LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL MISSION

The Lead Inspector General for an Overseas Contingency Operation will coordinate among the Inspectors General specified under the law to:

- develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation
- ensure independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and prevent, detect, and deter fraud, waste, and abuse
- perform analyses to ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements
- report quarterly and biannually to the Congress on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead Inspector General

(Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended)
FOREWORD

We are pleased to submit our combined Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) biannual and quarterly report to Congress on Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). This is our first biannual and second quarterly report for the overseas contingency operation (OCO), discharging our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The biannual report describes oversight activity that was completed, ongoing, or planned between April 1, 2015, and September 30, 2015, while the quarterly report discusses progress and challenges in the OFS mission in the last quarter of FY 2015. The quarterly report discusses OFS’s two complementary missions: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Resolute Support (NATO-RS) mission and the U.S. counterterrorism mission against al-Qaeda, its remnants, and its affiliates in Afghanistan. Our oversight responsibility extends to crosscutting and shared areas related to the OFS missions that support the government of Afghanistan’s ability to protect and govern itself.

We have continued a multiagency approach for managing our oversight responsibilities in Afghanistan. To that end, the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Afghanistan was published, effective October 1, 2015, in the FY 2016 Comprehensive Oversight Plan–Overseas Contingency Operations. This plan explains the eight strategic oversight issues that governed our planning strategy and details the planned and ongoing projects under the OFS missions and the reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and other Afghanistan projects that are separate from OFS.

Our teams collaborated to produce an oversight strategy with sufficient scope to deliver a thorough understanding of OFS commitments, as well as reconstruction, with projects that are geared to deter waste, fraud, and abuse and promote effective stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Our teams continue to coordinate oversight operations and activities to best meet our planning objectives, incorporate important lessons learned, and reset priorities as complex events continue to evolve.

Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense

Steve A. Linick
Inspector General
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Catherine M. Trujillo
Acting Deputy Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International Development
MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD IG

I am pleased to present the first biannual and second quarterly report to Congress for the Overseas Contingency Operation known as Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). OFS has two complementary missions in Afghanistan: U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. support for NATO’s Resolute Support capacity-building effort.

Afghanistan’s National Unity Government completed its first year in office on September 29, 2015, one day after the Taliban attacked and occupied the provincial capital of Kunduz. This high-profile attack demonstrated the challenges the Afghan government faces, with support from the United States and the international coalition, in bringing stability to the nation. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were able to take back control of the city in mid-October.

On October 15, 2015, President Obama announced his decision to keep the current U.S. troop level of 9,800 through most of 2016 and to draw down to 5,500 by the end of 2016. Our report examines U.S. activities in support of the OFS mission in this fluid operational environment.

My Lead IG colleagues, along with our oversight partners, continue to examine the sustainment of the ANDSF and the essential functions that support them, as well as the transition to a reduced military footprint in the future. We are also monitoring the capacity building and capabilities of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), which has assumed increased responsibility for counterterrorism operations, a mission new with the designation of OFS. Our strategic oversight planning includes initiatives to help us evaluate the progress of the ASSF as well as our U.S. counterterrorism mission, including the adequacy of intelligence capabilities supporting operations and information sharing among the coalition partners and the Afghan government.

U.S. oversight agencies released 13 reports related to OFS during the biannual reporting period, April 1, 2015–September 30, 2015. IG agencies have 38 ongoing and planned oversight projects related to the RS mission, ANDSF capacity building, and counterterrorism. The planning group responsible for developing and monitoring this plan meets quarterly to stay current, respond quickly, and suggest redirection of IG resources where they will have the greatest effect.
Our agencies have adopted an expeditionary workforce model to support efforts throughout the OFS region. Staff deployed overseas serve 3–12 months, and teams will travel as needed to locations in Afghanistan to conduct oversight. Senior leaders of all Lead IG agencies visited in-theater this quarter to support our teams in the field. Our staffs, in the United States and in-theater, continue their hard work and dedication to provide oversight and report on both OFS missions.

Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

Jon T. Rymer
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Defense
## Lead Inspector General Statutory Requirements

### Section 8L, Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended

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<tr>
<td>Appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the federal government in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>47–54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.</td>
<td>52–54</td>
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<td>Employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit to Congress on a biannual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:</td>
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<td>status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and</td>
<td>55–59, 65–68</td>
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<td>overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.</td>
<td>59–69</td>
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<td>Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.</td>
<td>1–44</td>
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**Note:** The Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) are the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Inspector General of the Department of State, and the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
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An Australian soldier from the Mentoring Task Force escorts Afghan National Army troops from the 3rd Kandak to a watch position in the Charmerstan Valley. (Images Defence)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During its first year, the Afghan National Unity Government faced complex challenges that affected every resource and every national security pillar—a longer fighting season, a continuing insurgency, attacks by multiple terrorist organizations, a still-developing fighting force, and more than 170 natural disasters from earthquakes to landslides.\(^1\) However, with the support of the United States and NATO partners, the Afghan government met these challenges. The Afghan government signed the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO partners and the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States last fall.\(^2\) The subsequent transition to NATO’s Resolute Support in January 2015 ended a 13-year combat mission but continued support to sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and to develop the Afghan security institutions at the corps and ministerial levels. The U.S. military serves the RS mission and continues a counterterrorism mission against the remnants of al-Qaeda and its affiliates under Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS).\(^3\)

General Martin E. Dempsey looks on as he leaves Resolute Support headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, on July 19, 2015, ahead of turnover of responsibility as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, succeeded him on October 1, 2015. (DoD photo)
On October 15, 2015, President Obama announced that he will keep the current posture of 9,800 authorized U.S. military personnel through most of 2016, anticipating a drawdown to 5,500 by the end of 2016. Following the announcement, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to a continued presence beyond 2016. Before the announcement, plans were under development for the U.S. military transfer to a Kabul-based security cooperation element by the end of 2017.

U.S. troop strength is now about a tenth of what it was in 2011, coinciding with the transition to a train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. Coalition forces are no longer embedded with Afghan conventional forces at a tactical level, and the RS military presence has been reduced and concentrated in strategic locations. RS advisors continue to address developmental shortfalls in ANDSF capabilities through eight Essential Functions that encompass the systems and processes required to sustain the Afghan security institutions. These functions include planning, budgeting, force sustainment, promoting transparency, intelligence processing, and strategic communications.

Progress has been made, but significant capability gaps exist in both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Continuing oversight efforts focus on critical weaknesses affecting both ministries in varying degrees. NATO has identified sustainment as the most pressing concern. For example, DoD reported that the MOD approach to recruitment and attrition aspects of personnel planning has been inconsistent and unbalanced, directly affecting army end strength. Additionally, MOD management systems for personnel are not fully integrated, and some tasks are accomplished manually in payroll and personnel accountability systems—areas vulnerable to corruption. In addition to sustaining the force itself, sustainment of equipment continues to be a priority area for development. DoD reported significant systemic problems in MOD’s entire logistics system, from forecasting requirements at the field level to creating repeatable processes and planning at the ministry level. DoD IG found similar logistics sustainment challenges in the MOI, from infrastructure to guidance, and from forecasting requirements to compliance.

President Ghani has indicated that corruption, and not the Taliban, is Afghanistan’s worst enemy. In February 2015, both the MOD and MOI procurement systems were shut down after the discovery of a major scandal in fuel procurement, a crime indicative of the broad reach of corruption. President Ghani established the National Procurement Authority to reduce corruption and minimize cost by developing, reviewing, and approving all large-value contracts. The new body has reportedly strengthened the rigor and transparency of the contracting process but has contributed to a growing backlog in the procurement pipeline.
Although the ANDSF has assumed increased responsibility for counterterrorism operations throughout the country, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said in October 2015 that “counterterrorism is going to be part of the enduring [U.S.] mission [in Afghanistan].”\textsuperscript{19} The Department of State has designated al-Qaeda, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Haqqani Network as foreign terrorist organizations, and all are operating inside Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{20} The U.S. military counterterrorism mission is primarily focused on al-Qaeda. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) continues working with U.S. and coalition partners to achieve stability; however, the security environment remains unstable.\textsuperscript{21} The UN Secretary General reported that intra-insurgent violence increased among terrorist organizations and the Taliban this quarter.\textsuperscript{22} Most every province has terrorist activity, some contending with multiple terrorist organizations at any given time.\textsuperscript{23}

This report presents selected high-visibility counterterrorism operations, and battles against the Taliban insurgency, conducted by the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) with the support of U.S. Special Forces. This includes one of the largest raids in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda networks\textsuperscript{24} as well as the recent Kunduz operation. Multiple investigations into the U.S. bombing of a hospital during the Kunduz campaign remain ongoing.\textsuperscript{25} The IG community has planned reviews of the counterterrorism effort in several areas, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support; training, advising, and equipping of the ASSF; and intelligence sharing among GIRoA and coalition partners.

ANDSF operating costs are mainly subsidized by the international community, which provides about 90% of all funding for security.\textsuperscript{26} General John Campbell, the RS Mission Commander, said that the ANDSF could not survive without that funding or the support of coalition forces.\textsuperscript{27} In 2015, the United States provided $4.1 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), international donors provided $923 million, and the GIRoA budgeted $411 million. Constituting about 7% of the $55.5 billion enacted by Congress for OFS and related missions in FY 2015, the $4.1 billion ASFF contribution provides funding to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANDSF. The additional funds for OFS include $11.9 billion for operations and force protection in Afghanistan and $18.3 billion for in-theater support from outside of Afghanistan, as well as $9.8 billion to repair or replace equipment still required after Operation Enduring Freedom.\textsuperscript{28}
Lead IG Reporting and Oversight Responsibilities

The Lead IG must submit to Congress and the public a report every quarter on the contingency operation. This quarterly report on OFS cites information announced by federal agency officials in open-forum settings and supplied by federal agencies in response to questions from the Lead IG agencies. Where available, as noted in this report, the Lead IG agencies have consulted reputable impartial sources in an effort to verify and assess such information. However, in light of the operational realities and dynamic nature of OFS, the Lead IG agencies have limited time to test, verify, and independently assess all of the assertions made by these agencies. This is particularly true where the Lead IG agencies have not yet provided oversight of these assertions through audits, inspections, or evaluations. The Lead IG agencies are assessing the information provided from their respective agencies and will use it to determine where to conduct future audits and evaluations.

The Lead IG agencies and other oversight partners finalized the FY 2016 Joint Strategic Oversight Plan (JSOP) for Afghanistan within the FY 2016 Comprehensive Oversight Plan-Overseas Contingency Operations (COP-OCO). The challenges inherent in OCOs require problem solving that crosses agency boundaries. The JSOP outlines the body of work required for a comprehensive approach to OFS oversight, and the consolidated COP-OCO brings together strategic oversight planning for all OCOs.

OFS planners identified several strategic oversight issues to be addressed this year. These are introduced in the JSOP and explained in detail in the biannual section of this report. Several activities that predate and extend beyond OFS objectives remain in progress.

U.S. oversight agencies completed 13 oversight projects related to OFS during April 1–September 30, 2015 (see Table 1), and had 18 ongoing and 20 planned projects as of September 30, 2015.

The JSOP for Afghanistan presents a comprehensive plan for all oversight agencies responsible for U.S. activities in Afghanistan:

- Department of Defense
- Department of State
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
- U.S. Army Audit Agency
- Naval Audit Service
- U.S. Air Force Audit Agency
- Government Accountability Office
Table 1. Lead IG Agency Reports Released During 4/1/2015–9/30/2015

<table>
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<th>Report</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense Inspector General</strong></td>
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<td>Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, through May 18, 2015 (DODIG 2015-156)</td>
<td>8/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</strong></td>
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<td>Alert Letter: ANDSF Cold Weather Gear (SIGAR 15-86-AL)</td>
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<td>Alert Letter: Camp Brown Command and Control Facility (SIGAR 15-85-SP)</td>
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<td>Inspection of the Special Operations Task Force–South Command and Control Facility Building at Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar, Afghanistan (SIGAR 15-79-AL)</td>
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<td>Command and Control Facility at Camp Brown (SIGAR 15-79-ALc)</td>
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<td>$14.7 Million Warehouse Facility at Kandahar Airfield: Construction Delays Prevented the Facility From Being Used as Intended (SIGAR 15-74-IP)</td>
<td>7/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law in Afghanistan: U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than $1 Billion (SIGAR 15-68-AR)</td>
<td>7/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army: Millions of Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of Personnel and Payroll Data (SIGAR 15-54-AR)</td>
<td>4/2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse: Stalled Construction Project Was Terminated After $1.25 Million Spent (SIGAR 15-51-IP)</td>
<td>4/2015</td>
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“They [the ANDSF] do not possess the necessary combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country.”

~ General John F. Campbell | Commander, Resolute Support Mission Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan

**ISIL/ISKP**
- Growing at a much faster rate than the U.S. military had anticipated—ISIL is now operating in 25 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.
- ISIL seeks to control territory once called the Khorasan Province, which extends from the Caucasuses to Western India, hence the affiliation as ISKP.
- Intra-insurgency violence has increased between ISIL and its affiliates and the Taliban:
  - ISIL is directing most of its attacks against the Taliban, not the ANDSF.
  - When Taliban members defect, many join the ranks of the ISKP.
  - Many disaffected Taliban, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members, have rebranded themselves as Daesh (another name for ISIL).

**TALIBAN**
- The Taliban has been fractured since the announcement of the death of its spiritual leader, Mullah Omar, on 7/29/2015.
- ISIL is attempting to seize at least one provincial capital, (2) seize multiple district centers, and (3) control and hold more territory.
- By extending its influence and being adaptable, the Taliban has forced the ANDSF to stress its command and control and its lines of operation.

**AL-QAEDA**
- Al-Qaeda is facilitated by the Haqqani Network (HQN) and shares the Taliban’s goals to (1) expel coalition forces, (2) overthrow the National Unity Government, and (3) reestablish extremism.
- It is focused more on survival than on orchestrating future attacks.
- Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri pledged allegiance to the new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor on 8/13/2015.

For the sources of information on this infographic, see the last endnote in this report.
“If al-Qaeda is Windows 1.0, then Daesh is Windows 7.0”
~ Attributed to Afghan President Ghani by General Campbell

“ANDSF operational tempo...has been twice as high in the first nine months of 2015 than 2014. Not surprisingly, ANDSF casualty rates have also increased this year. (The ANDSF have, however, inflicted far greater casualties on the enemy.)”
~ General Campbell
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THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT COMPLETES ITS FIRST YEAR OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The first anniversary of the approval of both the Status of Forces Agreement with NATO partners and the Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement (also known as the “Bilateral Security Agreement”) with the United States concludes the first year for the National Unity Government in Afghanistan. The GIRoA signed both on September 30, 2014, and the Afghan Parliament ratified both on November 27, 2014. As the U.S. combat mission ended, OFS began on January 1, 2015, continuing U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and contributing to NATO’s Resolute Support (RS) train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. The GIRoA has framed its National Security Policy around a self-sustaining ANDSF with six pillars:

- realizing peace and stability
- improving security
- establishing good governance and the rule of law

Resolute Support and Marshal Fahim National Defense University ushered in a new era of leadership development with the Afghan National Army Officer Academy ribbon cutting in Qargha District, Kabul, Afghanistan on Sept. 16, 2015 (RS News photo)
By completing a National Threat Assessment and approving a National Security Policy since June 2015, the GIRoA demonstrated progress in solidifying its national security framework. A National Military Strategy is awaiting approval, and the Afghan National Campaign Plan is under development. For an overview of the national security framework, see Figure 1.

Figure 1.
Afghan National Security Framework

Source: DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
Despite these achievements, significant challenges to security and stability in Afghanistan remain. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 6, 2015, General John F. Campbell, Commander Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), stated that many factors contributed to inconsistent performance within the ANDSF in the past year of transition. The ANDSF had to adapt quickly to changing combat situations and limited resources, faced a longer-than-usual fighting season with no winter break, and encountered a fight that spread all over the country beyond the traditional insurgent strongholds. According to General Campbell, complications faced by the ANDSF were far ranging, from changes in the battlefield dynamics to lack of experience, to lack of capabilities. He further noted weaknesses in intelligence fusion and cross-pillar coordination, as well as “sub-optimal utilization of [the] forces.”

According to General Campbell, the Afghan forces “do not possess the necessary combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country,” and they suffer high attrition through desertion and casualty rates. General Campbell expressed his concern about the ANDSF’s long-term viability. ANDSF operating costs are heavily subsidized by the international community, which provides about 90% of the funding. General Campbell noted, “Afghanistan cannot afford its security forces.” He further cautioned that the ANDSF could not survive without the backup of funding and the support of coalition forces.

Coalition troop strength has drawn down to about a tenth of what it was in 2011. The force reduction coincided with a change in mission from combat operations to a continuing counterterrorism mission against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as a TAA mission. RS advisors work with counterparts in GIRoA institutions to strengthen the systems and processes that will sustain the fighting forces. For example, coalition advisors assist Afghan officials in formulating budgets, devising procurement strategy, or implementing logistics procedures.

As part of the transition from a combat role, coalition “enablers” were reduced in areas such as close air support. According to General Campbell, the ANDSF cannot fill the close air support capability gap and faces other gaps in fixed and rotary-wing aviation, combined arms, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and sustainment. The ANDSF does, however, have the advantage of equipment its enemies do not have, such as heavy mortars, D-30s howitzers, armed Mi-17s, MD-530 attack helicopters, and armored vehicles. General Campbell said the ANDSF will need to reprioritize its efforts, be on the offensive, and be selective about its engagements—“when to defend, and where to assume risk.”

As of October 2015, approximately 10,500 U.S. military personnel were serving under OFS, including about 9,000 in Afghanistan. An additional 700 DoD civilian personnel, 6,700 third-country national personnel, and 10,700 contractors were also working to support the OFS mission. The mission of U.S. Forces is both train, advise, and assist (TAA) and counterterrorism.
President Obama examined several options for next steps in consideration of the many challenges the ANDSF still faces with the insurgency. On October 15, 2015, the President announced his decision to maintain the current U.S. troop posture of up to 9,800 military personnel through “most of 2016” and to draw down to 5,500 military personnel after 2016. The United States will keep military presence in the cities of Kabul and Bagram, as well as at bases in the east and south (Jalalabad and Kandahar). The President was in regular discussions with Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani and its Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, his U.S. military commanders, and his national security team leading up to the decision. The President reiterated that he would not “let that situation deteriorate such that it poses a threat to the United States,” and that U.S. forces are to continue “two narrow missions”—the bilateral counterterrorism mission and the TAA mission under the NATO RS mission—in keeping with advancing our national security interests to build a “network of sustainable partnerships around the globe.”

Following the announcement, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke with President Ghani and pledged NATO’s commitment to extend its presence through the RS mission as well.

Regional Stability
In 2015, the Taliban agreed that reconciliation talks with the GIRoA were a legitimate part of the peace process. The two parties met for their first official reconciliation discussions on July 7, 2015, in Murree, Pakistan, where representatives from the United States and China attended as observers. The UN Secretary General cited progress for peace with the Taliban until the July 29, 2015, announcement of the death of the Taliban’s spiritual leader, Mullah Omar. The Secretary General subsequently reported that the announcement does have “clear implications” for the peace process as “rifts within the Taliban leadership emerged” and the second meeting of the GIRoA and Taliban scheduled for July 31, 2015, was postponed. The United Nations characterized the postponement as a setback, reiterating that the peace process needs to be inclusive.

On September 26, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry co-chaired with China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi a meeting with Afghanistan’s Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. Secretary Kerry welcomed China’s engagement and commitment to the stabilization, reconstruction, and development of Afghanistan. He reiterated the current threat by the Taliban as well as the Haqqani Network, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and other
violent extremist groups. Foreign Minister Yi spoke of China’s willingness to help the GiRoA as it emerges from a “decade-long transformation period” and “faces an important opportunity to achieve unity, stability, peace, and reconstruction” in its position in the heart of Asia. The Foreign Minister encouraged the GiRoA and Taliban to work together expeditiously in the reconciliation political process to meet each other half way, and asked for other parties to support the process. He further asked the international community to support GiRoA in improving its relationships with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, acknowledging the ties between these relations and China’s own security and stability.

During his visit to Washington, D.C. in October 2015, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif presented his National Action Plan, including actions that would prevent the Taliban from operating inside Pakistan. President Obama used the occasion to highlight Pakistan’s efforts in the reconciliation process between the Taliban and the GiRoA. President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif reaffirmed their commitments to keeping the Pakistan-Afghanistan border safe, to countering terrorism, and to achieving regional stability in South Asia. Both leaders discussed their resolve to counter emerging terrorist groups, such as ISIL, and President Obama “expressed particular appreciation for Pakistan’s ongoing support to degrade and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.” Prime Minister Sharif further committed to assisting the United States in the safe return of hostages held by terrorist groups in the region, and both leaders mutually agreed to a coordinated effort for the return of Afghan refugees across the border.

The Afghan-led Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program is now in its fifth year. It started as a 5-year program to encourage insurgents to leave the battlefield and rejoin their communities. The program is considered a “village by village” peace process. Reintegration is internationally supported and engages political, social, and religious leaders at all levels in Afghanistan to build trust and confidence necessary for achieving peace across the region. Overall in 2015, of the reported 10,578 total insurgents reintegrated, only 1.35% have returned to the insurgency. Monthly totals have been sporadic: 17 in June; 133 in July; 40 in August; and 1 in September. Of the five provinces that most frequently asked for reintegration assistance from this program in 2015, three submitted zero requests for reintegration assistance this quarter: Jowzjan, Badghis, and Badakhshan. Possible influencers include the July announcement of Mullah Omar’s death and the September Eid-e Qurban holiday.
ANDSF Response to Natural Disasters

According to the U.N. Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2015, the “seasonal calendar” includes the fighting season as well as natural disasters that plague the region, such as heavy snow, rain, drought, floods, and landslides. Since January 2015, the Afghan people have endured 170 natural disaster incidents, affecting 30 of 34 provinces. Just in the month of July 2015, 33 events in 18 provinces were reported that caused damage and killed or injured people. Massive floods and landslides triggered from unseasonal snowmelts affected more than 8,300 people. According to the HRP, there have been 107,000 people displaced by natural disasters in the first half of this year, while 103,000 have been displaced by conflict.

USFOR-A reported that the ANDSF routinely provides assistance in the way of manpower and vehicles to clear the roads and facilitate access for non-governmental organizations. The ANDSF also provides airdrops for food, water, and medical supplies during emergencies that require a national level response, coordinated by the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Committee.
The GIROA took over full responsibility of Afghanistan’s national airspace on September 16, 2015, after 13 years under NATO control. Through that period, United States and NATO allies supported the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA) with funding for airfield and air traffic control services, as well as TAA support, to facilitate transition of Afghan airfields and airspace to ACAA control. According to NATO, “In Afghanistan, there is an added element to managing multiple layers of airspace that many of the world’s busiest aerial infrastructures do not have, and that is the element of war.”

In August 2014, NATO’s Office of Resources (NOR) provided more than $110 million to ensure performance of airfield functions of air traffic control; fire and crash rescue services; meteorological services; safety management; and maintenance of communications, navigation, and surveillance systems. The functions at Hamid Karzai International Airport and the airfields at Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar are executed via a NATO Support and Procurement Agency contract. The functions at Herat Airfield are performed by Italian military personnel. In February 2015, NATO modified NOR funding guidance to include contract provisions for on-the-job training for ACAA personnel.

NATO formed a framework to oversee Afghanistan’s four major airfields, each one overseen by a different nation. With the US decision and NATO concurrence to extend their presence in Afghanistan during 2016, transition dates at each airfield are pending confirmation by the following Framework Nations:

- **Herat Airfield (Italy)**—transition date is pending national decision regarding the length of 2016 stay. Italian military personnel provide airfield functions but are restricted from training Afghan personnel. A contract capable of conducting on-the-job training (OJT) is not estimated to begin until March 2016. Accordingly, the ACAA will require provision of contracted airfield functions and on-the-job training well into 2016 and potentially beyond.

- **Kandahar Airfield (United States)**—transition date is pending national decision regarding the length of 2016 stay, but is likely to be through 2016. Although transition is progressing, adequate numbers of ACAA personnel will not complete training prior to the end of 2016 and will require continued, persistent support and attention.

- **Mazar-e-Sharif Airfield (Germany)**—transition date is pending national decision regarding the length of 2016 stay. Transition is progressing and adequate numbers of ACAA personnel in most airfield functions are projected to complete training prior to transition and be capable of sustaining civil-military airfield functions.

- **Hamid Karzai International Airport (Turkey)**—transition date planned for late December 2016. The ACAA is projected to have adequate, trained personnel to execute airfield functions by the end of OFS. Continued NATO funding for contracted functions and training is necessary in the interim.

DoD reported that the ACAA signed a $47 million National Airspace Management contract on June 28, 2015, with the same U.S. firm that has been handling airspace management,
Ingenuity and Purpose/Readiness Management Support (IAP/RMS). The 2-year contract, with an option for a third year, includes control services for the Kabul Area Control Center and Kabul Approach starting September 2015. Signing and executing the airspace contract was the last remaining contingency to execute the U.S.-administered New Development Partnership (NDP), a program that provides funding to GIROA when certain developmental conditions are met. In this case, award of the contract allowed release of the first $100 million of the $800 million NDP fund, which GIROA could use to finance the following year of the airspace contract, along with proceeds from overflight and landing fees. In addition, the ACAA and the U.S. Combined Force Air Combat Commander signed a letter of agreement (LOA) in August 2015 that documents civil and military deconfliction procedures. The LOA provides for a phased implementation and stress-testing procedures for various airspace flight levels. The LOA further normalizes Afghan airspace to a construct recognized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

The Japanese government has donated $25 million to fund approximately the first year of the contract with IAP/RMS. The GIROA will be able to use NDP funds to finance services the following year of the contract. The initial implementation and operational evaluation period was considered successful. However, U.S. Embassy Kabul reported that, after assuming airspace management control in September 2015, the ACAA met with some minor technical problems related to the issuance of informational notices for the Kabul Flight Information Region and Hamid Karzai International Airport in accordance with ICAO standards. As an interim solution, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has continued to publish these notices for Afghanistan until a sustainable Afghan solution is worked out.

As of September 30, 2015, no DoD funds had been obligated or expended for the transition. The Department of State (DoS)-funded bridge contract expired on September 15, 2015. NATO common funds are available through 2015 for Hamid Karzai and for the Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar Airfields contracts.

Afghanistan’s ability to control its airspace is essential for safe operation of military and civilian air traffic and is a foundation to economic development in the country.

Turkish Major General Mehmet Cahit Bakir, Commander of the Hamid Karzai International Airport, at the ceremony at the airport to turn over control of Afghan national airspace.
FUNDING

In FY 2015, the U.S. government committed $55.5 billion for OFS and related missions. DoD has requested an additional $42.5 billion for FY 2016. Although the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 had not been finalized as of October 2015, under P.L. 114-53, continuing appropriations remain available for U.S. government programs and operations related to OFS until December 11, 2015.

According to the DoD Comptroller, the costs to maintain U.S. forces in Afghanistan will decrease more slowly than the size of the U.S. troop presence because of expenses associated with returning equipment, resetting the force, and closing bases (including contractor costs), as well as the continued high demand for “higher-end” intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. For a breakout of funds enacted by Congress for OFS in FY 2015, see Figure 2. For a breakout by category, see Table 2.

The Cost of War report provides information on obligations and disbursements of funds made available for OCOs such as OFS. The report captures the incremental cost of OCOs up to and above planned deployment activity, including the status of the ASFF, a subset of funding for OFS used to support the RS TAA mission. Although the Cost of War report is the only source of aggregated status of funds for OFS by service, account, and use, it lags the Lead IG quarterly reporting period by two months or more.

Approximately 42% of the FY 2015 funds enacted for operations in Afghanistan have been reported in the Cost of War report under the OFS heading. These estimated obligations do not include amounts recorded under Operation Enduring Freedom or take into account the processing time required to update systems to accommodate the change of operation name in the first quarter of the fiscal year.

As of July 31, 2015, the most current information available, total OFS obligations totaled $25.3 billion, including $3.2 billion of the ASFF (FY15: $1.0 billion; FY14: $2.2 billion); $19.5 billion in Operation and Maintenance (O&M); $1.5 billion for Military Personnel; and $1.1 billion for Procurement accounts. At least $13.5 billion (FY15: $11.2 billion; FY14: $2.3 billion) had been disbursed.
COUNTERTERRORISM AND EVOLVING THREATS

In an October 15, 2015, press conference, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter explained his view that “counterterrorism is going to be part of the enduring mission” in Afghanistan. According to General Campbell, the GIRoA has worked with the United States and coalition partners to improve stability; however, the security environment remains unstable. The region is vulnerable to many entities designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the Department of State, including al-Qaeda, ISKP, TTP, and the Haqqani Network. General Campbell said that many disaffected Afghan Taliban and TTP members, have rebranded themselves as ISKP, and they are classified as “operationally emergent.”

At the close of the National Unity Government’s first year, “the threats it faces are diversifying.” General Campbell reported that the operational tempo in the first nine months of 2015 was twice as high as it was during 2014. He assessed the ANDSF as vulnerable as a result of multiple factors, including limited troop availability stretched across a large geography; coalition troop drawdown; reliance on broad support of coalition forces; high casualty rates; inexperienced, poorly equipped units; a defensive posture at static sites; and multiple sets of enemies that impose an aggressive operational tempo. In addition, Pakistan military operations have forced insurgent fighters to retreat across the international border into Afghanistan, contributing to the spread of violence. The ANDSF has conducted operations against ISKP, and as a result may be increasingly targeted by them.

Commando units with MOD and MOI conduct operations using their own intelligence. The ASSF works with the ANDSF Special Mission Wing (SMW) in “carrying out unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators.” For more on the status of U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the ASSF, see the sidebar on page 24.

Al-Qaeda’s network is facilitated by the Haqqani Network, which shares

Table 2.
OFS and Related Missions
Estimated Funding by Category
($ Billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2015 Enacted1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-theater Support (outside of Afghanistan)2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations/Force Protection (in Afghanistan)3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/Equipment Reset and Readiness</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classified Activities</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Military End Strength</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Coalition Forces</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance Removal (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)</td>
<td>&lt;0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Estimated Funding by Category</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 FY 2015 enacted amounts include $2.9 billion of O&M base to OCO amounts transferred by the Congress and other related missions.
2 Funding by category is for budget justification display purposes only. In-country and in-theater categories include military personnel budget estimates.
3 Source: OUSD(C), response to Lead IG request for information, 11/17/2015.
the Taliban goal to expel coalition forces, overthrow the National Unity Government, and reestablish extremism. According to General Campbell, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have a renewed partnership, the strength and reach of which has yet to be seen. General Campbell reported that al-Qaeda is focused more on survival rather than orchestrating future attacks. At the same time, the Taliban is fractured over its leadership transition. More than two and a half years passed before the death of the Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Omar was announced and, as a result, it appears many Taliban feel disenfranchised because “they trusted somebody that wasn’t there.” Several rival leaders are vying for control, with Mullah Akhtar Mansoor currently the new leader of the Taliban.

Despite these conflicts, the Taliban has been able to amass its forces and align its strategic goals against ANDSF weaknesses. The UN Secretary General noted that there was a “noticeable spike in high profile incidents in Kabul” and “reports of internecine fighting among anti-Government elements in several areas” following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death. According to RS Headquarters, Taliban goals include:

- discrediting the political process
- weakening the ANDSF

While many jihadists still view al-Qaeda as the moral foundation for global jihad, they view Daesh as its decisive arm of action.

General John Campbell Testimony October 8, 2015
limiting ANDSF/RS freedom of movement
• conducting media-garnering events
• promoting insecurity through propaganda and influence

In his October 2015 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Campbell outlined the Taliban’s near-term insurgency objectives:

• seize at least one provincial capital
• seize multiple district centers
• control and hold more territory

The Taliban increased its fighting tempo, especially in the north at Kunduz and at Helmand, the largest province, located in the south central region of Afghanistan. Helmand and Kandahar are areas rife with narcotics networks. The actions of the Taliban have stressed the ANDSF command and control and its lines of operation.

The UN Secretary General reported that intra-insurgent violence has increased between ISIL and its affiliates and the Taliban. Many of the disputes were over ideological authority and also “financial control of lucrative cross-border smuggling routes.” According to General Campbell, ISIL is “growing its operational capacity,” further complicating the conflict areas—and at a much faster rate than the U.S. military had anticipated. It is now operating in 25 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, concentrating its forces in the east, predominantly in Nangarhar province, as well as more limited activities in southern and western Helmand and Farah provinces.

According to NATO, ISKP is directing most of its attacks against the Taliban, not the ANDSF. When Taliban members defect, many join the ranks of the ISKP. The territory ISIL seeks to control extends from the Caucuses to Western India, once called the Khorasan province, hence the affiliation as ISKP. In his testimony, General Campbell explained that President Ghani is concerned with the regional implications and common threat ISKP presents.

High Visibility OFS Operations

On September 28, 2015, the Taliban attacked the city of Kunduz in northeastern Afghanistan and held it for 15 days. According to General Campbell, both RS and ANDSF forces were surprised by the takeover. The ANDSF entered the city and, on October 3, after several days of fighting, a U.S. airstrike hit the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
On October 7, 2015, U.S. and Afghan forces began a major counterterrorism operation in Kandahar province. The assault included 63 U.S. airstrikes and more than 200 combined U.S. and Afghan forces against al-Qaeda networks located at two remote sites. One site was a “well established training camp” and the other “covered nearly 30 square miles.” According to RS Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, one location was likely a media hub judging from the amount of digital media equipment recovered. Other items recovered included materials for making improvised explosive devices (IEDs); anti-aircraft weapons; rocket-propelled grenade systems with associated hardware and warheads; machine guns, pistols, rifles and ammunition; and other intelligence data (foreign passports, laptops, IT media, digital cameras and cards, documents, and mobile phones).\textsuperscript{114}

ANA commandos pose in front of an Mi-17 helicopter in full battle gear. (Afghan Special Forces Facebook photo)
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program

DoS’s Bureau of Counterterrorism reported that the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program in Afghanistan is its largest bilateral program, with a total of $104 million invested during FY 2010–FY 2014. The Bureau of Counterterrorism committed $19 million to the ATA in FY 2014 and $19 million in FY 2015 to accomplish the following:115

- build Afghan security capacity in counterterrorism crisis response
- improve Afghan security forces’ leadership, management, and coordination capabilities
- build Afghan land border control and transit interdiction capacity, particularly with regard to regional cooperation and shared interoperability

According to the Bureau of Counterterrorism, the program has provided specialized training in counterterrorism skills to the Afghan Department of Protection for High-Level Persons and is increasingly shifting training resources to the Afghan MOI’s primary tactical counterterrorism response units. Training courses include:116

- crisis response/SWAT
- explosive ordnance disposal and explosive incident countermeasures
- tactical management of special/public events
- border controls and fraudulent document recognition
- protection of soft targets

DoS reported that counterterrorism supports periodic in-country capabilities assessments for its security force assistance in Afghanistan, during which U.S. subject matter experts and programs officers coordinate assistance directly with Afghan counterparts. As a result of the ATA program, among other assistance efforts, DoS reports that Afghan security forces demonstrate increased capacity to deter, detect, and respond to terrorist threats, and are improving interoperability and communication with Pakistani border security counterparts.117
BUILDING CAPACITY FOR THE AFGHAN SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES

Comprising both MOD and MOI units (see following illustration), the ASSF has demonstrated growing proficiency in conducting direct-action missions against insurgent and terrorist networks.118 An August 2015 assessment by the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) and the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) evaluated the ASSF as functioning unevenly but trending positively overall, noting improvements in coordination between individual units, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.119

According to NATO, special operations battalions operating under the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) continue to represent some of the most effective fighting forces in the ANDSF. They have demonstrated the ability to conduct independent operations throughout Afghanistan. The Afghan General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), under the MOI, exhibit a capacity to respond to and resolve specific security threats.120

Ongoing and Planned Oversight Projects Related to the ASSF

**DOD IG**
- Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts To Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF)
- Evaluation of ISR Support to OFS Counterterrorism Operations
- Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence for Information Sharing/Fusion with Coalition/Afghan Partners in Support of OFS
- Evaluation of USFOR-A Intelligence Training for Afghan Security Forces

**SIGAR**
- Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar
- Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) Use and Maintenance of its PC-12s
- Afghan Air Force (AAF) Use and Maintenance of its Mi-17 Fleet

Oversight Areas of Concern

Based on USFOR-A information, the ASSF faces continuing challenges in supply support, equipment maintenance, and personnel management.121 These areas affect the RS objective of reducing coalition support in favor of building a self-sustaining, independent ASSF122 and warrant continued Lead IG oversight. Accordingly, DoD IG has scheduled an assessment of coalition TAA efforts for the ANA Special Operations Forces (ANASOF). Beginning in January 2016, the project will seek to determine whether coalition and MOD goals, plans, and resources to train the ANASOF are sufficient, operative, and relevant.123

Additionally, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has scheduled three projects to evaluate aspects of the Special Mission Wing (SMW), which supports both MOD and MOI special security forces. One project underway is inspecting the SMW facilities in Kandahar to determine whether the construction was properly completed and whether facilities are being used and maintained as intended. Future projects will assess the SMW use and maintenance of its PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft fleet and the Russian-built Mi-17 fleet.124

Logistical Shortcomings

According to USFOR-A, ASSF elements continue to work through logistical supply problems to accomplish missions. Availability of mission-essential equipment remains high, but problems will persist until support personnel gain requisite familiarity with changes to ANDSF logistics systems.125 USFOR-A reports that Afghan advisors have noted that ASSF maintenance personnel do not always know the names of repair parts, and this has led to incorrect repair part requisitioning and delay of maintenance.126 A key...
reason for this is that much of the equipment was provided without maintenance manuals or parts catalogs. The development and implementation of more responsive, accountable ANDSF supply procedures, sometimes viewed as overly complex, requires continual adaptation by ASSF units. Increased access to and expertise in using the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS, the ANDSF inventory management system), and providing the ASSF with parts manuals and catalogs, will help ASSF maintenance personnel to learn the terminology and identification of repair parts, which is expected to increase the efficiency of the ASSF maintenance process. The lack of an MOD/MOI training school for advanced maintenance training courses has also hampered the development of maintenance expertise within the ASSF elements.

According to NSOCC-A, the ASSF faces additional challenge in resupplying basic commodities (such as fuel, food, and water) because these items are obtained from regional army corps and the ASSF must compete with other army components for their allocation. DoD IG has identified this area as a potential topic for a future assessment.

Maintenance Concerns

Although operational readiness rates for most mission critical equipment (weapons, vehicles, and communication devices) in ASSF units are higher than for conventional units, addressing maintenance shortfalls and fielding battle damage replacements are critical to sustaining combat capability. The high ASSF operating tempo has particularly strained SMW Mi-17 helicopter assets. The current flying hour program for the Mi-17 has increased to 625 hours per month—a 50% increase over its historic average of 400 hours per month, resulting in maintenance and sustainment challenges.

“When you look at our special forces, they have no match in the region. I think one could say that without exaggeration, not because others are not brave or trained, but because ours train with the very best, which is that of the United States Special Forces, and because we have had, unfortunately, immense combat experience.”

~Ashraf Ghani, President of Afghanistan

This has led NSOCC-A senior leadership to initiate weekly meetings with the Program Manager for Nonstandard Rotary Wing aircraft to address concerns regarding contract maintenance deficiencies. These meetings enabled progress on a variety of Mi-17 maintenance issues, and follow-up visits are planned for November 2015. Although the Afghan Air Force (AAF) has added some organic maintenance capability, such as the ability to perform phased inspections, the Mi-17 fleet will remain largely dependent on contractor logistics support until appropriate levels of organic maintenance capability are achieved in 2020. The August 2015 imposition of U.S. sanctions against Rosoboronexport, a Russian state arms export agency, may affect Mi-17 maintenance. DoD had purchased from the company the 35 Russian-built Mi-17 helicopters now in the Afghan fleet. Because Rosoboronexport is the sole Russian agency selling Russian-made defense items, sanctions will restrict DoD purchases of Mi-17 repair parts from Rosoboronexport unless an exemption is granted. DoD reported it does not plan to buy additional Mi-17s but is studying potential replacement of the fleet with U.S. aircraft.
10,500 special forces and commandos geographically dispersed across Afghanistan. Almost all special operations *kandaks* conduct company-level operations. Commandos operate in specialized light infantry units with the capability to conduct raids, direct action, and reconnaissance.

The GCPSU's 5,100 highly trained police personnel work in three national mission units that respond to crisis events. Its 33 provincial special units support the chiefs of police in the provinces and partner with the national Investigative and Surveillance Unit.

The SMW supports primarily the MOD and MOI ASSF units on both counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks. All 460 SMW personnel, including 82 fully trained pilots, are assigned administratively to the MOD. Aircraft inventory includes 30 Mi-17V helicopters and 13 of 18 planned PC-12 aircraft.

The Ktah Khas light infantry battalion conducts precision raids and vehicle interdictions against high-value targets using ground and air assets.
Recruitment and Personnel Planning Challenges

USFOR-A reports there are no critical personnel shortages in the ANASOC that would hinder its ability to complete the counterterrorism mission. SMW leadership has made recruitment and training a priority over the past year, averaging 30 new members a month, which is sufficient in view of limited availability of training slots. The MOI has set up a recruitment stand at regional police training centers to recruit Afghan police officers into the GCPSU. The GCPSU is also considering reaching out to recently separated service members in an effort to recruit them, and it is in the process of requesting that MOI assign GCPSU a higher priority for the assignment of new recruits.

Some ASSF units have nevertheless experienced challenges in obtaining necessary personnel. The issue appears particularly troublesome in the support area because the tashkil (the ANDSF equipment and personnel entitlement document) has not been updated to reflect changing operational requirements over the last 3 years. As a result, personnel and equipment entitlements may not have accurately reflected operational needs for more than 2 years. An updated tashkil released in August 2015 included an increase in the number of maintenance personnel authorized within ASSF units. The MOD has recently accepted the updated tashkil and allowed ANASOC to recruit support personnel. Total MOI maintenance personnel remains unchanged pending authorization and implementation of the latest tashkil.

TAA Support

Afghan special security forces, both MOD and MOI, have executed missions professionally and successfully over the past year and constitute some of the most capable fighting forces in the region. Despite the impacts of the capacity challenges facing the entire ANDSF, RS advisors say the progress of the ASSF is trending positively overall. Coalition support and oversight will arguably be needed to continue this trend. USFOR-A reports that NSOCC-A advisors have daily contact with many ASSF units. Afghan intelligence leadership regularly provides feedback on the kind of assistance they require, and Afghan intelligence personnel are generally receptive to suggestions that RS advisors provide. Future oversight planning will consider the need to monitor progress and address continuing ASSF challenges.
RESOLUTE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

OFS directs U.S. forces to support the NATO-led non-combat RS mission, which focuses on building capacity from the ministry level down to the corps level in key systems and processes that support the generation, resourcing, and sustainment of the ANSF. As a result, coalition forces are no longer embedded with Afghan conventional forces at the tactical level. \(^{147}\) RS advisors continue to address developmental shortfalls in the ANSF capabilities through eight Essential Functions (EFs) that encompass the systems and processes required to sustain the Afghan security institutions. \(^{148}\)

- EF 1—plan, program, budget, and execute
- EF 2—transparency, accountability, and oversight
- EF 3—civilian governance of the Afghan security institutions and adherence to rule of law
- EF 4—force generation
- EF 5—sustain the force
- EF 6—plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns
- EF 7—develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes
- EF 8—maintain internal and external strategic communication capability

As of October 2015, 41 nations had more than 10,000 military personnel participating in RS, including 26 NATO allies and 15 other partner countries. Approximately 6,800 U.S. personnel support the RS mission. \(^{149}\)

Since 2002, the U.S. has invested an estimated $65 billion\(^ {150}\) to help generate a self-sustaining ANSF, now with a total force strength of 324,000 army and police personnel against an authorized force level of 352,000. In addition, the Afghan Local Police, which are essentially village guards, have an authorized force level of 30,000, with approximately 28,000 on board as of August 2015. \(^{151}\) For an overview of the ANSF’s MOD and MOI forces, including personnel, equipment inventories, U.S. investment, funding needed to sustain the forces, indications of weakness, and progress toward capacity development, see the infographic in this section. \(^ {152}\)
ANDSF Joint Operations

In September 2015, the UN Secretary General reported that there was “a noticeable spike in high-profile incidents in Kabul.” The uptick in violence followed confirmation of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. 153

In August 2015, leadership of the Afghan MOD and MOI planned and executed Operation Iron Triangle to clear the area in Nangarhar province used as a staging area for attacks on Kabul. The operation was the first joint combat operation planned, led, and executed by the Afghans in the security area of Kabul. It included the ANA, Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Patrol, Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan National Police, National Directorate of Security, and AAF. RS Headquarters called it “the best level of cooperation we’ve seen of any operation to date this year.” 154 Some of the Afghan forces’ tactical accomplishments included directing the new MD-530 helicopters firing in support of ground forces for the first time on the battlefield; locating and clearing more than 150 IEDs; and clearing insurgent activity from more than 31 miles of roads and towns. 155 The operation was anticipated to take three weeks; however, the ANDSF cleared territory and reached the goal of the Hisarak District Center in Nangarhar province three days ahead of plans. 156
Defense Force Strength, as of 7/2015

Officers 31,000  
NCOs 60,000  
Soldiers 78,000  
Civilians 7,000

MOD Security Institutions

176,000

onboard | 195,000 authorized

- Afghan National Army
  - 6 Army Corps and Capital Division
  - Afghan Special Forces
- Afghan Air Force
- Facility Protection Force

≈2.4% monthly ANA attrition rate

U.S Funding Estimated for ANA Sustainment in FY2016—$705.0M

Army Salaries/Pay Reimbursements $304.4M 43.2%
Civilian Salaries $14.7M 2.1%
Incentive Pay/Pay Programs $358.9M 54.7%

$21 Million

Special Mission Wing Inventory/Pilots Completing Initial Entry Rotary Training, as of 9/2015

ANA trust fund pledges by allies and partners through 2017

$450M per year

MOD Equipment, Projected Inventory

U.S. appropriations to build the ANDSF since FY 2002 ($4B in FY 2015)

“Ultimately, the Afghan security leaders need to discern better when to fight, when to hold, and where to assume risk. Despite these shortcomings, however, the Afghan security forces have displayed courage and resilience. They’re still holding.”

~General John F. Campbell, RS and USFOR-A commander

Status of Maintainers & Year of Projected Completion (5–7 years in training pipeline)

Status of Pilots & Year of Projected Completion (3–4 years in training pipeline)

Status of Logistics Support

Ministry of Defense (MOD)
The ANDSF is generally effective, during ongoing operations, using the major weapon systems that DoD has provided in recent years, particularly aircraft, combat vehicles, artillery, mortars, and small arms. If anything, the sharp increase in ANDSF operational tempo this year is overstressing their equipment. For example, the Mi-17 fleet is flying more than the programmed hours, putting stress on the aircraft. DoD is not planning on buying any more Mi-17s but is studying future replacement of the fleet with U.S. aircraft. In addition, given the high usage and criticality of protected mobility, DoD is procuring an additional 1,600 up-armored HMMWVs to enhance Afghan police capability and to partially replenish Afghan Army combat losses. DoD is also procuring 157,000 M16A4s for the Afghan police to standardize the ANDSF with U.S. rifles, replacing aging AK-47s. —OUSD(P)

65% of ANDSF are functionally illiterate

The ANDSF is generally effective, during ongoing operations, using the major weapon systems that DoD has provided in recent years, particularly aircraft, combat vehicles, artillery, mortars, and small arms. If anything, the sharp increase in ANDSF operational tempo this year is overstressing their equipment. For example, the Mi-17 fleet is flying more than the programmed hours, putting stress on the aircraft. DoD is not planning on buying any more Mi-17s but is studying future replacement of the fleet with U.S. aircraft. In addition, given the high usage and criticality of protected mobility, DoD is procuring an additional 1,600 up-armored HMMWVs to enhance Afghan police capability and to partially replenish Afghan Army combat losses. DoD is also procuring 157,000 M16A4s for the Afghan police to standardize the ANDSF with U.S. rifles, replacing aging AK-47s. —OUSD(P)
According to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the MOD has been provided enough counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) equipment to fill all tashkil authorizations. However, some of the equipment has been damaged or destroyed in combat, and due to a lack of repair manuals and parts catalogs, Afghan units have had difficulty ordering the correct repair parts in a timely manner.157

According to CSTC-A, MOD C-IED unit leadership is capable, but constrained by a cautious headquarters. CSTC-A reported that ANA Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel levels are low (currently about 50%) relative to the number that have been trained (more than 200%). ANA retention of EOD personnel has reportedly been hampered by the misuse of trained personnel, casualties, and lack of promised incentive pay. CSTC-A reported that the MOI C-IED police force has strong leadership, its retention is high, and incentive pays will be increased within the next year, which will likely serve as an effective tool to improve retention. An ANA train-the-trainer program at the Engineer School in Mazar-e Sharif has a self-sustaining training cadre that will support an ANA training surge. In addition, train-the-trainer curriculum will continue at the Combat Training Center-Kabul through 2016 to develop a sustainable training cadre for the ANP.158

Current TAA initiatives under the RS mission include: an EOD training surge for 360 additional EOD personnel to increase manning above 80% at Bagram Airfield and other locations in the South and East, filling ANA C-IED HQ staff positions above 90%, staff capability development, and the addition of an electronic countermeasure branch to the tashkil.159

TAA planned initiatives include:160

- mid-level EOD/IEDD Police professional development
- C-IED awareness training for police and other government officials
- advise and assist only at the ministerial and institutional levels through 2017
- sustainment equipping to replace wear and tear/battle damage in accordance with historic consumption rates
Ministerial Capacity Development

The primary focus of NATO RS advisors is assisting the Afghan government to build systems and processes that will enable MOD and MOI to support the ANDSF. Although progress has been made in capacity-building efforts, significant capability gaps exist in both ministries. A factor that could impact progress, particularly in MOD, is instability at top leadership positions. On July 4, 2015, the Afghan parliament rejected President Ghani’s third nominee for Minister of Defense, Masoom Stanekzai, who had been serving in an acting capacity since May 2015. The previous nominee for Minister of Defense withdrew his nomination on April 8, 2015, before the parliament scheduled the vote. President Ghani has retired 72 general officers in MOD since taking office. According to DoD, political delays in naming senior MOD leaders impede decision making and impact the development of Afghan strategic documents. Current and future advisory efforts will focus on critical weaknesses affecting both ministries in varying degrees, each ministry having distinctive challenges.

SUSTAINMENT

NATO has identified sustainment as the “largest essential function” in the international coalition RS mission. It is considered vital to ensuring that the ANDSF is capable of maintaining mission capability and protecting the coalition investment in equipment provided to the ANA and ANP.

According to DoD, the sharp increase in ANDSF operating tempo this year has overstressed ANDSF equipment and highlights the critical need to address equipment sustainment. In that regard, DoD reports that Afghan sustainment capacity remains underdeveloped because of the past emphasis on rapidly generating and fielding line units, overreliance on support contractors to maintain equipment, limited coalition efforts to develop Afghan logistics training, and Afghan reliance on coalition sources for supply support.

The resulting gaps in Afghan ministerial capacity include the lack of effective systems and repeatable processes to develop requirements properly, delays in transitioning to a demand-based inventory system, and the need for assistance in forecasting and long-term planning. In his October 2015 testimony to Congress, General Campbell noted that shortages in operational units are most often the result of failures in accounting and distribution, rather than actual system-wide deficiencies—a problem exacerbated by the culture of hoarding and false claims of shortages to obtain more assistance. Although CSTC-A reports that both MOD and MOI can usually satisfy immediate requirements, it acknowledges that the failure to institutionalize life-cycle management processes could threaten long-term sustainability.
Afghan logistics leaders are addressing these issues by requesting U.S. support to improve their inventory management system and are embedding teams at the ANA corps that report to MOD on quantities and readiness status of key equipment. This effort is being facilitated by implementation of Core Information Management System (Core-IMS), which addresses warehouse inventory management needs from inventory initialization through order processing across multiple warehouses. DoD reports that full implementation of Core-IMS can provide asset visibility at all levels in the warehouse inventories and produce executive reports that will enable improvements in processing, shipping, and receiving.

Although use of the system has been hampered by electrical outages, network connectivity, and lack of training, the past 6 months have seen increasing use of Core-IMS to process electronic transactions at both national and regional logistics sites. CSTC-A reports that system use has been accelerated by the placement of 86 Afghan logistics specialists at sites to provide training and assistance in maintenance management, demand planning, and supply chain management. A second group of 44 logistics specialists completed training in September 2015. Additionally, 185 new computers and 18 new servers are scheduled to arrive at national and regional logistics sites by mid-October to expand utilization of Core-IMS. According to DoD, upgrades to Core-IMS software should be fielded in early 2016.
Gaps in sustainability are perhaps best illustrated by the MOD/MOI reliance on contracted maintenance. Although ANA personnel have made progress in performing maintenance on their equipment, the ANA continues to rely on contractor sites in Kabul and Kandahar for refurbished components. CSTC-A reported that ANA maintenance personnel have shown some capability for using the ANDSF supply requisition system, but their capabilities are limited and, when frustrated with their organic chain, turn to the coalition for solutions. One of the challenges facing Afghan maintainers is equipment that was provided without technical publications and parts manuals. ANP vehicle maintenance is performed by a contractor at 12 locations throughout the country. The ANP’s use of the MOI’s requisition system is considered “far from efficient,” reflecting limited focus by coalition advisors in previous years on assisting the Afghans in developing their logistics system.

To develop organic maintenance capabilities, one of the areas that needs development is ANA and ANP training institutions that will provide advanced technical training. The ANA leadership has requested RS support in establishing a 3-year technical academy that would provide officers with the knowledge necessary to oversee and provide training on preventive maintenance and services, as well as repair of equipment.

The challenges in developing an enduring logistics sustainment capability in the MOD were identified by a DoD IG assessment in December 2014 and remain a focus of coalition advisory efforts. The assessment found that, although the ANDSF was capable of conducting combat operations, its logistics systems remained “a work in progress.” A key observation identified ANA weaknesses in the development of a sustainable logistics planning capability— incomplete logistics guidance, limited expertise in requirements forecasting and contracting, and an ineffective information management systems. Additionally, the assessment found significant issues with ANA equipment repair/disposal cycles and the failure to turn-in and reutilization excess material. DoD IG found that these weaknesses were due, in part, to gaps in coalition advisor support, recommending that coalition advisors possess the capability and resources to ensure effective development of ANA logistics systems.

A subsequent DoD IG report, issued in January 2015, described similar logistics sustainment challenges in the MOI. The assessment found insufficient funding to support the ANP logistics infrastructure, delayed updates of MOI logistics guidance, noncompliance with existing guidance, inability to forecast supply requirements, failure to utilize automated processes, lack of vehicle maintenance planning, and insufficient numbers of skilled coalition logistics advisors.
Maintaining accountability for equipment procured for or transferred to the ANDSF is a critical element of sustainment. An April 2015 DoD IG audit found that neither MOD nor MOI had controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by the DoD for the ANDSF since 2005. Additionally, the audit reported that coalition advisors had no confidence the MOD/MOI ability to effectively and independently maintain vehicles, identifying weaknesses in supply chain management and maintenance expertise as leading causes. In response to audit recommendations, coalition advisors are coordinating with MOD/MOI counterparts to improve accuracy of vehicle records and strengthen maintenance capability.

To further evaluate equipment maintenance issues, SIGAR is currently assessing the extent to which the DoD-supported ANA Technical Equipment Maintenance Program is meeting its goals and whether DoD contractor performance under the program is adequate. SIGAR also issued an inquiry letter to U.S. military commanders in September 2015 questioning the large volume of equipment and vehicles being acquired by DoD on behalf of the ANDSF. SIGAR expressed concern that the quantities purchased may exceed requirements and prompt the ANDSF to dispose of existing assets before their service life is met. SIGAR is currently reviewing the DoD response.

**PROCUREMENT**

According to DoD, Afghan ministries’ procurement systems have not yet matured in terms of efficiency and internal controls. The result is a continuing backlog in satisfying current requirements. CSTC-A reports that the MOD Procurement Plan has 648 defined requirements, of which only 329 had been submitted to the MOD Acquisition Agency and 149 contracts awarded as of mid-September 2015. The MOI is experiencing a similar backlog, with 925 defined requirements—378 requirements submitted to the MOI Procurement Directorate and 83 contracts awarded.

The backlogs in MOD and MOI procurement systems have held up acquisition of critical goods and services, forcing the National Procurement Authority to issue decrees, with President Ghani’s approval, to award contracts for 119 MOD requirements and 165 in the MOI requirement without the open bidding process required by Afghan procurement law. According to CSTC-A, the continuing backlogs also delay execution of spending plans and limit the opportunities to transition procurement responsibilities from U.S. forces to GIRoA authorities.
A major contributor to current procurement backlogs is the rigor and oversight on contracting processes imposed by GIRoA in the wake of a scandal related to fuel procurement. In February 2015, President Ghani terminated a 3-year MOD fuel contract after Afghan oversight authorities, in concert with SIGAR and CSTC-A, found evidence of corruption in the form of collusion, price fixing, and bribery. In wake of the scandal, President Ghani established the National Procurement Authority to develop, review, and approve all large value contracts, an effort to reduce corruption and minimize cost.

A DoD IG audit issued in February 2015 found that neither MOD nor MOI adequately developed, awarded, executed, or monitored individual contracts funded with U.S. direct assistance. As a result, DoD IG concluded that direct assistance funds were vulnerable to fraud and abuse. CSTC-A agreed with the recommendation to place subject matter experts within the ministries to promote greater effectiveness, independence, and transparency.

Although actions taken to strengthen ministerial procurement accountability have slowed Afghan procurement operations, CSTC-A reports that these actions have led to more complete, robust contracts. Afghan procurement officials working together with RS advisors are adapting to new procedures. CSTC-A expects that the ministries will increase weekly procurement processing during the remainder of 2015. In addition, DoD is encouraging MOD and MOI to use the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system wherever possible because of the quality of materials received and accountability of funds it provides.

**PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

**Payroll Systems**

DoD reported that personnel and pay systems have not been fully integrated in the MOD and MOI. Instead, personnel tracking and salary payments are accomplished using manual transactions to interface among a collection of automated systems that do not communicate with each other. The situation facilitates fraud, minimizes accountability at all levels, precludes effective oversight, and contributes to inaccurate force strength, attendance, and financial statistics. Two recent SIGAR audits found significant vulnerabilities in ANA and ANP personnel/pay systems. An April 2015 SIGAR report concluded that weaknesses in ANA data and payment systems provide limited assurance that personnel receive accurate salaries and risk overpayment. Similarly, a January 2015 SIGAR audit found that limited functionality of the ANP payroll system and lack of data entry controls increased the risk of inaccurate and wrongful salary payments.
To correct problems with the current ANDSF payroll systems, the U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Enterprise Information Systems has deployed a team to Afghanistan at CSTC-A’s request. The team is working with the MOD and MOI to develop a new integrated personnel and payroll enterprise information system meant to address gaps in accountability for payroll. The system is scheduled to be fully operation for the ANA in July 2016, and for the ANP, in April 2017. Continued coalition involvement and oversight will be needed to achieve implementation by targeted dates.

The ANA and ANP use the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS) to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. AHRIMS connects slots with people, increasing accountability and eliminating “ghost soldiers”—people on the payroll who are not serving in MOD or MOI. NATO reports that coalition partners assisted MOD and MOI in its initial implementation and continue to provide guidance as AHRIMS improves coverage and addresses connectivity issues.

Based on information provided by USFOR-A, entering personnel data into AHRIMS (“slotting”) lagged until January 2015. By mid-September 2015, however, AHRIMS slotting increased from 59% to 97% of assigned strength in the ANA, and from 53% to 93% in the ANP. The rise in ANP slotting was a direct result of intervention by CSTC-A, which imposed financial penalties in March, April, and May 2015 when slotting fell significantly below objectives. USFOR-A reported that AHRIMS was active on 16 MOD servers and accessible from more than 22 MOD sites as of September 2015. AHRIMS was active on 7 MOI servers and accessible from more than 51 MOI sites. Approximately 500 personnel have been trained as AHRIMS operators in each ministry, and AHRIMS training manuals have been completed.

USFOR-A acknowledges that challenges with AHRIMS remain. Electronic workflows are not yet fully implemented, and key processes are still conducted by paper-based workflow. ANA identification card reforms to incorporate sequential numbering and biometric records will require a significant amount of data re-entry into AHRIMS. Connectivity and firewall issues between MOD’s 16 servers often prevent full synchronization.

NATO reported that similar challenges confront Afghan payroll operations, which remain largely manual with no internal controls or ability to audit. This creates opportunities for error and corruption, with no assurance that the right person is getting paid the right amount. MOD’s system (195,000 personnel with a $600 million–$700 million budget) is a completely manual process. According to DoD, ANA units report daily personnel attendance
that is entered manually into a series of data systems. Payroll-related information (such as rank and duty location) are ultimately loaded into the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS, the GIRoA budget and accounting system managed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF)), which calculates salary amounts and disburses funds to one of four banks. The banks then electronically transfer salaries directly to individual bank accounts.205

DoD further reports that the MOI payroll system (157,000 police/$500 million budget) uses disconnected automated processes requiring significant manual entry. Monthly attendance information is passed manually from local units to provincial headquarters, where MOI personnel provide payroll summaries to the MOF and enter attendance data into the Electronic Payroll System (EPS). The EPS is the ANP’s payroll system, administered by the United Nations Development Program to fund ANP salaries. Once funding is provided, the MOF disburses funds to one of four banks that make payments to individuals electronically.206 In the areas without banks, provincial MOF officials transfer monthly salary payments to a “trusted agent’s” bank account. This agent is charged with personally delivering those funds to recipients in cash.207

Personnel Planning

According to DoD, the MOD approach to recruitment and attrition aspects of personnel planning have been “inconsistent and unbalanced,” directly affecting ANA end strength.208 According to USFOR-A, a lack of communication between ANA recruiting, training, and personnel management organizations inhibits a coordinated approach to setting personnel targets across the career lifestyle. Moreover, a lack of manpower forecasting capability in the ANA limits reliability of force strength projections.209

To address these issues, USFOR-A reports that the first 12-month ANA personnel plan was developed and signed by the Chief of General Staff, MOD, on June 1, 2015, with the objective of growing the Army to approximately 187,000 by March 2016 (from approximately 176,000 in June 2015). With coalition assistance, the framework for the first 3-year ANA manpower plan has been developed.210

According to DoD, similar problems exist in the MOI, where coalition advisors have focused efforts on projecting future manning requirements and identifying factors contributing to attrition.211 Additionally, USFOR-A reports that significant gaps in training continues to impact professionalism in the ANP. The MOI made no significant progress in reducing the number of
untrained police in 2015. At the end of August 2015, more than 21,000 ANP and ALP personnel remained untrained. The ANP Regional Training Centers have sufficient capacity to train these personnel, but ANP Provincial Chiefs of Police are unwilling to send personnel to training during the fighting season. Additionally, the MOI Training General Command does not proactively forecast training requirements, instead requesting that the recruiting command send students to fill unused spaces at training centers.\textsuperscript{212}

According to CSTC-A, coalition advisors assisted the MOI in scheduling a training surge from the period November 2015 to June 2016 to address the issue. This ambitious schedule will significantly reduce the number of untrained ANP personnel, but will require strong leadership to overcome potential logistics and security challenges.\textsuperscript{213} USFOR-A also noted that working groups have formed to develop a 5-year ANP strategic manpower plan.\textsuperscript{214}

In his October 2015 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Campbell emphasized that attrition throughout the ANDSF remains high and has affected combat readiness. Unauthorized absences account for 70% of ANDSF personnel losses (casualties being the other main contributor) and pose increasingly significant challenges to force generation, development, and readiness over time. According to General Campbell, coalition TAA efforts will continue to focus on reducing Afghan combat casualties and on addressing systemic causes of attrition to ensure the long-term health and sustainability of the ANDSF.\textsuperscript{215} USFOR-A emphasizes that a full commitment from the ANA Recruiting Command is needed to achieve monthly recruiting goals, while reduction of ANA and ANP attrition rates is essential.\textsuperscript{216}

Transition to Civilian Leadership

A final challenge in the personnel management area concerns the lack of progress in “civilianization”—an initiative resulting from the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit agreement that the ANDSF would operate under civilian leadership.\textsuperscript{217} The 2014 MOD Bilateral Civilianization Agreement between CSTC-A and GIROA established milestones to transfer 7,783 MOD positions from military to civilian rosters by March 2014, convert qualified incumbents of 5,606 military positions to civilian status by December 2014, and convert qualified incumbents of the remaining 2,177 positions by December 2015. According to USFOR-A, the first two milestones were not met, and little progress has been made on the third milestone.\textsuperscript{218}
USFOR-A reported that the civilianization program was restarted in July 2015 when coalition advisors accelerated program efforts by MOD and the Afghan Civil Service Commission, resulting in the appointment of a dedicated project manager to develop an implementation plan. Since then, CSTC-A has reduced the number of positions identified for conversion from 7,783 to 4,783, all of which have been reviewed and aligned to civil service pay scales. However, further progress in this area will be slow given the apparent lack of emphasis placed on civilianization by GIRoA authorities.

CORRUPTION

President Ghani has stated that corruption, and not the Taliban, is Afghanistan’s worst enemy. A June 2015 report from the independent Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization noted, “Afghanistan is one of the most difficult and corrupt places in which to function.” General John Allen, then commander of the International Security Assistance Force, considered corruption “the existential threat to the long-term viability of modern Afghanistan.” In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Campbell emphasized that Afghanistan alone cannot afford its security forces at present levels but must depend on continued funding from the international community. However, CSTC-A cautions that poor management and corrupt practices could lead to a reduction in international contributions over time.

Although top Afghan leaders have expressed strong support for anticorruption measures, according to CSTC-A there remains a lack of high-level strategic guidance. The revision of the Anti-Corruption Strategy is overdue, and the Anti-Corruption Law remains in draft status. Fourteen of 38 top Afghan leaders have not yet declared their assets as required by Article 154 of Afghanistan’s constitution.

MOD and MOI procurement systems were effectively shut down in February 2015 after the discovery of a $200 million fuel-procurement scandal. Although greater rigor in awarding contracts has improved quality and transparency, throughput has slowed with resultant delays in budget execution and receipt of supplies. CSTC-A continues to develop Afghan capability to use the FMS system as an economical and transparent means of obtaining equipment, supplies, and ammunition.

As discussed above, SIGAR has identified capability gaps in both ANA and ANP pay systems which could allow diversion of salaries from recipients and payments of erroneous persons and amounts. Another area vulnerable to corruption concerns ANDSF inventories of fuel and ammunition. According to a DoD IG assessment in April 2015, lack of internal controls over MOD/MOI fuel and ammunition increased the probability for theft and diversion of fuel and ammunition to unauthorized users.
Based on information provided by CSTC-A, it is apparent that initiatives to reduce corruption in MOD and MOI have met with mixed success and will continue to require strong coalition support. The establishment of internal controls, formation of anticorruption forums, and initiation of organizational inspections demonstrate efforts in MOD and MOI to promote transparency and identify corrupt practices. However, much remains to be done.

**Ministry of Defense**

According to CSTC-A, the acting Minister of Defense signed the Ministerial Internal Controls Program (MICP) in April 2015, along with the anticorruption policy. RS advisors assisted with the development of MICP guidelines, which is leading to the introduction of process maps, inspection and audit plans, and a sustainable control process for major budget items (such as ANA food, fuel, ammunition, and payroll). The MOD and General Staff IGs have accepted responsibility for the implementation of MICP in MOD, and staff training efforts have begun. As a result, implementation in MOD has achieved its first milestone (“initiated”) and is on schedule to achieve “partially effective” in November 2015.

Transparency and Accountability Committees (TACs) have been established to enable ANA Corps IGs to communicate corruption issues up the chain of command. However, according to CSTC-A, the political will to make this an effective forum is lacking. A recent assessment by the MOD IG indicated that the TACs are ineffective and their working actions unsatisfactory. Other MOD oversight organizations are still evolving, with their full impact yet to be achieved. The MOD has conducted monthly Counter Corruption Working Groups chaired by the MOD IG and held two meetings of the Senior High Commission for Anti-Corruption, chaired by the first deputy minister. A third MOD oversight organization, the Senior Leader Counter-Corruption Panel, chaired by the Minister of Defense, has yet to meet.

**Ministry of Interior**

According to CSTC-A, the MOI has effectively implemented MICP, having achieved the “initiated” milestone and is on schedule to achieve “partially effective” in November 2015. The MOI Inspector General, who was appointed in July 2015, issued MICP Implementation Policy on August 29, 2015, and commenced internal control training for IG staff which possess limited technical capacity. CSTC-A reported that IG staff will commence a review of oversight organizations and will map key IG processes, identify internal
controls, and document weaknesses in November 2015. The MOI will reestablish two oversight forums—the Transparency Working Group and the Transparency Steering Group—but these groups have not yet been activated.

Under direction of the MOI IG, fuel inspections have strengthened fuel accountability. The objective is to establish a continuous fuel inspection program in an effort to reduce misappropriation and policy noncompliance. This inspection program will require the continued support of RS advisors to build MOI capacity in planning, executing, and reporting inspections.

Investigating and Prosecuting Corruption

The capability to investigate and prosecute specific cases of corruption is improving with the continued assistance of RS advisors, according to information provided by CSTC-A. However, limited coordination among responsible organizations, resource constraints, and the lack of political will are impeding progress in this area. The MOD has made recent efforts to collaborate on corruption investigations. The Criminal Investigation Division (CID), General Staff IG, and General Staff Intelligence Directorate agreed to form an MOD headquarters and corps level corruption coordination cell. Investigations will be centrally tracked, coordinated, and evaluated and the ministerial level. During August 2015, the MOD prosecuted and convicted a number of corps-level officials for dereliction of duty related to fuel accountability. Because corruption cases within the MOD can be handled internally within the ANA courts-martial system, CSTC-A does not consider inter-ministerial cooperation (between MOD and the Attorney General’s Office, or AGO) to be an issue.

Although some progress has been made in MOI efforts to investigate corruption and bribery, gaps remain in funding investigative operations and in achieving successful prosecution of charged individuals. According to CSTC-A, both the Afghan Anti-crime Police and the MOI segment of the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) have been operating with insufficient funding for the past 10 months. (MCTF employs investigators from the MOI and National Directorate of Security.) The Minister of Interior now grants funding on a case-by-case basis, but cases submitted for funding have not been approved. MOI case development has stalled as unpaid informants refuse to work and MOI investigators cannot travel to remote crime scenes. Further, CSTC-A reports that the MCTF lacks the autonomy to pursue cases on its own. Every case must be approved by senior officials outside the MCTF, which can stall case initiation and inhibit investigator initiative. Allowing the MCTF to pursue cases independently would ameliorate these obstacles.
CSTC-A reported that MOI corruption investigations have been further inhibited by a perceived lack of confidence by MOI investigators that cases referred to the AGO will be successfully prosecuted. Since January 1, 2015, the MCTF has submitted more than 150 cases to the AGO for prosecution and has learned that about 30 cases were prosecuted. This quarter, the MCTF has referred 11 corruption cases involving senior GIRoA officials to the AGO for prosecution, but none of these cases has been adjudicated. According to CSTC-A, there is little follow-up between the MOI and the AGO to obtain status of referrals. A draft document between the Acting Attorney General and the MOI for inter-ministerial cooperation could lead to improvement if signed and implemented.238

However, based on recent experience, the prognosis for improved MOI-AGO coordination may not be favorable. In a July 2015 audit, SIGAR noted that DoJ and DoS officials expressed the view that the AGO has for several years been unwilling to fight corruption. The officials reported that the AGO has not been pursing complex, high-level corruption cases and has routinely declined offers from DoJ to train Afghan prosecutors on investigative methods for pursing corruption cases. In short, SIGAR reported, “pervasive corruption in Afghanistan’s justice sector,” which has not shown any significant improvement.239
UPDATE ON THE LEAD IG MODEL

In January 2013, Section 8L of the amended Inspector General Act introduced the Lead IG model, creating the structure for teams of IGs to cooperate through shared processes and shared values. The challenges inherent in OCOs require problem solving that crosses agency boundaries—problems that cannot be handled independently by an individual agency. During the reporting period, the Lead IG agencies expanded their oversight capabilities and collaborated with other oversight partners to finalize the FY 2016 JSOP for Afghanistan.

For background on the designation of OFS as an OCO and designation of the Lead Inspector General, see Appendix B. For the text of section 8L, see Appendix C.

Staffing and Outreach

During the reporting period, the Lead IG agencies took significant steps toward staffing their respective OCO oversight efforts. This strategy includes a combination of assigning permanent staff and hiring new staff through the special hiring authority provided within 5 USC 3161 and the re-employment of annuitants provided within 5 USC 9902. Each Lead IG agency has assigned current permanent staff, as well as newly hired 3161 personnel to the oversight projects identified in this report and in support of the strategic oversight plan and reporting responsibilities.

Further, the Lead IG agencies have adopted an expeditionary workforce model to support efforts throughout the OFS region. Staff deployed overseas serve 3-12 months, and teams travel, as needed, to locations in the Afghanistan to conduct oversight. DoD IG deployed a regional investigations director to coordinate and manage operations and special agents conducting investigations in its field offices in Afghanistan.

Senior officials of the Lead IG agencies continue to visit commands and offices in OCO-related locations. During this reporting period, DoD’s Principal Deputy Inspector General and other officials traveled overseas for in-country meetings with military leadership in Afghanistan.
Joint Strategic Planning

The FY 2016 JSOP for Afghanistan was published, along with the JSOP for Operation Inherent Resolve and other Southwest Asia oversight plans, in the newly consolidated FY 2016 Comprehensive Oversight Plan-Overseas Contingency Operations, or COP-OCO. The JSOP for Afghanistan speaks to ongoing, planned, and completed projects related to OFS, reconstruction, and other Afghanistan areas of interest. All three Lead IG agencies have signed the JSOP for Afghanistan, as has SIGAR. The JSOP includes oversight efforts by other contributors as well, including the U.S. Army Audit Agency, Naval Audit Service, Air Force Audit Agency, and the Government Accountability Office.

The JSOP outlines the body of work planned for comprehensive and coordinated oversight, and allows for adjustments to support the transition in OFS operations, provide complete oversight, and avoid duplication of effort. Oversight projects are designed to achieve the following outcomes:

• Identifying challenges in critical operations and funds that can be put to better use to support operations.
• Providing independent, reliable, timely, and relevant reporting to internal and external organizations on the use of funds provided to achieve the national goals of the United States.
• Identifying life and safety risks and determining whether they have the necessary equipment, training, and resources to conduct missions within acceptable risks.
• Improving contingency business operations, including contracting, logistics, and financial management.

The JSOP for Afghanistan is organized by eight strategic oversight issues (SOIs). Four of these SOIs are primarily within OFS oversight:

• RS Mission and Transition to Security Cooperation
• Intelligence and Counterterrorism
• Retrograde and Property Management
• Contract Management and Oversight
The remaining four SOIs receive oversight from the Lead IG agencies and SIGAR or other oversight agencies:

- Building the Capacity and Capabilities of the ANDSF and Administering and Maintaining Accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- Building Afghan Governance Capacity and Sustaining U.S. Investment in Afghan Institutions and Infrastructure
- Implementing and Executing Anti-Corruption and Counternarcotics Programs
- Awarding and Administering Reconstruction Contracts

**OFS Oversight Responsibilities**

With respect to the OFS missions, the Lead IG agencies have oversight responsibility for the counterterrorism mission and the eight RS Essential Functions that guide the TAA mission. The Lead IGs have specific responsibility for Intelligence (EF7) and Strategic Communications (EF8) and shared oversight responsibility with SIGAR for the first six Essential Functions.

The Lead IG publishes quarterly and biannual reports pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. SIGAR publishes quarterly reports that provide additional details on programs related to building the capacity of the ANDSF as part of its reporting on reconstruction operations and programs in Afghanistan. For Lead IG reports and the COP-OCO, visit www.dodig.mil/oco. For SIGAR reports, visit www.sigar.mil.
RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION AND TRANSITION TO SECURITY COOPERATION

The specifics of a transition from NATO’s RS to a new security mission are under review after the President’s announcement that more U.S. troops would remain in country through the end of 2016. In planning prior to the announcement, the reconstruction-related SOIs “Building the Capacity and Capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces for the Transition to the Security Cooperation” and “Building Afghan Governance Capacity and Sustaining U.S. Investment in Afghan Institutions and Infrastructure” informed potential transition requirements. CSTC-A is responsible for the oversight and administration of the U.S. defense spending for programs that help build the capacity and capability of the ANDSF and maintains oversight of donor funds. The international community is also investing in Afghanistan, and the confidence of donor nations is essential to the transition.

CSTC-A focused on “top 10 initiatives” this past year to prepare for a transition to a defense security cooperation mission. According to General Campbell, these initiatives covered areas within “doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, personnel, and facilities” for the ANDSF. To help influence institutional behavior, CSTC-A and the ANDSF signed mutually agreed letters of commitment establishing conditions for the GIRoA to meet to receive funding, equipment, or infrastructure. In 2015, they signed 93 commitments: 45 with the MOD and 48 with the MOI. These commitments are developed to help improve MOD and MOI processes and procedures, and reduce fraud and corruption opportunities because the CSTC-A can leverage funds against performance. CSTC-A regards the conditions of the commitments as a difficult balance between instilling the fiscal disciplines for successfully sustaining the ANDSF and providing the necessary resources to provide security and fight the insurgency.

DoS OIG will conduct an audit to review planning for the transition to a security cooperation mission in Afghanistan. SIGAR has a planned project to assess DoD’s advisory efforts with Afghan MOD and MOI and another project to determine RS mission metrics of successes and failures.
DoD IG issued assessments of the transition of the security assistance mission in Iraq, from 2011 through 2013. These reports offer relevant lessons learned for the transition in Afghanistan. In 2011, DoD IG evaluated the planning for transitioning the security assistance mission in Iraq from DoD to DoS. It assessed whether the goals, objectives, plans, and guidance were in place to make the transition, and whether the troop drawdown adversely impacted the security assistance program. According to DoD IG, withdrawal of forces took priority over planning for an enduring security cooperation in Iraq, and the review found shortcomings in the joint doctrine. The report provided several recommendations for the U.S. Central Command and theater security operation planning.

In 2013, DoD IG issued a report that looked at the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) security cooperation programs, examining its organization and preparedness for its mission. DoD IG again found joint doctrine insufficient in supporting “the post-contingency inter-departmental transition of responsibilities in Iraq.”

In addition to assessments described above, DoS OIG published a performance evaluation of the planning for the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq in 2011. The report noted progress was slipping, attributing many weaknesses to a lack of senior-level DoS participation. A permanent transition coordinator was appointed to solve the progress issues as the responsibilities for security, life support, transportation and other logistical support transferred from DoD to DoS. DoS OIG also published a report in 2009 with key findings in DoS security planning and operational requirements to meet U.S. military reduction, transition, and normalization.
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM

With the end of the U.S. combat mission in Afghanistan, the ANDSF has assumed increased responsibilities for counterterrorism operations that depend on a robust, integrated intelligence capability. Although oversight of intelligence operations in Afghanistan was limited in the past, the commencement of OFS generated a need for oversight projects that examine progress being made in building an enduring institutional intelligence capability within Afghan security institutions, evaluate the adequacy of intelligence capabilities supporting the U.S. counterterrorism mission, and examine information sharing between the United States, GIRoA, and NATO partners.

To address these issues, DoD IG is planning three oversight projects expected to commence in late 2015 and continue sequentially through the end of 2016:

• **An evaluation of USFOR-A progress in training Afghan Security Forces to become self-supporting in intelligence operations.** As part of this assessment, the oversight project team will meet with personnel from training locations in Afghanistan to examine strategy, plans, and policy for intelligence training transition.

• **An evaluation of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to the continuing U.S. counterterrorism mission.** The project will evaluate the existing ISR posture and its ability to support U.S. counterterrorism operations.

• **An evaluation of intelligence and information sharing/fusion with coalition/Afghan partners, in light of applicable DoD guidelines.** As part of this effort, the project team will apply lessons learned from intelligence oversight work conducted to support Operation Inherent Resolve.

DoD IG is also developing a project to assess the operational counterterrorism capabilities of the ANASOF and evaluate the TAA coalition efforts. DoS OIG has a planned project to audit the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in the countries under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs.

The SOI “Implementing and Executing Anticorruption and Counternarcotics Programs” is relevant to the overall counterterrorism environment. SIGAR has planned projects to review of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units and assess its long-term sustainability; to examine SOJTF-A
plans to monitor village stability operations and Afghan local police, as well as the progress of establishing stability bubbles around rural areas; to inspect ANA Camp Commando Phases III and IV; and to inspect the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing facilities in Kandahar.

RETROGRADE AND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

Since 2011, when U.S. forces began drawing down operations in Afghanistan, logisticians have been working to retrograde more than a decade’s accumulation of equipment in theater. As a result, the development and implementation of retrograde policy and procedures, physical security over retrograde assets, equipment accountability, and contractor retrograde performance have been, and will continue to be, issues of interest for future contingencies.255

During the last 5 years, GAO, DoD IG, and the Army Audit Agency have issued reports illustrating the magnitude of the problem and providing recommendations to improve Afghanistan drawdown operations. For example, a DoD IG audit completed in March 2014 found that the lack of effective procedures for processing and safeguarding equipment was largely responsible for nearly $590 million in accumulated losses reported from May 2012 through May 2013 at the Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT) yards in Afghanistan. Included in these losses were weapons, weapons systems, and other sensitive items.256 In response to the audit, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command chartered a property reconciliation task force designed to conduct causative research on previous property losses and re-establish accountability. The task force calculated that more than $2.3 billion in property losses had accumulated since 2006. As of October 2015, the task force had recovered $1.4 billion in previously unaccounted for equipment.257

A May 2015 DoD IG audit found that oversight of contractors supporting RPAT operations was not effective. Specifically, due to a poorly written performance work statement (PWS), oversight officials did not agree on whether the contractor performed contract requirements. The Army Sustainment Command and Army Contract Command-Rock Island are taking action to strengthen the PWS for use in follow-on contracts for RPAT support.258
To guide future retrograde efforts in Afghanistan and emerging OCOs, an August 2015 DoD IG audit report summarized weaknesses found in 10 of its previously issued reports. The report is intended to advise incoming commanders of potential pitfalls in retrograde operations and avoid the five recurring weaknesses found in past oversight projects:

- lack of physical security controls
- ineffective equipment accountability controls
- insufficient contractor oversight
- inaccurate property accountability systems
- inadequate development of and compliance with policies/procedures

Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners will consider these issues in designing future projects.

**CONTRACT OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT**

Consistent with the transition of security responsibilities to the ANDSF, oversight projects will focus on contracts now being awarded by GIROA using ASFF resources and U.S. contracts used for enduring functions that support U.S. forces.

In a February 2011 policy memorandum, the DoD Comptroller authorized the CSTC-A to provide ASFF resources directly to Afghanistan’s MOD and MOI to sustain the ANDSF. The goal of this support was to develop ministerial capability and capacity in the areas of budget development and execution, payment of salaries, acquisition planning, and procurement. Establishing a formal process to manage these contributions assists the Afghanistan ministries in developing the skills and experience to provide security independently and operate successfully within the GIROA. Furthermore, the process helps ensure contributions are executed responsibly and directly benefit the ANDSF.

CSTC-A directs U.S. efforts to organize, train, and equip the ANDSF. It is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring adequate fiscal controls are in place to safeguard appropriated ASFF direct contributions provided to the Afghanistan ministries. CSTC-A provides trained staff to collaborate with the MOF, MOD, and MOI for budgeting, acquisition planning, procurement, financial management, and contract management and oversight. Finally, CSTC-A must ensure the MOF, MOD, and MOI establish standard operating procedures and maintain adequate fiscal controls and auditable records to oversee ASFF direct contributions.
This arrangement shifts the responsibility for large-dollar contracts (such as those for ANDSF fuel and equipment maintenance) to GIRoA with CSTC-A assistance. DoD IG has ongoing projects to evaluate the transition of responsibilities for large contracts to the GIRoA. For example, recently the MOD fuel contracts came under scrutiny for corruption, and MOD could not provide sufficient documentation to support $76 million in fuel requirements and deliveries on a previously awarded fuel contract. An ongoing DoD IG audit will seek to determine whether CSTC-A and the MOI have established effective controls for oversight of nearly $500 million in MOI fuel contracts. An earlier DoD IG audit report (issued in February 2015) found that MOD and MOI did not have effective controls over the contract management process, that MOD/MOI IGs failed to properly oversee the contracting process, and that CSTC-A did not enforce agreements (“commitment letters”) with GIRoA to impose management controls. In response to the audit, CSTC-A reported that it was taking action to add stricter language to commitment letters, improve ministry IG oversight, and place subject matter experts within the ministries to build their procurement capability.

The GIRoA creation of the National Procurement Authority to develop, review, and approve all contracts valued at 20 million afghanis (about $300,000) or more promotes transparency and institutional procedures to improve the quality of contracts. As of September 12, 2015, 150 MOD contracts and 99 MOI contracts had been awarded, with the numbers expected to continue to increase.

To determine whether controls for monitoring contractor performance remain effective for large U.S.-awarded contracts providing support to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, an ongoing DoD IG audit project will evaluate the assignment and training of DOD contracting officer’s representatives.

Projects undertaken to examine the award and administration of reconstruction contracts complement oversight responsibilities described above that pertain to contracts supporting the ANDSF and U.S. forces. A recent inspection by SIGAR found that construction of a $14.7 million Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse facility at Kandahar Airfield met technical requirements, but that a 2-year delay in completion (from August 2011 to February 2014) rendered the warehouse unnecessary given DLA intent to leave Kandahar. In April 2015, SIGAR found that the termination-for-convenience of an ANA slaughterhouse construction contract could cost DoD as much as $5.77 million, even though construction was no more than 10% complete. In an August 2015 alert letter to DoD officials, SIGAR addressed a similar situation at Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, where a contract for construction of a command-and-control facility had been terminated for convenience because the facility was no longer needed.
and construction was far behind schedule. Although it found the decision to terminate reasonable, SIGAR recommended that DoD reevaluate the need for the facility and complete remaining construction if warranted.  

OVERSIGHT PROJECTS

Final Reports

U.S. oversight agencies completed 13 oversight projects related to OFS during April 1–September 30, 2015.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Drawdown of Equipment in Afghanistan: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued from August 19, 2011, through May 18, 2015
DODIG-2015-156, August 5, 2015

The report summarized systemic challenges associated with the drawdown of equipment and forces in Afghanistan that were identified in 10 previous DoD IG reports. The report is intended to advise incoming commanders of potential pitfalls in retrograde operations and avoid the five recurring weaknesses found in past oversight projects: (1) lack of physical security controls; (2) ineffective equipment accountability controls; (3) insufficient contractor oversight; (4) inaccurate property accountability systems; and (5) inadequate development of and compliance with policies/procedures. The reported weaknesses indicate there is an opportunity to improve drawdown procedures by applying lessons learned to future retrograde operations in Afghanistan and future contingency operations.

Independent Auditor’s Report on the Examination of Department of Defense Execution of Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund Donations to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
DODIG-2015-154, July 31, 2015

Because of the significance of material variances, management’s assertion of the receipts and expenditures of projects fully funded with contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund in FY 2013 or earlier was not presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Material variances were discovered after auditors reconciled the asserted amounts to the transaction-level supporting documentation. Collections, obligations, and disbursements related to $490 million of the $538 million received were verified. Auditors found variances of $17.1 million in obligations and $16.3 million in disbursements. As a result, a material misstatement in the assertion was identified.
Contract Oversight for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations in Afghanistan Needs Improvement
DODIG-2015-126, May 18, 2015

DoD IG determined that the 401st Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) did not provide effective contract oversight of the Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT) operations in Afghanistan. A review of internal controls found that a poorly written Performance Work Statement on a support contract led to disagreements between the 401st AFSB and DCMA as to contract requirements. Additionally, the 401st failed to follow Army regulations for timely initiation of property loss investigations. As a result, DoD lost visibility of at least $26.5 million in equipment. DoD IG recommended that property loss investigations be initiated within established timeframes and that the 401st AFSB issue internal guidance and provide training to its Approving Officials and CORs that would reinforce policy requirements on property loss reporting. The 401st AFSB Commander agreed with the recommendations and took immediate action to resolve these concerns.

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts To Develop the Sufficiency of Afghan National Security Forces’ Policies, Processes, and Procedures for the Management and Accountability of Class III (Fuel) and V (Ammunition)

Coalition force and ANDSF leaders recognized that development of policies and procedures for the management and accountability of fuel (Class III [Bulk]) and conventional military ammunition and explosives (Class V) was crucial to long-term ANDSF operational success. (In order to facilitate supply management and planning, supplies are grouped into 10 categories or “classes.”) Coalition force leaders and advisors and ANDSF leaders and senior logisticians identified a need for updated policy, procedures, and management controls; improved policy enforcement/implementation; and increased contract oversight. This report contains 7 observations, resulting in 17 recommendations. DoD IG identified key issues in four areas related to the management and accountability of fuel and ammunition by the ANDSF: consumption reporting, management controls, training, and contract oversight.
Challenges Exist for Asset Accountability and Maintenance and Sustainment of Vehicles Within the Afghan National Security Forces  
DODIG-2015-107, April 17, 2015

CSTC–A and Afghanistan’s MOD and MOI did not have controls in place to effectively manage accountability of the approximately 95,000 vehicles procured by DoD for the ANDSF since 2005. In addition, MOD and MOI advisors were not confident that the ANDSF could effectively take over maintenance and sustainment of vehicles provided by DoD and coalition forces. This report includes two findings and 12 recommendations.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Alert Letter: ANDSF Cold Weather Gear  
SIGAR 15-86-AL, September 16, 2015

This alert letter addresses a potential critical shortage of cold-weather clothing for the ANDSF. Based on SIGAR’s preliminary review, it appears that the ANDSF will not have enough cold-weather clothing for 2015 and 2016. A lack of cold-weather clothing could adversely impact the overall effectiveness of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, and degrade their operational capabilities. Three recommendations are included in this alert letter.

Alert Letter: Camp Brown Command and Control Facility  
SIGAR 15-85-SP, September 11, 2015

This inquiry letter addresses SIGAR’s concerns that the United States may be buying equipment and vehicles in quantities that exceed the needs of the ANDSF and that such large acquisitions could prompt the premature disposal of equipment and vehicles that have already been issued to the ANDSF that have significant service life remaining. This Inquiry Letter requested responses and supporting documentation to seven questions no later than October 15, 2015.
Inspection of the Special Operations Task Force–South Command and Control Facility Building at Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar, Afghanistan

This alert letter addresses the results of an inspection that SIGAR conducted at a command and control facility at Camp Brown on Kandahar Airfield. Based on information available to auditors in August, a decision to terminate the contract for the command and control facility at Camp Brown appeared reasonable. However, SIGAR noted that DoD may want to consider whether the facility may be of use for future DoD or Afghan government activities at Kandahar Airfield and, if warranted, consider completion of remaining construction. Factors to consider would include cost and time needed for project completion, mission requirements, and the expected life and maintenance costs of currently used facilities.

Command and Control Facility at Camp Brown
SIGAR 15-79-ALc, August 6, 2015

This classified report discusses observations from SIGAR’s inspection of the Special Operations Task Force–South Command and Control Facility Building at Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

$14.7 Million Warehouse Facility at Kandahar Airfield: Construction Delays Prevented the Facility From Being Used as Intended
SIGAR 15-74-IP, July 15, 2015

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s inspection of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse facility construction project at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). SIGAR found that the $14.7 million warehouse facility was well built, but lengthy construction delays led to the facility never being used as intended. Had the facility been completed on schedule, DLA would have been able to use it for more than 2 years before the agency’s mission in Kandahar ended in 2014. SIGAR also found that the U.S. Army, which developed the requirement for the warehouses, did not take action to prevent more than $400,000 in modifications from being made to the project after the August 2013 decision was made to end DLA’s mission in Kandahar. A U.S. military official working with the Afghan Base Closure Commission indicated that, because the facility would not be used by DLA, it would likely be transferred to the Afghan government.
Rule of Law in Afghanistan: U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than $1 Billion
SIGAR 15-68-AR, July 1, 2015

SIGAR found that U.S. efforts to develop the rule of law in Afghanistan have been impaired by four significant factors. First, U.S. agencies lack a comprehensive rule-of-law strategy to help plan and guide their efforts. Second, DoD is unable to account for the total amount of funds it spent to support rule-of-law development. Third, DoD, DoS, the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all have had problems measuring the performance of their respective rule-of-law programs. Fourth, U.S. efforts are undermined by significant challenges from pervasive corruption in Afghanistan’s justice sector and the uncertainty regarding whether the Afghan government can or will sustain U.S. program activities and reforms. This report included four recommendations.

Afghan National Army: Millions of Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of Personnel and Payroll Data
SIGAR 15-54-AR, April 23, 2015

Despite 13 years and billions of dollars in salary assistance to the Afghan government for the ANA, there is still no assurance that personnel and payroll data are accurate. Although the U.S. and Afghan governments have been working to develop effective ANA personnel and payroll processes, those processes continue to exhibit extensive internal control deficiencies.

Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse: Stalled Construction Project Was Terminated After $1.25 Million Spent
SIGAR 15-51-IP, April 20, 2015

This report discusses the results of SIGAR’s inspection of the Afghan National Army (ANA) slaughterhouse construction project in Pol-i-Charkhi, Kabul province. SIGAR found that the project was terminated for convenience in October 2013, 9 months after construction began and the contractor was paid $1.25 million for incurred costs. Prior to termination, in September 2013, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) suspended the contract because of the contractor’s unsatisfactory performance. The International Security Assistance Force terminated the project for convenience as part of a review of all ongoing Afghanistan projects aimed at reducing the construction inventory. However, the contractor has submitted a claim for $4.2 million as payment for work already performed on the contract and for charges arising out of the government’s termination for convenience. USACE is currently reviewing that request and expects to complete a negotiated settlement by December 2015. No recommendations were made in this report.
Ongoing and Planned Projects

The Lead IG agencies and their oversight partners reported 18 ongoing and 20 planned projects related to OFS as of September 30, 2015.

ONGOING PROJECTS

As of September 30, 2015, U.S. oversight agencies had 18 projects related to OFS ongoing. For a listing of all ongoing projects and their objectives, see Table 3.

Table 3.

Ongoing OFS-related Oversight Projects, as of 9/30/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts</td>
<td>Determine whether CSTC-A and the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior have established effective controls for oversight of MOI Fuel contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Oversight of Contracts in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Determine whether DoD controls for monitoring contractor performance were effective for contracts in support of enduring functions in Afghanistan. Specifically, to determine whether contracting officer’s representatives were properly assigned, appointed, and trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of Embassy Islamabad and Constituent Posts</td>
<td>As part of the inspection of Embassy Islamabad, to determine whether the Chief of Mission is effectively coordinating and supporting security and counterterrorism activities in Pakistan. This project will include a classified component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Afghan Air Force operations and maintenance of Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft provided by the U.S. government and training of Afghan pilots in the United States</td>
<td>Assess the extent to which the Afghan Air Force is operating and maintaining the LAS aircraft as intended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of ANA National Engineer Brigade’s Engineering Equipment</td>
<td>1) Assess the extent to which DoD efforts to train, equip, and sustain the National Engineer Brigade (NEB) and ANA Corps Engineer Kandaks (CEKs) will build an independent and capable engineering operations for the ANA; 2) Identify challenges, if any, to building and sustaining the NEB and CEKs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Assess whether 1) construction has been or is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and 2) the occupied parts of the facility, if any, are being used as intended and properly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Objective</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police</td>
<td>1) Determine the extent to which the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) has achieved its goals of establishing security and stability bubbles around rural villages to date; and 2) examine and evaluate SOJTF-A plans to monitor the VSO/ALP’s progress after 2014, when the number of U.S. Forces is expected to be greatly reduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Oversight of Infrastructure Projects Transferred to the Afghan Government</td>
<td>Assess 1) the extent to which the Afghan government uses and sustains assets transferred from DoD; and 2) the challenges, if any, that DoD faces in overseeing the use and sustainment of infrastructure that has been transferred to the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (A-TEMP) for ANA Vehicle Maintenance and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Review DoD’s support to the ANA’s Technical Equipment Maintenance Program (TEMP). Specifically, to determine 1) the extent to which the ANA A-TEMP is meeting its stated goals; and 2) whether key ANA A-TEMP contract requirements are being met and, if not, assess the reasons why.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption in Afghanistan: Perceptions and Responses of the U.S. Government</td>
<td>To 1) establish a timeline of the corruption problem in Afghanistan, including when, how, and why corruption swelled over time since 2001; 2) analyze how the U.S. government understood the threat of corruption and how this perception changed over time, and identify the U.S. response in terms of policies, programs, and resources devoted to address the corruption problem; 3) evaluate the adequacy of the U.S. response (policies, programs, and resources) relative to U.S. strategic goals, interests, and risks. (Identify where U.S. policies or actions mitigated and/or contributed to corruption); 4) compare U.S. perceptions and responses to corruption, to those of the international community; and 5) identify lessons learned from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan and make actionable recommendations for policymakers and practitioners addressing how best to mitigate corruption or the risk thereof in future U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Assessment SIGAR’s Audits and Inspections of DoD-funded Construction Projects in Afghanistan Issued During FY 2009–FY 2015</td>
<td>Review SIGAR’s prior audit and inspection reports issued during FY 2009–FY 2015 that contained findings on construction projects in Afghanistan and summarize the findings and recommendations in those reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award, Administration, and Performance of Legacy Research Contracts</td>
<td>Determine the extent to which 1) the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) developed and awarded the legacy contracts in accordance with its broad agency announcements for research and analysis contracts, and DoD and federal regulations; 2) ARL provided oversight of the tasks performed by Imperatis and New Century Consulting in accordance with the broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts; and 3) Imperatis and New Century Consulting performed tasks in accordance with ARL broad agency agreements and terms of the contracts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title

**Inspection of the Ministry of Interior’s Headquarters Complex**
Assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.

**Inspection of the Afghanistan Defense Ministry Headquarters Support and Security Brigade Expansion Phase II**
Assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) the complex is being maintained and used as intended.

**Inspection of Afghan National Army Camp Commando Phases III and IV**
Assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.

**Inspection of the Afghan National Army’s Ground Forces Command, Garrison Support Unit, and Army Support Command**
Assess whether 1) the work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) the project is being maintained and used as intended.

**Inspection of the Afghan 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing Facilities in Kandahar**
To inspect the 3rd Air Squadron Special Mission Wing facilities. Specifically, to assess whether 1) the construction was completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards and 2) the facilities are being maintained and used as intended.

**Assistance to the Security Sector**
1) Identify security sector assistance strategy and how it evolved from 2001 to 2014, 2) assess the outcomes of the security sector effort (the extent to which ANSF performance has met specified U.S. Government strategic objectives, and 3) examine the sources of disconnect between stated objectives and outcomes of U.S. efforts to identify lessons for future operations involved in security sector assistance.

### Planned Activities

As of September 30, 2015, U.S. oversight agencies had planned 20 future projects related to OFS. For a listing of all planned projects and their objectives, see Table 4.

**Table 4.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Department of Defense Inspector General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of U.S./Coalition Efforts To Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF)</td>
<td>To determine whether U.S. Government, Resolute Support, Coalition, and Afghan Ministry of Defense goals, objectives, plans, and resources to train the ANASOF are sufficient, operative, and relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of USFOR-A Intelligence Training for Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>Determine 1) if U.S. support to Afghan training is sufficient and 2) the extent of training implementation and sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment U.S. and Coalition Efforts To Develop the ANDSF IG System</td>
<td>To assess U.S. and coalition planning for and development of ANDSF inspector general systems in Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Project Title

**Evaluation of ISR Support to OFS Counterterrorism Operations**

Determine 1) if DoD is setting the conditions for Afghan Special Security Forces to take the lead in employing indigenous ISR capabilities for counterterrorism (CT) operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates and 2) the status of drawdown planning of U.S. OCO-funded ISR capabilities currently employed in Afghanistan.

**Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence for Information Sharing/Fusion with Coalition/Afghan Partners in Support of OFS**

Evaluate DoD’s procedures and guidelines for sharing information, including ISR, with coalition partners in support of OFS.


Determine 1) what laws, regulations, directives, standards or other guidance exist about U.S. policy toward allegations of child sexual abuse involving Afghan Security Ministry and National Defense Force personnel, the obligation of DoD-affiliated personnel to report suspected child sexual abuse by Afghan government officials, and DoD involvement in responding to such reports or allegations; 2) has there been any guidance, informal or otherwise, to discourage reporting by DoD-affiliated personnel; 3) what training on identifying and responding to alleged child sexual abuse, or the obligation to report suspected violations, has been conducted/planned; 4) how many cases of alleged abuse by Afghan government officials have been reported to U.S./Coalition Forces commands, the Service Inspectors General, or DoD IG; 5) how many cases of alleged abuse have been reported to the Afghan government by DoD-affiliated personnel, when were such reports made, and what knowledge does DoD have of action taken by the Afghan government.

### Department of State Office of Inspector General

**Audit of the Department of State’s Compliance With Critical Department Environment Contracting Policies**

To determine the extent to which DoS is complying with P.L. 112-239 and 14 FAM 240 requirements to, among other things, perform comprehensive risk assessments and develop risk-mitigation plans for operational risk associated with contractor performance of critical functions. The audit will also look at DoS’s role in carrying-out the P.L. 112-239, Section 853 requirement for a database on contractor performance that can be used for source selection decisions.

**Audit of Embassy Kabul Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Afghanistan**

To determine 1) whether planning and coordination mechanisms are in place at Embassy Kabul and in Washington, D.C. for assuming DoD support functions, 2) the status of transitioning construction and infrastructure development projects to the GiRoA, and 3) key transition issues and operational challenges.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Department of State Use of DUNS Number 12-345-6787 (Miscellaneous Foreign Awardees) in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine whether DoS’s use of the general DUNS number 12-345-6787 (Miscellaneous Foreign Awardees) is in compliance with federal regulations and DoS guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of Contract and Grant Oversight Staffing in Afghanistan</td>
<td>To determine whether the number of contract and grant oversight staff in Afghanistan is commensurate with the amount and complexity of funds being expended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Countries Under the Department of State Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA)</td>
<td>To determine the extent to which the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Counterterrorism (CT) have 1) developed specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented goals and objectives, 2) developed and implemented an evaluation process to assess host country performance, and 3) established letters of agreement with host countries for sustaining the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs. The audit will also assess DS and CT’s contract monitoring and oversight, and invoice review processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation and Effectiveness On-Budget Assistance</td>
<td>To 1) determine the amount of on-budget of assistance provided to Afghanistan during 2001–2014 and the mechanisms used to provide the assistance, 2) assess the impact of on-budget assistance on developing the capacity of Afghan ministries, and 3) evaluate potential negative effects of on-budget assistance, such as corruption, and determine how these externalities were mitigated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) Specialized Units</td>
<td>1) Determine the extent to which CNPA specialized units are achieving their goals, 2) assess the oversight of salary payments made to personnel in the specialized units, and 3) assess the long-term sustainability of the CNPA specialized units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring, Evaluation, and Oversight of Reconstruction Efforts</td>
<td>To 1) Determine the monitoring and evaluation policies for DOD, USAID, and DoS in relation to reconstruction efforts; 2) Identify M&amp;E methodologies that were deployed in Afghanistan; 3) Examine how those M&amp;E policies and methodologies were executed by U.S. Government agencies and its contractors; and 4) Draw lessons for future monitoring and evaluation activities in conflict-affected countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolute Support’s Progress Executing Its Train, Advise, and Assist Mission</td>
<td>To 1) identify the metrics the RS Mission uses to determine success of its mission to develop the capacity of the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, and assess the extent to which these metrics have been met; and 2) determine what factors contribute to RS Mission’s successes and failures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) to Track and Monitor U.S. Direct Assistance Funding to the Afghan Government</td>
<td>1) Describe how the Afghan government uses AFMIS to track and monitor U.S. direct assistance funds, 2) identify the capabilities and weaknesses of AFMIS for tracking and monitoring U.S. direct assistance fund, and 3) determine the extent to which U.S. agencies are working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to address weaknesses within the system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Special Mission Wing (SMW) Use and Maintenance of Its PC-12s

1) Assess the extent to which the SMW can operate and maintain the PC-12s currently in its fleet, and 2) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the SMW can operate and maintain the PC-12s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.

Afghan Air Force (AAF) Use and Maintenance of Its Mi-17 Fleet

1) Assess the extent to which the AAF can operate and maintain the Mi-17s currently in its fleet, and 2) assess DoD’s efforts to ensure that the SMW can operate and maintain the Mi-17s, including any contracts DoD is funding or plans to fund to provide those services.

Department of Defense Efforts To Advise the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior

1) Assess the extent to which DoD has clearly articulated goals, objectives, and strategy of its advisory efforts; 2) describe DoD’s advisory efforts, including funding, the number of advisors and contractors, their assigned locations, and criteria for selecting the advisors; and 3) assess the extent to which DoD measures success.

Assistance To Improve Governance in Afghanistan

To 1) Identify the range of DoD, DoS, and USAID programs focused on improving governance in Afghanistan; 2) Assess how these efforts contributed to improvements in government institutions in Afghanistan.

INVESTIGATIONS

Embracing the whole-of-government philosophy, the criminal investigative components of the three Lead IG agencies are employing a collaborative, multiagency strategy to combat contract fraud and corruption that affect OFS. The collective experience of the law enforcement agencies charged with investigating fraud and corruption in wartime contracting proved that a collaborative team model is the most effective approach. The Lead IG investigative components completed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the structure and procedures for the Fraud and Corruption Investigative Working Group (FCIWG) model. The mission of the FCIWG is to allow its member agencies to identify, synchronize, and de-conflict fraud and corruption investigations related to U.S. government OCO contracts, grants, cooperative agreement, and other federal assistance awards; protect the integrity of relevant U.S. government processes; and deter future crimes.

Specifically, these components are the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), DoD IG’s law enforcement arm; the Offices of Investigations for DoS OIG and USAID OIG; the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command, Major Procurement Fraud Unit; and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is in the final stages of reviewing the MOU and is expected to concur by next reporting period.
These agencies and SIGAR have been active participating members of the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), a previously established investigative group formed exclusively to investigate public corruption and contract fraud across Southwest Asia. With the implementation of the Lead IG legislation, the FCIWG was specifically designed and established as an overarching, cooperative investigative structure for any future Lead IG OCO, including OFS in Afghanistan. As such, the FCIWG will coordinate and deconflict investigations in Afghanistan with SIGAR via the ICCTF.

The Associate Inspector General for OFS is assisting in focusing the joint investigative capabilities of the Lead IG investigative components. Staffing requirements and locations for forward-operating components have been projected with the goal of maximizing the cohesion of the group and the coordination of joint efforts to achieve the mission. Emphasizing the critical importance of prosecutorial support for investigations, the Associate Inspector General has implemented and directed plans for strengthening existing relationships with federal prosecution components at DoJ and among the offices of several United States Attorneys.

The investigative components of the Lead IG agencies are committed to actively and cooperatively pursuing allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse related to OFS programs and operations. Each of these components brings to bear a unique set of authorities and expertise.

For information related to the source of complaints, case allegations, and fraud briefings addressed by the Lead IG agencies, see Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Lead IG Investigative Activity

**FRAUD AWARENESS BRIEFING**

- **114 BRIEFINGS**
- **1,998 ATTENDEES**

**CASE ALLEGATIONS**

- **Theft**
- **Program Fraud**
- **Other**
- **Bribes/Kickbacks**

**SOURCE OF COMPLAINT**

- **2% DOS**
- **21% DOD**
- **77% DOD HOTLINE**
Defense Criminal Investigative Service

DCIS maintains regular liaison with contracting and support commands, such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, the Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Joint Regional Contracting Commands. DCIS investigators provided fraud awareness briefings and DCIS mission briefings to U.S. military leaders, civilian contracting officials, defense contractor personnel, and host-nation law-enforcement and civilian personnel. The purpose of these briefings is to educate these officials about recognizing, reporting, and countering fraud, waste, and abuse related to DoD contract dollars. During April 1–September 30, 2015, DCIS conducted 97 fraud awareness briefings for approximately 1,318 people.

DCIS deployed a Regional Director of Investigations to coordinate and manage all DCIS Lead IG operations in the deployed environment. DCIS has agents currently deployed to Afghanistan and Qatar in support of OFS.

DCIS currently has four ongoing OFS investigations, two proactive projects, and completed 23 information reports related to OFS. Investigative projects are initiated when there is reason to believe a suspicious activity exists or the suspicious activity involves a similar modus operandi (identified in prior substantive investigations) that may affect DoD entities, programs, or personnel. Information reports are generated if, following a preliminary review/inquiry, an allegation is determined not to warrant the initiation of an investigation by DCIS.

DCIS continues to investigate more than 132 legacy OCO-related criminal investigations not discussed in this report. The results of investigations initiated prior to the designation of OFS, on January 1, 2015, are reported in DoD IG’s Semiannual Report to Congress.

DoS Office of Inspector General

DoS OIG special agents have broad jurisdiction to conduct criminal, civil, and administrative investigations into claims of fraud, waste, abuse, and any allegation affecting the programs and operations of DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), including those relating to OFS. In conducting investigations, DoS OIG coordinates closely with its law enforcement partners, including DCIS, investigators from other military agencies, USAID OIG, SIGAR, and the FBI, to share intelligence and
maximize limited resources. DoS OIG uses its office in Frankfurt, Germany, in conjunction with its office in Kabul, Afghanistan, to investigate offenses occurring in the OFS region. Investigations involving OFS will be prioritized as appropriate. DoS OIG is using hiring authority delegated from DoD under 5 U.S.C. 3161 to bring in experienced agents to complement the existing workforce. As of September 30, 2015, DoS OIG had initiated one investigation related to OFS.

DoS OIG special agents provide fraud awareness briefings to DoS and BBG personnel working on many issues, some of which relate to overseas contingency operations. These personnel include contracting and grant officers, contracting and grant officers representatives, and regional security personnel. This quarter, DoS OIG presented 17 fraud awareness briefings to 670 people.

**LEAD IG HOTLINE**

The Lead IG Hotline is refreshing its education campaign on preventing, detecting, and reporting fraud, waste, and abuse across the military bases and camps throughout Afghanistan. The Lead IG Hotline Investigator conducted six presentations on the hotline and ways to report fraud, waste, and abuse.

During the biannual reporting period, DoD IG received 24 complaints:

- 11 were referred for investigation
- 11 were referred for information only
- 2 were closed with a referral

DoS OIG and USAID OIG representatives reported that they did not receive any OFS-related complaints in Afghanistan during the period.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Lead Inspector General Model 72

APPENDIX B: Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended 74
APPENDIX A: The Lead Inspector General Model

In January 2013, Congress passed the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which amended the Inspector General Act of 1978 to add a new section 8L. It directs responsibilities and authorities to the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and to the Inspectors General (IGs) for the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the oversight of an overseas contingency operation (OCO). Specifically, it details the duties of a Lead Inspector General for an OCO and addresses jurisdictional conflicts.

COORDINATION

Section 8L provides a new mandate for the three Lead IG agencies to work together from the outset of an OCO to develop and carry out joint, comprehensive, and strategic oversight. Each IG retains statutory independence, but together, they apply extensive regional experience and in-depth institutional knowledge in a coordinated interagency approach to accomplish oversight responsibilities for the whole-of-government mission. Essentially, when joint oversight projects are to be carried out among them, the Lead Inspector General, in consultation with the other two IG offices, will designate one of the three staffs to lead the project. The standard operating procedures of that IG office will take precedence.

In general, DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG conduct oversight projects within the boundaries of their individual office missions. However in addition to military programs, OCOs often involve coordinated work among multiple agencies. Pursuant to section 8L, the Lead Inspector General will determine which IG has principal jurisdiction among the Lead IG agencies. When none of the three IGs has jurisdiction, the Lead IG is to coordinate with the appropriate agency to ensure that comprehensive oversight takes place.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Lead IG approach leverages dedicated, rotational, and temporary staff from each of the Lead IG agencies to perform various operational activities, including joint strategic oversight planning. The Lead Inspector General develops, updates, and provides to Congress an annual joint strategic plan to guide comprehensive oversight of programs and operations for each OCO. This effort includes reviewing and analyzing completed independent oversight, internal management, and other relevant reports to identify systemic problems, trends, lessons learned, and best practices to inform future oversight projects.

REPORTS TO CONGRESS

As required by section 8L, the Lead Inspector General is responsible for producing quarterly and biannual reports to Congress and making these reports available to the public online. Biannual reports include the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits; the status of referrals to the Department of Justice (DoJ); and overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by IGs, including plans for
investigations, inspections, and audits. Quarterly reports—published after the end of each quarter—provide updates on U.S. programs and operations related to the OCO. The Lead Inspector General manages the timely production of congressionally mandated reports in a coordinated effort among the three Lead IG offices and other IG agencies, as appropriate.

THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR OFS

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) ended on December 31, 2014. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) began on January 1, 2015, a new overseas contingency operation as defined by Title 10 USC 101(a)(13). Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, the Lead IG agencies, representing the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development, are together carrying out our mandate to provide interagency oversight for this contingency under the Lead IG model.

These agencies have always had plenary authority to conduct independent and objective oversight. For more than a decade, while they conducted independent oversight of their agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, they also worked jointly on several projects requiring cross-agency collaboration. Since 2008, they have met quarterly, along with the Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Service Auditors General to coordinate their oversight and avoid duplication of effort.

CIGIE Chair Michael E. Horowitz designated Jon T. Rymer as Lead Inspector General for OFS on April 1, 2015. On May 4, 2015, Lead Inspector General Rymer appointed DoS Inspector General Steve A. Linick to serve as the Associate Inspector General for OFS, in keeping with the provisions of section 8L of the Inspector General Act, as amended. The Associate Inspector General will draw on his experience as a career federal prosecutor, and as Director of DoJ’s National Procurement Fraud Task Force, to develop joint investigative capabilities across the IG community through an interagency working group.

APPENDIX B:
SECTION 8L OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978,
AS AMENDED

§8L. Special Provisions Concerning Overseas Contingency Operations

(a) Additional Responsibilities of Chair of Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.—Upon the commencement or designation of a military operation as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days, the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) shall, in consultation with the members of the Council, have the additional responsibilities specified in subsection (b) with respect to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(b) Specific Responsibilities.—The responsibilities specified in this subsection are the following:

(1) In consultation with the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), to designate a lead Inspector General in accordance with subsection (d) to discharge the authorities of the lead Inspector General for the overseas contingency operation concerned as set forth in subsection (d).

(2) To resolve conflicts of jurisdiction among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on investigations, inspections, and audits with respect to such contingency operation in accordance with subsection (d)(2)(B).

(3) To assist in identifying for the lead inspector general for such contingency operation, Inspectors General and inspector general office personnel available to assist the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) on matters relating to such contingency operation.

(c) Inspectors General.—The Inspectors General specified in this subsection are the Inspectors General as follows:


(2) The Inspector General of the Department of State.

(3) The Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development.
(d) Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operation.—(1) A lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall be designated by the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency under subsection (b)(1) not later than 30 days after the commencement or designation of the military operation concerned as an overseas contingency operation that exceeds 60 days. The lead Inspector General for a contingency operation shall be designated from among the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c).

(2) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall have the following responsibilities:

(A) To appoint, from among the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), an Inspector General to act as associate Inspector General for the contingency operation who shall act in a coordinating role to assist the lead Inspector General in the discharge of responsibilities under this subsection.

(B) To develop and carry out, in coordination with the offices of the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight over all aspects of the contingency operation and to ensure through either joint or individual audits, inspections, and investigations, independent and effective oversight of all programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation.

(C) To review and ascertain the accuracy of information provided by Federal agencies relating to obligations and expenditures, costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, and the award and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements in support of the contingency operation.

(D)(i) If none of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has principal jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.

(ii) If more than one of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) has jurisdiction over a matter with respect to the contingency operation, to determine principal jurisdiction for discharging oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to such matter.
(E) To employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c), on a temporary basis using the authorities in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, such auditors, investigators, and other personnel as the lead Inspector General considers appropriate to assist the lead Inspector General and such other Inspectors General on matters relating to the contingency operation.

(F) To submit to Congress on a bi-annual basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the activities of the lead Inspector General and the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) with respect to the contingency operation, including:

(i) the status and results of investigations, inspections, and audits and of referrals to the Department of Justice; and

(ii) overall plans for the review of the contingency operation by inspectors general, including plans for investigations, inspections, and audits.

(G) To submit to Congress on a quarterly basis, and to make available on an Internet website available to the public, a report on the contingency operation.

(H) To carry out such other responsibilities relating to the coordination and efficient and effective discharge by the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of duties relating to the contingency operation as the lead Inspector General shall specify.

(3)(A) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation may employ, or authorize the employment by the other Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) of, annuitants covered by section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, for purposes of assisting the lead Inspector General in discharging responsibilities under this subsection with respect to the contingency operation.

(B) The employment of annuitants under this paragraph shall be subject to the provisions of section 9902(g) of title 5, United States Code, as if the lead Inspector General concerned was the Department of Defense.
(C) The period of employment of an annuitant under this paragraph may not exceed three years, except that the period may be extended for up to an additional two years in accordance with the regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3161(b)(2) of title 5, United States Code.

(4) The lead Inspector General for an overseas contingency operation shall discharge the responsibilities for the contingency operation under this subsection in a manner consistent with the authorities and requirements of this Act generally and the authorities and requirements applicable to the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) under this Act.

(e) Sunset for Particular Contingency Operations.—The requirements and authorities of this section with respect to an overseas contingency operation shall cease at the end of the first fiscal year after the commencement or designation of the contingency operation in which the total amount appropriated for the contingency operation is less than $100,000,000.

(f) Construction of Authority.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of the Inspectors General specified in subsection (c) to enter into agreements to conduct joint audits, inspections, or investigations in the exercise of their oversight responsibilities in accordance with this Act with respect to overseas contingency operations.


Prior Provisions
## ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ACAA</td>
<td>Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority</td>
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<td>AFMIS</td>
<td>Afghanistan Financial Management Information System</td>
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<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>ANA Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<td>Antiterrorism Assistance Program (DoS)</td>
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<td>BBG</td>
<td>Broadcasting Board of Governors</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>C-IED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units</td>
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<td>COP-OCO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
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<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service</td>
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<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>Department of State Office of Inspector General</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
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<td>FCWG</td>
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<td>GIRoA</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Response Plan (UN)</td>
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<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>inspector general</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>JSOP</td>
<td>joint strategic oversight plan</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of arrangement</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead IG</td>
<td>Lead Inspector General</td>
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<td>Lead IG agencies</td>
<td>refers to DoD IG, DoS OIG, and USAID OIG</td>
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<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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<td>New Development Partnership</td>
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<td>overseas contingency operation</td>
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<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>PWS</td>
<td>performance work statement</td>
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<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
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<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<td>SOJTF-A</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>TAA</td>
<td>train, advise, and assist (RS and OFS missions)</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
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138. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/21/2015.
139. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
140. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
141. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
142. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
143. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
144. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
145. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
146. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

153. UN Secretary General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security,” 9/1/2015.


157. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

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166. OUSD(P), response to Lead IG request for information, 10/22/2015.

167. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

168. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

170. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
171. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/13/2015.
173. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
174. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/13/2015
175. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
176. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/13/2015
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179. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/13/2015
180. DoD, response to Lead IG request for information, 11/13/2015.
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190. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
193. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.
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201. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 9/18/2015.


209. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

210. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


212. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

213. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

214. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


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220. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


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228. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


231. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015. See also DoDIG, *Summary of Management and Performance Challenges for FY 2015*, p. 47.

232. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

233. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015, and information provided to Lead IG 9/4/2015.

234. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

235. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

236. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

237. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

238. CSTC-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


240. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.

241. USFOR-A, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/14/2015.


254. Information on planned audit activities in this area was taken from ISPA briefing slides.


257. 401st AFSB, response to Lead IG request for information, 10/16/2015.


263. DoDIG, Project D2015-D000.JB-0174.000, “Audit of Controls Over Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Fuel Contracts”


266. DoDIG, Project D2015-D000.JB-0239.000, “Audit of Oversight of Contracts in Afghanistan


271. The Afghan security forces were formally known as the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF.


275. Pursuant to section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended: The Lead IG will “determine which IG has principal jurisdiction when more than one inspector general from the DoD, DoS, and USAID has jurisdiction.” Further, the Lead IG will “exercise responsibility for discharging oversight responsibilities” when Departments of Defense and State and USAID have no jurisdiction.

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