LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

JULY 1, 2016–SEPTEMBER 30, 2016
The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations will coordinate among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This is our sixth quarterly report on this overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

Two complementary missions constitute OFS: 1) the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and their affiliates in Afghanistan, and 2) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. The objective of the NATO mission is self-sustaining Afghan National Army and Police forces that are capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible Afghan ministries.

This quarterly report updates information on significant events involving OFS and the NATO-led efforts to build and strengthen Afghan security forces, during the period from July 1 to September 30, 2016.

This report also highlights oversight work conducted by the Lead IG Offices of Inspector General and partner oversight agencies during the same period, and ongoing and planned oversight work, as of September 30, 2016.

We remain committed to providing effective oversight and timely reporting on OFS to Congress, U.S. Government agencies, and U.S. taxpayers. Our collective oversight work, and its summation in this report, demonstrates our collaborative approach to providing oversight regarding the OFS contingency operation and to promoting efficiency and effectiveness.
On the Cover: (clockwise from top left) A pararescueman prepares to jump off a C-130J Super Hercules ramp during a recovery exercise, Bagram Airfield (U.S. Air Force photo); Afghan Soldiers march forward after graduating with their fellow recruits within Helmand Province (DoD photo); Afghan Air Force cadets graduated from the officer candidate school at Air University in Kabul (U.S. Air Force photo); A Czech Republic Air Force aerial gunner scans the area during a sortie near Kabul (U.S. Air Force photo); U.S. Soldiers talk with local children near a village in Laghman province while conducting a patrol with Afghan counterparts (U.S. Army photo); Kabul, Afghanistan, July 15th, 2016. (DoD photo).
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present the sixth report on Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). This report summarizes key events during the quarter, and it describes completed, ongoing, and planned Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) and partner agency oversight work relating to OFS.

This report describes the security situation in Afghanistan, with the Taliban and other insurgent groups escalating their attacks in an effort to seize population centers and destabilize the Afghan government. In this report, we provide a description of key events and U.S. military officials' assessment of the fight between Afghan security forces and the Taliban as the quarter ended.

The report also discusses the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan and NATO-led efforts to strengthen Afghan security forces. The progress in building the capacity of Afghan forces continues to be slow and uneven. However, the international community confirmed its physical and financial support for the Afghan government at two important conferences over the last 3 months.

At the end of this quarter, the Lead IG agencies and oversight partners had released 10 reports relating to OFS, and have 47 oversight projects that are either ongoing or scheduled to begin in FY 2017. As of September 30, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and oversight partners also were conducting 17 ongoing investigations into alleged fraud, waste, and abuse related to the OFS mission.

Examples of the completed oversight activities highlighted in this report include a DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessment of the U.S. and coalition efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces. This classified report contained five findings that addressed the progress of advisors in strengthening the ability of the Special Operations Forces to conduct combat operations, the enforcement of applicable Afghan policies, the adequacy of logistics support and budget authority, and command relationships between Afghan National Army corps commanders and Special Operations command units.

In addition, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction issued a report that assessed the management of the Afghan National Army vehicle maintenance program and a lessons learned review of corruption in Afghanistan. The Government Accountability Office issued a report related to the oversight of construction projects supporting contingency operations.

My Lead IG colleagues and I remain committed to conducting effective oversight of OFS. We appreciate and rely on the dedication of the teams of OIG employees who perform the planning, analysis, and oversight work for our organizations.

Glenn A. Fine
Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sections 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, require that a designated Lead IG submit to the United States Congress a quarterly report on each contingency operation subject to Lead IG oversight. The Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General is the designated Lead Inspector General for OFS. The Department of State (DoS) is the Associate Lead Inspector General for the operation.

This report provides the quarterly update on OFS. It includes an examination of the threat posed by Taliban and terrorist organizations, summarizes the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, and details U.S. spending for OFS in FY 2016. Additionally, the report describes U.S. counterterrorism activities to the extent possible in an unclassified report and efforts of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (Resolute Support) to build the capacity and sustainability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF or Afghan security forces).

The report covers OFS operations and Lead IG oversight activities during the 3-month period from July 1 to September 30, 2016. In addition, it describes completed, ongoing, and planned oversight work conducted by Lead IG partner oversight agencies, such as the Service Audit Agencies, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

Fighting escalated in several Afghan provinces this quarter, but Afghan security forces prevented the Taliban from seizing any provincial capitals or major population centers. According to Resolute Support advisors, the Afghan security forces continued to improve in some areas despite increased combat activity, but faced long-standing challenges in overcoming leadership deficiencies, corruption, and implementation of automated systems. In other developments, international donors pledged to extend financial support for Afghan security forces through 2020, and the Afghan government reached a tentative accord with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin extremist organization and its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

ANDSF AND TALIBAN FIGHT TO A “STALEMATE”

After a lull during the Ramadan period from June to early July, the Taliban and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) launched multiple attacks in several districts in the northern, northeastern, and southern provinces. Insurgents staged high-profile attacks in Kabul, briefly captured eight district centers, and put pressure on provincial cities and towns in six provinces. The Taliban
repeatedly targeted the provincial capitals of Kunduz, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces from the end of July through September.³

In response to the increased Taliban offensives against Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province and considered the top Taliban objective by U.S. officials, the Afghan Special Security Forces deployed to Helmand and called in U.S. and Afghan airstrikes. Senior ANDSF generals and officials shuttled between Kabul and Helmand to monitor the situation and rally their forces.⁴ In late August, an additional 100 U.S. soldiers were deployed to Lashkar Gah to advise the Afghan security forces.⁵

Although the Taliban overran some villages and districts in Helmand and other provinces, U.S. military officials asserted that the insurgents failed to achieve their territorial objectives. General John W. Nicholson, Jr., Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and Resolute Support said the ANDSF responded effectively to Taliban attacks, restored security, and retained control of the provincial capitals.⁶

In testimony before Congress on September 22, General Joseph Dunford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the military situation at the end of the quarter as a “stalemate” between the ANDSF and the Taliban.⁷ General Nicholson said the Afghan government controlled about 70 percent of the population, the Taliban controlled about 10 percent of the population, and the remainder was “in play” or contested.⁸
RESOLUTE SUPPORT CONTINUES TO BUILD ANDSF CAPACITY

This quarter, U.S. military officials reported that Resolute Support made gradual progress toward achieving benchmarks that measure ANDSF capabilities in eight key areas, which Resolute Support calls “essential functions.” For example, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) reported that the Ministries of Defense and Interior had improved their procurement performance by streamlining requirements validation, accelerating contract awards, and using multi-year contracts.\(^9\)

Moreover, USFOR-A stated that Afghan intelligence gathering and coordination abilities improved this quarter with the ANDSF continuing to expand its use of intelligence gathering platforms.\(^10\) According to USFOR-A, the ANDSF also made progress in keeping the Afghan people informed about ANDSF combat successes.\(^11\)

At the same time, CSTC-A reported that initiatives to deter fraud, waste, and abuse in the ministries were not going as well as expected because of leadership changes, bureaucratic delays, and “technical challenges.”\(^12\) USFOR-A reported continuing gaps in strategic planning, logistics, and maintenance.\(^13\)

The Afghan National Army (ANA) strength remained relatively level over the past two quarters, with recruitment roughly offsetting attrition. The number of soldiers stood at 170,000 as the quarter ended, which is 25,000 short of the ANA authorization.\(^14\) Although capability gaps persisted, the Afghan security forces continued to develop in many functional areas. The Afghan Special Security Forces operated independently 80 percent of the time with coalition advisors accompanying them in the field just 10 percent of the time and providing combat enablers, such as intelligence or logistics support, for the remaining operations.\(^15\) However, the ability to conduct offensive operations independently created an overreliance on Afghan special operations forces, as ANDSF leaders frequently used them to carry out conventional missions.\(^16\)

This summer, the ANDSF employed a “hold-fight-disrupt” strategy that involved prioritizing critical areas, populations, and infrastructure across the country and applying ANDSF resources where they would have greatest strategic impact.\(^17\) According to USFOR-A, the Afghan security forces executed this plan successfully; in spite of heavy fighting and high casualties, the ANDSF maintained its priorities and did not depart from the overarching strategy.\(^18\)

The Afghan Air Force’s combat capability reportedly continued to develop with new pilots and crews continually undergoing training for fixed wing and rotary aircraft.\(^19\)
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLEDGES FUTURE SUPPORT

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July, NATO nations and the Afghan government pledged to sustain the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016 and “to continue to deliver training, advice and assistance to the Afghan security institutions, including police, the air force and special operations forces.”20 In addition, NATO and other donor nations agreed to extend their financial support for the ANDSF through 2020.21 On October 5, the European Union and the Afghan government co-hosted the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, which was attended by 75 countries and 26 international organizations. Participants endorsed the ambitious reform agenda presented by the Afghan government in its new 5-year development plan—the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework 2017-2021—and pledged $15.2 billion in financial support for Afghanistan over the next 5 years.22

Among other things, the Afghan government promised donors at the Brussels Conference that it would ensure continued emphasis on democratic governance and produce a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in the first half of 2017.23 In August, the new Anti-Corruption Justice Center, created by a presidential decree at the end of June 2016, officially began operations in temporary quarters in the Afghan Attorney General’s Office. According to media sources, Afghan anti-corruption activists welcomed the establishment of the center to streamline corruption cases against high-ranking government officials.24

**Selected Key Events, 7/1/2016–9/30/2016**

**JULY 1** The Anti-Corruption Justice Center opens in Kabul.

**JULY 6** President Obama announces revised U.S. troop ceiling of 8,400 by end of 2016.


**JULY 23** IS-K suicide bomber targets the Hazara ethnic community in Kabul, killing at least 80.

**JULY 24-25** Five U.S. military personnel wounded while participating with Afghan security forces in counterterrorism operations.

**JULY 26** U.S. drone strike kills Hafiz Saeed Khan, leader of IS-K, and up to 300 IS-K fighters.

**JULY 26** IS-K suicide bomber targets the Hazara ethnic community in Kabul, killing at least 80.

**JULY 29** Member of Afghan parliament killed by an improvised explosive device in Kabul.

**AUGUST 3** DoD withholds $300 million in military aid to Pakistan for its failure to put sufficient pressure on the Haqqani Network.

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* = Anti-Government Insurgency
HEKMATYAR AGREES TO RECONCILE

In September, the Afghan government reached a peace agreement with representatives of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin extremist organization. The agreement allows its leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, to return from exile and participate in the political process. The Afghan government promised Hekmatyar an “honorary post” but the agreement does not include any kind of power-sharing. Both the Afghan government and the United States pointed to the accord as an important step towards peace and reconciliation. The Department of State stated that the United States welcomed the peace agreement and noted that “the only avenue to achieve lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan is through dialogue and negotiations.”

AUGUST 19
Pakistan closes major international border crossing into Kandahar province.

AUGUST 22
100 U.S. troops deployed to Lashkar Gar, to counter an increasing insurgent threat.

AUGUST 23
One U.S. soldier killed and one wounded by a roadside bomb while on a patrol near Lashkar Gar.

AUGUST 24
Insurgents attack American University of Afghanistan in Kabul, killing as many as 16.

SEPTEMBER 1
Pakistan reopens major international border crossing into Kandahar province.

SEPTEMBER 5

SEPTEMBER 8
Taliban targets Tarin Kot, capital of Uruzgan province. ANDSF repels the attacks.

SEPTEMBER 29
Representatives of President Ghani and former warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin insurgent group, concur on terms of a peace agreement to be effective when the leaders sign.
LEAD IG REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT

During the period July 1 through September 30, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners completed ten oversight projects that examined OFS-related matters. (See Table 1.)

The Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners have 24 ongoing projects and plan to start another 23 during FY 2017. Ongoing projects are examining OFS financial data appearing in DoD Cost of War reports, controls over U.S. direct assistance funds, DoD support for counternarcotics programs, and Resolute Support train, advise and assist efforts.

The Lead IG agencies have been working with SIGAR and partner oversight agencies to finalize the FY 2017 Joint Strategic Plan for Afghanistan. The plan, which will be publicly released and submitted to Congress in October 2016, includes a compendium of ongoing and planned oversight projects implemented in support of OFS.

During the quarter, the criminal investigative components of the Lead IG agencies opened three new OFS-related investigations and closed three. As of September 30, 2016, 17 investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations remained open. Based on the results of an investigation by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), which is the DoD OIG investigative component, the Department of the Army suspended and proposed to debar a DoD contractor and 45 of its employees from U.S. Government contracts due to their role in a fuel theft scheme at a U.S. base in eastern Nangarhar province.

In addition, the DoD OIG, which coordinates hotline activities among the Lead IG agencies and other OFS-related organizations, received and coordinated 79 contacts related to OFS and opened 44 cases during the quarter. These contacts were referred within DoD OIG, to the Lead IG agencies, or to other investigative organizations for review and, as appropriate, investigation.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) OIG has no OFS-related programs or activities, but does conduct audits, investigations, and other activities in Afghanistan. USAID OIG coordinates these activities as appropriate with other oversight entities, but these activities are not discussed in this report.

For more information on Lead IG and partner oversight efforts, see the section of this report entitled Completed Oversight Activities, and the section entitled Ongoing and Planned Oversight, beginning on page 69 and page 83 respectively. Appendix A contains detailed information on the Lead IG statutory requirements.
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| *Sexual Assault-Related Phone Numbers-Rounds Six and Seven*  
  (A-2016-0125-MTH)  
  August 15, 2016 |
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| *Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives*  
  (DODIG-2016-120)  
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| *Designation of Contracting Officer’s Representatives and Oversight Framework Could Be Improved for Contracts in Afghanistan*  
  (DODIG-2016-131)  
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| *Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces*  
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| *Improvements Needed in Managing Scope Changes and Oversight of Construction Projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti*  
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| **SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION** |
| *Afghan National Army: DOD has Taken Steps to Remedy Poor Management of Vehicle Maintenance Program*  
  (SIGAR-16-49-AR)  
  July 16, 2016 |
| *Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan*  
  (SIGAR-16-58-LL)  
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| *Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight: Personal Asset Declarations of High Ranking Afghan Government Officials Are Not Consistently Registered and Verified*  
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This report first examines the threats posed by insurgent and terrorist groups, significant combat developments, and the impact of other factors related to OFS, such as Afghan governance and international assistance. The next section of the report discusses U.S. funding for OFS and related missions, U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and progress being made by Resolute Support in building ANDSF capabilities, based on information provided by military commanders in Afghanistan and DoD publications.

Some of the narrative in the first section of the report reflects information obtained from media sources that supplement material available from Government agencies. Lead IG oversight projects that assess, evaluate, or audit different aspects of the OFS mission are highlighted in the first section of the report and described in greater detail in the oversight sections of this report.

THE THREAT CONTINUES UNDIMINISHED

Insurgent and terrorist groups continued to pose a formidable challenge to Afghan security forces this quarter. The Taliban remained the dominant threat, launching widespread attacks that challenged government control in key districts and provinces throughout Afghanistan. After an unexpected easing of offensive activity in early July, the Taliban insurgency regained its momentum after July 19, briefly capturing eight district centers, staging high-profile attacks in Kabul, and continuing pressure on the provincial capitals of Helmand, Uruzgan, and Kunduz provinces.

Although the quarter saw increased insurgent activity, the Taliban strategy did not involve sustained offensive operations with massed forces. Rather, Brigadier General Charles H. Cleveland, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, Resolute Support, described Taliban tactics as “raids,” in which 15 to 20 Taliban fighters would assault a checkpoint or district center, gain control when a smaller Afghan defense contingent withdrew, loot the facility, and then retreat when a larger Afghan force counterattacked. Although these tactics failed to capture population centers or provincial capitals, they reportedly intimidated the population, expanded Taliban presence in rural areas, disrupted transportation networks, and forced the Afghan security forces to redistribute their limited resources. Brigadier General Cleveland noted that the Taliban deployed its best fighting forces to Helmand this quarter.

On July 2, in his first public statement since taking control of the main Taliban faction, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada criticized the Afghan government for partnering with foreign forces and vowed to continue the “jihadic struggle” until Afghanistan was free of the “infidel occupation and mischief.” He called on the Afghan government to repudiate its foreign allies and expel all foreign forces from the country as a precondition for reconciliation.
**AT A GLANCE**

**OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL**

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**MISSION**

U.S. forces carry out two complementary missions under the military operation known as OFS: counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and IS-K in Afghanistan; and support for the Resolute Support capacity—building effort, which seeks to strengthen the ANDSF. OFS began on January 1, 2015, when the United States ended 13 years of combat under Operation Enduring Freedom and transitioned to a NATO—led train, advise, and assist role, while continuing counterterrorism operations. At that point, the ANDSF assumed full responsibility for security in the country.

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**HISTORY**

U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, in an effort to remove the Taliban government, which harbored the al Qaeda terrorist organization responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Taliban regime fell quickly and U.S. officials declared an end to major combat on May 1, 2003. Subsequently, the United States and its coalition of international partners sought to build a strong, democratic Afghan central government. However, as the new Afghan government developed, international security forces retained the responsibility for national security, but encountered persistent efforts by Taliban forces to recapture lost territory. The deteriorating security situation resulted in a surge in U.S. troop strength from 30,000 in early 2009 to approximately 100,000 during the period 2010-2011. The surge reversed Taliban momentum and the number of U.S. forces was gradually reduced to 16,100 by December 31, 2014, when the NATO-led combat mission ended and OFS began. The number dropped to the current 9,800 by March 2015 and will be reduced to 8,400 by January 2017.

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**COST**

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has obligated approximately $648 billion to sustain military operations and build infrastructure in Afghanistan. Well over half of that amount ($430 billion) was obligated for “operations and maintenance,” which includes the wide variety of goods and services needed to support U.S. operations, such as consumable supplies, ammunition, fuel, and contractor maintenance. Together with operations and maintenance, three other cost categories constituted over 97 percent of total U.S. obligations for Afghanistan: U.S. military personnel ($70 billion), procurement of major end items, such as vehicles and aircraft ($70 billion), and assistance for the ANDSF ($60 billion).

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**OVERSIGHT**

Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, the GAO, and the Military Services provide oversight of U.S. programs and operations in Afghanistan. The Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, which is produced by the Lead IG, provides guidance for developing future oversight projects. The Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, consisting of agencies which conduct oversight for Overseas Contingency Operations, ensures effective coverage, coordinates oversight to avoid duplication, and produces an annual plan that describes ongoing and planned oversight projects.34
At a press conference in late July, General Nicholson said the Taliban faced a number of its own challenges. He stated that the May 2016 report of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour and immediate elevation of Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada had undermined Taliban cohesion and effectiveness. He asserted that because the succession process was “not very inclusive,” it exacerbated existing tensions within the Taliban and caused many Taliban leaders to withhold support for the new leader. In addition, General Nicholson told reporters that the Taliban leadership was having difficulty getting control of its finances because Mullah Mansour had allegedly misdirected Taliban revenue for his own purposes. Although General Nicholson stated that the Taliban would continue to conduct high-profile and isolated attacks, he emphasized that it had failed thus far to achieve its primary goal of seizing and holding terrain.35

When asked about Taliban attacks in Helmand province at an August press conference, Brigadier General Cleveland stated that the situation in Helmand province was not “as dire as perhaps is portrayed in the press.” In that
regard, he explained that one of the Taliban's growing strengths was in its propaganda and psychological operations. He noted that the Taliban tried to intimidate local populations by exaggerating claims of its combat successes.36 A recent *Wall Street Journal* article highlighted the Taliban’s increasing use of media outlets. For example, the Taliban released audio files giving news updates, launched a smartphone app for its website, and featured sleek, widely available videos on open platforms. In its digital outreach, the Taliban frequently falsely reports or exaggerates its battlefield accomplishments. In that way, according to an Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) official, quoted by the *Wall Street Journal*, the Taliban attempts to deflect attention from its military failures and “distort people's minds.”37

**Haqqani Network Gains Influence**

The Haqqani Network, described by Brigadier General Cleveland as the most lethal and sophisticated insurgent group in Afghanistan, has taken over battlefield command of the Taliban according to an MoI spokesman as quoted by media sources.38 Reportedly operating out of sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan, Haqqani militants are known for mounting high-profile suicide attacks on Afghan and international forces. They also typically conduct coordinated small-arms assaults coupled with rocket attacks and attacks with bomb-laden vehicles.39 During his September press conference, General Nicholson said that the Haqqanis have been able to conduct operations inside Afghanistan and “constitute the primary threat to Americans, to coalition members, and to Afghans, especially in and around Kabul.”40

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the Haqqani Network took advantage of the Afghan security forces’ focus on Kunduz and Helmand provinces this quarter to establish a foothold in eastern Paktiya province.41 On August 27, the Taliban, led by Haqqani fighters, overran and captured Janikheil district in Paktiya province, which lies on a strategic road intersection that links other districts in Paktiya, is close to the border with Pakistan, and provides a launching point for expanded control in eastern Afghanistan.42 However, according to media sources, Afghan security forces recaptured the district 8 days later.43

On August 3, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter informed Congress—as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2015—that he could not certify that Pakistan's government was putting sufficient pressure on the Haqqani Network to justify the waiver of an otherwise required withhold of $300 million from the Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan. The assistance withheld was a portion of amounts which would have been paid to reimburse Pakistan for assistance to or in connection with U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Since 2002, reimbursements to Pakistan under this arrangement have totaled nearly $14 billion.44
Al Qaeda Adjusts Strategy

Al Qaeda, which maintained a close operational relationship with the Taliban, staged a resurgence in Afghanistan through its regional branch, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, according to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Rather than focusing on the historic al Qaeda mission of global terrorism, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has, at least temporarily, sought to become a unifying force for jihadist groups in Afghanistan by providing them funding, training, and battlefield support. Its ability to embed itself with local insurgent groups and adapt its strategies to changing circumstances makes al Qaeda a continuing regional threat.45

In late September 2016, The Long War Journal reported that Afghan commandos raided an al Qaeda encampment in the southeastern province of Zabul. The Afghan fighters captured a stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment before destroying the base. This was the fifth such al Qaeda facility discovered in just over a year in Afghanistan.46

IS-K Retreats in Face of Afghan Offensives

The threat posed by IS-K, also known as Daesh, reportedly decreased this quarter as the Afghan security forces, assisted by U.S. forces, accelerated offensive operations against the terrorist group in eastern Nangarhar province during July.47 According to General Nicholson, those operations enabled Afghan security forces to reclaim significant portions of territory that were
previously controlled by IS-K, kill 12 of the top IS-K commanders, and destroy their supporting infrastructure. Estimating their number in the 1,200 to 1,300 range, General Nicholson reported that IS-K fighters were retreating south to the mountainous regions of Nangarhar and that their area of control had shrunk from nine or ten districts in 2015 to partial control of three or four districts.48

A DoD press release on August 12 reported that the IS-K Commander, Hafiz Saeed Khan, was killed by a U.S. airstrike in Nangarhar province on July 26. The press release stated, “Khan’s death affects IS-K recruiting efforts and will disrupt IS-K operations in Afghanistan and the region.”49 However, as the quarter ended, the Voice of America reported that IS-K fighters began to return to their previous strongholds in Nangarhar when Afghan security forces relocated to positions they occupied prior to the start of the July offensive.50

COMBAT INTENSIFIES BUT AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES PREVENT MAJOR INSURGENT GAINS

After a lull in insurgent activity at the beginning of this quarter, the Taliban staged multiple offensive attacks in the northern provinces in mid-July, attempting to recapture Kunduz City, which it held temporarily in September 2015.51 Shortly thereafter, the insurgent group launched attacks against targets in the southern provinces of Helmand and Uruzgan, directed at capturing Lashkar Gah and Tarin Kot, the provincial capitals. Although the Taliban overran villages and districts as it converged on provincial capitals, the ANDSF successfully stalled those offensives.52 As a result, the Taliban failed to capture any provincial capital or population center. According to General Nicholson, the Afghan government controlled 70 percent of the population, the Taliban controlled 10 percent, and the rest of the population was “in play” at the end of the quarter.53 In his testimony before Congress on September 22, General Dunford described the overall situation as a “stalemate” between the ANDSF and Taliban.54

Taliban Resumes Offensive with Attacks in North

After completing a 3-day visit to Afghanistan on July 17, General Dunford noted a lower level of violence from the Taliban during July than was expected and expressed guarded optimism that Afghan security forces had seized the battlefield momentum. However, General Dunford acknowledged “peaks and valleys” in Taliban activity in the past, described the Taliban as a resilient force, and predicted “a fair amount of fighting ahead.”55

That prediction proved accurate, as the Taliban launched multiple attacks in two northern provinces on July 19, according to media sources. In northeastern Badakhshan province, the Taliban mounted a three-pronged attack on a remote
AFGHANISTAN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS UNDER THREAT

KUNDUZ CITY
After weeks of heavy fighting, Afghan security forces kept a tenuous hold on Kunduz City, the capital of Kunduz province, at the end of September. Taliban fighters repeatedly attacked the provincial capital during this reporting period; the insurgent group briefly controlled the city in September 2015.

LASHKAR GAH
More than 100 U.S. troops deployed to Helmand province in August 2016 to advise Afghan police and provide force protection for what Brigadier General Charles Cleveland said would be a “temporary period.” Taliban forces have been making advances toward Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, temporarily overrunning ANDSF checkpoints or district centers before withdrawing in the face of ANDSF counterattacks.

TARIN KOT
In September 2016, Afghan troops sent reinforcements to Tarin Kot, the provincial capital of Uruzgan province, to repel advances by Taliban forces there. Taliban fighters have overrun security posts in Tarin Kot and come within several hundred yards of the governor’s compound and local police headquarters. Afghan security forces mounted air and ground counteroffenses and had retained control of the city as of the end of the reporting period.

Sources: DoD, The Wall Street Journal
However, the Taliban reportedly gained territory after hundreds of insurgent fighters attacked two districts in Kunduz province, both bordering Kunduz City. Although the extent of Taliban control in those districts was unclear at the end of July, media reports said that the Afghan government controlled only district centers with the Taliban free to move in surrounding territory.

Taliban attacks on targets in the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan continued into August, according to media reports, as the insurgency appeared to prepare for an eventual attack on the provincial capital of Kunduz City. In early August, Taliban fighters mounted a 4-day coordinated offensive against a district in Baghlan province, which borders Kunduz province to the south. According to the Voice of America, insurgents overran the district on August 14, seizing weapons and military vehicles from retreating Afghan security forces. This district is just a few miles from the provincial capital of Pol-e-Khomri.

At the end of August, the Taliban reportedly mounted assaults on three districts in Kunduz province in an effort to surround Kunduz City, A counteroffensive launched by the ANSF stalled the Taliban offensive and recaptured a district which had briefly fallen to the Taliban. Fighting intensified between insurgent and Afghan security forces, as the Taliban interrupted the electrical supply to Kunduz City, destroyed a main bridge, and closed a highway between Kunduz and Baghlan provinces. In a press conference on August 25, Brigadier General Cleveland described the fighting in Kunduz as “consistent really with the seasonal norms,” noting that the capture of Kunduz City represented a “prize” for the Taliban and that ANDSF leadership in Kabul had deployed to Kunduz to assist forces on the ground.

According to media reports, the security situation in Kunduz remained “fragile” as the quarter ended, with territorial control shifting between opposing forces. The Taliban mounted sporadic offensives and then retreated.

“So overall we don’t think there’s massive, invincible offensive coming from the Taliban. What we see are…some localized successes that are temporary for them.”

in the face of ANDSF counterattacks.\textsuperscript{66} Describing security in Kunduz as “unsatisfactory” in media reports, the Afghan Minister of Interior announced a massive operation in late September to drive insurgents out of the region and restore government control.\textsuperscript{67}

In his news conference on September 23, General Nicholson acknowledged the Taliban attempt to take Kunduz City in preceding weeks, but stated that the ANDSF stabilized the situation and retained control of the provincial capital. He further observed that local leaders may have overstated the severity of relatively small Taliban attacks, such as overrunning a checkpoint in Kunduz, “in order to attract attention to their area.” He said that doing so results in exaggerated media reports “about how dire the security situation is.”\textsuperscript{68}
Two Southern Provinces Face Surging Taliban Attacks

As the Taliban escalated attacks in Kunduz, it also initiated an intensified offensive in southern Helmand province in an attempt to surround the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. In addition to carrying out isolated attacks in several districts that border Lashkar Gah, the Taliban repeatedly blocked the main road connecting the city to Kandahar province in the south and destroyed bridges to impede arrival of ANDSF reinforcements. According to a media report, the Afghan government considered only 2 of Helmand’s 14 districts “safe” as of August 10, with 4 entirely under insurgent control and 8 facing high or medium insurgent threat.

In response to the growing threat, the Afghan Special Security Forces deployed to defend Lashkar Gah and called in U.S. and Afghan airstrikes to counter ongoing Taliban offensives. Additionally, senior ANDSF generals began shuttling between Kabul and Helmand to monitor the situation and rally their forces. On August 22, an additional 100 U.S. soldiers were deployed to Lashkar Gah to train and support Afghan security forces and serve as a “new presence to assist the police force,” according to Brigadier General Cleveland. In announcing the US troop augment, Brigadier General Cleveland acknowledged “tactical victories” by the Taliban that would likely continue, but emphasized that the insurgency had not achieved its strategic goal of seizing a major population center. In his press conference on August 25, Brigadier General Cleveland stated that Lashkar Gah was “secure right now” and that commerce resumed, but that there continued to be “some Taliban activity” outside of the city.

On September 8, the Taliban staged a mass attack on nearby Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan province, which borders Helmand to the northeast. According to media sources, hundreds of Taliban fighters overran dozens of police security posts in a few hours, entered the city, and fired rocket propelled grenades at the governor’s compound and local police headquarters. Afghan security forces immediately responded to the attack. Local ANDSF forces, augmented by Afghan commandos and assisted by U.S. airstrikes, secured the city shortly after the attacks began.

Fighting in and around Tarin Kot continued in the following weeks. On September 23, the Voice of America reported that the Taliban mounted a series of attacks in a second bid to capture the provincial capital, but were repelled by ANDSF forces. Both sides reportedly suffered heavy casualties. According to media sources, the Afghan government subsequently removed the police chief of Uruzgan province for “incompetent management,” after the police chief ordered police personnel at several checkpoints to flee without offering any resistance to the Taliban.
High-Profile Attacks Continue

Noting that even though the high-profile attack was a “favorite weapon of the Taliban,” General Nicholson reported that the number of such attacks in Kabul had decreased this year—16 compared to 23 last year. Although the Taliban has been responsible for the majority of high-profile attacks in Kabul, the first major attack against a Kabul target this quarter was launched by IS-K. On July 23, a suicide bomber detonated his device during a demonstration by members of the predominantly Shiite Hazara ethnic community, who were marching to obtain routing of a major power line through their home province. At least 80 people were killed and over 230 injured.

In August and September, the Taliban claimed responsibility for two major attacks in Kabul and, according to media sources, were likely responsible for a third. On August 1, the Taliban detonated a powerful truck bomb on the perimeter of a housing complex used by military contractors. In the ensuing gun battle with Afghan police, three Taliban gunman were killed as they attempted to enter the compound. One police officer was killed and two were wounded. On September 5, twin bombings near the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) killed at least 40 people and injured more than 100. The attack was followed later that day by a truck bomb explosion that destroyed the compound of the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere in another area of Kabul. According to a Taliban spokesman quoted by media sources, The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere was targeted because it was a haven for “foreign spies.” Six employees were wounded in the attack.

The American University of Afghanistan came under attack by insurgents twice during August. On August 7 gunmen abducted two foreign university professors, including one American, on the way from their guesthouse to the campus. U.S. counterterrorism forces conducted an unsuccessful raid to rescue the hostages in August. No further reports concerning their whereabouts were made as the quarter ended.

Insurgents mounted a complex attack at the university on August 24, when two gunmen stormed the campus after detonating a car bomb at the university entrance. According to media sources, the insurgents fired on students indiscriminately and engaged in a fire-fight with Afghan security forces for nearly 10 hours. A small contingent of coalition troops advised and assisted the Afghan security forces during the battle. Although estimates varied, up to 16 people were reportedly killed in the attack with 53 wounded. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but media analysts noted that it resembled previous Taliban attacks and that the university has long been a Taliban target because of its association with foreigners.
Civilian Casualties Essentially Unchanged in 2016

Civilian casualties in Afghanistan were down slightly during the first 9 months of 2016, dropping by about one percent compared to the same period in 2015, according to the United Nations (UN). Between January 1 and September 30, 2016, the UN documented 8,397 conflict-related civilian casualties—2,562 deaths and 5,835 injuries.\(^8\)

More civilians were killed by Taliban fighters and other insurgents opposed to the Afghan government than by pro-government forces. Anti-government forces caused 61 percent of civilian casualties while pro-government forces caused 23 percent of all civilian casualties. Eleven percent died during ground fighting between the two sides where the responsible party could not be determined. Most of the remaining 5 percent were killed by unexploded ordnance.\(^9\) For an overview of civilian casualties from January 2009 to September 2016, see Figure 1.

The UN reported that child deaths had increased in 2016, while female casualties had decreased. The number of children killed or injured increased by 15 percent over the same period in 2015, even as the overall casualty number dropped. In the first 9 months of 2016, 639 children were killed and 1,822 were injured, the majority during ground fighting. The number of women killed or injured was down by 12 percentage points over the same period last year, including 240 women killed and 637 injured from January through September 2016.\(^9\)

Figure 1.

Afghan Civilian Casualties and Injuries, 2009-2016

\(^{8}\) For an overview of civilian casualties from January 2009 to September 2016, see Figure 1.

\(^{9}\) The UN reported that child deaths had increased in 2016, while female casualties had decreased. The number of children killed or injured increased by 15 percent over the same period in 2015, even as the overall casualty number dropped. In the first 9 months of 2016, 639 children were killed and 1,822 were injured, the majority during ground fighting. The number of women killed or injured was down by 12 percentage points over the same period last year, including 240 women killed and 637 injured from January through September 2016.
Civilian Casualties Essentially Unchanged in 2016
(continued from previous page)

Ground battles caused the most casualties, accounting for 39 percent of all civilian deaths and injuries and representing an 18 percent increase over 2015. Although Afghan and NATO airstrikes accounted for just 3 percent of civilian casualties, the UN expressed concern with the upward trend in this category. Airstrikes caused 292 civilian casualties, including 133 deaths and 159 injuries—a 72 percent increase over the same period in 2015. Two-thirds of the casualties were attributed to the Afghan Air Force, with the remainder caused by NATO forces.91

Deaths by unexploded ordnance rose by 67 percent over the same period in 2015, and 84 percent of the victims were children. However, deaths caused by improvised explosive devices decreased by 22 percent and the number of targeted killings declined by 30 percent.92 For an overview of civilian casualties by tactic and incident type for the first 9 months of 2016, see Figure 2.

Some attacks intentionally targeted civilian areas, including peaceful demonstrations, educational facilities, judicial workers, and media, as well as outdoor markets and mosques. Insurgents also targeted hospitals, universities, and humanitarian workers who were de-mining areas of the country or distributing polio vaccines. These included 75 deliberate attacks on educational institutions, including targeted killings, abductions, and the August 24, 2016, suicide attack at the American University of Afghanistan.93

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT REMAINS STRONG AMID GROWING GOVERNANCE AND MIGRATION CONCERNS

Afghanistan’s fragile National Unity Government remained intact at the end of this reporting period, despite the expiration of a power-sharing agreement between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah. The government, meanwhile, faced additional challenges from a significant increase in internally displaced persons and returning refugees. During this quarter, the Ghani government signed a peace agreement with one extremist organization, and two international conferences brought promises of much-needed additional resources from several countries, including the United States.
Power-Sharing Agreement Expires

The two-year power-sharing agreement between Afghan President Ghani and CEO Abdullah expired at the end of September. Two key events meant to lend legitimacy to the power-sharing arrangement did not occur. The agreement, reached in 2014 with U.S. assistance, gave CEO Abdullah the newly-created position of “chief executive officer” to share power in light of concerns about election fraud. He and President Ghani agreed to share power for two years, during which time the government would hold elections and convene a constitutional assembly to determine CEO Abdullah’s future status. Neither of those events took place. However, CEO Abdullah stated that he would keep his post as CEO for the remainder of President Ghani’s five-year presidency.

Political tension between CEO Abdullah and President Ghani has the potential to hinder progress in Resolute Support efforts to strengthen ANDSF capabilities. The December 2015 DoD report, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, emphasized that Ghani-Abdullah leadership “is critical to the success of the Afghan security ministries and the fighting force.” In August, General Nicholson expressed hope that political differences between the two Afghan leaders would not “undermine the security gains and progress within the security institutions that have been made over the last six to nine months.”

In responding to a Lead IG inquiry regarding the potential impact of political uncertainty on ANDSF performance, USFOR-A responded:

General Nicholson continues to praise the performance of the ANDSF despite the political situation in Kabul. His main message to the MoI and MoD (that he shared in his visualization) is that the ANDSF are loyal to the [Afghan] constitution and not to a party or an individual. He has asked his commanders to reinforce this message up and down the chain of command.

NATO, European Union Continue Support to Afghan Government

NATO and the European Union held two international conferences that had significant implications for Afghanistan’s future on security and economic fronts.

At the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland, the United States and its NATO allies resolved to continue the existing Resolute Support partnership arrangement beyond 2016 and to finance the ANDSF at its current level of 352,000 soldiers and police. Shortly after the close of the Warsaw summit, the White House released a fact sheet stating that 30 countries had renewed pledges to sustain the ANDSF financially through 2020 and that 39 NATO allies and partners had committed 11,000 troops to sustain Resolute Support beyond 2016.
On October 5, the European Union and the Afghan government co-hosted the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan attended by representatives of 75 countries and 26 international organizations. The Afghan government, represented by President Ghani and CEO Abdullah, presented what the European Union termed an “ambitious reform agenda” in the Afghan National Peace and Development Framework 2017 to 2021, the Afghan government’s plan to “achieve self-reliance and increase the welfare of our people.” The participants endorsed the Peace and Development Framework and pledged $15.2 billion to support Afghanistan through 2020 in order to “ensure that Afghanistan will remain on a firm path to political and economic stability, state-building and development.”

Migration Could Impact Security Operations

Two factors that could further complicate the military and peace efforts in Afghanistan are the large and rising number of Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan and the significant increase of internally displaced persons within Afghanistan. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 2.6 million Afghan refugees have found asylum in some 70 countries, with over 95 percent in Iran and Pakistan. The Pakistan Minister for States and Frontier Regions advised the UNHCR that the country had hosted Afghan refugees for over 40 years, and as of the end of this quarter, housed over 1.4 million registered Afghan refugees and about as many undocumented Afghans.

The government of Pakistan has announced a deadline of March 31, 2017, for the voluntary return of all Afghan refugees from Pakistan. The repatriation began this quarter. Pakistan estimated that, as of August 30, 2016, over 350,000 Afghans had left Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan. According to the UNHCR, since July 2016 there has been a surge in the number of Afghans returning from Pakistan, bringing the total number to over 117,000 for the first 8 months of 2016. Another UN estimate put the daily number of Afghan refugees leaving Pakistan at 7,400. According to a UN estimate, between 1 and 1.5 million refugees are expected to return to Afghanistan by the March 2017 deadline.

In addition, as of August 2016 the UNHCR estimates that since January 2016, 245,000 Afghans were internally displaced as a result of the fighting, which would bring the number of persons displaced within that country to 1.2 million.

The surge in repatriating Afghan refugees in itself has created significant needs for humanitarian assistance. Their presence in and transit through the Afghan provinces along the Pakistan border puts them at personal risk and complicates the battlefields there. The influx of returning refugees and increase in numbers of internally displaced persons compounds the economic and political distress in Afghanistan.
Afghan Government Agrees to Peace Accord with Hekmatyar

Since March 2016, the Government of Afghanistan has been pursuing peace negotiations with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin extremist organization and the group’s leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar has long refused to make peace with the Afghan government, even as other members of Hezb-e-Islami, an organization he founded in 1977, have joined Afghan governments since 2001 and assumed cabinet positions. Hekmatyar split from those Hezb-e-Islami members and continued to lead an armed faction, known as Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin. Far smaller than the Taliban, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin’s influence is confined to regions of eastern and northeastern Afghanistan.

In September, representatives of the Afghan government reached a peace agreement with representatives of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. The agreement allows Hekmatyar to return to Afghanistan after years in hiding abroad and to establish himself in the political process. The Afghan government promised Hekmatyar an “honorary post” but the agreement does not include any kind of power-sharing. The agreement was described as an important success by the Afghan government, and the DoS stated in a press release that “[t]he United States welcomes the peace agreement negotiated and signed between the Afghan government and representatives of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG). The only avenue to achieve lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan is through dialogue and negotiations.”

However, the peace agreement was controversial among many Afghans, notably with CEO Abdullah. According to press reports, CEO Abdullah’s Tajik supporters are opposed to another powerful Pashto political figure becoming active in Kabul. The agreement is also unpopular with a segment of the Afghan population who remember Hekmatyar as a ruthless warlord who attacked Kabul with artillery in the 1990’s. On the day that the agreement was signed by Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin negotiators and Afghan government representatives, protesters gathered in Kabul holding signs that reportedly read “We will never forgive the executioner of Kabul.”

A complicating factor for the agreement is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s 2003 designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the DoS, and the associated UN sanctions. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin reportedly claimed credit for a 2013 suicide bombing in Kabul that killed, among others, six American advisors to the Afghan MoD: two military personnel and four civilian contractors.

The final peace agreement will reportedly go into effect once it is signed by President Ghani and Hekmatyar in Kabul. However, the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin negotiators stated that Hekmatyar will not enter Kabul until the sanctions are lifted. The agreement between Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and the Afghan government is reported to state that the latter will pressure the U.S. Government to retract the designation. It is unclear how or if this retraction will occur.
FUNDING FOR OFS

DoD Status of Funds

In the *Cost of War* report, the DoD Comptroller details the year to date spending on OFS. As of May 31, 2016, this included $21.2 billion in obligations and $9.5 billion in disbursements. The principal categories for this funding are:

- **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**: Supports the sustainment, operations, and professionalization of the ANSF, which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) and funds capacity development of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in support of these forces. (For more information, see page 29.)

- **Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund**: Supports efforts to understand, develop, procure, and field measures to defeat improvised threats to U.S. forces, closing the gap between the enemy’s innovation cycles and operational capabilities used by the Joint Force.

- **Military Personnel**: Funds pay and allowances for U.S. service members, including costs related to permanent changes of station.

- **Operations and Maintenance**: Provides for a wide range of services and consumable items to support sustainment of U.S. war-related activities.

### Table 2.

**FY 2016 OFS Allocations, Obligations, and Disbursements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>Allocations</th>
<th>Obligations (Year to Date)</th>
<th>Percent Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursements (Year to Date)</th>
<th>Percent Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
<td>$3,652,257</td>
<td>$1,394,438</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>$494,850</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund</td>
<td>$349,464</td>
<td>$200,045</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>$8,736</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>$3,047,377</td>
<td>$2,115,975</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>$2,034,402</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
<td>$27,292,491</td>
<td>$16,355,748</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>$6,950,761</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>$3,113,740</td>
<td>$1,179,696</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>$50,405</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Development, Testing, and</td>
<td>$1,800</td>
<td>—*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$37,457,129</strong></td>
<td><strong>$21,245,902</strong></td>
<td><strong>57%</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,539,154</strong></td>
<td><strong>45%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: Depicts obligations and disbursements as of May 2016 against appropriations for FY 2016. Percent disbursed is based on amounts obligated. Excludes classified and intelligence programs. Research, development, testing, and evaluation funding is appropriated as two-year funds. As of the most recent *Cost of War* report, the Department was still utilizing its remaining FY 2015 funds and had not yet obligated FY 2016 funds.

including fuel, training, airlift, base support, ammunition, and civilian and contractor personnel.124

- **Procurement**: Supports acquisition of U.S. durable goods, such as aircraft, weapons systems, equipment, and vehicles.125

- **Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation**: Funds basic and applied research by contractor and military scientists in support of advanced technology development for computer software, vehicles, weapons, and other defense-related systems.126

The *Cost of War* report, prepared by DoD Comptroller, provides a snapshot of OCO spending through the first two-thirds of FY 2016. Totals for obligations and disbursements will rise as fourth quarter data become available. Individual accounts, as seen in the chart above, vary in their respective percentages obligated. Disbursements generally trail obligations, particularly for contracted goods and services because of the lag times between the award of contracts and the receipt of goods and services, and between those receipts and corresponding payments to contractors.127

### Audits Address Accuracy of Cost of War Data

The DoD OIG and its partner audit agencies have developed a series of audits to address the accuracy of data presented in *Cost of War* reports. The first, completed by the DoD OIG in June 2016, found that the reports were not timely and did not accurately reflect the status of Air Force funds for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria. The DoD Comptroller indicated in response to that audit that steps were being taken to improve the accuracy and timeliness of *Cost of War* reports.128 The following additional audits regarding the accuracy of OCO accounting are ongoing or planned:

- In May 2016 the DoD OIG began an audit to determine whether the U.S. Navy has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting OFS by evaluating the accuracy of obligations and disbursements that are reported in the *Cost of War* report for select Navy appropriations. The audit is expected to be completed in early 2017.129

- The Naval Audit Service is planning an audit to verify that the Department of the Navy’s obligations and disbursements supporting Overseas Contingency Operations are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and that internal controls are in place and functioning as intended.130

- To determine whether the U.S. Marine Corps has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting OFS, the DoD OIG is planning an audit to examine the accuracy of Marine Corps’ obligations and disbursements supporting OFS as reported in the *Cost of War* report.131

- The Army Audit Agency is planning an audit to verify the accuracy of the Army’s obligations and disbursements reported in the *Cost of War* report for OFS.132
Oversight of U.S.-Funded Contracts

The DoD OIG completed an audit on August 29, 2016, to determine whether contracting officer’s representatives, who help administer U.S.-funded contracts for OFS support, were properly trained and appointed, and able to perform their duties. As of September 2015, 34 DoD contracting activities, located primarily in the United States, were responsible for over 12,000 contract actions in Afghanistan. (“Contract actions” include contract awards and task orders under existing contracts.) USFOR-A requested the audit to address concerns that contracting officer’s representatives: 1) were not always assigned to contracts in Afghanistan; 2) were not sufficiently experienced or trained; and 3) had insufficient time to effectively perform their duties because they were overburdened with additional responsibilities.

Based on a non-statistical sample of 16 contracts with potential obligations exceeding $6.6 billion, the audit found that contracting officer’s representatives generally met training requirements, but that their designation letters did not meet DoD guidelines. In that regard, the DoD OIG found that the designation letters did not include certification that the representative met qualification requirements, identify all required contractual information, address standards of conduct or conflicts of interest, and were not signed by the contracting officer’s representative’s management. These representatives were not appointed in accordance with DoD guidelines because the contracting activities did not update the policies or standardized appointment documentation. Without a strong oversight framework, the contracting activities had limited assurance that the contractors were meeting the performance standards required by the contracts.

As a result of this audit, the DoD OIG made 14 recommendations to seven different entities. Three of the entities, including U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command, and U.S. Transportation Command, concurred with the seven recommendations directed at their respective organization. Two entities were late in responding to the draft and their responses to the report were not included in the final report. Two entities did not respond.

In addition, based on the results of a recent investigation by the DCIS, the Department of the Army suspended and proposed to debar a DoD contractor and 45 of its employees from U.S. Government contracts due to their role in a fuel theft scheme at a U.S. base in eastern Nangarhar province. The investigation revealed that, between 2014 and 2016, while providing services in connection with a support contract at the base, the contractor and several employees conspired to steal or wrongfully withdraw hundreds of thousands of gallons of JP-8 fuel valued at more than $1.8 million, and then redistribute the fuel to third parties in Afghanistan.
A Continuing Resolution Funds OFS for 10 Weeks

The enactment of a continuing resolution through December 9, 2016, ensured level funding for OCO for the first 10 weeks of FY 2017 at the levels enacted for FY 2016.\textsuperscript{134} However, the continuing resolution has delayed action on the Administration’s OCO priorities for FY 2017.

When the fiscal year ended on September 30, unspent funds from that fiscal year may generally continue to be used for a period of up to five years to pay costs associated with obligations made during that fiscal year. However, those funds may not be spent on any new programs or projects.\textsuperscript{135}

Paralleling the debate over appropriations, deliberations on an FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act are also ongoing. While the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have both passed defense authorization bills, differences between the two versions remain to be reconciled.\textsuperscript{136} One outstanding issue remains the need for a supplemental budget request to support the revised drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan—retaining 8,400 troops rather than the 5,500 which the President’s FY 2017 budget assumed.\textsuperscript{137} On September 26, Secretary Carter indicated that the Department was in the process of refining the details of a supplemental budget request. He said that he anticipated that the Administration will submit the revised request when Congress returns in November.\textsuperscript{138}

Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for DoD

The Administration’s original FY 2017 budget request included a total of $58.8 billion in OCO funding for DoD, of which $41.7 billion is to support OFS.\textsuperscript{139} This funding is broken out into 12 categories, which are detailed in Appendix B. While most of these categories support both OFS and OIR, some support just OIR and other categories support DoD operations worldwide. One of these categories is specific and unique to OFS:

**Afghanistan Security Forces Fund ($3.5 billion):** Congress appropriated $4.1 billion in FY 2015 and $3.6 billion in FY 2016 for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, which the DoD uses to provide assistance to the Afghan security forces in the form of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility maintenance, and funding. Appropriations made to this fund are available to be obligated by DoD for two years. The Administration requested $3.5 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund in FY 2017, and the DoD stated that this funding will provide resources for the sustainment, operations, and professionalization of up to 382,000 members of the ANSF. That would include up to 195,000 members of the ANA, 157,000 members of the ANP, and 30,000 members of the Afghan Local Police. According to the DoD Comptroller, the total amount required to support the ANSF during FY 2017 is $4.9 billion, of which the
Comptroller anticipates that the Afghan government will provide $544 million, international contributors will provide $915 million, and the United States will provide the remaining $3.5 billion through the Afghan Security Forces Fund.140

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund also supports efforts to develop the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to promote effectiveness and independence within the ANA and ANP, respectively. These efforts aim to build institutional capacity in critical areas, such as budget, procurement, personnel management, maintenance, and logistics, as well as to improve fiscal discipline, accountability, and transparency.141

**THE OFS COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION**

The June 2016 DoD report, *Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan* June 2016 DoD report, described U.S. counterterrorism efforts as focused on defeating al Qaeda, IS-K, and other designated terrorist organizations, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists who threaten the U.S. homeland.142 Under the revised U.S. troop ceiling of 8,400, roughly 2,100 U.S. military personnel will be assigned to counterterrorism operations according to General Nicholson.143 As described by General Nicholson and Brigadier General Cleveland in press conferences this quarter, U.S. forces use several options in carrying out the OFS counterterrorism mission, including unilateral missions, participating in Afghan operations, and enabling Afghan operations.

Examples of the unilateral combat mission carried out by U.S. forces include offensive operations against al Qaeda installations, targeted attacks against al Qaeda and IS-K leaders, and hostage rescue attempts. Targeted killings included the leader of IS-K, Amir Kamasay Khan in Nangarhar this quarter, as well as the strike against Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in May 2016. According to General Nicholson, U.S. counterterrorism forces are hunting al Qaeda and IS-K operatives in at least seven provinces “every day.”144

In August 2016, U.S. special operations forces unsuccessfully attempted to rescue two American University of Afghanistan professors who had been abducted by the Taliban on August 7 and held in eastern Afghanistan. According to DoD officials quoted in media sources, U.S. forces engaged insurgents at a compound where the hostages were thought to be held, but did not find them there.145 In May 2016, U.S. counterterrorism forces successfully rescued the son of Pakistan’s former prime minister during a raid against an al Qaeda safe house in southern Zabul province.146
The June 2016 DoD report noted that U.S. counterterrorism operations are conducted primarily in partnership with Afghan special operations forces to address shared counterterrorism interests. In his August 2016 press conference, Brigadier General Cleveland indicated that coalition counterterrorism forces were directly involved in about 10 percent of offensive operations conducted by Afghan special operations forces. He explained that in such cases, coalition forces “go outside the wire”—that is, they accompany Afghan security forces off base into a combat potential situation.

In late August, a U.S. Green Beret was killed and a second U.S. soldier injured by a roadside bomb in Helmand province. In that case, U.S. counterterrorism forces were assisting Afghan special operations forces in clearing a Taliban stronghold on the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital. On October 4, 2016, a second U.S. Green Beret died as a result of injuries sustained from an improvised explosive device while conducting counterterrorism operations with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.

According to Brigadier General Cleveland, coalition counterterrorism forces may be “out in the field” assisting Afghan special operations forces “on any given night.” General Nicholson emphasized the inherent risks in counterterrorism operations, noting that five U.S. military personnel were injured while partnering with Afghan security forces that were attacking IS-K in Nangarhar province during July. Those five individuals were expected to make a full recovery. The joint Afghan-U.S. counterterrorism operations against IS-K, according to General Nicholson, were successful—killing the top 12 IS-K leaders, reducing the number of IS-K fighters by 25 percent, and restricting IS-K space to three to four districts in the mountainous areas of southern Nangarhar, down from the nine or ten districts they previously occupied.

Another 10 percent of operations conducted by Afghan special operations forces are assisted by coalition advisors who do not accompany Afghans in the field, but may help plan their operations, provide intelligence support, assist with logistics, or call in airstrikes. As an example of an enabled operation, Brigadier General Cleveland reported that coalition forces assisted the ANP in responding to the August 24 attack on the American University of Afghanistan by providing training and advice. He emphasized that the coalition forces “did not go on to the objective” or participate in the 9-hour firefight with insurgents, although they were present in the area of the attack.

In August 2016, the DoD OIG began an evaluation to determine whether the USFOR-A airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process effectively supported U.S. counterterrorism operations.
THE OFS RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Complementing the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan, NATO’s Resolute Support mission focuses on training, advising, assisting, and equipping the ANDSF. The objective is to build a professional, independent force that can maintain security in Afghanistan and prevent the country from becoming a terrorist sanctuary. Additionally, according to the June 2016 DoD report, a capable and sustainable ANDSF will provide the Afghan government a stronger position from which to negotiate an end to the Taliban conflict in a way that is favorable to U.S. interests.

As of July 2016, Resolute Support was staffed by approximately 13,100 military personnel from 39 nations. The United States contributed the largest share with about 6,800 personnel, followed by 25 NATO allies providing 4,600 personnel and 13 partner nations providing 1,700. Resolute Support follows a regional approach, with coalition advisors spread across 17 bases in 5 train, advise, and assist commands, located in the north, south, east, west, and the capital of Kabul. The four train, advise, and assist commands outside of Kabul are aligned with four of the six ANA corps. The Resolute Support “hub” in Kabul includes Resolute Support headquarters; advisors to the MoD and MoI; the Train, Advise, and Assist Command—Capital, which advises the 111th ANA Division responsible for security in Kabul; and two smaller advise and assist cells. The two smaller cells may deploy to the two ANA corps that do not have assigned train, advise and assist commands.

According to General Nicholson, the reduction in the U.S. military personnel ceiling from 9,800 to 8,400 by January 2017 will result in a “new configuration” of advisory forces as units rotate into and out of Afghanistan from October to December 2016. The transition to 8,400 military personnel, General Nicholson stated, will result in “an actual expansion of our advisory effort.” He explained that U.S. advisory capabilities would be strengthened at the four corps outside of Kabul, while coalition allies would assist with other key functions, such as force protection. Additionally, General Nicholson stated that “over the horizon” forces (located outside of Afghanistan) would be available to provide additional capabilities, but he did not describe the nature of those capabilities citing security reasons.

At his August 2016 press conference, Brigadier General Cleveland provided a brief description of Resolute Support train, advise, and assist efforts. He explained that coalition personnel provide training to Afghan security forces in a wide variety of areas from “how to fire a weapon, to how to fly an airplane, and kind of everything in between.” With respect to advising, he stated that the coalition embeds advisory personnel at multiple levels within MoD and MoI headquarters, as well as in the ANA corps and ANP zones, to provide on-site expertise and to work through emerging problems with Afghan counterparts. Finally, Brigadier General Cleveland stated that...
“assisting” may come in the form of financial, material, intelligence, or logistics assistance to the ANDSF.\(^{162}\)

The June 2016 DoD report announced the development of an “advisor network tool” that provides coalition leadership greater visibility over the activity of Resolute Support advisors and demonstrates the linkage between advisory efforts and long term ANDSF development.\(^{163}\) According to USFOR-A, this tool identifies key relationships between coalition advisors and their primary Afghan counterparts, maintains records of reported advisor engagements, performs analysis to support advisory decision making, and synchronizes future advisor engagements across the country.\(^{164}\)

USFOR-A reported that the advisor network tool was developed and refined under a U.S. contract that expires in December 2016. In September, NATO began to modernize system architecture that will satisfy user requirements and bring the tool under NATO sponsorship and funding beginning in January 2017.\(^{165}\)
Resolute Support Focus: Eight Essential Functions

Resolute Support focuses on eight key areas, called “essential functions” (EFs), that provide the framework and guidance for the train, advise, and assist effort. Within the Resolute Support organization, a senior DoD or coalition official is assigned as lead for each EF with all coalition advisors, whether at the corps, institutional, or ministerial level, aligned under the EF lead. Assessments of ministry progress are measured against the completion of mutually agreed processes or outcomes. A list of EFs and their indicators of effectiveness is provided in Appendix C.

USFOR-A and CSTC-A reported the MoD and MoI made continued progress in achieving some milestones established for EFs, although progress was uneven and, in some cases, slower than anticipated, as described in the following sections. Information set forth here is based primarily on information provided by DoD sources.

**EF 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE**

With coalition training and advice, MoD and MoI began to prepare for the start of Afghan fiscal year 1396 (December 21, 2016 to December 20, 2017) by identifying funds that will not be obligated in the current fiscal year and will result in contract and cash carry-overs to the next fiscal year. CSTC-A reported that both ministries proposed realignments to make sure that unobligated resources were reprioritized to satisfy existing requirements. As of September 2, the MoD had obligated 40 percent of its budget; the MoI had obligated 49 percent.

Additionally, CSTC-A reported that the ministries have improved their procurement performance by streamlining requirements validation, accelerating contract awards, and using multi-year contracts. By September 2016, the ministerial Requirements Approval Boards had approved 99 percent of MoD requirements (up from 79 percent at the end of May) and 62 of MoI requirements (up from 34 percent at the end of May). The MoD awarded 127 contracts through mid-September compared to a total of 12 contracts through May 2016. To compensate for the presidential decision that withdrew MoI contracting authority from provincial authorities and centralized it in headquarters, the MoI developed 23 vendor agreements under which up to 132 individual contracts could be awarded over several years.

The MoD and MoI continued efforts to build institutional capability by increasing the number of civilians supporting finance, procurement, logistics, and personnel operations under the Functional Area Support Teams (MoD) and Subject Matter Expert (MoI) programs. Individuals serving in these programs are employed through a contractor with the possibility of future placement into established ministerial positions. As of August 31, 79 such individuals were working under contract throughout the MoD, with 286 working in the MoI.
This quarter the DoD OIG continued its audit to determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan government have implemented effective controls over the contract management process that obligates U.S. funds provided directly to the Afghan government. This project is one in a series of audits involving “direct funding” to the Afghan government for support of the ANDSF. The DoD OIG expects to complete the audit in early 2017.\textsuperscript{170}

In August 2016, SIGAR began a project to identify the capabilities and weaknesses of the Afghanistan Financial Management System used to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds. The project will also determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.\textsuperscript{171}

**EF 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT**

CSTC-A reported that, despite ongoing efforts, MoD and MoI have “not progressed as anticipated” in implementing managerial internal control programs that are intended to foster transparency and accountability. According to CSTC-A the ministries are not efficient in mapping key processes or identifying and mitigating internal control weaknesses. Both ministries conducted training and refined documentation as part of efforts to implement the programs. The MoD and MoI developed Counter and Anti-Corruption Plans that address anti-corruption initiatives, such as asset declarations, audits, inspections, and complaint receipt processes, CSTC-A reported.\textsuperscript{172}

CSTC-A highlighted efforts of the MoI IG this quarter in executing its annual inspection plan. The MoI IG identified the misuse of fuel, vehicles, and weapons and made recommendations that were implemented by the MoI to correct deficiencies. Unauthorized fuel storage and fueling of unauthorized vehicles were the main findings of MoI IG inspections.\textsuperscript{173} Additionally, the MoI IG forwarded 25 corruption cases to the Afghan Attorney General’s Office, which has so far resolved 7 of those cases to the MoI IG’s satisfaction. However, CSTC-A cautioned that despite improvements, continued advisory assistance will be needed to achieve an acceptable level of quality in MoI IG operations “from planning to report writing.”\textsuperscript{174}

CSTC-A further reported that initiatives to deter fraud, waste, and abuse in the ministries “are not progressing as expected.” CSTC-A reported that leadership changes, bureaucratic delays, and “technical challenges” prevented promulgation of anti-corruption policies in the MoI. Although 60 percent of senior MoD and MoI officials submitted asset declarations as required by Afghan law relating to financial disclosures, CSTC-A noted that the submissions were not subjected to verification and expressed “low confidence” in their accuracy.\textsuperscript{175}

This quarter the DoD OIG conducted fieldwork on an oversight project to assess coalition efforts to enable the MoD to develop its oversight and internal control capability.\textsuperscript{176}

Unauthorized fuel storage and fueling of unauthorized vehicles were the main findings of MoI inspections.
EF 3: RULE OF LAW AND GOVERNANCE
Encouraged by coalition advisors, MoD and MoI senior officials have taken increased interest in cases involving the gross violation of human rights, according to CSTC-A. This quarter ministerial officials were said to have provided more extensive documentation to coalition counterparts relating to official investigations, prosecutions, and judicial decisions. Improved tracking systems in the MoD and MoI have reportedly enabled top CSTC-A and ministerial officials to review essential facts and status of each active case involving a gross violation of human rights.177

This quarter the Minister of Defense was reported to have strengthened the role of his legal director by establishing the director as the sole legal review authority for all MoD policies and directives. Coalition advisors expect to assist the MoD legal office in publicizing the expanded role filled by the legal director to appropriate MoD organizations.178

Coalition advisors said they had also assisted the MoI, the Attorney General’s Office, the Afghan Supreme Court and President Ghani’s staff in establishing the Anti-Corruption Justice Center. Advisors reported having worked to formulate facility upgrades, staffing plans, budgets, and support arrangements needed to bring the Justice Center into full operation.179

EF 4: FORCE GENERATION
USFOR-A reported that the primary focus of coalition EF 4 advisors this quarter was ANDSF training and leadership development. Advisors hosted an ANA workshop to prepare for the upcoming battalion pre-command course and promoted a policy of mandatory participation in pre-command courses by emphasizing the importance of leadership development at all levels.180

According to USFOR-A, participation in basic ANP training has improved, with 97 percent of the force now considered trained. Additionally, the coalition’s Police Institutional Advisory Team assisted the development of a situation awareness course that is being offered at ANDSF regional training centers and has visited three regional training centers to identify systemic issues that may impact further progress in institutionalizing police training.181

However, during his September press conference, General Nicholson noted high casualty rates in some ANP units during the summer fighting season and emphasized the need to “regenerate” those units. He stated that coalition advisors will work with their Afghan counterparts this winter to re-staff, retrain, and re-equip police units that have suffered high casualties.182

USFOR-A also reported progress in enrolling ANA and ANP personnel in the biometric identification program that is a critical prerequisite for implementing the Afghan Personnel and Pay System. As of August 30, 70 to
Afghan Air Force cadets graduated from the officer candidate school at Air University, during a ceremony in Kabul, Afghanistan, Sept. 1, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo)

80 percent of the ANA was enrolled and 90 percent of the ANP was enrolled. In August 2016, coalition advisors assisted with the verification of enrollment data and with efforts to enroll members who are not yet in the program.  

**EF 5: FORCE SUSTAINMENT**

CSTC-A reported that ANDSF personnel completed the demilitarization process for 651 battle damaged vehicles. Removing these vehicles from property records will improve the accuracy of vehicle operational readiness reports.

CSTC-A further reported that all ANA Corps and ANP zones made “significant progress” in uploading vehicle repair parts to the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS), the ANDSF automated inventory management system. Accurate recording of assets in Core-IMS is the first step to building stock listings for ANDSF forward support depots and regional logistics centers.

In order to identify future ANDSF requirements for tactical radios, coalition advisors conducted a review of the entire MoD radio inventory, quantifying shortages, battle-damaged equipment, and end-of-life replacement needs. According to CSTC-A, the review yielded a requirement for procurement of 5,170 radios valued at $52 million. Additionally, coalition advisors developed a procurement package to obtain 125 new base station systems to update the MoI high frequency radio system and distributed 60 pallets of radio repair components to 38 regional police zones.
Following media reports that ANDSF personnel were unnecessarily firing off rounds of ammunition to sell cartridge casings for scrap, coalition advisors said they prompted the MoD Ammunition Group to develop two directives that would control ammunition expenditures. The first directive modified MoD reporting to more accurately capture expenditures. Ammunition consumption is now being reviewed by the MoD IG and the ANA General Staff Technical Office. The second directive requires that shell casings be returned to the Central Supply Depot.

To strengthen ANDSF facility maintenance capabilities, CSTC-A reportedly having undertaken a program to train Afghan facility engineers and public works personnel in skills needed to operate power plants, air-conditioning and heating systems, and water treatment plants. This quarter, CSTC-A arranged contractor-provided training for over 70 ANDSF personnel in a variety of facility maintenance courses at ANA and ANP locations. Additionally, over the past several years, coalition partners have institutionalized facility maintenance training at the ANA Engineer School, located at the Train, Advise, and Assist Command-North. The school offers ten engineering courses to ANDSF personnel and Afghan civilians on a recurring basis.

One of those courses, the facility engineering course, has been of particular interest to coalition advisors. It is intended to provide a sustainable Afghan facility maintenance capability that protects the $10 billion investment in facility construction funded by international donors over the past decade. The facility engineering course now has a core of instructors that can independently conduct 60 percent of the curriculum, but still requires coalition assistance for course administration, material support, and highly technical subjects. The greatest challenge, according to CSTC-A, involves increasing the level of participation by ANDSF personnel. Fewer than 60 percent of available seats were filled in the last two course offerings, because ANDSF commanders were unwilling to lose personnel for the 14 weeks
required. Over the coming fall and winter, coalition advisors will arrange visits to Corps headquarters and attempt to promote this course.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{SIGAR is conducting several oversight projects to determine whether construction projects completed on behalf of the ANDSF met contract requirements and applicable construction standards. Facilities that are undergoing review include those at the MoI and MoD headquarters complexes, ANA Camp Commando, ANA Ground Forces Command, and Afghan Special Mission Wing in Kandahar province. SIGAR is also examining the extent to which the Afghan government uses and maintains infrastructure assets transferred by DoD.\textsuperscript{191}}

**EF 6: COMMAND AND CONTROL OPERATIONS**

CSTC-A reported some progress as well as delay in achieving established performance milestones for EF 6, where advisors assist the ANDSF in planning and executing combat operations. A key objective of EF 6 is ministerial development of strategic planning documents that identify ANDSF capability weaknesses, promote operations with combined ANA and ANP forces, and enable subordinate organizations to formulate campaign plans.

This quarter, the MoD produced a formal document that describes strategic objectives and tasks but required significant advisory assistance to do so. The MoI, however, demonstrated the ability to produce key strategic planning documents with little coalition assistance. The MoI strategic plan, according to CSTC-A, presented a detailed listing of actions necessary to accomplish MoI strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{192}

The ANA did not achieve expected progress in identifying capability gaps, according to CSTC-A, because the ANA was misusing personnel during high tempo operations and not reporting readiness accurately. The ANP failed to meet expectations in planning and directing operations because the MoI did not endorse standard operating procedures or enforce operational orders.\textsuperscript{193}

**EF 7: INTELLIGENCE**

According to USFOR-A, Afghan intelligence gathering and coordination abilities improved this quarter on a variety of fronts. ANP human intelligence gathering operatives increased their sources throughout the country and worked closely with ANP organizations to integrate human intelligence with operations. USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF continued to expand its use of intelligence gathering platforms, such as ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle systems, Wolfhound radio monitoring systems, Aerostat (blimp) based surveillance platforms, and RAID towers (surveillance equipment mounted on 100 foot towers).\textsuperscript{194}

Noting that the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Office had difficulty supporting ANDSF operations in the past, USFOR-A reported concerted effort by Resolute
Support and ANDSF authorities during July and August to improve map making capabilities and refine procedures for obtaining maps. Additional Afghan-led efforts to enhance the use of intelligence in combat operations reportedly included the integration of intelligence into aircraft targeting packages, improved prioritization of intelligence gathering efforts, enhanced response to crisis situations by the intelligence watch in the National Military Intelligence Center, and a more comprehensive ANP intelligence training program.\(^{195}\)

The Intelligence Training Center continued to be Afghan-led and expanded its offerings from 26 to 32 courses tailored to new Afghan intelligence gathering capabilities, such as ScanEagle. ANA instructors and Afghan contractors led the majority of this training, enabled by the support of coalition advisors.\(^{196}\)

*This quarter the DoD OIG continued an evaluation to determine the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence training for MoD personnel. The project team deployed to Afghanistan last quarter, visiting training and advising sites in the Kabul area and conducting interviews with coalition advisors. The team also met with MoD general officers and soldiers.*\(^{197}\)

**EF 8: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION**

USFOR-A reported “positive progress” in ANDSF initiatives to inform the Afghan people of the successes of ANDSF operations and demoralize insurgent groups. Of particular interest has been the direct involvement of President Ghani’s office in strengthening strategic communications by appointing a presidential spokesperson and leading the strategy for reporting Afghan progress in advance of the October Brussels summit. According to USFOR-A, the MoD and MoI improved the recruitment, training, and retention of public affairs personnel; increased the number of media events to publicize successful ANDSF offensives; and streamlined internal operating procedures.\(^{198}\)
Support for Women in the ANDSF

Resolute Support advisors also assist the Afghan government in implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal rights to women. In addition to the eight EF organizations, USFOR-A reports that it has established a Resolute Support Gender Office, a stand-alone directorate that provides guidance on gender-related matters to all EF organizations. The gender office appoints a gender representative to serve in each EF and in some headquarters components. According to USFOR-A, the gender representative ensures that gender considerations are included in all advising activities.

As of August 2016, approximately 1,000 women served in the ANA and 3,000 women served in the ANP (5,000 women authorized in each force). USFOR-A provided the following examples of Gender Office accomplishments during the quarter:

- Assisted the ANA in developing an assignment plan for the 109 women who recently completed basic training in Turkey. Because the MoD has not developed an overarching strategy or career path for women military personnel, CSTC-A reported that the task of identifying ANA “spaces” for these 109 women has been “extremely challenging.” CSTC-A reported that a final plan has yet to be produced.

- Ensured that incentive payments were made to ANDSF women.

- Encouraged increased representation of women in MoD/MoI inspector general offices. As a result, four additional women were appointed to oversight positions.

- Assisted with the production of a training video that addresses human rights violations, unacceptable workplace behavior, and the respectful treatment of women in the workplace. The video will be shown to all new ANDSF recruits.

- Encouraged attendance by women at a radio maintenance course so that radios continue to be maintained when male technicians must leave to join a combat unit. This quarter the first women graduated from the course.

- Developed a media and marketing plan to increase public awareness of women in security roles.
Building Ministerial Capacity

Within the framework of the eight EFs, coalition advisors reported that they continued to focus on sustainability of the ANDSF by training and assisting ministerial officials in carrying out key managerial functions. The MoD oversees the ANA, which includes the Afghan Air Force, and three special operations forces components. It has an authorized strength of 195,000 military personnel. The MoI oversees the ANP, 1 police special operations forces unit, and 5 specialized police units that together have an authorized strength of 157,000, as well as the Afghan Local Police with an authorized strength of 30,000.

USFOR-A and CSTC-A reported progress in a number of ministerial functional areas this quarter, such as financial management, procurement, medical support, automated system implementation, and strategic communications, but emphasized that significant challenges remain. However, USFOR-A again cautioned that coalition advisors relied almost exclusively on data provided by the MoD and MoI to assess ANDSF readiness and effectiveness, because advisors had little ability to observe or gather data about ANDSF operations outside of ANA Corps or ANP zone headquarters. USFOR-A considered the credibility of MoI and MoD data “questionable,” emphasizing the importance of advisory efforts that focused on strengthening the interaction between the ministries and the security forces they oversee. Additionally, USFOR-A reported continuing gaps in strategic planning, leadership, logistics, and maintenance.

Measuring Success

To assess ministerial progress, Resolute Support has established a rating system based on MoD/MoI attainment of milestones, which are established by mutual agreement between coalition advisors and their Afghan counterparts. Milestones are grouped by EF and are accomplished over time through the execution of supporting actions to achieve the desired outcome. Ministerial progress is evaluated using a rating scale from one to five as seen in Table 3.

Last quarter, USFOR-A reported that MoD performance was evaluated at “fully capable” for 18 percent of the milestones (none met “sustaining capability”) and forecast that MoD would achieve a “fully capable” rating in 34 percent of its milestones and “sustaining” in 16 percent by the end of September 2016. More dramatic improvement was forecast for the MoI: USFOR-A expected that 46 percent of the milestones would achieve a “fully capable” rating by the end of September (up from 18 percent last quarter), while 15 percent would achieve “sustaining” (up from 3 percent last quarter). However, this quarter assessments of ministerial performance under the rating system are classified, so the accuracy of those forecasts is not reported here.
Table 3.

**EF Rating System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Scoped and Agreed Upon</td>
<td>The relevant Afghan organization has agreed with the specific supporting action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Initiated</td>
<td>The Afghan organization has commenced work on the specific action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Capable and Effective</td>
<td>The Afghan organization has completed or almost completed work on the action and the result is partially effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable and Effective</td>
<td>The Afghan organization has completed work on the action and the result is fully effective but may still require some coalition support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustaining Capability</td>
<td>The Afghan organization has completed work on the action and the result is sustainable without further coalition support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Leadership: A Continuing Challenge**

Resolute Support personnel reported that, since his parliamentary confirmation on June 20, Minister of Defense Abdullah Khan Habibi has exercised effective leadership, leveraging his 44-years of military service to establish credibility with the ANDSF, the Afghan government, and the general population. Because his appointment is permanent (unlike his predecessor’s temporary “acting” appointment), Habibi has been able to set long-term priorities and develop institutional policies needed to build ministerial and ANA capacity. Resolute Support described him as a strategic leader with a natural ability to achieve consensus among the senior leadership throughout the Afghan government. 211

However, Resolute Support personnel expressed concern over the lack of a supporting cadre of trained senior civilians in the MoD. Described by Resolute Support as a “limiting factor” in MoD, the absence of strong civilian leadership “routinely impacts organizational growth and progress and at times fuels the perceptions of corruption.” 212 In that regard, USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF lacks an institutional risk management system that would address and mitigate strategic and operational risk within the organization. Instead, ministerial leadership is focused on short term tactical issues and “relies heavily” on coalition advisors to prevent “eventual strategic failure.” 213

To meet this challenge, coalition advisors in the ministries are emphasizing the need to look ahead and develop long-term plans. MoD advisors are working with the ANA General Staff to formulate a 5-year plan. Similarly, MoI advisors are encouraging their MoI counterparts to focus on overarching strategic issues, rather than daily crises. 214 Yet, combat challenges requiring immediate response divert senior leadership in Kabul from strategic planning. For example, Brigadier General Cleveland noted that during the August Taliban offensive in Kunduz province, some ANDSF leaders deployed to the province to assist forces on the ground. 215
According to Brigadier General Cleveland, most of the challenges at all levels in the ANDSF are ultimately tied to leadership. USFOR-A reported that appointments to senior positions are often not based on merit. Instead, staff positions may be filled by inexperienced officers who are selected based on their ability to read and write, rather than their suitability for the position. General Nicholson stated that ANDSF leaders failed to provide adequate supplies, ammunition, or information to troops at checkpoints, leaving the checkpoints vulnerable to insurgent attacks.

**DoD Perspectives on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Relationship**

The June 2016 DoD report emphasized that the relationship between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan remains a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. When addressing security problems involving Pakistan during a joint press conference with President Ghani, Secretary Carter stated, “the greatest threat to Pakistan’s security is terrorism. It’s not its neighbors. It’s terrorism.” As a result, Secretary Carter emphasized that the United States is working with Pakistan “wherever we can” against any terrorism that emanates from Pakistani territory. In early August, Secretary Carter did not certify that Pakistan had taken sufficient action against the Haqqani network to justify a waiver of the otherwise required withholding of $300 million from the Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan.

USFOR-A reported that “the hardening Afghan policy toward Pakistan at the highest levels of government,” which began in March 2016, may have intensified this quarter. A number of factors accounted for the deteriorating relationship at strategic levels: high-profile attacks in Afghanistan that were traced to Pakistani operatives; tightening Pakistani border crossing restrictions for personnel and
cargo; and the increased flow of refugees from Pakistan into Afghanistan because of a change in Pakistani refugee policy. Despite the apparent standoff at top levels, the Afghan government promoted military-to-military dialogue as a way to resolve border issues before they required diplomatic intervention.\(^{222}\)

According to USFOR-A, dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani senior military officers resumed this quarter, even though the military-to-military relationship between the countries remained “tense and mistrustful.” USFOR-A reported that the “counter-Daesh [a term referring to IS-K] trilateral conference” took place as planned on July 26 at MoD headquarters in Kabul following its cancellation last April. Participants included ANDSF, Pakistani, and Resolute Support general officers who examined the threat posed by IS-K in the region and committed to sharing information on future counter-IS-K operations carried out by Afghan and Pakistani forces. USFOR-A reported that, although counter-IS-K offensives were not coordinated between the countries, general information concerning troop locations and intended targets was shared.\(^{223}\)

Immediately following the trilateral conference, a working group of ANDSF and Pakistani officials met to discuss border issues. Although the group did not resolve outstanding border conflicts, it identified the specific issues that it would address in future meetings.

USFOR-A also reported that five meetings at the general officer level were held in late August to resolve Pakistan’s August 19 closure of a major international border crossing into Kandahar province. The border crossing was reopened on September 1. Additionally, the telephonic “hotline” between the ANDSF general staff and its Pakistani counterpart was used periodically to resolve border disputes. USFOR-A expected this type of military-to-military cooperation to continue next quarter.\(^{224}\)
Commitment Letters Reportedly Provide Leverage

CSTC-A continues to place financial controls on U.S. and international funding contributions through a series of financial commitment letters with the MoD and the MoI. Commitment letters, signed by the relevant Afghan minister and CSTC-A commander, address critical conditions that the ANDSF must meet to help ensure funding is used appropriately.\textsuperscript{225}

The commitment letters for Afghan FY 1395 (running from December 21, 2015 through December 20, 2016) included 86 conditions to encourage transparency and accountability of equipment and resources. These letters established expectations for the responsible management of direct contributions from donor nations. If the criteria spelled out in the commitment letters are not met, total direct donor contributions may be reduced from initial amounts or funds may be withheld until corrective steps are taken. These enforcement mechanisms are critical to U.S. communications to Afghan leadership that they must demonstrate accountability and transparency in the expenditure of donor funds.\textsuperscript{226}

ANDSF compliance with commitment letters is reviewed quarterly and, when appropriate, CSTC-A recommends corrective action. For the period ending June 30, 2016, CSTC-A reported the following results in Table 4.\textsuperscript{227}

Table 4.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Number of Conditions Reviewed & Satisfactory Progress & Incentive Awarded & Insufficient Progress & Penalty Assessed \\
\hline
MoD & 42 & 31 & 4 & 11 & 1 \\
MoI & 46 & 27 & 1 & 19 & 4 \\
\hline
TOTAL & 86 & 58 & 5 & 30 & 5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Although progress was insufficient on 30 commitment letter conditions, CSTC-A did not assess penalties on 25, because CSTC-A determined that the failure to attain the specified condition was beyond the control of the ministry, the conditions were insufficiently measurable or assessable, or enforcing the penalties could have affected the ANDSF’s ability to execute 2016 spring and summer fighting season operations.\textsuperscript{228} CSTC-A advised the ministries that those 25 conditions required “significant improvement” to avoid incurring penalties after the next quarterly assessment.\textsuperscript{229}

The Commander, CSTC-A, advised the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the results of their second quarter conditionality assessment by letters dated July 8, 2016.
For the MoD:

- Incentives (additional funds) were awarded to the MoD for completing a plan to connect 28 bases to the commercial power grid; maintaining an accurate tracking system for its inventory of construction equipment; completing an inventory of construction materials; and recruiting women into the ANA.

- A penalty was assessed for the failure to submit inventories of night vision devices for all units. CSTC-A advised that deliveries of night vision devices to noncompliant units would cease until required inventories are received.

For the MoI:

- An incentive was awarded for reducing the number of untrained ANP below 5 percent.

- Penalties were assessed for not reporting action taken on 22 of 24 cases involving the gross violation of human rights that Resolute Support submitted; failure to report ammunition consumption; failure to submit inventories of night vision devices; and failure to upload a sufficient number of police records into the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS).

Oversight of Donor Funds

The DoD OIG is auditing the manner in which funds, provided by coalition partners directly to the Afghan ministries, are obligated in order to determine the extent of commitment letter enforcement. This quarter DoD OIG personnel continued fieldwork on a project to determine whether CSTC-A, MoD, and MoI have established effective controls over the contract management process. Contracts awarded under this process are donor-funded.

In July 2016, the DoD OIG initiated an audit to determine whether CSTC-A and the MoD have established effective controls over MoD-awarded fuel contracts. On-site fieldwork began on October 1, 2016. This audit is similar to a DoD OIG oversight project concerning MoI-awarded fuel contracts that was completed in January 2016. The audit found that CSTC-A did not have reasonable assurance that fuel valued at nearly $260 million supported actual ANP requirements and was used for its intended purpose. CSTC-A has previously considered fuel contracts “high risk,” because corrupt officials sold fuel purchased with U.S. funds for personal profit.

CSTC-A carries out a separate audit program to evaluate specific MoD and MoI operations. This quarter CSTC-A completed audits to determine whether the MoD adequately procured and accounted for pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, assess the timeliness of MoD contracting actions, and determine whether MoI payments for municipal services were properly managed.
The audits found deficiencies in the areas evaluated. Pharmaceutical quality control, medical inventory accuracy, storage facilities, and medical training were inadequate. MoD contracting actions were not timely and MoI payments were not properly documented. In response to the audits, the MoD took action to improve training, procurement, and inventory management in medical supply and contracting operations. The MoI obtained documentation to support expenditures for municipal services. Ongoing CSTC-A audits are examining accountability for ammunition and vehicles, adequacy of facility maintenance, utilization of MoD and MoI training courses, and payments to retired ANDSF personnel.

Building Functional Capacity

This quarter coalition advisors continued to work with their Afghan counterparts in the MoD and MoI to improve budget execution, procurement, personnel management, and sustainment capabilities. CSTC-A again reported that progress was uneven—the ministries made improvements in several functional areas, but continued to face challenges in others.

According to CSTC-A, both ministries continued to improve budget execution and procurement operations, but impediments remain. For example, CSTC-A reported that senior level MoD officials exerted “excessive oversight” on small dollar procurement actions that caused delay in executing contracts. Coalition advisors are assisting MoD develop a process to delegate authority for procurement approval from the ministerial to the contracting officer level. With respect to MoI procurement, CSTC-A noted that the MoI has failed to implement a centralized procurement operation that was mandated by President Ghani in March 2016 and that it lacks sufficient personnel with procurement expertise. Coalition advisors are assisting MoI officials with a reorganization of the procurement function and strengthening of the civilian work force.

The Struggle to Implement Automated Systems

The implementation and use of automated systems to manage personnel and materiel progressed slowly this quarter. A key Resolute Support objective is full implementation of the Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS) automated personnel system. AHRIMS is intended to manage personnel records for all ANDSF personnel who are assigned to a position authorized by the tashkil, the ANDSF manpower and equipment allowance document. Accurate recording of information in AHRIMS will improve the assignment and tracking of personnel, assist recruiting and retention by identifying potential losses, and monitor training.

Coalition advisors continued to assist the ANDSF with two major efforts with respect to AHRIMS this quarter: slotting personnel into AHRIMS (matching individuals to authorized positions) and improving the accuracy of data in
Both ministries, from the national level down, continue to rely on manual (paper-based) systems for materiel management and end-item accountability. Neither ministry met goals for AHRIMS (95 percent of personnel slotted to a position), but both made progress. By mid-August, 75 percent of MoD personnel and 88 percent of MoI personnel were slotted (compared to percentages of 69 and 68 percent respectively in May 2016).

In August 2016, the MoD reviewed and updated Afghan Air Force personnel records and expects to continue the quality review for all ANA personnel records through October 2017. The MoI is planning a similar review for ANP records. Additionally, coalition advisors have facilitated the use of AHRIMS at the ANA Corp, ANP zone, and provincial levels by setting up required equipment, providing training, and documenting procedures. However, USFOR-A reported that daily usage of AHRIMS “remains lower than desired.” Neither the MoD nor MoI is using AHRIMS as the standard means to manage the force and both operate using paper-based personnel processes.

CSTC-A also reported that both ministries, from the national level down, continue to rely on manual (paper-based systems) for materiel management and end-item accountability. The Afghans default to this approach because the transition from their historic “push-based” supply system to “demand-based” supply is still under development. In the current hybrid system, supply activities remain “disjointed, decentralized, and ineffective” with limited oversight and voluminous data that cannot be used to make inventory management decisions—such as determining appropriate stock levels, stock replenishment quantities, or facility requirements.

For more than 6 years, the effort to implement Core-IMS, an automated inventory system being developed by a DoD contractor that would be a key enabler of a demand-based supply system, has made slow and uneven progress. Over that period it has been modified incrementally to provide capabilities beyond the basic inventory management function it was designed to perform, such as property accountability and maintenance management. It uses web-based software and is accessible by any computer that has Internet access, but Internet connectivity in Afghanistan is limited outside major cities.

Over the past year, the ANDSF installed 165 Core-IMS computers and 18 servers at the ANA Logistics Command in Kabul and the 6 ANA corps locations. Additionally, CSTC-A reported that 130 contracted logistics specialists remain deployed at Core-IMS sites across the country to train ANDSF supply specialists in warehousing and automation. This quarter, the coalition advisors assisted the ANDSF in conducting inventories of warehouse items and uploading them to Core-IMS. In July 2016, all MoD units completed the inventory and upload of repair parts. CSTC-A expects the MoD to complete the upload of petroleum products, medical supplies, and organizational clothing by December 2016. As this effort continues, coalition advisors will train Afghan supply personnel to perform routine supply transactions using Core-IMS.
Action Underway to Improve Vehicle Readiness

CSTC-A reported that equipment readiness rates in the ANA decreased slightly over the past quarter, primarily because of the heavy fighting that occurred during the summer campaign. Battle damage was particularly high in the 215th Corps, which is responsible for Helmand province, where over 600 vehicles had to be demilitarized as unrepairable.\(^\text{249}\) As a result, the equipment readiness rate for the 215th Corps (36 percent as of September 2016), remained significantly below rates reported by other ANA Corps, which ranged from 54 percent to 77 percent.\(^\text{250}\)

Major repairs for the 50,000 ANA vehicles are performed by a logistics support contractor at nine sites throughout the country. CSTC-A reported that the contractor repaired over 1,000 vehicles during the past 3 months with ANA personnel responsible for routine oil changes and other preventive...
maintenance. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), however, the 1,000 vehicle figure is “incredibly low,” equating an average of only 37 vehicles repaired per month at each of the nine contractor repair sites, and demonstrates the contractor’s failure to meet contractual requirements. CSTC-A continued to report a shortage of more than 600 trained MoD mechanics that has existed since the start of the spring campaign: 3,500 are required, with fewer than 2,900 available. As a result, CSTC-A reported that the ANA is unable to complete required preventative maintenance for all vehicles.

In July 2016, SIGAR completed an audit of ANA vehicle maintenance program that focused on the performance of the logistics support contractor. The audit found significant weaknesses in the design of the contract, contractor performance, and oversight of the contractor by U.S. Government personnel. In response to the audit, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) reported that the existing maintenance contract was modified to incorporate additional performance metrics, such as requiring the contractor to close 80 percent of work orders within 15 days.

In mid-October 2016, the Army Contracting Command issued a “Letter of Concern” to the logistic support contractor advising of a “significant lack of performance” that required immediate resolution. Performance deficiencies included the failure to complete repairs in a timely manner, the lack of employee technical and managerial skills, and a deficiency of diagnostic equipment. The Army requested the contractor to provide a “get well plan” by the end of the month.

An initiative to address MoD and MoI vehicle maintenance problems involves establishment of an overarching contract that will provide maintenance and repair services to both MoD and MoI vehicle fleets, while training Afghan mechanics and logistics personnel. The solicitation for this so-called “national maintenance strategy” was released this quarter, with a contract award targeted for April 2017.

DoD awarded contracts this quarter totaling $465 million to provide the ANDSF 2,106 armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. The vehicles are scheduled to be delivered by July 2017. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), DoD is also responding to an Afghan government request for excess U.S. military high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. While there will be a cost associated with refurbishment, use of excess U.S. military equipment is expected to significantly reduce the cost of replacement vehicles and in some cases will
allow the Afghans to upgrade their vehicles and other equipment at a fraction of the cost of procurement of new materials. U.S. military depots and industry will be involved in the refurbishment of excess equipment ensuring that fully operational equipment is provided to the ANDSF.259

**Strategic Communications—Growing in Importance**

The Afghan government continues to emphasize the importance of strategic communications to counter insurgent messaging and to build public support for the ANDSF. MoD and MoI objectives in this area are two-fold: 1) inform the Afghan people of the successes of the ANDSF, and 2) demoralize the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

This quarter, coalition advisors helped build MoD capacity by training public affairs staffs to operate autonomously when conducting corps-level media engagements, assisting with budgeting and procurement processes, implementing standard operating procedures for information flow among public affairs offices, and conducting training for MoD communications personnel.260

With coalition assistance, the MoD created mobile training teams designed to improve public affairs capabilities in the ANA Corps and provide a “surge capability” to meet emergent crises with a prompt media response. USFOR-A reported that MoD and MoI abilities to execute strategic communications responsibilities were demonstrated during the July–August ANDSF offensives against IS-K in Nangarhar province. It said that weekly planning meetings, frequent MoD-MoI joint press conferences, and provincial level media events combined to present a positive image of the effort to drive IS-K from the province.261

Ministerial ability to counter insurgent messaging was further demonstrated after the IS-K suicide bombing attack during the July Hazara demonstration where nearly 80 people were killed. According to USFOR-A, the MoD and MoI quickly coordinated their efforts to produce media releases. Similarly, the MoI controlled messaging during the attack on the American University of Afghanistan in August to communicate emergency information to the public and report the incident before the insurgents could promote their message.262

This quarter the MoD information operations section established its first budget, which enabled the award of three contracts to support strategic communications: 1) a contract to print handbills; 2) a broadcasting contract with National Afghan Radio; and 3) a contract to repair “radios-in-a-box,” which are mobile radio transmitters that enable broadcasts in remote locations. In addition to assisting with radio-in-a-box maintenance, coalition advisors are helping their counterparts develop broadcast schedules and standardize radio programming.263
ANDSF: Resilient but Challenges Continue

At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, the member states of NATO praised the resilience and courage of the ANDSF while acknowledging the challenges and capability gaps that persist and the continued need for international support. General Dunford addressed some of these challenges during his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in September. He noted capability gaps that still exist in the areas of aviation, intelligence, and ministerial administration, but emphasized that the ANDSF had succeeded in preventing the Taliban from achieving its goals during the summer fighting season.

General Dunford stated that, with continued support, the Afghans will become increasingly capable of providing security to their country. During that Senate hearing, Secretary Carter testified that the ANDSF is growing in strength and performed well in its lead security role, especially given the strength of the Taliban forces opposing it.

High casualty levels have been a major hardship for the ANDSF as it transitioned into the lead security role. In his July and September press conferences, General Nicholson expressed concern with the high number of ANDSF casualties this year that were “trending about 20 percent higher” than the casualty rate experienced in 2015.

General Nicholson indicated that heavy casualties suffered last year by the ANA 215th Corps led to the force regeneration effort that brought new leadership and training to the unit. Several battalions of the ANA 215th Corps, charged with defending the unstable Helmand Province, were partially re-equipped and have since returned to the field with new commanders and a new advisory element. This year, the 215th Corps has been able to defend the contested area surrounding Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. The area stretches from the town of Marjah in the south to Sangin in the north. General Nicholson noted that the Afghans “take casualties and they keep going back into the fight. And this is something money can’t buy, is their willingness to take the fight to the enemy.”

General Nicholson stated that some ANP units are also being retrained and re-equipped, having suffered higher casualties in some cases than the ANA. In discussing the resilience of the police in carrying on the fight in the face of these losses, he said, “We believe that with improvements in leadership and …a reduction of dependency on check points, that this will reduce the potential for casualties.” General Nicholson noted the vulnerability that exists when a 30- to 50-troop checkpoint is attacked by a larger enemy force.

General Nicholson spoke about the challenges facing the Afghan police in administering these checkpoints, which are often posted in remote areas of
poor leadership at the lowest levels has led to checkpoints often being insufficiently resourced with ammunition, supplies, and intelligence, which increases their vulnerability to ambush attacks. In General Nicholson’s assessment, this was not only a security issue, but a political and social matter as well. Engagement with Afghan leaders at the provincial and community levels is necessary to support the quality of policing that will ultimately secure these sparsely populated regions.\textsuperscript{271}

The importance of local political engagement for the ANDSF was also addressed by Ambassador Richard Olson, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, when he testified before Congress this quarter. Ambassador Olson stated, “Political stability is directly linked to a positive security environment. Afghan security forces have incorporated lessons learned from previous fighting seasons into their current operations with improving results.”

**ANA Force Strength**

This quarter, USFOR-A reported that a comparable number of gains and losses have kept ANA force strength relatively level at an average of 170,209 over the six-month period from March to August 2016. However, attrition rates are still high, preventing the ANA from achieving its full \textit{tashkil} authorization of 195,000. Figure 3 illustrates gains (in blue) and losses (in red) over a 12-month period, demonstrating little change to total force strength (yellow). The total force strength consistently remained approximately 25,000 below the full authorization.\textsuperscript{272}

Personnel losses are due to a number of factors, including both planned separations and unplanned events, such as soldiers being killed, captured, or “dropped from rolls.” The latter category, which is defined as being absent without leave for over 30 days, was responsible for over two-thirds of attrition from March through August. Attrition rates vary significantly by unit, with the Capital Division, special operations units, senior leadership, and Afghan Air Force all losing less than 1 percent of their strength in July. The 215th Corps, which faces stiff opposition from the Taliban in Helmand province, suffered the highest rate of attrition at nearly 4.5 percent and experienced the highest rates of killed, wounded, and dropped from rolls among all ANA units.\textsuperscript{273}

**Hold-Fight-Disrupt**

The ANDSF’s national counter-insurgency offensive for the 2016 fighting season, Operation Shafaq, involved prioritizing key areas around the country and designating them as either “hold,” “fight,” or “disrupt” areas. According to Brigadier General Cleveland, “hold” areas are places where the ANDSF
positions troops and does everything in its power to prevent that area from falling to insurgents. These include major population centers and critical infrastructure. “Fight” areas are important but slightly less critical areas where Afghan security forces may not always be stationed, but where they aggressively counter attempts by the Taliban to encroach. Finally, “disrupt” areas are lower priority regions with sparse populations and no major infrastructure. The ANDSF works to impede Taliban advances in “disrupt” areas.

Figure 3
Afghan National Army Total Force Strength

Source: USFOR-A response to SIGAR request for information, 8/30/2016. Oct- Sec-01_DCOSOPS_CJ7_Attachment-01_ANA_Manpower_NRSU
areas, but not with the same level of commitment reserved for the more strategically significant “hold” and “fight” areas.\textsuperscript{274}

In General Nicholson’s assessment, this strategy has allowed the Afghan security forces, along with their U.S. enablers, to sustain security in strategic areas through the judicious employment of force strength.\textsuperscript{275} According to USFOR-A, the Afghan government reported that ANDSF combat operations killed \textbf{6,879} insurgent forces between July 1 and September 8, 2016.\textsuperscript{276}

**Special Operations Forces**

Afghan special operations forces include commandos, a high-end counter-terrorism unit known as the \textit{Ktah Khas}, and special police units. Together, these forces total roughly 17,000 soldiers and police, advised by their U.S. and NATO special operations forces partners.\textsuperscript{277} According to Brigadier General Cleveland, these units operate independently approximately 80 percent of the time. They are supported by U.S. planning, intelligence, air support, and other remote enablers in 10 percent of their operations, and they are advised on the ground by coalition forces, who may engage in combat, in the remaining 10 percent.\textsuperscript{278}

In recent years, ANDSF leaders have typically used these elite units to carry out conventional missions. This overuse degrades readiness and combat effectiveness. USFOR-A specifically cited the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the ANP’s special police unit, as having been “integrated into nearly all ANA operations to their detriment.” Frequently employing this specialized unit in clearing and holding operations outside of its defined mission and role has had a negative impact on the Afghan National Civil Order Police’s ability to implement the operational readiness cycle that is necessary to improve effectiveness.\textsuperscript{279}

On September 29, 2016, the DoD OIG completed a classified audit on the extent to which coalition forces had met their goals of training, advising, and assisting the ANA special operations forces to conduct independent combat operations. The audit focused on the progress being made by special operations advisers, budget authority for Special Operations Command, enforcement of MoD published policies, and ANA logistics in support of special operations. The audit also examined the command relationships between ANA Corps commanders and ANA Special Operations Forces commanders present in their areas of operations. The report made eight classified recommendations to CSTC-A and NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan based on the findings of the audit.\textsuperscript{280}
ANA and ANP Joint Operations

According to USFOR-A, the ANA and ANP have improved “somewhat” in their ability to conduct joint operations and to employ enablers. Integration of air and ground assets has improved, and the ANDSF has proven increasingly capable of conducting intelligence-driven operations. The same report assessed the ANA as “partially capable” of conducting combined arms operations with police units. All corps now have integrated rotary wing aviation and artillery with Special Security Forces and conventional maneuver elements according to USFOR-A. In terms of planning and operations, USFOR-A was encouraged by the manner in which the ANDSF followed its summer plan, Operation Shafaq. Despite heavy fighting, especially during August, Afghan security forces maintained their priorities and did not depart from the overarching strategy.

USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF achieved an unprecedented level of integration during planning for its 2016-2017 winter campaign, which will focus on the establishment of an operational readiness cycle to support both training and force regeneration. Afghan security forces recognize the need for a sustainable readiness cycle in order to counter insurgent forces effectively. The winter campaign plan aims to reduce over-reliance on ANA and ANP Special Security Forces to carry out conventional operations and restricts these units’ usage according to their specific mission statements.

Operational Readiness Cycles

An operational readiness cycle, sometimes called a force readiness cycle, is an organized, predictable pattern that guides the activity of military units. The Resolute Support mission is working to instill the concept of a three-phase cycle for Afghan units: first, the force goes through a training phase where the force prepares for combat operations; then, the operational phase during which they actively engage in the fight; and finally, a reset phase where soldiers take leave and equipment goes into maintenance. The reset phase is critical to ensuring that the unit is prepared to begin the cycle again with a new training phase to prepare once again for combat operations.

According to USFOR-A, establishment of operational readiness cycles will be the overarching focus of the winter planning months for both the ANA and the ANP, whose leaders have recognized the importance of sufficient rest and training periods to ensure the units are in prime fighting condition when they are sent out into the field. Consistent operational readiness cycles are especially necessary to maximize the effectiveness of special operations units. However, USFOR-A specifically cited overuse of the Afghan National Civil Order Police in operations outside their defined mission and role as a factor preventing them from implementing a regular operational readiness cycle. In that regard, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) emphasized that establishment of operational readiness cycles is possible only if force structure is sufficient to allow removing entire units from active operation for extended periods of time.
Integration of different staff elements in the planning process remains a challenge for the ANDSF, particularly in ANP zone headquarters, where staffs are often young and inexperienced. These zone headquarters have struggled to exercise effective command and control of all police elements in their regions, and reporting through MoI channels often fails to adhere to the directed reporting procedures. To address these issues, the MoI has developed a Zone Command Empowerment Action Plan to focus efforts on building these police headquarters as effective and respected command centers.\textsuperscript{287}

The new ANP zone headquarters standard operating procedure is still in the MoI approval process. The draft standard operating procedure enumerates job descriptions for personnel within the zone headquarters, but it does not include descriptions for provincial police chiefs, who report to the zone commander and perform duties as directed. USFOR-A attributed poor progress at the provincial level, in part, to a lack of clearly defined roles and duties that a standard operating procedure would provide.\textsuperscript{288}

USFOR-A reported several examples of operations where ANA and ANP units have successfully operated jointly. These include an effort by the 201\textsuperscript{st} Corps and ANP Zone 202 to clear the Achin, Kot, and Debala Valleys in southeastern Nangarhar. The 209\textsuperscript{th} Corps engaged with ANP Zones 707 and 808 to defend Kunduz City from insurgent occupation, and they conducted operations across the region to prevent the isolation of Kunduz Province. The 215\textsuperscript{th} Corps worked with ANP Zone 505 to conduct clearances of Highways 601 and 611 in southwestern Afghanistan, reducing violence along major commercial routes according to USFOR-A.\textsuperscript{289}
Afghan Air Force

This quarter the Afghan Air Force continued to plan, lead, and coordinate operations in support of ANDSF national security objectives. According to USFOR-A, the Afghan Air Force experienced increasing operational success from July through September with the addition of new aircraft and crewmembers, improving both combat and airlift capabilities.

Last quarter, the Afghan Air Force began forward deploying several of its A-29 Super Tucanos, multi-role turboprop aircraft with air-to-ground attack and reconnaissance capabilities, out of the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif. This quarter, USFOR-A stated that these A-29s are now flying extended sorties as far away as Helmand province, carrying out attacks on insurgent targets, and refueling at nearby Kandahar Airfield before returning home. From January 1 to September 10, 2016, the A-29s flew 99 combat sorties, employing 255 bombs and 199 rockets.

According to USFOR-A, A-29 aircrews have avoided engaging targets if there are significant civilian casualty concerns. Given the effectiveness of the A-29 platform and crews, identification of possible targets for sorties has become the primary limiting factor for the Afghan Air Force, and this has become a focus area of the train, advise, and assist mission. Despite these efforts, the UN reported that the Afghan Air Force was responsible for nearly 100 civilian deaths and 100 civilian injuries between January 1 and September 30, 2016, a 72 percent increase over the same period in 2015, reflecting the fact that in 2015, no A-29s had yet been fielded to the Afghan Air Force, and it had far fewer attack helicopters. The casualties represented about two-thirds of all civilian casualties inflicted by airstrikes in Afghanistan, with the remainder attributed to U.S. or coalition forces.

On August 25, the Afghan Air Force received its final shipment of four MD-530 helicopters, bringing the total fleet to 27. This aircraft currently operates out of Kabul and Kandahar Airfield, and the MD-530 will soon be operating out of Mazar-e Sharif as well, integrating efforts with the A-29s, Mi-17 helicopters, and ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle assets for escort and attack sorties. Afghan MD-530 crews flew 1,698 combat sorties from January 1 through September 20, including 424 strike missions in the fourth quarter (though September 20). Combat capability is expected to be enhanced during the winter with the addition of 26 new MD-530 pilots.

The Russian-made Mi-17 remains the Afghan Air Force’s primary tactical lift helicopter, but a significant decrease in available aircraft—11 fewer of these older aircraft at the start of the current campaign compared with last year—resulted in a decrease in overall sorties being flown. In order to make up for the loss of these aircraft, Mi-17 aircraft utilization rates have increased...
substantially, with some individual helicopters flying over 80 hours per month (versus the programmed 25 hours per month). USFOR-A anticipates that the additional wear placed on these aging aircraft by the increased use will substantially reduce aircraft availability in the coming years due to the increased maintenance and attrition. While noting that Afghan maintenance and servicing capabilities for the Mi-17 are improving, the increased utilization rates will present challenges as each individual helicopter requires more frequent inspections and repairs. The Afghan Air Force has a total of 48 operational Mi-17s, with another 10 in overhaul or heavy repair. These aircraft flew 8,406 sorties between January 1 and September 20, including 2,742 missions in the fourth quarter (through September 20).294

The C-208 and C-130 cargo planes continued to provide additional airlift capacity for the Afghan Air Force. USFOR-A described the C-208 as one of the most successful Afghan aviation programs, with pilots and maintainers demonstrating increased competency and ability to operate independently. C-208 missions have increased 6 percent thus far in 2016 compared to 2015. This increased capacity is due in part to more effective air tasking ability as well as the rebuilding of the C-208 pilot force, which was temporarily reduced
by aircrew transfers to other aircraft, like the A-29. Two additional C-130 crews are expected to complete training by fall 2017, which will provide increased flexibility, and additional C-130s maintainers are also being trained to support the aircraft. The C-130 fleet provides lift capability in support of MD-530 deployments to forward operating locations across Afghanistan, such as to Mazar-e Sharif.295

Afghan Air Force Medical Evacuation Capabilities

According to USFOR-A, Afghan Air Force medical evacuation capacity is expected to improve as 20 new Afghan Air Force medics are trained this fall, representing a 45 percent increase in total medical evacuation crews available. Additionally, the Afghan Air Force is transitioning from using aging Mi-17 helicopters for medical evacuation to using the C-208 for regional patient movement and the larger C-130 for flights from regional ANA Corps Hospitals to the Kabul National Military Hospital.296

During a one-week “snapshot” period from August 22 to 29, 2016, the Afghan Air Force’s 50 medical evacuation crew members flew on a total of 118 sorties, moving 288 wounded and 125 killed. Operating at high tempo, often flying two missions per day, crew members may be vulnerable to burnout. For this reason, CSTC-A has expressed concern about the Afghan Air Force losing flight medics after investing significant resources training them. Retention bonuses for medical evacuation crews have been considered but not yet approved. Another retention strategy of rotating personnel between forward locations was fielded in the second half of FY 2016, and its effectiveness is still being evaluated.297

Given the limited number of flight medics and available aircraft, ground transportation from the point of injury to battalion aid stations and regional hospitals is often necessary, resulting in significant delays from the time of injury to medical treatment. One attempt to mitigate the shortfall of air transport has been the implementation of a course for ANA medics on medical evacuation concepts. CSTC-A reported that this course was well received last year and is scheduled to be taught again during the winter season this year.298

A capacity gap also exists in the ability to move severely wounded critical care patients. The National Military Hospital has several critical care specialists with the necessary skillset, and CSTC-A plans to teach a joint critical care air transport team course this winter for Afghan Air Force and National Military Hospital personnel to build a collaborative team for the 2017 fighting season. If the training is successful, these critical care specialists would accompany Afghan Air Force medical evacuation crews during the three to four missions a month that require additional critical care expertise.299
ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS

The report of the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan stated that corruption continued “to pose a major obstacle to development and stability” in Afghanistan and stressed the importance of reform initiatives being undertaken by the Afghan government. Although President Ghani and CEO Abdullah made commitments at the conference to reduce corruption, significant accomplishments, such as successful prosecutions or visible support from parliamentary leaders, remain to be seen.

Justice Center Opens amid Growing Concern from International Donors

During this reporting period, the international community pledged continued support for the Afghan government, but emphasized the need for it to accelerate its counter corruption efforts. Since formation of the National Unity Government in 2014, the Afghan government has promised to implement political reforms, including 50 anti-corruption measures, and has recently established a new Anti-Corruption Justice Center. However, Transparency International, which identifies itself as a global organization formed to fight corruption, ranked Afghanistan as 166 out of 168 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2015.

The Warsaw Summit and the Brussels Conference Confirm Support

In July 2016, NATO allies at the Warsaw Summit agreed to continue funding the Afghan security forces through 2020, but they also expressed ongoing concerns about Afghan government corruption and issues regarding the rule of law. As part of the Warsaw Summit Declaration, the Afghan government pledged to “continue to pursue reforms; including to root out corruption; promote transparency and accountability; and foster economic development.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated, “We expect [Afghan leaders] will step up their efforts to fight corruption and to implement reforms.”

Three months later, representatives from 75 countries and 26 international organizations attended the October 4-5, 2016 Brussels Conference on Afghanistan to consider continued economic assistance. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah presented their national peace and development framework, or reform agenda, including significant anti-corruption measures. The participants endorsed the Afghan government’s reform agenda and pledged to provide $15.2 billion over the next four years to support good governance and economic development.

In preparation for the Brussels Conference, DoS developed its goals which featured measures to counter corruption, including requiring the major...
Anti-Corruption Justice Center is Established

On June 30, 2016, President Ghani signed a decree establishing the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (Justice Center) to prosecute corruption cases against high-ranking government officials. The center currently has 7 primary court and 7 appellate court judges, 25 prosecutors, and 12 investigators, as well as administrative support staff. President Ghani personally approved the principal personnel. The Justice Center will move to a permanent location at Camp Heath once facilities are upgraded and secured, anticipated by the end of 2016.

Officials in the Attorney General’s Office told CSTC-A that some of the cases referred to the Justice Center by the Major Crimes Task Force will be ready for prosecution when the Justice Center’s new facility opens. Moreover, CSTC-A noted that Afghanistan’s complex approval process for major criminal cases is one factor contributing to official corruption. Each case must be approved by multiple prosecution offices within the Attorney General’s Office and each layer of bureaucracy represents an opportunity for outside influence to stop the case from moving forward.

According to TOLOnews, a leading Afghanistan media source, the new center has been greeted with cautious optimism and general skepticism by third-party monitoring bodies such as the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Afghan Anti-Corruption Network. Those independent organizations have expressed concerns that the center may be nothing more than a symbolic gesture by the Afghan government to mollify western benefactors. The Afghan Anti-Corruption Network specifically cited the timing of the Justice Center’s launch just before the Warsaw and Brussels summits as particularly suspicious.

Preparation for members of the U.S. delegation included four focus points:

- **Countering Corruption**: Demonstrate that the justice sector can tackle serious cases of corruption, and that the Afghan government will implement credible, preventative systems to deter and diminish future corruption.
- **Fiscal Sustainability**: Spur business confidence and economic growth through private sector and fiscal management reforms.
- **Elections**: Demonstrate that the necessary electoral reforms and preparations can be agreed to and completed for the holding of free, fair, and credible parliamentary elections.
- **Women**: Demonstrate continued commitment to women’s economic and political empowerment and take measures to protect the rights of society’s most vulnerable.
Prior to the conference, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Olson emphasized that assistance for Afghanistan is “not a blank check” and will ultimately be conditional on Afghan progress in implementing reforms, including counter-corruption efforts.\textsuperscript{316}

In a joint communique, those attending the Brussels Conference underscored the importance of fighting corruption. They said the Afghan government “will effectively implement its anti-corruption measures to ensure that core government functions such as procurement, appointments, financial management and policy making are transparent, accountable and consistent, and that violations are met with legal, timely and consistently applied sanctions.”\textsuperscript{317}

**Asset Registration Requirements Implemented Ineffectively**

Article 154 of the Afghan Constitution requires senior government officials to disclose their personal assets to prevent conflicts of interest and to serve as a check on those who would abuse their positions to enrich themselves.\textsuperscript{318} A SIGAR report issued this quarter concluded that, although this requirement has been in place for over a decade, the government has not effectively enforced it. The SIGAR review of asset declarations by high-ranking officials in the Karzai
administration found clear omissions and errors in the filings of President Karzai, First Vice President Fahim, and Second Vice President Khalili. SIGAR said that the High Office of Oversight, which is charged with administering the asset registration process, has been unable to fulfill its mission for several reasons, including a lack of enforcement authority, unwillingness of the Attorney General’s Office to act on cases referred to it, insufficient procedures for verifying asset declarations, and a general absence of capacity and independence. While the report commended President Ghani’s willingness to take a more aggressive approach in this area, SIGAR stated that it was still too early to determine whether his government would prove to be more transparent than that of his predecessor.

Report: Afghan Attorney General Makes Fighting Corruption Top Priority

This quarter, media sources reported that Afghanistan’s new Attorney General, Mohammad Farid Hamidi, who took office in June 2016, has made fighting corruption and ensuring equal access to justice his top priorities. Since taking office, Hamidi has held weekly public access sessions in which ordinary Afghans can present their legal complaints. This is part of a campaign to improve public confidence in a justice system that, according to media sources, is widely viewed as corrupt, politicized, and rigged in favor of the powerful. The Washington Post quoted him saying, “If we don’t act against [corruption], we won’t be able to bring peace, stability, security or rule of law…. We are building a machine that has public support and strong political will.”

USAID’s Director of the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, Donald L. Sampler, Jr., offered a positive assessment of Hamidi during testimony before a Senate panel in September. Sampler told the senators that Hamidi enjoys “an excellent reputation” and “is working to promote the rule of law and to take specific anti-corruption measures.” As one example, he noted that Hamidi worked with U.S. officials in June 2016 to ensure that applications for 25 government positions were administered fairly and the vacancies filled on the basis of merit.

Whether Hamidi’s efforts will ultimately improve the functioning of the Attorney General’s Office remains to be seen. This quarter, CSTC-A reported that inaction and a lack of transparency in the Attorney General’s Office have stifled prosecution of cases brought by MoI’s Major Crimes Task Force, noting that Hamidi “has yet to deliver any serious corruption prosecutions to court.” Political interference and bribery continue to impede the fair administration of justice. However, CSTC-A acknowledged that the absence of a permanent Attorney General over an extended period of time may have contributed to the current problems.
Major Crimes Task Force Opens 187 Cases

Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force (Task Force), established in 2010 with training and mentoring by the FBI, conducts high-level investigations of kidnapping, organized crime, and official corruption. Brigadier General Abdul Ghaur Andarabi was appointed acting director as part of a revitalization of the task force in January 2016, and he was confirmed as director in May. According to CSTC-A, the coalition actively supported Andarabi despite opposition from “powerful forces” in the Afghan government that attempted to prevent his confirmation.

During the seven months since Andarabi took over, the task force has opened 187 cases, including 81 corruption investigations, and has arrested 148 suspects. During the seven-month period prior to his arrival, only 25 cases were opened and 36 arrests made. Andarabi also pushed the Task Force to pursue high-profile offenders, often in the face of political interference from the Ministry of the Interior, the Attorney General’s Office, National Assembly members, and other powerful individuals. According to CSTC-A, the Task Force made several arrests of allegedly corrupt prosecutors, police, and high-ranking officials. One recent high-profile case resulted in the arrest of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Fayeq, the provincial chief of police of Kapisa province, and six others for a fuel theft scheme.

This was the first Task Force arrest of a provincial chief of police in Afghanistan, and CSTC-A noted that it was accomplished in the face of major political pressure from elements within the Afghan Government and the Attorney General’s Office. According to CSTC-A, officials in the MOI Office of Inspector General, who initially investigated Fayeq, allegedly accepted a bribe to “water down the case,” so the Task Force assumed responsibility for the investigation. Subsequently, Andarabi arrested Fayeq in direct violation of orders from his superior.

President Ghani has met with Andarabi and promised to support the Task Force by expanding its authorized force from 130 to 300 personnel. Although Andarabi has submitted the paperwork to begin this expansion, CSTC-A reported that the request may have been stalled by the president’s national security advisor.

As the new Anti-Corruption Justice Center began its work, the Attorney General’s Office reported that it intends to begin prosecution of as many as 21 former cabinet ministers who served under President Hamid Karzai. According the Afghan media, Karzai recently acknowledged that he did not actively fight corruption in his own administration, fearing that efforts to do so would have led to chaos and political breakdown. Prosecution of these extremely powerful and well connected individuals will serve as an important test for both Hamidi and the new justice center.
According to a September 2016 *New York Times* article, Hamidi acknowledged that the failure of civil institutions of justice in Afghanistan had the effect of alienating the people and sowing mistrust in the government. This ultimately empowered the Taliban, to whom ordinary Afghans sometimes turn when existing authorities fail to address their grievances. Even in territory controlled by the Afghan government, the Taliban may be seen as the lesser of two evils when it comes to meting out justice. Hamidi stated that, rather than fighting corruption, the Attorney General's Office has often facilitated graft by offering a façade of legal cover for illicit dealings of the politically well placed. *The New York Times* reported that thousands of investigations have deliberately been left open for years at a time, allowing government officials to solicit bribes periodically from the accused.334

**SIGAR Issues Major Report on Corruption**

A September 2016 SIGAR report, “Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” concluded that endemic corruption fosters insurgent violence in Afghanistan. In its review of 15 years of American involvement in Afghanistan, SIGAR concluded that the United States exacerbated pre-existing corruption in Afghanistan by injecting tens of billions of dollars into the Afghan economy without exercising sufficient oversight. According to SIGAR, U.S. forces empowered corrupt officials by partnering with them in situations where these actors shared a very narrow set of interests with the United States and its allies.335 SIGAR found that, “Corruption significantly undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by damaging the legitimacy of the Afghan government, strengthening popular support for the insurgency, and channeling material resources to insurgent groups.”336

The SIGAR report concluded that the United States prioritized immediate security and counter-terrorism goals – such as maintaining positive relations with President Karzai’s government, denying safe haven to terrorists, and defeating al Qaeda—over fighting corruption in the Afghan government. SIGAR stated that this strategy allowed corrupt networks to become entrenched, and that endemic corruption has since festered into a security threat in its own right.

SIGAR recommended developing a thorough understanding of the nature and scope of corruption in the host country of a contingency operation and making anti-corruption efforts a top priority rather than a peripheral one. The report also recommended limiting the amount of assistance based on the host country’s capacity to absorb the funds productively and avoiding alliances of convenience with corrupt local officials.337
A crew chief waits to marshal an F-16C Fighting Falcon, Bagram Airfield, Oct. 5, 2016. Tactical aircraft maintenance technicians otherwise known as crew chiefs are the caretakers of the aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo)

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

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Section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended, established the Lead IG and created a structure for planning, conducting, and reporting on oversight of overseas contingency operations. This section of the report provides information on Lead IG staffing approaches to perform these oversight functions; outreach efforts by Lead IG agencies; completed Lead IG oversight work related to audits, inspections, and evaluations during the past 3-month period, July 1, 2016 through September 30, 2016; Lead IG investigative activity; and OIGs’ hotline activity.

USAID has ongoing efforts in Afghanistan but no OFS-related programs or activities. As a result, the USAID OIG conducts audits and investigations in Afghanistan and coordinates these activities as appropriate with other audit and law enforcement organizations, but does not have audits or investigations specific to OFS.

**LEAD IG STAFFING**

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and perform various operational activities. Each Lead IG agency is hiring new staff through the special hiring authority provided within 5 U.S.C. § 3161, and the re-employment of annuitants provided within 10 U.S.C. 9902, as well as assigning existing permanent staff to perform Lead IG work.

To support audit, evaluation, and inspection efforts, the Lead IG agencies adopted an expeditionary workforce model. Oversight teams from the Lead IG agencies travel to Afghanistan and other locations in the region on a temporary basis to conduct the field work for their respective projects. The DoD OIG established a field office in Afghanistan to support its regional activity with a small contingent of oversight staff assigned to the office on 6-month rotations. The DoS OIG has a small staff at Embassy Kabul on 1-year rotations.

The Lead IG agencies have also hired and deployed criminal investigators to the region to investigate OFS-related fraud and corruption. The DCIS, which is the DoD OIG’s investigative component, has deployed special agents to Afghanistan, and DoS OIG has special agents on 1-year tours in Afghanistan and maintains a regional office in Germany.

The Lead IG is required to develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations that support OFS. The Lead IG is also responsible for producing publicly available reports that provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO and include specific information related to the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits.
OUTREACH

Outreach and coordination continue to be important aspects of Lead IG work. Informing the agencies and Congress on critical oversight issues, travelling to the theater of operation, and coordinating with oversight partners and agency officials are key components of Lead IG oversight strategies.

In September 2016, a team of senior DoD OIG personnel traveled to Afghanistan to visit deployed employees and command officials, discuss oversight efforts, and witness ongoing activities. This trip was in addition to visits by project teams conducting oversight or by special agents who are leading investigations. Senior Lead IG officials continue to meet regularly with policy officials, collect information, and conduct research related to OFS’s military activities and governance activities.

During the quarter, the Acting DoD IG highlighted Lead IG efforts and common audit issues in his quarterly meetings with the Service Inspector Generals and the Service Auditors General. Investigative briefings and the OIGs’ hotlines are other avenues for outreach that are discussed later in this section.

COMPLETED AUDIT, INSPECTION, AND EVALUATION PROJECTS

Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other oversight partners released ten reports relating to OFS from July 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016. These projects examined contracts, grants, and assistance awards; military facilities supporting OFS activities, embassy activities; homeland security programs; and other OFS-related issues.

Final Reports

ARMY AUDIT AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Sexual Assault-Related Phone Numbers-Rounds Six and Seven
A-2016-0125-MTH, August 15, 2016

The Army Audit Agency conducted this audit to verify that sexual assault victims could successfully contact a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator or a Victim Advocate for immediate assistance using the Army’s 24X7 sexual assault helpline phone numbers posted on the DoD Safe Helpline. The Army Audit Agency found that sixth and seventh rounds of testing yielded a 75-percent and a 94-percent success rate, respectively, and verified the contents of voicemail greetings reached during test calls and Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention hotline phone numbers posted on the installations’ websites.
However, 7 percent in round six and 23 percent in round seven of sexual assault-related voicemail contents reached during test calls did not sufficiently inform callers about the DoD Safe Helpline number. Further, 35 percent of the websites reviewed in round seven did not post the DoD Safe Helpline and the primary 24/7 phone numbers in accordance with guidance.

The Army Audit Agency made six recommendations. The Army Audit Agency reported that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff met the intent of four of the recommendations, but had not implemented two of the recommendations because of control weaknesses.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OVERSIGHT

**Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives**  
DODIG-2016-120, August 9, 2016

The DOD OIG audited the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency to determine whether it effectively managed initiatives for rapid deployment on the battlefield. The audit found that, when followed, the agency processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield were effective. However, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives because not enough data were available to analyze. As a result, for the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency spent $112.5 million for eight counter-IED initiatives without showing evidence that the solutions were proven to help the warfighter in countering IEDs.

Additionally, the audit determined that Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency personnel did not follow certain policies because the personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Director provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate. As a result, the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency spent $446.8 million on the six sampled initiatives without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development to the requesting service.

The DOD OIG recommended that the Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, establish controls to make sure the sponsors for counter-IED solutions complete an assessment of operational effectiveness and post completed assessments to the knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository. It also recommended that the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Director develop control procedures to make sure the required supporting documentation is completed and captured. Management agreed with the recommendations.
Designation of Contracting Officer’s Representatives and Oversight Framework Could Be Improved for Contracts in Afghanistan
DODIG-2016-131, August 30, 2016

The DoD OIG conducted this audit to determine whether DoD controls for monitoring contractor performance were effective for contracts that support the enduring functions in Afghanistan, and more specifically, the contracting officer’s representatives were properly assigned, appointed, and trained. The DoD OIG determined that contracting officers’ representatives in Afghanistan generally met training requirements, but were not properly appointed after the designation guidelines were revised. None of the 24 letters designating the contracting officer’s representative, dated after DoD guidelines for designation letters were revised in March 2015, met the additional requirements included in the revised guidelines. The designation letter is the written notification from the contracting officer to the representative specifying the extent of the representative’s authority to act on behalf of the contracting officer, and the omission of the required elements may result in contracting officer’s representatives being unaware of the responsibilities they are agreeing to perform.

During the audit, the DoD OIG found that the designation letters did not include certification that the representative met qualification requirements, identify all required contractual information, address standards of conduct or conflicts of interest, and were not signed by the contracting officer’s representative’s management. These representatives were not appointed in accordance with DoD guidelines because the contracting activities did not update the policies or standardized appointment documentation. Without a strong oversight framework, the contracting activities had limited assurance that the contractors were meeting the performance standards required by the contracts.

As a result of this audit, the DoD OIG made 14 recommendations to seven different entities. Three of the entities, to include U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command, and U.S. Transportation Command, concurred with the seven recommendations directed at their respective organization. Two entities were late in responding to the draft and their responses to the report were not included in the final report. Two entities did not respond.
Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces
DODIG-2016-140, September 29, 2016

The DoD OIG conducted this assessment to determine the extent to which the U.S. and Coalition had met its goal to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces to conduct combat operations. The report contained five findings related to the progress of the advisors to train, advise, and assist the ANA Special Operations Forces to conduct combat operations; the enforcement of Afghan MOD and General staff polices; the adequacy of ANA logistics support and budget authority; and the relationship between the ANA Corps commanders and the Special Operations Command units. The DoD OIG made eight recommendations to the CSTC-A and Resolute Support, including coordination with the NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan. Command management agreed with seven of the recommendations but did not concur with one of the recommendations, as written. Instead, command management provided an alternative recommendation that detailed more specific actions that it believed were required to achieve the objective of the non-concurred recommendation. This report is classified.

Improvements Needed in Managing Scope Changes and Oversight of Construction Projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti
DODIG-2016-141, September 30, 2016

The DoD OIG determined whether the DoD was constructing facilities in accordance with legislative authorities and providing adequate quality assurance and oversight of military construction projects at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. Camp Lemonnier provides, operates, and sustains services in support of combat readiness and security of ships, aircraft, detachments, and personnel for regional and combatant command requirements, to include support for regional counterterrorism operations.

The DoD OIG non-statistically selected and evaluated two of 17 Camp Lemonnier military construction projects with combined estimated costs of $65.2 million. The audit determined that the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Atlantic did not obtain approval from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Commander Naval Installations, and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and initiate the congressional notification process for scope changes to the Ammunition Supply Point project as required by Federal law and Navy guidance. In addition, officials from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, did not provide adequate oversight for the Bachelor Enlisted Quarters and Ammunition Supply Point projects.
As a result, there is an increased risk that construction will not meet contract requirements and that the DoD will not receive what it paid for. Further, without complete contract files, the DoD may not have adequate information in the event of disputes or litigation. Additionally, because of the constant turnover of contracting officials and quality assurance representatives at Camp Lemonnier, the lack of complete contract files could limit the oversight ability of personnel subsequently assigned to manage and oversee contracts.

The DoD OIG recommended that the Commander, Naval Facilities Atlantic, submit a request for approval to reduce the scope of the inert storage facility and initiate the congressional notification process for the Ammunition Supply Point scope changes. The DoD OIG also recommended that the Commander, Naval Facilities Atlantic, establish local policies and procedures for contracting officials and quality assurance representatives to execute their roles and responsibilities and implement a process to consistently maintain complete contract files. Management officials disagreed with the recommendations, and their comments did not fully address all specifics of the recommendations. The DoD OIG requested additional management comments.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OVERSIGHT

Additional Actions Are Needed to Fully Comply With Section 846 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 Concerning Critical Environment Contracting
AUD-MERO-16-50, September 20, 2016

The DoS OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the Critical Environment Contracting Analytics Staff and the applicable stakeholders—the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and regional bureaus—conducted risk assessments, identified high-risk areas, and developed a corresponding mitigating action for each high-risk area identified for operational and political risks associated with contractor performance supporting contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in accordance with the requirements and intent of Section 846 of the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. This audit reviewed contracts that support U.S. personnel engaged in OFS and other OCOs and made recommendations relevant to current and future OCOs.

The DoS OIG found that the Critical Environment Contracting Analytics Staff and the stakeholders did not always develop mitigating actions for each high-risk area identified, as required by Section 846. Specifically, the OIG could not identify mitigating actions for 14 of the 32 high-risk areas in Afghanistan and 32 of the 52 high-risk areas in Iraq. Of the high-risk areas for which mitigating actions were identified, most pertain to contractor safety. Other high-risk areas, such as the government’s oversight of contractor operations, received less attention. According to Critical Environment Contracting
Analytics Staff officials, mitigating actions were not developed for all high-risk areas identified because the staff had determined that some were outside the scope of the Section 846 requirements and some were not applicable to specific contracts. DoS OIG made two recommendations. Management agreed with both recommendations.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE OVERSIGHT

*Defense Infrastructure Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Construction Projects Supporting Military Contingency Operations*

GAO-16-406, September 8, 2016

GAO evaluated, among other things, the extent to which DoD has 1) tracked the universe and cost of all contingency construction projects in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2) developed a process to determine the appropriate level of construction for Military Construction-funded contingency construction projects, and 3) developed a process for reevaluating contingency construction projects when missions change. GAO reviewed relevant guidance and project data. GAO found that since contingency operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD has not tracked the universe and cost of all U.S. Central Command contingency construction projects supporting operations there. According to senior DoD officials, DoD is not required to track all contingency construction projects separately from all other DoD projects and were unaware of the magnitude of their use of operations and maintenance (O&M) funds because the DoD has not tracked the universe and cost of O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects in support of contingency operations. The DoD has routinely used O&M funding to more quickly meet requirements because the Military Construction review process can take up to 2 years. However, DoD’s use of O&M funding has posed risks, including financial and duplication.

For Military Construction-funded contingency construction projects, the DoD has guidance used for determining the appropriate level of construction, or building standard, based on the facility’s life expectancy requirements, but had not documented the rationale for such determinations for some of the projects in fiscal years 2011-15. Senior DoD officials could not confirm what level of construction the projects represented based on DoD standards aimed at helping to match investments with requirements. An absence of such documentation could lead to DoD constructing facilities in excess of requirements because of the lack of communication with those who design and construct the facilities.

The DoD has not developed a formal process for reevaluating ongoing contingency construction projects when missions change. As a result, DoD risks constructing facilities that may be unneeded to support U.S. forces in
the U.S Central Command area of responsibility and in future contingencies worldwide. GAO made six recommendations. The DoD concurred with one recommendation, did not concur with two of the recommendations, and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION OVERSIGHT

Afghan National Army: DOD Has Taken Steps to Remedy Poor Management of Vehicle Maintenance Program
SIGAR-16-49-AR, July 26, 2016

SIGAR conducted this project to review DoD’s support to the ANA’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program, and determine the extent to which the program is meeting its stated goals and whether its contract requirements are being met. SIGAR found that in structuring the ANA Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program contract, the Army Contracting Command and CSTC-A made inaccurate assumptions about the capacity of the Afghans to manage the supply chain and conduct maintenance, underestimated the cost of spare parts, and established performance metrics that did not accurately assess contractor performance or progress towards contract goals. SIGAR concluded that, as a result of the inaccurate assumptions about Afghan capacity to conduct supply chain management and perform maintenance, and due to underestimated spare parts costs, the contract costs were significantly higher than originally estimated. SIGAR made two recommendations, and DoD concurred.

Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan
SIGAR-16-58-LL, September 14, 2016

SIGAR conducted this review to examine the corruption in Afghanistan, analyze the U.S. Government’s understanding of the corruption threat and evaluate its response, compare U.S. responses to corruption to those of the international community, and identify lessons learned from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan. In its review, SIGAR found that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom and noted that corruption cut across all aspects of the reconstruction effort, jeopardizing progress made in security, rule of law, governance, and economic growth. SIGAR concluded that failure to effectively address the problem means U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail.
SIGAR reported 5 findings:

- Corruption undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan by fueling grievances against the Afghan government and channeling material support to the insurgency;
- The United States contributed to the growth of corruption by injecting tens of billions of dollars into the Afghan economy, using flawed oversight and contracting practices, and partnering with malign powerbrokers;
- The U.S. government was slow to recognize the magnitude of the problem, the role of corrupt patronage networks, the ways in which corruption threatened core U.S. goals, and that certain U.S. policies and practices exacerbated the problem;
- Even when the United States acknowledged corruption as a strategic threat, security and political goals consistently trumped strong anticorruption actions; and
- Where the United States sought to combat corruption, its efforts saw only limited success in the absence of sustained Afghan and U.S. political commitment.

SIGAR made 11 recommendations, of which 3 were directed to Congress and 8 were directed to Executive Branch agencies, including the DoD, DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies.

Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight: Personal Asset Declarations of High Ranking Afghan Government Officials Are Not Consistently Registered and Verified
SIGAR-16-60-SP, September 19, 2016

SIGAR conducted this audit to follow up on its 2009 audit and re-examine the High Office of Oversight’s effectiveness in fighting corruption, with a specific focus on the office’s ability to register, verify, and publish the asset declarations of Afghanistan’s top government officials under the two Karzai administrations and the early stages of the Ghani administration. SIGAR found that the High Office of Oversight still suffers from a lack of independence and authority to fulfill its mandate, lacks enforcement power, and, in some instances, has failed to register and verify asset declarations. SIGAR found that the asset declarations that were verified by the High Office of Oversight contained errors and omissions that would have hindered robust verification efforts. Because the High Office of Oversight was unable to provide supporting documentation showing how it verified asset declarations and the outcomes of its verification efforts, SIGAR questioned the efficacy of the process. SIGAR did not make recommendations in this report.
INVESTIGATIONS

Lead IG agencies conduct investigative activity through DCIS and the DoS OIG criminal investigative components. During the quarter, these components maintained an investigative presence at in-theater locations, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in Germany and Washington, DC.

These Lead IG agency components and representatives from the military criminal investigative organizations form the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group. The members of the Working Group work together to detect, investigate, and prevent fraud and corruption in OFS-related programs and operations. During the quarter, the Working Group representatives synchronized investigative operations and de-conflicted information across 41 investigations. The USAID OIG does not participate in the Working Group for OFS and does not have investigations specific to OFS.

Investigative Activity

During the quarter, the Lead IG investigative components and the military investigative organizations initiated three new OFS-related investigations. Three investigations were also closed during the period.

As of September 30, 2016, 17 investigations involving OFS-related programs and operations remained open. These investigations involved allegations of procurement, grant, and other program fraud; corruption involving U.S. government officials; theft and diversion of government funds or equipment; and other offenses, including trafficking in persons. These open investigations do not include “legacy cases” that DCIS and DoS OIG special agents are continuing to pursue related to actions committed during Operation Enduring Freedom, the combat mission in Afghanistan that concluded in December 2014, or in investigations that SIGAR is conducting.

During this reporting period, each of the Lead IG investigative components and the military investigative organizations conducted fraud awareness briefings to educate individuals on the investigative mission and how to identify indicators of fraud. In total, investigators led more than 40 fraud awareness briefings attended by over 450 government, civilian, and military personnel; contractors; law enforcement personnel; and foreign officials. These briefings promote fraud awareness, help develop relationships, and uncover information about potential fraud and corruption in government programs.

A consolidated look at the activities of these investigative components over FY 2016 can be found in the dashboard on the following page.
ACTIVITY BY FRAUD AND CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE WORKING GROUP

OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL
As of September 30, 2016

OPEN INVESTIGATIONS

17

FY 2016 RESULTS

- Arrests: 1
- Contract Terminations: 1
- Criminal Charges: —
- Criminal Convictions: —
- Personnel Actions: 3
- Savings/Recoveries: $1,407,213
- Suspensions/Debarments: 46

Q4 FY 2016 BRIEFINGS

- No. of Briefings: 40
- No. of Attendees: 450

*Some investigations are being worked jointly by more than one agency. Therefore, the total number of open cases by FCWG Agency may not equal the total number of open investigations. Note: Cumulative since Jan. 1, 2015
DOD CONTRACTOR SUSPENDED AND PROPOSED FOR DEBARMENT

Based on the results of a DCIS investigation, the Department of the Army suspended and proposed to debar a DoD contractor and 45 of its employees from U.S. Government contracts due to their role in a fuel theft scheme at U.S. military base in eastern Nangarhar province. The investigation revealed that, between 2014 and 2016 while providing services in connection with a Basic Life Support contract at this U.S. military base, the contractor and several employees conspired to steal and/or wrongfully withdraw hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel valued at more than $1.8 million, and then redistributed the fuel to third parties in Afghanistan.

The suspension excludes the contractor and the 45 employees from receiving Federal contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, loans, and other sources of Federal funds pending a debarment decision. Additionally, based on the findings of this investigation, the Department of the Army did not renew the contract, valued at $277,698.

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

The OIGs’ Hotlines are a central part of the Lead IG outreach efforts to educate individuals on fraud, waste, and abuse. Each hotline provides a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; and abuse of authority for independent review.

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints and contacts specific to their own agency. Hotline representatives process the complaints they receive and then refer these complaints in accordance with their respective protocols. Any hotline complaint that merits referral is sent to the responsible organization for investigation or informational purposes.

The DoD OIG has a Lead IG Hotline investigator to coordinate the contacts received through the hotline among the Lead IG agencies and others as appropriate. During FY 2016, the Lead IG Hotline investigator received and coordinated 276 contacts related to OFS and opened 176 cases, which were referred within DoD OIG, to other Lead IG agencies, or to other investigative organizations. As noted in Figure 3, the majority of the complaints received during this quarter related to personal misconduct and other personal matters, and procurement or contract administration irregularities.
U.S. Soldiers talk with local children near a village in Laghman province, July 29, 2016 while conducting a key leader engagement patrol with Afghan counterparts. (U.S. Army photo)

ONGOING AND PLANNED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

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This section of the report discusses the ongoing Lead IG strategic planning process as well as ongoing and planned audit, inspection, and evaluation work. The ongoing and planned oversight projects are listed in separate tables. Information contained in this section is as of September 30, 2016.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING**

As required by Section 8L, the Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress a joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This planning effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

The Lead IG representatives, SIGAR, and other partner oversight agencies coordinate efforts to examine major oversight areas, identify oversight gaps, and decide how to balance oversight resources against identified oversight priorities. These representatives consider many factors in identifying the relevant strategic oversight objectives, which included Coalition objectives; congressional appropriations that support military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities; major departmental management challenges each agency has identified; and feedback from departmental and congressional stakeholders.

The strategic planning effort resulted in a Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, which included OFS and reconstruction. This resulting plan covers oversight of the ongoing activities in Afghanistan and Southwest Asia, oversight of the U.S. military mission and counterterrorism activities related to OFS, and the continuing U.S. reconstruction activities geared to empower the government of Afghanistan’s economic and social development. This plan was scheduled for release in October 2016.

Throughout this process, the practical challenges that conducting oversight of an overseas contingency operation presents to both oversight agencies and implementing agencies are considered. The limited size of the U.S. footprint and the dynamic operational environment require careful coordination by all parties to ensure that the timing of fieldwork and the size of oversight teams do not unnecessarily burden the military commands and embassy staff. The security situation and availability of transportation into and out of the theater may also restrict the ability of oversight teams to conduct oversight of certain U.S.-funded activities.
Lead IG Projects for FY 2017

The Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan organizes all Afghanistan-related oversight projects into eight strategic oversight areas that fall under one of three categories of the broader Afghanistan mission. These strategic oversight areas are listed in Table 5.

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<th>FY 2017 Strategic Oversight Areas</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Building the capacity and capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and administering and maintaining accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Building Afghan governance capacity and sustaining U.S. investment in Afghan institutions and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Implementing and executing anti-corruption and counternarcotics programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Awarding and administering reconstruction contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER THAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Property management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Contract management and oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CROSS CUTTING ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Transition from the Resolute Support Mission to a more traditional (peacetime military engagement) U.S.-Afghanistan security cooperation relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Intelligence and counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FY 2017 Strategic Oversight Areas

Over the last year, the Lead IG representatives, SIGAR, and oversight partner agencies engaged in a joint strategic planning exercise to identify oversight projects for FY 2017. The overall goal of the Lead IG FY 2017 strategic planning process is to identify oversight projects that will examine the economy, efficiency, or effectiveness of the programs and operations of federal agencies working in Afghanistan or in support of activities in Afghanistan. Planned FY 2017 oversight includes projects related to building the capacity and capabilities of the ANDSF and administering and maintaining accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund; accounting for equipment procured for and transferred to the ANDSF; counterterrorism; contract management; and the transition from the Resolute Support Mission to a more traditional U.S.-Afghanistan Security Cooperation Relationship. Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other partner oversight agencies coordinate and adjust their oversight efforts as the dynamic contingency operation evolves.
The FY 2017 oversight projects as well as the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan, which includes OFS, are included in the Comprehensive Oversight Plan-Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO). The Lead IG agencies, SIGAR, and other members of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, to include the Military Service Auditors General and GAO, are involved in planning oversight work on Afghanistan-related issues, and their projects are included in the COP-OCO. The OFS-related oversight projects are also identified by their associated Essential Function in the COP-OCO.

The COP-OCO, which describes oversight activities in support of the ongoing overseas contingency operations as well as oversight efforts in Southwest Asia, also contains an oversight plan and related oversight projects for Operation Inherent Resolve, and oversight projects in the rest of Southwest Asia. The COP-OCO is scheduled for publication in October 2016.

ONGOING PROJECTS

As of September 30, 2016, the Lead IG agencies and oversight partners had 24 ongoing projects directly related to OFS. Examples, by oversight area, of the ongoing projects include:

- **Building ANDSF and Afghan Government Capacity:** Eight projects are ongoing related to two strategic oversight areas—building capacity and capability in the ANDSF and Afghan government. The DoD OIG is assessing the U.S. and coalition’s efforts to train, advise, and assist the MoI to develop oversight and internal control capacity. The GAO is evaluating the ANDSF’s equipment and support capability. SIGAR has ongoing projects related to security sector reconstruction, legacy research contracts, and the Afghan system to track funding.

  SIGAR is conducting a congressional inquiry into the U.S. Government’s experience with allegations of sexual abuse of children committed by members of the ANDSF. The inquiry is also reviewing the DoD and DoS implementation of the Leahy amendments prohibiting the DoD and DoS from providing assistance to the units of foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights. The DoD OIG is conducting a parallel congressionally-requested inquiry into DoD’s implementation of the Title 10 Leahy Laws and a number of other specific areas related to human rights violations in Afghanistan.

- **Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics:** The DoD OIG has an ongoing project to determine whether the DoD effectively supported agreed upon counternarcotics requirements, and how it used funding to support these requirements.
Contracts and Contract Management: Eleven oversight projects are examining specific contracts, contract management and controls, or OCO funding. SIGAR has six ongoing projects related to reconstruction contracts. The DoD OIG is conducting two controls audits—one is to determine whether effective controls over the contract management process for U.S. direct assistance funding contract have been established and implemented; the other is to determine whether effective controls have been established over MoD fuel contracts. The DoS OIG is examining contracting officer representative responsibilities for overseeing OCO contracts. The GAO is examining how the DoD is using authorized or appropriated OCO funds. The DoD OIG is assessing the accuracy of the U.S. Navy funds supporting OFS.

Resolute Support and Transition: SIGAR has one ongoing oversight project reviewing DoD’s oversight of the infrastructure projects being transferred to the Afghan government.

Intelligence and Counterterrorism: Three ongoing oversight projects focus on this strategic oversight area. The DoD OIG is evaluating intelligence training for MoD forces and the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process. The DoS OIG is looking at counterterrorism coordination as part of a U.S. embassy inspection.

Table 6 provides the project title and objective for each of these ongoing projects.

Table 6.
Ongoing Oversight Projects, as of 9/30/2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of USFOR-A Intelligence Training for Afghan Ministry of Defense Forces</td>
<td>To 1) assess USFOR-A’s progress towards meeting intelligence training objectives for Afghan MoD forces as identified in OFS NATO – led Resolute Support Mission essential function seven; and 2) identify USFOR-A’s specific measures-of-performance for determining whether the Afghan MoD collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence effectively and integrates intelligence into combat operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
<td>To focus on answering a number of specific questions, including DoD implementation of Title 10 Leahy Laws regarding human rights violations, raised by several Members of Congress and congressional staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Controls Over U.S. Direct Assistance Funded Contracts</td>
<td>To determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and the Afghan MoD and MoI have established and implemented effective controls over the contract management process. This project is part of a series of audits related to U.S. direct assistance for the ANDSF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Reliability of Navy Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether the U.S. Navy has adequate accountability of DoD funds supporting OFS by determining the accuracy of obligations and disbursements, as reported in the Cost of War report, for select Navy appropriations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Defense to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. government and Coalition train, advise, and assist efforts will enable the Afghan MoD and subordinate organizations to develop a transparency, accountability and oversight capability that helps the MoD run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Fuel Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghan MoD have established effective controls for oversight of MoD fuel contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to OFS Counterterrorism Operations</strong></td>
<td>To determine if USFOR-A’s airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance allocation process is supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of DoD Support for Counternarcotics Requirements</strong></td>
<td>To determine 1) whether DoD effectively supported counternarcotics requirements agreed upon between the Department of Justice and DoD, and 2) how DoD used funding to support those requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts</th>
<th>As part of the inspection of Embassy Islamabad, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan. This project will include a classified component.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Countries Under the Department of State Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Counterterrorism have 1) developed specific, measureable, and outcome-oriented goals and objectives; 2) developed and implemented an evaluation process to assess host country performance; and 3) established letters of agreement with host countries for sustaining the Antiterrorism Assistance programs in Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs countries. The audit will also assess the bureaus’ contract monitoring and oversight, and invoice review processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Contracting Officer Representative Responsibility for Overseeing Invoices for Overseas Contingency Operations Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To 1) determine whether invoice review policies and procedures, training, staffing, invoice review practices, and accountability measures are sufficient to support overseas contingency operations; and 2) ensure invoice payments are reviewed in accordance with Federal requirements and Department guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD’s Use of Overseas Contingency Operations Funds</strong></td>
<td>To determine 1) the amount of obligated war funds DoD has authorized or appropriated with the OCO/Global War on Terror or emergency designation and the extent to which DoD has identified and reported these obligations; 2) the extent to which Congress has appropriated war funds for non-war purposes; 3) the extent to which DoD has applied the Office of Management and Budget or other criteria in identifying costs for inclusion in its war funding requests; and 4) the extent to which DoD has established and implemented guidance and a plan with milestones for transitioning enduring OCO costs to its base budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghan Defense &amp; Security Forces’ Equipment and Capability</strong></td>
<td>To 1) outline all major weapon systems and equipment procured for the ANDSF, consistent with the program of record; 2) summarize how such weapon systems and equipment support the overall strategy for the ANDSF; 3) describe the current capability and capacity of the ANDSF to operate and sustain such weapon systems and equipment; and 4) identify gaps in ANDSF capability given the evolving security situation and overall strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</strong></td>
<td>To assess the 1) extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to Track and Monitor U.S. Direct Assistance Funding to the Afghan Government</strong></td>
<td>To 1) describe how the Afghan government uses the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds; 2) identify the capabilities and weaknesses of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System for tracking and monitoring U.S. direct assistance funds; and 3) determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which 1) the Army Research Laboratory developed and awarded legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and DoD and federal regulations; 2) the Army Research Laboratory provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with the Army Research Laboratory broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior’s Headquarters Complex</strong></td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase III</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phase IV</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command</td>
<td>To assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar</td>
<td>To inspect the 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing facilities. Specifically, to assess whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the facilities are being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the U.S. Government’s Implementation of 22 U.S.C. §2378d and 10 U.S.C. §2249e, Commonly Referred To As The “Leahy Law”</td>
<td>To determine whether the Leahy Law may prohibit assistance to the ANSF. The Leahy Law prohibits DoD and DoS from providing assistance to units of foreign security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Sector Reconstruction</td>
<td>To trace the role that strategy and planning played throughout the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, and answer the following questions: 1) What were the U.S. policy goals for the ANDSF, why, and how did these goals evolve, and what were the implications on ANDSF design? 2) What were the various designs considered for the ANDSF, why were they chosen, and why did they evolve? 3) How well was the ANDSF design implemented (inputs and outputs)? 4) How well have the ANDSF achieved expected strategic outcomes and why? 5) What are the critical policy and strategy lessons learned from Afghan security sector reconstruction? More than one report may be produced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**PLANNED PROJECTS**

As of September 30, 2016, Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners plan to start 23 oversight projects related to OFS by the end of FY 2017. These FY 2017 planned projects are listed in the table below.

Table 7.
**Planned Oversight Projects, as of 9/30/2016**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY AUDIT AGENCY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Army’s Reporting of Obligations and Expenditures for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
<td>To verify the accuracy of the Army’s obligations and disbursements reported in the <em>Cost of War</em> report for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>To assess U.S. and Coalition efforts to train, advise, assist, and equip the Afghan Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Enable the Afghan Ministry of Interior to Develop its Oversight and Internal Control Capability</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Government and Coalition train, advise, and assist efforts will enable the Afghan MoI and subordinate organizations to develop a transparency, accountability and oversight capability that helps the MoI run efficient and effective operations, report reliable information about its operations, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability of Marine Corps Financial Data Reported for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
<td>To determine the accuracy of the Marine Corps’ obligations and disbursements supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel as reported in the <em>Cost of War</em> report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Report of Recommendations from OCO Intel Evaluations</td>
<td>To determine if recommendations from LIG OCO intelligence evaluations affecting OIR and OFS have been implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of DoD Biometric Enabled Intel Operations for OFS</td>
<td>To determine whether Biometric Enabled Intelligence effectively supports the OFS Commander’s requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Construction of the New Embassy Compound-Islamabad</td>
<td>To determine whether the Department is effectively administering the construction contracts for the new embassy compound in Islamabad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-Up Review of Explosive Detection Dogs in Iraq and Afghanistan</td>
<td>To follow up on DoS OIG recommendations made in a 2010 report where the OIG found that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security could not verify the detection abilities of its explosive detection canines under three programs: the Baghdad Embassy Security Force, the Kabul Embassy Security Force, and Personal Protective Services in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE**                                                      | **Department of the Navy Overseas Contingency Operations**  
To verify that the Department of the Navy’s obligations and disbursements supporting overseas contingency operations are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and that internal controls were in place and functioning as intended. |
| **SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION**                | **Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**  
To 1) determine the extent to which counternarcotics police specialized units are achieving their goals; 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units; and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the specialized units. |
|                                                                              | **Review of DoD Procurement of Proprietary Textiles for the ANDSF**  
To determine 1) the cost to the U.S. government of using proprietary textile patterns for ANDSF uniforms; and 2) how and why the U.S. government generated the requirement for proprietary patterns for ANDSF uniforms. |
|                                                                              | **The Effect of AWOL Afghan Military Trainees on Afghan Reconstruction Programs**  
To 1) determine how many Afghan military trainees have gone absent without leave while training in the United States; the trainees rank, specialty, command, the program(s) supported by the training effort; and the impact on the program(s) by the loss of these students (financial, operational, morale, etc.); 2) identify the disposition of the these trainees and obtain justifications for State to provide immigration status; and 3) determine the extent to which this issue has impacted the U.S. government’s reconstruction effort. |
|                                                                              | **Assistance to Improve Governance in Afghanistan**  
To 1) identify DoD, State, and USAID programs focused on improving governance in Afghanistan; 2) assess how these efforts contributed to improvements in government institutions in Afghanistan; and 3) determine lessons for future governance efforts in conflict affected countries. |
|                                                                              | **Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its Mi-17 Fleet**  
To assess 1) the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the Mi-17s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the Mi-17s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services. |
|                                                                              | **Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s**  
To assess 1) the extent to which the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet; and 2) DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Special Mission Wing can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense Efforts to Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior</td>
<td>To assess 1) the extent to which DoD has clearly articulated the goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) DoD’s advisory efforts, including funding; the number of advisors and contractors; their assigned locations; and criteria for selecting the advisors, among other things; and 3) the methods DoD uses to measure success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF Equipment Requirement Generation Process</td>
<td>To 1) describe the process(es) by which DoD develops equipment requirements for the ANSDF; 2) assess the extent to which DoD oversees these procurement processes; and 3) assess the extent to which DoD evaluates the performance of this equipment once fielded and makes adjustments, if needed. This may result in a series of audits examining different types of equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its A-29 Fleet</td>
<td>To 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the A-29 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29 currently in its fleet, including DoD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the A-29, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force Use and Maintenance of Its MD-530 Fleet</td>
<td>To 1) describe DoD’s process for selecting the MD-530 as a platform for the Afghan Air Force; 2) assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530 currently in its fleet, including DOD’s measures for determining success; 3) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the Afghan Air Force can operate and maintain the MD-530, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services; and 4) determine the extent to which the Afghan Air Force will be able to sustain this fleet in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation and Effectiveness of On-Budget Assistance</td>
<td>To 1) determine the amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance provided to develop the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) evaluate potentially negative issues that affected on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program Schools in Kapisa Province</td>
<td>To 1) review the accuracy of geographic location data; 2) assess current conditions and usability; and 3) collect community-based information regarding the value derived from the construction of health facilities constructed or rehabilitated through U.S.-funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commander’s Emergency Response Program Health Facilities in Nangarhar Province</strong></td>
<td>To 1) review the accuracy of geographic location data; 2) assess current conditions and usability; and 3) collect community-based information regarding the value derived from the construction of health facilities constructed or rehabilitated through U.S.-funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commander’s Emergency Response Program Health Facilities in Kandahar Province</strong></td>
<td>To 1) review the accuracy of geographic location data; 2) assess current conditions and usability; and 3) collect community-based information regarding the value derived from the construction of health facilities constructed or rehabilitated through U.S.-funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program projects in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. soldiers conduct a route clearance patrol on the roads of Kandahar Province Afghanistan, 8/23/2016. (DoD photo)
APPENDIXES

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## APPENDIX A:
Lead Inspector General Statutory Requirements

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>69-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>27, 88-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to Congress on a biannual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:</td>
<td>6-7, 71-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.</td>
<td>84-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.</td>
<td>1-117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) are the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Inspector General of the Department of State, and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
APPENDIX B: The President’s FY 2017 OCO Request for DoD

**Total Request: $58.8 Billion**

- **Iraq Train and Equip Fund**: $0.6 Billion
- **Joint Improvised-Threat Fund**: $0.4 Billion
- **Syria Train and Equip Fund**: $0.25 Billion
- **Counterterrorism Partnership Fund**: $1.0 Billion
- **Support for Coalition Forces**: $1.4 Billion
- **European Reassurance Initiative**: $3.4 Billion
- **Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**: $3.4 Billion
- **Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 Compliance**: $5.2 Billion
- **In-Theater Support**: $17 Billion
- **Equipment Reset**: $9.4 Billion
- **Operations/Force Protection**: $8.7 Billion
- ** Classified Programs**: $8.1 Billion

**Operations/Force Protection**
Covers the full spectrum of military operations requirements for U.S. personnel operating in OIR and OFS. These operations include supporting deployed forces; sustaining Special Operations Forces, combat-aviation units, and ground-based personnel; and communications and transportation.

**In-theater Support**
Enables units stationed outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to provide critical assistance to personnel in the two theaters, including air and naval support, intelligence resources, and dedicated unmanned air vehicles.

**Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund**
Supports efforts to understand, develop, procure, and field measures to defeat improvised threats to U.S. forces, closing the gap between the enemy’s innovation cycles and operational capabilities used by the Joint Force.
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
Funds the sustainment, operations, and professionalization of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, which including the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Also supports further capacity development of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in support of these forces.

Support for Coalition Forces
Finances coalition, allies, and a variety of support requirements for key foreign partners who wish to participate in U.S. military operations but lack the financial means.

Iraq Train and Equip Fund
Provides material, equipment, training, and operational support for the Iraqi security forces to liberate and stabilize territory captured by ISIL, protect Iraq's borders and the population, and ultimately defeat ISIL.

Syria Train and Equip Fund
Enables DoD to build capacity of partners on the ground and reinforce battlefield successes by providing equipment and supplies and targeted training to vetted opposition forces in the fight against ISIL in Syria.

Equipment Reset
Enables the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and munitions expended, destroyed, damaged, or degraded due to prolonged use in combat operations.

Classified Programs
Covers a number of Defense-related activities, such as the research and development of weapons systems, special operations, and intelligence.

Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
Continues the President's initiative to support a more sustainable and partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command areas of responsibility.

- Direct Partner Support
  To establish and maintain a network of partners on the front lines of the terrorist threat. This assistance could include near-term training, equipping, advising, and operational support and longer-term capacity-building efforts in coordination with DoS.

- Augmenting U.S. Capability to Support Partners in Counter Terrorism Operations
  To enhance selected DoD capabilities, which provide essential support to partner force operations, including improved Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capacity.

European Reassurance Initiative
Provides U.S. military assurance to allies in Europe threatened by aggressive actors in the region both through partner capacity building and increased forward stationing of U.S. military assets.

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 Compliance
As the amount specified in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 for FY 2017 OCO was $5.2 billion more than is anticipated necessary to conduct operations, the DoD intends use this funding to cover requirements not directly related to ongoing contingency activity.

APPENDIX C:
Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support Mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces. These EFs comprise the following:

**ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE**

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Under EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

**Indicators of effectiveness:**

- MoD and MoI are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance
- Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable MoI and MoD to develop a budget
- MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements
- MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes
- MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned
- MoD can fully pay all their employees accurately and in a timely and secure fashion.
- Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to MoI and MoD
- MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 2:
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, CSTC-A administers measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable
- MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- General Staff IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- Critical items (the “big four” issues—fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level
- Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 3:
CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF’s ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to gross violations of human rights, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other gross violations of human rights
- MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and gross violations of human rights
- MoD and MoI inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office on corruption adjudication, and with the Attorney General’s Office on gross violations of human rights allegations
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 4:  
FORCE GENERATION

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation train, advise, and assist mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force
- MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement
- MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigate attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength
- MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and MoI prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery
- Training delivered that results in reduced casualties

Afghan Soldiers march forward after graduating with their fellow recruits to become the 5th and 6th battalions to reform within Helmand Province. (DoD photo)
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 5: SUSTAIN THE FORCE

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Measurement and reporting has command emphasis
- ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements
- ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors
- MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the Coalition-funded AMS contract
- MoD has a developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable
- MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil, the official list of personnel and equipment requirements
- MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process
- ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare
- MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
- MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure
- MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout its lifecycle
- MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems
- MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations
- MoI is capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 6: PLAN, RESOURCE, AND EXECUTE EFFECTIVE SECURITY CAMPAIGNS

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council, the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Office of the National Security Council delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, and National Security Strategy)
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning
- Assistant MoD for Strategy and Policy leads and delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance on time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process
- General Staff Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy delivers strategic documents on time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors the implementation of strategy and planning, and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP
- ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps
- ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level with strategic guidance from the MoD
- ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations
- ANA Special Operations Command develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force
- ANA Special Operations Command is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations district operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives
- Special Mission Wing develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability in support of the Afghan Special Security Forces
- Afghan Air Force has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 7: DEVELOP SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant MoD for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence, and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues
- MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANA Special Operation Command and ANA corps level operations
- Directorate of Police intelligence human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can act and report on intelligence requirements and tasking
- Establish a National Military Intelligence Center as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations
- Directorate of Police intelligence trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs
- Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANA Special Operation Command
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 8: MAINTAIN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- Develops and sustains events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
- Afghan government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products.
- General Staff Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] tashkil inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT GENDER OFFICE

In addition to the eight EFs, the Resolute Support Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA and ANP levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.

Indicators of effectiveness:

- MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration.
- MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women.
- MoI and MoD takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women.
## Acronyms and Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DoS OIG</td>
<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State-Khorasan</td>
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<td>kandak</td>
<td>battalion</td>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior Affairs</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operation</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>OIR</td>
<td>Operation Inherent Resolve</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>tashkil</td>
<td>the official list of ANDSF personnel and equipment requirements</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAID OIG</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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Kabul, Afghanistan, July 15th, 2016. (DoD photo)
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