taliban who direct their violence against Afghanistan and India.

Regional Relations Sour after May 31 Bombing

The United States continued to encourage cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan military forces in order to “set the conditions” for an eventual Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated resolution to the conflict and a peaceful political settlement with the Taliban. Despite the continuing “tension and suspicion” between the two sides, Headquarters Resolute Support reported that there were nine Afghanistan-Pakistan conferences involving military representatives held this quarter. The conferences addressed ongoing operations, information sharing opportunities, and means to counter improvised explosive devices. According to Headquarters Resolute Support, participation by both sides at these engagements in the first 2 months of the quarter was “willing if not cordial.” Headquarters Resolute Support characterized these general officer-level meetings as “earnest engagements” by both militaries to work toward solutions to border-area issues.

Compared to last quarter, when there were several cross-border incidents, some of which involved artillery shelling, only one significant border event occurred this quarter. Fighting broke out on May 5 when Pakistani forces, accompanying a census team, entered “disputed territory” at the Chaman/Spin Boldak border crossing (Kandahar province) in order to include two provincial villages in the Pakistani census. At least 11 people were killed and dozens wounded. The skirmish, according to Headquarters Resolute Support, did not appear to aggravate tensions between Pakistani and Afghan military representatives, but rather caused both sides to seek opportunities to engage each other to achieve a mutually agreeable solution to the border problem.

However, a suicide truck bombing in Kabul on May 31 had an immediate negative impact on the military-to-military relationship. The blast killed at least 300 Afghans and damaged several embassies in the area. Although the Taliban and its affiliate, the Haqqani Network, denied responsibility for the bombing, the U.S. intelligence community assessed “with high confidence” that the Haqqani Network, which receives support from the Pakistani government, was responsible for the attack.

Headquarters Resolute Support reported that the tenor of the meetings and the degree of civility between Afghan and Pakistani military representatives changed significantly after the May 31 bombing. As Afghan media outlets blamed the Pakistani government for the event, Afghan government officials and ANDSF generals became openly hostile toward their Pakistani counterparts. MoD officials were unwilling to meet Pakistan officials in a public forum and ANDSF generals refused to attend regularly scheduled events that involved Resolute Support, Pakistani, and Afghan military officers.
Last quarter, Afghan and Pakistani military representatives agreed to begin telephone contact between ANA and Pakistani corps commanders, an initiative that Resolute Support officials consider a critical enabler of communications between military officials at the corps level. While two calls were subsequently completed, and attempts were made to initiate calls between remaining commanders, Headquarters Resolute Support reported that the initiative was discontinued in early June, after the military-to-military relationship deteriorated.

Additionally, Headquarters Resolute Support reported that there was little information sharing between ANDSF and Pakistani military representatives about cross-border terrorists, despite commitments made last quarter to share that information. Moreover, Headquarters Resolute Support found no evidence of successful action by either military against targets that had been identified by the other.

**CHINA INCREASES ITS INVOLVEMENT**

This quarter China was active on the diplomatic, military, and economic fronts in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States are members of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which seeks to support Afghan-Taliban peace and reconciliation efforts. Afghan news sources reported that on June 24, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Kabul to firm up China’s support to the peace process. Afghan news sources also reported that China has begun to play a role in helping to build the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship.
According to DoD officials, China’s increasing levels of military, economic, and political engagement in Afghanistan are most likely driven by its concern that violent extremism may spread into China. China also has a desire to protect its regional economic investments.\textsuperscript{120} China recently committed $85 million to establish and sponsor an Afghan Mountain Brigade in Badakhshan, the Afghan province that shares a border with China.\textsuperscript{121}

In congressional testimony this quarter, Secretary Mattis addressed congressional concerns regarding China’s growing economic, political, and military power, stating that, like Russia, China is “seeking veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions on [its] periphery.”\textsuperscript{122}

**IRAN SEEKS GREATER ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN**

Iran has also sought to increase its power in the region by exerting greater influence in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{123} This desire, according to DoD officials, remains strong and is not expected to wane.\textsuperscript{124} According to the June 2017 DoD report, Iran seeks to increase its influence through government partnerships, bilateral trade, and cultural and religious ties, with the stated goal of working toward a stable Afghanistan where Shia Muslim communities are safe and Iran’s economic interests are protected.\textsuperscript{125} It has also been reported that Iran recruits, arms, and trains Shia Afghans to support the Syrian regime and that Iran provides a 10-year residency permit to recruits who survive the conflict in Syria.\textsuperscript{126}

The June 2017 DoD report noted that one of Iran’s goals is to reduce the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the report stated that Iran justified its support of the Taliban and Haqqani Network as necessary to combat the spread of the ISIS-K threat in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{127} According to USFOR-A, Iran may be providing weapons and equipment to the Taliban.\textsuperscript{128} As is the case with Russia and China, Iran’s relationship with the Taliban undermines the credibility of the Afghan government.\textsuperscript{129}

**PEACE EFFORTS LED BY AFGHAN GOVERNMENT**

On June 6, just one week after the massive truck bombing in Kabul, Afghan President Ghani hosted a one-day peace conference there.\textsuperscript{130} According to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the “Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation” would start an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive peace process” with strong cooperation from regional and global actors involved in Afghanistan. The Ministry’s press release set out the purposes of the conference in these terms: “Afghanistan seeks sustained stability on the basis of genuine state-to-state relations with the region, which encompass diplomatic, economic, political, and security cooperation.”\textsuperscript{131}

Ambassador Hugo Llorens, Special Chargé d’Affaires at U.S. Embassy Kabul, described the conference as “a visible reminder to all those who seek to harm Afghanistan that the Afghan people are never alone.”\textsuperscript{132} The meeting included representatives from more than 20 countries, including the United States, Russia, Pakistan, India, China, Iran, and Saudi
In his remarks at the conference, President Ghani stated that his top priority was building a different relationship with Pakistan, emphasizing, “From the day I took office I went far out on a limb to offer an olive branch to Pakistan. It has not been taken.” The problem, he explained was that “we can’t figure out what it is that Pakistan wants,” and reiterated his request that Pakistan propose an agenda that will lead to peace.134 President Ghani also criticized the countries represented at the conference for pursuing separate peace talks with the Taliban, stating: “[t]here are too many players running too many parallel tracks with too little clarity on who they are and what they represent. We also ask that you respect the integrity of an Afghan-owned and led consolidated process and not set up separate tracks of your own.”135

The conference was held despite the May 31 bombing in Kabul and the continuing upheaval in the country. On the day of the conference, rockets struck the Indian ambassador’s property in Kabul.136 Also on June 6, a bomb killed seven people and wounded 15 outside of a mosque in Herat.137

Despite the surrounding upheaval, the Kabul Process conference resulted in some regional progress. Following the conference, Afghanistan and Pakistan established a bilateral cooperation mechanism following a visit by the Chinese foreign minister.138 On June 25, China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan issued a joint statement on their commitment to the “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned” Kabul Process and their broader commitment to peace and stability, as well as to regional cooperation. In the joint statement, Afghanistan and Pakistan included a willingness to improve their relationship and agreed to establish a crisis management mechanism in order to seek “proper solution through dialogue and consultation.”139
The joint statement also included a resolution to revive the Quadrilateral Coordination Group.\textsuperscript{140} The Quadrilateral Coordination Group provided a forum for the United States, Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan to work together towards regional stability. The group has not met since May 2016, reportedly due to the tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing refusal of the Taliban to participate in peace talks.\textsuperscript{141}

Despite the progress, the DoS described the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan as strained. According to DoS, the United States encouraged the steps taken thus far through frequent, senior-level diplomatic and military engagements. The United States will continue to encourage such cooperation in the future.\textsuperscript{142}

During the reporting period, the Afghan government continued to implement the terms of the peace agreement it concluded with Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, which included Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s return to Kabul after nearly 20 years in exile. In late April, Hekmatyar called upon the Taliban to enter into a peace process with the Afghan government, though to date there has been no affirmative response from the Taliban.\textsuperscript{143} Hekmatyar is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on lists maintained by the U.S. Government.\textsuperscript{144}

**AFGHAN GOVERNANCE: KABUL BOMBING SPARKS PROtests AND POLITICAL TURMOIL**

The massive bombings in Kabul in the four days starting May 31 led to infighting within the government of President Ghani, violent street protests, and, ultimately, the formation of a coalition of ethnic minority political parties which issued demands for reform.\textsuperscript{145}

Promptly after the bombing, thousands of protesters converged on the blast site and called for President Ghani’s resignation.\textsuperscript{146} Protests continued through much of June. Clashes with police led to the deaths of at least six protesters and injuries to many others.\textsuperscript{147} Media reporting described the protesters as a “mix of students, academics, liberal activists, and women’s groups, as well as families of bomb victims” calling for “justice, security, and more responsive governance.”\textsuperscript{148} President Ghani dismissed calls for his resignation and called for unity. He also pledged a thorough investigation into the deaths of protesters.\textsuperscript{149}

Increasing political unrest also ensued.\textsuperscript{150} The Afghan Foreign Minister issued a public call for the dismissal of other senior government officials including the National Security Advisor, Minister of Interior, Minister of Defense, and the National Director of Security.\textsuperscript{151} Speaking at UN headquarters in New York on June 21, the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan stated that the recent cycle of violence in Kabul served as a “clarifying moment” for decisions needed to strengthen Afghan stability. He noted how, following the week of violence in Kabul, political fault lines emerged based on ethnicity, and he predicted future crises unless the Afghan government increased political inclusiveness, strengthened accountability, and improved credibility in the security sector.\textsuperscript{152}
On July 1, leaders of three Afghan minority political parties, all of whom held senior positions in the government, announced the formation of a “Coalition for Saving Afghanistan.” The leaders issued a list of demands for reform and threatened to hold mass protests if the demands were not met. According to a media report, this “stunning development...brought together a group of powerful ex-militia leaders, once rivals in a civil war, in an extraordinary alliance” that constituted a serious challenge to the Ghani government.

**Elections Planned**

During the reporting period, according to the DoS, the Afghan government continued to work with the international community, including the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, to organize elections and strengthen the integrity, sustainability, and inclusiveness of the electoral process. In the midst of the upheaval of June, the head of the Independent Election Commission announced that parliamentary and provincial elections would be held on July 7, 2018. The same elections were initially scheduled for July 2015 but were postponed by the election commission due to disagreements between President Ghani and Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah over electoral reforms. The DoS predicted that election reform issues will be addressed over time.

**Afghan Refugees and Migrants Continue To Repatriate**

Through the first half of 2017, the rate at which Afghan refugees were returning to Afghanistan remained high, but had stabilized compared to 2016. With 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 950,000 in Iran, Afghanistan is the world’s largest refugee return operation. Through the first half of 2017, 35,500 documented Afghan refugees had returned from Pakistan, while returning undocumented Afghans and those deported from Pakistan and Iran numbered slightly more than 240,000.

For more than 5 years, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran have pursued a regional coordination strategy developed in 2012 with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The strategy aims to assist and protect returning Afghan refugees and strengthen Afghanistan’s capacity to absorb such large numbers of returning refugees while continuing to help refugee-assisting communities in Pakistan and Iran as they offer asylum space for Afghan refugees.

Within Afghanistan, during the first half of 2017, an additional 146,500 internally displaced persons were added to the approximately 1.2 million currently displaced persons. Further complicating Afghanistan’s humanitarian challenges is the number of Afghans displaced by the more than 200 natural disasters, including avalanches, flooding, and landslides. These events displaced nearly 98,000 persons in 33 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces from January through June 2017.
The Afghan Government’s ANDSF Road Map

The DoD reported that this year, looking to build upon past achievements and address lingering challenges, President Ghani announced plans to reform and strengthen the ANDSF over the next 4 years, starting in 2017. Following four main lines of effort, the plans are collectively referred to as the ANDSF Road Map. The key elements of the Road Map are:

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities**: Increase the size and strength of the ANDSF’s most effective fighting units, specifically special operations and air forces.

- **Leadership Development**: Emphasize the development of honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals through improved instruction, education, and training, as well as merit-based selection.

- **Unity of Command/Effort**: Review command and control structures to improve the unity of command and effort between ANA and ANP units.

- **Counter Corruption**: Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce the corruption that has weakened the ANDSF.

The Ghani administration began implementing the Road Map in early 2017 and intends to do so through 2020. The Afghan government’s goal is to establish its authority over regions containing a preponderance of the country’s population by the end of the 4-year period and compel the Taliban to negotiate terms of reconciliation. The NATO Chiefs of Defense, who met in Brussels on May 17, 2017, reiterated their support for the ANDSF, specifically stating the alliance’s commitment to helping Afghanistan fulfill the goals of the Road Map.

Under the Road Map, the ANDSF would carry out offensive operations while modifying its force structure to allow it to become an increasingly offensive-oriented force in 2018 and 2019. The plan calls for the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), which
consists of ANA and ANP special operations units, to serve as the primary strike force while conventional forces protect the population, hold key terrain, and secure critical infrastructure.

As part of a Road Map reorganization, the ANA Special Operations Command plans to absorb the ANA’s two mobile strike force vehicle brigades to provide ground assault force capability and reduce reliance on conventional ground forces. The number of special operations units will grow with the addition of a fourth commando company, two new special forces kandaks (battalions), and general support kandaks to enable the ASSF to support itself logistically. The Special Mission Wing, the special operations air component, will also expand its ranks, adding additional helicopter crews and creating new kandaks for fixed wing aircraft and aviation support, with plans to double the size of its fleet by 2023. Position authorizations for these new and expanded units will be transferred from existing unfilled ANA slots, and no change in the ANA’s total end strength authorization is anticipated.

The ANP will reorient its mission away from tasks properly handled by the military and focus on building competent community police forces capable of enforcing law and order. Reorientation will entail reorganization, specifically, the ANP’s special operations forces units and portions of the Afghan Border Patrol will be transferred from the MoI to the MoD to unify paramilitary and civil order functions under the military while permitting the police to focus on its core mission of law enforcement.
High Civilian Casualty Rates Continue

According to the latest UN report, the number of civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan as a result of armed conflict during the first 6 months of 2017 continued at approximately the record high levels the UN reported for the same period in 2016. The 2017 UN Commission on Human Rights Midyear Report, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, stated that 1,662 civilians were killed from January 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017, compared to 1,637 during the same period in 2016. The number of civilians injured remained about the same (3,630 to 3,581) as did overall casualties (5,257 to 5,243). Since January 2009, more than 26,500 civilians have died and nearly 49,000 have been injured as a result of armed conflict in Afghanistan. Highlights from the UN study include:

- Civilian casualties due to ground engagements decreased, while casualties caused by improvised explosive device tactics, particularly suicide bombs, increased. The UN reported a record number (1,151) of civilian casualties from complex attacks in 2017, a 15 percent increase over 2016.
- Anti-government elements were responsible for 67 percent of the civilian casualties—43 percent attributed to the Taliban, 19 percent attributed to unidentified fighters, and 5 percent attributed to ISIS-K.
- Pro-government forces were responsible for 18 percent of the casualties, pro- and anti-government combat jointly was responsible for 10 percent, and “other” fighters were blamed for 5 percent. The UN report noted a decrease in civilian casualties forces by pro-government forces compared to the same period in the prior year.
- The UN documented 232 civilian casualties (95 deaths and 137 injured) caused by Afghan and coalition air operations, a 43 percent increase compared to the first six months of 2016. According to USFOR-A, this may be attributed to the significant increase in AAF capabilities, both in the number of aircraft and in the number of strikes conducted.
- Civilian casualties increased in 15 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, with the highest numbers of casualties reported in 10 provinces. Nineteen percent of the casualties occurred in the capital, Kabul, as a result of suicide and complex attacks.
- Conflict-related violence continued to take its toll on women and children. Women accounted for total of 174 killed and 462 injured, a 23 percent increase over the same period last year. A total of 436 children were confirmed killed and 1,141 injured, a 9 percent increase over the same period last year.
The report made several recommendations to each of the parties involved in the Afghanistan conflict. The UN recommended that insurgent forces cease “deliberately targeting” civilians and civilian infrastructure, including government officials, journalists, human rights defenders, judges and prosecutors, aid workers, religious scholars, and mullahs, as well as places of worship.

The UN recommended that the Afghan government end “indirect” (without line of sight) use of mortars, rockets, grenades, and other weapons, as well as aerial attacks in civilian-populated areas. It also called on the government to develop and implement clear tactical directives, rules of engagement, and other procedures for the use of explosive weapons and armed aircraft. USFOR-A reported that the Afghan government is developing a national policy to prevent and mitigate civilian casualties. This policy will codify a requirement that the ANDSF report and investigate civilian casualty incidents.\(^ {172}\)

The UN also called on the international coalition to continue to support the Afghan government in developing the “National Policy on Civilian Casualty Prevention and Mitigation” and that an appropriate action plan for the implementation of the new policy that includes concrete objectives for preventing civilian casualties and continue to conduct post-operation reviews and investigations. USFOR-A reported that Resolute Support conducts investigations on every civilian casualty allegation in accordance with international humanitarian law.\(^ {173}\)

Figure 3.

Civilian Deaths and Injuries, 6-month periods, January to June
STATUS OF FUNDS

The President’s Budget for FY 2018, publicly released this quarter, requests a total of $64.6 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, of which $45.9 billion is for OFS and related missions. Within the budget for OFS, $3.7 billion is for U.S. military pay and benefits, $5.0 billion for DoD procurement of major end items, such as vehicles and aircraft, and $36.7 billion for “Operation and Maintenance,” a budget category that covers a wide range of day-to-day operational costs, as well as civilian and contractor salaries. Also included under Operation and Maintenance is $4.9 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), reflecting an upward trend over the past 2 years. The President’s Budget for FY 2017 underwent several revisions but ultimately totaled $42.8 billion for OFS, $4.3 billion of which was for the ASFF. The President’s Budget for FY 2016 requested $42.5 billion for OFS, $3.8 of which was for the ASFF.

The FY 2018 Budget assumes the current U.S. force posture of 8,400 troops in Afghanistan, consistent with the approved force manning level announced in July 2016. In June, after the Budget was released, President Trump announced his decision to allow the Secretary of Defense to determine the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Figure 4.
According to General Nicholson, at least 3,000 additional troops are necessary. In his June 15 testimony before Congress, Secretary Mattis acknowledged the President’s delegation of authority, but he added that he had not made any decision to adjust troop levels. In July, media sources reported that President Trump limited the increase to 3,900 U.S. troops.

From October 1, 2016, through February 28, 2017, the DoD obligated $15.1 billion in support of OFS. The DoD has spent $89.4 billion on OFS since the start of that operation on January 1, 2015. Since 2001, a total of $675.0 billion has been spent by the DoD on operations in Afghanistan. In total, since September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated $1.69 trillion and the DoD has obligated $1.45 trillion for war-related expenses in Afghanistan, Iraq, and related operations, as well as homeland security missions under Operation Noble Eagle.

**Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**

The ASFF is the primary funding stream through which the United States supports the ANDSF. The ANDSF receives a majority of its financial support from this fund, which Congress provides through two-year appropriations. The total amount estimated necessary to sustain the ANDSF during FY 2018 is $6.2 billion, of which the President’s Budget calls for the United States to contribute $4.9 billion via the ASFF. The Afghan government is expected to contribute $500 million, and other international partners will provide $789 million.

The President’s request for the ASFF includes $3.8 billion to support the ANA’s authorized end strength of 195,000 and $1.1 billion for the ANP’s authorized end strength of 157,000, and 30,000 ALP. The budget request includes $709.8 million for the second year of the Afghan aviation modernization effort, which includes acquisition of 27 modified U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to begin replacing the ANDSF’s Russian-made MI-17s.

In FY 2017, Congress appropriated the President’s requested amount of $814 million as the first installment of funding for the aircraft modernization program.

The FY 2018 request for the ASFF takes into account President Ghani’s ANDSF Road Map, including the plan to grow the ASFF by transferring existing, vacant ANA positions into the ASSF. While this will not alter the overall end strength authorization of the ANA, it will require additional funds. The June 2017 DoD report estimated that implementation of the Road Map will place the anticipated requirement for ASFF funding at around $5.0 billion per year through at least 2020. This includes costs associated with training new special operations forces ($203.3 million in FY 2017 and $192.5 million in FY 2018) and modernization of the AAF ($814.0 million in FY 2017, $709.8 million in FY 2018, and a total of $6.8 billion over 7 years).

The June 2017 DoD report cautioned that the ANDSF’s reliance on international funding will increase as security costs increase, driven by programs such as the ANDSF aircraft modernization. The Afghan government’s capacity to execute this financial aid independently also remains limited. Of the $4.2 billion delivered through the ASFF in FY 2017, only $1.0 billion was provided directly to the Afghan government ($796.5 million to the MoD and $212.5 million to the MoI). The remaining $3.2 billion is executed by the DoD, primarily through DoD contracts using pseudo-Foreign Military Sales cases.
CSTC-A reported this quarter that MoD facilities and maintenance service contracts, previously executed by the Afghans using Afghan contracts funded with DoD’s ASFF, are now contracted by the DoD due to capacity challenges at the Ministry’s Construction Property Management Division, which resulted in a lag in maintenance that threatened to degrade MoD facilities built with U.S. funds. Also, DoD resumed contracting for ASFF-funded ANDSF fuel requirements due to corruption in Afghan contracting and quality issues and to reduce the risk of corruption compromising timely fuel delivery to the Afghan Forces.\(^\text{188}\)

As shown in Figure 5, the FY 2018 request of $4.9 billion for the ASFF would provide assistance to the ANA and the ANP through the following eight principal funding categories:

**ANA**

**Sustainment**: Provides funding for salaries and incentive pay, uniforms, individual equipment, communications assets, ammunition and ordnance, aircraft maintenance, logistics, fuel, facilities upkeep, base support, medical supplies, communications equipment, vehicle maintenance, transportation services, and other day-to-day operational costs for the ANA.\(^\text{189}\)

*Figure 5.*
Infrastructure: The ASFF FY 2018 budget justification states that there are no major construction requirements for the infrastructure program in FY 2018. Requested infrastructure funding is less than half the FY 2017 request and will primarily support connection of existing ANA facilities to the power grid."\(^{190}\)

Equipment and Transportation: Continued acquisition of UH-60 Blackhawks will consume over half of the requested funding. Other transportation funds cover acquisition of AC-208 aircraft, contracted airlift, aircraft maintenance, and the recapitalization and refurbishment of damaged wheeled vehicles. Equipment funds support replenishment of ANA weapons, night vision devices, equipment training, and communication-jamming equipment."\(^{191}\)

Training and Operations: Supports the training and professionalization of ANA personnel in general military training, aviation, special operations, logistics, communications and intelligence, and other specialized military skills."\(^{192}\)

ANP

Sustainment: Includes police pay and benefits, ammunition, fuel, uniforms, facilities upkeep, logistics, medical equipment, vehicle maintenance, and transportation. This program also supports ALP lifecycle sustainment, including salaries, weapons, vehicles, and other equipment."\(^{193}\)

Infrastructure: There are no major construction requirements for the ANP in FY 2018. Most of the requested funding for infrastructure supports renovation of ANP buildings to provide safe and secure facilities for female personnel. A small amount of this funding is requested to connect ANP facilities to the power grid."\(^{194}\)

Equipment and Transportation: Most of the requested funding supports replacement of destroyed vehicles either through refurbishment of U.S. military excess or new procurement. A smaller amount funds engineering workshops, industrial equipment, and safety equipment such as fire extinguishers."\(^{195}\)

Training and Operations: Supports seminars and training for the ALP, mentoring of ANP analysts, and specialized gender training to better integrate women into the police force. Funds specialized training in fields such as information technology, English language, and logistics."\(^{196}\)

THE OFS COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

According to the June 2017 DoD report, the OFS counterterrorism mission focuses on defeating al Qaeda and ISIS-K, thereby preventing Afghanistan from being a safe haven for terrorists planning attacks against the United States and its allies. In carrying out the counterterrorism mission, U.S. special operations forces either operate unilaterally against terrorist targets or support operations undertaken by the ASSF that target both ISIS-K and the Taliban."\(^{197}\) The ASSF comprises Afghan special operations units totaling approximately 20,500 personnel."\(^{198}\)
This quarter, U.S. and Afghan special operations forces mounted a series of offensive operations in Nangarhar province, where ISIS-K has maintained its strongest presence, and in neighboring Kunar province. USFOR-A reported that the ASSF executed 1,015 ground operations and 96 air strikes this quarter. Of these operations, 458 were performed by the Afghans independently of U.S. support, 524 were advised by the U.S. forces, and 33 involved some level of participation by U.S. forces.

ISIS-K Remains a Threat Despite Heavy Losses

On April 5, 2017, a U.S. airstrike killed an ISIS-K senior leader, Syed Omar Bajawari, in Nangarhar province. On April 11, an airstrike operation killed 13 ISIS-K fighters in the region. The strike came soon after a member of U.S. Special Forces was killed during a combat operation in Nangarhar on April 8, marking the first combat death of an American soldier in Afghanistan in 2017.

On April 13, a U.S. aircraft dropped a 21,600-pound GBU-43, a Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb in the Achin district of Nangarhar province, on the Pakistan border, targeting a network of tunnels believed to be occupied by ISIS-K. The impact of the MOAB, which has the equivalent destructive force of 11 tons of TNT, remained unclear at the end of the quarter. One senior Afghan security official in Kabul reported that 94 fighters were killed, 4 of them commanders.

During an April 24 press conference, General Nicholson emphasized that the MOAB was used to send “a very clear message to ISIS—not only here in Afghanistan, but also ISIS main.”

Thereafter, the number of U.S. airstrikes in the region increased. Aided by U.S. airstrikes, U.S. and Afghan special operations forces attacked the ISIS-K headquarters in Nangarhar province on April 27, killing several high-level ISIS-K leaders and up to 35 ISIS-K fighters. Of note, the raid killed Sheikh Abdul Hasib, known to be the leader of ISIS-K and responsible for the March 2017 attack on a military hospital in Kabul that killed nearly 100 Afghans. However, two U.S. soldiers were killed during the 3-hour firefight, possibly by friendly fire.

In early May, the ASSF, with U.S. assistance, conducted airstrikes over a 24-hour period in Nangarhar, destroying an ISIS-K broadcasting station and killing an estimated 34 ISIS-K members, including several high-ranking leaders. On June 3, an airstrike destroyed an ISIS-K media production hub in Nangarhar and killed the director of ISIS-K media production. According to General Nicholson, the death of the director will disrupt the ISIS-K network, degrade its ability to recruit fighters, and hinder ISIS-K attempts to conduct international operations.

According to USFOR-A, these and other counterterrorism operations led to 874 ISIS-K and Taliban fighters killed and 127 captured this quarter, and restricted ISIS-K’s freedom of maneuver to existing safe havens in Pakistan and in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. Additionally, U.S. and Afghan targeting operations isolated ISIS-K leaders and limited their ability to synchronize operations.
Despite aggressive U.S. and Afghan counterterrorism operations, ISIS-K remained a threat to Afghan security. USFOR-A reported that about 900 ISIS-K fighters still operated in Afghanistan, an estimate that has not changed since last quarter. The media reported that ISIS-K is able to replenish its forces almost as quickly as it loses them. It recruits from a variety of sources, reportedly enlisting fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other Central Asian countries, while sponsoring madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan that focus on developing children to join its ranks.

**Counterterrorism Operations Attack Taliban, al Qaeda**

Outside the Nangarhar region, the ASSF conducted partnered counterterrorism operations targeting the Taliban in Kunduz, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces. In northern Kunduz province, a clearance operation in May removed senior Taliban leadership and destroyed or recaptured Taliban equipment. In the southern provinces, coalition-advised ASSF operations resulted in the capture of several Taliban commanders and, in one case, rescued Afghan civilians and soldiers being held in a Taliban prison.

In Pakistan, U.S. drone strikes killed two terrorist leaders. Iraqi Abdul Raheem, a senior al Qaeda military commander in the Afghan-Pakistan region, was killed on April 29, 2017. Abu Bakar Haqqani, senior commander in the Haqqani Network was killed on June 13, 2017. Although Pakistan “condemned the airstrikes as a violation of its sovereignty,” a media source reported that the United States is considering extending its drone operations in the region.

In support of U.S. counterterrorism operations, the DoD OIG continued an oversight project this quarter that seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the USFOR-A airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation processes that guide counterterrorism operations. DoD OIG evaluators conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan in mid-January 2017. The project was initiated in August 2016 based on feedback from U.S. commanders in Afghanistan who identified intelligence support to counterterrorism as an issue that warranted review. The DoD OIG expects to complete the project by September 30, 2017.

Additional information concerning the U.S. counterterrorism mission is provided in the classified Appendix to this report.

**THE NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION**

Complementing the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, the United States participates in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, which began on January 1, 2015, replacing the NATO-led combat mission that started in 2003. The Resolute Support mission focuses on training, advising, assisting, and equipping the ANDSF so that it will become capable of independently defending Afghan sovereignty and deterring long-term instability.
When U.S. operations in Afghanistan transitioned to OFS in January 2015, Resolute Support was staffed with approximately 13,100 troops from 39 nations. Since that time, the number has increased slightly. As of April 2017, Resolute Support was staffed by 13,459 troops with the United States contributing the largest share (6,941 personnel), followed by 26 NATO allies that provided 4,862 personnel and 12 non-NATO partner nations that provided 1,656.

The number of personnel assigned to Resolute Support has been sufficient to locate NATO advisory assistance at the ministerial (MoD/MoI) level and at four of the six ANA Corps and ANP zone headquarters levels. Additionally, Resolute Support has established two task forces to oversee expeditionary advising teams that provide tailored support to corps and zone headquarters and to regional ANDSF commands where needed.

**NATO Will Add Troops to Expand Resolute Support Mission**

In his February 2017 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Nicholson raised the prospect of increasing the Resolute Support staff because it faced a “shortfall of a few thousand” personnel needed to strengthen the advising effort. General Votel concurred in subsequent testimony, stating that Resolute Support needed to expand advisory efforts to support all six ANA Corps and ANP zones in 2017 and noted that the train, advise, and assist mission would continue to evolve in 2017.

The June 2017 DoD report stated that the reduction of the U.S. troop ceiling to 8,400 effective January 1, 2017, resulted in the risk to mission becoming “moderate-to-moderate-
of particular concern were “critical shortfalls” of advisors, especially those who provide assistance at dispersed ANDSF locations as part of expeditionary advising teams.\textsuperscript{229} The report noted that Resolute Support has increasingly relied on expeditionary advising teams to provide immediate and tailored support to the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{230}

NATO representatives met several times during this quarter to discuss the security situation in Afghanistan. On May 17, NATO defense chiefs met in Brussels to examine proposals that would increase the number of Resolute Support troops and change the way that those troops are deployed. According to General Dunford, the NATO representatives agreed to improve the security situation in Afghanistan by giving the Afghan security forces a “competitive advantage” over the Taliban. Additionally, the defense chiefs considered the need to provide Resolute Support advisors below the ANA Corps level, at the brigade or battalion level.\textsuperscript{231}

The May 17 meeting enabled the defense chiefs to update their nations’ political leaders who attended the NATO Heads of State and/or Government meeting in Brussels on May 25. According to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, the allied leaders expressed continuing support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan and some of the leaders announced their willingness to increase force contributions.\textsuperscript{232}

On June 13, President Trump delegated to DoD the authority for setting U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan, a decision that, according to Secretary Mattis, will “enable our military to have greater agility to conduct operations.”\textsuperscript{233} Although no number was given, Secretary Mattis was then believed to “favor sending several thousand” additional troops.\textsuperscript{234} Subsequently, media sources reported that President Trump limited the increase to 3,900 U.S. troops.\textsuperscript{235} At the end of the quarter, the new strategy for Afghanistan and any increase in U.S. troop levels remained under review by the Administration.\textsuperscript{236}

On June 13-14, NATO hosted a force generation conference in Brussels to address Afghanistan manning requirements where 15 nations pledged additional contributions to Resolute Support.\textsuperscript{237} NATO deliberations on strategy for Afghanistan culminated in a second meeting of NATO defense ministers on June 29 to discuss the path forward in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{238} In a press conference after the meeting, Secretary-General Stoltenberg announced that NATO would provide additional forces in order to stem the rising tide of violence in Afghanistan. He stated, “Our military authorities have requested a few thousand more troops for the mission in Afghanistan, and today I can confirm we will increase our presence in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{239}

Secretary-General Stoltenberg emphasized, however, that NATO’s increased presence in Afghanistan did not mean that the alliance would once again engage in combat operations.\textsuperscript{240} Instead, he emphasized that NATO advisors would focus on strengthening the professionalism and capabilities of Afghan security forces. Efforts would include advising additional Afghan special operation forces, expanding AAF capabilities, and strengthening ANDSF leadership through improved military education.\textsuperscript{241} Earlier in June, Secretary Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee that additional American troops could provide more fire and air support in direct combat operations, in addition to augmenting the train, advise, and assist mission.\textsuperscript{242}
However, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 23, 2017, Director of National Intelligence Coats predicted that the security situation in Afghanistan “will almost certainly deteriorate through 2018 even with a modest increase in military assistance by the United States and its partners.” The Director also assessed that the Taliban would make gains, especially in rural areas, as performance of the ANDSF declined due to attrition, weak leadership, and poor logistic support.\textsuperscript{243}

In advance of a U.S. determination regarding whether to increase the number of troops deployed, Australia announced its pledge to increase its troop numbers by 30, which would increase Australia’s contingent in Afghanistan to 300 military personnel.\textsuperscript{244} British Defense Minister Michael Fallon said that the United Kingdom would send just under 100 additional troops to help support Afghan forces around Kabul, bringing the total number of British soldiers in the country to around 600.\textsuperscript{245}

### The Resolute Support Approach

According to the June 2017 DoD report, Resolute Support advisory efforts focus on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational structures in the MoD and the MoI that will support a sustainable, credible ANDSF that is capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. To that end, Resolute Support advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on three levels:

- **Level One.** Advisors work closely with Afghan counterparts on a continuous basis, either embedded with an Afghan unit or organization or in close proximity to one.

- **Level Two.** Advisors work with their counterparts on a less frequent basis. The frequency of interaction depends on the proximity and capability of Afghan counterparts, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.

- **Level Three.** Advisors are not co-located with the Afghan counterparts but communicate from a central location with periodic visits or deployments of “expeditionary advising teams” to assist Afghan security forces with operations and sustainment.\textsuperscript{246}

Resolute Support focuses on eight key areas, known as “essential functions” (EFs) that provide the framework and guidance for the train, advise, and assist effort. In addition to the eight EFs, USFOR-A has established the Resolute Support Gender Office, a stand-alone advising directorate that provides guidance on gender-related issues to all EFs. Each EF has a gender focal point to ensure that gender considerations are incorporated into train, advise, and assist efforts.\textsuperscript{247}

Within the Resolute Support organization, a senior DoD or coalition official is typically assigned as lead for each EF with all Coalition advisors, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, aligned under the EF lead. The EF lead integrates advisory efforts from the ministerial level to the ANA Corps or ANP zone.\textsuperscript{248} A list of EFs and their indicators of effectiveness is provided in Appendix C.
INSIDER ATTACKS MAR RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

A series of 5 insider attacks throughout Afghanistan during the last 5 weeks of this quarter killed 3 U.S. service members and 16 Afghan soldiers, while wounding 8 U.S. and 5 Afghan military personnel. Single Afghan soldiers carried out four of the attacks, while two ANP participated in the fifth. The Taliban claimed that several of the attacks were carried out by Taliban infiltrators as part of its strategy to use insider attacks to target foreign forces. According to an Afghan news source, General Nicholson said that insider attacks targeting foreign forces by “a few confused individuals” would not damage relations between the ANSF and coalition forces.

June 17, Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh province
An Afghan soldier opened fire on military personnel at Camp Shaheen, the headquarters for the ANA 209th Corps, wounding seven U.S. soldiers and killing one ANA soldier. The Taliban claimed the attacker was a loyal insurgent.

June 10, Achin district, Nangarhar province
Three U.S. soldiers were killed and one wounded when an ANA soldier opened fire on them. A spokesperson for the Taliban claimed that the attacker was a Taliban infiltrator, but Afghan officials said it may have been the result of a personal dispute.

June 25, Khost province
Three Afghan security personnel were killed and three injured when a colleague opened fire on them. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 27, Shinkai district, Zabul province
An Afghan police officer opened fire on his colleagues at a checkpoint, killing six and wounding one. According to media reports, the attacker attempted to hand over control of the checkpoint to the Taliban, but Afghan security forces prevented the turnover. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 3, Kandahar City
Two ANP attacked a police facility in Kandahar City, killing six of their colleagues and wounding the district police chief. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that the two attackers had joined the ANP for the express purpose of carrying out such an attack.

Sources: See endnotes, page 120
BUILDING MINISTERIAL CAPACITY

USFOR-A and CSTC-A again reported progress and setbacks in building institutional capacity in the MoD and MoI, which exercise authority, direction, and control over Afghan army and police forces, respectively. In an effort to improve the accuracy of payroll disbursements and avoid improper payments, the MoD and the MoI continued to validate records in their automated personnel systems, a prerequisite for transition to the Afghan Personnel and Pay System, an improved method for managing personnel and pay. Afghan security forces also improved their ability to plan security operations, particularly in integrating air support with ground operations. Visibility over materiel in the Afghan supply system improved with expanded use of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS)—the Afghan inventory tracking system.

However, the ministries continue to face challenges across a wide spectrum of activities. U.S. leaders pointed to a lack of strong, dedicated Afghan leaders as the major impediment to the attainment of a sustainable security force. Leaders lack the skill sets necessary to guide their organizations; personnel promotions and assignments may be based on nepotism rather than merit; and corruption in leadership circles impedes proper use of resources. Although coalition advisors continued to address these issues, they reported that progress has been limited.

In January 2017, SIGAR initiated an audit to evaluate DoD efforts to advise and build ministerial capacity in the MoD and the MoI, and to examine the extent to which the DoD oversees and coordinates its efforts to advise those ministries.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- **BUDGET PLANNING AND EXECUTION**
  CSTC-A reported that, at the end of the 2nd quarter, the MoD executed its budget with no variation from its spend plan. The Minister of Defense claimed that the MoD was the only Afghan government agency that matched its expenditures to its spend plan.

- **PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**
  The MoD continued leadership development training this quarter, conducting brigade and battalion pre-command courses. The MoI reported that the number of untrained police in April 2017 was below the 5 percent threshold required in a commitment letter.

- **INTERNAL CONTROLS**
  According to CSTC-A, the MoD made “significant progress” in implementing its ministerial internal control program at the headquarters level, but full implementation at the corps level will be “more challenging” until the security situation at corps locations improves. This quarter CSTC-A reported that the MoD mapped several headquarters-level processes in order to identify high risk areas. Further efficiencies are expected when the program is implemented at the ANA Corps level.
The MoI completed its personnel asset inventory at the end of May. However, USFOR-A reported that nearly 30 percent of MoI end-strength personnel remained unaccounted for in AHRIMS because of the inability to update information on deserters, those wounded or killed in action, and personnel in remote or severely threatened locations. Although USFOR-A did not estimate their number, “ghost soldiers,” the term used for nonexistent personnel on the rolls, also contributed to the number of personnel who were not in AHRIMS.260

CSTC-A reported that, since January 1, 2017, it has saved nearly $19 million by withholding payroll funds for MoD and MoI personnel not in AHRIMS.261 Continued refinement and completion of AHRIMS data are critical to the implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), scheduled to begin in summer 2017. APPS will integrate MoD and MoI personnel and payroll data into a single system to strengthen personnel accountability and payroll accuracy. Currently, Afghan security forces are paid using a paper based system that is not linked to AHRIMS. When implemented, personnel records from AHRIMS will be migrated to APPS, and AHRIMS will be retired.262

■ SUSTAINMENT

Core-IMS can now track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to regional supply depots. Previously, visibility over materiel was lost after it left a national warehouse until it was reentered at the regional point of receipt.263

As part of the MoI-NATO weapons exchange program, the ANP turned in 25,000 AK-47 automatic rifles, of which several thousand were found serviceable and redistributed to fill ALP shortages. Additionally, the ANP received 16,500 M16 rifles for distribution to ANP zones.264

The MoI received the final delivery of 1,692 hand-held radios and an updated radio software package that included a Dari language menu and display to facilitate Afghan training and usage. A maintenance contract was awarded for the repair of nearly 9,000 radios that are now inoperative.265

The ANP command center underwent final system testing prior to coming on-line (expected in July) as a state-of-the-art facility with country-wide operational visibility.266

The MoD made significant progress in restoring capabilities at Kabul’s main military hospital that was severely damaged by an ISIS-K attack on March 8. CSTC-A reported that, by early April, 90 percent of the repairs had been completed. Procurement action was taken to replace $2.7 million of equipment and supplies. Repairs were initiated to improve the hospital water system, which has low water pressure, corroded piping, and deficient fixtures.267

Last quarter, CSTC-A reported that a critical shortage of force protection personnel limited the interaction between coalition logistics and maintenance advisors and their MoI counterparts.268 This quarter, CSTC-A reported

Kabul National Military Hospital continued to provide medical services and support following an attack on the facility in March. (DoD photo)
improvement in the availability of force protection for advising missions. 269

**PLANNING AND EXECUTING SECURITY OPERATIONS**

Headquarters Resolute Support reported “moderate improvement” in the ANSF ability to plan security operations, noting better integration of local governance and intelligence into operational plans and improved focus on core issues by ANA Corps commanders. 270 However, it cautioned that ANSF planning processes still lacked the quality needed to be fully sustainable, primarily because residual senior leaders lacked the knowledge, skills, and inclination to conduct and lead the process. As a result, coalition efforts have focused on developing Afghan officers who recently obtained leadership roles in the planning process. 271

According to Headquarters Resolute Support, President Ghani continued to replace ANA brigade and corps commanders this quarter with officers who demonstrated “promise in providing positive direction and energy to their organizations” and are “more offensive oriented.” 272 Coalition advisors observed an increasing level of offensive operations in four ANA Corps this quarter and reported that the ANSF has attempted to reduce the number of defensive, vulnerable checkpoints. Although some ANA Corps have become more adept at integrating enablers, such as airpower, intelligence, and artillery, into combat operations, Headquarters Resolute Support reported that most units “are not yet proficient.” 273 The most significant ANA accomplishment in using enablers has been the improved employment of A-29 attack aircraft to assist ground forces. 274 In April 2016, the AAF conducted its first A-29 airstrike, with coalition assistance. At the end of the quarter, the AAF was regularly conducted airstrikes without coalition assistance, relying instead on direct communication from Afghan air controllers to guide the A-29 pilots. 275

**INTELLIGENCE**

Headquarters Resolute Support reported that Afghan operators at the second ScanEagle drone surveillance site, established at Kunduz in March 2017, demonstrated the ability to launch, fly, and recover daily operational missions with contractor oversight. 276 According to the June 2017 DoD report, operators at the first site, located in Helmand province, have become adept at employing the system for observing targets, facilitating airstrikes, and conducting battle damage assessments. 277

According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF has continued to expand capabilities at the National Military Intelligence Center by implementing a platform that will enable the viewing of video feeds from multiple intelligence gathering assets. Additionally, USFOR-A reported that the Center increased its pool of intelligence sources by obtaining access to social media sites that have the potential to provide threat information. 278
STRAIGHT COMMUNICATIONS

According to USFOR-A, the MoD continued to improve its communications capabilities by delegating greater authority to ANA Corps public affairs officers, thereby enabling them to directly engage local television, radio, and social media outlets to highlight ANA activities. Additionally, the MoD established a liaison office in its headquarters to provide guidance to public affairs officers in the field. To extend communication access to remote areas, the MoD and coalition advisors embarked on a NATO-funded project to involve religious educators in communication matters.279

KEY CHALLENGES

MOI STRATEGIC PLAN

In summer 2016, the MoI issued strategic planning documents that identified five strategic goals to enhance overall ANP performance. The five goals called for: 1) strengthening public order, 2) enforcing the rule of law, 3) improving institutional management, 4) enhancing ANP professionalism, and 5) improving MoI infrastructure.280 However, since that time, Headquarters Resolute Support has reported limited or sporadic progress in achieving those goals.281

For example, the ANP continued to focus on countering enemy activity across the country rather than strengthening public order through effective policing. The MoI made little systemic change to improve its management and retained its basic organization and leadership. While Headquarters Resolute Support reported some progress this quarter in replacing “old guard MoI senior leaders” and implementing merit-based selection procedures, it noted that MoI needed to replace “the truly corrupt second layer” of management. For the past two quarters, Headquarters Resolute Support reported no noticeable improvements in MoI infrastructure.282

INTERNAL CONTROLS

The MoI failure to submit fuel consumption reports continued. Only one monthly report was submitted since January 2017, and the MoI Office of Inspector General has not conducted agreed-upon inspections of fuel sites. Coalition advisors have repeatedly emphasized the need for improved fuel accountability.283

FORCE MANAGEMENT

CSTC-A reported no progress in building the capability of the MoD and the MoI to manage their own force structures—a critical discipline that results in the assignment of the right mix of personnel and equipment to military units. The ministries remain dependent on coalition assistance to manage force structure. Since last quarter, CSTC-A has been seeking advisors with force management skills to instruct Afghan personnel analysts, but those advisors have not been put in place.284
SUSTAINMENT
Core-IMS loses visibility over materiel once it is shipped from regional depots to brigade or provincial headquarter levels. The contract for additional trainers to expand Core-IMS to the brigade level has been delayed.285

The MoD reported continuing vehicle readiness challenges resulting from lack of timely replacements for combat losses, ineffective contractor maintenance, and inadequate maintenance facilities. The MoD reported that 58 percent of its vehicles were operational.286

The MoI Facilities Directorate continued to demonstrate an inherent lack of knowledge and capability needed to prepare materiel requirements packages and move them through the procurement process. CSTC-A reported that this weakness has impeded the ANP mission and MoI progress toward self-sustainment.287

INTELLIGENCE
Several challenges impeded the achievement of a sustainable ANDSF intelligence operation. Although the MoD made progress in utilizing the ScanEagle surveillance system, USFOR-A reported that Afghan operators failed to recognize that they will eventually be responsible for managing the program on their own. In that regard, the ANA failed to maintain the equipment unless U.S. advisors prompted them to do so and did not plan or budget for future ScanEagle sustainment. Another intelligence gathering system, Wolfhound, which enables users to intercept insurgent radio communications, encountered personnel and training issues. USFOR-A reported that many of the attendees at the Wolfhound training course lacked established prerequisites and, on completion of training, were assigned to positions that did not involve Wolfhound operation.288

Intelligence sharing between the MoI and the MoD at the National Military Intelligence Center was “difficult,” according to USFOR-A, because the ministries used separate information management systems and a “lack of trust” existed between senior MoI and MoD leaders. Additionally, USFOR-A reported that nepotism in Afghan senior officer assignments at the Center negatively affected morale of junior officers assigned there. Coalition advisors continued to address this problem with the Center’s senior leadership.289

USFOR-A also reported that the Afghan Intelligence Training Center suffered from failing infrastructure and decaying facilities. Repairs to building structures, power generation systems, security fencing and lighting, and vehicles were not made because the Afghan budget process did not include all training center requirements.290

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
USFOR-A reported that, although the MoI strategic communications operation is staffed by over 150 people, it does very little to counter Taliban communications efforts and is largely reactive in nature. According to USFOR-A, the Afghan government needs to “mobilize” MoI strategic communications resources to “make the news and control the narrative.”291
Gender Affairs Update

This quarter, the Resolute Support Gender Office successfully produced the Resolute Support Gender 4-Year Plan. This plan provides the conceptual and operational approach to gender initiatives that will be integrated into the ANDSF Road Map.292

During a visit from members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on May 10, Resolute Support organized a roundtable discussion with women from the ANA and ANP to allow these women to highlight their concerns and provide insight into what they believed were the challenges regarding women in the ANDSF.293

The MoD and the MoI continue to pursue a target of 5,000 women each in the ANA and ANP. This quarter, USFOR-A reported that 1,091 women were in the ANA out of a total force of about 170,000, down from the 1,256 total reported last quarter. As of May 2017, 2,881 women served in the ANP out of a total force of about 150,000, down from 3,112 last quarter. ANP decreases, according to the command, were due to retirements and absences without leave.294

In addition, USFOR-A reported that the MoD intelligence program slowly integrated women as a part of a larger intelligence career development program. However, USFOR-A noted that the prevalence of traditional attitudes concerning women remains a significant road block to the acceptance of women in the workplace in other than subservient roles, and to valuing their analytic contributions to the intelligence mission.295 As described in a previous Lead IG report, women face obstacles to their service, including threats from the Taliban, hostility from male colleagues, and opposition from family members.296

Gender Affairs Office advisors continued to emphasize a gender perspective within the EFs and across the Resolute Support staff functions. Bi-weekly meetings of Gender Focal Points (representatives of the Gender Office) were held to ensure that gender was considered in all advising efforts and actions.297

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Women in the MoD/MoI</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officer</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Measuring Capability

To assess ministerial progress, Headquarters Resolute Support established a rating system based on MoD/MoI attainment of milestones, which are determined by mutual agreement between coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts. The rating system groups milestones by Essential Function (EF), and Afghan components, with coalition assistance, endeavor to accomplish the milestones over time through the execution of supporting actions to achieve the desired outcome. Every 6 months, coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts review the action plans to assess the ministries’ ability to achieve milestones. Coalition advisors evaluate progress using a rating scale from one to five as shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agreed Upon</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has agreed with the specific supporting action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Development</td>
<td>The Afghan organization has planned the specific action and is ready to implement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Capable and Effective</td>
<td>Measures to achieve the desired outcome have been designed and partially implemented, but are neither operational nor adequately effective. The condition can be achieved with existing level of coalition support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable and Effective</td>
<td>The specific condition is nearly achieved, but incomplete. The Afghan organization is fully capable but requires assistance to improve efficiency and achieve sustaining capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustaining Capability</td>
<td>The condition is fully achieved and the Afghan organization can effectively apply the capability, while refining processes to enable growth. Coalition support is provided only on request.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commitment Letters Being Revised

CSTC-A continued to place financial controls on U.S. and international contributions through a series of annual bilateral financial commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI. Commitment letters, jointly signed by the relevant Afghan minister and CSTC-A commander,
Table 4.

**Combined MoD/MoI Assessments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month of Assessment</th>
<th>Total MoD and MoI Milestones</th>
<th>Number Agreed Upon</th>
<th>Number in Development</th>
<th>Number Partially Capable</th>
<th>Number Fully Capable</th>
<th>Number Sustainable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted by End September</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

establish conditions for the use of international funds and hold the Afghan ministries accountable for the transparent and responsible management of those funds. CSTC-A enforces the conditions by issuing rewards and penalties based on performance metrics in the letters.301

The June 2017 DoD report described several concerns with the commitment letters established for Afghan Fiscal Year 1395, which ended on December 20, 2016. Over 130 letters were operative, which are too many to enforce or track accurately. Furthermore, some of the penalties, if applied as specified by the letter, could have detracted from ANDSF combat readiness. For example, a penalty calling for withholding fuel allocations could impede unit mobility. To address those concerns, CSTC-A revised the commitment letters to reduce the number of conditions assessed and establish penalties that would not affect combat capabilities.302

CSTC-A reported that the Ministers of Defense and Interior have not yet signed the proposed commitment letters for Afghan FY 1396, and the conditions in those commitment letters are, therefore, not yet in force. Penalties imposed under prior commitment letters, such as a ban on certain types of ministerial travel, remain in force.303

**Oversight of Donor Funds**

This quarter, the DoD OIG continued work on an audit to determine whether CSTC-A provided effective oversight of ammunition procured for the ANDSF with U.S. funds. This audit is another in the series of audits related to U.S. direct assistance funding. A final report is anticipated in August 2017.304 Previous DoD OIG oversight work has evaluated controls over MoD and MoI fuel contracts and examined the contract management process implemented by the MoD and the MoI to award contracts funded by the United States.305

CSTC-A carries out a separate audit program to evaluate MoD and MoI operations. The CSTC-A audit staff was conducting seven audits at the end of this quarter, with eight additional audits planned this fiscal year. The ongoing audits were examining controls over payroll payments to ANA and ANP personnel, the adequacy of MoD and MoI facility maintenance, utilization of MoD and MoI gender facilities, and the administration of contracts for MoD generators.
CSTC-A reported that it expanded its audit mission this quarter to address programs that are funded by the ANA Trust Fund, a NATO sponsored account that supports the ANA. In June, CSTC-A began two audits—one to evaluate the administration of a radio support contract for Afghan special operations forces and another to evaluate a literacy training project.306

SIGAR completed two oversight projects this quarter that identified issues regarding uniforms procured for the ANDSF with U.S. funds. An audit report completed in April found that poor data and a lack of clear roles and responsibilities limited CSTC-A’s ability to develop and validate clothing and equipment requirements for the ANDSF. The DoD concurred with SIGAR’s five recommendations to improve the processes by which the coalition and Afghan government develop and procure ANDSF clothing.307 A SIGAR special project completed in June found that the DoD may have wasted $28 million licensing a proprietary camouflage pattern for nearly 1.4 million ANA uniforms rather than using one of the many patterns owned by the DoD. Additionally, the MoD selected the forest green pattern even though it was never tested for effectiveness in the arid Afghan landscape, of which less than 2.1 percent is covered by forests. The DoD concurred with SIGAR’s recommendation to conduct an analysis of the current ANA uniform specifications to determine whether there is a more suitable alternative to the forest green pattern.308

BUILDING ANDSF CAPACITY

A high attrition rate was a factor in preventing the MoD and the MoI from reaching their authorized strength levels. During the 12-month period ending April 30, 2017, about 50,300 personnel were separated or dropped from ANA rolls, with about 52,600 recruits added. This equates to an annual personnel turnover rate of 30 percent, indicating that at any time almost one-third of ANA soldiers have less than 1 year of experience.309 For comparison, the U.S. Army recruitment goal in 2016 was 62,000 recruits to maintain a force of 460,000 soldiers.310 The attrition rate in the MoI was slightly better than in the MoD, with about 36,200 losses and 36,800 additions, representing an annual turnover rate of 24 percent.311 Although DoD officials emphasized that the attrition rate decreased in 2017, the latest strength figures show little overall increase (1.1 percent) from April 2016 to April 2017.312 The trend in ANDSF end-strength is illustrated in Figure 6.

According to Headquarters Resolute Support, the long-term solution to minimize attrition and attain authorized ANDSF strength is to achieve a “critical mass of competent, empathetic leaders who embrace the importance of properly caring for their people.”313 Coalition advisors have oriented their train and advise efforts under the Road Map to support this goal.314

Headquarters Resolute Support identified the poor quality of the current ANP leadership as a major impediment to ANP retention, specifically citing the “ambivalence” of many commanders to personnel issues, such as job dissatisfaction, lack of support and supplies, and limited opportunities to take leave. Lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with inadequate provisions and the constant possibility of combat have also driven personnel out of the ANP ranks.315
The MoI senior leadership has taken several steps towards addressing this problem, such as replacing nine Deputy Ministers and half of the eight ANP zone commanders whom the MoI had identified as corrupt and ineffective. Headquarters Resolute Support cited reports from advisors in the field that these personnel changes had a positive impact on morale. However, senior MoI leaders recognize that rooting out corrupt officers is not enough. Long-term sustainability will require the ANP to develop highly skilled, well-trained leaders of character. MoI train and advise efforts continued to focus on incorporating merit-based selection procedures to ensure that police commands are earned and not purchased. For its part, the ANA instituted a formal selection board process for senior officers and NCOs with the stated goal of eliminating the practice of paying for promotions.

Figure 6.

**ANDSF On-Board vs. Authorized Strength, April 2016 to April 2017**
To improve ANA leadership in the short-term, the MoD approved plans this April to evaluate mid-level ANA commanders and chiefs of staff. For longer term improvement, Headquarters Resolute Support drafted leadership development plans predicated on five main lines of effort: merit-based promotions, assignments, career paths, education, and training. Headquarters Resolute Support expected to finalize this plan no later than August 1, 2017, and submit it to the MoD for approval and implementation in September. While educational resources for rising ANDSF leaders exist in the United States, the limited number of Afghan officers with English proficiency combined with the increase in absence without leave incidents involving Afghans training abroad have decreased ANDSF leadership training opportunities in the United States.

Casualties remained a second cause of ANDSF attrition and the number of soldiers and police killed or injured in routine patrols increased since the Afghans assumed the lead responsibility for security in 2015. Although the number of casualties that occurred during planned offensive operations dropped, the leading cause of ANDSF casualties remained direct fire attacks, with improvised explosive devices representing a much smaller portion. The ANDSF has taken steps to try to reduce casualty rates by replacing ineffective leaders. Insider attacks continued to represent a significant threat to Afghan and U.S. force security. (See infographic on page 47.) Coalition advisors have engaged MoD and MoI leadership on the importance of formal personnel screening policies. Monthly gains and losses of ANA personnel over the past year are shown in Figure 7.
The ANA continued to build a reserve force. ANA reserve units consist of honorably discharged ANA soldiers who rejoin the army on one-year contracts. These reserve soldiers serve in their home areas and support the existing ANA force on an as-needed basis. Generally, ANA policy does not permit active-duty soldiers to serve in their home areas in order to reduce the potential for local influence. However, this policy has increased transportation costs and created challenges for soldiers attempting to take authorized leave. Both of these consequences have contributed to the problem of attrition.

As of April 19, 2017, the ANP had approximately 148,710 personnel out of a total authorized end strength of 157,000. The ANP experienced an attrition rate of 2.1 percent over the most recent six-month period, which was consistent with its 2 percent attrition rate over the last three years. These high numbers of police personnel dropped from the rolls have been offset with high levels of recruiting, although the ANP still struggled with reenlistment. Monthly gains and losses of ANP personnel since May 2016 are shown in Figure 8.

Headquarters Resolute Support reported that the MoI and the MoD have begun work on plans for a reorganization that will more clearly delineate military and police responsibilities. Future train and advise efforts will seek to facilitate the transfer of units between the MoI and MoD as well as connect advisors that will develop a culture of community policing in ANP units. Headquarters Resolute Support cautioned that these are future plans and no significant work has yet been completed in this area.
ANDSF Improves Campaign Planning

The June 2017 DoD report stated that in the run-up to Operation Khalid (the 2017 Afghan summer campaign) the ANDSF demonstrated improved planning capacity. While coalition advisors provided some counsel to the ANA and ANP, the overall campaign was the product of Afghan planners. ANDSF commanders designated the principal and supporting efforts, allocated resources, and conducted formal planning briefs to senior officials with little to no coalition assistance.

ANA and ANP Work to Improve Medical Capacity

CSTC-A reported that while the number of ANP medical providers was only 81 percent of its authorization this quarter, the number was expected to reach 90 percent of authorization within the next 2 years at its current rate of growth. Given this trend, advisors shifted their focus in the medical community from recruitment (quantity) to force management (quality). This will involve expanding personnel to include occupational specialties. Among other things, this will help identify unqualified personnel assigned to specialized positions, particularly those on medical staffs. To support the retention of qualified medical
personnel, advisors assisted the MoI in reforming its incentive pay structure to attract more highly educated doctors, nurses, and medical technicians.\(^{328}\)

This quarter, coalition advisors sought to improve the ANP hospital, which has suffered from patient overcrowding. The original hospital was opened with a 77-bed capacity and now houses 204 beds. This overcrowding has negatively impacted patient outcomes and contributed to the perception that the ANP hospital system provides substandard care. This June, a contract to renovate the hospital and increase its capacity to 300 beds was approved. The Afghan Surgeon General’s Office, in consultation with the MoI and supported by advisors, is also developing plans to expand ANP zone hospitals to better meet the needs of wounded ANP personnel. The MoI hospital system consists of the ANP hospital in Kabul and seven 20-bed hospitals in ANP regional zones.\(^ {329}\)

CSTC-A reported that ANA hospital staff were generally well trained, and the ANA Medical Command was recently able to receive, store, process, and prepare vaccines that require temperature-controlled supply chains at all six of its regional military hospitals. However, procurement remained a challenge in this area because the ANA continues to rely heavily on coalition partners for medical supplies and equipment. The corps-level medical warehouses were reportedly in various stages of organization with many suffering from low stock levels and an inability to provide consumption reporting or accurate forecasting of future needs.\(^ {330}\)

Several medical skill sets remained lacking in the ANA Medical Command, including pathology, psychiatry, oncology, and public health. CSTC-A cited pathology as the skill set in most critical need. The ANA Medical Command also suffered the loss of its only Magnetic Resonance Imaging-qualified radiologist in the March 8, 2017, attack on the Kabul National Military Hospital, and a replacement for him had not yet been found.\(^ {331}\)

A general lack of standard personal hygiene practices, such as handwashing, which is prevalent across Afghanistan, is particularly pernicious in the medical community. CSTC-A also reported that cleaning and disinfection practices at ANA medical facilities were generally below World Health Organization standards.\(^ {332}\)

**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP is a community-based security force operating in districts around the country. District Chiefs of Police establish ALP checkpoints as fixed defensive positions, and receive support from both the ANP and the ANA. USFOR-A reported that the ALP presence in remote villages represented an effective, visible show of force to deter potential insurgent attacks. Drawing personnel from the communities they protect, the ALP tended to enjoy a positive relationship with the local populations.\(^ {333}\)

According to USFOR-A, the ALP is a critical element of the ANDSF’s layered security structure. The command cited the willingness of villages to organize and staff ALP checkpoints in the face of insurgent threats as a demonstration of the program’s effectiveness. The ALP contributed to the Afghan Sustainable Security Strategy by...
fighting alone in their villages or alongside the ANA and ANP during both planned and emergency operations. USFOR-A stated that the relationships between the ALP and the local populations contribute to a heightened situational awareness in their areas which made the ALP particularly effective in disrupting insurgent activity.  

As of June 6, 2017, 77 percent of ALP personnel were electronically slotted and validated in AHRIMS and 85 percent were being paid electronically. This fiscal year, CSTC-A instituted a policy of only funding salaries for validated personnel, reviewing validated numbers quarterly, and adjusting funding accordingly. All ALP personnel are also required by CSTC-A to possess a biometric ID card. As of May 23, 2017, 81 percent of on-hand ALP met this requirement.

An additional challenge for the ALP has been equipment inventory. Since September 30, 2016, ALP headquarters were required to have a 100 percent inventory of all on-hand equipment. As of June 1, 2017, the ALP met only 91 percent of the required district inventories. USFOR-A also reported that many ANP lacked formal training. The MoI directed untrained personnel to attend regional training centers during the spring months to close this gap.

USFOR-A continued to monitor allegations that some ALP personnel committed gross violations of human rights, which include cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; torture; prolonged detention without charges and trial; disappearance by abduction and clandestine detention; and other flagrant denials of life, liberty, or security. From May 2012 to July 2016, 14 allegations were made against the ALP, of which 9 resulted in criminal case openings by Afghan authorities. USFOR-A stated that allegations against the ALP were consistent with those brought against other ANP elements in 2016. No new allegations were brought against the ALP during this reporting period.

USFOR-A reported that the MoI established “a full department dedicated to investigating and tracking human rights and criminal violations.” However, according to the SIGAR report for the quarter ending June 30, 2017, CSTC-A determined that the MoI had not sufficiently investigated cases of gross violations of human rights. The ALP is paid with U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government.

**Afghan Air Force**

The U.S. 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan reported that the AAF continued to plan, lead, and coordinate air operations in support of ANDSF national security objectives. As part of Operation *Khalid* (the Afghan 2017 summer campaign), the AAF expanded its operations using the A-29, the principal fixed wing attack aircraft of the Afghan forces. The addition of 4 new A-29s (bringing the total fleet to 12), combined with a new forward operating base at Mazar-e Sharif in northern Balkh province, enhanced the ability of these pilots and crews to provide full area of responsibility coverage. This quarter, A-29 aircrews had 16 pilots in training. The pilots and crews currently flying reportedly demonstrated professionalism and situational awareness in designating targets. Ongoing MoD efforts sought to further enhance the targeting process.
One year after integrating the A-29s in combat, the AAF provided aerial fires to support ground forces with little to no coalition assistance, selecting targets and coordinating ground-to-air communication independently. The AAF also supported ANA ground operations through integration of intelligence obtained by ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles. The ANA 215th Corps, assigned to the turbulent Helmand province, reportedly made use of the ScanEagle system for target surveillance, air-to-ground integration for aerial fires, and after action battle damage assessments. The 209th Corps in Kunduz province also used ScanEagle, and demand for the system continues to increase as the ANA realizes its effectiveness.

The MD-530 continues to serve as the AAF’s primary attack helicopter, operating around the country out of established bases at Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif. This quarter, the first four MD-530 maintainers graduated to the “craftsman” skill level, which indicated capacity to work independently and perform some supervision and training. This quarter, the AAF had 18 MD-530 crews with 51 pilots in training. This quarter, one MD-530 was lost due to a crash landing in low-visibility dust storm conditions. While the safety report was ongoing, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan indicated that pilot fatigue related to insufficient living conditions may have contributed to the accident.

The 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan reported that AAF C-208 and C-130 cargo planes doubled the amount of cargo carried over the past year. Increasingly operating independently, there were five C-208 pilots qualified to conduct airdrops with more pilots in training for this specialized skill during this quarter. On June 28, 2017, the Afghan C-208s conducted their first operational airdrop.
The Mi-17 serves as the AAF’s primary tactical airlift helicopter, despite the pressure placed on the fleet by overuse. While Mi-17 utilization rates remained higher than optimal this quarter, strain on the fleet was slightly reduced from the previous quarter due to the return of 4 aircraft that had been overhauled. As of this quarter, the AAF had 46 Mi-17s in its fleet, of which 25 were available for use in ANDSF operations.\(^{348}\)

The 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan reported that Mi-17 utilization rates remained slightly above the goal of 30 hours per month, and that DoD was exploring alternative lift options to ensure required lift capabilities continue until additional aircraft become available through the Afghan aircraft modernization program.\(^{349}\) The DoD’s budget request for FY 2018 included $709.8 million for the second year of this effort to continue the transition from Russian-made Mi-17s to U.S. Army UH-60 Blackhaws. The requested funding will support the acquisition of 27 UH-60s that will be upgraded to a modern configuration of lift and armed variants, modification of 30 UH-60s that were procured in FY 2017, procurement of 5 AC-208s, and training for aircrew and maintenance personnel.\(^{350}\) The DoD’s FY 2017 appropriation included $814.5 million that is, in part, being used to procure the first 53 UH-60s of a planned total fleet of 159, of which 40 will be utilized by the Special Mission Wing.\(^{351}\)

This quarter, the DoD OIG continued work on an evaluation of U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist the AAF. The DoD OIG expects to complete the project in December 2017.\(^{352}\)
Table 5.

AAF Operations by Aircraft from March 15-June 14, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total Missions</th>
<th>Operational Missions</th>
<th>Training Missions</th>
<th>Air Strikes</th>
<th>Passengers Moved</th>
<th>Cargo Moved</th>
<th>Tons of Human Tons of Human</th>
<th>Casualties Evacuated</th>
<th>Human Remains Recovered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>3652</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>66*</td>
<td>22,073</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10,202</td>
<td>315.8</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>1273</td>
<td>1095</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8,220</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>255</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*10 of the AAF’s 46 Mi-17s are armed with fixed forward firing weapons


Special Mission Wing

The Special Mission Wing is the aviation component of the Afghan special operations forces. From April 1, 2017, through June 9, 2017, the Special Mission Wing supported a total of 150 counterterror and 10 counternarcotics missions with fixed-wing (PC-12) and/or rotary-wing aircraft. USFOR-A reported that cooperation between the AAF and the Special Mission Wing has improved and proven effective at eliminating key enemy targets. USFOR-A assessed the Special Mission Wing as effective in accomplishing counterterror and counternarcotics operations, planning and executing these missions with minimal advisor assistance and often on short notice.353

Despite its accomplishments on the battlefield, the Special Mission Wing continued to be challenged by assignments outside its normal operational missions. Due to limitations in AAF capacity, the Special Mission Wing was routinely tasked with conventional air operations—such as supply drops and casualty evacuation—outside of its core mission in support of the ANA. USFOR-A reported that the Special Mission Wing was tasked this quarter with at least nine such missions. These forces were also ordered to conduct operations outside of the normal tasking chain, with orders from the MoD going directly to commanders in the field. This resulted in forces being sent into danger without time to conduct proper mission planning. Coalition advisors have emphasized the importance of proper tasking chains, but many ANDSF elements continue to bypass the official procedures.354

The Special Mission Wing also faced logistical challenges, relying on significant coalition assistance in this area. USFOR-A stated that this was slowly improving and that these forces were able to conduct low-level maintenance and services independently. However, coalition-funded contractors continued to provide the higher-level maintenance and all part and tool acquisitions. Advisors continued to work with the Special Mission Wing to encourage use of the MoD supply system to reduce reliance on the coalition, but Afghan logistic channels remained unable to provide many necessary supplies.355
COALITION CONTINUES TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE ONGOING FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

As has been discussed in this report, corruption is still identified as a key barrier to Afghanistan’s progress toward achieving its national security goals. As noted, for example, CSTC-A reported that MoI leadership remained hesitant to take effective action against corruption, and that officials “continually find new ways” to engage in corrupt activities. One of the four key elements under President Ghani’s Road Map for the ANDSF is to implement counter-corruption reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks. Since the initiation of this effort, coalition advisors have met with their Afghan inspector general (IG) office partners with a focus on actions that can build upon previous work and accomplish Road Map goals over the next 4 years.

At the MoD, the Annual Inspection Plan is the primary tool by which the inspectors general are empowered to detect and prevent fraud and abuse within MoD programs and operations. CSTC-A stated that while this program is useful, challenges remain in the inspection, reporting, and follow-up processes. While CSTC-A considered the MoD IG team capable and amenable to coalition advising, the limited number of advisors assigned to the MoD OIG combined with an adverse security situation made it difficult to provide the necessary level of support. CSTC-A also noted challenges in the area of asset declaration. Afghan law requires senior public officials to declare their assets as a means to promote transparency, but implementation of the asset declaration process, which was neither well developed nor well understood, has progressed slowly.

The MoI also employs an Annual Inspection Plan, and this quarter coalition advisors received reports that the MoI IG had completed most of its scheduled inspections. Moreover, the MoI conducted more work independently rather than under direction from a higher authority. Seventy-five percent of inspections were directed from the Ministerial or Presidential level compared to 90 percent last year.

The MoI made greater progress in the area of asset declaration than the MoD due to efforts by the MoI IG to personally contact senior officials who had failed to submit their required forms. At the IG’s recommendation, the Minister of the Interior agreed to withhold pay from delinquent personnel. As a result, the MoI has reported a 98 percent asset declaration compliance rate.

As directed by President Ghani, the MoD and the MoI incorporated anti-corruption efforts into their strategic plans. This included implementation of the Ministerial Internal Control Program, developed in consultation with coalition advisors, as an oversight mechanism to detect and minimize waste, fraud, and abuse. This program is designed to promote conditions for self-regulating oversight within the ANDSF by directing functional areas to conduct risk assessments and implement internal controls and risk mitigation. CSTC-A reported that the MoD made “significant progress” implementing the Ministerial
Internal Control Program at the headquarters level, but cautioned that the program’s full effectiveness will not be realized until it is incorporated at the corps level. Progress was not as strong in the MoI, where CSTC-A reported effectiveness of the program “is yet to been seen,” because implementation at the headquarters level awaits completion of training. CSTC-A said that it expects all MoI headquarters offices to implement the program when training is completed.361

This quarter, the DoD OIG continued its assessment of coalition efforts to enable the MoD and its subordinate organizations to develop an internal control program that helps the MoD run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. The project is expected to be completed in August 2017.362

The MoI IG continued to face challenges in obtaining accurate fuel consumption reports. CSTC-A reported that poorly regulated vehicle fuel remains a source of corruption. As of this quarter, the MoI IG had only received one monthly fuel consumption report since December 21, 2016. The MoI IG has so far taken only minor steps to improve oversight in this area and the OIG has yet to produce a quantitative method to measure acceptable ranges of fuel consumption.363 Coalition advisors continue to assist on this issue.364

CSTC-A noted that significant challenges remained in the execution of anti-corruption policies, especially within MoI. Despite the Afghan government’s institution of anti-corruption programs and willingness to hold meetings to discuss issues related to official corruption, action by the Afghans to address corruption was lacking. MoI leadership reportedly remained hesitant to move against corrupt individuals and networks.365

CSTC-A also took steps to increase the MoD’s and MoI’s capacity to manage international donor funding directly and in a fiscally transparent and accountable manner. This included
efforts to reduce payments to so-called “ghost soldiers.” Coalition advisors have worked with the ANDSF to improve accountability and accuracy in personnel counts. CSTC-A has helped to reduce such illicit payments through its new policy of only funding ANDSF salaries at the levels of electronically validated military and police personnel. As a result of this policy, both the MoD and the MoI took steps to improve the fidelity of their record keeping on unit strength.366

**Counter Corruption Advisory Group Prepares to Begin Operations**

This quarter, CSTC-A reported that Resolute Support’s Counter Corruption Advisory Group, previously known as the Counter Corruption Cell, was in the build-up phase but not yet operational.367 As reported last quarter, the purpose of this organization will be to provide targeting data and help synchronize the counter-corruption efforts of the Afghan government, Headquarters Resolute Support, inter-agency, and international partners. This advisory group was designed to facilitate action against corrupt networks, help the MoD and the MoI build counter-corruption capacity, and provide analysis that will assist the Afghan government in developing warrants and taking action against corrupt parties.368

Led by a Lieutenant Colonel, the Counter Corruption Advisory Group secured office space at Resolute Support Headquarters, Hamid Karzai Intentional Airport, and Bagram Airfield. It started the process of acquiring military, civilian, and contractor personnel with the goal of beginning operations in summer 2017. Once fully staffed and operational, the Counter Corruption Advisory Group will employ four analytical teams to monitor the
following sources of corruption within the ANDSF: corrupt networks within the MoD, corrupt networks within MoI, corruption through illegal patronage, and corruption related to criminal narcotics. Based on its findings, the Counter Corruption Advisory Group will provide analysis to Headquarters Resolute Support and the Afghan government to provide a common understanding of the sources of official corruption in order to coordinate, synchronize, and provide options for commanders to take action against corrupt actors, according to CSTC-A.  

**Major Crimes Task Force Update**

CSTC-A describes the Major Crimes Task Force as the Afghan government’s primary means to combat criminal networks. The task force is an elite unit within the MoI that investigates high level corruption, organized crime, kidnappings, and other serious crimes. This quarter, coalition advisors continued to work with the task force, focusing on leadership development, capacity building, and professionalization of the force. Advisors have also worked to increase communication between the MoI and the Attorney General’s Office to improve transparency throughout the investigative and prosecution processes.

According to data provided by the Afghan government, the task force initiated about 490 cases and made 125 arrests from January 2016 through May 2017. This quarter, CSTC-A reported that the Major Crimes Task Force opened 118 cases.

**Anti-Corruption Justice Center Update**

The Anti-Corruption Justice Center was established in November 2016 to prosecute high level corruption cases. Designed to remain independent from outside pressure, the Center employs specialized police, prosecution units, and judges under the same roof to investigate and prosecute serious corruption by high-level government officials and powerful individuals. Since its inception, the Anti-Corruption Justice Center has completed 14 major corruption cases involving 38 defendants including four from MoI, one from MoD, and the rest from other ministries or private sector entities. The Center’s most recent case was tried on May 22, 2017, against the CEO of a branch of the Afghan United Bank. Charged with embezzlement, fraud, and misuse of authority, he was convicted and sentenced to 15 years and 3 months imprisonment, as well as fined over $3 million.

While the Anti-Corruption Justice Center made progress, CSTC-A cautioned that the Anti-Corruption Justice Center was still in its infancy and faced challenges in organization, docketing, and strategic communications. Facility issues have also hindered the Center’s work. The move to a new office complex, funded by the U.K. Government, was delayed due to a lack of electricity, sanitation issues, and dissatisfaction on the part of Center staff with the smaller courtrooms at the new site. However, CSTC-A expects the move to be completed this summer.
### COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG Agency Staffing</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Projects</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotline Activity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

As required by Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG is responsible for planning, conducting, and reporting on oversight of overseas contingency operations. This section of the report provides information on Lead IG staffing to perform these oversight functions; outreach efforts by Lead IG agencies; completed Lead IG oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations during the past 3-month period, April 1, 2017 through June 30, 2017; Lead IG investigative activity; and the OIGs’ hotline activities.

USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan that do not involve OFS-related programs or activities, and coordinates these efforts as appropriate with other audit and law enforcement organizations. This oversight activity, discussed starting on page 77, is included in this report to provide a more comprehensive update on the oversight of U.S. government programs in Afghanistan, including those not involving OFS-related programs.

LEAD IG AGENCY STAFFING

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees as well as contractors to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and perform other functions, such as strategic planning and reporting. Oversight teams from the Lead IG agencies regularly travel to Afghanistan and other locations in the region on a temporary basis to conduct the field work for their projects. The DoD OIG and DoS OIG have field offices in Afghanistan to support regional activity staffed with OIG employees on 90-day, 6-month, and 1-year rotations. USAID OIG also has a field office in Afghanistan staffed with OIG employees that is supported by its offices in Germany and Washington, D.C.

OUTREACH

Outreach and coordination continue to be important aspects of Lead IG work. During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies met with senior agency officials and coordinated with other oversight partners and agencies.

In April, the DoD IG, in his capacity as Lead IG, traveled to U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida, where he met with the Commander of Central Command and his senior officers. The purpose of the visit was to discuss Lead IG responsibilities and DoD OIG oversight efforts and to hear the Command’s input on operations and oversight activities. During the quarter, the DoD IG continued to highlight Lead IG efforts and common audit issues in his quarterly meetings with the Service Inspectors General and the Service Auditors General.
On June 30, the DoS IG and his leadership team briefed the new Deputy Secretary of State on DoS challenges and current focus areas for DoS OIG oversight, including the DoS OIG’s joint efforts with DoD IG and USAID IG to provide Lead IG oversight and quarterly reports for OIR and OFS. The Deputy Secretary was sworn in on June 9.

Senior Lead IG officials, representing the DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG, regularly meet with policy officials, collect information, and conduct research related to OFS and activities in Afghanistan.

**COMPLETED AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION PROJECTS**

Lead IG and partner agencies released six reports relating to OFS from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017. These projects examined military facilities and embassy building construction, uniforms, and equipment for the Afghan security forces, the implementation of a DoS antiterrorism assistance program, and Leahy Law implementation in Afghanistan.

Although USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities, it does conduct efforts in Afghanistan in many sectors, including agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. As a result, USAID OIG conducts audits in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with Lead IG and other audit organizations.

**Final Reports**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OVERSIGHT**

**U.S.-Controlled and Occupied Military Facilities Inspection–Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti**

DODIG-2017-087, June 2, 2017

The DoD OIG inspected facilities at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to determine whether they were in compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems. Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, provides housing and support for military personnel involved with OFS operations.

The DoD OIG found that the newly constructed U.S. military-occupied facilities were generally well-built. However, some new construction that was accepted as complete did not fully comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards. The inspection team discovered 172 electrical system deficiencies and 519 fire protection systems deficiencies. These deficiencies resulted from acceptance of new construction that did not comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards, inadequate contractor maintenance, insufficient government inspection of work performed by the contractor, and lack of onsite government specialized skills in electrical and fire protection.
inspections. The DoD OIG report said five of the deficiencies were critical and required immediate corrective action. The DoD OIG issued a notice of concern to the Commanders of Navy Installations Command and of Camp Lemonnier.

The DoD OIG made four recommendations to the Navy Installations Command. Specifically, the DoD OIG recommended that the Command 1) conduct a root cause analysis, implement a corrective action plan for all deficiencies identified in the report, and ensure that all facility operations and maintenance comply with the Unified Facilities Criteria and the National Fire Protection Association standards; 2) prepare and implement a corrective action plan to ensure all construction projects are reviewed for compliance with applicable electrical and fire protection systems codes and standards before they are accepted by the U.S. Government as complete; 3) review the circumstances surrounding the failure by the contracting officer, contracting officer’s representative, and the performance assessment representative to fully document the contractor’s work performance and, as appropriate, initiate administrative action; and 4) create an acquisition plan and take action to obtain the services of certified electrical safety experts and provide the DoD OIG a copy of these four plans within 90 days of the issuance of the report.

The Commander, Navy Installation Command and the Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, agreed with most of the report’s findings and have taken steps to address them. However, the Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, did not fully address the recommendation regarding the accountability of the acquisition specialist who did not adhere to guidelines. The Commander also failed to fully address the recommendation to acquire the services of electrical safety experts and fire protection engineers. The DoD OIG has asked the Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia, to provide further comments that address the specifics of the recommendations within the 90 days of the issuance of the report.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OVERSIGHT**

*Management Assistance Report: Building Deficiencies Identified at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan Need Prompt Attention*

AUD-MERO-17-44, June 29, 2017

The DoS OIG issued a Management Assistance Report to prompt action to address the deficiencies identified as part of an ongoing audit of Embassy Kabul construction. Working in collaboration with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the DoS OIG identified a number of ongoing deficiencies throughout the new construction that, if left uncorrected, would have long-term implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the buildings’ equipment and systems. The deficiencies identified impact plumbing and electrical systems; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems; elevators; and fire-safety systems.

The deficiencies that DoS OIG identified in the new Embassy construction are due, in part, to weaknesses in the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations’ oversight of this multi-million-dollar construction project. The DoS OIG found a lack of quality assurance oversight during key phases of the project that contributed to many of the identified
deficiencies. The report stated that failure to adequately address these deficiencies would result in increased costs to the DoS in carrying out corrective actions as well as in conducting additional medium- and long-term maintenance, repairs, and replacement in response to shortened life cycles of building equipment and systems.

The DoS OIG made 19 recommendations to the Bureau of Overseas Building Operations to address the deficiencies identified in the report. Based on the Bureau’s actions taken and planned, the DoS OIG considered all 19 recommendations resolved pending further action. The DoS OIG will continue to monitor the Bureau’s implementation during the audit compliance process until each recommendation is fully implemented and closed.

Management Assistance Report: Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan
AUD-MERO-17-37, May 15, 2017

The DoS OIG concluded a compliance follow-up review of the implementation of the DoS Antiterrorism Assistance program. The objective of this compliance follow-up review was to determine whether the two closed recommendations from an April 2012 DoS OIG report that currently apply to the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Pakistan had improved program management and oversight in Pakistan as intended, and to assess the implementation status of the open recommendation concerning the establishment of an Antiterrorism Assistance program monitoring and evaluation system.

In April 2012, the DoS OIG reported that the DoS Bureau of Counterterrorism and the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security had not developed specific, measureable, and outcome- oriented objectives for the Antiterrorism Assistance program, nor did they establish a means for evaluating progress against those objectives. The report also explained that both Bureaus had not assessed the ability of partner countries to further develop and build on the anti-terrorism assistance training provided without U.S. Government support. As a result, the report concluded that the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security could not determine the Antiterrorism Assistance program’s effectiveness.

The DoS OIG follow-up review found that the actions taken to address the recommendations made in the OIG’s April 2012 report relating to the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Pakistan did not collectively have the desired effect of improving the management and oversight of the ATA program in Pakistan. The DoS OIG also found that due to the lack of oversight, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security was at increased risk of paying for work not in accordance with contract requirements. The DoS OIG also found that the absence of performance reporting prevented DoS from assessing the effectiveness of Antiterrorism Assistance program training in Pakistan.

DoS OIG modified and reissued one recommendation from the April 2012 report and offered four new recommendations intended to assist the DoS in improving management and oversight of Antiterrorism Assistance program activities in Pakistan. Based upon the DoS’s response to the recommendations, the DoS OIG considers the recommendations resolved pending further action.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT

Proprietary Textiles: Afghan National Army: DoD May Have Spent Up To $28 Million More Than Needed to Procure Camouflage Uniforms That May Be Inappropriate for the Afghan Environment
SIGAR 17-48-SP; June 20, 2017

SIGAR conducted this review to determine 1) how and why the U.S. Government generated the requirement for the use of a proprietary camouflage pattern for ANA uniforms, and 2) the resulting cost to the U.S. Government of using a proprietary camouflage pattern for ANA uniforms from November 2008 through January 2017.

SIGAR found that the DoD’s decision to procure ANA uniforms using a proprietary camouflage pattern was not based on an evaluation of its appropriateness for the Afghan environment. SIGAR also found that the procurement costs to the U.S. Government were 40–43 percent higher for an ANA uniform using a privately-owned proprietary camouflage pattern and more complex cut than the costs for comparable ANP uniforms that use a DoD-owned non-proprietary pattern with a simpler cut. The DoD had spent approximately $93.8 million to procure uniforms for the ANA using the proprietary pattern since it made the decision approximately 10 years ago. SIGAR’s analysis found that changing the ANA uniform to a non-proprietary camouflage pattern and simpler design, similar to those procured for comparable ANP units, could save U.S. taxpayers between $68.6 million and $71.2 million over the next 10 years.

SIGAR recommended that DoD conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the current ANA uniform specification to determine whether there is a more effective alternative, considering both the operational environment and cost. The DoD concurred with SIGAR’s recommended action.

Leahy Laws: DoD and State Implementation of the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan
SIGAR-17-47-IPc; June 10, 2017

At the request of 93 members of Congress, SIGAR conducted a review on the DoD’s and DoS’s implementation of the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan. The review concerned allegations of sexual abuse of children by members of the Afghan security forces. Under the Leahy Laws, the DoD and DoS are prohibited from providing assistance to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed any gross violations of human rights. SIGAR made recommendations to the DoD and DoS to improve implementation of the Leahy Laws in Afghanistan. This report is classified.

NOTE: The DoD OIG is conducting a related congressionally-requested inquiry into the DoD’s implementation of the Title 10 Leahy Laws and other issues related to human rights violations in Afghanistan. The DoD OIG has provided a draft report to relevant DoD officials for review and response, and the DoD OIG expects to issue a final report in September 2017.
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: DoD Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment
SIGAR 17-40; April 24, 2017

SIGAR conducted this audit to assess the extent to which the DoD developed clothing and equipment requirements for the ANDSF and provided oversight and accountability of the clothing, equipment, and funds transferred to the Afghan government. From 2010 through 2014, the DoD spent more than $415 million to purchase uniforms, helmets, body armor, boots, and sleeping bags for the ANDSF. CSTC-A, the entity responsible for overseeing the DoD efforts, planned to turn the process over to the Afghan government by the end of 2014, but CSTC-A remains involved in providing clothing and equipment.

The audit found that CSTC-A’s ability to develop and validate clothing and equipment requirements for the ANDSF was limited by inaccurate data, reliance on questionable assumptions, and a lack of clear roles and responsibilities. As a result, CSTC-A ordered too few items in some cases and too many items in others. Furthermore, the audit found clothing and equipment frequently went unordered until the Afghan government reported acute shortages. In some cases, it could take more than a year between order and delivery. Based on a judgmental sample of 4,940 shipments between April 2015 and October 2016 containing approximately 5 million discrete pieces of clothing and equipment, SIGAR found that CSTC-A was able to provide documentation receipt and title transfer for only 1.7 million, or about 33 percent, of those items.

SIGAR made five recommendations, for which the report said that CSTC-A should develop and implement corrective action plans within 90 days. The recommendations included actions related to document and implementation guidance, the transition from a paper to electronic record system, and development of enforcement mechanisms. The DoD concurred with all five recommendations and noted that it had started to address the identified deficiencies.

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OIG OVERSIGHT

USAID OIG completed two non-OFS related financial audits on USAID-funded activities from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017:


INVESTIGATIONS

Lead IG agencies conduct OFS-related investigative activity through the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the DoD OIG’s investigative component, and the DoS OIG criminal investigative components. During the quarter, these components maintained an investigative presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Germany, and the United States.

The Lead IG agencies deploy criminal investigators to the region to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The DCIS has special agents in Afghanistan on a rotating basis. The DoS OIG has special agents on 1-year tours to Afghanistan and also maintains a regional office in Germany from which other investigators travel to Afghanistan if additional support is needed.

The USAID OIG conducts investigations related to USAID programs in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with other law enforcement organizations. These programs support USAID’s strategy for sustaining achievements in health, education, and for women; stimulating agriculture-led economic growth and fiscal sustainability; and supporting legitimate and effective Afghan governance. The USAID OIG has a team of one special agent and two Foreign Service National investigators in Afghanistan with support from an investigative analyst in Washington, conducting these investigations.

OFS-Related Investigative Activity

During the quarter, the Lead IG investigative components and the military investigative organizations initiated eight OFS-related investigations, involving allegations of procurement or program fraud, theft, and trafficking in persons. One investigation was closed during the period.

As of June 30, 2017, 33 investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations remained open. These open investigations do not include “legacy cases” that the DCIS and the DoS OIG are continuing to pursue related to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, the combat mission in Afghanistan that concluded in December 2014, or investigations that SIGAR is conducting. The OFS-related investigations involved allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. Government officials; theft and diversion of Government funds or equipment; trafficking in persons; and other offenses.

A consolidated look at the OFS-related activities of these investigative components during this quarter can be found in the dashboard on the opposite page.
ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL
As of June 30, 2017

OPEN INVESTIGATIONS

33

Q3 FY 2017 RESULTS

Arrests —
Criminal Charges —
Criminal Convictions —
Savings/Recoveries —
Suspensions/Debarments 1/1
Job Terminations 1
Personnel Actions 1
Other Administrative —

Q3 FY 2017 BRIEFINGS

No. of Briefings 19
No. of Attendees 138

*Some investigations are being worked jointly by more than one agency. Therefore, the total number of open cases by FCWG Agency may not equal the total number of open investigations. Note: Cumulative since Jan. 1, 2015
USAID OIG Investigative Activity in Afghanistan

During the quarter, the USAID OIG received 17 new allegations, totaling 51 allegations since the beginning of the fiscal year. The USAID OIG closed 11 investigations during the period.

In addition, the USAID OIG conducted 5 fraud awareness briefings in Afghanistan for 112 participants, for a total of 25 briefings to 377 attendees this year.

As of June 30, 2017, USAID OIG was continuing to conduct 39 investigations involving Afghanistan-related programs and operations. As noted in Figure 9, these open investigations involved allegations of bribery, gratuity, and kickbacks, false statements and claims, and program fraud and mismanagement.

Figure 9.
USAID Investigations in Afghanistan
HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to its agency. The OIGs’ hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review.

The OIG hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and refer these complaints to the appropriate entity in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG has an investigator to coordinate the hotline contacts received among the Lead IG agencies and others as appropriate. During the reporting period, the investigator received and coordinated 31 contacts related to OFS and opened 43 cases, which were referred within the DoD OIG, to other Lead IG agencies, or to other investigative organizations. Some contacts included multiple allegations that resulted in multiple cases.

As noted in Figure 10, the majority of the complaints received during this quarter related to personal misconduct and other personal matters, criminal allegations, and procurement or contract administration irregularities.

Figure 10.
Hotline Activity
An F-16 Fighting Falcon, belonging to the 555th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron at Bagram Airfield. (U.S. Air Force photo)

ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

Strategic Planning 84
Ongoing Projects 87
Planned Projects 96
ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

This section of the report discusses the ongoing Lead IG strategic planning process as well as ongoing and planned audit, inspection, and evaluation work. The ongoing and planned oversight projects related to OFS activities, as of June 30, 2017, are listed in separate tables.

USAID OIG had ongoing efforts in Afghanistan that do not involve OFS-related programs or activities. These ongoing and planned oversight projects review USAID efforts in Afghanistan related to agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth, education, gender promotion, health, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance. These projects are listed in separate tables.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Pursuant to Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG is required to develop and carry out a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO, and annually provide each plan to Congress. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed oversight, management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

Planning Group Meets Quarterly

On April 27, 2017, the Joint Planning Group received a briefing from the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who discussed the opportunities and challenges in Afghanistan. The second half of the meeting addressed the ongoing and planned oversight projects as well as those projects nearing completion.

To inform the planning activities and coordinate projects among oversight entities, the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, which began in 2008, serves as the primary vehicle to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations throughout Southwest Asia. Meeting quarterly, the Joint Planning Group continues as a forum for information sharing and coordinating the broader Federal oversight community’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in Southwest Asia, including oversight by the Military Service Inspectors General, the Service Audit agencies, and the Government Accountability Office.

FY 2018 Planning Continues

During the quarter, the Lead IG agency representatives continued FY 2018 comprehensive joint strategic planning for Afghanistan, including OFS, focusing on the agreed-upon strategic oversight areas, considering coordination opportunities for audits and investigation, and discussing possibilities for complementary oversight.
The Lead IG representatives will continue meeting to plan projects consistent with the strategic oversight areas, with the goal of issuing the FY 2018 joint strategic oversight plan for Afghanistan, including OFS, in the fall. The following provides a short description of each of the five strategic oversight areas for Afghanistan.

**FY 2018 Strategic Oversight Areas**

**Security**
Enabling people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence by establishing transitional public order, countering illegal combatants and criminal elements, conducting border control, protecting key personnel and facilities, establishing and strengthening relationships with host nation military and police, enforcing cessation of hostilities and peace agreements, and disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating belligerents.

**Governance and Civil Society**
Fostering the ability of the host-nation government, at all levels, to represent and serve its citizens by building or enhancing governance capacity; promoting inclusive and effective democracy, reconciliation, peaceful resolution of conflict, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces; fostering sustainable and appropriate reconstruction activities; enabling fair distribution of resources; and countering and reducing corruption, inequality, and extremism.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Development**
Ensuring that the population’s basic needs are met, transitioning to peaceful coexistence in communities, and providing long-term development supporting health, education, and the empowerment of women.

**Stabilization and Infrastructure**
Providing the people of Afghanistan the opportunity to pursue sustainable livelihoods in peaceful communities with effective economic systems and essential public services, which includes repairing or rebuilding essential infrastructure and buildings, reestablishing public utilities and basic health services, removing remnants of war and debris, and promoting an economic system that fosters basic commerce, free markets, and employment generation through sound legal frameworks, outside investment, and reduction of corruption.

**Support to Mission**
Enabling the U.S. government to conduct military operations and diplomatic efforts as well as provide humanitarian assistance to the local population. This includes the security of U.S. personnel and property, grant and contract management, program and project administration, occupational safety and health of U.S. infrastructure, and logistical support to U.S. personnel.
Implementing the FY 2017 Plan

The FY 2017 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, effective October 1, 2016, organizes Afghanistan-related oversight projects into eight strategic oversight areas. The FY 2017 ongoing and planned projects are aligned according to these strategic oversight areas:

**FY 2017 STRATEGIC OVERSIGHT AREAS**

- Building the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and administering and maintaining accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- Building Afghan governance capacity and sustaining U.S. investment in Afghan institutions and infrastructure
- Implementing and executing anti-corruption and counternarcotics programs
- Awarding and administering reconstruction contracts
- Property management
- Contract management and oversight
- Transition from the Resolute Support Mission to a more traditional (peacetime military engagement) U.S.-Afghanistan security cooperation relationship
- Intelligence and counterterrorism

The FY 2017 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan was effective October 1, 2016, and was included in the FY 2017 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations.
ONGOING PROJECTS

Ongoing OFS Projects
As of June 30, 2017, the Lead IG agencies and its partner agencies have 41 ongoing projects directly related to OFS. Figure 11 describes the ongoing projects by strategic oversight area, and the discussion that follows highlights some of the ongoing projects by these strategic areas. Table 6 lists the project title and objective for each of these projects.

- **Building ANDSF and Afghan Government Capacity:** Fifteen projects are ongoing related to two strategic oversight areas—building capacity and capability in the ANDSF and Afghan government. The DoD OIG has two ongoing projects to assess the U.S. and Coalition efforts to enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to develop oversight and internal control capabilities, and train, advise and assist the Afghan Air Force. The DoD OIG also has ongoing project related to allegations of child sexual abuse by members of the ANDSF. The GAO is conducting two projects related to the procurement of ANDSF major weapons systems and equipment and how these systems and this equipment support the overall strategy for the ANDSF. SIGAR has ten ongoing projects, including security sector reconstruction, non-intrusive equipment at Afghan border crossings, the DoD’s efforts to advise the Afghan ministries of Defense and Interior, the Afghan Air Force’s ability to maintain U.S. aircraft, and the effect of absent-without-leave (AWOL) Afghan trainees on reconstruction.

- **Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics:** Two oversight projects are ongoing to assess programs related to anti-corruption and counternarcotics. The DoS OIG is conducting an audit of the aviation program supporting DoS counternarcotics programs. The DoD OIG is auditing whether the DoD effectively supported counternarcotics requirements agreed upon between the Department of Justice and DoD.

- **Contracts and Contract Management:** The Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners have 21 ongoing oversight projects examining specific contracts, contract management and controls, or OCO funding. The DoS OIG is conducting six audits. Two of these audits relate to the oversight of invoices for OCO contracts, one involves Embassy Kabul construction and commissioning, one relates to the oversight protocols surrounding the construction of the new embassy compound in Islamabad, one deals with the solicitation of life support contracts for Embassy Kabul, and one involves the implementation of the explosive detection dog program at the Embassy. The DoD OIG has four ongoing audits in this area. One audit involves the effectiveness of oversight controls over ammunition provided to the
ANDSF, two audits relate to Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contracts, and one audit deals with U.S. direct funding to Afghanistan. The Army Audit Agency is auditing overtime pay and entitlements for deployed Army civilians and the Army’s reporting of OFS obligations and expenditures. The Naval Audit Services is auditing the reliability of the Marine Corps financial data reported for OFS and the Navy’s obligations and disbursements supporting the OCOs. SIGAR has seven ongoing projects, including inspections to determine if construction projects were completed in accordance with contract requirements and construction standards, and whether the constructed projects are being maintained and used as intended.

- **Resolute Support and Transition:** The DoD OIG is conducting a follow-up evaluation of the Bagram Air Field’s compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards. SIGAR has a project assessing the extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD to the Afghan government.

- **Intelligence and Counterterrorism:** The DoD OIG is evaluating airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to counterterrorism operations.

Table 6.

**Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of 6/30/2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Overtime Pay and Entitlements for Deployed Civilians</td>
<td>To verify that overtime was effectively managed and downrange entitlements (including danger and post differential pay) were accurately paid to Army civilians deployed in support of OFS and Operation Inherent Resolve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Army’s Reporting of Obligations and Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
<td>To verify the accuracy of the Army’s obligations and disbursements reported in the Cost of War report for OFS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
<td>To focus on answering a number of specific questions, including DoD implementation of Title 10 Leahy Laws regarding human rights violations, raised by several Members of Congress and congressional staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Supporting Counterterrorism Operations in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine if USFOR-A’s airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process is supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. and coalition train, advise, and assist efforts will enable the Afghan MoD and subordinate organizations to develop a transparency, accountability and oversight capability that helps the MoD run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title | Objective
---|---
**Audit of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Oversight and Management of Ammunition Supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel** | To determine whether CSTC-A provided effective oversight of ammunition of the ANDSF. This is a part of a series of audits related to U.S.-direct assistance to the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

**Audit of DoD Support for Counternarcotics Requirements** | To determine 1) whether DoD effectively supported counternarcotics requirements agreed upon between the Department of Justice and DoD, and 2) how DoD used funding to support those requirements.

**Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force** | To assess U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Afghan Air Force.

**Audit of Army Accountability of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government Furnished Property in Afghanistan** | To determine whether the Army provided effective oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Government-furnished property in Afghanistan.

**Audit of DoD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Invoice Review and Payment** | To determine whether the DoD adequately monitored contractor performance and conducted sufficient invoice reviews for services provided under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV contract.

**Summary Audit of U.S. Direct Funding Provided to Afghanistan** | To summarize whether the DoD has provided effective oversight of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and follow-up on the status of implementation of recommendations from five prior DoD OIG audits reports in this series.

**U.S. Military Facility Follow Up Evaluation-Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan** | To determine if U.S. military occupied facilities comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical, fire protection, and fuel systems.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**Audit of Contracting Officer Representatives Responsibility for Overseeing Invoices for Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts** | To 1) determine whether invoice review policies and procedures, training, staffing, invoice review practices, and accountability measures are sufficient to support overseas contingency operations; and 2) ensure invoice payments are reviewed in accordance with Federal requirements and Department guidance.

**Audit of Embassy Kabul Construction and Commissioning** | To determine whether the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations followed DoS policies and guidance governing the affirmation of substantial completion and final acceptance of construction projects at U.S. Embassy Kabul.

**Audit of Construction of the New Embassy Compound-Islamabad** | To determine whether the Department is effectively administering the construction contracts for the new embassy compound in Islamabad.

**Audit of Afghanistan Life Support Services Contract Planning & Solicitation and Award Process** | To determine whether the DoS is planning and implementing the solicitation and award process for the Afghanistan Life Support Services contract in accordance with acquisition regulations and Department guidance.

(continues on next page)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Canine Explosive Detection Program in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is managing and overseeing the Explosives Detection Dog program in accordance with DoS guidance and selected contractors are complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Invoice Review Process for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Contracts–Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs</td>
<td>To 1) determine whether invoice review policies and procedures, training, staffing, invoice review practices, and accountability measures at the DoS Bureau of International Law Enforcement Affairs are sufficient to support overseas contingency operations; and 2) ensure invoice payments are reviewed in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Aviation Program</td>
<td>To determine whether the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is administering its aviation program, including key internal controls such as inventory management, aviation asset usage, aircraft maintenance and asset disposal, in accordance with Federal requirements and DoS guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Defense &amp; Security Forces’ Equipment and Capability</td>
<td>To summarize how such weapon systems and equipment support the overall strategy for the ANDSF and identify gaps in ANDSF capability given the evolving security situation and overall strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Defense &amp; Security Forces’ Equipment and Capability</td>
<td>To 1) outline all major weapon systems and equipment procured for the ANDSF, consistent with the program of record; 2) summarize how such weapon systems and equipment support the overall strategy for the ANDSF; 3) describe the current capability and capacity of the ANDSF to operate and sustain such weapon systems and equipment; and 4) identify gaps in ANDSF capability given the evolving security situation and overall strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability of Marine Corps Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom's Sentinel</td>
<td>To determine the accuracy of the Marine Corps’ obligations and disbursements supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel as reported in the Cost of War report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Navy Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
<td>To verify that the Department of the Navy’s obligations and disbursements supporting Overseas Contingency Operations are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and that internal controls were in place and functioning as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</td>
<td>To assess the 1) extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior’s Headquarters Complex</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which 1) the Army Research Laboratory developed and awarded legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and DoD and federal regulations; 2) the Army Research Laboratory provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with the Army Research Laboratory broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Sector Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>To trace the role that strategy and planning played throughout the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, and answer the following questions: 1) What were the U.S. policy goals for the ANDSF, why, and how did these goals evolve, and what were the implications on ANDSF design? 2) What were the various designs considered for the ANDSF, why were they chosen, and why did they evolve? 3) How well was the ANDSF design implemented (inputs and outputs)? 4) How well have the ANDSF achieved expected strategic outcomes and why? 5) What are the critical policy and strategy lessons learned from Afghan security sector reconstruction? More than one report may be produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment of Afghan Border Crossing Points</strong></td>
<td>To examine the quantity, types, and costs of non-intrusive inspection equipment purchased with Department funding for installation and use at Afghanistan’s border crossing points, and assess the extent to which such equipment is currently being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</strong></td>
<td>To assess 1) the extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD’s advisory efforts, including funding; the number of advisors and contractors; their assigned locations; and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its MD-530 Fleet</strong></td>
<td>To 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530 currently in its fleet, including DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Effect of AWOL Afghan Military Trainees on Afghan Reconstruction Programs</strong></td>
<td>To 1) determine how many Afghan military trainees have gone absent without leave while training in the United States; the trainees rank, specialty, command, the program(s) supported by the training effort; and the impact on the program(s) by the loss of these students (financial, operational, morale, etc.); 2) identify the disposition of the these trainees and obtain justifications for State to provide immigration status; and 3) determine the extent to which this issue has impacted the U.S. Government’s reconstruction effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MOI Complex Support Structures</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether the 1) work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lessons Learned Review of the G222 (C-27A) Aircraft Program</strong></td>
<td>To 1) review the decision to provide 20 G222s to the AAF; 2) determine the total amount spent to procure, operate, sustain, and dispose of the G222s; 3) review future plans (disposal or otherwise) for the G222s; and 4) evaluate what processes and controls have been put in place to prevent similar challenges from affecting future AAF purchases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Renovations and Construction at the Kabul Military Training Center</strong></td>
<td>To inspect select KMTC facilities renovated or constructed under the July 2013 contract. Specifically, to assess whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and 2) the facilities are being used and maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processes and Procedures for Blood Type Collection of ANDSF Personnel</strong></td>
<td>To 1) identify the entity responsible for the collection of ANDSF soldiers' blood types, and determine how these blood types are captured and then recorded in APPS and AHRIMS; 2) determine who is responsible for paying for the collection of blood samples for ANDSF soldiers and how payment for services is collected; 3) identify CSTC-A's role, if any, in collecting and recording blood types for ANDSF soldiers; and, 4) assess the processes used to ensure that recorded blood types for ANDSF soldiers are accurate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Air Force's Ability to Operate and Maintain U.S.-provided Aircraft</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the 1) aircraft the U.S. plans to provide the AAF address validated capability gaps identified by both the DoD and MoD; 2) DoD synchronized the recruitment and training of aircrews and other critical personnel with estimated aircraft delivery schedules; and 3) DoD and MoD have developed and implemented a plan to support the operation and maintenance of AAF aircraft provided by the United States, including steps to address capability gaps within the AAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</strong></td>
<td>To 1) determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Ongoing USAID OIG Projects in Afghanistan

As of June 30, 2017, USAID OIG had 17 ongoing non-OFS related projects in Afghanistan. Table 7 provides the project title and objective for each of these ongoing projects.

Table 7.

### Ongoing USAID OIG Oversight Projects in Afghanistan, as of 6/30/2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on ICF Macro, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>Under Demographic and Health Surveys, AID-OAA-C-13-00095, for the period from 9/9/13-12/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on New York University</strong></td>
<td>Under Assessment of Learning and Outcomes and Social Effects in Community-Based Education, AID-306-G-13-00004, for the period from 1/1/14-8/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Development Alternatives, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To determine if the schedule of costs incurred in Afghanistan by Development Alternatives Inc., fairly present, in all material respects, program revenues, costs incurred and reimbursed, and commodities and technical assistance directly procured by USAID for the periods in question, in accordance with the terms of the following contracts: Under Driving Economic Alternative for the North, East, and West, AID-306-A-00-09-00508, for the period from 12/1/14-9/30/15; Stabilization in Key Areas, AID-306-C-12-00003, for the period from 12/1/14-5/31/15; Regional Agriculture Development Program, AID-306-C-14-00002, for the period from 12/1/14-12/31/15; Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience, AID-306-C-14-00016, for the period from 11/30/14-12/31/15; and Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan, AID-306-TO-13-00004, for the period from 12/1/14-12/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on AECOM International Development, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>To determine if the schedule of costs incurred in Afghanistan by AECOM fairly present, in all material respects, program revenues, costs incurred and reimbursed, and commodities and technical assistance directly procured by USAID for the periods in question, in accordance with the terms of the following contracts: Under Stabilization in Key Areas-East, AID-306-C-12-00002, for the period from 9/1/14-9/6/15; Stabilization in Key Areas-West, AID-306-C-12-00004, for the period from 9/1/14-8/31/15; and Stabilization in Key Areas-South, AID-306-C-13-00003, for the period from 9/4/14-7/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Kansas State University</strong></td>
<td>Under Pre-award Services (Micro Toxin), 306-AID-OAA-L-14-00002, for the period from 1/1/14-6/30/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on International Relief and Development</strong></td>
<td>Under Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support, 306-C-00-11-00512, for the period from 4/1/15-12/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Use of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether USAID/Afghanistan adopted effective and consistent practices to provide reasonable assurance that activities implemented through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund contribute to achieving USAID’s objectives in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Tetra Tech ARD</strong></td>
<td>To determine if the schedule of costs incurred in Afghanistan by Tetra Tech ARD fairly present, in all material respects, program revenues, costs incurred and reimbursed, and commodities and technical assistance directly procured by USAID for the periods in question, in accordance with the terms of the following contracts: Under Women’s Leadership Development, AID-306-I-TO-14-00031; and Initiative to Strengthen Local Administrations (ISLA), AID-306-C-15-00005, for the period from 9/23/14-9/30/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Chemonics International, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>Under Regional Agriculture Development Program West AID-306-C-14-00007, for the period from 8/10/14-12/31/15; Promote-Component 3 (Women in Government Program), AID-306-TO-15-00044, for the period from 4/21/15-12/31/15; Famine Early Warning System Network III, AID-OAA-TO-12-00003, for the period from 1/1/15-12/31/15; Regional Agriculture Development Program, 306-C-13-00018, for the period from 1/1/15-12/31/15; and Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project, AID-306-TO-13-00009, for the period from 1/1/15-12/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit on Roots of Peace</strong></td>
<td>Under Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development, AID-306-C-12-00006, for the period from 1/1/15-12/31/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s New Development Partnership</strong></td>
<td>To determine if USAID/Afghanistan has 1) adequately verified the achievement of completed indicators under the New Development Partnership for any payments made to date and 2) adopted internal policies and procedures to adequately verify the achievement of New Development Partnership indicators contained in the July 25, 2015 New Development Partnership results framework.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLANNED PROJECTS

Planned OFS Projects

Lead IG agencies and partners are planning to start 11 oversight projects related to OFS by the end of FY 2017. The discussion that follows highlights some of these planned projects by oversight area. The Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners do not have projects they plan to start during FY 2017 in the Resolute Support and Transition and Property Management oversight areas. Table 8 provides the project title and objective for each of the planned projects.

- **Building ANDSF and Afghan Government Capacity**: Seven projects are planned to begin in FY 2017 related to two strategic oversight areas—building capacity and capability in the ANDSF and Afghan government. The Army Audit Agency is assessing the accuracy of the Army’s obligations and disbursements regarding OFS as reported in the *Cost of War* report. SIGAR has six planned projects, related to the assistance provided to improve governance in Afghanistan, the use and maintenance of aircraft fleets by the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Mission Wing, the DoD processes to develop and assess the ANDSF’s ability to manage equipment procurement and fielding; and the use of the Afghanistan financial management system to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance to the Afghan government.

- **Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics**: SIGAR has one planned project to review the special police counternarcotics units to determine the extent to which these units are achieving their goals.

- **Contracts and Contract Management**: The DoD OIG is planning a follow-up inspection of the Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan to evaluate compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards.

- **Intelligence and Counterterrorism**: The DoD OIG has two planned projects. One involves biometric enabled intelligence and the other is a follow-up review on the implementation of prior DoD OIG recommendations from OCO intelligence evaluations.
Table 8.
**Planned Oversight Projects, as of 6/30/2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Army’s Reporting of Obligations and Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
<td>To verify the accuracy of the Army’s obligations and disbursements reported in the <em>Cost of War</em> report for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Report of Recommendations from OCO Intel Evaluations</td>
<td>To determine if recommendations from LIG OCO intelligence evaluations affecting OIR and OFS have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of DoD Biometric Enabled Intel Operations for OFS</td>
<td>To determine whether Biometric Enabled Intelligence effectively supports the OFS Commander’s requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan Follow-up Inspection</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. military-occupied facilities supporting Overseas Contingency Operations comply with Department of Defense health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</td>
<td>To 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotics police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Improve Governance in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To 1) identify DoD, State, and USAID programs focused on improving governance in Afghanistan; 2) assess how these efforts contributed to improvements in government institutions in Afghanistan; and 3) determine lessons for future governance efforts in conflict affected countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its Mi-17 Fleet</td>
<td>To assess 1) the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the Mi-17s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the Mi-17s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Special Mission Wing Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s</td>
<td>To assess 1) the extent to which the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF Equipment Requirement Generation Process</td>
<td>To 1) describe the process(es) by which DoD develops equipment requirements for the ANSDF; 2) assess the extent to which DoD oversees these procurement processes; and 3) assess the extent to which DoD evaluates the performance of this equipment once fielded and makes adjustments, if needed. This may result in a series of audits examining different types of equipment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continues on next page)
**Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its A-29 Fleet**

To 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29 currently in its fleet, including DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.

**Use of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to Track and Monitor U.S. Direct Assistance Funding to the Afghan Government**

To 1) describe how the Afghan government uses the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds; 2) identify the capabilities and weaknesses of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System for tracking and monitoring U.S. direct assistance funds; and 3) determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.

---

**Planned USAID OIG Projects in Afghanistan**

USAID OIG is planning to start 18 non-OFS related projects in Afghanistan by the end of FY 2017. Table 9 provides the project title and objective for each of these planned projects.

**Table 9.**

**Planned USAID OIG Oversight Projects in Afghanistan, as of 6/30/2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Follow-Up Audit on USAID/Afghanistan’s Strategy for Monitoring and Evaluating Programs Throughout Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>To determine if USAID/Afghanistan has effectively implemented corrective actions taken in response to the Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Strategy for Monitoring and Evaluating Programs Throughout Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Sustainability Strategy for the Power Transmission and Connectivity Project</strong></td>
<td>To determine if USAID/Afghanistan has an effective strategy for helping to ensure a viable, long-term Afghan electric grid after the conclusion of PTEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</strong></td>
<td>Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC); &amp; Installation of Turbine Generator Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam Hydropower Plant Projects, SOAG-306-05-000, from 1/1/2015 to 12/31/2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Purdue University</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening Afghanistan Agricultural Faculties (SAAF), Grant 306-A-00-11-00516, for the period from July 1, 2015 to December 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of ICF Macro, Inc.</strong></td>
<td>Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Contract No. AID-OAA-C-13-00095, from Jan 1, 2016 to Dec 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation</strong></td>
<td>Challenge Tuberculosis, Cooperative Agreement AID-OAA-A-14-00029, for the period from Jan 1, 2015 to Sep 28, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Roots of Peace</strong></td>
<td>Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP), Cooperative Agreement 306-A-00-10-00512, for the period Jan 01, 2016 to Dec 31, 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACA Financial Audit of Tetra Tech ARD</strong></td>
<td>Initiative to Strengthen Local Administration (ISLA), Contract AID-306-C-15-00005, for the period Oct 1, 2015 to Sep 30, 2016; and Women’s Leadership Development (WLD), Contract AID-306-TO-14-00031, for the period Oct 1, 2015 to Sep 30, 2016.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:
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APPENDIX A

Methodology for Preparing This Lead IG Quarterly Report

This report is issued pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on an overseas contingency operation. The DoD IG is the designated Lead IG for OFS. The DoS IG is the Associate Lead IG for the operation.

The USAID IG is designated by the Inspector General Act as the third IG responsible for overseas contingency operations, but USAID has no OFS-related programs or activities. However, the USAID OIG does conduct audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. USAID OIG coordinates those activities as appropriate, with other oversight entities.

This report contains information from the Lead IG agencies as well as from partner oversight agencies. This unclassified report covers the period from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017.

To fulfill its congressional mandate to produce a quarterly report on OFS, the Lead IG gathers data and information from federal agencies and open sources. Data and information used in this report are attributed to their source in endnotes to the text or notes to the tables and figures. Except for references to Lead IG and oversight partner agency audits or investigations in the text or in sidebars, the Lead IG has not independently verified and assessed all the data included in this report.

Data Call

Each quarter, the Lead IG directs a series of questions, or data calls, to federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OFS. The OFS data call developed by the Lead IG is coordinated with SIGAR, which also issues a data call to support its quarterly report, to avoid duplication and minimize the burden on reporting agencies. The Lead IG agencies use responses to these data calls to develop sections of the OFS quarterly report, as well as to inform decisions concerning future audits and evaluations.

Various DoD commands and offices and DoS offices participated in the data call for OFS this quarter.

Open-Source Research

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report include the following:

- Information publicly released by U.S. agencies included in the data call
- Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Congressional testimonies
- Press conferences, especially DoD and DoS Briefings
- Congressional Research Service
- UN (and relevant branches)
- Reports issued by non-governmental organizations
- Media reports

Materials collected through open source research provide information to describe the status of the operation and help the Lead IG agencies assess information provided in their agency data calls. However, the Lead IG agencies have not tested, verified, or independently assessed the assertions made by these agencies.

**Report Production**

The Lead IG is responsible for assembling and producing this report. It coordinates with the DoS OIG, which drafted sections of the report related to the activities of the DoS. Every Lead IG agency participates in reviewing and editing the entire quarterly report.

The Lead IG agencies provide the offices who have responded to the data call with opportunities to verify and clarify the content of the report. During the first review, the Lead IG asks agencies to correct inaccuracies and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG incorporates agency comments and sends the report back to the agencies for a final review. Each OIG coordinates the review process with its own agency.

**APPENDIX B**

**Classified Appendix to this Operation Freedom’s Sentinel Quarterly Report to Congress**

This appendix on counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan is classified and has been delivered to appropriate government agencies and congressional committees.
Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces. These EFs comprise the following:

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE**

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Under EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT**

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, CSTC-A administers measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 3: CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW**

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF’s ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 4: FORCE GENERATION**

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation train, advise, and assist mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 5: SUSTAIN THE FORCE**

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 6: PLAN, RESOURCE, AND EXECUTE EFFECTIVE SECURITY CAMPAIGNS

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council, the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 7: DEVELOP SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant MoD for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate, the Mol Directorate of Police Intelligence, and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 8: MAINTAIN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT GENDER OFFICE

In addition to the eight EFs, the Resolute Support Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA and ANP levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.
## ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>Absent without leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kandaks</td>
<td>battalions</td>
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<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
</tr>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tashkil</td>
<td>the official list of ANDSF personnel and equipment requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General</td>
</tr>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANAs 215th 3/2 Kandak Graduation (Resolute Support Media photo)
ENDNOTES

15. OUSD(P) vetting comment, 8/9/2017.
17. USFOR-A response to SIGAR requests for information, Apr-Sec-37, 3/1/2017 and Jul-Sec-37, 7/14/2017.

22. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/15/2017.


29. Lead IG analysis based on references cited in this section.


32. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/16/2017.

33. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/16/2017.


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47. CSTC-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/18/2017.


49. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017; DoD, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 6/2017, p. 45; Resolute support response to SIGAR request for information, 5/15/2017; USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/14/2017.

50. Lead IG analysis based on Resolute Support responses to SIGAR requests for information, 2/20/2017 and 5/21/2017.


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OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL


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44. Remarks (as prepared) of Ambassador Richard G. Olson “Afghanistan, the Reconciliation Option,” Stimson Center, 4/4/2017, pp. 2 and 3.


66. Lead IG Analysis based on sources cited in this section.
69. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/15/2017.


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94. Lead IG analysis based on review of congressional testimony and media sources.


98. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/15/2017.


122. Testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph F. Dunford and Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis, Senate Armed Services Committee, 6/13/2017, p.5; Testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph F. Dunford and Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis, House Armed Services Committee, 6/12/2017, p.6.


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160. Dos-PRM, Afghanistan Fact Sheet, June 2017, p. 2.


179. Testimony of Secretary Jim Mattis before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, 6/15/2017.
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199. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, OPS-CT-15 (a) 6/12/2017.
211. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/12/2017.
212. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/15/2017.


217. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/12/2017.


221. NATO-Resolute Support Mission website.


244. Statement of Hon Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 5/23/2017.

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251. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/15/2017.
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256. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/18/2017.
257. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
261. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
262. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
263. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
264. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
265. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
266. CSTC-A response to SIGAR request for information, 5/21/2017.
269. CSTC-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/15/2017.
270. Resolute support response to SIGAR request for information, 5/15/2017.
274. Resolute support response to Lead IG request for information, 6/6/2017.
276. USFOR-A response to Lead IG request for information, 6/14/2017.
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