LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations will coordinate among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report to Congress and the public on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This is our third quarterly report on the overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. This quarterly report discusses OFS’s two complementary missions: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Resolute Support mission and the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda, its remnants, and its affiliates in Afghanistan. Our oversight responsibility extends to crosscutting and shared areas related to the OFS missions that support the government of Afghanistan’s ability to protect and govern itself.

Principal Deputy Inspector General for the Department of Defense (DoD) Glenn Fine has assumed the roles of Acting DoD Inspector General and Lead Inspector General with the departure of the Honorable Jon Rymer. Mr. Fine joined DoD in June 2015, having previously served as the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for 11 years. In addition, Ann Calvaresi Barr was confirmed as the Inspector General for U.S. Agency for International Development. She served previously as the Deputy Inspector General at the Department of Transportation and brings more than 30 years of experience in the federal oversight community.

In early December, we briefed interested congressional parties on the work of the Lead IG as it relates to the three OCOs that were designated during the past year. Approximately 25 congressional staff members, representing 8 committees from the Senate and House of Representatives, 3 members’ offices, and the Congressional Research Service, participated in the discussion on the individual OCOs as well as the Lead IG oversight concept. As a group, we highlighted lessons learned and best practices that will continue to shape our oversight work. We look forward to continuing our information sharing, coordination, and collaboration among our oversight partners.

Glenn A. Fine
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Ann Calvaresi Barr
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD IG

As the newly designated Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), I am pleased to present to Congress our third quarterly report on OFS.

Inspector General Rymer, who resigned as the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General on January 8, 2016, was instrumental in creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) concept. I thank him for his leadership in promoting and implementing the Lead IG model as an effective method for improved collaboration and coordination of the oversight of overseas contingency operations.

OFS faced significant challenges this quarter as attacks occurred throughout Afghanistan. In October 2015, the Taliban temporarily occupied the provincial capital of Kunduz province. Through December, intense fighting continued in Helmand province, where U.S. forces provided limited support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Despite initial gains by the Taliban in these and other provinces, the ANDSF ultimately prevailed in defending key areas and in recapturing lost territory.

However, the ANDSF’s continued ability to fight in the current environment is jeopardized by sustainment issues that past oversight work has identified. As we point out in this report, material readiness of ANDSF vehicles and weapons is in “dire condition,” according to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. Although coalition advisors continue to assist Afghan counterparts in building support mechanisms, the risk is that the pace of progress may not be sufficient to achieve a self-sustaining ANDSF by the end of 2016 when further U.S. force reductions are planned. This is one of the challenges that confronts General John Nicholson as he assumes command of our forces in Afghanistan.

My Lead IG colleagues and our oversight partners are committed to effective oversight and timely reporting on OFS and are currently working 22 oversight projects in Afghanistan. In these efforts, we appreciate and rely on the dedication of the teams of OIG employees in the field, who perform the day-to-day planning, analysis, and oversight work for our organizations. We thank them for their hard work and sacrifice.

Glenn A. Fine
Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel
Glenn A. Fine
Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
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Afghan National Army soldier fighting to retake Kunduz City from the Taliban. (Josh Smith/Stars and Stripes photo)
An Afghan air force aerial gunner flies on an Afghan air force Mi-17 helicopter near Kabul, Afghanistan. (DoD Photo)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall security situation in Afghanistan “deteriorated” in the last half of 2015 with continuous attacks by the insurgent Taliban and the emergence of a long-term threat in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)). The usual winter lull in fighting did not occur as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were engaged in combat throughout Afghanistan during October 1-December 31, 2015. The heaviest fighting was in the traditional Taliban stronghold of Helmand province and in Kunduz province, where the Taliban temporarily captured the provincial capital, Kunduz City.

This heightened degree of conflict was among factors that led to an adjustment of the drawdown timeline for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. On October 15, 2015, following consultations among U.S. government agencies and with members of Congress, international partners, and Afghan leaders, President Barack Obama announced the U.S. military would not draw down further in 2016. The President authorized troop levels to remain at no more than 9,800 personnel throughout the year, with a reduction to no more than 5,500 troops by January 2017, deployed at locations such as Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. After the President’s announcement, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to maintain the total Resolute Support troop level at its 2015 levels during 2016.

Freedom’s Sentinel—finishing its first year in operation as 2015 ended—was designed to help the Afghan government build and sustain its security capacity by continuing two U.S. activities in Afghanistan: (1) conducting counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its remnants, and its associates; and (2) training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. A DoD assessment identified three ongoing threats in late 2015:

- **Al Qaeda remains active.** In October, U.S. special operation forces and Afghan National Army personnel destroyed a training site for a new branch of the terrorist organization named Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.

- **The Taliban and Haqqani Network strengthen ties.** After the announced death of Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar last summer, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor began to consolidate his leadership of the Taliban. Siraj Haqqani, of the terrorist group Haqqani Network, was named his deputy. The Taliban showed no indication of decreasing their fighting tempo, staging major offensive operations in Kunduz and in their traditional stronghold of Helmand province through December.
• **ISIL-K emerging as an operational force.** This branch of ISIL is made of fighters formerly with the Taliban and other extremist groups who pledged their support to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi early in 2015. This quarter, ISIL-K accelerated its fight against the Taliban in an attempt to establish a safe haven in Nangarhar province. The Department of State designated ISIL-K as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 14, 2016.8

Ratings used to assess progress in the Resolute Support mission and the capabilities of the ANDSF improved this quarter. The effectiveness of Resolute Support’s training, advising, and assisting efforts were demonstrated by increases in “partially capable” ratings this quarter for both the Ministry of Defense (55.6 percent to 57.8 percent) and Ministry of Interior (59.5 percent to 64.9 percent).9 Likewise, the percentage of ANDSF units rated as capable or better increased from 73 percent in January 2015 to 88 percent by November 2015, the last date available for this report. However, DoD officials noted that those ratings ultimately were based on subjective assessments by Resolute Support advisors and unverifiable information provided by Afghan officials.10

Despite the improvement in these ratings and sufficient ANDSF manning, DoD reported that ANDSF performance was uneven in the field. Moreover, attrition continued to be a significant problem for the ANDSF this quarter and stems from poor leadership, corruption, and the high tempo of combat operations. The Afghan government made changes—filling 61 senior Ministry of Defense positions and 22 Ministry of Interior general officer positions in the last half of 2015—to improve leadership.11

Challenges in the areas of Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics and leadership were apparent in late 2015, with DoD officials reporting two critical problems:

• **Afghan army vehicle readiness is troubled.** The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—the U.S. command that is responsible for managing DoD security assistance for Afghanistan—reported that ANA vehicle readiness “is in a dire condition.” The main issues were a combination of too few mechanics, aging vehicles, and too many variations of vehicles. In particular, DoD noted that previous procurements of vehicles typically were fielded without life-cycle sustainment plans or program management support.12

• **The ANA 215th Corps for Helmand province required rebuilding.** CSTC-A is leading an effort to reconstitute the ANA 215th after it performed poorly amid persistent Taliban attacks in Helmand province. Resolute Support officials attributed much of the poor performance and high attrition in the 215th to ineffective and corrupt leadership. In response, the acting Minister of Defense removed the
corps commander, two brigade commanders, and corps headquarters staff officers. U.S. Special Forces are advising their Afghan counterparts as part of a counter-offensive against the Taliban.

Lead IG Reporting and Oversight

Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires that the designated Lead IG submit to Congress a quarterly report on the contingency operation. This report provides the quarterly update on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. It includes an examination of the evolving threats and high-visibility conflict in Afghanistan during the first quarter FY 2016 and a discussion of regional stability where the outlook improved with a restart of the peace process in late December. Additionally, the report describes U.S. support for the Resolute Support mission and U.S. funding of nearly $100 billion enacted for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel as of December 31, 2015. Information concerning U.S. counterterrorism operations is classified and not available in this unclassified document.

In addition to its reporting requirement, Lead IG is responsible for developing a joint strategic plan for comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation. In October 2015, the Lead IG issued the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan and a compendium of all ongoing and planned oversight projects conducted to support OFS.

On November 5, 2015, the DoD OIG led the quarterly Joint Planning Group meeting to coordinate and update oversight activities in Southwest Asia. Importantly, representatives from the Offices of Inspectors General for the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury participated as part of this group for the first time to promote a whole-of-government oversight approach.

The November meeting was highlighted by a televideo presentation from Afghanistan by Major General James E. Rainey, Deputy Commanding General-Support, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), who also serves as the USFOR-A oversight coordinator. Major General Rainey shared his observations regarding the threat situation, ANDSF fighting capabilities, and sustainment issues that were of particular interest to planning group participants.

As of December 31, 2015, the Lead IG agencies had 22 ongoing projects supporting OFS. For a listing of those projects, see Appendix B. Lead IG agencies will provide detailed summaries of completed work as well as a discussion of ongoing and planned work among Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners in our next report. USAID has reported it has no programs or operations related to OFS.
Since the July 2015 announcement that Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar died in 2013, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor has largely consolidated his position as the new emir, though some dissenting factions have broken away. The Taliban has proven capable of taking rural areas, fighting for key terrain in Helmand province, and conducting high-visibility attacks in Kabul and Kunduz. However, the group has not been able to hold key terrain for extended periods of time and has suffered significant casualties. The Taliban has presence throughout Afghanistan, but most insurgent activity during the last half of 2015 was carried out in Kabul, Kunduz, Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Uruzgan, Parwan, Faryab, and Ghazni provinces.

For most of 2015, al Qaeda was considered to be in a survival mode. U.S. counterterrorism efforts have targeted the terrorist group since 2001. Fewer than 100 core members were estimated to be cooperating with the Taliban, particularly in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. However, in October, U.S. forces found and destroyed a major training site in a remote part of Kandahar.

With links to the Taliban and al Qaeda, this extremist group is considered the greatest threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces. Its involvement with the Taliban has increased, with the appointment of the network’s leader, Siraj Haqqani, as deputy to Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor. The network leads the insurgency in Paktika and Khost provinces and uses those areas to launch attacks on Kabul.

The ISIL-K has been gaining membership from disaffected members of the Taliban and other extremist groups. ISIL-K has been battling the Taliban, and now the Afghan army, in a section of Nangarhar province by the Pakistan border. The group’s name refers to an ancient area that included parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The extremist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has pledged support to the ISIL-K, and there are reports of it operating in Zabul and Ghazni provinces, as well as in Kunduz province to the north.

Source: Afghan Special Police Force (CRU) Facebook photo December 3.
HIGH-VISIBILITY ACTIVITY

1. **Kunduz province—September 27.** Taliban captures Kunduz City in a surprise attack, making it the first provincial capital under Taliban control since 2001. The Afghan forces, with coalition air support, retake the city on October 13.

2. **Kandahar province, Shorabak district—October 7.** U.S. and Afghan forces begin a major counterterrorism operation against an al Qaeda training site that covered nearly 30 square miles.

3. **Ghazni province—October 11.** Taliban forces attack the provincial capital, Ghazni, but are repulsed by Afghan forces.

4. **Zabul province—October 14.** Highway 1, linking Kabul and Kandahar, is blocked by Taliban forces but reopened by Afghan forces a week later. **November 9—** Islamic state militants behead seven ethnic Hazara civilians, prompting antigovernment protests at the presidential palace in Kabul.

5. **Faryab province—October 20.** Taliban forces capture Ghormach district, which is retaken by the ANDSF following a 3-day air and ground counterattack.

6. **Helmand province—October 20.** Taliban forces overrun several checkpoints on the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital, but Afghan forces retain control of the city. **November—December—** Several districts change hands as Taliban initiate offensives and Afghan forces counterattack in multiple locations across Helmand province.

7. **Nangarhar province—early November.** The ANDSF, with coalition forces, begin targeting and clearing operations in eastern Nangarhar, where the ISIL-K controls several districts and maintains an overt presence.

8. **Kandahar province, Kandahar district—December 8.** Sixteen Taliban fighters attack the Kandahar airbase, killing 54 and wounding 42. After 24 hours of fighting, Afghan security forces end the attack, killing 14 insurgents.

9. **Kabul province—December 11.** Taliban insurgents storm the Spanish embassy in the Kabul city center, killing 1 person and wounding 10 others. **December 28—** Taliban suicide bomber attacks a bus near Kabul airport, killing 1 person and wounding 33.

10. **Parwan province—December 21.** Taliban suicide bomber on a motorcycle strikes a joint U.S.-Afghan patrol near Bagram Airfield, killing six U.S. servicemembers.
OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL

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OVERVIEW

This quarter saw a continuation of unrelenting insurgent activity as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) completed their first year of fighting with full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan and virtually no U.S. combat enabler support. Under Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), an overseas contingency operation that began January 1, 2015, U.S. Forces transitioned from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led combat mission to a NATO-led mission of training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, while supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda and its associates.

This report responds to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on the contingency operation. In order to describe the environment prevailing during OFS, this report examines evolving threats faced by the ANDSF, describes high-visibility conflict, and summarizes Afghan-led efforts to improve regional stability during the first quarter of FY 2016. This leads into a discussion of U.S. support for the NATO-Led Resolute Support mission, an assessment of ANDSF capabilities based on oversight work and information provided by commanders in Afghanistan, and an analysis of U.S. funding for OFS and related missions that totaled nearly $100 billion for fiscal years 2014-2016.

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FIGHTS TO MEET CHALLENGE OF CONTINUOUS INSURGENT ACTIVITY

The overall security situation in Afghanistan “deteriorated” in the last half of 2015, according to the Department of Defense (DoD), with continuous attacks by the insurgent Taliban and the emergence of a long-term threat in the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-Khorasan (ISIL-K). Although winter snow in the Hindu Kush Mountains usually produces a lull in insurgent activity, the ANDSF, comprising the Afghan military and police, was engaged in combat throughout Afghanistan during the reporting period of October 1-December 31, 2015. The heaviest fighting was in the traditional Taliban stronghold of Helmand province and in Kunduz province. This heightened degree of conflict, which included the temporary Taliban capture of the provincial capital of Kunduz province, was among factors that led to an adjustment of the drawdown timeline for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.

On October 15, 2015, following consultations among U.S. government agencies and with members of Congress, international partners, and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, President
Barack Obama announced the U.S. military would not draw down further in 2016. The President authorized troop levels to remain at no more than 9,800 personnel throughout the year, with a reduction to no more than 5,500 troops by January 2017, deployed at locations such as Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. After the President’s announcement, NATO agreed to maintain the total Resolute Support troop level at its 2015 levels during 2016. As of December 2015, approximately 11,400 NATO forces were participating in the Resolute Support mission, comprised of 6,800 U.S. forces and 4,600 personnel from other NATO countries. In addition, about 1,700 non-NATO military personnel participate in Resolute Support. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that the troop-level adjustment was “based on conditions on the ground to give the United States and our allies the capability to sustain a robust counterterrorism platform, denying safe haven for terrorists and violent extremist organizations.”

The former Taliban-controlled regime of Afghanistan had provided such a safe haven to al Qaeda, giving that organization the ability to plan and execute the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States, along with its coalition and Afghan partners, broke the Taliban’s control over Afghanistan, facilitating the initiation of legitimate representative government. With the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom in December 2014, the United States formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan and initiated Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel was designed to help the Afghan government build and sustain its security capacity by continuing two U.S. activities in Afghanistan:

- conducting counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda, its remnants, and its associates
- training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF via NATO’s Resolute Support mission.

General John F. Campbell is commander of both USFOR-A and NATO’s Resolute Support Mission, encompassing 40 nations with a total of 13,100 U.S. and international troops. Resolute Support entails training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and their supporting ministries in areas ranging from development and use of logistical systems to recruitment and instruction of Afghanistan’s all-volunteer military forces. In support of this mission and because key ANDSF capability gaps remain, U.S. forces continue to provide limited military support primarily in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. U.S. forces are authorized to provide close air support to the ANDSF only under extreme circumstances.

**Conditions Governing the Use of U.S. Force**

Since the end of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is described as non-combat in that U.S. forces no longer plan or conduct offensive combat operations. Use of force is restricted to the following specific conditions:

- U.S. forces can take action against individuals or groups that directly threaten U.S. and coalition forces or against al Qaeda, ISIL-K, and associated groups.
- The USFOR-A commander has the authority to provide support to the ANDSF under extreme circumstances at his discretion.

In addition, the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts to defeat al Qaeda, its associates, and ISIL-K, and provides protection to U.S. forces. The U.S. Special Operations Forces train, advise, and assist the Afghan Special Security Force which, in turn, accompany U.S. forces on certain counterterrorism missions. Meanwhile, the Afghan Special Security Forces conduct their own operations using their developing capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats.

The United States relies on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of the Military Force and the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief as the legal basis for its use of force. With the 2001 Authorization, Congress gave
the President the authority to use all necessary force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or who harbored such groups or persons.32

COUNTERTERRORISM AND EVOLVING THREATS

On December 13, 2015, General Campbell noted significant changes among the insurgent and terrorist groups. He said an influx of militants into Afghanistan resulting from Pakistani military operations on the Pakistani side of its border with Afghanistan exacerbated an already volatile insurgent environment in Afghanistan. In addition, he noted changes in the threat landscape resulting from new alliances and fissures within the Taliban following the July announcement of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, as well as from a persistent al Qaeda presence, and the emergence of the ISIL-K.33

Various groups operate in Afghanistan, particularly along its border with Pakistan, including the Taliban, al Qaeda, Haqqani Network, and ISIL-K.34 For a map showing the main groups, their strongholds, and sites of high-visibility attacks, see the infographic after the Executive Summary in this report. As discussed below, DoD's threat assessments note a high level of insurgent and terrorist activity in 2015, which carried into the last three months of the year.

Al Qaeda Remains a Threat

The U.S. military has directly targeted al Qaeda in Afghanistan since 2001, and DoD credits U.S. counterterrorism efforts with killing many of its leaders, primarily through strikes by armed unmanned aerial vehicles.35 However, an increased al Qaeda presence was detected in Afghanistan in late 2015. DoD reported that Pakistani military operations pushed many foreign fighters, including some al Qaeda leaders, into Afghanistan in 2015. In addition al Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had announced in a 55-minute video in September 2014 the creation of “Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS),” a branch aimed at Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. In October 2015, U.S. Special Operations Forces and Afghan National Army personnel destroyed a training site run by AQIS that was set up in the remote southern part of Kandahar province, which borders Pakistan. The training site sprawled more than 30 square miles, and General Campbell described it as “probably the largest” al Qaeda training site found in Afghanistan in 14 years.36 DoD reports that al Qaeda remains a threat to the United States, focused on “survival, regeneration, and planning and facilitating future attacks.”37
The Taliban and Haqqani Network Strengthen Ties

The Taliban pressed attacks throughout Afghanistan in the last three months of 2015, temporarily capturing Kunduz City in the north and fighting to gain districts in Helmand province in the south.\(^{38}\) DoD reported that the high level of violence had been expected in the Taliban strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar, but the ANSF also was forced to confront more security threats than expected in other parts of the country.\(^{39}\)

The Taliban named new leadership after the July 25 announcement of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Mullah Omar was the head of the Taliban regime during 1996–2001, and then of the insurgent Taliban. The new Taliban leader is Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, with Haqqani Network leader Siraj Haqqani serving as his deputy. The Haqqani Network, which has a long association with the Taliban and al Qaeda, has led the insurgency in the eastern border provinces of Paktika and Khowst and has launched high-profile attacks in Kabul, including planning an assassination attempt on then-President Hamid Karzai and attacking Kabul’s upscale Serena Hotel, both in 2008.\(^{40}\)

Mullah Mansoor has largely consolidated his leadership of the Taliban despite dissent from some Taliban commanders. One dissenter is Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, who was released from U.S. detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2007 and now operates in the Helmand area. Other terrorist leaders, such as al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri, have declared support for Mullah Mansoor.\(^{41}\) While there were local reports that Mullah Mansoor was wounded or killed in a gunfight with dissident Taliban, President Ghani said in a December 7, 2015, press conference that there was no evidence of this.\(^{42}\)

ISIL-K Emerging as an Operational Force

Disaffected Tehrik-e Taliban fighters pledged their support to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in January 2015, naming their branch, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K). The name refers to a historic region that once included parts of what is now Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. (There is no Khorasan province in present-day Afghanistan.) U.S. officials have estimated
that there are 1,000–3,000 ISIL-K fighters in Afghanistan. The group is openly fighting with the Taliban to establish a safe haven in Nangarhar province along the border with Pakistan. ISIL-K has claimed responsibility for an attack on a United Nations (UN) vehicle and 10 ANDSF checkpoints in September. In addition, DoD states that the group’s recruitment of experienced fighters could increase its operational capability in 2016. ISIL-K is primarily located in Nangarhar province, where it is the main focus of ANDSF operations. ISIL-K appears to draw fighters from three other groups:

- Disaffected fighters from the Tehrik-e Taliban, who were driven over the border into Afghanistan by the Pakistani military in early 2015 (The Tehrik-e-Taliban are separate from the Taliban in Afghanistan and target the Pakistan government.)
- Fighters who left the Taliban in Afghanistan after Mullah Omar’s death was announced
- Members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan based in northern Afghanistan and along the eastern border with Pakistan

At its startup, ISIL-K selected former Tehrik-e Taliban commander Hafeez Saeed Khan as the leader of the new group. The Uzbekistan group fully pledged allegiance to ISIL-K in September 2015. The Uzbekistan group has attacked Shia ethnic minority Hazara civilians, particularly in Ghazni and Zabul provinces. ISIL-K’s short-term goal seems to be to establish a safe haven from which to attack Jalalabad, the provincial capital of Nangarhar, and control Highway 7 from Pakistan into Kabul.

The Department of State announced on January 14, 2016, the designation of ISIL-K as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The consequences of the designation include a prohibition against knowingly providing, or attempting or conspiring to provide, material support or resources to this organization. The Department of State took this action in consultation with the Departments of Justice and the Treasury. In Congressional testimony on February 2, 2016, General Campbell acknowledged that U.S. forces are attacking ISIL-K and have had considerable success in degrading their capabilities.
Leaders of Terror and Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan

The National Counterterrorism Center, DoD and media reports have identified the following leaders of terrorist and insurgent groups:

**Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda.** Al-Zawahiri became radicalized during his university years in Cairo in the 1970s. After receiving his degree in general surgery in 1978, he became increasingly involved with Islamist groups opposed to the government of Anwar al-Sadat. Following the 1981 assassination of President Sadat, al-Zawahiri was arrested along with other Islamists and received a 3-year prison sentence. He later met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan while both men were supporting anti-Soviet insurgents. He was sentenced in Egypt to death *in absentia* in 1997 for a terrorist attack on foreign tourists. One year later, he merged his group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with al Qaeda. After bin Laden’s death, al-Zawahiri became the acknowledged leader of al Qaeda.

**Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, Taliban.** There is a dearth of reliable information on Mullah Mansoor’s background. Another veteran of the fight against the Soviet Union, he is alleged to have been born near Kandahar, studied at a radical Pakistani madrassa, and been an integral part of the inner councils of his now-deceased predecessor, Mullah Omar. During the 1996-2001 Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Mullah Mansoor controlled the nation’s civil aviation authority. After the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in 2015, Mullah Mansoor quickly took control of the Taliban. But this was met with opposition from several Taliban leaders. His followers have been involved in several clashes with forces aligned with ISIL-K.

**Sirajuddin Haqqani, Haqqani Network.** According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Haqqani was born in either Afghanistan or Pakistan in the 1970s. He emerged as the network’s leader in 2014, after the reported death of his father Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was one of the most powerful leaders of the anti-Soviet insurgency and a sometime ally of the United States. While drone strikes have taken a severe toll on the terrorist network, eliminating many senior figures based in eastern Afghanistan and North Waziristan, Pakistan, the network remains capable of conducting significant attacks.

**Hafez Saeed Khan, ISIL-K.** Born in Pakistan in the early 1970s, Saeed is reported to have travelled to Kabul after September 11, 2001, to fight alongside the Taliban. He was a member of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, but pledged his allegiance to ISIL after that group splintered in 2014. In January 2015, an ISIL spokesman released a video confirming his leadership of ISIL-K. According to media reports claiming to be based on information obtained by the Afghan National Directorate for Intelligence, Saeed was killed in a July 2015 U.S. drone strike in eastern Afghanistan along with 30 other insurgents. However, ISIL-K denied those reports and neither the U.S. nor Afghan governments confirmed the death.
New Terrorist Tactic Spreading

Beheadings surfaced as a new terror tactic in Afghanistan in late 2015. The beheadings were attributed to the ISIL-K and, more unexpectedly, to the Taliban, which has not traditionally killed by this means. The United Nations said there were reports that the Taliban beheaded up to 17 members of the Afghan security forces during the battle in October over Kunduz, although Taliban representatives denied that report. In November, the decapitated bodies of seven ethnic minority Hazara Afghans—four men, two women, and a 9-year-old girl—were found in Zabul province, setting off protests across Afghanistan, including a protest by thousands of people at the presidential compound in Kabul. It remains unclear who was responsible for those beheadings. In addition, President Ghani ordered an investigation into reports that ISIL-K captured and beheaded four member of a pro-government militia in Nangarhar in December. In an act of retribution, the militia decapitated four ISIL-K prisoners and placed their heads along a main road.

HIGH-VISIBILITY FIGHTING IN LATE 2015

The security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate. The Taliban and other insurgent groups demonstrated an improved ability to exploit vulnerabilities in the ANSF and mounted a series of attacks during the October–December period in a continuing effort to destabilize the Afghan government and establish control over key areas. Although temporarily successful in gaining ground in several areas, most notably in Kunduz and Helmand provinces, insurgent advances were stalled or ultimately reversed by ANSF forces.

ANDSF Retook Provincial Capital of Kunduz from the Taliban

The ANSF counter-attack on the Taliban in Kunduz City occurred at the beginning of this quarter after Taliban fighters occupied the city center in late September and pushed Afghan security forces back to positions at the Kunduz airport. The Taliban’s seizure of Kunduz City marked the first loss of a provincial capital to insurgents since 2001 and constituted a major setback for the Afghan government. However, by mid-day on October 1, the ANSF, assisted by coalition forces, recaptured large parts of the city, although fighting continued until October 13, when the Taliban announced its withdrawal. According to a UN report, the city had fallen quickly to Taliban forces because Afghan authorities failed to respond to the steady expansion of insurgent control in districts surrounding Kunduz City following Taliban offensives from April to June.
2015. The United Nations also reported that, during the Taliban occupation of Kunduz city, over 600 prisoners were freed from the Kunduz prison, some of whom were armed by and joined insurgent forces.58

According to media sources, a six-member commission appointed by President Ghani attributed the rapid collapse of security forces defending Kunduz City to leadership failure at the central and provincial levels, along with flaws in judicial and security institutions. According to the commission findings, Taliban fighters seized intelligence information and up to 40 military vehicles during their siege. The commission further noted that U.S. close air support to ANDSF forces during the counter-attack prevented insurgents from capturing the Kunduz airport and was a crucial factor in driving insurgents out of the city.59 However, while providing that support, the crew of a U.S. AC-130 gunship mistakenly targeted the Medecins Sans Frontieres trauma center in Kunduz city, causing a large number of civilian casualties and facility damage. See sidebar for details regarding the strike on the medical center and results of the ensuing DoD investigation.
The Strike on Medecins Sans Frontieres Trauma Center

At a DoD press briefing on November 25, 2015, General Campbell announced that an investigation into the October 3, 2015, U.S. strike on the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Trauma Center in Kunduz City determined that the incident was the direct result of human error, compounded by systems and procedural failures. General Campbell noted that findings of the investigation, conducted by a U.S. Army major general from outside his chain of command, were consistent with findings of a parallel investigation conducted by a NATO-Afghan combined civilian casualty assessment team.

Initial reports indicated 30 persons were killed and 37 injured but since then MSF has identified additional casualties; the most recent total is 42 killed with a significantly higher number of wounded reported since the initial estimate. The strike also resulted in extensive damage to the government-owned building that MSF used.

The strike occurred as part of a combined Afghan-U.S. response to a surprise attack on Kunduz City launched by Taliban and insurgents on the evening of September 27, 2015. By the next day, enemy forces had achieved control over most of the city. On September 29, U.S. and Afghan special forces deployed to a camp adjacent to the Kunduz airfield and moved into the city the following day, repelling sustained enemy attacks in the process. Below is General Campbell’s summary of the investigation:

On October 2, after 4 days of heavy fighting, Afghan special forces requested U.S. close air support to augment a planned area clearing operation, which included the headquarters building for the Afghan National Directorate of Security that was allegedly occupied by insurgents. The U.S. on-scene commander agreed to have the air support on standby. From that point forward, multiple problems arose, leading the aircrew of an AC-130 gunship to misidentify the trauma center as the target, rather than the Afghan security headquarters building. Those problems included:

- Failure of the aircrew to receive the normal mission-specific brief that would have identified the trauma center as a no-strike facility. The briefing was not possible because the aircraft was diverted inflight from a canceled mission.
- Malfunction of electronic systems onboard the aircraft preventing the crew from transmitting video and sending or receiving e-mail/electronic messages to/from ground control.
- A missile avoidance maneuver by the aircraft which forced it into an orbit 8 miles from a normal approach, thereby degrading the accuracy of certain targeting systems. When coordinates for the NDS headquarters building were entered into the fire control system, the resultant target was an open field, 300 meters from the building.
- Aircrew reliance on a physical description of the target in lieu of grid coordinates or other electronic indicators. From the air, the trauma center roughly matched the physical description of the Afghan security headquarters building and the trauma center was located near the open field originally targeted by the fire control system.
- Failure of ground control to recognize the misidentification and take corrective action when the aircraft provided coordinates of the trauma center as the target of an immediate engagement. The mistake was not recognized for nearly 30 minutes after the strike.

General Campbell noted that fatigue and high operational tempo contributed to the incident, emphasizing that U.S. forces would not intentionally target a hospital. He committed to taking appropriate disciplinary action and to implementing steps that would avoid a recurrence of the target identification errors identified during the investigation.
Helmand Province Was a Contested Battleground

Intense fighting between the ANDSF and Taliban was continuing in late 2015 in Helmand province, a traditional stronghold of the Taliban. The province grows a large quantity of opium, used to produce heroin, with a harvest valued at up to $3 billion annually, which helps fund the insurgency. DoD said that the Helmand towns of Marjah and Sangin probably would remain contested all winter. In addition, the ANDSF were engaged in keeping open Highway 611, a main road to the Kajaki Dam, which has a power plant supplying electricity to the region. Fighting escalated in December, according to media sources, and U.S. forces provided air support because of the extreme danger to the ANDSF, and U.S. Special Operation Forces provided advisor support. The Taliban pressed its attack in northern Helmand where, according to media sources. It controls at least three districts, is contesting several others, and threatens the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah. DoD stated that the Taliban's goal remains gaining control of Helmand province, and that the Taliban attacks in the north are an attempt to draw Afghan security forces away from Helmand.

ISIL-K Was in Conflict With the Taliban

A complicating factor has been the growing strength of Taliban splinter factions, some of which have rebranded themselves as part of ISIL-K. Although there have been reports of infighting between splinter factions and the main Afghan Taliban group for prominence and territorial control, the conflict does not appear to have weakened the Taliban.

ISIL-K’s primary focus has been in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, where it has launched attacks since April 2015 in an attempt to establish a base of operations. ISIL-K captured numerous villages in several districts of Nangarhar and has enjoyed freedom of movement. However, since early November, the ANDSF with the support of coalition forces has been conducting targeting and clearing operations in eastern Nangarhar province. During a visit to Nangarhar province in December 2015, Secretary of Defense Carter emphasized that Afghan and coalition forces must be prepared to deter the growth of emergent insurgent forces such as ISIL-K and counter the threats they pose, stating, “They can never have a secure base here in Nangarhar or anywhere else in Afghanistan.”

Attacks Occurred Across Afghanistan

At the time it was engaging the ANDSF in Kunduz City, the Taliban was widening its offensive operations across Afghanistan, capturing a remote district in the northwest province of Faryab, threatening the provincial capital of Ghazni, and mounting a multifold attack on two southern Afghan provinces, Helmand and Uruzgan. Additionally, the Taliban in mid-October also blocked Highway 1, the country’s biggest arterial road, leaving hundreds of vehicles stuck and thousands of people stranded between Kabul and Kandahar.
Despite these initial enemy gains, ANDSF forces prevailed in defending key areas or driving back insurgents from temporary seizures during October. Following a 3-day air and ground counterattack, Afghan security forces recaptured the Ghormach district in Faryab province on October 24. Security forces repelled an assault on Ghazni by hundreds of Taliban in mid-October and retained control of the city of Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province, despite sustained attacks by hundreds of Taliban. After a week of fighting, Afghan forces retook control of Highway 1 from insurgents, who had destroyed bridges and set up landmines.

On December 8, 16 insurgents armed with rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, and assault rifles, opened fire at a bazaar near the Kandahar airbase, killing 54 people and wounding 42. According to a UN report, the Taliban dismounted their vehicles at the bazaar and targeted residential areas near the airbase that accommodated Afghan security forces. Media reports citing Afghan authorities indicated that the attack continued for about 24 hours, ending after Afghan security forces killed 14 Taliban fighters, while two reportedly escaped. At the same time, Taliban forces overran a district in neighboring Helmand province that resulted in over a dozen members of the Afghan National Police (ANP) killed.

Three days later, on December 11, Taliban insurgents attempted to storm a compound run by the Spanish embassy in the capital of Kabul, killing a Spanish security official and wounding 10 others. According to media sources, the attack began with a car bomb detonation and was carried out by at least five insurgents. Meanwhile, according to a DoD report, one of the deadliest incidents involving U.S. forces this year occurred on December 21, 2015, when six U.S. service members were killed and three Afghan service members were injured in a vehicle bomb attack outside Bagram Air Base, about 25 miles north of Kabul. Media sources indicated that a Taliban fighter on a motorcycle carrying explosives struck the joint patrol of U.S. and Afghan service members. One week later, a suicide bomber killed at least one person and wounded 33 others in an attack on a road near Kabul airport. The attack was reportedly targeting a bus transporting Americans and Europeans from a military base to Kabul airport.

**Fighting Lessens Afghan Government Reach Over Districts**

According to a DoD assessment, the heightened degree of conflict resulted in a 7 percent decrease in the number of districts controlled or influenced by the Afghan government in the quarter ending December 31, 2015, while the number controlled or influence by insurgents increased 1.1 percent. DoD reported that the Afghan government directly controlled or influenced 71 percent (286) of the nation’s 407 districts.
A City Under Taliban Occupation

A special report by the United Nations on the human rights situation in Kunduz province provides an insight into the terror and chaos faced by the civilian population of an urban area that is captured by the Taliban. The UN report stated that civilians were subjected to arbitrary killings, assault, gender-based violence, and widespread criminality.

For example, during the first days of their occupation of Kunduz City, Taliban fighters carried out systematic searches for civil society activists, human rights defenders, media employees, supporters of the Afghan government, and staff members of international organizations. Although many such individuals had fled the city, UN investigators received numerous eyewitness accounts of Taliban fighters shooting targeted individuals on the spot or executing civilians held in custody. The Taliban appeared to have particular interest in searching for women’s rights defenders, entering their homes, asking for them by name, and in some cases, threatening or physically assaulting family members. Additionally, the United Nations received reports of civilians shot by sniper fire when they attempted to leave their homes.

The United Nations reported that the Taliban used large numbers of child soldiers (ages 10-17) during the attack, many of whom had been forced to take up arms on the threat of harm to their families. One eyewitness reported that the Taliban shot a child who tried to escape. During the first week of occupation, the Taliban reportedly singled out and abducted young men and boys. In most cases the whereabouts of these civilians remained unknown, prompting speculation that the abductees were either killed or forced to join the Taliban.

According to multiple UN sources, the Taliban looted and destroyed the offices of several media outlets and searched out journalists, most of whom had fled the city. On October 12, the Taliban condemned reporting by two Afghan television stations, identifying their employees as “enemy personnel.” This action followed broadcasts by both stations alleging the Taliban had committed acts of gender-based violence against women and girls in Kunduz City. On October 16, the Taliban called for attacks on media outlets, referring to them as “firm military targets” that must be eliminated.

Although not on the same scale as the conduct attributed to the Taliban, some inappropriate conduct by Afghan forces recapturing Kunduz City also was reported. For example, the United Nations received several witness accounts of the ANDSF stopping vehicles transporting injured persons to medical facilities and harassing occupants, as well as accusing medical personnel of “helping the Taliban.” Both Afghan and Taliban forces reportedly desecrated the bodies of opposing fighters.

Finally, according to the report, the collapse of governance and rule of law during the Taliban occupation enabled local residents and criminal elements not directly associated with the Taliban to engage in opportunistic criminality, including revenge killing, looting, and property destruction. The United Nations indicated that the Taliban release of hundreds of prisoners from Kunduz prison exacerbated the criminality.

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REGIONAL STABILITY

Although Afghan-led efforts to promote regional stability are being carried out independently of the OFS mission, we provide a brief summary of those efforts here because of their relationship to the DoD objective of developing the ANDSF into a capable force that can protect the Afghan people and contribute to regional and international security.84

According to reports by the Congressional Research Service, the United Nations, and media analysts, regional security and stability in central Asia depend on an end to the insurgent threat in Afghanistan and the growth of economic interdependence among Afghanistan and its neighbors.85 President Ghani continues to pursue a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and insurgent groups by engaging Afghanistan’s neighbors.86 At the same time, he and other senior Afghan leaders met with regional partners in numerous conferences, forums, and visits to promote economic development and cooperation.87

The Quest for Peace

On December 31, 2015, President Ghani announced a four-country meeting to establish a framework for peace between the Afghan government and insurgent groups. According to a press release issued by the U.S. Embassy, Kabul, representatives from the Afghan, U.S., Pakistani, and Chinese governments, known as the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, met in Islamabad, Pakistan, on January 11, 2016, to facilitate an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process.88 A follow-up meeting of representatives was held in Kabul on January 18, 2016, where, according to a statement issued by the Group, progress was made “on a roadmap towards initiating peace talks with the Taliban groups.”89

These efforts restarted the peace process initiated last summer when reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, to be hosted by Pakistan in July 2015, were postponed after the belated announcement of the death of Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, caused rifts within Taliban leadership.90 Although the new Taliban head, Mullah Mansoor, attempted to consolidate leadership, a rival faction issued a statement in late September 2015 claiming that his attempts to restore the cohesion of the Taliban had failed.91 According to a media source, one insurgent group, Hezb-e-Islami, has endorsed the recent peace initiative, but the Taliban have not commented on it.92
DoD maintains that the Afghan government’s relationship with Pakistan is a critical aspect of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. However, that relationship remained tenuous during this quarter as some Afghan political leaders alleged that Pakistan’s inaction enabled the escalating attacks by Taliban forces, particularly the capture of Kunduz City. Additionally, a report by the Congressional Research Service notes that experts and foreign officials of a range of countries question Pakistan’s commitment to Afghanistan’s security.

Despite those factors, DoD reports that Afghanistan and Pakistan maintain regular contact at the most senior levels of government and in the military. For example, Afghan and Pakistani liaison officers at the general officer level meet monthly through the NATO-Resolute Support Tripartite Joint Operations Center. On December 7, 2015, Resolute Support hosted a meeting with

The President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani giving a speech and presenting awards at the Ministry of Interior Affairs 12/19/2015. (DoD photo)
Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss the growing issue of ISIL-K within both nations. Following this briefing, Afghan and Pakistan delegates met separately to address a variety of border issues that continue to plague the relationship between the two countries and established a hotline between their offices to diffuse future tensions. Pakistan military officials have also invited Afghan commanders to hold border conferences in January.97 During his visit to Washington, D.C. during October 2015, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, affirmed his continuing readiness to facilitate talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.98

Although some Afghan leaders continued to oppose outreach to Pakistan, President Ghani made a 1-day visit to Islamabad on December 9 to co-host the Heart of Asia conference, which provided an opportunity to discuss regional security and economic issues. According to media sources, President Ghani’s reception on arrival, which included greeting by Prime Minister Sharif, presence of all the country’s military chiefs, and a 21-gun salute, far exceeded the demands of protocol and indicated Pakistan’s desire to mend the frayed relationship.99 During the conference, President Ghani met with Prime Minister Sharif and representatives of China and the United States who affirmed full support to the Afghan government and agreed to work together to encourage peace negotiations with Taliban groups.100 However, some Afghan leaders have criticized this outreach involving Pakistan and it reportedly prompted Rehmat Nabil, the head of the Afghan domestic intelligence directorate, to resign his position.101

Nevertheless, joint Pakistan-Afghan efforts to revive the peace process continued with the visit of General Raheel Sharif, Pakistan’s army chief, to Kabul at the end of December 2015. According to media sources, General Sharif met with senior Afghan officials, including President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah to discuss matters of mutual interest, particularly the need to stop cross-border terrorist activities.102 The meeting was followed by President Ghani’s announcement of an agreement with Pakistan to host resumption of peace talks in January 2016.103

Pursuing Regional Economic Development

In addition to the military efforts, the promotion of peace talks, and the efforts of the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to foster economic development in Afghanistan, the United States has encouraged Afghanistan’s neighbors to support stability in Afghanistan by including Afghanistan in regional economic organizations. In that regard, the United States is emphasizing development of a Central Asia-South Asia trading hub in an effort to support Afghanistan’s economy in the face of decreasing donor contributions.104 According to DoS, the initiative seeks to bolster connectivity between Afghanistan and its neighbors by
building a regional energy market, facilitating trade and transport, improving customs and border procedures, and linking businesses and people. On October 2, Afghanistan participated in a session of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Cooperation Organization, a political and economic intergovernmental organization under the UN charter that promotes trade and investment opportunities among the 10-member nations of central Asia.

According to a UN report, the vice president of China visited Kabul on November 3, 2015, to meet with President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah and to reiterate China’s commitment to the peace process and its support for infrastructure projects connecting Afghanistan to its neighbors. In mid-November, Afghan’s deputy minister of foreign affairs visited India to discuss regional security and economic ties, while President Ghani visited Kazakhstan on November 20 for a similar purpose. On November 23, Afghanistan and Pakistan hosted the 10th meeting of the Joint Economic Commission where delegates discussed trade agreements and infrastructure connectivity.

Efforts promoting regional economic stability continued in December with the fifth Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process conference in Islamabad on December 9, 2015. According to media reports, the Asia-Istanbul Process, launched by Afghanistan and Turkey in 2011, seeks to integrate Afghanistan into the regional economy and improve its relationship with neighbors. The 30 countries reportedly represented at this year’s conference recognized the crucial role played by Afghanistan in regional stability, renewed their support to the government of Afghanistan, and called on the international community to assist in repatriating Afghan refugees. On December 17, 2015, Afghanistan also won formal approval to join the World Trade Organization, a global trading organization that accounts for about 95 percent of the world’s commerce. According to USAID, reforms made by the Afghan government in order to join the organization will benefit Afghan consumers and business, while its membership will open foreign markets to Afghan products.

On December 25, 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Afghanistan where he helped inaugurate the new parliament building that was funded and built by India. During the ceremony, he pledged India’s support for Afghanistan and urged regional powers, including Pakistan, to work together for peace. According to media sources, India has pledged $2.0 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction and rehabilitation projects.

Major regional infrastructure projects designed to promote economic development in central Asia also began this quarter. On December 13, President Ghani reportedly attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline which, when
completed, will carry 33 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India.\(^\text{113}\) (See Figure 1.)

According to media sources, the $7.6 billion construction project will bring jobs to Afghanistan, as well as up to $400 million annually in transit fees.\(^\text{114}\) However, a major threat to completion is that the pipeline passes through southern Helmand province, where escalating insurgent attacks could disrupt construction.\(^\text{115}\) According to media sources, Afghanistan intends to raise a 7,000 member security force to guard the pipeline route when clearing operations start in April 2016.\(^\text{116}\)

A second megaproject involving Afghanistan and its neighbors involves the Central Asia-South Asia electrical transmission project (CASA-1000). According to DoS, the project when completed will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell surplus electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, benefiting Afghanistan as an electricity consumer and as a recipient of transit fees.\(^\text{117}\) A January 2016 status report issued by the World Bank, which is financing CASA-1000, stated that implementation of the project is progressing well, albeit with some delays in completing construction contracts. Completion is expected in 2020.\(^\text{118}\)
SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

A quarterly assessment of public perceptions in Afghanistan, conducted in November 2015 under NATO sponsorship, found a decline over the past year in public sentiment pertaining to Afghan governance and security, even though the public view of the ANDSF remained positive. The survey, known as “ANQAR Wave 30,” represented the opinions of Afghans nationwide based on a sample of 13,461 men and women over the age of 18 in all 34 provinces with an overall complex margin of error equal to plus or minus 1.2 percent.

The capability of the Afghan government was viewed as declining in four key areas: providing services, ensuring security, growing the economy, and improving the quality of life as indicated below. Government corruption continues to be a widespread issue with 78 percent saying that it affects their daily life and 39 percent saying there is more corruption than one year ago. Just 42 percent of those surveyed thought the Afghan government was doing an “overall good job,” compared to 55 percent at the end of 2014. The lack of jobs and unemployment was the most frequently mentioned concern of those surveyed, with 65 percent mentioning it as a top concern, compared to security, the second most often mentioned concern—cited by 39 percent of respondents.

Public opinion of the Afghan National Army has held steady, with 70 percent holding a favorable opinion (69 percent at the end of 2014). Nearly half of Afghans (48 percent) say that the Army will defeat the insurgency in the next few years which is down from 59 percent in December 2014 but above historic levels (30-35 percent). Perceptions of the ANP are slightly lower with just 58 percent having a positive opinion, although 70 percent of those surveyed indicated that the ANP was capable of protecting their local area. A high percentage of Afghan men said they would consider joining the ANDSF if they were looking for a job (79 percent ANA; 77 percent ANP).

Eighty-eight percent of those surveyed said it would be bad for the people if the Taliban returned to power, up from 85 percent a year ago. Only 3 percent supported arrival of ISIL-K, compared to 7 percent a year ago.
Additional Survey Findings

**Top Two Concerns of Afghans**


**Local Security Is Good**

- 2014: 20% feeling mostly/completely safe
- 2015: 40% feeling mostly/completely safe

**Safety of Ring Road**

- 2014: 20% feeling mostly/completely safe
- 2015: 40% feeling mostly/completely safe

**Reasons for Taliban Support**

- Government Corruption: 20% (2015)
- Intimidation: 20% (2015)

**52% of Afghans would leave their country if they had opportunity and resources**

**19% had money extorted at a security checkpoint in the last 3 months**

**46% said the Afghan National Police improved in their area in the last 6 months**

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel is the named operation for U.S. forces’s participation in the NATO-led non-combat Resolute Support mission. The mission is to train, advise and assist the ANSDF down through the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to the ANA and ANP at the corps level or equivalent. This is a change from the pre-2015 mission of the International Security Assistance Force, which focused primarily on combat operations with a secondary focus of training and equipping the Afghan forces, advising Afghan forces at the brigade and battalion levels, and building ministerial capacity.120

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey are the “framework nations” for the Resolute Support mission, which includes a presence in Kabul and four Train-Advise-Assist commands (TAACs) aligned with ANA corps. In addition, TAAC-Air advises the Afghan Air Force, and expeditionary advise and assist cells periodically deploy from Kabul to advise the ANA 203rd and 215th Corps, which do not have dedicated TAACs. The areas of responsibility for the 203rd and 215th Corps are some of the most highly contested territory in Afghanistan. The ANA 203rd is responsible for seven provinces: Bamyan, Ghazni, Khost, Logar, Paktika, Paktiya, and Wardak. The ANA 215th is responsible for Helmand and Nimroz provinces.121

Assessing the Ministries and ANDSF

RATING OF MINISTRIES’ DEVELOPMENT IS BASED ON SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT

The Resolute Support mission focuses on developing Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) capacity in eight essential functions (EFs) while connecting the associated systems and processes that execute those functions between the ANA corps and police zone level to the respective ministry. The EFs are:122

- EF 1-plan, program, budget, and execute
- EF 2-transparency, accountability, and oversight
- EF 3-civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law
- EF 4-force generation
- EF 5-sustain the force
- EF 6-plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns
- EF 7-develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes
- EF 8-maintain internal and external strategic communication capability
Each essential function has accompanying Indicators of Effectiveness. For instance, EF1 has eight indicators, among them that “MoD and MoI are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.” An example of one of EFS’s 16 indicators is “ANDSF has adequately executed a demand based inventory management system.” In addition, an example of one of EF6’s 15 indicators is “ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP.”

A U.S. or coalition general officer or a member of the DoD Senior Executive Service is typically the lead for each of the eight EFs. The EF leads develop a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) for each EF in conjunction with Afghan ministry personnel. Ministerial progress toward their PoAM is evaluated according to a five-step system:

- Rating 1: Scoped and Agreed Upon
- Rating 2: Initiated
- Rating 3: Partially Capable/Effective – The relevant Afghan organization has completed or almost completed the work on the specific action defined by the PoAM and the result is considered partially effective.
- Rating 4: Fully Capable/Effective – The relevant Afghan organization has completed the work on the specific action defined in the PoAM and the result is considered fully effective; however may still require some coalition forces support.
- Rating 5: Sustaining Capability – The relevant Afghan organization has completed the specific action defined in the PoAM and the result is considered sustainable such that no further coalition force support is required.

Each EF directorate maintains and updates their PoAM assessments using a centralized tracking methodology. However, DOD reports that ratings 3, 4 and 5—partially capable to sustaining capability—are “based on the subjective assessment of the EF lead.”

This quarter, the Resolute Support assessment indicates the MoD has increased the percentage of its development milestones that are partially capable or above from 55.6 percent to 57.8 percent, while MoI saw its partially capable or above ratings increase from 59.5 percent to 64.9 percent.

A complete list of essential functions and their indicators of effectiveness is in Appendix A.
RATING OF ANDSF DEVELOPMENT IS LARGELY SELF-REPORTED BY AFGHAN MINISTRIES

Regional TAAC commanders track progress at the ANA Corps and ANP equivalent level through the Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report (MAAR), which assesses the army and police fighting capability with five effectiveness ratings, ranging from In Development (Rating 1) to Sustainable (Rating 5). These assessments are synthesized into an overarching assessment of the ministry and Afghan security forces, based on EF milestones. USFOR-A reported the percentage of ANDSF units rated as “capable” or better in the MAAR increased from 73 percent in January 2015 to 88 percent (86 percent if Afghan Special Security Force units are removed) by November 2015.127

USFOR-A stated that the MAAR is a reporting tool used by the training advisors to inform their senior leadership of the advisors’ collective assessment of training progress and to help focus advisor efforts over time. However, USFOR-A advises that these assessments are based on data provided by the ANDSF and cannot be independently verified. According to USFOR-A, coalition advisors have limited direct involvement with or access to ANDSF data collection processes and have no alternative means to assess proficiency/effectiveness of the ANDSF other than Afghan-provided assessment data. According to DoD, coalition officials attempt to spot check ANDSF processes to determine the reliability of data collection processes, but security conditions prevent travel to tactical units that would allow them to accurately assess data validity, except in rare cases where coalition advisors have interface at the tactical level.128 Over the past quarter, several changes were made to make the MAAR assessments more specific and to incorporate additional units receiving TAA, including requiring the training commands to report on the level of training and which specific Afghan units received it.129

ANDSF Capacity Development

While train-advise-assist effectiveness ratings in 2015 increased for the ANDSF and Afghan security ministries, ANDSF performance was uneven in the field. According to DoD, the ANDSF showed a growing capability to plan and execute large-scale offensive operations but, as expected, significant challenges remained in areas such as logistics, leadership, and ministerial capacity.130 Working to continue to improve ANDSF capabilities, Resolute Support advisors were engaged in a variety of activities in late 2015, including:131

- TAAC Capital provided 13-week courses on crime scene investigation with the Kabul City Police
- TAAC East aided in the development of an ANP Regional Logistic Center in Nangarhar province
- TAAC South focused on coordinating the ANA 205th Corps with the ANP in Uruzgan province
• TAAC West supported several Afghan police search and clear operations across Herat province
• TAAC North trained Afghan personnel in the use of the warehouse inventory system, Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS)
• TAAC Air worked with the Afghan Air Force to integrate aerial fire support with the ANA corps more effectively through prepositioning teams of Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators and establishing an improved training program that began in October 2015

USFOR-A stated that both the army and police forces were sufficiently manned to be effective. The overall manning strength percentage for the ANA was 88 percent (172,331 manning level with a goal of 195,000) as of December 31, 2015; the ANP was at 92 percent (144,591 manning level with a goal of 157,000). However, USFOR-A stated that attrition was a significant problem, with experienced soldiers and police officers leaving at a rate of 4,400 per month (3-year average). The attrition was attributed to poor leadership, endemic corruption, poor conditions in the barracks, and the high tempo of combat operations. DoD noted that combat weariness was often cited as a factor in the number of soldiers who were considered absent without leave and eventually dropped from the rolls.
The Afghan government made leadership changes to improve ANDSF performance, filling 61 senior MoD positions and 22 MoI general officer positions during the last half of 2015.\textsuperscript{135} However, DoD stated that early advancement of officers was also a factor in the poor performance of the 215th Corp in Helmand province (discussed below) which it said was caused in part by an inexperienced corps commander, who was recently replaced.\textsuperscript{136}

Resolute Support advisors are addressing a shortage in ANA noncommissioned officers and soldiers by working to improve the quality and efficiency at the Kabul Military Training Center, Regional Military Training Centers, and the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. In addition, advisors are assisting in developing and implementing pre-command courses for brigade and battalion commanders.\textsuperscript{137}

Advisors have been advocating that both the Afghan military and police need to reduce their reliance on checkpoints. General Campbell has publicly said that a reliance on a large number of checkpoints rather than undertaking more offensive operations leaves Afghan soldiers and police vulnerable to massed insurgent attacks, leading to increased casualties and equipment loss. (The Afghan government does not publicly release information on Afghan casualties.) Checkpoints are, however, a politically sensitive issue for the Afghan government because many local politicians and police commanders see them as a demonstration to the Afghan citizens that Afghan security forces are present in their area. In the last half of 2015, the Afghan police devoted more than half of its personnel to manning checkpoints and fixed sites, while the ANA had reduced its total checkpoints by almost 40 percent over 6 months but still had an estimated 53,000 personnel at static sites.\textsuperscript{138}

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

While DoD stated that the Afghans are making good use of Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, mortars, howitzers, and other weapons in both offensive and defensive operations, the Taliban were able to choose where they would attack and select positions that were less well-defended. Challenges in the areas of ANA logistics and leadership were clear in late 2015, with DoD reporting two critical problems in its responses to Lead IG questions regarding quarterly performance. Those two issues concerned (1) the Afghan army vehicle readiness and (2) the 215th Corps in Helmand province.\textsuperscript{139}

**CSTC-A Reported ANA Vehicle Readiness Is in ‘Dire’ Condition**

The ANDSF’s logistic systems, particularly supply, distribution, and unit-level maintenance, remains underdeveloped. While developing this capacity is a major focus of coalition efforts, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—the U.S. command that is responsible for managing
DoD security assistance for Afghanistan—reported that ANA vehicle readiness “is in a dire condition.”\textsuperscript{140} CSTC-A reported numerous problems impacting the readiness of the 51,049 vehicles:\textsuperscript{141}

- **Too few mechanics:** The ANA had about 600 fewer mechanics than its required 3,527, and mechanics were often sent to fill infantry shortfalls.

- **Aging vehicles:** Many vehicles require either overhauls or replacement. Previous procurements of vehicles typically were fielded without life cycle sustainment plans or program management support that would have helped to identify ongoing requirements for resetting/replenishing the fleet. DoD states it is now reviewing options and resourcing requirements for such a program.\textsuperscript{142}

- **Too many variations:** The fleet is comprised of 68 major model types with over 200 variations. A model is considered a variant if the major assembly, engine, transmission, injection or drive train is unique. Due to the number of different models in the fleet, there are close to 20,000 documented repair parts, increasing the challenge to stock, track, maintain, or issue in an inventory tracking system that is only partially automated and is still under development. The Afghans rely on a mostly paper-based supply system.

Only 8,800 vehicles-- armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles--of the 51,049 fleet are actual combat systems. Most of the rest are Ford Ranger pickup trucks or logistics support vehicles that lack armor. These vehicles were procured over the last decade to rapidly establish a maneuver capability for the ANA, but now that the ANDSF are responsible for the security of Afghanistan, DoD is reviewing a rebalance of the fleet mix to better meet operational requirements.\textsuperscript{143}

In October 2015, the EF 5 Directorate (force sustainment) completed a comprehensive review of the national-level Materiel Management Center—a key command for approving requisitions from corps—and found that the center was ineffective, which directly degraded ANA readiness. The review found the majority of center personnel were illiterate, had poor computer skills, and had negligible logistics experience. In addition, personnel often were not present for duty. As a result, ANA corps often had to re-requisition supplies, leading to duplicative and excessive requisitions, as well as problems at the supply depot. CSTC-A stated that the current TAA team of 20 personnel could only provide support to the center once a week and that long-term change would require an expert TAA team with nearly daily contact for 6-12 months.\textsuperscript{144}
The problems at the Materiel Management Center contributed to issues that coalition advisors regularly find regarding reported shortages in operational units. The advisors found that reported shortages were the result of loss of paper records, difficulty in identifying specific needs for corps units, inability to locate stocks at the Central Supply Depot, misplaced stock, and the theft or hoarding of items at the depots. Many of these problems are symptoms of limitations in using the warehouse management system—CORE-IMS. DoD also stated that a further complication was that the Afghans do not have access to the DoD system that tracks inbound supplies procured through the foreign military sales system, although DoD states that efforts are under way to address this gap. 

**OVERSIGHT IDENTIFIED ANA VEHICLE READINESS PROBLEMS**

During FY 2015, the DoD OIG has issued reports regarding ANA vehicle readiness and issued recommendations for improvement. A look at some of the findings:


- The ANA did not have a fleet management plan for the repair and return to the force of severely damaged vehicles, or the purchase of replacements for vehicles beyond repair. In addition, coalition forces fielded the ANA multiple models of non-standardized commercial vehicles.
- Coalition forces’ logistics support contracts focused on equipment readiness, but often had no contractual requirement to also train ANA mechanics present on-site, which slowed the development of ANA maintenance capacities and extended ANA dependence on U.S. and coalition support.

**DoD-2015-107, Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces, April 17, 2015**

- Although ANA is responsible for performing the majority of its maintenance, as well as supply chain management independent of contractor support, ANA continued to rely on contractors to perform repairs and maintenance that it was capable and required to perform.
- ANA did not have the capability to effectively perform supply chain management.

A list of 22 ongoing oversight projects for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel conducted by IG agencies as of December 31, 2015 is provided in Appendix B.
CSTC-A re-scoped the existing ANA maintenance contract in October 2015 to provide a bridging solution while a new maintenance strategy is developed. This resulted in resuming contractor support at the corps level, which had been transitioned to organic ANA maintenance by early 2015, even though the capacity of the corps to manage their fleets had not been developed sufficiently. The current maintenance contract for MoI, in contrast, provides support at all levels of the ANP.\textsuperscript{146}

DoD stated that the long-term answer to ANSF equipment maintenance involves implementation of a single DoD contract for both the MoD and MoI that is expected to be in place in the third quarter of FY2017.\textsuperscript{147} The strategy calls for contract support at 23 key national and regional nodes to conduct maintenance and supply chain management operations, while training and supporting the ANSF leadership and operators in maintenance and supply.\textsuperscript{148} The ultimate goal of the strategy is to enable the ANSF to maintain its combat power without contracted support by 2021, although some contract support will likely be necessary for the more sophisticated defense articles at a minimum. This will be achieved by a gradual reduction of contracted maintenance and a corresponding growth in ANSF organic capability over a 5-year period.\textsuperscript{149}

\textit{The ANA 215th Corps for Helmand Requires Rebuilding}

CSTC-A is leading an effort to reconstitute the ANA 215th Corps, which has responsibility for Helmand province. The 215th performed poorly amidst the persistent violence in Helmand. According to Resolute Support officials, the 215th suffers from poor equipment maintenance, high attrition of troops, and poor leadership. The 215th is one of two corps without a dedicated TAAC. The corps commander, two brigade commanders, and corps headquarters staff officers have been removed. A new corps commander is in place, and coalition advisors and contractors along with Afghan officials are focusing on reconstituting the units by retraining soldiers in basic skills, adding replacements, and repairing equipment to make them ready for combat. Coalition advisors are engaged in both direct training of soldiers as well as train-the-trainer advising.\textsuperscript{150} Resolute Support officials attributed much of the high attrition in the 215th to ineffective and corrupt leadership which did not pay or feed or give deserved leave to soldiers, maintain equipment properly, or distribute ammunition and supplies where needed.\textsuperscript{151}

USFOR-A indicated that as the rebuilding occurs, with a planned completion by August 2016, the new corps leadership will need continued coalition help to offset a shortage of officers and manpower with specialized skills in maintaining equipment.\textsuperscript{152} While the 215th Corps is being rebuilt, MoD has moved forces from elsewhere in Afghanistan to assist in Helmand during this
process. In addition, U.S. Special Operations Forces advised partnered Afghan special forces as part of the counter-offensive against the Taliban in Helmand province.\footnote{153}

**Afghan Air Force Aircraft Heavily Employed**

The AAF, which is part of the ANA, has an inventory of 91 fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft, largely made up of 49 Mi-17 multi-role helicopters and 24 fixed-wing C-208 providing personnel and casualty evacuation transport. Low pilot manning of the C-208s is expected to continue through 2016 until more pilot candidates make it through training. The Mi-17 remains the workhorse of the AAF, yet the fleet has been unable to meet the ground forces' demand. Increased utilization has resulted in unanticipated maintenance and overhaul requirements. Increased demand is likely to continue in 2016. In an effort to alleviate the strain, coalition advisors awarded a contract in September for rotary-wing aircraft to conduct lift missions. In addition, four weaponized MD-530 helicopters have been delivered this quarter, bringing the fleet to 14. Another delivery is scheduled for May 2016.\footnote{154}

**Afghan Special Security Forces**

DOD states that Afghan special forces are increasingly capable but are often misused in a conventional role, in part to fill missions that would otherwise be conducted by two Mobile Strike Force brigades, which provide a strategic reserve to reinforce conventional forces and are stretched thin. Starting in early December, Afghan security forces conducted two successful night raids on Taliban prisons at night using only Afghan forces and Afghan aircraft, freeing Afghan security forces that had been held captive, in some cases...
for over two years. There were no casualties, no prisoners harmed and no damage to equipment.\textsuperscript{155}

In January 2016, the DoD OIG will begin an assessment of coalition efforts to train, advise, and equip the Afghan Special Operations Forces to determine whether those efforts are sufficient, operative, and relevant.

\textbf{Afghan National Police}

The ANP have sustained a disproportionately higher number of casualties than the ANA because most of the police force is neither intended nor trained to be used for fighting, but units are coming under attack by the Taliban, according to DoD. Only three of seven main branches are trained and equipped to fight massed forces with heavy weapons: the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU).\textsuperscript{156} Of those forces, DoD stated that the elite ANCOP and GCPSU have been deployed at a rate that is not sustainable. Coalition advisors have focused on increasing readiness and manpower for these units throughout the winter campaign.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition, a winter training surge was introduced by NATO Resolute Support to reduce the number of untrained ANP personnel. There are approximately 8,734 untrained Afghan Uniformed Police and 4,564 untrained Afghan Local Police as of December 23, 2015. Based on current training plans, DoD estimates that the combined number of untrained personnel will be reduced to 8,000 by March 31, 2016. The winter police training program for AUP is 8 weeks long; for the Afghan Local Police, 30 days.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{Afghanistan Program Management Review}

The Afghanistan Program Management Review (PMR) was held in Arlington, Virginia, on October 26-30, 2015, to help integrate ANDSF leaders into the long-term Afghanistan Security Forces Fund/Foreign Military Sales (ASFF/FMS) planning process, develop a coordinated ANDSF sustainment plan, synchronize the ASFF program with U.S. stakeholders, and review life-cycle management center activities, milestones, and products. In attendance were both U.S. and Afghan officials and stakeholders, including personnel from CSTC-A. The review consisted of four working groups: (1) weapons and ammunition, (2) aviation, (3) ground wheeled vehicles, and (4) command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Highlights of the PMR included the involvement of Afghan program managers and their connection with the U.S. military counterparts to begin addressing problems. DoD stated this connection between Afghan and U.S. personnel is critical to our long-term efforts to development ANDSF sustainment capabilities.\textsuperscript{159}
Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, deputy chief of staff for communications, Resolute Support Mission, outlined the key security improvements needed in Afghanistan in 2016 during a Pentagon briefing via teleconference from Kabul:

“The first is to implement a force readiness cycle, and the concept here is a three-phase cycle where the forces will go through a training phase where they're getting ready for combat operations, and then an operational phase where they're in the fight, and then they'll come out of that and they're go into a reset phase. During the reset phase, soldiers will take leave, equipment will go into maintenance, and the unit gets itself reset so that it can begin the cycle again, starting with that training phase.

The second is to reduce checkpoints. President Ghani has made this a major point of emphasis. They've got too many checkpoints and they've got too many of their forces strung out on checkpoints. There's an old military saying that ‘if you defend everywhere, you defend nowhere,’ and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. If they have too many forces on checkpoints, then what they don't have is the ability to maneuver. What they don't have is the ability to respond to security crises when they arise. So what we need them to do is to reduce the number of checkpoints and move to strong points, which are well defended and which will provide them enough available combat power so that they can respond when needed.

They've also got to make some tough leadership choices. They've got some leaders that need to be replaced, they've got some leaders that are corrupt that need to go. The Afghan security forces are making these changes. They've made a lot of them in 2015. Those new leaders are going to need some time to get established, and they're going to need some time to form their units, but that's ongoing.

Recruiting is another area of emphasis. Currently, the Afghan national army has a shortfall of about 25,000 overall. They've established the goal of closing that gap over the next 6 months (mid-2016), and that'll be a significant -- a significant accomplishment, but something that's got to be done so that they have the combat power to continue into 2016. Part of their challenge in manning is not just recruiting, but it's addressing the attrition issue. So the way to look at this is the holistic issue of properly manning the force, so if they can address the attrition issue, that's getting the leadership to make sure that soldiers are paid, that they're fed and that they get their proper leave and they're treated properly, that'll go a long way to retaining the soldiers that they have. One of the things that they're struggling with is what we would call re-enlisting, and that is getting soldiers to re-contract. Once they fix their challenges in re-contracting, that'll help significantly as well. So it's going to take a combined effort with the -- fixing the re-contracting, addressing attrition and recruiting as many as they can before the fighting season in 2016 starts to demand more and more of their forces.”
Ministerial Capacity Development

DoD stated that developing sustainable planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes is a long-term effort. Acting Defense Minister Masoom Stanekzai continued to work with full authority under a Presidential decree. DoD notes that 2015 marked the first year that the Afghan government, coalition, and the international donor community participated in an integrated program and budget development process.161

Meanwhile, Resolute Support advisors are working with the MoI to expedite approval of more than 160 current contracts for goods and services that are at risk of lapsing due to poor budget execution. As of mid-November, 2015, the MoI had awarded only 32 of these contracts. MoI signed a bulk fuel policy and began conducting fuel inspections for ANP units in the last 6 months of 2015. In addition, MoI initiated a review to revise and update its policies and procedures. The results of that review will be finalized in early 2016 and will inform an organizational reform plan.162

DoD noted that coordination at the MoD and MoI headquarters level had modestly improved, especially in the area of intelligence. MoD had invited senior MoI officials to participate in the ANA Corps Commanders Conference in early November to coordinate planning more effectively for the coming months.163 In February 2016, the DoD OIG will begin an assessment of USFOR-A’s efforts to determine whether the Afghan MOD collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence effectively and integrates intelligence into combat operations.

MOD FAST PROGRAM

Under the Functional Area Support Teams (FAST) program, coalition advisors work with MoD staff to develop up to 500 subject matter experts. The program’s mission is to provide college-educated Afghan citizens, recruited primarily out of Afghan universities and technical programs, at the MoD Headquarters, General Staff and Corps Headquarters to support procurement, finance, facilities management, and human resource functions. FAST is supported by a 1-year, off-budget contract with two option years. Currently, 64 employees will be hired. The contract was awarded to an Afghan-owned and based contractor (Youth In Action Consulting Services) on November 30, 2015, and hiring was expected to begin by mid-January.164

MOI SME PROGRAM

The MoI continues to develop its Subject Matter Expert (SME) program, under a Memorandum of Understanding in which CSTC-A supports the funding, hiring and employment of 361 SMEs, and the MoI/provinces have operational management. All SMEs are Afghan citizens with higher education and
demonstrated experience in their field of expertise. Hiring is conducted through the joint MoI CSTC-A SME Program Office. CSTC-A works closely with MoI to ensure the hiring process is fair, merit-based and transparent. As of December 23, 2015, 262 SMEs had been hired. According to CSTC-A, SMEs assist their Afghan counterparts to improve work practices and compliance with Afghan government policies and procedures. SMEs also provide CSTC-A insight and analysis of emerging issues at MoI headquarters and Provincial Commands. Ultimately, SMEs will provide the knowledge-bridge and institutional memory necessary for future civil servants to assume the functions of current uniformed personnel.165

COMMITMENT LETTERS
CSTC-A continues to place controls on U.S. and international contributions through a series of financial commitment letters with the ministries. These letters stipulate conditions that MoD and MoI must fulfill to receive full allocations of funding from the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), NATO ANA Trust Fund, and the UN Development Program Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan for those portions of their requirements that are executed by the Afghan government and not through DoD contracts. The majority of ASFF is obligated through DoD contracts and is not provided directly to the Afghan government. Commitment letters also identify various legal requirements that must be met to receive U.S. funding, equipment, services, or other forms of security assistance. To encourage full implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) by early 2017, for example, CSTC-A will place conditions on its current fiscal year commitment letter for APPS funds. Under these conditions, CSTC-A will provide full funding for only authorized positions with personnel who receive payment electronically and will fund all other positions at 80 percent. Such enforcement mechanisms are designed to signal to Afghan leadership that they must demonstrate accountability and transparency in the expenditure of donor funds.166

Because inconsistent enforcement of commitment letters has been a recurrent theme in past oversight work, the DoD OIG will continue a series of audits on direct funding provided to Afghan security forces to determine whether coalition advisors are strengthening their enforcement of those letters.167 As part of that effort, a DoD OIG team will deploy to Afghanistan in early 2016 to audit controls over contracts awarded by the Afghan government using U.S. funds.168 This is similar to an audit the DoD OIG completed in February 2015 that found neither MoD nor MoI adequately developed, awarded, executed, or monitored contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance. As a result, DoD OIG concluded that direct assistance funds were vulnerable to fraud and abuse.169
CORRUPTION
The leading anticorruption agency in Afghanistan stated that graft, theft, and abuse of funds nominally dedicated to the support of the ANSDF has adversely affected the development of ANSF’s capability to protect the people and preserve the government. In a statement before representatives of the European Union in November, 2015, the executive director of Afghanistan’s Independent Joint Anti-Corruption and Monitoring and Evaluation Committee cited corruption as one of the primary factors behind the Afghan government’s difficulties in developing a “well working army [and] police force.”

The Afghan government and its ministries continue to work to increase accountability and institute oversight functions. For instance, early in 2015, President Ghani dissolved the government-wide procurement system and instituted a commission to oversee all contracts above the Afghan equivalent of $300,000. As a result, nearly half of the 465 MoD contracts for the current budget year were still in the development and award stage during the last half of 2015. The hiring of SMEs for both security ministries, increased use computerized systems, and the establishment of a professional Afghan inspectors general system are under way. However, DoD reports that while the MoI Inspector General is making efforts to increase oversight, the ANA Corps Inspectors General have demonstrated limited capacity.

According to DoD, fuel is one of the most highly pilfered items. Numerous initiatives have been undertaken to improve fuel accountability, but consumption reporting remains a work in progress. The DoD OIG is currently auditing controls over MOI fuel contracts to determine whether CSTC-A and MOI are exercising effective oversight particularly with respect to the reporting of consumption data. The audit is expected to be completed in the second quarter, FY 2016. The DoD OIG has proposed a similar audit for MOD fuel contracts to begin in February 2016.

DOD OIG AND SIGAR REVIEW CLAIMS OF ANDSF SEXUAL ABUSE
In response to media report allegations of sexual abuse of children by members of the ANSDF and related questions by congressional committee staff members, DoD OIG in October 2015 initiated a research project to study applicable DoD policies, procedures and actions. On December 23, 2015, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) received a request by members of the House and Senate to investigate similar allegations in coordination with DoD OIG. In response, on January 29, 2016, SIGAR announced the initiation of a review of the U.S. government’s implementation, if applicable, of a series of statutes commonly referred to as the “Leahy Law,” which address actions by U.S. government entities in response to allegations of gross human rights abuses. SIGAR and DoD OIG officials are currently working together, and in correspondence with committee staff members, to scope and de-conflict upcoming assessments.
U.S. FUNDING

As of December 31, 2015, nearly $100 billion\(^{175}\) had been enacted for the OFS mission to conduct U.S. military counterterrorism operations and DoD programs to continue building the capacity of the ANDSF. This includes more than $55 billion\(^{176}\) for FY 2015 and approximately $42 billion\(^{177}\) for FY 2016.

The FY 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), passed on December 18, 2015, continued funding for OFS activities, including $3.65 billion authorized for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF).\(^{178}\) Details of amounts appropriated and allocated for FY 2016 programs and activities should be available in a future report.

Funding allocated by title and appropriation through December 31, 2015, totaled $58.45 billion, including $55.5 billion in FY 2015 appropriations and $2.95 billion in FY 2014 appropriations obligated after designation of OFS in January 2015.\(^{179}\) (See Figure 3.)

Figure 2.
FY 2014/FY2015 OFS and Related Missions by DoD Account
($ Billion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>$40.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>$12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>$11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>$7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. FY 2015 enacted amounts include $2.9 billion of Operation and Maintenance Base to OCO amounts transferred by the Congress. “Other” includes JIEDDF ($0.4 Billion) and RDT&E/Revolving and Management Funds ($0.2 Billion). “ASFF includes $2.95 billion from FY 2015 appropriations.

Sources: OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/17/2015, and Cost of War, 9/2015

Figure 3.
Status of Funds for OFS and Related Missions, by Fiscal Year, as of 9/30/2015
($ Billions)

- Appropriated $58.45
- Requested $42.45
- Obligated $32.47
- Disbursed $19.21

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. FY 2015 appropriated amount includes $55.5 billion enacted in P.L. 113-235 and $2.95 billion in FY 2014 ASFF funds obligated during FY 2015 (reported under the OFS category in the Cost of War report. The $2.95 billion amount is incorporated into the cumulative obligations total. Cumulative disbursed total includes $2.39 billion in FY 2014 ASFF funds disbursed during FY 2015.

Status of Funds

The Cost of War report provides information on obligations and disbursements of funds made available for OCOs, such as OFS. The report captures the incremental cost of OCOs up to and above planned deployment activity, including the status of the ASFF, a subset of funding for OFS used to support the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist mission. Although the Cost of War report is the only aggregate source for OFS funding status by service and account, it lags the Lead IG quarterly reporting period by one quarter.180

As of September 30, 2015, obligations for OFS and related missions totaled $32.47 billion, including nearly $5.12 billion of the ASFF ($2.16 billion from FY 2015 appropriations and $2.95 billion from FY 2014 appropriations). Nearly 56 percent of all OFS funds had been obligated as of the end of FY 2015.181

Approximately $19.21 billion had been disbursed as of September 30, 2015, including $16.82 billion in FY 2015 funds and nearly $2.39 billion in FY 2014 funds. About a third of all OFS funds had been disbursed by the end of FY 2015, including 65 percent of the ASFF.182

For an overview of OFS funding, as of September 30, 2015, see Figure 2. For a breakout of cumulative OFS obligations and disbursements as of September 30, 2015, by account and as a percentage of total amount enacted, see Table 1.

### Table 1.
OFS Obligations and Disbursements, by Account, as of 9/30/2015
($ Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>Obligations</th>
<th>% Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>% Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M⁴</td>
<td>24,198.7</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12,493.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFF⁵</td>
<td>5,119.0</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4,549.4</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILPERS⁶</td>
<td>2,039.8</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2,002.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Procurement⁷</td>
<td>854.1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIEDDF⁸</td>
<td>254.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,465.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,210.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers affected by rounding.

⁴ Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds transport of troops and their equipment to Afghanistan, military operations, in-country support for bases, medical services for deployed troops, and repair and return of war-worn equipment.

⁵ Congress created the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.

⁶ Military personnel (MILPERS) funds cover special pay for deployed personal (such as imminent danger and separation pay) and the additional cost of activating reservists to full-time status.

⁷ Procurement funds provide for the purchase of new weapons systems to replace war losses.

⁸ The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) supports the development and purchase of new devices to improve force protection for soldiers against roadside bombs or IEDs.

**Sources:** OUSD(C), Cost of War, 7/2015 and 9/2015.
Related Missions

Amounts shown under the OFS heading in the Cost of War report reflect combined totals for funds obligated and disbursed for both Afghanistan and “related missions.” Funds for these smaller missions are not tracked separately in the Cost of War report. Although some amounts made available for “related missions” in FY 2015 and requested for FY 2016 are publicly available, some, including those for classified programs, are not. The U.S. Army, which serves as the Executive Agent for OFS funds, has identified five missions related to OFS:

- **Operation Spartan Shield**—provides U.S. military forces to meet U.S. Central Command mission imperatives, including the building of partner capacity, to meet the requirements of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review for ensuring the United States has the capability to win decisively in conflicts in the Middle East. ($445.5 million enacted in FY 2015 and $780 million requested for FY 2016)

- **Joint Task Force-Guantanamo**—operates with a mission to conduct safe, humane, legal, and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission. ($98.2 million enacted in FY 2015 and $100.5 million requested for FY 2016)

- **Post-Operation New Dawn activities**—includes several capacity-building activities continued in Iraq after the conclusion of Operation New Dawn in December 2011, such as security assistance for Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and Interior through the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. ($140.0 million enacted in FY 2015 and $142.8 million requested for FY 2016)

- **Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa**—located in Djibouti, primarily supports the national security interests in the defeat of violent extremist organizations in East Africa. This includes military-to-military engagement with partner African countries and crisis response and personnel recovery of U.S. military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa. Funding for the operation also supports operations in Afghanistan and additional ISR requirements in FY 2016. ($942.4 million enacted in FY 2015 and $935.5 million requested for FY 2016, predominantly for the U.S. Special Operations Command.)

- **Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines**—The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines disbanded in 2015, but a U.S. Pacific Command Augmentation Team now operates with a focus on low-key engagement in the areas of humanitarian relief, capacity building, and disaster-response capabilities. (Funding details not available.)
Ascertainment of the Accuracy of Data

Under section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended, the Lead IG carries the responsibility to ascertain the accuracy of information provided to federal agencies on programs and operations related to Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Specifically, the Lead IG is responsible for reviewing the accuracy of obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements. DoD OIG is developing an audit for FY 2016 to ascertaining the accuracy of the financial data for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel.193

CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

For contingency operations, DoD routinely relies on contractors to provide front-line support and assist with the cradle-to-grave contracting process. These contractors perform vital tasks in support of U.S. defense and development objectives, including logistics support, equipment processing, construction, base operations support, and transportation. A number of different U.S. departments and agencies award and administer contracts for services in Afghanistan, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) – Rock Island, and ACC-New Jersey. As of December, 2015, USFOR-A reported more than 400 ongoing contracts listed in the Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) database for the Combined Joint Operational Area-Afghanistan. SPOT is a web-based joint database used for tracking contractor personnel who accompany U.S. forces.194

Because contingency contracting occurs in less controlled environments and within varying cultural, political, and economic conditions overseas, there is a greater potential for violations of law, regulations and contract terms. Oversight and surveillance is an ongoing process to ensure contractors provide supplies or services on time that conform to quality requirements. Effective oversight and surveillance helps identify contractors that may have performance problems and allows the appropriate course of action to be taken to make sure those supplies or services to be delivered meet the contract requirements.

In March 2015, DoD OIG report DODIG-2015-101, “Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform-2015 Update,” consolidated 40 previously issued reports and press releases related to 21 fraud investigations issued from April 1, 2012, through December 31, 2014, regarding DoD’s contingency contracting. These reports and investigations identified a variety of problems relating to DoD officials not properly awarding, administering, or managing contingency contracts in accordance with federal and DoD policies. Currently, the DoD OIG is conducting an audit to determine whether contracting officer representatives are properly appointed and trained, and were able to effectively perform their oversight responsibilities for contractor’s provision of required goods and services. Results from this audit are anticipated in May 2016.
## APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: Resolute Support Essential Functions 48

APPENDIX B: Ongoing OFS-related U.S. Oversight Projects 56

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APPENDIX D: The Lead Inspector General Model 62

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APPENDIX A: Resolute Support Essential Functions

The Resolute Support mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions in order to develop capable and sustainable Afghan security ministries and forces. These EFs comprise the following:

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 1: PLAN, PROGRAM, BUDGET, AND EXECUTE

EF 1 has three priorities: increase resource management capability within the ministries; build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Under EF 1 resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of funds being spent.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- MoD and MoI are able to accurately identify requirements, programs, and funding over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance
- Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable MoI and MoD to develop a budget
- MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements
- MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes
- MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned
- MoD can fully pay all their employees accurately, timely and in a secure fashion.
- Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to MoI and MoD
- MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 2: TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OVERSIGHT

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls, as well as maintain accountability and oversight to improve transparency. Under EF 2, CSTC-A administers measures, such as financial commitment letters that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management, to ensure the Afghan government’s proper use of funds from the United States and international donors.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- MoD Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable
- MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability
- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level
- Ensure appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan government
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 3: CIVILIAN GOVERNANCE OF THE AFGHAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO RULE OF LAW

An ANDSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to a professional ANDSF’s ability to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure the ANDSF respect and adhere to the rule of law and operate in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on preventing and responding properly to GVHRs, such as extra-judicial killings, and significant acts of corruption.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR
- MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR
- MoD and MoI inter-ministerial cooperation with AGO on corruption adjudication, and with AGO on GVHR allegations
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 4: FORCE GENERATION

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and ANP utilize the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation TAA mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF build a more professional force.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force.
- MoD implements civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement.
- MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve desired end strength.
- MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction.
- All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and MoI prevents future untrained policy by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes.
- The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability established and used for information operations delivery.
- Training delivered that results in reduced casualties.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 5: SUSTAIN THE FORCE

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. EF 5 is divided into three parts. First, advisors assist the ANP and ANA in logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons predominantly at the corps and national levels. Second, advisors assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Third, advisors assist in the fields of communications, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- Measurement and reporting has command emphasis
- ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements
- ANDSF has adequately executed a demand based inventory management system
- ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors
- MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract
- MoD has a developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable
- MoD and MoI has sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill tashkil
- MoD and MoI has an operational and sustainable medical logistics process
- ANP operate inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines
- The Afghan government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare
- MoD capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
- MoD and MoI able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure
- MoD able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycle
- MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems
- MoD able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations
- MoI capable of managing its portion of frequency spectrum for the Afghan government
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 6:
PLAN, RESOURCE, AND EXECUTE EFFECTIVE SECURITY CAMPAIGNS

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANSF effectively employ combat power in support of the Afghan government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist with strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts are designed to develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives while strategic guidance and objectives are in turn translated into operational and seasonal plans supported by effective security campaigns.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- ONSC delivers national security guidance through the national strategic security document set (National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, and National Security Strategy)
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead – deliver strategic documents (National Military Strategy and Guidance for Operational Planning) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware) to inform subordinate planning
- Assistant Minister of Defense for Strategy and Policy lead – delivers the Defense Capabilities Planning Guidance in time and of sufficient quality to inform and drive the departmental capability development process
- GS Plans Directorate deliver planning guidance and a coherent, synchronized campaign planning process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy – delivers strategic documents (MIS, MIP, and Strategic Programming Guidance Directive) in time and of sufficient quality (focused, threat informed, and resource aware), monitors implementation and manages change through a robust force management process
- The MoI Deputy Minister of Strategy and Policy monitors MIS and MISP implementation and delivers guidance to ensure a robust departmental force management process
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct combined arms operations
- ANA has an established and sustainable capability to conduct operations in coordination with ANP
- ANA has assessed its capability gaps at the operational level and implemented improvements to address the gaps
- ANA has a sustainable capability to prepare detailed plans and orders at the corps level from strategic guidance from the MoD
• ANP has an established and sustainable capability to coordinate ANP inputs to ANA operations
• ANASOC develops as a strategic MoD asset capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining the force
• ANASOC is able to synchronize special operations brigade and special operations kandak operations within the framework of corps security operations in support of the Afghan government and MoD objectives
• SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of ASSF
• AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system

ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 7: DEVELOP SUFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND PROCESSES

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Ministry of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the National Threat Intelligence Center, also known as the Nasrat. The goal of this effort is to ensure that the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

• Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues
• MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps level operations
• DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking
• Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations
• DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs
• Establish enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC
ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 8: MAINTAIN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan government to counter insurgent messaging and offer a positive narrative to the Afghan people and the international community. Efforts seek to help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both within their own organizations and externally. Advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improved communications within the Afghan security ministries and forces while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities to improve.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- Develops and sustains events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.
- National Unity Government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products.

GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly [personnel and equipment] tashkil inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable the MoD information operations capability throughout the country.

RESOLUTE SUPPORT GENDER OFFICE

In addition to the eight EFs, the RS Gender Office seeks to train, advise, and assist Afghan leadership to ensure that an appropriate gender perspective is incorporated into planning for all policies and strategies within the security ministries and through implementation at the ANA corps and ANP equivalent levels. Since gender issues cross all EFs, advising in this area is not restricted to one EF.

Indicators of Effectiveness:

- MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration
- MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environment (facilities) for women
- MoI and MoD takes actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women
## APPENDIX B: Ongoing OFS-related U.S. Oversight Projects, as of 12/31/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts</strong></td>
<td>Determine whether the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (OI) have established effective controls for oversight of Mol Fuel contracts..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Audit of Oversight of Contracts in Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td>Determine whether DoD controls for monitoring contractor performance were effective for contracts in support of enduring functions in Afghanistan. Specifically, to determine whether contracting officer’s representatives were properly assigned, appointed, and trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research on Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Security Ministry and Afghan National Defense Security Force Officials and DoD Activity in Response to Such Allegations</strong></td>
<td>Determine: 1) What laws, regulations, directives, standards, or other guidance, including international law, treaties, or agreements, exist about U.S. policy toward allegations of child sexual abuse involving Afghan Security Ministry and National Defense Force personnel, the obligation of DoD affiliated personnel to report suspected child sexual abuse by Afghan government officials, and DoD involvement in responding to such reports or allegations? 2) Is there - or was there - any guidance, informal or otherwise, to discourage reporting by DoD affiliated personnel? 3) What training on identifying and responding to alleged child sexual abuse, or the obligation to report suspected violations, has been conducted or planned? 4) How many cases of child sexual abuse alleged against Afghan government officials have been reported to U.S./Coalition Forces Commands, the Service Inspectors General, or the DoD Office of Inspector General? When were such reports made? What actions were taken and by whom? And 5) How many cases of alleged child sexual abuse have been reported to the Afghan government by DoD affiliated personnel? When were such reports made? What knowledge does the DoD have of action taken by the Afghan government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF)</strong></td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Government, Resolute Support, Coalition, and Afghan Ministry of Defense goals, objectives, plans, and resources to train the ANASOF are sufficient, operative, and relevant. (Subject to change)</td>
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<td>Project Title</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Islamabad, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan. This project will include a classified component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Department of State’s Compliance with Critical Environment</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the Department is complying with Public Law 112-239 and 14 FAM 240 requirements for the Department to, among other things, perform comprehensive risk assessments and develop risk-mitigation plans for operational risk associated with contractor performance of critical functions. The audit will also look at the Department’s role in carrying-out the P.L. 112-239, Section 853 requirement for a database on contractor performance that can be used for source selection decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Policies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD’s Use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds (Also See OIR 0079)</td>
<td>(1) How has DOD obligated war funds authorized or appropriated with the OCO/Global War on Terror or emergency designation and to what extent has DOD identified and reported these obligations? (2) To what extent has Congress appropriated war funds for non-war purposes? (3) To what extent has DOD applied the Office of Management and Budget or other criteria in identifying costs for inclusion in its war funding requests? (4) To what extent has DOD established and implemented guidance and a plan with milestones for transitioning enduring OCO costs to its base budget.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment of Afghan Air Forces’ Operations and Maintenance of Light Air</td>
<td>To determine whether the Department of State is administering WPS Task Order No. 3 in accordance with acquisition regulations and the contractor is complying with contract terms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support (LAS) Aircraft Provided by the U.S. Government &amp; Training of Afghan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilots in the U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry</td>
<td>Assess whether 1) Construction has been or is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The parts of the facility, if any, that are occupied are being used as intended and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</td>
<td>Assess 1) The extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) The challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP) for ANA Vehicle</td>
<td>Review DoD’s support to the ANA’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (TEMP). Specifically, to determine 1) The extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals; and 2) Whether key ANA A- TEMP contract requirements are being met and, if not, assess the reasons why.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance and Capacity Building</td>
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<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Corruption in Afghanistan: Perceptions and Responses of the U.S. Government</strong></td>
<td>To 1) Establish a timeline of the corruption problem in Afghanistan, including when, how and why corruption swelled over time since 2001; 2) Analyze how the U.S. government understood the threat of corruption and how this perception changed over time, and identify the U.S. response in terms of policies, programs, and resources devoted to address the corruption problem; 3) Evaluate the adequacy of the U.S. response (policies, programs, and resources) relative to U.S. strategic goals, interests, and risks. Identify where U.S. policies or actions mitigated and/or contributed to corruption; 4) Compare U.S. perceptions and responses to corruption, to those of the international community; and 5) Identify lessons learned from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan, and make actionable recommendations aimed at policy-makers and practitioners as to how best to mitigate corruption or the risk thereof in future U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interim Assessment SIGAR’s Audits and Inspections of DoD-funded Construction Projects in Afghanistan Issued from Fiscal Year 2009 through Fiscal Year 2015</strong></td>
<td>Review SIGAR’s prior audit and inspection reports issued from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2015 that contained findings on construction projects in Afghanistan, and summarize the findings and recommendations in those reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</strong></td>
<td>To determine the extent to which 1) The Army Research Laboratory (ARL) developed and awarded the Legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and Department of Defense and federal regulations; 2) ARL provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with ARL broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Ministry of Interior’s Headquarters Complex</strong></td>
<td>Assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The complex is being maintained and used as intended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II</strong></td>
<td>Assess whether 1) The work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) The complex is being maintained and used as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phases III and IV</strong></td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Cairo, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting counter-ISIL programs and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar</strong></td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Ankara, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting counter-ISIL programs and operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army SupportCommand</strong></td>
<td>As part of the inspection of the overall programs and operations of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), to assess the effectiveness of PRM’s humanitarian support activities in Iraq, Syria, and neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistance to the Security Sector</strong></td>
<td>To 1) Identify security sector assistance strategy and how it evolved from 2001 to 2014; 2) Assess the outcomes of the security sector effort, i.e., to what extent has ANSF performance met specified USG strategic objectives; and 3) Examine the sources of disconnect between stated objectives and outcomes of US efforts to identify lessons for future operations involved in security sector assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation and Effectiveness of On- Budget Assistance</strong></td>
<td>To 1) Determine the. Amount of on-budget assistance provided to Afghanistan from 2001-2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance; 2) Assess the impact of on-budget assistance on developing the capacity of Afghan ministries; and 3) Evaluate potential negative effects of on-budget assistance, e.g., corruption, and how these externalities were mitigated.</td>
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APPENDIX C: Letter of Reaffirmation

January 11, 2016

Glenn A. Fine
Acting Inspector General
Department of Defense
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Dear Glenn:

In view of the resignation of Jon T. Rymer as Inspector General (IG), Department of Defense (DoD), effective January 8, 2016, and in recognition of your position as Acting IG, DoD, I am writing in my role as Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) to reaffirm my designation of the IG, DoD, as Lead Inspector General (LIG) for the overseas contingency operations OPERATION INHERENT Resolve (OIR) and OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS) (see enclosures). It is my understanding and intention that, as Acting IG, DoD, you now hold the LIG responsibilities for OIR and OFS.

As stated in the enclosed letters, on December 17, 2014 and April 1, 2015, former CIGIE Chair Phyllis K. Fong and I acted pursuant to Section 8L(b)(1) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. App., to designate Hon. Rymer, as Inspector General of the Department of Defense, to the position of LIG for OPERATION INHERENT Resolve (OIR) and OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL (OFS), respectively. Upon the advice of Counsel for CIGIE in consultation with your General Counsel, it is my view that, under the applicable authorities, you automatically assumed the responsibilities and functions of the LIG for OIR and OFS when you began serving in an acting capacity, and that you shall continue to serve as the LIG for OIR and OFS until either the sunset provisions of Section 8L(e) of the IG Act become effective or you cease to perform the duties of the IG for the DoD. Given that the overseas contingency operation OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA) terminated on June 30, 2015 and former IG Rymer’s responsibilities as LIG for OUA concluded at the end of fiscal year 2015 pursuant to Section 8L(e) of the IG Act, you do not assume any duties under that overseas contingency operation.
I appreciate your willingness to lead these initiatives, in coordination with the Hon. Steve Linick, Inspector General, Department of State and the Hon. Ann Calvaresi Barr, Inspector General, United States Agency for International Development, and, with respect to OFS, in cooperation and coordination with the Hon. John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).

If CIGIE can be of assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Horowitz  
Chair

Enclosures

cc:  IG, Department of State  
IG, United States Agency for International Development  
IG, SIGAR  
CIGIE Executive Director  
CIGIE Executive Chairpersons
APPENDIX D: The Lead Inspector General Model

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. It directs responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the oversight of overseas contingency operations (OCO). Specifically, it details the duties of the designated Lead Inspector General for an OCO and addresses jurisdictional conflicts.

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them, the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence.

In general, DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However, OCO programs and operations often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies, including military operations. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When none of the three Lead IGs has jurisdiction, the Lead IG is to coordinate with the appropriate agency to ensure that comprehensive oversight takes place.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General must develop, update, and provide to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.
QUARTERLY REPORTING

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice; and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits. Quarterly reports—published each April, July, October, and January—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO.

The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OFS

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ended on December 31, 2014. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) began on January 1, 2015, a new overseas contingency operation as defined by Title 10 USC 101(a)(13). Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Lead IG agencies, representing the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development, are together carrying out our mandate to provide interagency oversight for this contingency under the Lead IG model.

These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

Upon the resignation of Jon T. Rymer, CIGIE Chair Michael E. Horowitz designated Glenn A. Fine as Lead Inspector General for OFS on January 11, 2016. DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick serves as the Associate Inspector General for OFS, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended. The Associate Inspector General will draw on his experience as a career federal prosecutor, and as Director of DoJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force, to develop joint investigative capabilities across the IG community through an interagency working group.
APPENDIX E:
Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended

§8L. Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations

(a) Additional Responsibilities of Chair of Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.-Upon the commencement or designation of a military operation as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days, the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, have the additional responsibilities specified in subsection (b) with respect to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(b) Specific Responsibilities.-The responsibilities specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) In consultation with the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), to designate a lead Inspector General in accordance with subsection (d) to discharge the authorities of the lead Inspector General for the overseas contingency operation concerned as set forth in subsection (d).

(2) To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on investigations, inspections, and audits with respect to such contingency operation in accordance with subsection (d)(2)(B).

(3) To assist in identifying for the lead inspector general for such contingency operation, Inspectors General and inspector general office personnel available to assist the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on matters relating to such contingency operation.

(c) Inspectors General.-The Inspectors General specified in this subsection are the Inspectors General as follows:


(2) The Inspector General of the Department of State.

(3) The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
(d) Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation.—(1) A lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall be designated by the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency under subsection (b)(1) not later than 30 days after the commencement or designation of the military operation concerned as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days. The lead Inspector General for a contingency operation shall be designated from among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(2) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall have the following responsibilities:

(A) To appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

(D)(i) If none of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has principal jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(ii) If more than one of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to determine principal jurisdiction for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.
(E) To employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.

(F) To submit to Congress on a bi-annual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:

(i) the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and

(ii) overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.

(G) To submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.

(H) To carry out such other responsibilities relating to the coordination and efficient and effective discharge by the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of duties relating to the contingency operation as the lead Inspector General shall specify.

(3)(A) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation may employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of, annuitants covered by section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of assisting the lead Inspector General in discharging responsibilities under this subsection with respect to the contingency operation.

(B) The employment of annuitants under this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, as if the lead Inspector General concerned was the Department of Defense.

(C) The period of employment of an annuitant under this paragraph may not exceed three years, except that the period may be extended for up to an additional two years in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3161(b)(2) of title 5, United States Code.
(4) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall discharge the responsibilities for the contingency operation under this subsection in a manner consistent with the authorities and requirements of this Act generally and the authorities and requirements applicable to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) under this Act.

(e) Sunset for Particular Contingency Operations.—The requirements and authorities of this section with respect to an overseas contingency operation shall cease at the end of the first fiscal year after the commencement or designation of the contingency operation in which the total amount appropriated for the contingency operation is less than $100,000,000.

(f) Construction of Authority.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) to enter into agreements to conduct joint audits, inspections, or investigations in the exercise of their oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to overseas contingency operations.


Prior Provisions

# ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Contracting Command</td>
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<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>ANCOF</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD OIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>Functional Area Support Teams</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff (Afghan National Army)</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>inspector general</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>ISIL-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>refers to DoD OIG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAR</td>
<td>Monthly ANDSF Assessment Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Committee</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>overseas contingency operation</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<td>PMR</td>
<td>Program Management Review</td>
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<td>PoAM</td>
<td>program of actions and milestones</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPOT</td>
<td>Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>train, advise, and assist (RS and OFS missions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAAC</td>
<td>Train-Adviser-Assist command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAPI</td>
<td>Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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Endnotes

10. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016
12. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016; DoD response to Lead IG request for information, 2/7/2016.
13. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016; DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 2/7/2016.
14. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
16. OSD (P) Vetting Response, 2/18/2016
18. See Endnote 15
21. Cite source.


44. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 2/4/2015.


54. UN report of the Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, p. 16.


56. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, p. 1.
60. Information presented in this section summarizes the statement made by General Campbell on November 25, 2015, at NATO-RS headquarters. Updated casualty figures provided by OSD (P) Vetting Response, 2/18/2016
63. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
66. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.


82. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.

83. Information presented in this section was obtained from UNAMA report, *Afghanistan Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict—Special Report on Kunduz Province*, 12/2015.


87. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, pp. 2.


93. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, p. 3.

106. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, p. 6.
108. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 12/10/2015, p. 7.
133. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
137. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/11/2016.
139. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
140. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
141. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
142. DoD response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
143. DoD response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
144. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
145. DoD, response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
146. DoD, response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
147. DoD response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
149. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
150. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
151. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
152. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
153. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
155. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.
156. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
158. USFOR-A, response to lead IG request for information, 1/3/2016.
159. DoD, response to Lead IG request for vetting, 2/7/2016.
160. DoD briefing, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, NATO-RS, 1/19/2016.

174. DoDIG proposed project number D2016-D000JB-0084.000


179. OUSD(C), Cost of War, 9/2015, and response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.

180. OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/5/2015.

181. OUSD(C), Cost of War, 7/2015 and 9/2015.

182. OUSD(C), Cost of War, 9/2015.


189. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress, 1/2012, pp. 4, 28.


195. DoD. Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2015, pp. 82-84


198. Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended: The Lead IG will “determine which IG has principal jurisdiction when more than one inspector general from the DoD, DoS, and USAID has jurisdiction.” Further, the Lead IG will “exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities” when Departments of Defense and State and USAID have no jurisdiction.

TO REPORT FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE RELATED TO OIR PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS, CONTACT:

**Department of Defense Hotline**

dodig.mil/hotline
1-800-424-9098

**Department of State Hotline**
oighotline@state.gov
1-800-409-9926 or 202-647-3320

**U.S. Agency for International Development Hotline**

ig.hotline@usaid.gov
1-800-230-6539 or 202-712-1023