USACE
Overseas Contingency Operations
Playbook

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Many people selflessly provided expertise to this document in hope that it will assist others in future operations. The following list includes primary authors, contributing authors, reviewers, and others who provided specific information. The list does not include those who provided original source documents or those who participated in lessons learned conferences.

This work is dedicated to those who lost their lives serving the USACE mission.

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, ADRPs, ADPs, ATPs, FMs, TMs, etc., must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
In his final days, Abraham Lincoln was thinking about reconstruction. The Civil War was finished, but the nation was in shambles: nearly 2 percent of the population was lost as war casualties; the government was partially dismantled; supply lines were broken; newly freed citizens required assistance; and basic services, including law enforcement, medical care, and a functioning judicial system were lacking. Rebellious and violent factions compounded the complex question of how to put the country back together, as did racial intolerance and national anxiety.

Two days after Confederate forces surrendered and three days before his assassination, President Lincoln delivered his last public speech focusing on reconstruction. He saw that “…reconstruction… is fraught with great difficulty,” and that “…there is no authorized organ for us to treat with.” President Lincoln also felt “…additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner and means of reconstruction.”

Lincoln understood the great challenge the nation faced in restoring it to full function, peace, and prosperity. Nearly a century and a half later, similar concerns faced the nation’s decision makers when Secretary of State Colin Powell discouraged President George W. Bush from war in Iraq. In 2002, Secretary Powell told President Bush, “…once you break it, you are going to own it, and we’re going to be responsible for 26 million people…” While he saw that the initial conventional warfare “looked like it was extremely successful,” he noted concern about “a lack of planning for these latter phases.”

The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook provides lessons learned from more than 10 years serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The playbook’s purpose is to capture leaders’ significant experiences, observations, issues, and perceptions; to share and institutionalize these insights within USACE, the Engineer Regiment, and the Department of the Army to provide a tool for operating effectively in future contingency operations.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), USACE was responsible for much of the host nation’s physical reconstruction mission. These operations were USACE’s only recent experiences with reconstruction on this scale. USACE also learned that construction itself is easier than integrating it into, and measuring its effects on, the overall campaign.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE faced many unexpected situations and first experiences, which revealed the need for an innovative and adjustable military contingency strategy that is established, communicated, and exercised before operations begin.

The USACE Transatlantic Division collected many lessons learned about OIF and OEF from contributors and interviewees through their experiences and personal stories. Subject matter experts (SMEs), senior leaders, playbook contributors, and editors collaborated to capture and articulate the military contingency operations’ enduring lessons. These are the most broadly applicable, universal, and timeless lessons learned, with potential application across operational theaters.

Although it is “impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take” (*Joint Operating Environment [JOE] 2010*), the USACE construction mission will likely remain a fundamental force multiplier in near- and medium-term future engagements. USACE initially provides commanders with a nonlethal combat capability to achieve area stability, enhance host-nation mission ownership, and successfully operate and sustain programs and projects. USACE integration with combatant command planning before contingencies will enhance its success in future contingencies. Once a contingency begins, deployed and supporting USACE organizations will benefit from planning and training.

Contingency engineer district and Headquarters, USACE elements should seek integrated planning approaches as early as possible in program and project development. Many of the lessons learned and activities in this playbook interrelate. Leaders should apply them holistically by considering similarities and differences in conditions and the environment. Best practices or lessons learned in one functional area may have implications in others.

> "Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it."

— Sir Winston Churchill

The *USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook* should enable individuals and organizations to work more effectively as teams to achieve the objectives of a deployed USACE organization. It provides USACE members with shared operational guidelines and insights. Additionally, this playbook can allow leaders of future overseas contingency operations to operate at a higher level in a shorter amount of time by understanding and applying these enduring lessons.
References


Introduction

As a contract construction agency, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an executing agent, working at the direction and funding of other agencies (e.g., Department of Defense [DOD], United States Agency for International Development [USAID], or combatant commands [CCMDs]. Much of the USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook focuses on the contingency engineer district (CED) because this unit is the primary executing agent of overseas contingency or expeditionary construction. Other organizations enable the CED by shaping the theater for its success.

USACE organizes the CED from military-civilian teams in response to a specific contingency mission, expanding USACE’s worldwide reach. The CED provides engineer and construction management services for military and civil construction, supporting U.S. forces, host-nation (HN) security forces, and others in the contingency area of operations. These services provide sustainable infrastructure and positive construction effects supporting decisive U.S. operations.

The CED promotes security and stability with reconstruction and infrastructure development, in concert with other U.S., coalition, HN, and international nongovernmental organizations, including the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the Air Force Civil Engineering Center. The CED’s role is especially vital if the HN or area of operations lacks capacity or capability.

This playbook can assist all USACE operating divisions aligned with a CCMD to increase their focus on planning for and responding to overseas contingency operations (OCO). The Transatlantic Division (TAD) implemented some of these practices and lessons during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The lessons learned are especially important for high operating tempo and prolonged operations, where personnel rotations and asset transfer may result in continuity problems and institutional knowledge gaps.

1. Concepts

1.1 Permissive Versus Nonpermissive Environments

Responding to a military contingency differs from responding to a civil disaster in the continental United States (CONUS). In permissive CONUS environments, USACE can provide as much capability as necessary without encumbering the mission. In contrast, an outside the continental
United States (OCONUS) environment may be nonpermissive. Sending excessive capability forward may burden the military command while unnecessarily endangering lives.

A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host-country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

— Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

1.2 Contingency

A contingency is a situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversions, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect U.S. interests (JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). The DOD may ask USACE to support a range of international contingencies, including:

• **Combat operations.** USACE advanced planning teams in a foreign nation during offensive or defensive operations may evaluate the viable infrastructure and identify the necessary steps to upgrade the infrastructure to minimum conditions that will meet the citizens’ basic needs.

• **Stability operations.** Various stakeholders generally execute stability operations, including the HN government, donor governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector organizations. USACE’s role substantially increases during stability operations as compared to offensive and defensive operations.

• **Sustainable development.** Post-conflict, USACE may support the resumption of vital services for the local population, meeting humanitarian needs. The post-conflict period may not offer a fully protective security setting.

USACE may provide support using one of the established organizations described in Chapter 3, *USACE Contingency Elements: Mission, Organization, and Operational Phases*, or create a specialized team to meet a specific need. These teams broadly support U.S. military and other U.S. government agencies with agile and responsive technical engineering, contingency planning, and contract construction.

2. Background

2.1 Playbook Sources

This playbook contains raw information distilled from many sources (see Figure 2-1). In 2011, both the TAD and the Gulf Region District began a formal process to collect and synthesize lessons learned for the engineer contingency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among other information, this collected information included:
• A formal contracted study on USACE in OIF and OEF
• Results from two conferences to collect lessons learned and best practices from previous senior leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan
• After action reports, informal reports, investigation results, and other written material from contingency personnel
• The TAD contingency operations standard operating procedure

Figure 2-1. The playbook production process involved distilling strategic, operational, and tactical information, and a cycle of writing, editing, and review.

Most importantly, experienced civilian and military personnel within USACE with considerable institutional knowledge and multiple deployments contributed to this playbook as authors, working group members, and reviewers.

2.2 Playbook Development

TAD began drafting chapters of the playbook while still collecting information. Subject matter experts, senior leaders, contributors, and editors tried to capture and articulate the contingency operations enduring lessons. Enduring lessons are relatively universal, timeless, and applicable across operational theaters. The enduring lessons in this playbook are arranged in tables according to chapter in the appendix of this chapter. Each enduring lesson contributes to one of seven contingency engineer mission principles (see Figure 2-2).
After the subject matter experts drafted each chapter, the working group edited and reviewed each section, and members of the TAD primary staff reviewed each chapter. The TAD Office of Counsel reviewed the chapters after all other staff members completed their reviews.

After the TAD review, a team of unique external reviewers with subject matter expertise reviewed each chapter. Concurrently, the Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) monitored and contributed to the document. Finally, the working group assembled the final product for a final review from the TAD Office of Counsel.

3. Principles

Table 2-1 describes the seven enduring principles and best practices for USACE military contingency operations. These principles can apply to any OCO, regardless of location, and are critical to USACE success in the contingency environment.
Table 2-1. Enduring contingency engineer mission principles captured from experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adapt</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide only the <em>level of service needed</em> to accomplish the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Adapt methodologies</em> in stride to meet changing requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design Sustainability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider program/project hand over and end state early in the process; assume the HN will eventually use, operate, and control all projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project success depends on the <em>local population’s needs and abilities</em>. Build facilities the HN can <em>operate and maintain</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Develop Capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximize <em>indigenous resources</em> and <em>build host-nation capacity</em> where appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integrate Command and Effort</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize that <em>military and civilian agencies share equities</em> in each other’s initiatives, programs, and projects. Whenever possible, coordinate, deconflict, network, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Communicate critical observations</em> to those who need to hear them (command, host-nation officials, customers), even if not part of the standard process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully integrate USACE elements into the <em>theater military command/task force</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximize Reachback</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Maximize use of reachback</em> and reduce deployed assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standardize Processes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximize use of USACE <em>standard business processes</em> and corporate information technology solutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use <em>standard engineering designs</em> where possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Train</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Train</em> for contingencies during peacetime and <em>establish relationships</em> with supporting maneuver units and sister agencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Appendix A. Tables of Principles and Enduring Lessons

4.1 Principle: Adapt

Table 2 A-1. Enduring Lessons: Adapt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Adapt</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USACE faced many unexpected situations and first experiences, which revealed the need for an innovative and adjustable military contingency strategy that is established, communicated, and exercised before operations begin.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only address issues related to construction projects when engaging with HN leadership.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial stages of the contingency operation should be direct-funded.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The command may wish to consider visits from influential leaders as key leader engagements and treat them accordingly.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve logistical issues before sending personnel to non-USACE supported areas, or daily operations may become inefficient.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize the real estate function with a USACE office, if possible.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules, procedures, and thought processes from home districts may be ineffective in the contingency environment.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting for security requirements places extremely sensitive responsibilities on personnel outside of direct military command.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining appropriate battlefield protection posture is a command decision. USACE operations personnel should periodically check the equipment of those leaving the forward operating base (FOB) for compliance.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When employing private security contractors, a dedicated (full-time), in-theater contracting officer representative is necessary to oversee the contract.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When regulatory compliance is not possible or operationally unwise, the CED commander decides the appropriate course of action and in which areas to accept risk.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel on FOBs may become complacent about security and need reminding about imminent threats surrounding the FOB and training in an emergency situation response.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical communications systems are expensive, and require time and expertise for design, procurement, installation, and maintenance.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a separate unit identification code and DOD activity address code for each CED office location will simplify property accountability.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upon arrival in theater, establish a central property receiving point with a proper shipping address for property receipt, storage, and distribution.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Lessons: Adapt (continued)</td>
<td>Chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider requiring contracting officer representative certification for all logistics personnel.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining the IT infrastructure is paramount to keeping the CED mission functioning.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before deploying, contingency contracting officers should understand established procedures in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, which are used to expedite the acquisition process during contingencies.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure sufficient staffing levels to maintain effectiveness during periods of rest and recuperation and unexpected curtailments.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When USACE contracts for services outside its core competencies, it has difficulty resourcing post-award surveillance and oversight for the contract’s life cycle. Service and supply acquisitions are directed to the cognizant in-theater agency rather than accomplishing it in-house.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting officers should challenge dependence on cost-reimbursement contracts as the contingency matures.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including liquidated damages in a contingency construction contract must be based on the government’s best interest.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty in contract closeout should be anticipated. A special project delivery team should be formed for closeouts focused on requests for equitable adjustments, customer interface, and reporting.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide job position return rights to any federal employee volunteering to deploy.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing, tour lengths, and number of Schedule A employees must be carefully considered to coincide with the decrease and eventual end of the contingency operations.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider using contractor personnel for selected activities to mitigate effects of high personnel turnover.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE must tailor command and support relationships specifically for each deployed forward engineer support team (FEST), which requires thoughtful consideration of anticipated missions, threat level, etc.</td>
<td>Annex A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider creating engineer reconnaissance teams able to prioritize in-theater requirements for reconstruction. These teams could report to forward engineer support teams–advance (FEST-AFs), the leaders of which would, in turn, consolidate their inputs and forward them to the appropriate headquarters.</td>
<td>Annex A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting liquidated damages from contractors in the United States Central Command area of responsibility is often not effective.</td>
<td>Annex B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT support personnel should remain on-site at the area office, ensuring adequate mission support.</td>
<td>Annex B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only fully trained personnel are deployed during the drawdown — operating tempo precludes drawdown on-the-job training.

The CED may want to establish a liaison officer (LNO) closeout position, or a closeout surge team dedicated specifically to closing offices at each FOB.

USACE offices should close before their FOB Defense Reutilization Management Office, if possible, to avoid transporting equipment for turn-in to other FOBs.

Intermodal storage containers may cause excessive problems during drawdown. These containers tend to fill with miscellaneous equipment that requires disposal before the container may be turned in.

Because communications equipment often has special handling, accountability, and disposal requirements, and the CED does not have assigned signal personnel, the CED commander may quickly run into trouble during the drawdown.

Creating cross-functional project closeout teams helps ensure proper physical, financial, and contractual closure.

4.2 Principle: Design Sustainability

Table 2 A-2. Enduring Lessons: Design Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Design Sustainability</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly or unfairly, critics will hold the construction agent responsible for the success and even the usefulness and benefits of the project. USACE personnel should advise customers on project efficacy, usefulness, and linkage to the overall campaign strategy, as well as engineering concerns.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define the project requirements with the customer early to ensure the project will most efficiently achieve its desired effect.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE elements must clearly define customer requirements and help customers sustain reasonable expectations.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ease and simplicity of land disposal largely depends on the thoroughness of the land acquisition.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish environmental practices early in the contingency mission to minimize environmental incidents and support consistent, expeditious corrective actions.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing fuel consumption reduces personnel risk and improves operational and fiscal efficiency.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early in the contingency mission, plan to transition to power distribution grids and centralized power generation plants versus spot generations.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enduring Lessons: Design Sustainability (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Design Sustainability (continued)</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create a plan to monitor and collect energy use data early in the contingency.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every major acquisition strategy is examined with great concentration on second- and third-order effects.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contracting officer must anticipate and oppose contractor corruption and fight insurgency support.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMDs are encouraged to develop nation-specific building codes to avoid inappropriate and impractical construction and design specifications.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore directly hiring local nationals early in the contingency operation.</td>
<td>15</td>
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</table>

### 4.3 Principle: Develop Capacity

#### Table 2 A-3. Enduring Lessons: Develop Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Develop Capacity</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successful construction management in high-risk environments depends heavily on local nationals.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development is fundamental to effective governance, capability enhancement, enhanced ownership, and successful program and project sustainability.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity development efforts must be specifically authorized by law, and will almost always require separate funding that cannot be commingled with dedicated project funds.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustration and friction occur when USACE cannot meet the customer’s needs with the local skills and resources available, and when the customer cannot or will not fund the required training and mentoring.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine which projects would be more suitable as capacity development or training vehicles based on delivery timelines and project priority.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As early as possible, inform customers if a project may involve capacity development. For these projects, advise customers that up front training in U.S. methods may ensure best chances for long-term project success.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing nations require time and training to meet U.S. construction standards.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project scope may affect the local contractor’s ability to complete projects; letting numerous smaller projects may be better than letting a single large one to a local firm.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account for cultural differences when determining a project’s most effective capacity development features.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting with local nationals as quality assurance (QA) personnel brings many benefits to USACE projects and programs.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The local national quality assurance representatives (LNQARs) trained by USACE become especially important in the CED’s drawdown, because as personnel decrease, visiting project sites with U.S. personnel becomes more difficult.

The LNQARs can be essential in preventing and reporting HN corruption.

### 4.4 Principle: Integrate Command and Effort

**Table 2 A-4. Enduring Lessons: Integrate Command and Effort**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Integrate Command and Effort</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Although USACE is not ultimately responsible for project selection within the purview of the overall campaign, USACE personnel often possess critical information and perspective that can predict project success or failure. Communicating this information to stakeholders, formally and informally at all levels, can greatly enhance reconstruction campaign success.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The supporting missions that are outside of the contingency engineer district’s core competencies come at the expense of quality, schedule, budget, and safety to the core missions.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only assume missions supporting the CCMD’s campaign plan, counterinsurgency strategy, or stability operations.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparent and clearly understood command relationships are vital to mission effectiveness.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use standard joint doctrinal organizations to integrate deployed USACE organizations into the joint task force.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDs must deploy as part of a larger, coordinated effort. Units are not sent into the field without an overarching command.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While each stakeholder has a reconstruction objective influenced by its own perception, successful leaders will understand and communicate the interdependence of these objectives.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without unity of effort, each stakeholder operates independently, increasing the likelihood of misunderstood requirements, timelines, and objectives.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction requires leaders and staffs to establish and maintain an appropriate relationship with the mission proponent, and to communicate with and understand the interdependent objectives among the various centers, commissions, staffs, augmentations, field offices, and agencies.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE and USAID should develop joint policies for civil works programs to leverage technical capabilities and resources (e.g., water, energy, schools).</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE elements must clearly define customer requirements and help customers sustain reasonable expectations.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Lessons: Integrate Command and Effort (continued)</td>
<td>Chapter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leaders at every level must involve public affairs office staff in key meetings to help focus the communication processes for contingency districts, and their missions and projects.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE’s deployed elements must understand and incorporate its branding requirements into external materials and products to the maximum extent possible.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division should oversee any district social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) to maintain administrative continuity and ensure adherence to applicable law, regulation, and policy.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division and districts must network with participating government offices, bureaus, and agencies to share information, operations plans, and activities to leverage each other’s efforts.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program objectives must satisfy both the contingency mission and the USACE and Army campaign plans.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The program manager (PgM) must understand the USACE campaign plan and communicate it to contingency mission leaders.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because they fully understand the contingency engineer mission, PgMs should help shape communications and public affairs statements relating to the construction mission.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreasing delivery times is perhaps the most important value that USACE PgMs can bring to the customer.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE PgMs must quickly integrate with clients, customers, and stakeholders to align and integrate program management and create value for those USACE supports.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PgMs should know, monitor, and forecast program workload and the relationship of workload to workforce requirements and project delivery schedules.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most important aspect of a QA and quality control (QC) program is regular work site visits by the project engineer.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully understand all agreements, laws, and policies are fully understood regarding land use in a HN to expedite USACE use and return of real property.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The USACE real estate function typically serves the CCMD and should align in the organization to best serve the CCMD.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of USACE-related projects may not accurately represent real estate-related actions because the function involves many more activities than USACE construction.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate professionals should determine the appropriate owner by reviewing the nation’s laws in coordination with internal USACE staff attorneys.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division should coordinate and guide all USACE operational energy efforts to prevent effort duplication and conserve resources.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Lessons : Integrate Command and Effort (continued)</td>
<td>Chapter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic relationships enable USACE to communicate its capabilities and skills in relation to customer and battlespace-owner goals and objectives.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security company contract success depends on an effectively written performance work statement. All stakeholders (program management, operations, intelligence, legal, logistics, and contracting) should participate in its creation.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders must identify priority intelligence requirements — information about the enemy, environment, or situation the commander needs to achieve the mission.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE personnel, particularly those operating regularly in the field, should become familiar with the local battlespace owner’s priority intelligence requirements.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysts should produce intelligence with releasability in mind, developing information at the lowest possible classification level from the start of operations.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geospatial information system and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets help manage all phases of construction projects in austere environments.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematically connecting people to information (such as knowledge management) is critical to contingency operation success.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing priority for coordinated logistics support requires negotiation upon arrival in theater. This task should be accomplished as early as possible.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CED should have a property book officer (PBO) or PBO representative in theater with full permissions to manage the property book.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing officials are stakeholders in choosing the proper labor category and can highlight advantages of using military and/or contractors for specific functions vice sourcing and staffing with civilian government employees.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division should formally present unique support requests to the headquarters G-3 to determine if USACE can support the mission.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with the contractor inside the secure USACE office compound is key to resolving issues identified during the site visits and to establish an effective working relationship with the contractor.</td>
<td>Annex B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay attention to local HN authorities for indicators about corruption, security, utilities, and local sentiment about the project. This knowledge, along with establishing rapport with the HN’s armed forces and police, can save lives.</td>
<td>Annex B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CED must coordinate its own drawdown with the theater operational drawdown.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CED should publish its drawdown operation order about a year before its projected closing date.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A PBO, or a representative with full permissions, should be in theater with the CED from the beginning of the operation.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The joint task force mandated overall numbers of personnel in theater. These numbers drive the personnel drawdown in the CED, followed by project and program completion. 

The Joint Programs Integration Office primarily focuses on programming and integration rather than project or construction management. 

The CED and enduring district must deliberately map program and project management transition processes, anticipating differences between organizations’ structures and assignment of responsibilities. 

A quarterly review of all project beneficial occupancy dates facilitates project status transparency and delivery timeline certainty with customers and other stakeholders. 

### 4.5 Principle: Maximize Reachback

**Table 2 A-5. Enduring Lessons: Maximize Reachback**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Maximize Reachback</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For success, reachback support must be customer-oriented, transparent, responsive, economical, and link together multiple systems.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize workload on deployed staff and resources by engaging reachback mechanisms at the beginning and throughout the contingency operation.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division should solicit support and initiate non-project funding early in the contingency operation to ensure supporting districts devote personnel, receive training, and provide reachback support.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful reachback requires a smooth and easy request process and rapid response by the supporting unit.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In its oversight role, the contingency division must act as the reachback assignment coordinator between the supported and supporting districts.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reachback cells provide rapid support using pre-established relationships between the supporting and supported districts.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use reachback to assist in information management (IM) and IT administrative requirements to keep deployed IM and IT assets focused on the deployment mission.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reachback is employed early in the contingency to reduce the mission’s risk, hazard exposure, and cost.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The family readiness network prepared deployees’ families to function independently, allowing USACE employees to fully focus on the mission.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS-based personnel recruiting and hiring are used to allow deployed assets to focus on the contingency mission.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contingency-specific hiring processes are included in deployment training for supervisors. | 15

Use an Administrative Personnel Processing Office to standardize and centralize personnel processing in support of OCO missions. | 15

### 4.6 Principle: Standardize Processes

#### Table 2 A-6. Enduring Lessons: Standardize Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Standardize Processes</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division-level leaders retain authority to accept programs on behalf of USACE.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When the contractor establishes a comprehensive QC plan and executes that plan completely and systematically, the result is quality construction while easing the QA burden on the government.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properly identifying the authority having jurisdiction over the building code for a project before construction begins can prevent costly retrofitting later.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistently employing standard designs is key to streamlined project management and QA in a contingency operation.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide clear guidance for photograph archiving procedures, including information by date, location, and primary persons in photographs.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop processes early to identify and retain historical materials relating to contingency district mission, staff, and operations.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximizing USACE standard business processes and reachback streamlines operations, reduces the footprint forward, and ensures information continuity.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use and train on a common project management tool (such as the Project Management Business Process Automated Information System Austere) available for use in CONUS and OCONUS.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforce use of standard engineering designs.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use the Theater Construction Management System to reduce design and operations and maintenance costs for the HN.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always deploy contingency districts with a suite of integrated standard business processes.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The contingency division and districts will not use USACE financial management system to process financial transactions for any other agency.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early in a contingency, USACE must establish the means by which the program will be governed, including reporting format and frequency, situation reports, project management reviews, steering committee, etc.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Enduring Lessons: Standardize Processes (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use the established contingency program management review briefing format as a starting point for reporting construction status during future contingencies.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early in the program, the PgM should plan and conduct a checkpoint review of the financial management apparatus and identify the program’s specific needs and requirements.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop standard business practices and continuity books with lease forms early in the contingency.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use existing contracts to assist and standardize operational energy efforts, especially during initial deployment stages when energy requirements are still maturing.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE should establish clear standards for when spot generation should cease and centralized power generation begin.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE must maintain appropriate property accountability and stewardship of government equipment. Assign a PBO and establish property accountability early.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritized equipment moving into theater to avoid overtaxing the transportation system, distribution channels, and the on-FOB storage capacity.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data backups are critical to support information requests that may come weeks, months, or years after the mission’s end.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard fiscal law principles remain unchanged during contingency operations.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE may only obligate funds in accordance with its own authority.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard contracting rules continue to apply during contingencies; contracting professionals must adhere to these rules even when under operational pressure to obligate and award.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQUSACE and the contingency division should establish a standard and consistent deployment policy for all USACE elements.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haphazard accountability procedures during the stand-up and sustainment phases create negative consequences during the drawdown as property receipts are reconciled. Avoid costly, potentially career-damaging financial liability investigation for property loss by maintaining good property stewardship throughout the operation.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most logisticians agree that using the FOB-provided life support offers the greatest simplicity, especially during drawdown.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without appropriate information archiving and knowledge management, even the most basic information about USACE’s contingency contributions may be difficult to discern later, including number of projects, program values, personnel involved, and combat losses of contracted personnel.</td>
<td>Annex C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating appropriate project documentation is often the most difficult closeout task.</td>
<td>Annex E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enduring Lessons: Standardize Processes (continued) | Chapter
---|---
Mandating USACE Resident Management System use or all project recordkeeping can significantly mitigate the frustration of locating closeout documentation. | Annex E

The CED should establish the timeline for final project delivery as early as possible, allowing time to consider whether completing the project as awarded, descoping, or terminating the contract is in the best interest of the government. | Annex E

### 4.7 Principle: Train

**Table 2 A-7. Enduring Lessons: Train**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lessons: Train</th>
<th>Chapter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commit embedded planners (e.g., field force engineering, LNOs) to military and interagency organizations during non-contingency periods.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between active contingencies, maintain a division structure to continue minimal operations and be able to surge to meet future contingencies.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE and DOD must codify and exercise USACE battlefield structure before supporting a contingency.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating the theater engineer commands with USACE on the battlefield requires exercising this operation in peacetime and ensuring the theater engineer commands’ deployable command posts are written into CCMD operations plans.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE divisions must sustain relationships and interactions with key interagency partners between contingencies.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever possible, USACE electrical engineers should also have generator experience.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE must communicate, plan, and train with its military CCMD partners in peacetime to ensure it is included in CCMD-level operations plans.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codify the support relationship between USACE and supporting commands or agencies in the CCMD and subordinate elements’ operation plans.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct weekly secure video teleconferences with the FEST-A to disseminate information and lessons from previously deployed teams, address concerns, and provide visibility and assistance in predeployment requirements.</td>
<td>Annex A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The FEST commander should distribute the specific predeployment duties among the team members, ensuring the burden does not rest solely on the team leadership.</td>
<td>Annex A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Chapter 3

USACE Contingency Elements:
Mission, Organization, and Operational Phases

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ contingency elements (UCEs) used to respond to overseas contingency missions and created in response to past contingencies. It also introduces UCEs’ functions, organizational structures, and how they function within the joint operational phases. The main United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operational activities — stand-up, sustained operations, and drawdown — are also introduced.

1. Responding to Contingency Requirements

Capability (organic and contractual) and readiness are the two functions required to meet military contingency operation requirements. During a contingency operation, the supported geographic combatant command (CCMD) usually formulates and then communicates mission requirements to the Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE). HQUSACE then analyzes the mission and may deploy small teams of subject matter experts (SMEs). The SME teams either satisfy the mission requirements or determine the requirement’s magnitude, and communicate this to HQUSACE. HQUSACE then deploys the appropriate teams and/or units into the contingency theater to fulfill the mission. USACE’s support to the contingency mission can range from providing engineering solutions using the reachback process to stand-up multiple contingency engineer districts (CEDs).

1.1 USACE Organizational Structure to Support Military Contingency Missions

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) presented USACE with immediate and significant reconstruction missions. During these operations, USACE gained experience and clarified its operating concepts and principles for overseas contingencies. Based on this experience, USACE developed five UCEs to respond to contingencies and meet the mission requirements. These five UCEs included:

1. Forward engineering support team-advance (FEST-A) or reconnaissance team (RT). USACE will send one of these two teams forward to respond to the contingency mission’s initial stages. Annex A, Forward Engineering Support Team-Advance, discusses forward engineering support teams (FESTs) in greater detail.
2. Advanced echelon (ADVON) team. The ADVON team deploys after the initial elements if the mission requires increased capacity. The ADVON team may initially be a small element that could grow into a CED.

3. CED. The CED is the primary USACE element that responds to major military contingencies. Chapter 4, *Contingency Engineer District*, includes the CED organization and mission. Many of the other chapters in this playbook give greater detail on specific CED functions.

4. Contingency division. The contingency division provides command oversight and major subordinate-level control over the district and any other deployed UCE. Any of the USACE divisions may become a contingency division if a military contingency occurs in their area of responsibility (AOR). Chapter 5, *Mission Command and the Contingency Division*, discusses the contingency division’s organization and mission.

5. The Joint Programs Integration Office (JPIO). The JPIO forms from an initial HQUSACE augmentation team that integrates the USACE construction mission with the joint task force (JTF) and host-nation (HN) mission and requirements. The JPIO interacts with JTF command and staff elements, and ensures the USACE construction efforts appropriately integrate with other theater construction efforts. Annex D, *Program Integration Above the Contingency Division*, further discusses the JPIO organizational structure.

1.2 Capability

Each overseas contingency mission will have unique characteristics, including indigenous resources, culture, local capacity, etc. The *USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook* discusses how USACE assigns responsibilities and distributes functions among the UCEs, how it responds to contingencies, and how it provides support and services to military operations and the HN. The UCEs support the warfighter with:

- USACE technical expertise
- Roads, water, and power (counterinsurgency operations success depends on infrastructure development)
- Contract construction authority and capability
- Contingency experience and expertise
- Ability to manage a large volume of work
- Expeditionary civilian workforce
- HN support capability
- Developing water resource capabilities

Each UCE mission nests within the mission of its higher organization.
1.3 Organizational Structures

The CED’s organizational structure evolves with mission stages; the response depends on the mission. Figure 3-1 shows a typical progression of contingency operations. The initial elements analyze the mission and determine if it warrants a larger element. The CED’s organizational staffing structure incrementally increases as the contingency evolves. Generally, the first step is deploying an initial element that analyzes and responds to immediate theater mission requirements within its capabilities. This initial element should contain all the basic USACE district operational elements needed to establish initial operating capability. It could be an RT or FEST-A attached to the supported military unit with a composition tailored to the mission. As requirements increase beyond the initial element’s capacity, it transitions in size and structure from initial operating capability into full operational capability. The initial operating capability element provides initial, limited support. Once fully staffed and operational, the CED can support the full spectrum of construction and engineer mission requirements.

![Figure 3-1. Organizational progression of the contingency engineer district](image)

**Reconnaissance Team**

The RT (see Figure 3-2) may deploy to support military contingencies or humanitarian missions. The RT has no organic force protection or transportation assets, and fully relies on the supported command for these services. While not an RT member, the mission integrator works to integrate the RT into the mission, facilitating support agreements with the ground forces and assisting the supported command to define its engineer requirements.
Forward Engineer Support Team-Advance

The FEST-A organization (see Figure 3-3) may serve as the initial element in a military contingency or humanitarian mission and defines the mission for the follow-on force. The FEST-A’s mission integrator is not organic to the team, but integrates the FEST-A into what could be the initial stages of a major military contingency. The FEST-A prepares for the potential establishment and arrival of the CED ADVON team. In addition to preparing for follow-on elements, the FEST-A can manage projects within its capacity.

Advanced Echelon Team

If the contingency mission demands more capability than the FEST-A can manage, the supporting USACE division may request to deploy a complete engineer district forward. In this case, the first step to deploying the CED is to send its ADVON team into theater (see Figure 3-4); the ADVON team only deploys if HQUSACE expects to stand up a complete district in the theater of operations. The ADVON team comprises the initial elements of the CED and prepares for the CED’s arrival.
Contingency Engineer District

As the mission progresses, the ADVON team integrates additional personnel as necessary and becomes a fully operational CED (see Figure 3-5). Its organizational structure resembles a typical USACE district with augmented military personnel in several key positions that require military expertise, engagement with resident military units, and management of military members (see Figure 3-6). These positions include the headquarters and headquarters detachment, the area and resident office officers in charge, and others.
OIF and OEF helped USACE establish its process to stand up and deploy a contingency engineer division. Although the playbook mostly discusses experiences of the Transatlantic Division (TAD) in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR, all USACE divisions are potentially contingency divisions if an emergency occurs in their associated CCMD AOR. For example, a contingency mission in United States Africa Command AOR would involve the North Atlantic Division rather than TAD. However, certain aspects of any outside the continental United States contingency mission would remain with TAD if so directed by HQUSACE. Chapter 5, *Mission Command and the Contingency Division*, discusses the division in greater detail.

**Joint Programs Integration Office**

Directly supporting the theater engineer, the JPIO manages JTF Title 10 programs, directly linking with stakeholders, including USCENTCOM, United States Army Central Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the U.S. Embassy, United States Agency for International Development, in-theater USACE elements, and reachback districts and centers. The JPIO focuses on programming and integration rather than project or construction management.

Establishing the JPIO occurs in steps. At the beginning of contingency operations, USACE uses an element called the HQUSACE augmentation cell to initially source the contingency division. The augmentation cell is the initial deployable team that shapes the deployed contingency division forward.
After the contingency division presence is established, personnel from the augmentation cell form the JPIO. More information about the JPIO is included in Annex D, Program Integration Above the Contingency Division.

1.4 Readiness

Readiness is the second key component of USACE’s success in the contingency operation. Because USACE is primarily a civilian-staffed organization, maintaining deployment readiness creates unique challenges compared to standard military units. Contingency operating tempo may not allow sufficient time to deploy all required skills into theater. Many USACE employees who are willing to deploy may be unavailable because of work on priority projects or programs in their home offices. USACE divisions should maintain and periodically update a personnel roster that includes required contingency skill sets (e.g., electrical, petroleum, water, environmental) and individual deployability. USACE personnel can be battle-rostered at large against the CED table of distribution and allowances.

As the contingency matures, the CED mission and structure evolves. Planning and preparing for different phases of the contingency early in the process can mitigate uncertainty and risk, and, in turn, enhance the CED’s capability and readiness to respond.

2. Mission Integration

During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USACE discovered it held a pivotal role as both a formal and informal integrator in stability operations. During OEF, USACE established the JPIO to formally interact with the JTF and customers and stakeholders on the program and campaign levels. The JPIO is critical for ensuring USACE’s role in the HN’s reconstruction efforts is integrated with the roles of other stakeholders and interagency partners.

Before the JPIO’s establishment, a member of the USACE team would sometimes discover that another in-theater agency had a similar planned or ongoing project co-located with USACE’s project. The JPIO is able to deconflict these projects, eliminate redundancy, and reduce waste by communicating with other construction partners at a campaign level.

Enduring Lesson

Although USACE is not ultimately responsible for project selection within the purview of the overall campaign, USACE personnel often possess critical information and perspective that can predict project success or failure.

Communicating this information to stakeholders, formally and informally at all levels, can greatly enhance reconstruction campaign success.

2.1 Advising the Customer on Engineering Effects

USACE must advise the customer on potential engineering effects, and ask the customer questions about the linkage of a project to the campaign strategy (see Figure 3-7, showing the life cycle of a USACE project). Because USACE is a contract construction agency, it does not strategically plan stability operations, nor does it decide which construction projects provide the greatest benefit to the HN and/or the JTF campaign.
The customer who provides the project funds is responsible for assessing the project benefits. During OIF and OEF, USACE engineers and leaders often found they possessed unique perspective and critical information that could predict project failure or success. Passing this information to the stakeholders, both formally and informally, is key to project and reconstruction success. While the JPIO fulfills USACE’s formal integration role, USACE team members at all levels can enhance project success by communicating potential project issues and efficacy to the appropriate person.
Enduring Lesson

Fairly or unfairly, critics will hold the construction agent responsible for the success and even the usefulness and benefits of the project.

USACE personnel should advise customers on project efficacy, usefulness, and linkage to the overall campaign strategy, as well as engineering concerns.

2.2 Project Selection and Execution

During OIF and OEF, investigators and the popular media criticized USACE for expending resources, effort, and funding, and endangering lives building projects that, ultimately, the HN did not use. However, USACE’s formal role is ensuring the customer’s project is built to standard, on time, and within budget — not deciding what the customer should build.

Although the decision to commit funds is ultimately the customer’s, USACE professionals should ask questions and discuss the project with the customer before project initiation. Some discussion topics may include:

- Addressing critical planning elements (i.e., the “Six Pack”). These elements are used to guide the project delivery team from initiation and planning to request for proposal development and, ultimately, to contract award. These elements include:
  - Agreement on scope of requirements
  - Appropriate project site
  - Validated funds available
  - Available water supply and other utilities such as electrical, gas, and sewer
  - Physically accessible location
  - Situationally secure construction location
- Asking the customer how the planned project links with the overall campaign and stability operations strategy
- Asking the customer how a given project fits with the local commander’s plan
- Using appropriate designs that the HN can sustain

Enduring Lesson

Define the project requirements with the customer early to ensure the project will most efficiently achieve its desired effect.

USACE must leverage its authorities and organization to flexibly complement the overseas contingency operations organization, changing to adapt to operational conditions and demands. USACE reports to the supported command as well as to its internal USACE chain of command. JTFs are organized under the supported CCMD. The engineer command structure within the JTF must provide comprehensive situational awareness including logistics, intelligence, and staffing. USACE, the Air Force Civil Engineering Center, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and military construction forces’ resources should be responsible to, if not assigned and reporting to, the supported command to support the vision. The different joint and interagency organizations must participate to achieve unity of effort. Chapter 5, *Mission Command and the Contingency Division*, and Chapter 6, *Unity of Effort and Stakeholder Engagement*, further discuss mission command.

3.1 Command Relationships

USACE divisions may become operationally controlled by their supported CCMD during a contingency. The operational area commander will assume operational control (OPCON) of the initial USACE elements and will define the mission requirements for the initial deployed team and the CED. The supporting USACE division retains administrative control of all elements related to its mission so it can provide USACE-specific administrative support requirements.

The JTF or theater commander retains OPCON of the deployed assets and may further delegate the command relationship to subordinate commanders. Table 3-1 shows a mission command structure for USACE’s deployed assets.

**Table 3-1. Typical mission command structure for USACE’s deployable assets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Delegated</th>
<th>To</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEST-A</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>*JTF</td>
<td>Direct support</td>
<td>OAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>*JTF</td>
<td>Direct support</td>
<td>OAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADVON</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>*JTF</td>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Supporting USACE division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>*JTF</td>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Supporting USACE division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The supporting USACE division retains administrative control responsibility for USACE-specific support requirements for the FEST and the RTs. Because of their direct support to the operational environment owner, the operational environment owner will provide all logistical requirements to support their mission. The district and the ADVON team logistical requirements are all project reimbursable.

*If the mission does not use a JTF, an element would be assigned to the senior theater command.*
3.2 Customer Relationships

USACE’s reimbursable business model dictates that its customers often include high-level institutions such as other U.S. government agencies and governments of foreign nations. Though appearing similar, command relationships and customer relationships are inherently different.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lesson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only address issues related to construction projects when engaging with host nation leadership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Monitoring and Oversight

Division-level oversight is similar in contingency and noncontingency environments. Appropriate oversight requires a forward command presence. Any USACE division may ultimately act as a contingency division if an operation occurs in its AOR. Unlike the noncontingency environment, the contingency USACE leadership must have clearly defined roles and relationships with the tactical engineer commanders in theater. Contingency elements should maintain the standard USACE monitoring and oversight model from HQUSACE division (major subordinate command) districts.

The JTF’s joint engineer (J-ENG) cell oversees the tactical engineer elements in theater. The contingency division commander and the J-ENG director must interface seamlessly to ensure consistent mission command. The JPIO represents USACE and external engineers at meetings but may call on district staff through the contingency division.

The JTF determines the specific maneuver engineer oversight structure; this element will likely be the Joint Force Engineer Command organization or similar theater command structure. The USACE contingency division and the engineer maneuver units must link solidly within the JTF structure (see Figure 3-8). More information about the command oversight structure can be found in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, and Annex E.
5. Combatant Command Operational Phases

USACE’s role in the contingency operation changes with very distinct phases, differing greatly from one another. Generally, the contingency can be categorized in six CCMD/USACE phases; UCE activities overlap and roughly coincide with these phases in three general processes that consist of stand-up, sustained operations, and drawdown (see Table 3-2).
Table 3-2. General alignment of combatant command and USACE phases and USACE contingency element activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHASE 0</th>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
<th>PHASE III</th>
<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>PHASE V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCMD Phases</td>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Deter</td>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>Dominate</td>
<td>Stabilize</td>
<td>Enable civil authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE Phases</td>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Deploy team</td>
<td>Deploy detachment</td>
<td>Deploy main body</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Redeploy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCE Activities</td>
<td>Stand-up</td>
<td>Sustained</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Drawdown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following sections introduce the phases and refer to other locations within the playbook for further details. The three UCE processes are highlighted first, followed by a more specific discussion of the six CCMD phases. Each contingency has specific trigger points that carry the operation from one phase to the next. While these triggers vary with the operation, some potential trigger points are included at the beginning of the section.

5.1 USACE Contingency Element Stand-Up

The UCE stand-up activities coincide with the first four CCMD operational phases.

Trigger Point: Receipt of Mission

Although this phase begins with the receipt of the contingency mission, pre-contingency planning, training exercises, and mission rehearsal exercises are crucial to preparation. Participating in planning, coordination, and training allows the contingency division and CED to:

- Understand, develop, and identify triggers
- Identify and request funding
- Integrate the contingency division and CED into the CCMD plan
- Develop initial engineer organization (relationship with the JTF)

(Note: Liaison officers can perform many of these functions for USACE elements.)
Commit embedded planners (e.g., field force engineering liaison officers) to military and interagency organizations during non-contingency periods.

The initial entry of a USACE organization in a contingency operation sets conditions for a larger, more capable, follow-on organization. The initial engineer organization may be a reconnaissance element or FEST. The contingency division must plan with its CCMD to identify the appropriate initial engineer organization and integrate it with the JTF in theater, while also considering how the CED will integrate into full-spectrum operations. Chapter 4 discusses the initial USACE elements and their transition to a fully operational CED.

**Transitioning from the Initial Element to the Contingency Engineer District**

Determining the transition triggers from an initial organization to a full CED requires deliberate planning to match the anticipated mission requirements to resources and capabilities. Considerations include the following:

- Identifying who has the Department of Defense-directed contract construction mission in the AOR
- Anticipated operational duration
- Specific USACE expertise required (e.g., contract construction, real estate)
- Reachback functionality and capability
- Other lead engineering elements in theater such as the Theater Engineer Command/deployable command post or another service acting as the lead agency
- Sufficient workload to support an entire district

**Phase 0: Shape — Assess and Coordinate**

Phase 0 is a pre-initiation phase and includes all planning efforts. This phase is sustained until the plan is executed at which time Phase 0 ends. The objective and desired effects are to integrate USACE processes into the CCMD and the CCMD’s contingency plans and to implement USACE engineer capabilities.

**Phase I: Deploy Reconnaissance Teams to Validate and Assess Engineer Requirements**

Phase I begins upon deployment of the first RTs. Phase I is sustained during the conduct of their mission. The RT’s recommended action for future deployment teams will determine if this mission will transition to Phase II. Phase I ends upon issuance of a “prepare-to-deploy” order for the ADVON team. The objectives and desired effects are to deploy SMEs to assess the on-ground situation. The assessment includes the operational environment for follow-on forces and the requirements for follow-on USACE capabilities.
Phase II: Deploy Advanced Echelon Team to the Area of Responsibility

Phase II begins upon issuance of prepare-to-deploy order for the ADVON team. This phase is sustained throughout the mission until the arrival of the main body into theater at which time Phase II ends. The objectives and desired effects are for the engineer detachment team to deploy to:

- Establish a forward base for follow-on USACE capabilities
- Refine the current mission requirements
- Initiate the engineer common operating picture by recognizing the current tasks
- Fulfill other requirements where USACE can assist and determine a rough order of magnitude for future USACE capabilities

Phase III: Deploy the Engineer Detachment Main Body to Assume Mission Command of USACE Elements in the Area of Responsibility

Phase III begins with the main body’s arrival in theater. This phase is sustained throughout the mission until the construction has reached a period where new construction is no longer initiated. Any residual construction project continues the transition to its end, but the projection of no new construction triggers the end of Phase III and the beginning of Phase IV, though existing projects continue through completion. The objectives and desired effects are to deploy the main body of the required capability (the size and composition may range from a single project office up to and including one or more CEDs). The required main body’s capability can vary.

5.2 USACE Contingency Element Sustained Operational Phase

The CED enters the sustained operational phase when it can deliver sustainable engineering and construction services meeting the theater campaign plan’s goals and objectives. Potential trigger points for determining sustained operations include the following:

- An 80 percent personnel staffing level
- Number of project pre-awards is less than or equal to the number of projects in execution
- The threat situation allows for expanded operations
- Other trigger points as determined by the command

Most of this playbook discusses the role of the CED in the sustained operational phase.

**Enduring Lesson**

Successful construction management in high-risk environments depends heavily on local nationals.
The CED must conduct sustained operations while remembering its ultimate goal to depart the HN and leave the construction work in the care of the local nationals. To transfer the operation successfully, the CED should integrate local nationals as much as legally possible in the developing organization, which may include hiring, training, or mentoring local nationals. Program and project planners should account for the possibility that HN personnel may need training on how to operate and maintain construction projects turned over to the HN. UCE sustained operations corresponds with CCMD operational Phase IV.

**Phase IV: Transition the Construction Mission (Completed or in Progress) to the End User and Host Nation**

Phase IV begins when the CED accepts no new contracts and the on-going construction is pending completion before transition to the end user, a HN entity, or an enduring USACE presence in the HN, such as an area office. Specifics of this phase depend greatly on the individual contingency and HN ability. The JPIO would have a significant role in deciding how best to transition the construction mission.

This phase is sustained throughout the project transition process, and personnel attrition and office location changes occur as projects are transitioned. This phase ends when all construction has been completed and transitioned to the subsequent construction entity, and offices and personnel begin the final redeployment process. The objectives and desired effects are to transition current and completed construction projects where the end user assumes operations and maintenance of transferred facilities.

USACE elements could potentially transition the construction mission seamlessly to a similar or “shadow” element comprised of HN personnel. This element could be one that USACE created and developed during the contingency, or one that existed previously within the HN government.


**5.3 USACE Contingency Element Drawdown**

Potential triggers for the UCE drawdown may include:

- Approaching a known operational end date.
- Number of projects in execution exceeds those in pre-award.
- Decreasing number of projects requires reducing commensurate number of personnel to maintain affordability.
- Other triggers as determined by the command.

The UCE drawdown activities coincide with CCMD operational Phase V.
Phase V: Redeploy USACE Capability

Phase V begins when all construction projects have been transitioned. The redeployment process objective is only to return all personnel home and close all deployed offices supporting the contingency. This phase is sustained until all personnel have redeployed and there is no enduring mission in the HN. This phase will be considered complete when all personnel have returned home or the enduring mission has transitioned to something new or different. The desired effect is for the residual mission to be transitioned to an enduring USACE entity and all others redeploy.

References


ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, August 2012.


Chapter 4

Contingency Engineer District

Introduction

The contingency engineer district (CED) is USACE’s main functional unit to conduct major reconstruction operations in a contingency environment. This chapter discusses the CED’s formation, organization, mission, and operational characteristics as a stand-alone unit.

1. Mission

The CED’s mission statement is: On order, the contingency engineer district deploys into any location worldwide to support military operations with general engineering services and capabilities across the full operational spectrum, supporting U.S. and coalition deployed forces, other governmental agencies and host nations as directed in the Army action plan for stability operations.

The CED draws its mission essential task list (METL) from the mission statement. A mission essential task is one the CED can perform based on its design, equipment, manning, table of distribution and allowances (TDA), and mission. The METL compiles all the mission essential tasks (see Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders). The METL provides the framework from which the CED can respond to mission requirements. Directed missions may require the unit to add additional specified tasks to the METL. Table 4-1 shows the CED’s draft METL.

The CED’s core responsibilities in a contingency environment remain the same as in the peacetime continental United States (CONUS) environment, but accomplishing them in a contingency requires two additional skill sets that deal with conflict-related missions and coalition missions. The combination of the three skill sets encompass all the skills required for accomplishing the CED’s mission in nonpermissive environments (see Figure 4-1 for the three CED mission subsets). Paragraphs 1.1 through 1.3 discuss each mission subset in more detail and outline where in the playbook the skill sets are covered.
Table 4-1. Draft mission essential task list for the contingency engineer district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Mission Essential Tasks</th>
<th>Core Capabilities Mission Essential Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilize</td>
<td>Provide technical engineer support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct pre-deployment activities</td>
<td>Conduct engineer reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct reception, staging, and onward</td>
<td>Conduct engineer estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration activities</td>
<td>Conduct engineer support in the operational decision cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilize</td>
<td>Design and plan projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct redeployment activities</td>
<td>Execute contract construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command the Mission</td>
<td>Control project quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan an operation</td>
<td>Conduct environmental assessment and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for an operation</td>
<td>Provide engineering advice on construction effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute an operation</td>
<td>Discuss project efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess an operation</td>
<td>Provide stakeholder feedback during construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Sustainment</td>
<td>Manage construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct logistics/life support</td>
<td>Acquire/dispose of real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide human resources support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide information technology and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information management support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ survivability measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ chemical, biological, radiological,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and nuclear protection measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct personnel recovery operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide mobility operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct USACE business management functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contract projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manage financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide legal support for contract construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct safety and operational health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct logistics operations (manage bill of materials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closeout/turnover projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1 Core Missions

CED core missions are listed on the right side column of the METL in Table 4-1. The most fundamental of the CED’s core missions is executing contract construction, but this is only one core mission. In addition to those listed, the joint task force (JTF) or Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) may require the CED to conduct other tasks for a specific mission. Although all chapters of the playbook contain information about core missions, the following chapters include information specific to core mission execution:

- Chapter 7, *Reachback, Engineering, and Business Processes*
- Chapter 8, *Project and Program Management*
- Chapter 9, *Supporting Missions: Real Estate, Environment, and Energy*
- Chapter 13, *Authorities, Authorizations, and Funding*
- Chapter 14, *Acquisition*
1.2 Conflict-Related Missions

Conflict-related missions involve additional skills the CED requires to perform its core missions in the combat or nonpermissive environment. The following chapters are specific to conflict-related missions:

- Chapter 11, *Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence*
- Chapter 12, *Conflict-Related Requirements: Sustainment and Information Technology*
- Chapter 15, *Personnel Sourcing*

1.3 Coalition Missions

Coalition missions include additional skills the CED requires to perform its missions in the joint or coalition environment. These skills include interacting with unified action partners. These partners include military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and private sector elements (see ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*) with whom the CED plans, coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates during the contingency mission. The following chapters discuss the coalition mission:

- Chapter 5, *Command and Control, and Major Subordinate Command Oversight*
- Chapter 6, *Unity of Effort and Stakeholder Engagement*
- Chapter 10, *Capacity Development*

1.4 Missions Performed During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

*Enduring Lesson*

Only assume missions supporting the combatant command’s campaign plan, counterinsurgency strategy, or stability operations.

The contingency divisions and districts performed widely varying missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As the missions matured, the CEDs were able to better define what might constitute an appropriate mission for CED execution. One of the major lessons learned during these operations was that USACE encountered tremendous and unanticipated difficulties when assuming responsibilities for missions outside of its core areas of expertise.

*Enduring Lesson*

The supporting missions that are outside of the contingency engineer district’s core competencies come at the expense of quality, schedule, budget, and safety to the core missions.
Table 4-2 identifies some of the missions the CEDs executed during OIF and OEF. The table categorizes the missions as follows: those that went well and CEDs should endure in the future; those performed with difficulty that CED’s should decline; and those that USACE did not perform but probably should have. Although USACE subject matter experts generally agreed on the services described as successful, not all subject matter experts agreed on those described as difficult that should be declined in the future.

**Table 4-2. USACE missions and lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful Performance: (Sustain for future contingencies)</th>
<th>Performed with Difficulty: (Consider declining in future)</th>
<th>Not Performed: (Consider assuming in the future)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military construction, both environmental and facilities</td>
<td>USACE business model applied to minor construction projects</td>
<td>Programmatic oversight through an enduring division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Real estate</td>
<td>Service contracting</td>
<td>Basing master planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistent, embedded planning using forward engineer support teams</td>
<td>Capacity development as a separate program (not integrated within each project)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces construction</td>
<td>Construction management of remote and unsecure projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reachback</td>
<td>Assuming responsibility for missions not assigned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject matter experts forward (i.e., hydrological assessments)</td>
<td>Operations and maintenance, Army construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the Department of State mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental baseline surveys and other environmental oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure development and nation building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Personnel within USACE disagree whether real estate is a USACE mission or if USACE supports the mission (in accordance with Army Techniques Publication 3-34.40 [Field Manual 3-34.400], *General Engineering*), with USACE providing subject matter experts.
1.5 Core Missions Versus Other Accepted Missions

Assuming missions beyond the CED’s core competencies (such as operations and maintenance [O&M], banking for other entities, etc.) may result in unanticipated consequences, including vital resources diverted from the CED’s most fundamental missions. Although each CED METL may differ depending on the contingency operation, eliminating mission creep begins with defining the core missions and understanding how they nest into the overall campaign requirements. Reinforcing this concept must come from the top down using the project management business process workload acceptance process.

CED must possess the skill set to understand and provide true resource-loaded program and project management. Each potential assignment must be reviewed for its effect on the existing workload on the functional elements involved. The command and project manager must understand their roles in reprioritizing affected actions and informing customers and stakeholders.

1.6 Operation-Specific Requirements

Each contingency will have geographical and environmental challenges or differences. In addition to core USACE competencies, leadership from each contingency should anticipate what the JTF may request (e.g., oil, electricity, water, O&M, capacity development, etc.). USACE must collaborate with other responsible agencies such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations, and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program to effect rapid construction execution with supporting sustainment processes. USACE leadership must insert itself in the JTF process early and pre-plan and train for the requisite roles and responsibilities as the field construction expert.

Although the METL for the CED requires contingency construction (with design support from reachback), the OIF and OEF JTFs did not mobilize adequate service and agency components required to support capacity development, O&M, public works management, and service contracting. As a result, the JTFs often turned to USACE to support these missions, which reduced the core mission’s quality, schedule, budget, and safety.

1.7 Liaison with Operational Commanders

Another important element of focusing on the CED’s core competencies is ensuring direct liaison with operational commanders. Ideally, USACE elements should co-locate with regional commanders and operational area commanders at many different levels of the coalition to support them effectively.

Direct interface and aligning area offices with tactical commanders’ areas of responsibility (AORs) can help battlespace owners understand the benefits USACE brings to the campaign, potential benefits to the operational commander, and USACE’s cost-reimbursable business model. Co-location and close interface with local tactical units can help mitigate sweeping priority changes caused by changes in their leadership due to unit rotations or moves.
**Liaison Officers**

In addition to co-locating with commands, placing dedicated liaison officer (LNOs) within critical offices of the JTF helps communicate the USACE capability and fosters relationship building among unified action partners. LNOs must explain to customers/stakeholders the effects of accepting a workload outside of CED’s core competencies. LNOs must understand resource-loading scheduling and the work breakdown structure tools for determining the true effects of accepting work.

LNOs are not authorized to accept work per the USACE workload acceptance process and must be diligent to not lead the customer to assume that work will be accepted. Work acceptance is the command’s role and responsibility, executed through the project manager.

**2. The Contingency Engineer District Structure**

The CED organizational structure resembles a typical USACE district with augmented military personnel in several key positions that require military expertise, engagement with resident military units, and management of military members. These positions include the headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD), the area and resident office officers in charge, and others.

The final CED composition depends on the mission. The district leadership must consider the number of income-producing projects required to maintain the district’s structure and affordability. The contingency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the CED structure must account for and differentiate between administrative and mission requirements, and allocate resources accordingly.

The structure in Figure 4-2, and key positions outlined in Table 4-3, provide the district with an HHD, giving the district commander the ability to delegate administrative authorities (inventories, security, life support, location of camp issues, etc.) to the HHD commander, allowing the district commander to focus on the construction and engineer support to the local tactical commander.

![Figure 4-2. Standard contingency engineer district composition](image-url)
Table 4-3. Contingency engineer district key personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>O6, CED commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>E9, Command Sergeant Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>04, HHD Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>E8, HHD First Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Property Book Officer/Logistics Technician (GS 1640 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Real Estate Technician (GS 1170 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Environmental Support Team Technician (GS 0801 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Information Manager (GS 2210 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public Affairs Officer (GS 1035 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligence (GG 0132 12/14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director (GS 0801 14/15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Program Manager (GS 0340 12/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Construction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Project Engineer (GS 0801 12/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Quality Assurance/Quality Control (GS 0809 9/11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Administrative Officer (GS 0301 12/13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Support</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Contracting Officer (GS 1102 12/13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

The CED establishes a base where USACE employees work and live during their deployment, support ongoing construction, assess and award new construction, and support the operational area commander’s mission with engineer services, as required. The district commander focuses on delivering the construction mission while the subordinate HHD commander manages administrative and military operational requirements for personnel assigned to accomplish the construction mission. Some of the HHD commander’s responsibilities are to:

- Establish and manage the information management network
- Account for property and manage logistics to sustain the base camp
- Assure force protection
• Coordinate operations and intelligence
• Manage personnel accountability human resource cell
• Implement external and internal communications role through the public affairs office
• Coordinate movement control
• Implement a safety program
• Coordinate with the operational area commanders

3. Contingency Engineer District Duties

Paragraphs 3.1 through 3.10 discuss some of the CED’s major requirements.

3.1 Host Nation and Local National Engagement

The supported command guides the deployed teams early in the mission and defines their requirements. Some construction requirements for the benefit of the HN may require HN leadership engagement and coordination with the Department of State (DOS) and local tactical commander (see Figure 4-3). A key point in meeting with HN leadership and local government is that USACE representatives must only address issues related to the construction project. The HN must address any issues outside of the construction project with the representative of the DOS and/or the battlespace owners.

Enduring Lesson

The command may wish to consider visits from influential leaders as key leader engagements and treat them accordingly.
3.2 Engineering

All USACE deployed assets have specific areas of expertise and limitations. If a deployed team faces a requirement for which it lacks capacity, the reachback process is available to leverage capabilities in CONUS. For example, engineering design capacity only becomes available in theater when the CED becomes fully mission capable. If the initial deployed team or the advanced echelon (ADVON) team requires engineering design, the team can coordinate with its supporting division’s engineering and technical services section or submit a formal reachback request.

3.3 Operations, Security, and Intelligence

Although the term “operations” in a military unit usually encompasses all of the unit’s mission requirements, USACE separates its core tasks (engineering, contracting, resource management, etc.) from its military operations tasks. As such, operations and security responsibilities encompass only those tasks inherent to performing the USACE mission in a nonpermissive environment.

During the early mission stages, the deployed teams rely on the supported command to provide security, movement, intelligence, and force protection. As the CED becomes more fully functional, it may perform these tasks internally if the supported command cannot provide them...
due to other mission requirements. The ADVON team focuses on establishing the basic district operational functions and growing these abilities as the unit reaches full strength.

**Contracted Security and Intelligence**

During the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, USACE CEDs relied heavily on integrated contracted security and intelligence. Future contingencies need to determine if they will address security and intelligence requirements using contractors, organic U.S. military, or other methods. Although the use of security contractors offered some advantages, including personnel longevity in theater and flexibility, their use also introduced significant disadvantages related to cost, oversight, and political considerations.

Although a Soldier is required to follow all legal orders, falling under the purview of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a security contractor is only required to fulfill obligations within the terms of the contract and must ensure criminal acts are not committed (contract personnel are subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act for U.S. crimes committed overseas during contingency operations). Potentially serious conflicts can arise if USACE military leadership gives the contractor direction in a hostile situation that the contractor does not wish to follow.

Because contractors often are not U.S. citizens, collecting and releasing intelligence to them also becomes problematic. Most contractors do not possess a SECRET security clearance, preventing them having full access to intelligence collected within the operational area. Chapter 11, *Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence*, discusses these issues in greater detail.

**3.4 Acquisition and Contracting**

The deployed district has organic contracting capabilities and additional support available via reachback. Contracting expertise is one of the core USACE competencies and is overseen by the USACE Directorate of Contracting. The mission for the initial entry teams and the ADVON team is to identify contract construction requirements and prepare the contract package requirements for the contracting support personnel. As the ADVON team progresses into a full district, contracting capacity increases commensurately. Chapter 13, *Authorities, Authorizations, and Funding*, discusses the CED’s contracting and acquisition role in detail.

**3.5 Program, Project, and Construction Management**

By reviewing the different project requirements and their sources of funding, the programs section separates the categories of projects into programs. Like the other sections, programs capability increases during the transformation from the forward engineer support team – advance (FEST-A)/reconnaissance team mission to the CED at full operational capability (FOC). The programs section must interface considerably with the local military units, the DOS, USAID, and intergovernmental agencies involved in the district’s projects.

Based on the project locations, the district’s area offices receive project assignments and then the area office officers in charge assign each project to a resident office. The resident office assigns qualified engineers to the project. The engineers normally live at the resident office where they work with construction managers to monitor the project. The construction managers develop the project’s quality assurance plan, monitor construction progress, and work with the contractor to sustain the quality assurance plan.
The initial deployed team may be required to perform limited project and construction management, provided it possesses organic expertise for such tasks. Because its capacity is limited, the amount of construction and project management assumed by the initial team often depends on the task’s urgency. In some cases, the initial team initiates a process to be taken over as a more permanent staff arrives in theater. For further information about program management, project management, and construction management, refer to Chapter 8, *Project and Program Management*.

### 3.6 Personnel Sourcing

HQUSACE and the supported division human resources team sources all the deployed teams to find the best suitable personnel for the required task. Because the CED is stood-up and sourced when the contingency mission demands, it also means district members have not previously worked together as a team nor trained as a team. This situation presents unique and difficult challenges for the CED. In addition to the CED team not being together as an integral unit before the contingency, many of the slots in the CED are sourced with Schedule A employees, who may or may not have ever had USACE experience previously.

FEST-As must maintain 100-percent strength with its two assigned full-time military personnel and six battle-rostered volunteer civilians. Reconnaissance teams and FEST-As must be accessible and available to deploy within 7 to 10 days. Their CONUS units must identify and battle-roster each team slot in order to maintain deployable teams. Sister divisions identified by HQUSACE will source each team, affording the opportunity to establish training events and readiness exercises to ensure teams are deployable at all times. If personnel sourcing capacity diminishes as the contingency matures from the supporting sister division, recruitment actions will then be advertised and filled enterprise wide.

### 3.7 Resource Management

Resourcing funding for the CED has been complicated and difficult during the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, not only because of the large costs involved with the USACE reconstruction effort, but also because the USACE funding streams were not designed for wartime operations.

Because USACE is project-funded, deploying teams early in the process was problematic. These teams had no established funding source because projects were not yet underway and not generating funds. Currently, USACE is exploring the possibility of obtaining direct funding for initial operational stages.

**Enduring Lesson**

Initial stages of the contingency operation should be direct-funded.

After the initial stages, project and mission requirements define the funding sources available. For example, Congress approves funding for U.S. military construction and some HN construction, like the Afghanistan National Security Forces projects in Afghanistan and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The CED defines programs based on the funding...
sources. The supervision and administration percentage charged by various disciplines in support of the district’s projects fund the district’s management costs. In-depth resource management procedures are discussed in Chapter 13, *Authorities, Authorizations, and Funding*.

### 3.8 Capacity Development

USACE Engineer Regulation 5-1-16, *Capacity Development*, defines capacity development as:

... the building of human, institutional and infrastructure capacity to help societies develop secure, stable and sustainable economies, governments and other institutions through mentoring, training, education, and physical projects, the infusion of financial and other resources, and most importantly, the motivation and inspiration of people to improve their lives.

Many of the projects USACE builds, by definition, increase the capacity of the HN by improving its infrastructure. In addition, provided appropriate legal authority and funding exist, USACE team members may be tasked to train HN engineers or construction team members, therefore, contributing to capacity development. In effect, the CED contributes to capacity development each time a project is completed and turned over to the HN. The DOS also engages in capacity development — often described as nation building — under various economic development authorities.

During the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, the HN often lacked appropriate experience to sustain and manage the facility upon project completion and turnover. Therefore, developing the HN engineer skills was required to properly transition the responsibility for completed and turned-over projects. USACE was often tasked with integrating training of local nationals during project construction. The intent was that after conclusion of the contingency mission, trained local national engineers could provide the required O&M expertise to the HN government agencies. Chapter 10, *Capacity Development*, discusses capacity development in detail.

### 3.9 Information Management and Knowledge Management

Because of USACE’s unique communication requirements, developing, maintaining, and archiving a robust information network is critical to mission accomplishment. This process includes the following:

- Establishing the hardware and physical computing network
- Installing appropriate and standard software
- Maintaining the accuracy of the information entering those systems
- Safeguarding government information to prevent improper dissemination or disclosure
- Establishing data management standards across the division, to include file naming conventions and database structures
USACE uses the Project Management Automated Information System and the Resident Management System to document project-related information. In addition, the Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System tracks all projects supported by reachback districts and division elements. The CED communicates information to the local tactical commander through the unit’s organic information management infrastructure. The initial deployed teams must coordinate accessibility to the tactical unit’s network and establish the communication link with the supported operational area commander as it becomes available. Information management in the CED is discussed more completely in Chapter 12, Conflict-Related Requirements: Sustainment and Information Technology, and the standard business software is discussed in Chapter 7, Reachback, Engineering, and Business Processes.

3.10 Internal and External Review

External organizations frequently conduct audit activities during the contingency mission, including the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Inspector General for Reconstruction, U.S. Army Audit Agency, members of Congress, and others. The review process is often extensive because of the significant appropriated fund expenditure associated with post-conflict reconstruction and the potential for funds misuse or mismanagement as large amounts of money change hands. Administrative, civil, and criminal investigations may proceed from these reviews. All government personnel are required to cooperate with U.S. government audit officials performing authorized audit activities.

Although USACE commanders are responsible for ensuring that periodic internal reviews are performed as required by the regulations governing each aspect of the CED, the external review process is largely reactive. A special staff member, generally an internal review auditor, is included in the CED composition to analyze and forward any requests for information or investigations to the appropriate CED functional area. The supporting division will also initiate internal review actions in coordination with HQUSACE. In addition to the formal review processes, members of the U.S. press corps are often interested in reporting on the reconstruction process. Articles written for publications with large readerships may have disproportionate influence with populations back in the United States. Because the press corps is independent and free, its members may draw their own conclusions about any aspect of the reconstruction process and subsequently publish those opinions.

4. Stand-Up

The Transatlantic Division’s (TAD’s) TDA has three notional contingency districts as subordinate elements. The districts are notional because Congress authorizes HQUSACE to fill the positions only when a contingency is exercised. Any USACE division could use these authorizations to stand up a contingency district worldwide. TAD is only responsible to exercise mission command of any contingency element deployed in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR. When a contingency operation requires the stand-up of a CED outside of the USCENTCOM AOR, HQUSACE will use the CED authorizations on the TAD TDA and fill those positions based on the contingency operation requirements. TAD assumes a support role to the sister division engaged in the contingency in this event. The initially deployed reconnaissance teams or FEST–As stand up according to the CCMD needs in coordination with HQUSACE.
The USACE chain of command notifies personnel who were previously battle-rostered and identified as possessing required skills and begins their deployment preparation. The identified personnel are selected from the existing USACE capabilities matrix and stand ready to deploy within 7 to 10 days. In order to deploy the unit, several steps must take place to include the following:

- The supporting CCMD must specifically request the FEST–A to deploy.
- USACE must receive authority from the Department of the Army to use a modified table of organization and equipment unit for the mission.

The team will stand up until the mission ends or until it transitions to a more robust construction element, whichever occurs first. If the CCMD determines that it requires a CED to fulfill the mission, the FEST–A will transition project requests to the CED ADVON team before moving to another mission or standing down.

Stand-up of the CED begins when the mission requires more complete and immediate project management. The ADVON team deploys first to transition requirements from the FEST-A unit in theater. Upon reaching initial operational capability, the ADVON team requests additional personnel from the division’s human resources element through which personnel are recruited and deployed. The CED becomes FOC when personnel have arrived and are fully supporting the construction mission.

It is important for USACE leadership to consider the joint operational phases when deploying each element of the CED. USACE elements must appropriately synchronize with the joint operational campaign events (see Figure 4-4). In this required synchronization, personnel from these engineer assets must be included in the time-phased force and deployment list that allows forces to flow into theater.

![Figure 4-4. Typical flow of USACE engineer assets during the joint operational phases](image-url)
USACE must align these initial assets with a maneuver unit that can initially provide transportation until USACE can provide its own. In addition, these supporting units must always provide security to ensure freedom of maneuver in areas where engineer capabilities are required.

During Phase 0 of a contingency, HQUSACE must identify all deployable personnel for a reconnaissance team or FEST-A and the CED ADVON team, allowing the responding division to begin deploying specific personnel to the contingency immediately. When Phase 0 transitions to Phase I, the initial team deploys with the maneuver unit to the area of operation. This team will rely on the deputy commander forward in theater to further integrate it into the mission as required.

During Phase I, HQUSACE notifies and prepares the CED ADVON team for deployment in coordination with the supporting major subordinate command. When Phase I transitions to Phase II, the CED ADVON team deploys to a forward staging area with follow-on forces, and remains in the staging area until follow-on forces move to the AOR. Concurrently, the supporting division human resources function begins recruiting for CED positions, if needed. These recruited personnel flow into theater as the CED ADVON team moves to the AOR and becomes FOC during Phase IV.

5. Drawdown

Generally, the drawdown consists of collapsing the project and resident and area offices, and reducing the in-theater footprint. There are four key components to a smooth drawdown:

- A clear, timely vision of the end state, ideally at least a year before the end date
- Careful planning early in the process, establishing expectations for staff actions and event synchronization
- Frequent in-progress reviews and persistent, firm adherence to suspense dates
- Increased logistical support

Annex C, Drawing Down the Contingency Engineer District, reviews the CED drawdown processes in depth.

References

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 16 MAY 2012.

ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, August 2012.

Engineer Regulation 5-1-16, Capacity Development, June 2009.

Engineer Publication 5-1-15, Capacity Development, 30 JUN 2009.
Chapter 5

Mission Command and the Contingency Division

Introduction

Responding to a military contingency is different from responding to a civil disaster within the continental United States (CONUS). CONUS environments are permissive, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) can provide as much capability as necessary without encumbering the mission. In contrast, military contingencies outside the continental United States (OCONUS) are often associated with nonpermissive environments. Sending too much capability forward can burden the military command.

A permissive environment is an operational environment in which the host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

— Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms

Mission command relationships are one of the more complicated and nuanced elements of the contingency engineer mission. This chapter outlines some innate issues facing contingency engineer units and explores previous methods USACE used to address them in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Enduring Lesson

Transparent and clearly understood command relationships are vital to mission effectiveness.

Providing freedom of action is the ultimate objective of all military engineering tasks. The four primary lines of engineer support emanate from this objective. These four primary lines of engineer support include assure mobility, enhance protection, enable logistics, and develop infrastructure (Field Manual 3-34, Engineer Operations). Although the USACE contingency mission supports all of these lines, it focuses on developing infrastructure (see Figure 5-1). Additionally, USACE organization, skills, and capabilities differ from tactical engineer units (see Table 5-1).
Figure 5-1. An electrical substation outside of Erbil, in northern Iraq. This under-construction substation has eight fedders and two 10-MVA transformers that supply electrical load to three area villages and supply power to local industrial customers. (Photograph by Jim Gordon)

Table 5-1. Comparison of tactical engineer units and the USACE contingency engineer district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Tactical Engineer Unit</th>
<th>Corps of Engineer District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction skill set</td>
<td>Generally rudimentary</td>
<td>Great technical depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction equipment</td>
<td>Organic equipment</td>
<td>None; rely on contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction effects</td>
<td>Small scope</td>
<td>Large, complex scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction duration</td>
<td>Generally short</td>
<td>Generally long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover (personnel)</td>
<td>Low, but new unit every 9-15 months</td>
<td>Approximately 41 percent per quarter; but enduring unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project initiation</td>
<td>Unit initiates</td>
<td>Customer initiates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project development</td>
<td>Rudimentary, unit performs</td>
<td>Complex; District or reachback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract administration</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Full spectrum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, USACE must coordinate with entities outside the normal communication channels to leaders of other organizations. For example, a district commander may interface directly with the U.S. Ambassador to the host nation (HN) (or the security cooperation officer), leaders of the HN government, and entities within other areas of the U.S. government. Because of these complicating factors, transparent and clearly understood command relationships are vital to mission effectiveness.
1. Contingency Engineer Division

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) helped USACE establish its process to stand up and deploy a contingency engineer division. Although this publication mostly discusses experiences of the Transatlantic Division (TAD) in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), all USACE divisions are potentially contingency divisions if an emergency occurs in their associated combatant command (CCMD) AOR. For example, a contingency mission in United States Africa Command’s AOR would involve the North Atlantic Division rather than TAD. However, certain aspects of any OCONUS contingency mission remains with the TAD if so directed by Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE).

1.1 Contingency Engineer Division Roles and Responsibilities

The division is the major subordinate command (MSC) within USACE, providing six major combat multipliers to the mission on the ground beyond the district’s inherent capability (see Figure 5-2), including:

1. Mission command
2. Oversight, including regional governance boards
3. Cultivating and maintaining strategic relationships
4. Program management
5. Quality assurance and quality control
6. Hiring actions

HQUSACE identifies the funding sources for contingency MSC activities.
The division provides mission command for the subordinate USACE elements in country (forward engineering support teams [FESTs], contingency districts, subject matter expert (SME) teams from USACE labs, etc.) (see Figure 5-3). In addition to the actual commander, the division provides purpose, direction, and guidance to achieve a multilevel unity of effort. The supported division is the only USACE entity to provide a mission command role to USACE elements in theater. HQUSACE must designate the supported division early in the contingency. HQUSACE’s options include:

1. TAD
2. The supported division (division in whose AOR the contingency occurs)
3. A hybrid of both the supported division and TAD
4. A new contingency division stood up to support the mission (unlikely)

TAD could also train another contingency division.
The contingency division provides mission command for all forward subordinate elements. In this photo, the Transatlantic Division commander, MG Michael Eyre, inspects a project site in Farah, Afghanistan, June 2012. (Photograph by Karla K. Marshall)

Planning is also an important part of the mission command that the contingency engineer district (CED) cannot provide. The executing CED can probably plan six months into the future. Beyond this, the division can provide planning guidance within the legal and policy constraints associated with its funding.

Division Oversight

The contingency division works USACE-related problems in theater that the CED is unable to solve. These areas may include facilitating legal advice, resource constraints in funding and personnel, technical reachback assistance, contract consulting, or other areas for which the district lacks internal ability.

Regional Governance Boards

The division provides a host of regional governances to enhance mission accomplishment, discussed further in Chapter 7, Reachback, Engineering, and Business Processes. The four universal governance structures throughout USACE are:

1. The Regional Acquisition Strategy Board
2. The Regional Program Budget Advisory Committee
3. Regional Management Board
4. Regional Command Council
The Regional Acquisition Strategy Board generally meets twice annually, while the other boards meet once quarterly. At these meetings, specialists gather to discuss salient issues, forcing conversations at the regional level, allowing the division to emplace overarching strategies for subordinate commands.

**Acquisition and Contracting**

The contingency district predominantly performs acquisition and contracting functions. The contingency division contracting section assists with overseeing contracting processes, procedures, and policy. In addition, the division staff can assist in recruiting additional contracting capabilities through the Directorate of Contracting to ensure timely completion of contract actions. For detailed contracting and acquisition requirements and capabilities for a contingency operation refer to Chapter 14, *Acquisition*.

**Resource Management**

Every contingency mission should have authorizations for employment and/or appropriations allowing USACE to fund and support the mission. Projects and programs against which the division staff can charge will partially comprise the financial resources for future contingencies. The contingency will be at least partially direct-funded, based on the congressional appropriations established at the time of the contingency. Early programming efforts will assist in acquiring funds in time to employ division staff for the mission requirements. For detailed procedures on division resource management and programming practices refer to Chapter 13, *Authorities, Authorizations, and Funding*.

**Information Management and Knowledge Management**

One of the division’s critical tasks is to retain and properly manage information and knowledge. Accessibility to project information is crucial to properly and accurately report mission completion. The deployed division must sustain standard business systems and procedures for project management and knowledge management. Districts use the Resident Management System and the Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System (RAMS) to track project information and reachback requests. The division manages, assists, and coordinates any information management system requirements. Chapter 8, *Project and Program Management*, details the management of project information and the reachback processes.

**Internal and External Review**

During the initial phase of a contingency deployment, HQUSACE supports all internal review requirements because the division will not have organic capability to conduct internal reviews or respond to external reviews. However, division activities are always subject to external audits from entities such as the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, the United States Army Audit Agency, and the Special Inspector General. HQUSACE internal review management supports coordination with external audit organizations.

**Strategic Relationships**

A division headquarters assists the supported command, maneuver units, and other governmental agencies understand USACE capabilities. It defines programmatic construction for CED execution, and communicates USACE’s construction and contractual services benefits. The
division works with the theater command to define USACE’s potential contributions to the major construction programs (Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF], military construction [MILCON], etc.). Communication with CCMDs should be at the division/MSC level (TAD or the other supported division). See Chapter 6, *Unity of Effort and Stakeholder Engagement*, for more information.

**Program Management**

The division is always responsible for appropriately overseeing construction programs and facilitating consistent program application (see Figure 5-4). The division translates the customer program into construction execution through its own internal program management process. For example, to enhance efficiency, the division might require all subordinate units to execute projects of a certain type (for example, MILCON) similarly throughout the theater or consider awarding all MILCON projects on a certain forward operating base using a particular acquisition strategy.

![Figure 5-4. U.S. Navy LCDR Frank Carroll, resident office engineer, assigned to the USACE, Mosul, looks over floor plans with the contractor at a construction site in Mosul, Iraq. Engineers came out to visit the site to ensure that construction is being performed to standard and is running on time.](image)

Program management’s ultimate goal is achieving greater USACE capability than if projects were managed individually. The division’s program management requires acquiring the appropriate resources, coordinating with customers to ensure the program’s intent and coordinating with the construction district. Program management is a life cycle process, often lasting for four to eight years for a given project. By nature, CEDs are short-term focused, and close years before all projects are closed out. The division provides overarching oversight and management.
Often, customer coordination occurs at a fairly high level outside the theater of operations. For example, MILCON customers for the USCENTCOM AOR, United States Army Central Command (USARCENT), United States Air Forces Central Command (USAFCENT), USCENTCOM, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), and Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management are all located in CONUS. While the division coordinates at this level, the executing district coordinates with end users and installations in theater.

Sometimes proper program management requires balancing subordinate units’ workloads. Work may migrate to a single subordinate element over time, and the division may need to shift workloads among all subordinate elements, especially those managing specific projects.

USACE application of specific programs must be synchronized with the operations tasks and objectives of the CCMD. Individual construction projects should complement tactical objectives and lines of operations, or they may not be well-integrated into the local plan.

**Reachback**

Appropriate project management includes identifying necessary work for reachback versus what the forward element must accomplish locally. A division commander can effectively establish reachback and in-theater policies for everyone in the command, ensuring all MSC entities share ownership of the downrange projects. Conversely, the executing organization may avoid reachback in favor of on-hand assets and within the commander’s direct control. The division must ensure the contingency district places appropriate business into the reachback process, that the assistance request reaches the reachback providers, and the provider is resourced and capable to complete the work.

**Enduring Lesson**

Contingency engineer districts must deploy as part of a larger, coordinated effort. Units are not sent out into the field without an overarching command.

For the current USCENTCOM contingencies, the USACE Reachback Operations Center and RAMS provide the working platforms for reachback requests. These systems provide effective communications between the contingency operators (project managers), engineers, and the CONUS-based reachback providers. For future operations, at least four possibilities exist on how reachback could be managed:

1. TAD runs reachback operations by USACE policy for all supported divisions.

2. The supported division manages reachback.

3. HQUSACE tasks TAD to manage reachback for the supported division by individual mission.

4. HQUSACE tasks TAD to manage the contingency as a whole (including the reachback processes).

HQUSACE would need to decide early in the process which of these options to employ.
Engineering

On occasion, and depending on the task, the division’s engineer technical services can respond with organic capabilities in support of a mission. Refer to Chapter 7 for a discussion of contingency division supporting engineering functions.

Authority to Accept Work

The Regional Business Center is a concept for how the supported division operates. Chapter 8 outlines guidance on work acceptance and authority to commit USACE to execute programs. The CED commander then executes these missions, projects, and programs. The division oversight and guidance ensures that the projects to which the USACE commits are in keeping with the overarching USACE campaign plan and the CED mission essential task list.

USACE should send CEDs to the operational area as part of a larger organization. Without this coordination, extremely costly commitments can be made, requiring the United States’ participation over many years that may or may not align with its long-term goals. For example, in Afghanistan, the CED committed to an operations and maintenance (O&M) mission requiring years of continuous effort that may not be sustainable. In Iraq, the CEDs committed to executing hundreds of minor construction projects and services contracts that probably would have been better executed by other agencies and organizations.

Districts do not have the authority to volunteer for new programs. The district can volunteer or sign up for projects within a designated program (e.g., a new or existing building within the ANSF program).

The district should not create new programs such as:

- O&M for a compound or ANSF, because it will require new funding
- Capacity development of local nationals, which also requires additional funding and is not part of the core USACE mission, but is the mission of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other nongovernmental organizations

The CED should focus on project execution, while the division should be concerned with long-term program management, funding, and close-out.

Enduring Lesson

Division-level leaders retain authority to accept programs on behalf of USACE.
Capacity Development

HN capacity development is a core competency for the Department of State. Capacity development is not a core competency for USACE, but HN capacity and capabilities may receive tangential benefits through appropriately funded USACE activities such as:

- As part of standard pre-solicitation outreach efforts, providing guidance to interested offerors on how to submit responsive proposals
- USACE assisting HN partners in determining whether opportunities exist for training relevant to facility maintenance

However, USACE offices must work closely with resource management and the office of counsel to determine whether any proposed activities are permissible (e.g., whether appropriate funding is available that may legally be used for the intended activity). Refer to Chapter 10, Capacity Development, for information.

Quality Assurance and Quality Control

The division establishes policies and specifies construction and performance standards that must be met to attain quality construction. The quality assurance (QA) program is executed when the CED evaluates construction and performance against these standards. The district also evaluates the contractor’s quality control (QC) plan and the execution of that QC plan. The districts execute the QA program to ensure that each project attains the required quality at each milestone and when the project is completed, which includes the enforcement of QC procedures by the construction contractor. The district QA and QC program ensures completed engineering projects:

- Are safe for the occupants
- Achieve purpose for which they were designed
- Are useful to the client
- Manage resources conservatively

In addition to project quality control, the division provides a QA and QC oversight program for resource management, as well as for project closeout. Chapter 8 provides a detailed explanation of the QA and QC process.

Enduring Lesson

When the contractor establishes a comprehensive quality control plan and executes that plan completely and systematically, the result is quality construction while easing the quality assurance burden on the government.
Tailoring and Standardizing Design

Projects must be appropriate in size and functionality for the end user. All projects built for HNs must consider sustainability and complexity level given the HN capacity and capabilities. Technical requirements in contract specifications must comport with HN realities or difficulties that may arise.

Some avoidable issues that became USACE challenges in Afghanistan included:

- USACE projects contained locking doors. An Afghan who loses a door key cannot create a replacement, resulting in Afghans breaking down the locked doors.

- Placing mechanical equipment, such as an air conditioner, in areas where local nationals cannot operate or maintain it. Such cases waste resources used to acquire and place the equipment.

Design standards must meet fire, earthquake, or other appropriate building standards as required by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the HN, and/or the CCMD (e.g., United States Central Command Regulation 415-1, Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility: The Sand Book).

**Enduring Lesson**

Properly identifying the authority having jurisdiction over the building code for a project before construction begins can prevent costly retrofitting later.

Managers must clearly identify the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) for building codes for each construction program, and then ensure the construction is designed and built to comply with AHJ directives. For MILCON and other projects for U.S. use, the AHJ is usually clear. For off-forward operating base projects that may be used by the HN, the AHJ may be much less intuitive. Properly identifying the AHJ before construction begins can prevent costly project retrofitting later.

**Enduring Lesson**

Consistently employing standard designs is key to streamlined project management and quality assurance in a contingency operation.

Using a single or standard design adapted to the specific job site can conserve engineer resources as well as make use of previously developed QA standards. For example, if a customer requires many guardhouses across the operational area, resources may be protected by using a single design and adapting it to specific job sites.

Historically, USACE maintained standard designs for a wide variety of CONUS-based construction projects between the late 1930s and the late 1960s. Expeditionary construction in World Wars I and II appears adapted to local climatic conditions. Although engineers sometimes want to create their own designs, commanders and project managers should employ standard designs to the fullest extent possible.
Hiring Actions

The division is responsible for the contingency elements’ hiring actions, including identifying candidates, hiring, vetting backgrounds, and deploying them to the operational area, which closely follows the standard Army model where the division headquarters is generally responsible for providing personnel to operational entities. The division assists with acquiring support from other MSCs to supply the right personnel for the contingency mission. More information on personnel sourcing is in Chapter 15, Personnel Sourcing.

The contingency division structure (as identified for 2015) will most likely not possess the internal capability to staff the forward deployed division element with organic assets. HQUSACE augments the division with the HQUSACE augmentation staff, with authorizations identified on the current approved table of distributions and allowances.

HQUSACE will identify a sister division to provide personnel sourcing for these positions. The augmentation staff then establishes the in-theater division forward element to meet the immediate mission requirements. Consequently, upon establishing the division forward cell, the HQUSACE augmentation team will change focus and initiate mission integration. Volunteers from across the enterprise will staff the contingency division to full operational capability. Sister divisions provide personnel to staff the deployed division without impeding their mission. Refer to Chapter 15 for more detailed information about sourcing.

1.2 The Contingency Division’s Directorate Missions

Although future contingency divisions may align differently, the information in this section describes the TAD’s directorate missions. The director of Programs Management Directorate (PMD), a member of the senior executive service (SES), manages, integrates, develops, oversees, and analyzes division-wide engineering and constructions services programs. The Military Integration Division chief and the Engineering Technical Services chief, also part of PMD, directly engage with customers and stakeholders in support of the commander.

Programs Management Directorate

The PMD team integrates and oversees program execution and advises the commander on all program, engineering, and construction activities within the supported AOR. The PMD also monitors life cycle project management for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational customers and provides technical support and management for all of the division’s customer programs. In addition, real estate technical services provide interagency customers with real estate acquisition, management, disposal, and appraisal throughout the CCMD AOR.

Contingency Business Directorate

The director of the Contingency Business Directorate, a member of the SES, manages, integrates, and develops the division’s business operations. The director, the Business Resource Division chief, and the Business Management Division chief provide analytic support to the strategic customer engagement development plan. In coordination with the commander and the PMD, this plan recommends strategic customer outreach activities (see Figure 5-5).
The Contingency Business Directorate uses three key tools to illustrate project resources stewardship to customers:

- Continuous business practices process improvement
- Automated project information and data management for customer use
- Disciplined budgeting and budget execution

Deputy Commanding Officer and Plans, Operations and Intelligence Division

The division deputy commanding officer oversees the plans, operations and intelligence division (G-3). The G-3 manages current operations, future operations, and plans in support of all operations and services. In addition, the G-3 integrates USACE capabilities, conducts crisis action and deliberate planning, develops and publishes orders, and provides the division and its supported and supporting elements with intelligence preparation of the battlefield (Army Techniques Publication 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*).

1.3 The Division Forward

The deployed contingency division’s organization will mature and grow if program needs begin to exceed a single CED’s capabilities. The division’s composition requires dual locations or footprints. The first element remains in CONUS to coordinate support for contingency districts, as required, provides mission command for ongoing noncontingency missions, and sustains permanent presence upon the contingency’s completion. The second element is the division forward, providing mission command of all USACE assets in theater and overseeing all major contract construction in the designated AOR. Among other factors, the contingency’s intensity dictates which division location will be dominant.
Administrative, Operations, and Logistical Support

A deployed contingency division operates independently from the operational division sustained during peacetime. This division forward element normally locates near the supported joint task force (JTF) command headquarters. The closest operating CED headquarters and headquarters detachment provides administrative, operations, and logistics support. Life support could be obtained through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program process. If this is not tenable, the division element may be able to operate autonomously, emplacing its own contracted security and transportation. If the theater prohibits contract security and transportation, this support must be coordinated through the maneuver commander, Department of State, and HN authorities. Refer to Chapter 11, Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence, for more information about security and operations; refer to Chapter 12, Conflict-Related Requirements: Sustainment and Information Technology, for a discussion in more detail about logistics.

1.4 Contingency Division Enduring Responsibilities

Early in the mission, HQUSACE must decide the responsible entity for deployment support, hiring actions, and reachback. Establishing responsibility for these tasks early prevents the creation of a myriad of individual solutions to common problems over which the division may have little oversight. Without this oversight, standardization throughout the unit is difficult. Functions may depend heavily on a few key people’s institutional knowledge; sustainable operations may also become more difficult.

HQUSACE may direct specific contingency functions to remain with TAD even if the mission occurs outside of TAD’s AOR. TAD’s designated functions could include deployment support through the United States Army Corps of Engineers Deployment Center (UDC) (see Figure 5-5) and administrative personnel support, such as travel orders and timekeeping, through the administrative personnel processing office. While these offices will close after the current contingency, they may re-activate in the future, as needed.

The supported division must prepare and transport people from CONUS to the contingency theater, either internally or using a standard Army program, such as a CONUS replacement center. For much of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, UDC, operated by TAD’s Middle East District, was responsible for medical screening and theater-specific training requirements, equipment issue, and transportation arrangements. All deploying USACE personnel used the UDC except those designated to attend a CONUS replacement center.
1.5 The Contingency Division in Peacetime

Since establishing TAD, HQUSACE decided that sustaining a contingency division in peacetime provides valuable flexibility to respond to military contingencies. A standing contingency division increases USACE’s readiness posture, provides oversight, and validates the deployment readiness of FESTs, CEDs, and the division itself.

Enduring Lesson
Between active contingencies, maintain a division structure to continue minimal operations and be able to surge to meet future contingencies.

TAD will adopt an austere construct when current overseas contingency operations funding ends, retaining operational continuity with the ability to surge to meet future contingency requirements. As OEF closes, TAD’s mission will transition from primarily oversight, management, and synchronization of the Afghanistan construction programs to an enduring mission focused on direct support to USCENTCOM and further integrating with USCENTCOM components and interagency partners. These partners include:
TAD’s enduring direct support role will emphasize senior leader strategic engagement, deliberate planning, and maintaining trained and ready personnel, teams, and force structure. These personnel will train on contingency lessons learned and prepare to deploy to meet steady-state or contingency needs throughout the AOR. The Transatlantic Middle East District, an enduring district, supports USCENTCOM, USARCENT, and other stakeholders, focusing more on steady-state security cooperation activities such as:

- Foreign military sales/foreign military financing
- Strategic engagement/building partner capacity
- Support to interagency and partner nations
- Small-scale (less than $5 million) humanitarian assistance, counter narcotics, and O&M projects

Missions such as master planning, real estate, and traditional MILCON will also continue as USCENTCOM and its service component commands retain an enduring forward presence. Although large-scale construction activities in Afghanistan will be drawing to a close by fiscal year 2015, USACE will require program oversight and execution support for foreign military sales/foreign military financing, legacy Afghan Security Forces Fund and Afghan Infrastructure Fund projects, MILCON, O&M support to Afghan security force facilities, and OEF contract, fiscal, and project closeout activities well into the future.

As the supporting division to CENTCOM, with this organization, TAD’s only SES will become the director of both programs and business. TAD will maintain a plans and operations division led by the deputy commander and G-3. Additionally, TAD will retain one person from each of the national organizations, including contracting, counsel, and human resources. This new organization will serve as the commander’s advisory team and can surge to meet the next contingency. HQUSACE and other MSCs, as assigned, will provide all other support services, including logistics management, security, equal employment opportunity, information management, public affairs, and internal review.
2. USACE in the Joint Task Force

2.1 Integrating USACE into the Joint Task Force Structure

Although the CED served as the theater’s primary construction execution agent during OIF and OEF, USACE had not extensively served in this role during previous protracted contingency operations. Inserting a USACE presence of this size into the wartime operating environment was complex and unprecedented.

Some of the questions encountered by the JTF leadership included:

- To whom does USACE report?
- Should a single engineer general officer lead both USACE and combat engineer elements?
- How does USACE address conflicting issues of requiring reimbursement while simultaneously responding to theater battlefield missions?

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE and the Department of Defense must codify and exercise USACE battlefield structure before supporting a contingency.

Before OIF and OEF, most USACE missions occurred within the peacetime CONUS environment. Leaders’ early efforts to assimilate USACE sometimes resulted in nonstandard organizations designed to meet specific requirements, rather than achieve general, overarching integration. While these early efforts solved immediate problems, they also created some enduring inconsistencies in the command hierarchy, underscoring the need for consistent, universal integration of USACE into the JTF structure.

**Enduring Lesson**

Use standard joint doctrinal organizations to integrate deployed USACE organizations into the joint task force.

During the late stages of OEF, USACE and JTF leadership reorganized some of the USACE’s ad hoc organizations to more closely resemble established joint doctrinal structure. These efforts mitigated some of the lingering problems created by previous freelance structures, and ensured better connection among all engineers in theater and a tighter unity of command better able to prioritize engineer operations across the combined/joint operations area.

2.2 USACE Command in the Joint Task Force

During OIF and OEF, the senior ranking USACE commander was often a major general. Because he was the highest ranking engineer in theater, the JTF commander would sometimes turn to the USACE commander to answer for all theater engineer assets. However, the USACE construction and maneuver missions are so distinct that it is difficult for a single individual to
manage both. In addition, the USACE mission can be extremely large (more than 1,000 ongoing projects at peak) in both complexity and scope. As a result, USACE experimented with several organizational solutions during the USCENTCOM contingency missions with varying success.

The Theater Engineer

Ideally, the senior ranking engineer in theater serves as the theater engineer. This individual reports to a ranking member of the JTF, for example, the deputy commanding general for support. Engineers reporting to the theater engineer include the USACE district commander and senior engineers from the subordinate commands. The office of the ranking engineer replaces the traditional engineer primary staff office (the C-7 or J-7) in lieu of a theater engineer office. An organization so designed has a clear leadership structure and encompasses all engineer assets in the operations area (see Figure 5-7).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5-7.** This flow chart shows typical command relationship for USACE elements within a joint task force. The joint task force command determines the exact configuration for each operation. (Note: This flow chart does not illustrate relationships with a multinational coalition, which would require further elaboration to this schematic.)
Joint Force Engineer Command

The Joint Force Engineer Command (JFEC) was one entity used to integrate engineering in the Afghanistan theater (see Figure 5-7). The JFEC commander reported to the deputy commanding general for support and two lower ranking engineer leaders reported to the JFEC commander.

JFEC’s challenges included:

- The breadth of required expertise was difficult to find in a single commander.
- The JFEC lacked a sufficient staff to provide appropriate oversight, command, and guidance.
- JFEC staff lacked an appropriate mix of engineer military officers and civilian personnel to provide both command and engineering expertise.

The JFEC commander could fill the role of theater engineer in the JTF structure.

Theater Engineer Command Deployable Command Post

The United States Army Reserve’s 412th and 416th Engineer Commands provide a theater engineer command (TEC) deployable command post (DCP) to the theater of operations. The TEC is designed to command engineer assets for the theater army. TEC provides the JTF with an operational engineer headquarters, if required. It can also form, or provide augmentation for, a JTF engineer staff.

**Enduring Lesson**

Integrating the theater engineer commands with USACE on the battlefield requires exercising this operation in peacetime and ensuring the theater engineer command’s deployable command posts are written into combatant command operations plans.

The TEC provides mission command for all assigned or attached engineer brigades and other engineer units and missions for the joint force land component or theater army commander. When directed, it may also provide mission command for engineers from other services and multinational forces, and oversight of contracted construction engineers. The deployable command post of the TEC serves as the single engineer commander for all of the engineer assets, including USACE elements. Becoming proficient at integrating the TEC DCP into an active JTF requires exercising this task during peacetime as well as ensuring the TEC DCP is written into CCMD operational plans.

3. Relationships Among USACE Entities in Theater

The contingency district exercises mission command over other USACE elements in theater that are not directly related to their mission, for example, elements of the Engineer Research and Development Center, the 249th Prime Power Battalion, or the Geotechnical and Structures Lab. The CED could potentially provide these entities with support, including life support, mission command, and project oversight. Generally, the CED will not provide these functions unless it is specifically tasked and funded to do so.
3.1 Forward Engineer Support Teams

FESTs (discussed in Annex A, *Forward Engineer Support Team-Advance*) are designed to attach and provide engineering support to a maneuver unit. Their duties might include deploying with an initial combat force and assessing the durability of structures for occupation and use by the unit.

3.2 Subject Matter Expert Teams

In-theater entities sometimes request and resource SME teams from USACE. When this happened during OIF and OEF, the SME team usually directly reported to the unit requesting and resourcing it, which caused accountability and command and control issues, rectified by attaching these entities to the CED in the latter part of OEF. Again, reimbursement must be obtained by the CED from the SME teams for any reimbursable support that the CED provides.

References


Chapter 6

Unity of Effort and Stakeholder Engagement

Introduction

This chapter describes how the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) applies unity of effort in the military contingency. Chapter 5, *Mission Command and the Contingency Division*, addressed some of the issues USACE faces in employing unity of command. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, defines the difference between two similar principles:

- **Unity of command.** The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose.

- **Unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified action.

**Enduring Lesson**

While each stakeholder has a reconstruction objective influenced by its own perception, successful leaders will understand and communicate the interdependence of these objectives.

Employing these principles in USACE’s support of military overseas contingency operations offer some unique challenges, including:

- Reconstruction activities involve U.S. military and civilian organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other nations that may be unfamiliar with each other’s processes. The Department of State (DOS), a civilian agency, is the official proponent of the reconstruction effort.

- Reconstruction inherently involves a host nation (HN), whose construction standards, culture, language, and overall expectations may differ from those in the United States. In addition, HN construction capabilities vary widely, sometimes requiring a capacity development aspect in USACE planning.

- Many projects involve a unique set of stakeholders. Each project or program may bring unfamiliar entities and processes to team with USACE.
• Many entities that would benefit from USACE support do not understand that USACE is a reimbursable organization and that the entities it supports must properly, and often, fully fund USACE’s participation in military contingency operations.

Although these factors are challenging, USACE must employ unity of effort to avoid duplicating effort, wasting resources, and sending mixed messages to the HN.

1. Unity of Effort with Stakeholders

1.1 Stakeholder Perspectives

Stakeholder agencies with differing charters and objectives present considerable potential for friction and competing agendas. Full effort unification requires coordination and cooperation among the military, government agencies, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nations in alliance or coalition, and the HN, and must occur vertically and horizontally for all involved chains of command. Without unification, each component operates independently, increasing the likelihood of misunderstood requirements, timelines, and objectives.

**Enduring Lesson**

Without unity of effort, each stakeholder operates independently, increasing the likelihood of misunderstood requirements, timelines, and objectives.

USACE leadership must directly address and manage these issues, or the results may hinder the process, delay project completion, or contribute to mission failure. In addition, USACE must not expect that external partners will adapt to USACE or U.S. Army business rules and processes. The approach must remain flexible to accomplish the mission, even if it is USACE that must adapt.

Because disparate civilian organizations play key roles in reconstruction, harmonizing the various civil and military entities requires clear understanding and coordination. Achieving a holistic approach requires appropriate command or support relationships with the lead mission proponent and communications among the various centers, commissions, staffs, augmentations, field offices, and agencies (see Figure 6-1). Varying national perspectives and mission interpretation complicate these efforts. For example, U.S. agencies might interpret the mission with a force protection perspective. A different nation’s agencies might view the same mandate with strict neutrality and mediation, or one of observation, interposition, and transition assistance.
Figure 6-1. Community leaders, media, and coalition representatives gathered for a grand opening of the newly renovated $5.4 million Iskandariyah Vocational Technical Center, 22 APR 2009, in Babil Province, Iraq. According to the USACE commander, “The renovation project became a reality because of the partnership between city and provincial government leaders, coalition forces, the Babil Provincial Reconstruction Team, USACE, and the Iraqi construction crews, along with unwavering support from the local community.” (Photograph by Alicia Embrey)

Interagency collaboration is essential for success, but complicates unity of effort. Planning and coordination with organizations external to USACE is extremely beneficial. For example, Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, nongovernmental organizations, and Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers should coordinate a smooth transition to stability operations as soon as possible after combat operations cease.

1.2 Identifying Stakeholder Strengths

Civilian and military organizations contribute different skill sets and capabilities to reconstruction. For example, the military brings planning and logistics capabilities, communication equipment, tactical ability, and security. The civilian agencies contribute subject matter expertise in reconstruction, development strategies, and programming. One of the greatest values that USACE adds to the reconstruction mission is building a team from this myriad of civil, military, international, and HN components. USACE possesses special skills in translating customer needs into requirements for the reconstruction community, then communicating this to construction contractors. Likewise, USACE can communicate requirements for changes to the customer offering an element of due diligence that would be otherwise difficult to obtain.
**Enduring Lesson**

Reconstruction requires leaders and staffs to establish and maintain an appropriate relationship with the mission proponent, and communicate with and understand the interdependent objectives among the various centers, commissions, staffs, augmentations, field offices, and agencies.

USACE members should recognize the benefits each stakeholder brings to the mission and the expertise their agency provides. Together, the civilian and military components of the team create a critical link, enabling them to apply the U.S. government’s full expertise more fully and creatively. Within these components, “USACE is the Army’s direct reporting unit assigned responsibility to execute Army and Department of Defense military construction (MILCON), real estate acquisition, environmental management, and development of the nation’s infrastructure through the civil works program.” (JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations)

Civilian organizations most commonly contribute expertise in political, social, and economic programs; however, effectively implementing reconstruction projects and programs transcends the individual organization performing each task. Effective USACE leaders understand the interdependent relationship of all participants, military and civilian.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE and the United States Agency for International Development should develop joint policies for civil works programs to leverage technical capabilities and resources (e.g., water, energy, schools).

Military forces may be required if adequate civilian capacity is unavailable. Similarly, military forces may need to work in concert with civilian talent where the local environment is not sufficiently secure. Reconstruction programs for political, social, and economic well-being are essential to achieving stability and developing the local capacity that achieves popular support. For effectiveness, USACE planners and program managers should:

- Know the roles, authorities, and capabilities of U.S. government’s military and civilian agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and HN partners.
- Include other participants, particularly HN partners, in planning at every level.
- Support civilian efforts, including those of NGOs and IGOs.
- Conduct, facilitate, or participate in political, social, informational, and economic programs.

**1.3 USACE’s Interagency Role**

Although USACE mostly focuses its efforts at the operational and tactical levels, understanding the broader strategic vision and the effects customers are trying to achieve is necessary to success. Because USACE’s mission inherently involves other agencies and missions (such as security, governance, and economy), USACE must align with corresponding national- and
sector-level efforts to be effective (see Figure 6-2). Any discontinuity or gaps in these efforts will likely manifest as difficulty in achieving unity of effort within the AOR. USACE organizations play an important role informing and refining operational guidance from intermediate or higher headquarters and ensuring the tactical-level objectives are effective, attainable, and aligned with operational and strategic goals.

![Image](image.jpg)

Figure 6-2. Ambassador Ryan Crocker (left), Babil Provincial Council Chairman Engineer Al-Masoudi, Babil Governor Al-Muslimawi, and Gulf Region Division Commander, MG Michael Eyre, cut the ribbon to mark the completion of a $2.8 million renovation of Al Hillah Maternity and Children’s Hospital in Babil Province, Iraq, 2008. (Photograph by Jeff Daigle)

The following sections discuss the complexities in achieving unity of effort during recent overseas contingency operations. Each contingency has unique geographical, cultural, and political challenges; therefore, some considerations and historical discussion are presented.

2. Stakeholder Engagement

2.1 Integrated Vertical Alignment

USACE’s strategic engagement is founded on integrated vertical alignment. The contingency division sustains and builds on its relationships and interactions with key interagency partners such as DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between contingencies whenever practical. The contingency division should share this mission with its subordinate districts and the Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) when the involvement of echelons adds value to customer relationships.
Enduring Lesson

USACE divisions must sustain relationships and interactions with key interagency partners between contingencies.

This enduring partnership emphasizes senior leader strategic engagement, deliberate planning, and training to meet interagency stakeholders’ steady-state or contingency needs. Afghanistan’s Kajaki and Dhala dams are examples of enduring infrastructure projects promoting stability and requiring unity of effort with DOS and USAID. Other significant stakeholder engagement with the international and intergovernmental community occurs within the security cooperation and foreign military sales (FMS)/foreign military financing (FMF) programs. Key stakeholders include the geographic combatant command (CCMD), country desk officers in DOS, Office of Secretary of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and the U.S. embassies of each prospective HN.

The contingency division should proactively engage with its supported CCMD, sister services within the CCMD, HN partners, DOS, USAID, World Bank, Millennium Challenge Corporation, the intelligence community, the Asian Development Bank, and others. The division commander leads and provides executive direction for stakeholder engagement. The commander, deputy commander, director of programs, and director of contingency business represent the USACE and Transatlantic Division (TAD) in meetings, conferences, briefings, and other forums at the CCMD. This team also represents the division to outside organizations and agencies and regionally interfaces for customer and stakeholder issues and concerns.

2.2 Steady-State Activities

For United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) contingencies, TAD’s Transatlantic Middle East District executes the steady-state security cooperation activities such as the FMS/FMF mission to support USCENTCOM, United States Army Central Command, and other stakeholders (Joint Phase 0). In addition, other programmatic activities enable regional relationship building with interagency partners and stakeholders. These include strategic engagement/building partner capacity, support to the interagency and partner nations, small-scale (less than $5 million) humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics, and operations and maintenance (O&M) projects.

Missions such as master planning, real estate, and traditional MILCON will also continue as the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational community retains an enduring presence throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Although large-scale construction activities in Afghanistan will largely conclude by fiscal year 2015, other activities in the USCENTCOM AOR will persist well into the future, including:

- Program oversight and execution support for FMS/FMF
- Legacy Afghan Security Forces Fund and Afghan Infrastructure Fund projects
- MILCON
• O&M support to Afghan security force facilities
• Operation Enduring Freedom contract, fiscal, and project closeout

3. In-Theater Customer Relationships

Because of USACE’s reimbursable business model, its customers often include high-level institutions, such as other U.S. government agencies and foreign nations (see Figure 6-3). The contingency engineer district (CED) is accountable both to its chain of command and its in-theater customers. Though perhaps appearing similar, command relationships and customer relationships are inherently different.

Figure 6-3. Infrastructure working group meeting, which includes USACE, USAID, and other international development organizations.

Customer responsibilities and relationships do not affect USACE’s integral command hierarchy. For example, if a CED has large projects required and funded by the DOS, the local U.S. ambassador may request the CED commander to brief him personally on project statuses. In this case, the ambassador is in the role of a customer to whom the CED commander is accountable (as well as the senior U.S. government representative). This customer relationship could cause the erroneous appearance that the CED reports to the DOS or directly to the ambassador.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE elements must clearly define customer requirements and help customers sustain reasonable expectations.
As a reimbursable organization, USACE is limited in its ability to assist with nonreimbursable projects. USACE, as the service provider and the customer, must establish the customer’s responsibility and role for the entire program during the project negotiation phase. For example, USACE personnel in Afghanistan attempted to support an NGO to complete a portion of a ring road but, ultimately, could not participate because the customer would not fully reimburse USACE for its costs.

4. Public Affairs

4.1 Introduction

As USACE’s official communicator to external organizations, the public affairs office is an important and integral part of unity of effort. USACE’s communication synchronization and engagement goal is to protect and develop public trust through strategic engagement and communication that will assist USACE in successfully serving the nation and the Armed Forces. Communication and strategic engagement enhance relationships by managing, tracking, and evaluating stakeholder and audience:

- Requirements
- Issues
- Messengers
- Messages
- Documents
- Actions
- Events
- Engagements
- Assessments

Enduring Lesson

Leaders at every level must involve public affairs office staff in key meetings to help focus the communication processes for contingency districts, and their missions and projects.

Effective communication is a shared responsibility existing every day at every level, from HQUSACE to the division or major subordinate command (MSC), and down to the lowest organizational elements. Every USACE action, word, and image must send a message of faith, trust, and credibility; every member of the command is a messenger, from senior leaders to the most junior employees. Communication products critically influence this communication, including senior leader updates, key messages, talking points, fact sheets, articles, and videos.
The CED must coordinate its words and deeds, including actively considering how external audiences will interpret and attribute them to the division’s actions and policies. Achieving effective communication is a shared responsibility among all members of the deployed team. To ensure truth, trust, and credibility, there must be a fully-integrated team of professionals working together to provide the right message to the right stakeholder by the right person at the right time, the essence of communication and strategic engagement.

The public affairs office (PAO) is obligated to keep Americans and the Army informed and help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in USACE and its readiness to conduct the range of military operations. Every member of USACE contributes to effective public affairs; and the public affairs team is primarily responsible for ensuring communication synchronization. The MSC’s most senior personnel must advocate and implement this culture by reinforcing it through mechanisms and processes. To adequately represent the commander or director, the PAO should be included in senior-level planning activities, including the command council, senior staff meetings, corporate board, and other similar meetings. The more the PAO staff understands, the better it can appropriately focus internal and external communication strategies.

4.2 Overseas Contingency Operations Marketing Concepts

To the greatest extent possible, the deployed division and districts should use the following marketing concepts during overseas contingency operations to help build recognition and support for the USACE mission: branding, instilling customer satisfaction, and social media.

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<th>Enduring Lesson</th>
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<tr>
<td>USACE’s deployed elements must understand and incorporate its branding requirements into external materials and products to the maximum extent possible.</td>
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**Branding**

MSCs must adhere to the USACE corporate brand and consistently communicate a strong brand identity through actions and messages. Stronger local community acceptance and support may hinge on understanding that USACE’s members are working to strengthen infrastructure and provide capacity development in the country where the contingency district is located.

While standard branding communicates USACE’s work in the HN, it also may increase USACE’s profile on the battlefield. Visual recognition of the USACE brand allows the local population to recognize, and potentially accept and appreciate USACE’s efforts. This same visual recognition may also emphasize and broadcast USACE’s presence and location, creating a targeting potential for USACE and its contractors.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the CED command used modified branding to enhance freedom of movement and force protection in cooperation with information operations (IO). Later, the CED transitioned to standard branding as the environment became more permissive. USACE accomplished little branding recognition to external Afghanistan audiences considering that USACE had little interaction with local media or community outreach programs.
Instilling Customer Satisfaction

The contingency division and district must work toward both fulfilling customer and stakeholder requirements and helping them establish reasonable expectations. USACE must inform the customer of unreasonable expectations and ensure its elements do not promise more than is deliverable. The division should monitor satisfaction through direct interaction with the customer, such as face-to-face meetings and other venues, to continually improve operations and services.

Social Media

The PAO community must identify and emphasize the benefits of understanding, cooperating with and supporting USACE in a way that motivates the HN population. Only one social media presence should be created for each division and/or district. Subject to governing law, regulation, and policy, social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn, provide a vehicle to communicate positive messages about USACE directly with stakeholders.

Enduring Lesson

The contingency division should oversee any district social media sites (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc) to maintain administrative continuity and ensure adherence to applicable law, regulation, and policy.

The division can provide administrative rights to the district public affairs teams as they deploy, preventing certain issues experienced when previous district PAO representatives created sites using personal email addresses. After the hosting individual redeployed, the PAO had difficulty limiting and providing administration rights to these sites, which restricted the ability to provide updates. Actively using popular media sites provides potential audiences instantaneous avenues to learn about USACE’s mission and interact with USACE personnel.

Emerging Communication Tools

Many older communication tools and products are becoming obsolete, requiring the consideration of new strategies for both external and internal communications. Even previous standard command information tools such as district magazines are becoming antiquated. More often, publications are becoming exclusively available online and are more interactive. These online publications may incorporate a variety of media, including drop down screens providing further information, embedded video and audio, and increased visual coverage. Engaging in the development of media and internet broadcasting capabilities allows the CED to reach a wider and more diverse audience.

Future contingency PAOs should consider a single, MSC-produced magazine for a region or campaign, which reduces in-theater staffing requirements, allowing public affairs resources to focus more on story development, internal command communication, social media, and photographic support.
Enduring Lesson
Using popular media sites provides potential audiences instantaneous avenues to learn about USACE’s mission and interact with its personnel.

4.3 Information Operations

In addition to public affairs operations, IO also promote external themes and messaging for the contingency division. While audiences and intent differ, both public affairs and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. The USACE public affairs and IO should mutually support each other’s efforts.

Enduring Lesson
The contingency division and districts must network with participating government offices, bureaus, and agencies to share information, operations plans, and activities to leverage each other’s efforts.

Communicating operational matters to internal and external audiences is a major public affairs function. Because of public affairs’ universal role in USACE’s missions and functions, interacting with the IO staff enables public affairs to coordinate and deconflict its activities. Future IO and public affairs programs should interact frequently with one another, with U.S. embassies, and other stakeholder agencies.

Synchronized public affairs and IO planning is essential for effective external communication. Interagency efforts promote international support for nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance regional partnerships. Commanders should ensure their IO and public affairs messaging is consistent with overall U.S. government objectives. Because public affairs and IO both disseminate information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences, their activities must be closely coordinated and synchronized to communicate consistent themes and messages, and to avoid credibility losses.

4.4 Media Engagement

It is critical for the PAO to engage the media at all levels early and often by establishing command-level personal relationships to augment the PAO and educate the media, and, by extension, the public, about operational objectives to avoid rumors and misinformation.

4.5 Archiving and Historical Items

Beginning with early initial operations, the command must ensure its personnel develop and use standard procedures to identify, catalog, and maintain documentation, materials, and artifacts that provide perspective on the deployed district mission. These records document historic contributions and help respond to the myriad of oversight events (such as audits) that continue for years beyond the completion of any contingency operation.
**Enduring Lesson**
Provide clear guidance for photograph archiving procedures, including information by date, location, and primary persons in photographs.

This information should be both easily retrievable and consistently labeled to ensure the USACE enterprise and the HN retain the information for future use. Public affairs and other program and project records must fully catalog images, articles, and publications chronologically to allow rapid information recovery by date, location, project identifier, and specific participants (when identifiable and to the extent possible and legally permissible).

**Enduring Lesson**
Develop processes early to identify and retain historical materials relating to contingency district mission, staff, and operations.

**References**


Introduction

Successful U.S. government contingency operations require compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and international agreements. Within this context, two critical aspects of successful operations are employing standardized, streamlined business practices and maximizing reachback support. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) learned these two lessons during the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, where many of the business processes were comprised of ad hoc solutions created for specific situations.

Enduring Lesson

Maximizing USACE standard business processes and reachback streamlines operations, reduces the footprint forward, and ensures information continuity.

Although the contingency environment sometimes requires ad hoc, unique solutions, their use can create complicated and enduring problems. For example, unique business processes require that new personnel receive training upon arrival in theater, which reduces time for mission execution. Unique systems complicate communications of vital project information to personnel within USACE and impede archiving project data and appropriate project closeout. Advantages to employing standard processes and reachback include:

• Personnel arrive in theater already trained.

• Everyone in the USACE enterprise can communicate vital project information with maximum ease.

• Reduce risk to personnel by decreasing time in the contingency theater of operations.

• Minimize expense by focusing on mission execution.

• Provide greater continuity and institutional knowledge because turnover of reachback personnel is substantially less than deployed personnel.

• Assure a well-defined audit trail for project and contract decisions with information readily available to support future oversight activities.
1. Reachback

Reachback is essential in a contingency environment because deploying all the assets necessary to solve every possible problem is costly and impractical.

**Enduring Lesson**

For success, reachback support must be customer-oriented, transparent, responsive, economical, and link multiple systems.

1.1 Reachback Overview

Reachback describes formal and informal actions by a deployed individual or agency to gain assistance with problem solving beyond their internal capability and those of co-located peers. Informally, deployed USACE personnel may reach out to home station contacts that may be able to assist, or to persons previously deployed who worked on similar problems. Reachback is essential in a contingency environment because it is costly and impractical to deploy all the assets necessary to solve every possible problem (see Figure 7-1).

Figure 7-1. Solar-powered laptop computers and secure wireless networks allow critical communications directly from the field to reachback experts.
USACE personnel should conduct all functions via reachback except those requiring performance in the forward area. The intent is to limit the forward presence to the command elements and those requiring close contact with the customer or project site.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), USACE’s Transatlantic Division (TAD) developed a formal reachback process as a means to request and provide technical and administrative support for deployed personnel in a contingency operation. The process allows USACE to reduce its forward-deployed footprint, as well as track, quantify, and oversee reachback requests. Later, others with similar challenges can analyze this information to gather lessons learned, review responses, and implement solutions more efficiently.

Reachback Functional Areas

Reachback functional areas include administrative, engineering, program/project management, contracting, legal, real estate, resource management, information management, water, geospatial, environmental and hydrology support, logistics and other design and technical expertise as needed. A formal reachback request may support field force engineering (FFE) or a contingency engineer district (CED).

The USACE Reachback Operations Center (UROC) provides reachback engineering capability that allows deployed Department of Defense (DOD) personnel to communicate directly with experts in the U.S. when a problem in the field needs quick resolution. Located in Vicksburg, MS, the UROC can connect deployed personnel to subject matter experts within USACE, the Army, DOD, various government entities, or private industry or academia to answer a request. The combination of UROC assets and its vast network greatly expand the deployed assets’ capabilities and allows them to execute their core missions while maintaining a smaller footprint.

The CED is responsible for oversight of reachback operations. Reachback support should be managed through the CED’s commensurate functional organization. For example, the CED’s office of counsel should manage legal reachback requests. If the function is not represented in the CED, then reachback should be managed by the CED’s program and project management organization.

Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System and the Reachback Engineering Data Integration System

Alternatively, the Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System (RAMS) and the Reachback Engineering Data Integration (REDi) system may support the CED with coordination provided by the overseeing contingency division. During OIF and OEF, TAD provided necessary coordination and oversight. Depending on the combatant command involved, another division may be tasked with overseeing reachback support to the contingency district. The support provided may be as simple as reviewing a drawing for compliance with contract specifications or as complex as full request-for-proposal development and awarding of construction contracts.

It is not always immediately apparent if a request is for FFE- or CED-related support. In these cases, the overseeing division and the UROC coordinate to direct the request through the appropriate channels.
Engaging Reachback Mechanisms

The supported contingency district obtains reachback support through RAMS, which facilitates coordination from a nondeployed (supporting) district (see Figure 7-2). For example, during OEF, nine continental United States (CONUS) supporting districts were committed and trained to provide reachback support to the contingency districts, later expanded to eleven districts. Identifying reachback as a key pillar of the contingency operation facilitates a reliance on the system and prevents exhausting deployed staff.

![Figure 7-2. A supporting district uses teleconferencing to leverage its engineering, design, and other subject matter expertise to assist a deployed supported district.](image)

Reachback provides talent and capabilities in response to contingency challenges while allowing USACE to level workload across the supporting divisions. Leadership must emphasize using reachback to assure the full return on investment is realized by both the supported and supporting districts. If not, the supporting districts will not see the expected workload materialize and may no longer allocate assets to reachback. This can result in reachback not being available when required by the district.

**Enduring Lesson**

Minimize workload on deployed staff and resources by engaging reachback mechanisms at the beginning and throughout the contingency operation.
1.2 Reachback Reporting and Training

The supporting division must establish a reporting regime to document reachback deliverable status and monitor the services provided by the supporting district. Training the supporting districts on reachback procedures helps ensure consistency in deliverables and reporting. Transparency in the reporting requirements and inclusion in the training program helps create a collaborative atmosphere between the supporting districts and the supported contingency districts and division. Soliciting reachback, selecting nondeployed reachback districts, and training should be accomplished early to identify and allocate resources from these districts. USACE must identify an initial funding source to train staff and to fund administrative costs of the supporting districts before project funds are available.

**Enduring Lesson**

The contingency division should solicit support and initiate non-project funding early in the contingency operation to ensure supporting districts devote personnel, receive training, and provide reachback support.

1.3 Reachback Policy

Reachback operations policy is established by:


USACE OPORD 2011-35 expands the FFE reachback concept to apply more directly to the CED’s daily operations. The commander’s intent is to “standardize and expand the reachback processes, specifically in support of the United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR) short-term requirements that are transparent to the customer and link multiple systems capable of monitoring these processes. This effort will be shaped to support future outside the continental United States (OCONUS) contingency events supporting any combatant command long-term needs.”

1.4 Reachback Process

**Enduring Lesson**

Successful reachback requires a smooth and easy request process and rapid response by the supporting unit.

TAD and the UROC developed the reachback process during OEF using RAMS, coupled with the REDi system. These enterprise systems automate the reachback process and allowed USACE to transition the process to other divisions as required (see Figure 7.3).
The contingency division must screen each request to determine the appropriate reachback assignments. The UROC and the contingency division communicate upon receiving each reachback request and determine whether the request will be satisfied by FFE/UROC channels, or internally within the contingency division. During OEF, a small TAD team reviewed each incoming request and recommended how it should be processed.

**Reachback Components**

Reachback components can be separated into three categories (see Figure 7-4):

- **Enablers** are tools used within the reachback process.
- **Coordination** describes the units working to bring the pieces together.
- **Execution** describes conduct of the required engineering work.
Figure 7-4. Reachback components can be categorized as enablers, coordination, and execution.

Figure 7-5 illustrates how these components work together in the reachback process in an example from an Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) project. This reachback request focused on the design functional area.

Figure 7-5. Reachback process using an ANSF project example
Supported Contingency and Supporting Division Reachback Interface

The contingency division communicates through the UROC and the reachback (supporting) districts before selecting which district will provide the support, which ensures that solicitations for reachback are staffed promptly allowing the contingency division to answer or staff any questions from the potential supporting district.

**Enduring Lesson**

In its oversight role, the contingency division must act as the reachback assignment coordinator between the supported and supporting districts.

The contingency division selects supporting districts with input from the contingency district based on the resources the supporting district can potentially provide. Assignment is documented in RAMS. By serving as the coordinator, the contingency division remains situationally aware and can track workloads and hold supporting and contingency districts accountable in accordance with reachback policies and program management plans. For example, during OEF, Afghanistan Engineer District-South and Northwestern Division completed water resource projects in accordance with a memorandum of agreement between them.

During OIF and OEF, some reachback interactions were not tracked routinely in RAMS; therefore, they occurred largely beyond TAD’s oversight. Because the contingency division was unaware of the request, it could not appropriately respond to Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers requests for information. Situational awareness is critical for the contingency division to perform its oversight function.

Reachback Cells

The reachback cell concept establishes working groups within a dedicated supporting district for a specific type of support. The cells assist with requests for support within their functional or technical area. For example, operations and maintenance (O&M) and electrical engineering cells were established through RAMS during the Afghanistan contingency that provided streamlined review of post-award contractor designs/drawings for adherence with contract specifications.

**Enduring Lesson**

Reachback cells provide rapid support using pre-established relationships between the supporting and supported districts.

Some CONUS districts’ specialized technical expertise allow them to manage requests or provide support to other districts. Examples of this were the Philadelphia District’s experience in executing power projects, such as the Southeast Power System and the Northeast Power System in Afghanistan, and the Great Lakes and Ohio River Division supporting transportation projects. This support did not occur using defined reachback cells; instead, the contingency district leveraged existing resources and developed contacts with the supporting districts to provide assistance. TAD’s oversight and coordination with districts providing specialized technical expertise was essentially the same as with other reachback districts.
Using Common Project Management Tools

The large volume of reachback work strained TAD’s ability to monitor all the supporting districts’ work. Compounding the difficulty, deployed districts were using different project management systems than those used for CONUS work. A common system established from the start of operations, such as the Project Management Business Process Automated Information System (P2) Austere, allows consistent reporting of milestone dates, minimizes reporting duplication, and frees the supporting districts to focus on execution. The system should remain consistent throughout the contingency life cycle and be included in all reachback-associated training to contingency and supporting districts.

Enduring Lesson

Use and train on a common project management tool (such as the Project Management Business Process Automated Information System Austere) available for use in CONUS and OCONUS.

Lastly, all entities involved with the contingency work must sustain the reachback program and its enabling tools (RAMS, UROC/REDi, and ProjectWise) as the contingency operation concludes. Supporting districts require ongoing training to ensure they remain current on reachback requirements and processes and are prepared to assist in future contingencies.

2. Engineering

2.1 Design and Construction Codes and Standards

The contingency environment presents unique construction challenges. The host nation (HN) may lack institutions such as business standards and infrastructure, construction codes, material testing laboratories, and construction experience and skills. Similarly, the HN’s culture and construction practices may not use international (or any) standards. In situations where applying western standards is difficult or appears unwarranted or impractical, USACE customers may request that designs be modified or simplified to better fit local circumstances.

Where no local construction standard exists, the command must give appropriate guidance about what standard should be followed, which is especially true for compliance with life, health, and safety standards. TAD Operation Order 2011-1 requires compliance with international building codes. Guidance may change depending on the mission, geographic location, HN, and other factors. In 2013 and 2014, DOD published three Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) (References O, P, and Q) providing minimal life safety and habitability requirements in nonpermanent DOD and HN facilities in support of military operations.

2.2 Contingency Standard Designs

In response to United States Army Central Command requirements and to improve reachback efficiency, USACE established the ninth Center of Standardization in the Transatlantic Middle East District (TAM) in January 2012, focusing on contingency operations construction for OCONUS environments. This program centers on a contingency standard design library that can be used by any district providing reachback support.
Standard Design Advantages

Standardization ensures that entities providing contingency construction can access consistent and established designs faster than generating original designs for each request. The library organizes standard designs by building function. For example, an engineer can create a fully functional base camp or facility design using these designs as building blocks, adapting each design with minimal effort.

Enduring Lesson

Enforce use of standard engineering designs.

The Center of Standardization’s primary focus is providing standard designs that meet current and future contingency operational needs, lower construction costs, and significantly reduce completion times. The designs use building materials easily obtained in the region and familiar to the local labor force. The designs also comply with UFC 1-201-01, *Non-Permanent DOD Facilities in Support of Military Operations*. All designs meet or exceed force protection and environmental strength requirements. Each design includes a complete cost estimate and Department of Defense Form (DD Form) 1391, *Military Construction Project Data*, thus speeding the cost validation effort required for military facility procurement.

The designs meet the semi-permanent standards specified in USCENTCOM Regulation 415-1, *Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility: The Sand Book*, under the contingency category. Each design includes necessary force protection assuming location on a secure military installation within a controlled perimeter, but may be adapted to other environments by engineering staff. In general, each facility design package provides an 80-percent design solution. Designs may require modifications to conform to site conditions.

Center of Standardization Functions

The Center of Standardization performs the following functions:

- Develops the Army standard criteria, standard designs, and UFCs in consultation with appropriate outside entities, and contract/district resources. For each facility type, the Center of Standardization

  - Develops and maintains building information models (BIMs) and applies energy modeling analysis on BIMs as needed

  - Maintains model requests for proposals and statements of work

  - Provides consultation to districts involved in the design and construction of assigned facilities

  - Maintains a historical database of standard design use by fiscal year, project number, and location
• Participates as an integral member of the military construction (MILCON) project development team. Coordinates with the assigned geographic district. Performs mandatory design reviews at designated phases (35 percent and 95 percent design phases) on all assigned facility types.

• Participates in planning charrettes (DD Form 1391) for designated facility types to ensure consistent application of criteria and to validate scope.

• Participates in design charrettes or work plan development to ensure that the standard design intent is maintained through design development.

• Reviews Design Directive Codes 1, 2, and 3 for compliance with standard design requirements.

• Populates the corporate lessons learned website and the lessons observed/learned system to provide meaningful, detailed information to Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Installation Management Agency, and USACE in a user-friendly format on demand.

• Explores, adopts, and implements new technologies (processes, materials, equipment, and methods) that support standards and improve facility management for OCONUS execution.

Expecting contractors to achieve U.S. standards in contingency theaters may be unrealistic. For example, the lack of batch plants and concrete trucks in Afghanistan results in concrete being mixed one wheelbarrow at a time, preventing maintenance of Western standards. Nevertheless, some form of acceptable engineering and construction standards is required.

2.3 Adapting to Host Nation Conditions

Maximizing construction operations in HNs requires designs and standards using local materials, labor, methods, and techniques, but must remain suitable for use by U.S. or coalition forces and HN personnel (see Figure 7-6). Standard USACE construction methods are not always appropriate for contingency theater construction. Construction in Iraq was often more complex than desired by the customer and required extensive O&M investment to maintain. Use of local material, labor, and techniques must always be consistent with applicable public laws, statutes, international agreements, and governing acquisition regulations.
TAD generally designs contingency facilities with less than 10 years of life expectancy, with potential use by U.S. forces for up to 25 years (USCENTCOM Regulation 415-1). Enduring facilities in the USCENTCOM AOR have been constructed in compliance with all UFC requirements and designed for use for more than 10 years as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*. The USCENTCOM master plan and the service component master plans and programs identify structures as either enduring or contingency facilities before approval and funding. Project funding and customer requirements determine whether a facility is temporary, semi-permanent, or permanent, and whether it is for U.S. or HN occupancy. Nonpermanent contingency facilities for U.S. occupancy built in support of U.S. military operations are designed and built to comply with minimum life safety and health requirements in compliance with UFC 1-201-02, *Assessment of Existing Facilities in Support of Military Operations*; HN facilities in support of military operations are designed and built to comply with UFC 1-202-01, *Host Nation Facilities in Support of Military Operations*.

### 2.4 Theater Construction Management System

The Theater Construction Management System is a personal computer-based automated construction planning, design, management, and reporting system used by military engineers primarily for OCONUS contingency construction activities. The Theater Construction Management System combines computer hardware and software with Army Facilities Component System design information to support and enhance the engineer mission in the theater of operation or other areas.

**Enduring Lesson**

Use the Theater Construction Management System to reduce design and operations and maintenance costs for the host nation.
The Army Facilities Component System (Army Regulation 415-16, *Army Facilities Components System*) supports engineers and DOD mission partners worldwide with planning, design, and management of contingency construction missions in a theater of operations and for emergency construction during disaster relief. The Army Facilities Component System design data repository contains 1,413 facility designs, 213 component designs, and 5,802 drawings. These designs include 36 Navy facilities with 95 unique Navy drawings. Some of the designs include base camps, barracks, latrines, containerized housing units, roads, administration, hospitals, power, petroleum storage and distribution facilities, and ammunition storage facilities.

3. Business Processes and Governance

USACE intends to maximize use of standard business processes and existing enterprise systems in a contingency environment.

3.1 Regional Business Center Concept

TAD uses the Regional Business Center (RBC) as its primary business-operating unit. The regulation governing RBC is Engineer Regulation (ER) 5-1-13, *Resource Management — U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Policy on Regional Business Centers*. The division office and its districts act as a regional business entity, vertically and laterally integrating organizational capabilities, resource sharing, technical expertise, project management, and delivery services within the region.

The RBC enhances regional operations effectiveness and efficiency in products and services delivery through coordinated planning by staff and regional governing bodies. TAD holds virtual RBC meetings as often as possible to reduce the downrange footprint. The RBC also conducts ad hoc meetings periodically when issues arise that require senior leader engagement. Standard regional governance bodies guide the operation of RBC, including:

- Regional Command Council (RCC)
- Regional Management Board (RMB)
- Regional Program Budget Advisory Committee (RPBAC)
- Regional Acquisition Strategy Board (RASB)
- Program Management Review

While these governing bodies are similar in operation to other USACE standard governing bodies, the contingency division’s boards are much more focused on the military contingency mission. Because of the operational tempo and because many members must participate remotely, discussion is generally limited to decision briefs and forums lasting no more than four to six hours. The RBC generally communicates information briefings using other methods outside of the formal forum. The RMB, RPBAC, and RCC generally meet three times a year, or on an ad hoc basis, as required. The RASB generally meets two times per year, or as the need arises.
Regional Command Council

The RCC serves as the contingency division’s guiding corporate body and is the primary forum for making regional decisions and approving policies requiring region-wide command attention and participation.

Regional Management Board

The RMB is the region’s senior managing board, responsible for managing coordination within the RBC on regional and operational matters, facilitating communication between individual districts and functions, and seeking greater regional effectiveness. The RMB recommends and implements policies that strengthen the region’s strategic business affairs and is responsible for:

- Determining and adjusting workload and managing the workforce
- Deciding standard business practices and organizations within the RBC and across districts
- Developing policy on other common regional business issues, as needed

Regional Program Budget Advisory Committee

The RPBAC reviews military programs and projects, provides current year workload management and advises the division commander on issues with a regional effect. The RPBAC provides regional resource guidance and priorities, aligns regional budget formulation, and develops planning, programming, and budget execution. The RPBAC is the primary vehicle that sets appropriate rates, establishing affordable, appropriate, and objective organizations that operate within the established parameters.

Regional Acquisition Strategy Board

The RASB assesses regional acquisition matters and reports its findings to the RMB. These assessments identify shared division requirements and facilitate developing acquisition strategy plans. These responsibilities include assessing division technical capabilities and competencies needed to meet regional mission requirements and statutory goals. Additionally, the RASB recommends contracting methods and capabilities to enhance mission execution and to better support to customers, and deals with other items of concern relative to the acquisition mission of the RBC.

Program Management Review

USACE standard governing bodies also included a Regional Program Review Board (RPRB). TAD elected to not operate this board and replaced it with a monthly program management review necessitated by the finite mission and end state of the contingency. The program management review provides the senior-level advisory body with information to make decisions on strategic direction and advice to integrate and execute the contingency programs. Senior-level advisors provide direction, responsible stewardship, and positive influence, to achieve successful execution and transition of programs. The composition of the senior-level advisory body differs from the USACE RPRB in that the board membership is not strictly internal and can include authorized external stakeholders as standing advisors.
3.2 Standard Financial and Business Practices and Processes in the Contingency Environment

USACE uses standard business and financial processes in the deployed environment to enhance record keeping, reporting, and seamless transition from CONUS to the contingency. Project management business processes (PMBPs) refer to the standard processes used to execute construction work; standard financial processes guide USACE’s financial management. Entering OCONUS programs with clear direction as to what standards to use and what processes to comply with contributes greatly to achieving and maintaining continuity and efficiency. For example, a standard policy requiring all personnel use the international building codes and all-standard USACE business processes requires the on-ground team to think though their needs up front to determine whether a request for authority to deviate is warranted or possible.

Enduring Lesson

Always deploy contingency districts with a suite of integrated standard business processes.

ER 5-1-11, *U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Business Process*, mandates USACE to execute all projects using the PMBP and, further, that USACE use P2 to enable the process. Using PMBP across USACE is the key to operating effectively and seamlessly, consistently delivering quality products and services in a contingency environment. Because a contingency workforce is largely transient, USACE relies on this standard and other standard business processes and automated corporate information systems to ensure continuity and ease of communication. Eliminating the need to train and equip individuals in non-standard business processes and systems results in lower operational costs, improved data accuracy and accountability, ease in responding to audits and congressional inquiries, and increased efficiency in implementing change management, transitioning on-going and completed work, and project and program closeout.

Project Management Information System

The P2, provides a standard tool for project managers to assist project planning, execution, and management in accordance with the PMBP. Future contingency divisions will employ P2 in its austere form; P2 Austere provides a standard minimum number of milestones and fields to track and report on project and program performance. This design is a streamlined version of P2 to promote greater efficiency and optimize performance in a high operating tempo contingency environment. The P2 data dictionary provides the MILCON guidelines to enter status and update MILCON projects. The TAD OPORD 2013-01, Appendix 4, *P2 — Data Management*, to Annex K, *Business Management*, provides non-MILCON project and program execution guidance. TAM supports the contingency districts with P2 support and services.

Five primary interconnected databases comprise P2: Primavera, Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS), Resident Management System (RMS), Standard Procurement System (SPS), and the USACE Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW). The project manager primarily uses Primavera software to develop project schedules and budgets, and monitor work execution. The program analyst primarily operates CEFMS as the accounting software to track the receipt and expense of funds. RMS is the software to monitor and document the contractor’s construction progress and is operated primarily by the construction division. SPS is the software
used to store and evaluate contracts, updated entirely by the contracting division. The EDW provides a consolidated view of data from the source databases, Primavera, CEFMS, and RMS, and is used to develop both standard and ad hoc reports.

**USACE Financial System**

USACE’s single authorized financial management system is CEFMS, which is the system of original entry and financial record. It will be deployed and used in all contingencies. All users record financial transactions involving USACE funds in CEFMS. Contrary to what occurred in past contingency operations, USACE will not process financial transactions for other agencies using CEFMS.

**Enduring Lesson**

The contingency division and districts will not use USACE financial management system to process financial transactions for any other agency.

Contingency operations must comply with a litany of legislative and statutory requirements. USACE must adhere to the principles and standards governing the design and operation of the financial/cost accounting and reporting as defined in ER 37-1-30, *Financial Administration — Accounting and Reporting*. The general military accounting policy and procedures are provided in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations and Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Regulation 37-1, Chapters 1, 2, and 6. ER 37-1-30 is not intended to replace or duplicate the policy contained in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations or Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis 37-1. Rather, it provides additional supplemental guidance unique to USACE’s business practices and not found in DOD or Army regulations.

Because USACE is project oriented, individuals must appropriately record time and labor to the benefiting project. Work is prohibited in advance of funds. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 31 United States Code, Section 1301, labor hours actually worked on a specific project or reimbursable order must be expensed and posted to that project or reimbursable order.

When USACE is ordered to deploy to an overseas contingency to assess infrastructure or for engineering services, it may be authorized to use the USACE revolving fund before Congress appropriates wartime contingency funds. These rules affect business management practices during a contingency. For further information on contingency funding, see Chapter 13, *Authorities and Funding*.

Districts must follow the USACE annual consolidated command guidance for applicable supervision and administration resource guidance and revolving fund metrics for operational performance. Additionally, the Army Management Control Plan requires that districts complete an internal management control review checklist for the revolving fund as shown in ER 37-1-30, Appendix 2-A.
Resident Management System

The RMS is a comprehensive, user-friendly system to expediently and effectively manage construction contracts. RMS is the standard contingency operations system, regardless of the construction agent (USACE or the Air Force Civil Engineer Center). RMS tracks and documents all facets of a contract by the field offices and contractors and is used for administration, finances, quality assurance, submittals, schedules, closeout, contractor evaluation, and reachback assistance.

Quality Assurance System

The Quality Assurance System (QAS) is an extension of RMS for government personnel to use remotely from the main RMS software program. Certain modules and tasks can be assigned by RMS to accomplish with QAS. These modules and tasks will become “read only” in the RMS program. The program can import and/or export to and from RMS to synchronize both programs.

Quality Control System

The Quality Control System (QCS) is the RMS contractor module that construction contractors use to exchange information electronically with the government. The QCS program includes a remote program module allowing the master site to assign various modules to one or more remote QCS sites. It operates similarly to the QAS program used remotely from the government program, RMS.

Quality Management System

All contingency engineering districts use standard business processes, streamlined for the contingency environment to plan, design, construct, and deliver projects that support troops, as well as provide for regional security and stability. The contingency division continually improves its process methodologies, primarily using Lean Six Sigma, to maximize operating efficiency. As the contingency develops, the contingency division must capture the institutional knowledge gained by executing its mission, becoming more efficient and effective. It must continue building its Quality Management System (QMS) to remain straightforward, valuable, and focused on key processes.

QMS is the formalized system of documented processes defining the structure, authority, responsibilities, resources, planning, and documented procedures needed to implement the organization’s quality policy. Currently, TAD maintains the regional QMS SharePoint site that functions as the repository for standard business processes and lessons learned.

ProjectWise

ProjectWise is a suite of engineering project collaboration software (Bentley Systems) designed for the architecture, engineering, and construction industries. It serves as the standard for life cycle project document management. Contingency districts use ProjectWise to help project delivery teams manage, share, and distribute engineering project content and review data in a single platform. ProjectWise can manage any type of computer-aided design, BIM, geospatial, and project data, and can integrate with SharePoint, Autodesk, and Microsoft Office applications.
Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System

RAMS is a web-based standard process using SharePoint that captures requirements from contingency districts to UROC for engineering, technical, business, and operational products and services. Requests are submitted and processed via an automated tracking system. This system is designed to track requests for products and services as they move through the system, notify team members at critical process steps, and record completed actions.

Deploy using USACE standard business processes and automated information systems such as the Resident Management System, Quality Assurance System, Quality Control System, Quality Management System, ProjectWise, and the Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System. CONUS-based teams should maintain these systems and manage data input, allowing the forward-deployed team to concentrate on direct support to the customer and project construction oversight.

References


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Chapter 8

Project and Program Management

Introduction

This chapter provides guidance for United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) personnel establishing contingency program management. Contingency program management supports diverse customers and stakeholders who focus on establishing security, rule of law, governance, national stabilization and construction, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and/or capacity development in an outside the continental United States (OCONUS) contingency environment. USACE program management enables contingency goals and objectives such as:

- Program parameter establishment
- Assessments
- Work acceptance policy
- Leadership and staff development
- Effort integration
- Critical decision making
- Acquisition planning
- Contract and risk management
- Resource management
- Standard performance and efficient effort measurement
- Information system management
- Reporting progress
- Program reviews
- Alignment with contingency leadership and campaign plans
USACE program managers (PgMs) develop life cycle systems to program, schedule, and ultimately deliver a portfolio of projects. USACE PgMs are the USACE subject matter experts in project and program delivery and are USACE’s primary interface with the customer both in the forward area and as the coordinator of all continental United States (CONUS) reachback efforts.

The United States generally appoints several construction agents in a contingency, of which USACE will probably be the largest. Within the Department of Defense (DOD), military construction is governed by DOD Directive (DODD) 4270.5, Military Construction. Combatant commands (such as United States Central Command [USCENTCOM]) may then issue theater-level guidance on designated construction agents to supplement the DODD (e.g., USCENTCOM, Designation of Lead Design Construction Agents, 14 FEB 2008). As a result, the joint task force often looks to USACE to integrate construction operations in theater. USACE’s formal role in construction integration falls to the Joint Program Integration Office (JPIO). Annex D, Headquarters Augmentation, includes further information on the JPIO and USACE’s role in construction integration.

1. Key Differences Between Programs and Projects

While sometimes used interchangeably, programs and projects are different. Programs are broadly defined as a schedule of resources and activities to accomplish a planned objective (e.g., the safety program). However, in the context of USACE’s program and project management role in the contingency environment, the Project Management Institute’s narrower definitions from A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge are more useful:

- A project is a “temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service.”
- A program is a “group of related projects managed in a coordinated way.”

Using these definitions, programs are comprised of multiple projects contributing to the same major objective. While a project is unique and has a finite duration, programs are generally longer in scope, but usually also have a specific end date. USACE implements programs to achieve consistent, specific results. At the primary level, project managers coordinate individual projects. PgMs oversee project managers, and account to the program sponsor (or board).

To learn more about project management, see A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge.

Program management oversees a collection of projects to achieve greater USACE capability than if these projects were managed individually — in effect creating a program synergy. This practice provides major stakeholders with a focal point for communication and ensures unity of USACE action and response.

Project management focuses on delivery of a specific product. A successful project delivers the right output at the right time and at the right cost. Figure 8-1 shows a USACE employee engaged in project work.
A project is defined by parameters of performance, cost, and time.

A program’s success is measured by performance in that program’s objectives and schedule of resources. For example, USACE could measure a program with the objective of improving quality of life by assessing the benefits to end users such as increases in Soldier billeting, hospital beds, or a population receiving potable water or electricity. Success of a program to aid governments in providing better infrastructure would be measured using those services as yardsticks and the previous level of service delivery as benchmarks.

While a project involves a specific product and a finite timeline, process improvement for programs is continuous. USACE organizations have an established procedure to change a project’s scope. Programs often must create organizational changes to react to strategic and environmental changes. Table 8-1 highlights some differences between programs and projects.
Table 8-1. Differences between projects and programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Defined objectives at project initiation.</td>
<td>Larger scope than projects, providing more significant organizational benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Expected; project managers implement processes to manage and control change.</td>
<td>Expected from both inside and outside the organization; PgMs must prepare for and manage change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Project managers progressively process information into detailed plans throughout the project life cycle.</td>
<td>PgMs develop the overall program plan and create plans to guide detailed planning at the component level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Project managers serve as the leader of the project team to ensure the accomplishment of project objectives.</td>
<td>PgMs manage the program staff and the project managers, providing vision and leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success</td>
<td>Measured by product and project quality, timeliness, budget compliance, and customer satisfaction.</td>
<td>Measured by how well the program satisfies the needs and benefits for which it was undertaken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>Project managers monitor and control the product production, services, or results.</td>
<td>PgMs monitor program component progress to ensure USACE meets the program’s goals, schedules, budget, and benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Project and Program Managers in the Contingency Environment

Most aspects of project management remain the same in the contingency environment as in a peacetime environment. The primary process groups (initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and control, and closing) are unchanged. Similarly, the project manager is accountable for accomplishing the stated project objectives. Major project management responsibilities include creating clear and attainable project objectives, building the project requirements, and managing the triple constraints for projects (cost, time, and scope).

Enduring Lesson

Program objectives must satisfy both the contingency mission and the USACE and Army campaign plans.

As in the peacetime environment, program management provides a layer above project management and focuses on selecting the best group of projects, defining them by objective, and then providing an environment where project managers can manage projects successfully.

Because USACE programs support higher headquarters vision, goals, and objectives, the deployed program management office (PMO) must ensure programs align with the governing offices, primarily aligning with the contingency operation mission and the USACE campaign plan. USACE’s annual campaign plan provides its operational focus and vision; it aligns closely with Department of Army goals and objectives eight years into the future.
The PgM must align the contingency and USACE goals into a clear set of performance objectives for the USACE team. Thoroughly understanding the current USACE campaign plan is important, because the PgM can then integrate with leaders of the contingency operation to pursue successful mission execution.

3. Project and Program Planning

Project managers and PgMs develop plans, bringing together the information on projects, resources, schedules, monitoring, and control. Project managers and PgMs typically prepare a comprehensive program management plan focusing on scope, budget, and schedule.

For program planning, most managers typically use a bottoms-up approach that identifies and executes planning iterations for the program’s component projects. First, each project manager constructs a project management plan estimating and allocating the required resources to deliver the project’s products or results.

In the next planning iteration, managers identify connections and dependencies among the program’s projects to refine and rework their project plans to integrate them with others. Generally, the PgM uses the same techniques and practices as in planning a standalone project when developing a program management plan. This integration effort requires adjustments to the products planned for each project, the numbers and types of resources required, and the overall program schedule. The PgM’s collective ability to manage and adjust to inter-project dependencies significantly determines program success. This ability is also a major differentiator between the requirements of project planning and program planning. Using the program management plan’s integration of the significant planned activities and individual project results, managers better understand the program’s cumulative required effort. Managers may use the program management plan to:

- Verify the program is on course to achieve stated goals.
- Identify where unplanned changes may occur and assess their potential effects.
- Model and/or test the effects of possible adjustments and corrections.

4. Program Management Leadership Responsibilities

The PgM is accountable to executive sponsors for scope, schedule, budget, and quality of all program elements; the PgM must regularly review projects, ensure lower echelon accountability, and manage projects, stakeholders, and suppliers.

Enduring Lesson

The program manager must understand the USACE campaign plan and communicate it to contingency mission leaders.
The PgM’s major responsibility is to own and oversee the implementation of the program’s underlying business strategies and to define the program’s connection to the enterprise’s overall business plan and direction. Usually, the PgM accomplishes these duties by leading executive-level sessions for program plans and schedule development. During these sessions, the PgM reviews and approves project plans for conformance to program strategy and program plan and schedule.

The PgM also communicates between executive sponsors and conducts periodic briefings and status updates. When necessary, the PgM escalates decisions to executive sponsors. Management activities include providing and interpreting policy and creating an environment that fosters sustainable momentum for the program (i.e., removing barriers both inside and outside the enterprise). The PgM periodically reviews program progress and interim results to ensure alignment with the overall strategic vision.

PgMs receive periodic summaries and briefings on funding consumption, resources, and delivery of interim work products and results (see Figures 8-2 and 8-3). Typically, they focus on these reports and briefings only after significant deviation from the plan.
USACE PgMs should remain involved in shaping communication strategies and public affairs statements as related to program management efforts in support of the contingency mission.

**Enduring Lesson**

Because they fully understand the contingency engineer mission, program managers should help shape communications and public affairs statements relating to the construction mission.

5. Embedding With Customers and Adding Program Value

The PgM must ensure component parts of USACE program management support the contingency goals and facilitate successful mission accomplishment. Due to fast operational tempo, environmental stressors, and potential cultural barriers, close communication with customers is critical in the military contingency.

**Enduring Lesson**

Decreasing delivery times is the most important value that USACE program managers bring to the customer.
Advantages of closely aligning with customers by embedding PgMs into the customers’ organizations include:

- Better understanding of how to target economies of scale and efficiency
- Taking advantage of opportunities
- Removing obstacles to decision making and project delivery
- Improving delivery time
- Creating enduring tactical and strategic relationships with those USACE supports

Embedding with clients helps the USACE PgM understand how to add value to the customer and streamline the program’s myriad of processes. An integrated and valued presence with the customer ensures USACE’s role as the nation’s primary agent for contingency reconstruction.

Each contingency construction program has a single major client along with other secondary entities. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), each program’s primary client had supporting personnel from nongovernmental organizations, the Department of State, etc. All the supporting personnel will coalesce around the primary client to provide for that client’s needs.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE program managers must quickly integrate with clients, customers, and stakeholders to align and integrate program management and create value for those USACE supports.

Attending the customer’s daily operations meeting was often the PgM’s simplest, yet most productive daily event. Attending these internal meetings allowed the PgMs to hear from each of the customer’s key clients, who the PgM may not otherwise normally have had access to. Attending these meetings allowed the PgMs to build meaningful relationships, which also helped them anticipate the customers’ needs.

Embedding sometimes involved placing staff people in the offices of the customer’s functional area leaders, which literally means sitting with the customer’s staff. PgMs sometimes discovered that these functional area leads were young officers with operational knowledge, but lacked experience in business processes, affording opportunities for mentorship. Embedded members must ensure that they do not commit USACE before they coordinate with the executing agent (district, reachback, etc.), also ensuring they have the resources to meet the customer’s need.

**Enduring Lesson**

Resolve logistical issues before sending personnel to non-USACE supported areas, or daily operations may become inefficient.

Embedding with customers can create logistical problems and raise key questions such as who will support the individual project or PgM, where will those individuals sleep and eat, and who will supply cellular phones, network access, and computer and information technology support.
During OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), USACE sometimes had single individuals in places without standard support mechanisms. Logistical issues are resolved before sending individuals to non-USACE supported areas or day-to-day operations can become inefficient. In addition, any such arrangement must be reviewed by counsel to ensure that all relevant laws are followed with respect to obtaining logistical support outside of USACE.

6. Infrastructure and Organizational Structure

Infrastructure describes roles, tools, and practices that organizations assemble and integrate to provide program management support. Infrastructure might include offices, supporting services and systems, and support personnel and contracts. USACE PgMs should familiarize themselves with workload and workforce planning, and continuously monitor and refine workload forecasts and delivery schedules, which drive infrastructure, USACE organizational structure, and the USACE table of distribution and allowances.

The PMO provides administrative and management support to the PgM/director and all other program participants. It also provides specialized staff expertise for specific work areas. Appropriately allocating resources influences the program’s cost and success. Infrastructure required for a successful program includes management and administrative roles, tools, and practices that constitutes the PMO. Primary management and administrative infrastructure responsibilities include:

- Program office management
- Resource coordination
- Budget administration and procurement
- Risk assessment
- Work product tracking and review
- Facility administration
- Technical support liaison
- Training coordination
- Methodology and process support
- Issues management
- Communications management
- Status reporting management
**Enduring Lesson**

Program managers should know, monitor, and forecast program workload and the relationship of workload to workforce requirements and project delivery schedules.

USACE staffs the PMO with senior specialists; in addition to serving the PgM/director, the PMO staff fills essential program roles. For large or complex programs, the PMO helps establish and maintain appropriate work processes, controls, and reporting functions to keep management apprised of the program’s progress. It also defines, plans, and completes various work efforts. The PMO provides infrastructure that enables productivity for all the project teams involved in the program.

**7. Means of Governance**

Governance is the structure, process, and procedure to control operations and processes to accomplish performance objectives. Governance includes performance metrics indicating the vitality and progress of the program’s most vital areas. Program governance is the discipline for both the structure and practices guiding the program and providing senior leadership and control.

**Enduring Lesson**

Early in a contingency, USACE must establish the means by which the program will be governed, including reporting format and frequency, situation reports, project management reviews, steering committee, etc.

Strategically, governance encompasses the relationship between the oversight effort and the customer served by USACE. It also includes the decision-making roles and responsibilities in executing the program effort. Programs require a complex governing structure because they involve fundamental business decisions and expenditures with significant effects throughout the project portfolio.

Because program success depends on efficient governance, USACE must establish the means by which the program will be governed early in the contingency. Specifics of governance should include reporting format and frequency, situation reports (SITREPs), project management reviews, steering committee, etc. A poorly articulated management structure, overlapping roles, and decision-making authority, and roles filled by the wrong people (or not filled at all) can prevent a program from achieving sustained momentum, burdening it, and creating lethargy by too often attempting to achieve consensus.

Programs usually have a steering committee or other group representing diverse interests and providing executive-level oversight. As the program evolves, this governing body ensures that it continues to align with the enterprise’s strategic direction and makes decisions that may eventually filter up to a higher governing board. During OEF, this board was the steering committee board of directors.

A significant duty of the program governance is defining the steering committee’s role and decision-making powers, which should promote rapid decisions and a clear, unified direction.
8. Organization

Figure 8-4 illustrates the typical organization and relationships for the program management structure. This relationship is more complicated than that of the project management structure.

9. Roles and Responsibilities

The project and program management roles and responsibilities involve complex interrelationships. Simply understanding these relationships when first arriving in theater will assist project managers in becoming functional much earlier in the deployment. Defining primary and secondary responsibilities, specific decision-making authorities, and the method to resolve or elevate decisions helps clarify team members’ duties. Generally, USACE responsibilities can be categorized into four groups:

1. The *responsible* person or organization completes the actual task.
2. The *accountable* person has ultimate responsibility and oversight authority for the task.
3. A *consulted* entity must provide feedback and contribute to the activity.
4. An *informed* entity requires knowledge of the decision or activity.
Figure 8-5 consists of a matrix that correlates the major tasks in the project and program management operation with duty position. Further, the matrix organizes the tasks by functional area and details responsibilities using the four categories of responsibilities. While specifics included in the matrix may change, it provides a starting point for future contingencies.

**Roles and Responsibilities Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity or Task</th>
<th>MSC</th>
<th>Contingency District</th>
<th>RS</th>
<th>RB</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>Contingency Center of Standardization (TAM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Load project information in Procurement Automated Source System</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load project information in Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish reachback scope of work</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish reachback schedule</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit funding request</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve reachback funding request</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create cross-charge labor codes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review changes and funding bi-weekly</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and lead project delivery team</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage reachback tasks</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with customers</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive feedback from contractors</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage changes</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve conflicts at deputy for project manager level or lower</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with reachback</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate independent technical review/ability, constructability, operability, and environmental review</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal close-out</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete project system</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain engineer library on ProjectWise</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish weekly meetings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop procurement documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidability, constructability, operability, and environmental review</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post final documents to Transatlantic Middle East District ProjectWise</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post final documents to contingency district ProjectWise</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit input to statement of responsibilities</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete performance survey</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish acquisition strategy</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select construction contract</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete remote Corps of Engineers Financial Management System access request</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve and apply remote Corps of Engineers Financial Management System access</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request contractual purchase request and commitment</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create contract documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify vendor registration (black list)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award construction contract</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish policy</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve conflicts above duty for project manager level</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publish standard business processes</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and maintain Reachback Acceptance Monitoring System portal</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture lessons learned</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct and manage basic reachback training</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain reachback cadre</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign work to reachback</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- **R**: Responsible - person or organization who performs an activity or does the work
- **A**: Accountable - person or organization who is ultimately accountable and has Yes/No/Veto authority
- **C**: Constrained - person or organization who needs to provide feedback and contribute to the activity
- **I**: Informed - person or organization who needs to know of the decision or action

**Figure 8-5. Roles and responsibilities matrix**
10. Standardizing Information and Reports

One of the most important lessons learned during OIF and OEF was the importance of quickly establishing a standard format for communicating project and program information up and down the chain of command. During OEF, project and program management developed a standard slide communicating the most often requested information about a project or program (see Appendix 1 of this chapter). Future PgMs may also want to create a slide showing key events for each project in a program.

**Enduring Lesson**

Use the established contingency program management review briefing format as a starting point for reporting construction status during future contingencies.

In addition to a standard report format, the project and program data also must be standardized within USACE, and, ideally, within the customer’s data systems. Without this standardization, USACE personnel expended time translating the data from one system to another and learning to operate multiple data systems. Frequently during OIF and OEF, various stakeholders contacted USACE’s program managers requiring immediate information. Common databases and common communication methods allowed the USACE PgMs to relay this information to general officers and senior executives quickly, allowing them as much time as possible to make decisions.

USACE should use organic capabilities to pull reports from USACE standard systems. Vendors pulling the reports and data often leads to vendors marketing alternate reports to stakeholders and customers. In turn, vendors pulling reports leads to multiple report versions and an unsustainable desire for more data. USACE organic capability should be familiar with the source data and be able to help ensure that quality timely data is input and used to generate reports.

11. Program Management Review

The main formal vehicle for conveying program information to the chain of command is the program management review. The program management review is a critical, two-part engagement, allowing the PgMs to communicate vital information to the chain of command, steering committee, and customer. In one part of the two-part review, the customer is present, and the other part is USACE-internal.

The Transatlantic Division (TAD) designed the program management review to generate decisions rather than just design it as a forum for information sharing. Rather than static information (such as the number of projects awarded and completed), program management reviews focus on information relating to the collective steering of the program, such as why a particular program may have been behind on awards, or why delivery was ahead of or behind schedule, etc. It also created a forum for USACE to identify its priority projects and projections.

During OEF, TAD program management completed a standard slide deck showing the most important program and project information, including projected awards, projected completions, top issues, priority projects, etc. Determining the information in these slides required lengthy input and refinement from key USACE personnel. Future contingency PgMs should use them as a starting point to determine the most relevant and frequently requested project and program
information. Ensuring that these meetings drive decisions rather than just informing requires that the PgMs fully understand all the information they present. Appendix A of this chapter includes an example of the program management review slides.

12. Situation Reports

In USACE, a SITREP is a report to the chain of command providing information on a critical issue. Like the program management review slides, standardizing the format for the SITREP helped streamline communication. Before TAD formalized this process, sometimes individuals would communicate information directly to the Chief of Engineers, bypassing the chain of command and the PgMs.

13. Quality Assurance

PgMs must verify and validate the program, ensuring adherence to standards and alignment with the USACE and contingency missions. PgMs must establish proactive, tangible systems to ensure project quality and the means to assess whether USACE’s contingency personnel are successfully employing established processes and best business practices. The contingency PgM should initially consult with established USACE quality management systems to verify that policy, process, and procedures are being established in the contingency, and that positive controls exist to assure success and efficient program management. Later, established quality management systems applications may be revised, documented, and issued and trained as needed to suit the contingency mission.

Enduring Lesson

The most important aspect of a quality assurance/quality control program is regular work site visits by the project engineer.

Effectively quality assurance programs carried out by the U.S. government, complemented by effective quality control programs performed by contractors, usually yield successful projects.

14. Affordability

PgMs must track basic project costs together with additional program administration costs. The program’s financial aspect must conform to internal and external policies and/or regulations for expenditures. These responsibilities also include developing and using program-specific procedures for making and reporting expenditures. The responsibilities associated with authorizing, recording, and reporting program expenditures extend well beyond those typically exercised by an individual project manager.

Typically, the lead resource manager helps strategically define and financially evaluate the program. Financial analysts construct and/or use financial models to ensure that the enterprise’s personnel correctly interpret and apply its financial policies. They also ensure that the program’s financial effect is accurately represented to executives at key decision points.
15. Continuous Improvement

PgMs must continuously assess performance and research, and develop new capabilities and systemically apply lessons learned and knowledge management to the program and/or contingency operation. USACE has decades of recent and relevant experience in project and program management in contingency environments. Much of this experience has been collected, stored, and archived for future reference and application. The PgM must continually learn from experience, mistakes, and failures, as well as from successful accomplishments.

**Enduring Lesson**

Early in the program, the program manager should plan and conduct a checkpoint review of the financial management apparatus and identify the program’s specific needs and requirements.

Every program assessment of USACE’s management support should include an after action review, discussing past performance and strategizing how USACE can increase efficiency and create more value for clients, customers, and stakeholders. Project and program partnering sessions are formerly scheduled and lessons learned captured from audits by outside agencies, such as the Government Accountability Office, Army Audit Agency, Department of Defense Inspector General, Department of the Army, Commission for Wartime Contracting, and others. USACE should prepare for the most likely audits by collecting and having available key records and documents in electronic format.

16. Conclusion

Project and program management lie at the heart of USACE’s contingency mission. Experience in OIF and OEF shows that new project and program management can tackle this complex set of tasks by first understanding where to begin. Some key elements of success are using standard processes, data information systems, and reports, ensuring value added by embedding with the customer, and understanding all of a project or program’s information. These factors are timeless in managing professional, efficient programs.

17. Appendixes

17.1 Appendix A. Sample Program Management Review Slides

Figures 8 A-1 through 8 A-7 are sample slides of a monthly program management review. The slides do not include some administrative slides, backup slides, or quad charts of all the projects that the contingency engineer districts include in a normal program management review.
Figure 8 A-1. Agenda
Completed Actions

- **FY13 CCIR Analysis completed 30 Nov**
  - Pre-Award CCIRs and Post-Award CCIRs.
    - Establish reasons, causation, and help determine preventative actions.
    - Achieve better understanding of "Operational Impact".

- **Safety**
  - Provided Lessons Learned Report on the roof collapse accident to COL Xxxxxx. Provided COL Xxxxxx with a Dari Translation for delivery to CPMD.

- **BOD Summit Information distributed on 20 Nov**
  - Post Award Six-Pack used to identify and respond to early slips.
  - BOD Slip Mitigation Tools identified for use:
    - Utilizing Afghan firms to conduct QA services similar to Title II services.
    - Use of imagery which is useful but limited.
    - Re-enforce buying back time from contractors.
    - Transform the organization into a construction focused delivery team.
    - Utilize the O&M contract to complete minor features on contracts that are T4D.
  - RMS modified for new metrics.
  - Next BOD Summit – 30 Jan 13 (tentative scheduled date).
  - BOD Summit to be held at New Kabul Compound (NKC), TAD-A.
Figure 8 A-3. Program overview
Figure 8 A-4. Fiscal year awards and number of projects
Figure 8 A-5. Beneficiary occupancy date outlook
Figure 8 A-6. Glide path to completion
17.2 Appendix B. Project Initiation Criteria

Appendix B describes two project initiation criteria checklists:

1) **The Six Pack process**, which TAD followed in Afghanistan and assisted project managers and PgMs during pre-initiation dialogue with customers. (See TAD Operation Order 2012-17, *Afghan National Security Forces Thermo Report and Site Assessment Six Pack Clarification*.)

2) **The 16 Go/No-Go Criteria**, which predated the Six Pack process. These processes also aided the customers’ project selection and strategic decision making. (See Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Operation Order OMID 1390 001-2010, Annex EE, Appendix 4, *Construction Contracting Guidelines for Afghanistan*.)

For project success chances, acquisition process decision makers ensure adherence to established processes and procedures. Future contingency PgMs can use these criteria and processes as guidelines for other contingencies, modifying them to facilitate timely solicitation packet preparation.
The Six Pack process outlines critical planning elements to guide the project delivery team (PDT) from initiation and planning to contract award. These critical planning elements include:

- Agreement on scope of requirements.
- Appropriate project site.
- Validated funds available.
- Available water supply.
- Physically accessible location.
- Situationally secure construction location.

With approval from the PDT, the project manager assigns status colors (red, amber, and green) and integrates the data into other reports. At one time, all six criteria required a green status before the districts would expend significant effort in pre-award activities. All six had to be green before contract award.

If USACE awards the contract with Six Pack elements in red or amber status, the government will begin to accept additional cost and risk associated with the uncertainty. In these cases, PDTs should coordinate with their customers and partners to develop solicitations that will help mitigate the increased risk. USACE will then discuss the project’s increased risk with the customer; USACE may then award the project if the customer so desires. The discussion should thoroughly review the anticipated period of performance to ensure the solicitation period of performance adequately reflects the associated risk. Once awarded, PDTs must monitor these projects and develop mitigation strategies throughout the construction process until delivery.

Figures 8 B-1 and 8 B-2 show the Six Pack process and illustrate the executing agent and customer validation required before investing resources in a project.

Figures 8 B-3 and 8 B-4 show an enhanced site assessment process used as an extension of the Six Pack when mitigating risk and uncertainty.

Figure 8 B-5 shows the 16 Go/No-Go Criteria (predecessor to the “Six Pack”) used to provide guidance and establish procedures for procuring construction projects supporting Afghanistan’s basing strategy.
1. **SCOPE**
   - Default is Red, no Customer SOR (Statement of Requirements) or SA received.
   - Yellow defined as receipt of Customer SOR or, for new stand-alone project, the SOR and SA. Scope will stay Yellow until the PDT reviews the Scope, SA and/or Enhanced Site Assessment (ESA) to validate constructability (this may include resolving recommend changes to the scope of requirements (SOR) based on PDT review).
   - Green defined as USACE concurrence with Customer SOR.
   - Project Manager will turn SCOPE Green in the six pack once the PDT has validated the scope.

2. **SITE**
   - Default is Red, no Grids or, for a new standalone project, SA report received.
   - Yellow defined as the receipt of the Grids (ANA) or SA report (ANP)—remains Yellow throughout the Grid validation or ESA process.
   - Green defined as PDT concurrence with project location.
   - Project Manager will turn SITE Green in the six pack once the PDT concurs the site is valid.

3. **FUNDING**
   - Default is Red; defined as no PO received.
   - Yellow defined as R&D funds provided and/or only SAF letter is received for solicitation.
   - Green defined as construction funding received (sufficient funds to match the funding document).
   - Program Analyst will turn FUNDING Green in the six pack once sufficient funding is validated.

---

**Figure 8 B-1. Six Pack requirements**
**ANSF Six Pack Requirements**

4. **WATER**
   - **Default is Red**: defined as no SA received or knowledge obtained from other sources regarding WATER.
   - **Yellow**: defined as receipt of PD, SOR and SA, and ESA underway if required. WATER will stay yellow until water is found or a satisfactory resolution is found for water supply.
   - **Green or Black**: will be assigned as a result of the PDT review of the SOR and/or Enhanced SA. Green defined as reasonable confidence exists at conclusion of ESA; that WATER will be found by well or alternate sources identified; Black defined as no resolution is possible.
   - Project Manager will turn WATER Green or Black in the six pack once the PDT has determined water sources is validated or that no resolution is possible.

5. **ACCESS**
   - **Default is Red**: defined as no PD, SOR or, for a stand-alone project, SA received.
   - **Yellow**: defined as receipt of PD, SOR, and SA.
   - **Green or Black**: will be assigned as a result of the PDT review of the SOR and/or ESA. Green defined as ability to physically access the site; Black defined as ability to access the site is not possible. (Access is as related to physical terrain issues)
   - Project Manager will turn ACCESS Green or Black based on PDT review.

6. **SECURITY**
   - **Default is Red**: no coordination has been initiated.
   - **Yellow**: defined as receipt of PD with initial grid point and coordination with USACE Area Officer in Charge including input from AE & RE or Coalition or ANSF Forces. Plan to provide support that will allow for the contractor to safely access and investigate the work and LNQA can access site to perform QA inspections.
   - **Green**: defined when the assessment indicates contractor can safely access and investigate the work and LNQA can access site to perform QA inspections. Black is assigned when contractor and/or USACE LNQA cannot safely access the site.
   - Project Manager will turn SECURITY Green or Black based on PDT resolution.

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**Figure 8 B-2. Six Pack requirements**
Figure 8 B-3. Enhanced site assessment process roles and responsibilities
Figure 8 B-4. Enhanced site assessment process flowchart

GO/NO-GO Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best Practices</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Go</th>
<th>No-Go</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe Accessibility</td>
<td>Coordinate with RC, cleared, permissive, force protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Location</td>
<td>Walk the site, FP requirement, mines, water, flood plain, historic, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Plan Coordination</td>
<td>Reconfirm appropriate strategy, other project site, coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>End-User Participation</td>
<td>Consult stakeholders and make part of PDT, occupy immediately</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Stimulate economy, develop local workers, private sector, follow rules</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan First Priority</td>
<td>Use section 866 if appropriate, leverage Afghan construction industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Design Criteria</td>
<td>Austerize design and local technology/material, international standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>Minimum Military Requirements (MMR), smart, solid, safe engineering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Sustainability</td>
<td>Adequate water and sustainable electricity (connect to grid)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Durability</td>
<td>Afghan durable, functional and maintainable or outside O&amp;M contract</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contractor Qualifications (Vetting)</td>
<td>Acceptable record of past performance, available capacity, document</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contractor Vehicles</td>
<td>FFP/LPTA usual, but be flexible to build capacity, other factors then $</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M)</td>
<td>End user agreement to O&amp;M in place prior to construction contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality Assurance Management</td>
<td>Post award management based on value and complexity, use Afghans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contract Printing</td>
<td>Competitive (prices/salaries) in local area, discourage, non-competitive</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Life Cycle Management</td>
<td>Inclusive PMP (cradle-to-grave), transition of phases, BOD, close-out</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 B-5. Go/No-Go Criteria checklist (predecessor to the Six Pack process)
References


Chapter 9

Supporting Missions: Real Estate, Environment, and Energy

Introduction

This chapter reviews supporting missions critical to overseas contingency operations (real estate, environmental operations, and operational energy). Carefully review and understand the most current regulatory information before executing these supporting missions. Many regulations and agreements between the U.S. and the host nation (HN) apply to each area.

1. Real Estate

1.1 References

- Army Regulation 405-10, *Acquisition of Real Property and Interest Therein*, 14 MAY 1970.


1.2 Real Estate Introduction

Establishing the United States’ use of the HN’s lands and/or facilities requires thoroughly understanding international, HN, and United States laws and regulations. In addition to establishing use of the land and facilities, the United States must also properly return the land or facilities to the HN or other entities at the end of mission. Accomplishing this during a contingency environment’s confusion and government upheaval may be especially complex. HN governments and individuals may levy legal claims against United States if these processes are managed incorrectly.

With few exceptions, USACE real estate serves all U.S. forces. The real estate teams prepare leases and other approved real estate instruments for many real estate activities such as:

- Private leasing, land use agreements, and permits for houses, offices, and vacant land for the U.S. military
- License for construction, land use agreements, and no-cost land arrangements for USACE construction projects in the HN

**Enduring Lesson**

Fully understand all agreements, laws, and policies regarding land use in an host nation to expedite USACE use and return of real property.

1.3 Status of Forces Agreement and Real Estate Acquisition

Generally, any contingency situation other than armed conflict involves a status of forces agreement, treaty, defense agreement, or other diplomatic agreement with the HN. Generally, USACE acquires needed real property subject to local law and international agreements. Alternately, the HN may allow U.S. forces to use their property.

Before conducting real estate operations in a particular nation, background research is needed to determine if any of the aforementioned agreements addressing their facilities exist. Questions should include:

- Does the United States (or coalition nation) have an embassy or consulate in country? If so, who are the points of contact? Does the Department of State have a real estate point of contact for the country?
- Does the HN have a ministry-level representative responsible for real estate?
- What is the process to obtain HN facility use?
• Does the HN possess the financial and technical ability to fulfill its obligations in accord with the agreement?

• Does the country have “quick take” or eminent domain laws? If so, how is the landowner compensated and how is compensation determined?

• Where does the HN maintain land and real estate records? How does the HN establish proof of ownership?

1.4 Real Estate Function Alignment

The real estate function should align to best serve in the geographic combatant command (CCMD) staff. Traditionally, the real estate function locates with, and is part of, the senior in-theater United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) team. That USACE entity ensures the real estate team is equipped with needed office supplies and equipment, network conductivity, and life support.

Enduring Lesson

The USACE real estate function typically serves the combatant command and should align in the organization to best serve the combatant command.

Enduring Lesson

The number of USACE-related projects may not accurately represent real estate-related actions because the function involves many more activities than USACE construction.

1.5 Contingency Real Estate Support Team

The Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST) capabilities include a mix of civilian USACE professionals trained to meet varying real estate service requirements. If needed, CRESTs may augment or otherwise support the real estate office throughout the range and phases of the operation. Under the Field Force Engineering program, the CREST would be used for short deployments in immature theaters.

1.6 Determining Ownership

Verifying legal land ownership is one of the real estate office’s most difficult challenges in the contingency environment. To prepare for this challenge, peacetime research should address the nation’s land ownership laws and processes before any contingency operation arises. If this information is not available before the operation, the real estate office should establish it as early as possible in the contingency, including copies of the nation’s real estate laws and samples of their real estate documents. If proper legal records do not exist, contacting surrounding landowners and/or government officials to determine and document ownership may be a viable option.
Some land ownership questions to consider include:

- Are all the lands owned by the state and leased to individuals?
- Does the nation use tribal or communal properties/ownership?
- How does the nation resolve property ownership disputes? Does the nation’s court system function?
- Does the nation prohibit or restrict any members of the population from property ownership, such as women, ethnic minorities, or religious groups? If so, does an underground or unofficial system of property sales/ownership exist?
- Can foreigners own property?
- What water or mineral rights issues is the nation experiencing?
- Which properties or areas are sensitive because of religious, historic, archaeological, or environmental reasons?
- Does the nation have a system similar to the Multiple Listing Service or professional real estate sales/leasing services?
- Where and how is ownership documented?
- Are records open to the public?
- If not, what is the process to access these records?

Real estate professionals should determine the appropriate owner by reviewing the nation’s laws in coordination with internal USACE staff attorneys.

1.7 Private Versus Public Ownership

Some nations have nationalized property within their borders, or, conversely, have privatized previously national assets. These changes, along with inconsistent documentation, can pose challenges for determining or verifying private versus public ownership. Additionally, some countries may be major partners or stockholders in “private” land ownership companies.
Determining land ownership in Iraq was problematic; errors, failures of Iraqi bureaucracy, and other issues resulted in project delays and numerous terminations for convenience where construction contracts could not proceed because land rights could not be secured.

1.8 Establishing Real Estate Records and Documentation

Establishing and maintaining accurate records throughout the operation is important because the United States eventually returns property to the HN or private owner. Records should formally document the initial property condition (i.e., a joint survey condition report) and include an environmental baseline survey (EBS).

USACE should document any improvements made to the property during its control that will remain after USACE’s departure. Improvements can offset potential damage claims, and may include buildings; electrical upgrades; heating, ventilation, and air conditioning installations; drainage; or sanitation upgrades.

Environmental Baseline Survey

The EBS is completed before occupying the land, or as soon as possible thereafter. An EBS should be conducted as part of the acquisition process and attached to the agreement to document the occupancy conditions.

Enduring Lesson

The ease and simplicity of land disposal largely depends on the thoroughness of the land acquisition.

If a formal survey is not practical, the maneuver commands’ engineering and logistics staff should photograph and video the real estate and facilities they occupy and use. It is important to document any environmental changes and events during use of property, such as mine clearing, spills, and subsequent clean-up (see Figure 9-1).

Figure 9-1. Real estate functional team members determining land ownership and USACE property use
1.9 Water Wells

Water wells are a function of the joint command task force or other assigned entity, because some nations require that water rights be specified by agreements. However, if land will be acquired through a real estate agreement, real estate professionals must discuss and plan for any water well use or creation while initially acquiring the property during the operational phase, and during base closure or property return to the HN. Without agreement and communication established early in the process, both the HN and U.S. forces may disagree on the well’s ultimate use and disposition. In addition, the capabilities of the ultimate end-users are considered, for example, appropriate well depth and electrical infrastructure of the HN.

1.10 Travel and Communication

Upon arrival in the theater of operations, both classified and unclassified lines of communication are established, including phone numbers and email addresses. Immediately after establishment, all contact information is communicated to military in the operational area, members of the joint task force, and others who may require contact with the CREST or real estate team. The team should diligently monitor these lines of communication and use them in lieu of face-to-face contact whenever possible.

Preventing unnecessary travel for the CREST or real estate team reduces their exposure to life-threatening situations. Real estate professionals should use careful judgment when deciding issues involving minimal money or grant a verbal lease approval to an officer or an owner. Documenting the approval may suffice instead of risking travel to sign a hard-copy lease.

1.11 Real Estate Claims

Real estate specialists cannot process and settle claims resulting from property use. Any such claims should be coordinated with the Army Claims Service, the designated authority to handle such claims. USACE Office of Chief Counsel (CECC-R) Bulletin 14-06, *Ratification of Leasehold Interests*, provides information on remedies when USACE has taken possession or otherwise occupied real property before a lease instrument has been signed by the appropriate real estate official.

1.12 Real Estate Standard Business Processes and Continuity Books

Developing standard business processes and continuity books early in the contingency minimizes the U.S. government’s risk caused by errors and omissions in a real estate action. The Transatlantic Division and its districts developed standard business processes and continuity books during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and uploaded them into the Quality Management System. The use of reachback is always maximized in the deployed environment, thereby conserving on-site reachback resources such as the CREST.

***Enduring Lesson***

Develop standard business practices and continuity books with lease forms early in the contingency.
1.13 Real Estate Disposal

Ultimately, USACE will deliberately release property and facilities to the landowner or the HN. Such release requires coordination, inspections, and fulfillment of many agreements. Correctly returning property first requires understanding of how the United States acquired use of the property, which may have been a lease with private owners, a land use agreement, or accommodation consignment agreement with the HN. Conversely, an agreement may not be in place if land ownership was not initially established.

2. Environmental Operations

2.1 References


- United States Central Command Regulation 200-2, *Contingency Environmental Guidance*.

2.2 Environmental Operations Introduction

USACE must follow practices minimizing environmental damage and chemical releases and support consistent and expeditious corrective actions. The practices during contingency operations differ from those in United States and vary with each operation.

**Enduring Lesson**

Establish environmental practices early in the contingency mission to minimize environmental incidents and support consistent, expeditious corrective actions.

Although environmental considerations are usually subordinate to operational requirements and force protection in wartime, USACE personnel must still consider human health and environmental protection while executing orders and developing plans. Good judgment is exercised at all levels and military operations are integrated to safeguard personnel health and safety, minimize costly and resource-intensive environmental corrective actions, and facilitate timely base closure and transfer.

2.3 Hazardous Materials and Waste

Contingency operations hazardous materials (HAZMAT), hazardous waste (HW), and disposal involve complex (and potentially problematic) requirements beyond the scope of this publication. This section offers some broad guidelines based on contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Using environmental response team yards in Iraq and Afghanistan to treat and dispose of in-theater HW was very useful, compared to Logistics Civil Augmentation Program-operated HW storage areas. USACE personnel should establish HW treatment centers; all HW should go directly to these centers, rather than being stored.

An accurate list is maintained of all HAZMAT and petroleum, oils, and lubricants stored on USACE sites. The HAZMAT inventory form is posted at storage locations where significant spills could occur. All pertinent information from the original manufacturer’s label is displayed on the container itself; the manufacturer’s adhesive labels commonly become damaged and unreadable on containers stored in the open. Incompatible materials are segregated to prevent comingling, which may result in explosions, fires, hazardous polymerization, etc.

Liquid HAZMAT in volumes greater than 55 gallons require secondary containment. Transporting HAZMAT, HW, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants always introduces a spillage risk; appropriate shipping papers must accompany the transport. Currently, this documentation includes a completed Department of Defense Form (DD Form) 1348, *DOD Single Line Item Requisition System Document (Manual)*, and the corresponding material safety data sheet identifying hazards associated with the material. When shipping HW, shipping papers must also include an HW profile sheet (Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service Form 1930, *Hazardous Waste Profile Sheet*). Materials recycling should also be established with the HN infrastructure, as available.
2.4 Spill Prevention and Response

Ensure that all USACE sites establish a spill prevention control and response plan in accordance with applicable procedures. Spill response includes four steps:

1. Stop the source/contain spill.
2. Clean the spill.
3. Dispose of spilled material.
4. Complete the spill report.

In addition to the above steps, USACE personnel must report the spill to the USACE safety officer and other required personnel in accordance with theater policies. With minor or easily containable spills, the personnel or unit responsible should immediately dig up the spill (if on soil), or use dry sweep to soak up the spill, and containerize the material in an approved and marked container. Persons responding to the spill should protect themselves against potential chemical, physical, and biological hazards, with special concern for the respiratory system and eyesight (Army Regulation [AR] 200-1, Environmental Protection and Enhancement, and Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations, parts 110, 302, 355).

2.5 Solid Waste Management


Contingency operations create a significant volume of solid waste, usually 10 pounds per person per day. Source reduction, recycling, and waste minimization should be implemented at all levels to reduce disposal operations. The DOD Solid Waste Management Policy requires base camps to implement a solid waste management strategy in order to reduce solid waste volume.

USACE may dispose of solid waste in properly constructed landfills either before or after volume reduction or through shredding, burning, or incineration. Initially establishing these sites can be problematic because solid waste begins generating immediately, while a landfill or military construction (MILCON) incinerator may require months to design and construct. Due to burn pit prohibitions, few options remain for the interim period; these may include portable incinerators and haul-off by local national contractors. DOD Instruction 4715.19, Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations, states that open-air burn pits are not allowed for any post/camp/station with more than 100 personnel.

Landfills may be impractical in contingency environments if design and construction times are considerably long and estimating the design life/capacity is too difficult. For these reasons, consideration is given to waste incineration or using HN infrastructure such as local national haul-off, if available.
2.6 Wastewater

Wastewater (WW) generated at contingency bases includes black water, grey water, and blue water which must be managed to prevent water contamination and protect public health. Black water contains human waste. Grey water includes wastewater from non-latrine sources such as showers, laundry, kitchens, vehicle wash racks, and hand-washing stations that should be chemically treated inside storage cistern to prevent bacteriological growth. Blue water is wastewater from chemical toilets.

The water treatment approach depends on location, population served by the treatment system, availability of properly operating HN public works, and other factors. USACE environmental professionals must ensure new treatment systems are designed according to current governing regulations (currently Military Handbook 1005/16, Wastewater Treatment System Design Augmenting Handbook). Untreated WW may not be discharged directly into the HN’s surface waters. WW general treatment preference order is:

1. Pumping to an evaporation pond
2. Pumping to a sewage treatment lagoon/system
3. Pumping to an on-base package treatment system
4. Pumping to a HN municipal WW treatment system
5. WW removal by a contractor

2.7 Environmental Baseline Surveys

An EBS factually represents initial environmental conditions and provides information about environmental risks (see Figure 9-2). An EBS may make conclusions or recommendations about current environmental issues only. The base camp commander is responsible for the EBS; the commander typically delegates to the base operation support integrator who coordinates with USACE for support as necessary.

![Figure 9-2. Military construction projects affect water supplies of local villages without the appropriate preventative measures.](image)
The EBS preparer should visually assess the subject area and interview base camp personnel (including the mayor, environmental officers, HAZMAT contractors) using a checklist included in the American Society for Testing and Materials International Publication D6008, *Standard Practice for Conducting Environmental Baseline Surveys*. The checklist does not serve as the EBS report, but it assists the preparer in gathering all required environmental information, including photos, to include in the EBS report.

The USACE environmental staff and a base camp representative usually walk the entire base camp after interviews. Properly documenting environmental conditions with an EBS may be done by the engineering or logistics staff officer/noncommissioned officer of the maneuver unit that first occupies a facility or parcel of real estate. United States Army Central Command (USARCENT) Pamphlet 415-1, *Contingency Base Camp Handbook*, contains samples and blank EBS forms.

### 2.8 Environmental Site Closure Report

The environmental site closure report (ESCR) represents the surveys and reports used to ensure that each U.S.-occupied site was properly cleaned and prepared for closure or return to the HN. The base camp commander is responsible for the ESCR; this responsibility is typically delegated to the base operation support integrator who coordinates with USACE for support, as necessary. An inspection is conducted and a preliminary ESCR is prepared before the occupying unit’s logistics/engineering staff departs (see USARCENT Pamphlet 415-1 for sample and closure report formats). Steps to completing an ESCR include:

- Conduct the initial ESCR before the permanent closure notification date; at least 90 days before closure or return.

- Develop a corrective action plan based on the initial ESCR, addressing sites requiring cleanup, or removal actions necessary to comply with applicable requirement (corrective action plans as stand-alone documents were not needed in Afghanistan. Typically, the corrective actions required were sufficiently identified in the initial or preliminary ESCR).

- USACE typically conducts the preliminary ESCR 30 days before closure/return to identify all environmental actions that must be completed before the closing base grants final closure/return clearance (in Afghanistan, United States Forces-Afghanistan contracted these services through USACE). The combined joint forces commander or service component typically tasks and funds USACE to do this.

- The final ESCR is conducted within a week of the closure or return — at the time required to complete removal efforts and corrective actions.

### 2.9 Existing Contract Support

The contingency division should maximize in-house capability in providing technical support to the area of responsibility. If an environmental issue requires a major study or action, a contingency division subject matter expert will guide the work and execute it through an existing contract vehicle available at any of the USACE districts/centers/divisions (e.g., the United States Army Engineering and Support Center at Huntsville, AL, has contract vehicles that may be used to award on most environmental issues including ordnance and explosives). The combined
joint forces commander or service component typically tasks and funds USACE to do this. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, USACE successfully provided an environmental response team that performed spill response and corrective actions in instances when military personnel lacked expertise, manpower, or equipment.

2.10 Firing Ranges

Firing ranges must be properly established with real estate land use agreements, including firing points, impact areas, surface danger areas, and range fans. Range plans must include management, closure, and clearance actions. Many issues regarding ranges and explosive remnants of war may be avoided with proper range establishment and management.

3. Operational Energy

3.1 References


- Policy Memorandum Subject, *Sustainable Design and Development Policy Update (Environmental and Energy Performance)*, 27 OCT 2010; Katherine Hammack (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Installations, Energy, and Environment).

3.2 Operational Energy Introduction

Increasingly complex global challenges to U.S. national security require broad military operations and capabilities, and a large and steady energy supply. While military energy demand grows, enemy forces more often attack intra-theater fuel supply logistics at the operational and tactical levels. Strategically, energy is important for economic stability and growth, with nations around the world increasingly competing for the same energy resources. As long as U.S. forces rely on large energy requirements, supply vulnerability and volatility will continue to raise risks and costs for deployed coalition forces.

**Enduring Lesson**
Reducing fuel consumption reduces personnel risk and improves operational and fiscal efficiency.

*October 2011, the Army G-4 office estimated 18 percent of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq were related to ground resupply. By lowering fossil fuel consumption in theater, the number of trips made by convoy supply units will be reduced, cutting risk to Soldiers*

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Energy is critical to sustaining military capability and is the most significant factor in determining operational endurance and range. To ensure success, the United States must reduce its dependency on fossil fuel by improving how it generates, uses, and conserves energy. The contingency division should decrease energy demand by reducing the deployed footprint through maximizing reachback, leveraging standard designs, and using best management practices, which will maximize energy efficiency by reducing required personnel at each tactical location and decrease energy consumption.

3.3 Spot Generation Versus Centralized Power Plants

During the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, base camp designers often did not fully consider all future power generation needs while planning. Instead, they initially designed and built the main base camps for current requirements and then, as additional sections were added, each area was independently supported by its own spot generation.

**Enduring Lesson**
Early in the contingency mission, plan to transition to power distribution grids and centralized power generation plants versus spot generations.
Spot generation is both costly and inefficient to supply base camp power because the generators used typically operated significantly under capacity. Using power distribution grids and centralized power generation plants within secure perimeters resulted in less maintenance and fewer outages with properly emplaced redundancies (see Figure 9-3). USACE establishes clear standards for when spot generation should cease and centralized generation begin.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE should establish clear standards for when spot generation should cease and centralized power generation begin.

![Image of power distribution grid](image)

**Figure 9-3. Using power distribution grids such as the 132/33/11 KV substation shown above reduces spot generation and power outages.**

In addition to centralized fossil-fuel driven power plants, the energy planning professional should explore and exploit alternative energy sources to the greatest extent possible. For example, mobile solar powered light sets and hybrid renewable energy systems were used with some success for remote locations during both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF. Lastly, large-scale waste-to-energy systems were considered as potential sources of power and energy, but were not implemented because the technology was not mature or proven for harsh, demanding, and austere environments.
3.4 USACE Energy Generation Experience

When using existing power grids and centralized power generation is a viable option, USACE personnel with experience in electrical power plant rehabilitation are generally in short supply and high demand. The lack of skill sets associated with power plant generation and rehabilitation projects can hinder progress for important projects. Augmentation with contract technical advisors is considered to provide the necessary skill sets (see Figure 9-4). When electrical generation and distribution systems are poorly maintained, damaged, or unavailable, projects depend on generators to provide sufficient energy to enable the user to meet requirements.

Enduring Lesson

Whenever possible, USACE electrical engineers should also have generator experience.

Figure 9-4. USACE may use contracted technical advisors to augment its skill sets.

3.5 Metering and Data Collection

Operational energy use was difficult to measure and quantify throughout contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the effects of incorporating new technologies, changing operational practices, and using more efficient designs were uncertain and not well quantified. Metering and data collection is incorporated as fully as possible early in contingency operations to avoid uncertainty and document usage.

Enduring Lesson

Create a plan to monitor and collect energy use data early in the contingency.
Without historical data, measuring energy use, determining cost effectiveness, and measuring return on investment for improvements made as the contingency operation matures is difficult. Operational and maintenance constraints are considered in the metering and verification strategy implemented in accordance with AR 420-1, *Army Facilities Management*, paragraph 22-15.

### 3.6 Reporting (Recurring Meetings)

USACE elements responsible for contingency energy operations should conduct recurring meetings with all CCMD components to communicate and coordinate. Within USACE, the major subordinate command assigned to oversee the contingency operations should conduct regular internal meetings with the execution districts, reachback districts, and the USACE Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) to align energy initiatives and unity of effort.

**Enduring Lesson**

The contingency division should coordinate and guide all USACE operational energy efforts to prevent effort duplication and conserve resources.

Throughout the contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, poor information exchange caused numerous duplications of effort, both within USACE and United States Central Command. To prevent overlap and conserve resources, the aligned contingency division should coordinate and guide all USACE operational energy efforts. In addition, the division should ensure accurate project data is entered and maintained in the Reachback Acceptance and Monitoring System and/or the Resident Management System. To the extent permitted by law, the contingency division should grant access to these systems and advocate their use by other DOD partners and stakeholders, allowing them to view project data regularly, avoid overlaps, and reduce data calls.

### 3.7 Demand Reduction Measures in Facilities

In addition to optimizing power generation, energy professionals must consider demand reduction measures to decrease total energy consumption. Current plans and designs for temporary and semi-permanent construction do consider energy demand reduction. Projects are underway to improve these designs and ultimately incorporate them into the Army Facilities Component System/Joint Construction Management System, and other planning and design documents.

Moreover, planning and design charrettes for larger MILCON-size facility projects should consider sustainable features such as LED lighting, day-lighting, vestibules, solar water heating, added insulation, solar shading, etc., as part of request for proposal development.

### 3.8 Additional Resources

**Existing Contract Support**

Future contingency energy professionals should fully explore the existing contract vehicles before awarding new contracts. For example, the Philadelphia District currently maintains two contracts supporting contingency operational energy. These pre-awarded contracts allow rapid installation and repair of critical electricity generation and distribution. Their general scopes
of work include base electrical support services and worldwide power contingency response. Although these contracts may change before the next contingency, contracts like these may exist and locating them may require some investigation.

**Enduring Lesson**

Use existing contracts to assist and standardize operational energy efforts, especially during initial deployment stages when energy requirements are still maturing.

**Existing Technical Support (249th Engineer [Prime Power] Battalion)**

The 249th Engineer (Prime Power) Battalion is assigned to USACE and provides commercial-level power to military units and federal relief organizations during emergency and contingency operations. The organization rapidly provides Army generators to support worldwide requirements, including overseas contingency operations. The battalion consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, four prime power line companies (A, B, C, and D), and the U.S. Army Prime Power School. The 249th’s capabilities include:

- Rapid response to the contingency environment
- Subject matter expertise for assessing existing electrical systems
- Developing statements of work and providing contract oversight for electrical projects

The 249th is USACE’s asset to deploy in the event of an overseas contingency

**Existing Design Support (Center of Standardization)**

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed a need to ensure mission essential facilities in contingency areas meet minimum life, health, safety, force protection, and seismic requirements. Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) addressed this need by establishing the Center of Standardization (COS) at the Transatlantic Middle East District to provide greater efficiency and effectiveness in MILCON execution. The COS efforts can reduce the potential for injuries caused by substandard safety practices and reduce costs associated with purchasing and using nonstandard designs at different locations.

The COS conserves federal funds by implementing standard facility designs, which, in turn, helps ensure consistent energy savings in the facilities. The COS establishes standards on assigned facility types, ensures compliance with approved standards, and implements mandatory design reviews at established design phases (35 and 95 percent) on mission-essential facilities.

**Applicable Studies**

Various agencies authored energy studies during the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, but USACE lacked a central repository for those studies, and, as a result, many of the studies were difficult to access. ERDC ultimately wrote a separate study with the intent of consolidating the previously written material into a single document. Energy professionals in future contingencies should be aware that such studies exist and they may be useful and applicable to problems.
encountered during the contingency. Additionally, in 2013, the Department of Energy conducted an energy efficiency/conservation and energy vulnerabilities/surety assessment of Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. Some examples of these types of studies include:

- **Energy Study—Contingency Facilities.** The Transatlantic Middle East District COS completed an assessment of measures to reduce energy requirements using sustainable low-cost options through passive measures, building systems solutions, and renewable energy solutions. While some of the energy solutions will be incorporated into standard designs, other solutions (for example, metering, solar water heater, solar lighting, wind turbine, etc.) will be available as optional features to be selected where justifiable to meet contingency mission, climatic data, and local capabilities.

- **Operational Energy Base Camp Studies.** The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs tasked ERDC’s, Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) with reviewing all currently available energy-relevant studies, assessments, and lessons learned. CERL documented its findings in a report released February 2012.

- **Feasibility of Renewable Energy Technology at the Afghanistan National Security University.** National Training Mission-Afghanistan requested that USACE conduct a site-specific feasibility study to assess the potential use of renewable energy to reduce or replace planned fossil-fueled generators at the Afghanistan National Security University and its supporting facilities located in Qargha, Kabul, Afghanistan. USACE documented its findings in a report released in June 2009.

- **A Qualitative Study of Energy Reduction Opportunities and Indoor Air Quality Improvements in Facilities in an Expeditionary Theater.** A study conducted by ERDC CERL that addressed opportunities to reduce energy consumption and improve indoor air quality in harsh, austere, and hostile environments. The report from the study, released in July 2012 and based on lessons learned from recent deployments, addressed both supply and demand management recommendations from a qualitative perspective.

- **USACE Support to Contingency Base Energy Management, Lessons Learned.** HQUSACE asked ERDC CERL to compile lessons learned on operational energy in a contingency base camp environment. Included in the report are responses on phases of construction, what has worked or did not work, and recommendations for improvement. CERL documented its findings in a report released in August 2013.

- **Bagram Airfield Energy Surety and Energy Efficiency Improvement Study.** The Department of Energy conducted a comprehensive energy study of Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, identifying and implementing various energy efficiency and conservation measures released in September 2013.

- **Abbreviated Level I Energy Study of the New Kabul Compound, Kabul, Afghanistan.** The purpose of this USACE ERDC study was to conduct an abbreviated Level I energy study of New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan. It determined power and energy requirements across the compound, and recommendations for efficiency and conservation improvements/measures.
Operational Energy for Contingency Basecamps: Historical Perspective of Achievements, Areas Needing Improvement, and Recommendations for Future Campaigns. The purpose of this USACE ERDC study is to capture information and analyses on operational energy for contingency basing in the active Afghanistan Combined/Joint Operations Area, Afghanistan, and to identify and recommend best practices and lessons learned across the DOD and theater commands which advance operational energy/contingency basecamps to the next level of power, water, and energy efficiencies.
Chapter 10

Capacity Development

Introduction

This chapter provides general guidance and considerations for capacity development during operations supported by the contingency engineer district (CED) and division. It addresses capacity development relating to contingency project delivery, interaction with local nationals and capacity development effects on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The Department of State (DOS) and/or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) traditionally conduct capacity development in foreign nations. During recent contingency reconstruction operations, the CED became an agent for capacity development as well.

1. Capacity Development — USACE Definition

Enduring Lesson

“Capacity development is fundamental to effective governance, capability enhancement, enhanced ownership, and successful program and project sustainability.”

— MG Michael Eyre, Transatlantic Division Commander

Capacity Development is the building of human, institutional and infrastructure capacity to help societies develop secure, stable, and sustainable economies, governments, and other institutions through mentoring, training, education, and physical projects, the infusion of financial and other resources, and most importantly, the motivation and inspiration of people to improve their lives.

— Definition authored by LTG Henry J. Hatch, USACE (Retired), published in Engineer Regulation 5-1-16, Capacity Development-International, Appendix A.
2. Capacity Development Essentials

2.1 Planning, Legal Authority, and Budgeting

Although the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) adopted the definition for capacity development in Engineer Regulation 5-1-16, *Capacity Development-International*, capacity development activities and levels change based on available legal authorities, conditions in the theater of operations, and the contingency district’s mission. The CED and division should view capacity development in three distinct phases:

1. Initial entry into the contingency theater
2. Sustainment operations
3. Close-out

**Host-Nation Conditions**

USACE may respond to a contingency in any area of the world. Host-nation (HN) conditions drive many factors, including capacity development requirements. A developing country likely lacks construction capacity and supporting institutions such as banking establishments, law enforcement, judicial systems, etc. Because the USACE business model typically works well in fully developed countries (e.g., Germany, Japan, Korea, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia), USACE staff experienced with work outside the continental United States often initially apply similar expectations in the contingency environment.

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<td>Rules, procedures, and thought processes from home districts may be ineffective in the contingency environment.</td>
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Even well-developed nations may not employ the same daily practices as USACE. To the extent authorized, the CED team must tailor a project’s processes to the HN, remembering that the best or most skilled contractor may not understand USACE procedures and/or processes, and, therefore, may not win the project award.

**Legal Authority**

Capacity development efforts must always be legally authorized and funded; as the executing agent, USACE cannot create and fund capacity development efforts independently and without legal basis. Capacity development activities undertaken without proper authority risk being suddenly halted once discovered.
Planning

Capacity development planning involves defining the right level and approach for capacity development, providing sufficient time and funding to conduct capacity development activities, tracking performance, and measuring the outcomes over time. Planning must be coordinated with all key stakeholders and must always include the HN, which must assume and manage facilities, systems, and equipment at project handover.

*Operation Iraqi Freedom included a number of authorized capacity development initiatives, such as the Water Sector Sustainment Program. Major construction contracts contained requirements and incentives to facilitate transition through Iraqi workforce development, training, and employment.*

Funding

Subject to funding and specific legislative authority, a portion of the project’s funding should be set aside to ensure necessary capacity development. The U.S. government is responsible to ensure proper funding of contract work, rather than the contractor. The CED should maintain capacity development funding as a distinct element and both the contract statement of work and deliverables should address capacity development, if it applies. This separate identification helps the capacity development requirement stand out as budgets and schedules become stressed during the contract term.

Because the CED is project-funded, funding type affects the projects they support and what types of work may be completed. Strict fiscal limitations apply to military construction, foreign military sales, Commander’s Emergency Response Program, counter narcoterrorism, Global Peace Operations Initiative, and other funding types. The funding source and type determine an appropriation’s availability for capacity development.

*Enduring Lesson*

Capacity development efforts must be specifically authorized by law, and will almost always require separate funding that cannot be commingled with dedicated project funds.

2.2 Special Considerations

Work in the contingency environment requires close coordination with the combatant commander, other military partners, DOS, USAID, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and HN ministries/authorities for timely construction execution, and to avoid project duplication/redundancy. Table 10-1 shows a partial list of capacity development considerations, not all of which may relate to a specific project or program.
Table 10-1. Capacity development considerations (partial list)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
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<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Organizational processes</td>
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<td>Governance</td>
<td>Personal behavior</td>
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<td>Institutions</td>
<td>Personal skills</td>
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<td>Labor pool</td>
<td>Physical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Stakeholder processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social norms</td>
<td>Support infrastructure</td>
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2.3 Customer Expectations

Understanding standard customer expectations helps clarify USACE’s relationship with traditional capacity development partners. Customers expect USACE will:

- Deliver the requested project on time and within design standards and the established budget.
- Overcome culture and language barriers to ensure successful competition.

**Enduring Lesson**

Frustration and friction occur when USACE cannot meet the customer’s needs with the local skills and resources available, and when the customer cannot or will not fund the required training and mentoring.

The capacity-building conflict occurs when the customer’s requirements do no match the HN’s or other service recipients’ abilities. An example of this occurs when adequate skilled contractors and/or labor are unavailable to complete a project and the customer will not alleviate these shortfalls with additional funding. To avoid this conflict, USACE must set customer expectations based on actual conditions and facts; USACE must understand the contractor’s abilities and project’s design standard while developing the project delivery package.

The CED or contingency division leadership must be willing to refuse projects that lack a good chance of successful delivery; it is preferable for USACE to decline a project than to accept it and fail to deliver. See Chapter 8, *Project and Program Management*, Appendix B, for more detailed information on this subject.
Enduring Lesson
Determine which projects would be more suitable as capacity development or training vehicles based on delivery timelines and project priority.

**Measuring Success**

Quantifying capacity development success is difficult and requires performance metrics to measure progress and identify trends. Values such as “number of successful local contractors” should increase over time. Long-term economic indicators such as “number of working quarries” or “permanent concrete batch plants in operation” could also indicate successful capacity development.

3. Capacity Development Roles

When successful project completion requires capacity development, USACE must alert and convince customers that up-front training will result in better probability for a successful and sustainable project, in spite of the additional time and funding that may be required.

Enduring Lesson
As early as possible, inform customers if a project may involve capacity development. For these projects, advise customers that up-front training in U.S. methods may ensure the best chances for long-term project success.

3.1 Contingency Engineer Division

Any USACE division may be called to support a combatant command during times of conflict. Defining capacity development responsibilities as an element of this support will depend on available legal authorities, the combatant command commander’s strategic and tactical goals, and the customer funding the project.

The contingency engineer division can become involved during any phase of a contingency, but will not expect to be fully functional until Phase IV (stabilize) (refer to Chapter 3, *USACE Contingency Elements: Mission, Organizations, and Operational Phases*, for more information). The division staff’s location affects its role in capacity development. The division carries out the regional business center’s responsibilities, focusing on policy making, operational planning and management, program management, relationships, and quality assurance (QA). It also emplaces appropriate quality control (QC) processes and systems within the region to meet partners’ and stakeholders’ expectations. The division’s capacity development roles and responsibilities include:

- Determining the most effective and appropriate manner to implement capacity development policy and guidance throughout the division’s area of operations
- Monitoring and evaluating capacity development activities
• Carrying out program-level capacity development planning and implementation

• Advocating for capacity development with customers and stakeholders

See Chapter 5, *Mission Command and the Contingency Division*, for details about the division’s involvement in the overall contingency operation.

### 3.2 The Contingency Engineer District

The CED locates in the area of responsibility and/or in a neighboring country depending on combatant commander’s requirements and the ability to access infrastructure, such as commercial power and airfields, among other items. As early as possible, USACE must inform customers if a potential project requires capacity development to ensure long-term success, including initial training for the customer or vendor in U.S. methods.

The CED works under the supporting contingency division and must execute all work the division’s regional business center assigns. If the CED supports large-scale stability operations missions in a mature theater, it may assist in developing capacity development requirements and providing technical support when requested. Subject to legislative authority and available funding, the CED’s capacity development roles and responsibilities may include:

• Advocating for capacity development with customers and stakeholders

• Conducting capacity development planning and implementation at the program and project levels

• Conducting district QA/QC of capacity development work

### 4. Strategic Relationships

When establishing the CED, USACE must consider the theater’s operational goals, such as COIN and/or nation building. The strategic relationships involved with the USACE mission and capacity development potentially involve many offices and institutions, including senior HN officials, senior U.S. Embassy officials, local tribal leaders, and civilian agencies (e.g., USAID).

#### Enduring Lesson

Strategic relationships enable USACE to communicate its capabilities and skills in relation to customer and battlespace-owner goals and objectives.

### 4.1 Customer and Non-Military Relationships

Successful customer relationships include setting realistic expectations while delivering a customer’s project. This communication also serves as a forum to raise implementation issues and to achieve solutions. The CED may also communicate with NGOs to clarify the district’s potential projects or programs. To the extent authorized, the district concurrently may assist the NGO with time and resources for training local persons in construction trades and project management. USACE may find itself as the construction and capacity development integrator because of its knowledge and experience in both.
Coordinating among key USACE customers and partners while establishing the USACE organization’s plans and procedures helps ensure:

- Synchronization of basic capacity development concepts, methods, and framework
- Clarification of USACE’s capacity development roles and responsibilities with external customers and partners
- Identification and consideration of lessons learned and other customer or partner input
- Customer satisfaction with the USACE capacity development business practice
- Successful implementation of capacity development throughout USACE programs or projects

The contingency division may assist the executing CED by remaining engaged with its non-military customers (e.g., DOS, USAID) during the early programming phase to ensure proper authorities exist and adequate funds are requested. These customers and the HN may not be aware that USACE customers must fund certain costs, such as shipping by U.S.-flagged vessels, port handling charges, Defense Base Act insurance, and many other regulations and statutes associated with contingency construction.

4.2 Relationships with Military Units

The CED has unique relationships with military customers and in-theater military units. Military customers may not be in the district’s chain of command or may have competing priorities, which could change with operational priorities within the area of responsibility.

Understanding USACE’s capabilities allows maneuver commanders to effectively request the support they need. Otherwise, a commander unfamiliar with USACE may not understand how to leverage USACE competencies and skills, potentially affecting the supporting operation’s capacity development work. In turn, this lack of understanding may ultimately degrade USACE objectives, such as project delivery and customer satisfaction.

Commanders can also task and fund USACE to perform authorized capacity development activities, such as contractor open house sessions or trade school information sessions. It is important to note that such activity is also subject to standards of conduct applicable to USACE personnel and organizations. When properly conducted, these activities support the U.S. military’s mission by leveraging USACE skills without drawing on military units and teams to perform these functions.

USACE entities in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom established several authorized training and education programs for local labor forces. USACE projects, in turn, benefit from these training programs which can be leveraged for needed construction services, such as plumbing and carpentry (see Figure 10-1). In several cases, these programs were executed locally and funded by Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds. In all cases, specific authority and funding is required before providing capacity development support.
Military Relationships Between Contingencies

Between contingencies, USACE district and division planners and commanders must regularly communicate with the military units they support, articulating USACE’s capabilities as a force multiplier to COIN or nation-building responses. Potential assets USACE may provide include field force engineering, technical reachback, and forward engineer support team (FEST)/contingency real estate support team/environmental support team support and deployment.

Additional support may be in the form of engineer intelligence preparation of the battlefield, discussed further in Chapter 11, *Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence*

Military Relationships Early in the Contingency

During the initial CED standup, the FEST team, advanced echelon team, or other first-responding entity will depend on strategic relationships with the combatant commanders. The CED works with military units tasked with training, mentoring, and security. Some units have engineering capability and can establish base camps, reconnoiter sites, and conduct basic field engineering missions typically associated with military operations. The CED should understand the leverage that these military units can provide in working locally on authorized training and mentorship programs for tradesmen and contractors.

5. Capacity Development Throughout the Project Life Cycle

Capacity development efforts will change based on the project, delivery schedule, and even among projects with the same customer. USACE can begin capacity development support at the initial project development meeting with the customer and should include capacity development in discussion of project objectives (see Figure 10-2).
The USACE project manager must examine factors affecting the required capacity development before the project begins or the project’s chances of failure increase. The project manager must communicate potential capacity development issues to the customer and the program manager, and resolve conflicts before they interfere with project success. Some factors to consider include:

- Authority and funding available
- Contracting and/or procurement methodology
- Project safety standards
- Methods of QA and QC used for formal project acceptance
• The HN’s facility sustainment plan, including post-transition support in project management, operations, and maintenance

• Understanding and communicating the project measures of success among stakeholders

• Understanding which technical and engineering aspects must be built first, and whether the contractor can likely accomplish these initial tasks

• Requirements to bolster the local workforce’s knowledge, skills, and abilities

• Required strengthening of the HN’s institutional and educational capacity

Customers and stakeholders may request or expect USACE’s involvement in capacity development efforts during the project’s initiation and planning phases, which varies with each program and project. USACE does not set policy or unilaterally decide the extent to which capacity development will be employed on specific customer programs or projects. A USACE customer, another leading stakeholder, or an HN may determine that capacity development is not necessary or appropriate in a given situation. Considering capacity development during the primary or secondary mission analysis can potentially affect USACE’s mission acceptance and execution. In all cases, USACE must document its input to the stakeholder team, including the HN or service recipient.

6. Contracting and Capacity Development

Project stakeholder identification of capacity development requirements may affect the contracting methodology, project delivery schedule, the use of subcontractors, and the use and funding of skilled or unskilled labor. Common contracting and procurement methods may change based on the contingency environment, including whether fixed-price contracts versus cost contracts are more advantageous to the government.

A contractor’s performance work statement should include capturing and reporting capacity development efforts. This data helps stakeholders and USACE gauge the capacity development success and determine if there are enough current local resources to provide operations and maintenance support.

Local National Versus Other Construction Firms

During acquisition planning, CEDs must decide whether to use U.S. or other international construction firms. While USACE may require these more skilled firms during initial contingency phases, the HN may view their long-term use as detracting from the economic benefit to the region. Subject to applicable legal authority, including acquisition law and regulations, the district should consider phasing out non-local firms in favor of local businesses to allow building capacity through experience and mentorship.

In 2008, most Afghan firms were not capable of acting as prime contractors. Through capacity development opportunities, local firms gained expertise as subcontractors, resulting in 150 unique Afghan firms eventually operating as prime USACE contractors.
7. Capacity Development in Real Estate, Environment, Business Practices, and Safety

7.1 Real Estate

Cultural, political, and legal differences between U.S. government personnel and the HN will likely create issues in real estate acquisition and protection of the environment. In both areas, contractors, builders, and customers may need education to understand the required processes and the timelines for clear title ownership and/or lease arrangements. This education and training is also a capacity development-type function.

USACE is typically responsible for determining property ownership, which can be problematic in areas where legal, governmental, and other civil-societal organizations are still developing. Deployed real estate personnel may need to work with and instruct local tribes, villages, and HN representatives in U.S. property standards and requirements for clear land titles. In many places, property ownership standards differ from U.S. standards, causing many execution problems with land titles, including the risk of duplicate or erroneous payments. For more information on real estate in the contingency environment, see Chapter 9, Supporting Missions: Real Estate, Environment, and Energy.

7.2 Environmental Issues

The USACE environmental standard in the United States is typically to leave areas in better environmental condition than at the onset of a program or project. In a contingency environment, this standard may cause difficulties for contractors unfamiliar with U.S. environmental principles. An initial site inspection and ongoing progress inspections should always be performed to help ascertain any environmental issues present during construction, which allows mitigation before turning over the project to the customer.

7.3 Financial Issues

Cultural differences also affect how HNs perceive the purpose or utility of a banking system, use of credit, and the value of schedules and planning efforts. These differences can dramatically affect a local firm’s ability to successfully complete a project. CED personnel must work diligently to overcome, or at least reduce, the effect of these cultural differences.

7.4 Safety Issues

Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards are U.S.-based, but must be followed for project work in the contingency environment. Developing countries typically do not require comparable worker safety standards, which creates training and education requirements. Ensuring that adequate worker protection and safety standards are followed requires continual oversight, especially in regions where worker safety is not a cultural norm. In addition, contractors may not report accidents (even fatalities) and may not understand the use of Defense Base Act Insurance to provide compensation if injuries occur.
8. Quality Assurance Issues

Teaching and mentoring local nationals to meet appropriate building standards is also a type of capacity development (see Figure 10-3). Project managers should evaluate these standards in terms of project failure risk and the project objectives. After receiving proper authorization through the office of counsel and appropriate funding, some types of QA/QC capacity development that the CED may consider include:

- Creating a formal local national QA/QC training program
- Working with engineer candidates from HN military training academies
- Donating academic materials to local university engineering programs
- Hosting open house events with the local contractor community

Site Inspections

The security environment and project location may further complicate QA/QC by limiting USACE’s ability to conduct site inspections. Site inspectors experience extreme difficulty identifying quality issues early and directing timely corrective action without regular project visits, resulting in rejecting the work performed and needing to closely mentor the contractor during rework.
Strengthening Education

USACE may support and influence a HN long term by strengthening institutional and educational capacity in engineering and construction management, which is especially true in areas with higher learning institutions associated with U.S. universities that teach these topics. USACE staff may be able to teach sessions or seminars at local institutions if the security situation allows, funding is available, and the program is legally authorized.

For example, in 2008, staff at the Afghanistan Engineer District worked with continental United States (CONUS) districts to supply engineering textbooks to Kabul University. One area officer in charge taught a seminar about heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems at a trade school near his location. Specific ethics rules apply in each situation; before participating in such activities, USACE personnel should consult with the office of counsel.

9. Project Sustainment

The district staff must consider how the customer or user will sustain a facility after project turnover. Depending on customer or user requirements, USACE may train and mentor local national personnel in sustainment functions. In CONUS, the Installation Management Command normally operates and maintains a facility without further USACE involvement. If the Installation Management Command or another appropriate entity does not have a deployed team available, USACE and the customer should consider facility sustainment in the initial project development stages with resulting roles and responsibilities defined in the project package.

Enduring Lesson

Developing nations require time and training to meet U.S. construction standards.

The customer should understand that USACE considers likely project outcomes when authorizing and accepting projects. Customers should also understand that while investing in capacity development early typically increases project costs, it also creates benefits over time. These benefits may include eventual cost savings because of more efficient resource use and available, less-costly, skilled labor.

10. Leveraging Indigenous Resources

Supporting district operations with indigenous resources (including local personnel), supplies, and equipment can benefit both the HN and the CED while concurrently contributing to capacity development. Whenever legally possible and practicable, use of products available locally or within the surrounding countries is specified. Otherwise, HNs may feel little ownership toward the project and may discard it when it requires repair or replacement.
Understanding the local conditions, using the correct contract methodology, and setting reasonable customer expectations can mitigate difficulties associated with using indigenous resources. Some factors to consider include the following:

- Contingency operation maturity
- Potential to import labor
- Local population education levels
- Existing infrastructure, including haul routes
- Availability of materials testing laboratories
- Availability of local supplies and equipment

Capacity development supporting a specific program may bolster the HN’s capabilities to successfully execute other programs. For example, management training translates to a variety of settings and gives local nationals the ability to train others in the HN.

### 10.1 Capacity Development in Initial Contingency Stages

The USACE staff should anticipate that initial operations will demand greater capacity development activities. Building local firms’ internal capabilities may take years in poorly developed nations, and their progress may not coincide with operational necessity or the contingency operational periods. In addition, project demands may require new or additional local national firms over time and the education process may need to start again.

In a contingency’s early stages, the CED may determine that only a U.S. firm or firms from other developed countries can perform to contract specifications and other applicable standards. As the operation matures, local firms may develop enough to begin winning contracts and complete quality products. If this occurs, as the end of an operation approaches, local firms may have learned enough about USACE contracting and construction means and methods to assume the remaining contracts and complete quality projects. A fully functioning USACE contractor can do the following:

- Bid on projects at the beginning of the contingency operation.
- Write a technically sound proposal and prepare a resource-loaded schedule.
- Successfully staff the project from beginning through closeout.
- Help with local contractor capacity development and mentorship.

Subject to the authorized acquisition process, USACE may wish to initially compete operations and maintenance projects among only local national firms. Because a newly completed facility will likely have relatively few maintenance issues, it will allow time to train locals on the traditional trades while building contractor skills.
Knowledge of local capabilities will help guide USACE program managers in considering whether it is in the government’s best interest to perform capacity development work in house, recommend other stakeholders to perform the work, or include it in contracts to the extent authorized. USACE may develop or update written agreements, allowing USACE to rapidly activate and fund capacity development initiatives conducted by these entities.

10.2 Enhancing Capacity Development Through Procurement Strategy

Avoiding Over-Commitment

Sometimes, skilled local contractors winning simultaneous multiple contracts leads to over-committing their skilled managers, resulting in poor project performance. Project scope may also affect the local contractor’s ability to complete projects; awarding numerous smaller projects to several contractors may be more efficacious than letting a single large one to a local contractor.

The risk of over-awarding to a single contractor is further compounded if multiple reachback districts assist with pre-award actions. Keeping multiple entities continually apprised of source selection sensitive information on many different acquisitions is not only extremely difficult but can raise procurement integrity concerns.

Maximizing Competition

District leaders must weigh many factors in procuring the work, including maximizing competition. USACE will sometimes broadly define “engineering skills” when evaluating local national offerors or bidders on a particular acquisition. Capacity development may focus on construction training because the project outcome depends primarily on actual construction; however, the contractor may also require capacity development training in project management or fiscal and contracting skills. The project manager must balance these needs given the project resources and restraints to best satisfy customer and mission requirements.

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<td>Project scope may affect the local contractor’s ability to complete projects; letting numerous smaller projects may be better than letting a single large one to a local firm.</td>
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Competition for project bids may create conflict between local contractors. The CED’s award decisions may affect regional or tribal alliances, which, in turn, may affect project delivery. The project manager may not grasp the complex dynamics among local groups, sometimes resulting in unexpected consequences. For example, local villages or tribes may not cooperate with labor imported from another region, resulting in tribal conflict, project vandalism, supply theft, or threats of harm. A project manager may favor using local labor because it would garner project support and benefit the local economy; however, lacking a trained labor force may lead to project delays and negatively affect that local support and jeopardize project success.
11. Enduring Contingency Responsibilities

Many developing nations require post-transition support to ensure facilities last and satisfy the customer long term. The CED should develop a standard process to turn over facilities at the contingency’s end. The HN’s culture and construction experience may complicate turnover if it does not value maintenance or has little experience with modern facilities. Most customers do not fund maintenance after project acceptance and turnover, potentially risking facility failure without funds for USACE to assist.

USACE presence in a country and committing funds for projects will, of its own accord, affect the local economy. The CED leadership must work closely with customers, battlespace owners, and other construction stakeholders to gain the best value, use funds effectively, and minimize conflict.

References


Engineer Publication 5-1-1, Capacity Development-International, 30 JUN 2009.

Engineer Regulation 5-1-16, Capacity Development-International, 30 JUN 2009.

Chapter 11

Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence

Introduction

This chapter and Chapter 12, Conflict-Related Requirements: Sustainment and Information Technology, describe the missions the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) must accomplish in a combat or nonpermissive contingency environment. A nonpermissive operational environment is one in which the host-nation (HN) military and law enforcement agencies do not have control, capability, or intent to assist in the operations a unit intends to conduct (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0, Joint Operations). These missions involve integrating and adapting the USACE organization into the military environment. Operational planning must include the integration of functional areas, with personnel having the appropriate skill sets in the following areas:

- Operations:
  - Interface with the joint task force (JTF)
  - Security services contracting officer representative (COR)
  - Force protection (FP), including mobile and static security
  - Tactical communication
  - Intelligence
  - Training
  - Command security management
  - Personnel recovery

- Sustainment

- Information management

In the contingency engineer district (CED) the deputy district commander and the headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD) commander oversee these functions to allow the district commander to focus on the core construction mission.
1. District Operations (S-3)

1.1 Responsibilities

The district operations officer oversees FP (including static and mobile security), training, command security management, tactical communications, and intelligence (see Figure 11-1) for the district. The S-3 also interacts with the JTF operations office, receives battlefield updates, responds to JTF operation orders, and communicates information from the task force to the USACE command as needed. The S-3 issues operation orders for the command, oversees any required training, and responds to critical incidents and enemy contact.

![Figure 11-1. Primary operations functions in the USACE contingency environment](image)

The CED commander or deputy commander decides how to align intelligence (S-2) functions with the operations office. In some cases, one individual may act as both the S-2 and the S-3 and assumes responsibility for both offices. Alternately, the CED command may separate the S-2 and S-3 sections that report directly to the deputy or HHD commander. Finally, the S-3 may oversee the intelligence function along with other operational duties. In this case, the S-3 supervises the S-2 and remains ultimately responsible for S-2 functions. Details about the intelligence function are included later in this chapter.

While the CED’s construction personnel engage with customers and other stakeholders, the S-3 engages with the military JTF and with the higher USACE headquarters. As a result, the CED interfaces with two commanders. Depending on the task force configuration, the JTF command representative could be a local operational area commander, a member of the JTF staff, or...
another individual. Although this command interface requires many different duties, two main
duties include issuing and receiving orders and transmitting the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs).

1.2 Operations Requirements from the Joint Task Force

The JTF issues daily fragmentary orders giving direction in all aspects of its mission. The CED
S-3 section must analyze these orders to determine if and how they may apply to USACE and
then respond accordingly. The S-3 also reports to the JTF any information meeting the higher
command’s reporting criteria, including serious incident reports, significant activity reports, and
the CCIRs.

Both the JTF and the USACE higher headquarters commanders issue CCIR criteria, outlining
information critically required for operations. When an incident occurs meeting the criteria,
S-3 personnel must submit this information through the appropriate channels within the time
required. Often, CCIRs require an initial response immediately upon the event occurrence, which
may be the case for death or serious injury of a unit member, enemy contact, or other event for
which the commander requires immediate reporting.

1.3 USACE Operations Offices Versus Other Military Operations Offices

The CED S-3 operations section differs from most other military operations offices in several
ways. First, because most personnel in the CED are civilian, the S-3 must assume their combat
skills are limited, and that most personnel have little tactical training or understanding. These
same individuals may be moving through combat areas to inspect project sites and conduct key
leader engagements. The S-3 must ensure their protection, while being mindful of their limited
military experience. Second, the USACE S-3 is generally not engaged in or responsible for the
core mission, which falls under the deputy for program and project management and the chief of
engineering and construction. The operations office is not involved in any project management,
design, or construction work, and rarely engages with key project stakeholders. Finally, USACE
conducts all required personnel training before deployment, reducing the CED S-3’s training to
only specified in-theater tasks.

1.4 Force Protection

FP endeavors to prevent unnecessary loss of friendly capabilities to accident, disease, or enemy
action. FP methods are either mobile, involving moving personnel from and through unsecure
or hostile areas, or static, involving securing fixed facilities. A variety of military and contracted
sources can provide FP capabilities. The CED S-3 may assign a single FP officer responsible for
both categories, though depth in this position is required for continuous operations.

Mobile Security

Providing construction oversight in a combat zone involves risk to personnel. Moving safely
from forward operating bases (FOBs) to project sites requires detailed, integrated planning with
the operational area commanders, appropriate equipment and personnel, and accurate, timely
intelligence. USACE often requires fixed- and rotary-wing air transport in addition to ground
movement.
USACE personnel require protected movement during any travel from an unsecure area (such as the traditional rear area, or a secure FOB) to an unsecure area where enemy contact is more likely. USACE elements should travel in unsecure areas with the same protection as service members, which may include crew-served weapon systems, armored vehicles, and tactical communications and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment to block radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (see Figure 11-2). As an exception, leadership may deliberately decide that blending in with the local population is safer than conventional protection measures, assuming theater policies allow flexibility on FP posture and equipment.

Figure 11-2. USACE mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles return from a mission in southern Afghanistan

USACE lacked the organic equipment and appropriate personnel to protect its facilities or conduct movement in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) did not provide military units for security at times. USACE instead contracted private security companies that were expensive and caused significant challenges.

Types of Mobile Security

USACE potentially employs protection from three sources: U.S. or coalition military forces, private security companies, and the HN. While each has its strengths and weaknesses, the preferred security source is military alignment and protection with traditional U.S. Armed Forces. The CED S-3 must anticipate employing all three, combinations thereof, and rapid adjustments caused by changes in the threat, retasking of military units, contract modification, or status of forces agreements (SOFAs).
1. Military Security

USACE has several avenues to receive and request military security. Ideally, DOD will align the force structure to provide USACE protection in future contingencies. Operation plans requiring or anticipating the employment of a CED must include security capabilities in the plan’s time-phased force and deployment list or request for forces (RFF). USACE submits a RFF for units (i.e., an infantry company or military police platoon) or individuals (i.e., 43 x 11B, E1-E5; 8 x 11B, E6) and must specify active duty or reserve component.

Regardless of the protection methods, operational area commanders must be aware of USACE’s mission and presence, requiring significant peacetime communication and training. As soon as possible, USACE must embed a liaison officer with the major U.S. theater command. The liaison officer should be a senior Department of Army (DA) Civilian with military background or senior field grade officer with USACE contingency experience.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE must communicate, plan, and train with its military combatant command partners in peacetime to ensure it is included in combatant command-level operations plans.

While preferred, military security has several drawbacks, including inflexibility, the draw on overall forces, and logistics requirements. The DOD may require 9 to 12 months to fill an RFF. This time requirement may not offer the flexibility USACE needs as it expands and contracts to meet changing project loads. Second, USACE’s use of military forces detracts from combat power committed in a theater that may be limited by a troop cap or SOFA. Finally, military forces require sustainment; USACE may need to provide billeting, vehicles, weapons, communications, computers, and any items required but not available to the unit or individuals when they arrive in theater.

2. Private Security Companies

If military forces are not available, USACE may look to fulfill its FP requirements by using a private security contractor (PSC), if permitted by U.S. and HN law (see Figure 11-3). USACE successfully contracted PSCs extensively in both OIF and OEF. While security contractors offered some advantages, including personnel longevity in theater and flexibility, their use also introduced some disadvantages.

**Enduring Lesson**

When employing private security contractors, a dedicated (full-time), in-theater contracting officer representative is necessary to oversee the contract.
Although Soldiers are required to follow all legal orders, a security contractor is only required to fulfill obligations within the contract’s scope of work. This situation presents potentially serious issues when orders given to local military members conflict with actions the contractor must perform under the terms of his contract. Orders, theater policies, rules of engagement, law of war, SOFAs, HN laws and customs, property accountability and maintenance and standards for military conduct should be included in every security contract. These contracts require intensive management by a team of military and civilian project/contract management personnel under the CED S-3. Because contractors are often non-U.S. citizens, collecting and releasing intelligence to them also becomes problematic. Most contractors do not possess a security clearance, preventing them full access to intelligence collected on the battlefield.

The use of PSCs is politically sensitive. The HN may dislike their use or even disallow PSCs entirely. Oversight of the PSC requires strong leadership, a military staff trained in contract requirements, and full understanding of the limits to CORs’ authority. The CED should take two actions to mitigate potential adverse incidents involving their PSCs:
1. The security services contract should have a dedicated, full-time 1102 administrative contracting officer, co-located in theater with the CED staff with extensive service contract experience. The COR and administrative contracting officer together ensure the contracted security teams operate within the parameters of the performance work statement (PWS). The S-3 should oversee the COR, ensuring a clear line of authority for security operations. The COR position requires a strong individual with experience in combat operations. The COR should also receive extensive training on the specific contract and contractual requirements before assuming office. The COR is also responsible for understanding the contractor’s quality control program and preparing and administering USACE’s quality assurance program.

2. USACE must select the private security contractor carefully. Typically, the contractor is selected based on the best value acquisition procedure, rather than lowest price, because the PSC must protect personnel in life-threatening situations. The need to adequately oversee and prepare accurate, supportable contractor performance evaluations by the COR and administrative contracting officer are critical to ensuring sound future source selections.

### Enduring Lesson

Contracting for security requirements places extremely sensitive responsibilities on personnel outside of direct military command.

Before soliciting contracting services, the CED should ensure the soliciting agency possesses the required expertise. If the readily available contracting sources are untrained, the CED should seek out an agency with appropriate competence, such as the contracting service for the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, or Department of Justice (which oversees the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation). Security services contracts are nuanced, expensive, politically sensitive, and demand appropriate administration and oversight. The CED should expect external audits from multiple agencies because of the cost and sensitivity of these contracts.

Be aware of contractual limitations when using contracted security. While contract security allows commanders to focus on projects, it can impose limitations, such as when the security contractor disagrees with district leadership on security risks.

USACE experienced considerable difficulty during OIF and OEF identifying a contracting entity with sufficient experience in security services contracts. While USACE can potentially manage these strategic and sensitive service contracts internally, procuring and administering them consumes valuable contract administration resources. In addition, USACE does not possess extensive training on these contract types. USACE may use the combatant command (CCMD) contracting officer to conduct the PSC procurement and the Defense Contract Management Agency for contract administration. Funding for PSCs varies depending on many factors. Initially, overseas contingency operations funding covered costs for PSCs, while at other times, security costs were added to the project budget. Contingency commanders must be aware that security services contracts are expensive, and may significantly increase project costs.
USACE must develop an appropriate PWS for security contracts. In addition to fluency in English, PSCs must adhere to uniform standards for vehicle operation, equipment use, weapons use, safety, and personal conduct. The CED should train in peacetime with a PSC, or employ a surrogate PSC during training exercises to familiarize both USACE and PSC personnel with each other, including contractual and oversight complexities. This training can be table-top exercises or full-scale rehearsals that “load tests” the PWS in a low-cost event. Additionally, USACE security CORs should participate in ASCC or CCMD exercises to familiarize the commands with the cost, complexity, and sensitivity PSCs bring.

**Enduring Lesson**

Private security company contract success depends on an effectively written performance work statement. All stakeholders (program management, operations, intelligence, legal, logistics, and contracting) should participate in its creation.

Some items to include in the PWS are:

- If permitted by fiscal and contract laws and policies, such as those dealing with vehicle leases, the security services contract may require the contractor to provide up-armored vehicles and related maintenance. Separating the security services contract from the transportation contract creates potential service gaps between the two interrelated operations. For nonpermissive environments, appropriate vehicle selection is vital, and special fiscal and contract rules apply when leasing vehicles. The CED can prepare in peacetime environments by identifying vehicle requirements and sources to simplify their acquisition once the contingency begins. Contractor mission planners must possess a U.S. security clearance to access the necessary intelligence. One consideration to make is the number of U.S. citizens with security clearances the contract requires. Many communications and information technology (IT) operating systems require U.S. personnel presence because of security or classification considerations.

- The security services contract must have appropriate leadership oversight to monitor the teams and conduct thorough mission planning. Preferably, the security services contract leadership should possess contingency military experience.

- Required logistical items are included such as uniforms, weapons, and body armor, in the base bid to avoid additional unexpected charges. Vehicle alternators must provide appropriate amperage to power tactical communications systems.

- If aviation assets are included, aircraft must receive the required certifications (DOD Instruction 4500.53, DOD Commercial Air Transportation Quality and Safety Review Program), maintenance, fuel, hangar, ramp space, and insurance.

- When contingency environment contracts require the contracting agency to provide life support to contracted personnel, the COR usually coordinates a letter of authorization. Such support is usually coordinated using a letter of authorization through the theater command.
3. Host Nation-Provided Security

USACE must carefully monitor and control any situation where the HN provides security using HN security forces or contracted HN or local national citizens. Confidence in HN-provided security is a function of training, trust, competence, and experience. Appropriate vetting of HN personnel is critical. As in all reconstruction efforts, USACE performs a large role in HN security development by modeling fair and competent administration while integrating their capabilities.

Static Security

Static security involves passive protection measures, including:

- Reinforcing structures against enemy attack
- Ensuring appropriate personnel battlefield readiness posture
- Protecting against on-FOB criminal activity
- Using cipher locks on work spaces
- Appropriately training deployed personnel in incident response
- Using closed circuit video or other persistent surveillance systems

Protecting People in Structures

The FP staff must ensure billeting and office space is properly reinforced and protected against enemy attack. Protection may include sandbag reinforcement, concrete bunkers, T-wall barriers, or any other physical devices to shield personnel from indirect fire, blasts, or expected enemy attack methods. The JTF or theater command may have published FP standards for occupied buildings and required materials may be readily available. FP risks are greater in less mature theaters because threats are less known and protection resources are fewer. These cases require active and deliberate consideration from the S-3 to ensure best possible safety for personnel.

Personal Protective Equipment

USACE personnel on the battlefield must always wear appropriate personal protection equipment (see Figure 11-4). Determining the appropriate battlefield posture is a command decision with which USACE military and civilian personnel must comply. Gear includes ballistic protective eyewear, hearing protection, flame-resistant coveralls and gloves, body armor, and helmets. All personnel must remain vigilant, wearing and maintaining equipment in a high state of readiness, and wearing it when directed. Complacency tends to increase the longer a deployed member remains in-theater safely, requiring discipline and leadership to ensure personnel continue to appropriately use all personal protection equipment while travelling outside the FOB. USACE assets and organizations are normally under the tactical control of the senior Army headquarters in a contingency operation and must adhere to its published FP standards.
Enduring Lesson

Determining appropriate battlefield protection posture is a command decision. USACE operations personnel should periodically check the equipment of those leaving the forward operating base for compliance.

Figure 11-4. U.S. Army Chief of Engineers and USACE Commanding General LTG Thomas Bostick, adjusts his personal protective gear in preparation for travel across northern Afghanistan at Bagram Air Field.
Crime Prevention

Criminal activity against USACE personnel and property may be a more potent threat than enemy activity in a mature theater. Safeguarding USACE camps against criminal activity may involve employing a static guard force, interfacing with the base provost marshal’s office and mayor cell, and encouraging the team to remain diligent and situationally aware. The command may require all personnel to travel in pairs. FP personnel should monitor base and HN crime reports and institute appropriate protection measures.

Protecting Personnel Through Training

The CED command must perpetually guard against on-FOB personnel becoming complacent and overly confident in their safety. The command and the operations staff should periodically evaluate if base-specific training is adequate for reaction to indirect fire, direct fire, insider attack, or active shooter; casualty evacuation; responding to natural emergencies (such as a sandstorm or tornado); and acquiring 100-percent personnel accountability.

Enduring Lesson

Personnel on forward operating bases may become complacent about security. They may require reminders about imminent threats surrounding the forward operating bases and training in emergency situation response.

Command Security Management

The CED’s command security manager ensures classified information is appropriately safeguarded. Among other responsibilities, this includes ensuring CED personnel are cleared to receive information at the necessary classification level, ensuring classified areas are built and maintained at DOD standards, and enforcing operational security (OPSEC).

Antiterrorism and Force Protection

While DOD physical security standards in mature areas (such as the continental United States [CONUS]) are clearly defined, appropriate security in the contingency environment depends on many factors. Essentially, the JTF defines and enforces antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) standards for the theater, based on operational tempo, materials available, enemy activity, and the mission.

Sometimes, the command security manager may find the written, established standards for AT/FP are not possible to meet or enforce in the contingency environment. When facing a situation where regulatory compliance is not possible or seems operationally unwise, the command security manager must inform the commander, which then allows the commander to decide the appropriate course of action. The CED commander decides in what areas to accept risk.
When regulatory compliance is not possible or operationally unwise, the contingency engineer district commander decides the appropriate course of action and in which areas to accept risk.

Operational Security

OPSEC is an FP component involving safeguarding unclassified information. Although classified information requires specific handling, enforceable by law, OPSEC is the more general and fundamental protection of all information against those without a need to know, including discussion of nonclassified information, missions, personnel, movements, and construction information. It may also involve shredding or burning any approved for public release paper. Social media internet sites give all deployed personnel new opportunities to easily and inadvertently violate OPSEC policies. See Chapter 6, Unity of Effort and Stakeholder Engagement, for more information about social media.

Operational security was a constant concern in Iraq. USACE personnel varied travel schedules and routes to enhance movement security. Many Iraqi and third-country nationals worked for the Gulf Region Division as contractors, supporting the private security and reconstruction mission. While these individuals were thoroughly vetted, the nature of reconstruction operations and the mission of establishing partnerships with local nationals necessarily exposed some unit operations to risk.

1.5 Security Integration with Operational Area Commanders

The CED’s movement and security plan must fully integrate with the local tactical units and operational area commanders. Some elements to integrate include:

- **Intelligence.** The tactical unit or operational area commander generally possess much more robust intelligence abilities than the CED, and the CED must regularly obtain this information and integrate it into the risk management process. The CED also possesses information valuable to the operational area commanders because of its longevity in location and close integration with the HN. Intelligence helps the CED commander and operations officer determine if the mission should occur and what equipment and protection posture is appropriate. For example, USACE should visit certain projects in heavily armored vehicles such as a mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle, while other sites only require up-armored sport utility vehicles (SUVs). Intelligence may show that the risk of reaching some sites may warrant only visits from local nationals in unarmored vehicles that can easily blend into the environment. The CED should also assess the threat to determine route selection, unmanned aerial vehicle support, and the need for a possible military escort.
• **Avoiding kinetic operations.** The operational area commander must be aware of USACE’s movements to deconflict them with any planned kinetic military operations. Fratricide prevention is paramount to operations.

• **Incident management and response.** The operational area commander maintains awareness of friendly movements in the area of operations so they can respond to military contact with a quick reaction force or casualty evacuation, if necessary. The CED operations center must be connected at all times with the adjacent unit and higher headquarters for security and emergency response.

• **Communications.** The moving USACE element must always maintain communication with the operational area commander. Communications may be set up through a deliberate unsecured system such as the single channel/plain text system used in OIF or may require secure communications equipment, as in OEF. The tactical communications section of this chapter contains further details.

• **Electronic countermeasures.** If the CED operates in areas where threat forces employ radio-controlled improvised explosive devices, the operational area commander should supply the most recent ECM equipment. Acquiring systems for PSC use becomes more complex and requires the CED to follow established security protocols.

Reconstruction projects and personnel make soft targets that the enemy can attack to degrade or prevent progress. USACE’s security plans must align closely with maneuver forces to provide the best intelligence, requisite escorts, and risk mitigation. USACE personnel must closely coordinate all movements through nonpermissive environments with maneuver units. Establishing a subordinate S-3 office, or a reconstruction operations center (PSC involvement may not involve inherently governmental functions) can greatly improve integration with tactical forces and improve overall security.

### 1.6 Entering and Exiting the Operational Theater

The contingency division generally oversees personnel movement into and out of theater. During OIF and OEF, the division G-3 oversaw these duties by establishing the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) cell. All USACE personnel entering or exiting the theater traveled through the RSOI cell, unless departing by medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). The RSOI cell tracked, coordinated, and oversaw movement of all USACE military personnel, DA Civilians, and contractors into and out of Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan in the safest, most expedient and comfortable manner possible.

Because most personnel traveled by commercial air during OIF and OEF, the RSOI cell tracked USACE personnel, received them at the appropriate time and location, and acquired billeting until their movement onward to the duty location. The RSOI cell then coordinated their forward movement to the appropriate in-theater hub. The RSOI cell also handled non-medical emergency departures for USACE personnel. USACE should establish the RSOI cell at the closest safe transportation hub to the hostile area. Locating the RSOI cell close to, but not within, the combat zone enabled them to conduct duties efficiently without posing undo risk to assigned personnel.
1.7 Medical Evacuation Process

The RSOI cell does not manage MEDEVACs, nor monitor individual progress through the MEDEVAC system. Once admitted to an in-theater medical facility, medical personnel assume personnel accountability and manage any MEDEVACs, including coordinating for care, requesting aircraft, and transporting patients.

The supporting CED operations office reports any required MEDEVAC to the division. The deployed district monitors and oversees the individual’s progress until departure from theater (see Figure 11-5). During OIF and OEF, Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers stationed a supporting representative at the CCMD medical facility to liaise among the theater command, the home district, and the medical facility. This representative can also act as a patient advocate and interact with family members as needed.

![Figure 11-5. Medical evacuation process and accountability](image)

1.8 Tactical Communications

Moving safely in a hostile fire area demands effective tactical communications. Each vehicle must be able to communicate with other vehicles in the movement formation or serial, the USACE base, or the local military unit (most important).

*USACE’s in-theater communications system must be compatible with both military and civilian elements. Do not assume compatibility among services, agencies, or international allies.*

Each individually moving vehicle serial should have primary, secondary, and emergency means of communication. For instance, the primary means might be very high frequency (VHF) radio, the secondary might be satellite communications (SATCOM), and the emergency might be satellite phone. Other means could be Blue Force Tracker, cell phones, or high frequency radios. Before employing any tactical communications, the operations office must coordinate with the in-theater frequency manager to acquire radio frequencies for both USACE and its contractors.
Deployed military units will have organic communications equipment. If a U.S. military unit provides security for USACE in future contingencies, this support should already include appropriate tactical communications. However, if employing PSCs, USACE or the PSC may be required to obtain battlefield communications equipment.

**Enduring Lesson**

Tactical communications systems are expensive, and require time and expertise for design, procurement, installation, and maintenance.

In Afghanistan, the Transatlantic Division successfully teamed with the Navy Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division’s Special Communications Requirements Division of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to develop a communications package, including ECM, specific to up-armored SUVs. NAVAIR performed similar custom installations for United States Special Operations Command. NAVAIR contracted the actual assembly, installations, and maintenance of the communications packages.

Procuring radio systems is expensive. Often, radios installed in the vehicle cost more than the up-armored SUV itself. For example, the Transatlantic Division paid more than $10 million to design, procure, install, and maintain the radio systems in Afghanistan. Table 11-1 is an estimating matrix for deciding the number of required radios.

**Table 11-1. Estimating matrix for tactical radio procurement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Base stations per site (a)</th>
<th>Security teams per site (b)</th>
<th>Number of sites (c)</th>
<th>Total base stations (a) x (b)</th>
<th>Total mobile team (b) x (c) = (d)</th>
<th>Total systems requirements per team (d) x 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because USACE has a lower priority for fielding communication equipment through normal military channels, acquiring this capability before the contingency is essential to mission success. In addition, USACE may not be authorized to retain communication equipment purchased or acquired through contingency funds. Some questions to consider when acquiring tactical communications are:
• What radio system do the local commanders use?
  ○ Are military encryption and frequency hopping necessary?
  ○ What repair facilities are available?

• Will the radios need to function in an ECM environment? One consideration is whether both USACE and the operational area commanders will use electronic jammers. Otherwise, the USACE element could lose communications as it passes checkpoints, military convoys, or even during an incident as a quick reaction force arrives. NAVAIR and its contractors provided vital expertise designing systems to work in an ECM environment.

• How far will the teams travel from the base station? While standard VHF works for several miles, it is line-of-sight limited. Topography limits capability, and longer trips require high frequency or SATCOM capability.

Vehicles with electronic power demands are identified in advance. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, many vehicles required retrofitting with larger alternators and batteries to accommodate the ECW and the radio packages. Many communications subcomponents require long procurement times. Acquiring just the amplifiers, adaptors, and antennae could consume nine months, not including development and installation time. Expect it to take at least a year to have functional radios (from initiation to final installation).

Only U.S. personnel can legally use Type 1 encrypted military radios. These radios can become problematic because personnel employed by PSCs are often not U.S. citizens. USACE personnel may request an exception to this policy by submitting a communications security release request through the operational area commander and the appropriate CCMD to the Committee for National Security Systems. This process is time-consuming and requires strong justification.

2. Intelligence (S-2)

Intelligence within USACE provides timely, relevant, accurate, and synchronized information to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders in support of engineer operations. USACE intelligence analysis and production efforts are somewhat atypical of the traditional intelligence support function, which normally focuses on finding, targeting, and defeating the enemy. These differences are especially pronounced within a contingency operation where USACE intelligence efforts are more tailored to the organizational needs. These needs may include conducting engineer intelligence preparation of the battlefield, remote monitoring of project sites, and supporting the commander and project management team by identifying criminal and enemy threats or actions that could lead to potential project delays, cancellations, and above all, risk to USACE personnel.

To sustain current efforts and expand for future operations, USACE personnel must accurately understand the environment, terrain, political situation, terrorist or criminal threat, and major infrastructure nodes. By integrating intelligence into the daily battle rhythm, commanders can make informed decisions that can help satisfy critical information gaps and achieve mission success.
2.1 Identifying and Defining Priority Intelligence Requirements

In order to support USACE mission requirements, commanders must identify priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) — information about the enemy, environment, or situation that the commander must know that are critical to accomplishing the mission. PIRs may include:

- Enemy effectiveness, logistics, and morale
- Potential regional implications of specific events
- Critical infrastructure nodes
- General threats or terrorist posture
- Circumstances that could impede providing security, stability, and capacity development from an engineering perspective

**Enduring Lesson**

Commanders must identify priority intelligence requirements — information about the enemy, environment, or situation that the commander needs to achieve the mission.

Understanding the operating environment enables commanders to grasp ideologies and potential motivations of various groups, nations, and state actors. Intelligence personnel gain this knowledge through various collection methods and information searches on open and classified media sources. Intelligence helps clarify the overall area security and highlights political or social events the commander may need to understand to support engineering activities from start to finish.

**Information Requirements**

In addition to PIRs, the commander may also define information requirements (IRs), which are supporting information needs specific to a certain PIRs that further define the enemy or operating environment. These requirements may include information about enemy operating areas, critical infrastructure nodes, major water bodies, and the national or regional transportation capability. Once the commander identifies PIRs and IRs, the intelligence officer uses parameters to focus intelligence production efforts.

As an operation matures, intelligence specialists are able to more quickly identify information gaps and explain how activities relate to USACE’s mission, providing the commander situational awareness. Information the commander may want to know through PIRs may be a country or region’s critical infrastructure nodes, general threats or terrorist posture, and what circumstances could impede security, stability, and capacity development from an engineering perspective.

**Local Commanders’ Priority Intelligence Requirements**

USACE personnel’s experiences, exposures, and unique placement and access may add value to the greater U.S. and coalition effort. Understanding PIRs of the local commanders and providing insights and information to satisfy PIRs could allow USACE to contribute significantly to the
broader mission. Doing so, however, requires careful balancing; USACE must maintain its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its customers. USACE personnel should seek to satisfy non-USACE PIRs only in the normal course of their duties. When possible, USACE personnel, and certainly the J-2, G-2, and S-2 sections, should also socialize their own commander’s PIRs with local elements.

**Enduring Lesson**

USACE personnel, particularly those operating regularly in the field, should become familiar with the local tactical commander’s priority intelligence requirements.

2.2 Intelligence Support to the Contingency District and Division: Mission
Command and Project Management

Mission-based intelligence focuses on developing broad knowledge of the threat and creating various plans to support the contingency missions. Commanders must prioritize, focus, and surge intelligence assets to properly support mission operations. In nonpermissive areas with reliable global communications, USACE may receive full intelligence support through reachback. Additionally, depending on the availability of organic intelligence and the specific operating environment, deployed USACE elements may rely heavily on support from units and the JTF.

**Engineer Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**

Engineer intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic approach to analyzing the battlefield environment as it relates to engineer plans and operations. The intelligence team provides updates as the situation develops and tailors information to USACE personnel and ongoing engineer operations.

**Indications and Warnings**

USACE intelligence personnel also monitor indications and warnings in respective regions, which include country and area studies and cultural awareness information that may vitally affect engineering efforts. Traditionally, the J-2, G-2, and S-2 sections monitor emerging threats throughout their respective area of operations, including, but not limited to:

- Regional aggressions
- Ethnic, religious, and national rivalries
- International terrorism
- Drug-trafficking
- Organized crime

Predictive intelligence enables commanders and staff elements to anticipate future events or scenarios and quickly develop corresponding actions and reactions. Analysts specifically tailor predictive analysis to the commander’s PIRs and IRs. When conducted properly, predictive analysis drives the entire military decisionmaking process.
During a contingency operation, the commander may request engineer-focused intelligence for specific operations planning. For example, during OEF, intelligence analysts provided USACE customers upgrading the agricultural water supply with information about murabs, the key individuals controlling irrigation water allocation. Real estate records, irrigation maps, and information about local resources assisted with this endeavor.

**Enduring Lesson**

Analysts should produce intelligence with releasability in mind, developing information at the lowest possible classification level from the start of operations.

Analysts must always tailor intelligence support to the information consumer. For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will likely operate in multinational or coalition environments, potentially working with foreign military and personnel lacking security clearances altogether. Although this challenge is not USACE-unique, the CED may be more likely than other U.S. elements to employ foreign or local national contract security personnel. This reality presents obstacles that are not easily overcome because safeguarding classified or sensitive information is paramount. Because the ultimate end-user of intelligence may not be authorized to receive information of a certain classification or sensitivity, consideration is given to providing adequate intelligence support while continuing to maintain proper protocols for safeguarding classified or sensitive information.

Various software platforms help USACE intelligence analysts understand the environment and provide a common operating picture that multiple organizations can access for information.

**Geospatial Analysis**

Conducting geospatial analysis enables USACE elements and engineers to visualize the earth’s topography in relation to a potential project site or to aid in a natural disaster recovery. Maps and imagery also help project managers identify the physical location or landscape of a site during pre- and post-award and give the ability to remotely monitor the area through various construction phases. In many cases, this process can substantially help gauge progress (or lack thereof) when engineers or other personnel cannot conduct site visits.

**Enduring Lesson**

Geospatial information systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets help manage all phases of construction projects in austere environments.

Analysts can incorporate near real-time intelligence data to assist with remote project monitoring through imagery collection, terrain analysis, and visualization capabilities if grid coordinates are available for the project site. As with all intelligence requirements, requests for imagery and geospatial support and associated issues should be channeled and managed through the J-2, G-2, and S-2.
2.3 Intelligence and Knowledge Management

During a contingency operation, providing real-time intelligence support to deployed USACE elements may be difficult. Complicating factors may include accessibility of current and relevant information, the reliability of HN or open-source data, and the lack of repositories or archives containing this information. As a result, managing knowledge by systematically connecting people to information is critical to contingency operation success. Intelligence knowledge management enables an organization to:

- Communicate between offices by facilitating information flow
- Effectively respond to and track requests for information (RFIs)
- Develop and maintain document and presentation standards
- Establish product archives for future access

**Enduring Lesson**

Systematically connecting people to information (knowledge management) is critical to contingency operation success.

This practice enables an organization to share insights and experiences and to create processes to achieve objectives, improve performance, and provide reachback to forward-deployed personnel. Implementing intelligence analysis throughout the knowledge management cycle helps identify and interpret key information significance; establish trends, patterns, and relationships; and ultimately, form well-reasoned arguments.

2.4 Intelligence and Communications

Establishing an intelligence fusion center aids effective communication between CONUS and outside the continental United States intelligence personnel. An intelligence fusion center can leverage the broader intelligence community to tailor intelligence support to USACE needs. It can also collate and file large amounts of data while enabling multiple correspondence venues and information exchange at varying security levels.

Secure mission command measures allow intelligence analysts to receive data from various agencies and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Less formal, more tactical equipment is available for initial communications and setup; however, intelligence data and products must remain on the proper network to avoid classified information spillage. Additional hardware, such as video teleconferencing suites, provides other means to collaborate and help sustain information sharing.

2.5 Intelligence Cycle — Request for Information Management

The intelligence cycle is a requirements-driven process that begins with a decision-maker issuing a requirement (see Figure 11-6). The intelligence apparatus then collects, processes, and analyzes information, and finally publishes a finished intelligence product. The USACE Reachback Operations Center (UROC) manages all RFIs.
Intelligence requirements topics typically vary widely, and may include political, military, economic, and social information and infrastructure issues. The UROC assesses the RFI to determine if means are available to satisfy the request. After the UROC decides to support an RFI, it can engage internal and external mechanisms to answer the request. The UROC also stores and archives information, enabling planners, analysts, designers, and key leaders to capture lessons learned, and identify potential process improvements.

An RFI spreadsheet kept locally or within the command in a contingency environment helps leaders understand the types of information being requested, the time spent satisfying particular requests, potential unit limitations, and the types of support the unit required to accomplish its mission. A typical RFI tracker should include the following information:

- Date and time the RFI was received
- Synopsis of the request
- Suspense date
- Requester
- Action officer
- Notes
- Percentage completed

**Figure 11-6. The intelligence cycle**

Intelligence team produces a finished product.
Intelligence team collects information.
Intelligence team analyzes information.
Intelligence team processes information.
Decision-maker issues a requirement for information.
Once the RFI is complete, the product can be closed out through UROC and sent to the original requester via the appropriate network. The requirements manager should also solicit feedback to ensure end-user satisfaction.

2.6 Standards for Intelligence Products

Establishing product standards allows an organization to easily share information while also promoting common practices. The larger intelligence community issues continuously updated directives and publications to establish common practices and product dissemination protocols. Intelligence analysts must understand several of these publications when working across multiple organizations and agencies external to the DOD.

JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, serves as the current guide for joint and multinational intelligence activities, doctrine, and the identification of core principles, enabling analysts to fully integrate operations, plans, and intelligence into a cohesive product or team.

The National System for Geospatial Intelligence is an enterprise architecture that defines the operations and systems needed to produce geospatial intelligence data at various levels. Standards developed within the National System for Geospatial Intelligence ensure the compatibility and interoperability of geospatial intelligence data and systems. USACE intelligence analysts should not only understand and create products useful to the organization and commander, but also retain the proper security classifications for data-sharing restrictions.

USACE employees often work with various nongovernmental organizations and locals within the region who are not properly cleared, or may not have the need to know, for full product details. It is critical that when the requester submits an RFI, the desired classification of the final product is also included, which allows intelligence analysts to create products specifically tailored to meet end-user requirements and to ensure adherence to regulatory standards.

Operating in contingency environments normally involves information sharing, further reinforcing the need for product standards and templates. It also provides commanders continuous and reliable information in a prescribed format that can be universally understood and acted upon. The command security manager, as well as other cognizant agencies (such as the appropriate foreign disclosure office), must be consulted and proper approvals obtained before any dissemination of products or information outside of standard protocols.

2.7 Intelligence Repositories

Posting completed products and supporting documentation to repositories or respective web pages or shared drives allows users to retrieve information at their convenience. Once products are completed, the data should be stored and made accessible to consumers with appropriate permissions. For intelligence purposes, the data should be posted to an organizational web page that can support metadata searches for continued collaboration across the community, subject to the OPSEC controls. Creating repositories also allows different databases to be combined and searched with common engines for product retrieval.
References


Chapter 12

Conflict-Related Requirements: Sustainment and Information Technology

1. Sustainment in the Deployed Environment

The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) owns limited organic equipment and cannot independently provide its own life sustainment support. As such, USACE elements must depend on the supported organization, agency, or command for logistical sustainment support. This chapter revises the logistics support for future contingencies from how USACE received that support during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

The deploying USACE element must ensure logistical support requirements are synchronized and aligned with specific authorities and appropriations for the operations. The deployed USACE element cannot provide for its independent life support and must ensure the geographic combatant command (CCMD) plans include sustainment support to USACE, including subordinate commands and agencies’ operations plans.

1.1 Logistics Support During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom

Without the benefit of long planning times, USACE deployed personnel during OIF and OEF using field-expedient logistical support plans, characterized by ingenuity and reachback operations for supplies and contracted services, placing the mission at greater risk and resulting in a degraded ability to appropriately manage property. USACE commands were overwhelmed with property management and ineffective property accountability procedures by too much property and equipment being shipped to the theater beyond the logistics personnel’s ability to properly receive, account, store, and issue the items.

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) serves as the operational area commander’s sustainment support element. USACE relied heavily on LOGCAP during OIF and OEF to resolve “unit shortfalls represented in operations plans (OPLANS) and in the Army program” (Army Regulation [AR] 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program). LOGCAP “is a service contract, not a supply contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to buy items or products” (LeDoux, 2005). USACE coordinated supply and services through several available resources, such as U.S. military forces, garrison commands at the forward operating bases (FOBs), multinational forces, and host-nation (HN) elements operating in the area of responsibility.
Terminating LOGCAP-contracted services required a cessation letter 180 days before services were no longer required. At the close of an operation, as LOGCAP support decreases, USACE found it easier and more flexible to use supported unit or organic USACE civilian or military logistics staff because their ability to work was independent of a contractual agreement.

Understanding and Communicating USACE’s Logistics Requirements

The quality of support received during OIF and OEF often depended on the USACE command’s ability to define and articulate its needs to the supporting entities. USACE created a detailed support network to achieve the required logistical support infrastructure by modifying its organizational structure and initiating new contracted support. In future contingency operations, USACE will seek to employ a more structured and standardized approach to logistics support.

1.2 Planning and Predeployment Logistical Support

Logistics planning must begin well before the main contingency engineer district’s (CED) arrival in the operational area. Logisticians must plan for the life cycle of predeployment movements, deployment processes, sustainment operations, and drawdown and redeployment efforts.

Logistics Assistance from the Supported Unit

USACE elements depend on the supported unit, the unit by whom they are operationally controlled, for predeployment, deployment, and sustainment operations. The supported unit assists with sustainment and can leverage shipment priority for resupplies, using its force activity designator code for transportation and movement. In addition, the local theater garrison command can assist with establishing accounts at the supply support activity (SSA), maintenance activity, central issuing facility (if available), and other types of area support activities.

**Enduring Lesson**

Codify the support relationship between USACE and supporting commands or agencies in the combatant command and subordinate elements’ operations plans.

In most cases, the deployed CED must provide a Delegation of Authority, Department of Army (DA) Form 1687, *Notice of Delegation of Authority — Receipt for Supplies*; assumption of command orders; and unit roster to establish accounts with the garrison or supported organizations and activities. For some requirements, the CED may require support from the HN and multinational military force logistical support elements operating in its area of operations. These too, should be coordinated through the supported unit and theater joint task force (JTF).

Host-Nation Support

Wartime host-nation support (WHNS) has become a large logistics support provider. The CCMD and its associated Army Service component command (ASCC) emplace these agreements before the contingency begins or early in the operation. The contingency division and the CCMD must socialize USACE’s logistics requirements between contingencies to ensure USACE is included in WHNS planning. Foreign entities may be used only if an appropriate agreement is in place (e.g., an acquisition and cross servicing agreement [ACSA], WHNS), because USACE has no inherent authority to use the services of foreign entities.
Planning and Preparation During Peacetime

Ensuring success for the logistical support model depends on writing it into theater-specific contingency plans, socializing it before any contingency arises, and exercising the plan during peacetime. The contingency division should request that the CCMD and government department agencies integrate support to USACE in their concept and operations plans (OPLANS). These plans should include the support relationship between USACE and the CCMD.

Establishing support in theater will require the CED to obtain a derivative unit identification code (UIC) and a Department of Defense activity address code (DODAAC) before deployment. These are critical for funding supply requisitions, establishing an SSA, and placing orders for engineering and construction government-furnished equipment and government-furnished material.

The USACE Logistics Activity (ULA) DODAAC manager is contacted to coordinate for the appropriate DODAACs for the operation. ULA is responsible for USACE DODAACs, which are managed by their support and services division. The contingency division’s resource management allocates and controls their funding.

Purchase Agents

A trained purchase agent is required to make local purchases and to acquire products online. The contracting office determines the purchase agent’s purchase authority level and the process for which requests are routed for approval. For example, the contracting office decides whether to authorize a forward-deployed resource assistant to approve some local and online purchases, or if all purchase requests need to be sent to reachback for processing.

When negotiating the purchasing approval process with the contracting office, CED logistics planners should consider the customer wait time, shipping costs, and costs for repackaging, storing, shipping, and distributing purchased goods. During OIF and OEF, many purchased items were sent to the division rear in Winchester, VA, where they were collected, consolidated, shipped through Germany; re-packaged in country at the receiving point; and then distributed to the requestors on available lifts. This process sometimes resulted in long customer wait times, and unclaimed items when requesters left theater before delivery.

1.3 Establishing USACE Presence in Theater

Movement

The advanced echelon (ADVON) team logistics technician arranges for USACE’s ensuring support in the contingency area of operations and prepares for the follow-on district main element, which includes establishing the CED’s accounts, supplying the UIC, DODAAC, assumption of command orders, alpha roster, and any other administrative requirements. Establishing a separate UIC and DODAAC for each CED office will simplify property accountability.

Because the formal Army force structure does not include USACE’s reconnaissance and ADVON teams, the teams must depend on the support command or organization for both movement and life support.
The property book officer (PBO) establishes contact with the local area support group who provides sustainment to USACE. USACE’s teams are operational control to another unit and depend on that unit or organization for both movement and life support.

**Initial Requirements**

Sustaining the reconnaissance and ADVON teams for the first 90 days requires a combination of organic resources, reachback, contracted resources, and assistance from the supported unit. The team’s requirements must be determined, practiced, and communicated to the supporting unit during exercises before deployment. Deploying teams should consider developing a package of goods and material (crated or containerized) that can be shipped to coincide with the team’s arrival, if necessary. In addition, the initial teams should anticipate operating in an austere environment.

Because the CED elements are organized with a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) rather than a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), establishing organic initial supply may not be possible because the TDA will limit the amount of common table allowance (CTA) items (such as tents, chairs, tables, etc.). The CED’s logistics planner can arrange for CTA equipment through several sources.

After 90 days in theater, USACE elements become theater tenant units. USACE may transition to in-theater support such as LOGCAP and the theater sustainment command, or retain logistics support from the supported unit. At this point, the CED (or ADVON or reconnaissance elements) connect to the theater’s supply system with a senior logistics liaison officer (LNO), PBO, or a logistics officer deployed with the ADVON team. This individual will assist with establishing services and supply support with the theater-provided support activities and JTF elements.

The deployed logistics subject matter expert (SME) ensures logistics requirements are appropriately established and initiated. Failing to establish an effective logistics operation early in the contingency may create systems that cause years of frustration for follow-on personnel. The logistics SME should:

- Assess requirements and capability for logistics support in country.
- Establish the line of communication for shipping and receiving goods and equipment, including an appropriate shipping address.
- Assess facility requirements, to include offices and billeting, in coordination with real estate and security.
- Establish property management control procedures in coordination with the PBO.
• Assess vehicle, transportation, and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) support requirement for follow-on and replacement personnel.

• Develop a CED logistics support plan that incorporates both contracted logistical services and the organic J-4 structure and capability.

The CED must present a signature card delegation of authority (DA Form 1687, Notice of Delegation of Authority — Receipt for Supplies), assumption of command orders, and a unit alpha roster to establish accounts with the deployed garrison command and supporting activities. As noted, the CED may obtain service support from the HN and multinational forces operating locally; in these cases, the operational commander may arrange an ACSA with foreign military forces.

Enduring Support

The ASCC LNO helps the USACE’s logistics SME establish USACE’s presence in theater. As the land component representative, the ASCC LNO participates in LOGCAP advisor, garrison command, and ASCC forward meetings. The LNO’s presence at these meetings establishes significant links for USACE with the JTF, and helps to establish USACE’s priority of support at the FOBs. Without this assistance, the LOGCAP advisor, garrison commands, or other entities may give priority support to the combat brigade. Likewise, USACE representatives must attend garrison meetings on the FOB or installation to request priority of logistical support.

Enduring Lesson

Establishing priority for coordinated logistics support requires negotiation upon arrival in theater. This task should be completed as early as possible.

In a mature theater of operations, USACE may acquire supply and equipment from the theater-provided equipment (TPE) pool.

1.4 Property Accountability

Property accountability was a major issue for contingency districts during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The CED possess both TPE and USACE-owned assets. USACE must manage and control both property types in accordance with AR 735-5, Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability, and Engineer Regulation (ER) 700-1-1, USACE Supply Policies and Procedures, without compromising the mission or creating unreasonable risk to personnel.

USACE must account for sensitive items monthly, in accordance with AR 735-5 and ER 700-1-1, using Property Book Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE) as the system of record for all property purchased with theater operational funds. Because PBUSE aids in establishing accounts with the SSA and other local military services, the CED can expedite property turn-in and exchange, requiring PBO clerks to become familiar with both PBUSE and the Automated Personal Property Management System (APPMS).
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

A headquarters element is required to provide administrative and logistical internal sustainment support for the CED headquarters command and staff; the experience gained during OIF and OEF underscored the need for a headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD) in the CED organizational structure. The HHD (commanded by a major) worked and resolved administrative issues to allow the CED commander to concentrate on the construction mission.

A key component of the HHD commander’s mission is property accountability and sensitive-item inventories. The HHD commander serves as the appointing official for financial liability investigation of loss property, formerly called report of survey; the district commander serves as the financial liability investigation of loss property approving official within his scope of authority, per AR 735-5.

Property Book Officer

The PBO has the overall responsibility for maintaining accurate accounts for the command’s assigned property. Normally, the PBO serves at the division level and coordinates property book transactions and property management activities and actions with the designated hand-receipt holders. Ideally, the initial PBO joins the contingency operation during the planning phase, and deploys and remains in theater for at least nine months.

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<td>USACE must maintain appropriate property accountability and stewardship of government equipment. Assign a property book officer and establish property accountability early.</td>
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Alternately, if the contingency element is unable to assign a forward PBO because of personnel restrictions, the CED substitutes a primary hand-receipt holder to establish property accountability early in the deployment process. This person reports directly to the PBO, has APPMS administrative privileges as a primary hand-receipt holder, and has the same basic duties and responsibilities of the PBO with permissions granted by both the PBO and Transatlantic Division (TAD) commander.

High personnel turnover can negatively affect accountability; during one six-month period, Iraq’s Gulf Region Division had six different PBOs. Arriving PBOs did not know what property was on hand, what was in containers and lockers, turned in, transferred, or coded as unserviceable because the personnel rotation timeframe did not allow for change-of-hand-receipt inventories. In OIF, this resulted in an incident where encryption equipment and communications security equipment were misplaced, requiring several days of searching before locating the devices.

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<tr>
<td>The contingency engineer district should have a property book officer or property book officer representative in theater with full permissions to manage the property book.</td>
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In at least one instance, the CED’s property book officer was located at the supporting district in the continental United States (CONUS). This arrangement was problematic; local deployed
personnel could not perform simple property book maintenance, and the local commander was unable to readily validate property. In addition, personnel in CONUS often worked a standard five-day workweek rather than the seven-day workweek of the deployed CED. At the very least, the CED should have a forward-located property book officer representative in theater, with full permissions to manage the property book.

**Contingency Engineer District J-4**

The J-4 oversees logistics planning and coordinating support, while the HHD conducts and directs the internal organizational supply requirements. Some of the logistical functional areas include supply and services, property book management, facility management, transportation and traffic management, movement and reception operations, support operations, food services, and petroleum. The J-4 obtains contracted or dedicated air resources, assists with customs and border-crossing issues, purchases or leases security vehicles (if fiscal and contractual authority to do so exists), and accounts for real property.

**Establishing a Central Property Receiving Point**

Because of operational urgency in OIF and OEF, USACE initially shipped equipment directly to area and project offices without going through the district property management office. Shipping direct to area and project offices alleviated the requirement for follow-on transportation to redistribute the material to its needed location, and reduced the time required to deliver items to the requestor. However, this throughput created conditions for serious and enduring accountability issues because multiple entities signed for unit property. Lacking a single accountable person to track, report, and account for property resulted in difficult and complex property records.

**Enduring Lesson**

Upon arrival in theater, establish a central property receiving point with a proper shipping address for property receipt, storage, and distribution.

One consideration is to establish a central receiving point at the CED HHD under the PBO or designated hand-receipt holder to control and account for property shipped to the district. The central receiving point can further direct the shipments to their ultimate destination by controlling the reception and movement of the property using a proper shipping address. Alternately, in-theater policies may allow the SSA to hold the property or equipment at an area support location until a designated accountable person can secure the items. In this case, the CED may not need to establish its own central property receiving point.

**Prioritizing Property Movements**

Early in the operations, shipment is limited to priority items. The first USACE personnel arriving in theater must establish a central property receiving point with a proper shipping address. Unless absolutely mission-critical, all property should flow through the centrally-located property management office. The logistics team must barcode the property and equipment before forwarding it to its final destination. If a subordinate unit receives the property via throughput, the PBO is informed and accountability is established as soon as possible.
**Enduring Lesson**

Prioritize equipment moving into theater to avoid overtaxing the transportation system, distribution channels, and the on-FOB storage capacity.

**While in the emergency mindset of the contingency operation, USACE wanted to send as much property as quickly as possible, overburdening the transportation system and the ability of logistics personnel to account for the shipments.**

**Property Accountability Systems**

USACE logistics personnel must be knowledgeable in USACE-specific property accountability processes, especially APPMS. APPMS is a USACE-specific system that logisticians in most other organizations are not familiar with. APPMS interfaces with the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System.

The CED also uses PBUSE, because not all property is TPE on APPMS. The CED should manage all property on standard property management systems. The Army will replace PBUSE in 2017 with Global Combat Support System-Army. Organizations must upload their derivative UIC and DODAAC to Global Combat Support System-Army for supplies and services in theater.

**1.5 Special Logistics Issues**

**Billeting**

Billeting management falls under the purview of the J-4 and may require dedicated contract or organic personnel due to its time and resource intensiveness. A logistics management specialist who manages billeting will not be able to also perform logistics functions.

**Vehicle Support**

Two avenues for obtaining vehicles and vehicle service support include contracted services with local vendors or theater-provided transportation services through the garrison and installation commands. For teams and personnel under direct support of a command or agency, vehicles are provided by the supported organization. Tactical vehicles should be obtained from the TPE property book manager.

To obtain vehicles from the garrison commands, CED logistics representatives must develop operational needs statements for vehicle support and submit the statements through appropriate command channels; some commands may require a memorandum of agreement. The CED logistics planner should develop a vehicle support plan for leased armored and non-armored commercial vehicles and non-tactical vehicles (NTVs) and tactical vehicles. Later in the contingency, the CED may acquire vehicle support using assets turned in by other units that are no longer needed, including heavily armored vehicles such as mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles (see Figure 12-1).
As with other property, the visibility for vehicles is conducted in accordance with AR 735-5, placed either on USACE’s APPMS accounts or the TPE accounts.

*During Operation Iraqi Freedom, travel within U.S. bases and the International Zone was routinely performed in commercial non-tactical vehicles. Travel outside of U.S. bases “outside the wire” was a combat movement in a lethal environment requiring substantial planning and coordination. Typically, the theater movement control team sets priorities on main supply routes.*

If the CED obtains vehicle support through NTV leasing, the contracting team develops and lets the contract country wide or with multiple regional vendors. The J-4 assigns a contracting officer representative (COR) to interact with the vendor, coordinating normal vehicle maintenance, repairs, replacement schedule, delivery, lost keys, type of vehicle for mission, etc.

The CED may also acquire vehicle service support for passenger movement and cargo shipment using local nationals (local contracted workforce) working in the logistics office, to include coordinating transportation services from local truck companies. Local nationals working in the logistics office may assist in identifying such companies. The CED may use the local national workforce to arrange movement of its property and supplies from one base to another if coalition
forces are unable to provide transportation. These arrangements are subject to strict requirements as a local national service contract.

When leasing up-armored sport utility vehicles, acquire only vehicles with V-8 engines; any smaller vehicle is unable to travel up hills when loaded with its normal compliment of armor, personnel, and gear.

Vehicle Maintenance

The logistics officer must establish procedures for licensing, fueling, maintaining, requisitioning repair parts, safe operations, recovery, and scheduled replacements for all acquired vehicles per AR 58-1, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles. Although the theater may grant some exceptions, the Army has accepted life span and mileage limits for vehicle usage. Using a vehicle beyond its normal wear life (retention limits for year and mileage) may present a safety hazard.

Vehicle maintenance for contracted vehicles may be problematic if the on-FOB vehicle maintenance centers only work on General Services Administration vehicles. The contingency district may require a maintenance contract to maintain contracted vehicles.

Driver Training

Operator safety training, as with all other contingency preparations, should take place before deployment. Despite the operational tempo and high personnel turnover, the CED may not neglect appropriate vehicle training while in theater. As in peacetime, vehicle operation remains a high-risk activity. Commanders and logistics personnel must remain diligent in enforcing operator safety standards, vehicle maintenance checks and services, and other required training.

For security and force protection, unauthorized personnel are not allowed to access or use government vehicles. Unless specifically authorized (contracted terms or other written permission) contractor personnel are not allowed use of government vehicles, which may signal inappropriate contractor-government relationships. An employee may be subject to disciplinary actions or removal for allowing unauthorized personnel to use government-leased or government-owned vehicles.

Container Management

Manage Army-owned and leased containers in accordance with Field Manual 55-80, Army Container Management. Personnel using containers must label them and identify contents with an inventory sheet attached to the outside. Personnel must appropriately mark containers with sensitive contents. In-theater container yards may require guard personnel. Radio Frequency Identification and barcode technology are used with rich data format for automated inventory control. Turn-in or transfer of unneeded containers is planned before they become problematic, especially commercially leased containers that could generate a large retention bill.
Oversight of Logistics, Life Support, and Security Contracts

USACE must maximize the use of available resources from U.S. military forces, multinational forces, HN, and garrison commands before using contracted services. If contracted services are required, full-service provider is used for life support and security operations to minimize the number of contracts.

USACE required extensive contracted supply and life support during OIF and OEF. These contracts required a responsible, trained COR to ensure the vendors met the agreed terms. The J-4 must either assume COR duties or actively coordinate with the COR for all logistics and life support contracts to maintain oversight. COR certification is taken into consideration for all logistics personnel.

Enduring Lesson

Consider requiring contracting officer representative certification for all logistics personnel.

Contracting security services with a private security company creates additional logistical complexity. The J-3 primarily oversees the security services contract, which involves many logistics requirements. For example, the private security company closely interfaces with the transportation provider, and will probably employ its own logistics manager. The J-4 works with the COR to understand the logistics portion of the security services contract and to maintain operational control and knowledge of the entire CED logistics mission.

Contracting may use temporary contracts with local nationals for transportation, facilities repair, facilities cleaning, etc. These contracts require base access and badging for local nationals per the base security procedures.

Logistics Reachback Support

As with almost all CED functions, the logistics operation depends on reachback support. A responsive reachback team alleviates numerous progressing issues and problems the CED faces as it stands up. The logistics reachback point of contact, whether forward-deployed or in CONUS, must keenly understand the CONUS resources available and requested by the CED.

Plan and incorporate reachback support for supplies and equipment during the initial phase of the operation. Ideally, reachback should decrease after transitioning to theater- or command-provided logistics support. When planning reachback support, the transportation cost for repackaging is taken into consideration, as well as storing CONUS, shipping outside the continental United States, and the labor hours required for receiving, storing, and redistributing versus acquiring the items through local sources. Also taken into consideration is the customer wait time required to obtain the goods and products from a CONUS-based supply source.
Drawdown and Redeployment

The final phases of the contingency mission involve intense logistics requirements. The CED must transport or dispose of all in-theater properties (see Figure 12-2). Emphasis on command supply discipline and property management policies and procedures pays dividends during the drawdown phase. The CED J-4 office should understand and follow local policies and procedures for the disposal of properties, including sensitive and special-handling items.

Some questions to consider during the CED’s drawdown phase include:

- What is an appropriate template for closing camps?
- What are the drawdown’s key decision points? At what point in the mission should the CED offices begin becoming more austere and turn-in equipment and facilities?
- How can the CED mitigate the largest anticipated obstacles (i.e., weapons and ammunition turn-in, chemicals, etc.) while disposing of excess property?
- What equipment must return to CONUS and what can be turned into the Defense Logistics Activity-Disposition Services?
• What did USACE purchase with overseas contingency operations funds that they would like to retain and the DA G-4 would likely grant a policy exception to retain?

• What is the disposition of items purchased with theater-provided funds? What did USACE purchase that it would like to retain?

Annex C, *Drawing Down the Contingency Engineer District*, includes detailed information about closing a contingency district.

### 2. Network and Information Technology

Signal or information technology (IT) personnel deploy with the ADVON team and are among the last to leave. USACE’s overall mission success critically depends on an operational IT system from initial deployment through sustainment and drawdown. Complicating this is USACE’s IT systems, networks (CorpsNet), and associated equipment that are separate from the rest of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army Network Enterprise.

#### 2.1 Establishing Contingency Environment Communications Networks

**USACE Requirements**

The deploying signal and IT personnel set up the network to support the commander’s requirements, which must be the most robust, reliable network possible in the shortest time, under relatively unknown austere conditions. The success or failure of USACE’s IT systems largely determine USACE’s overall mission success or failure. Ideally, establishing as many different types of technical communication systems as possible (i.e., voice, internet, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), etc.) allows the greatest opportunity for mission accomplishment. The deployed signal element will identify the tools to meet the requirement and request those not organic to the unit.

USACE offices currently deploy with a very small aperture terminal (VSAT) system, enabling network communications and reachback support. VSAT systems support operations by providing high-speed internet and voice-over internet protocol (VOIP) telephone services. VSAT allows the user to reliably transfer data, transmit video and voice information, and exchange files.

Each USACE location will require connectivity with the USACE theater headquarters and back to CONUS. Each site also requires rack configurations, server and storage requirements, and VOIP capability. The signal element and IT section should develop the unit’s automation/signal standard operating procedure (SOP) to support operations by acquiring any existing SOPs or continuity books created by previous teams. These documents may eliminate the need to duplicate work or re-think problems already solved by previously deployed personnel.

**Zero Clients**

Using zero clients and a virtual desktop infrastructure with virtual servers may be a useful strategy in the deployed IT environment. A zero client is a computing station without internal storage, usually comprised of a small box connecting the keyboard, mouse, monitor, and network connection to a remote server. The zero clients reduce desktop cost, have no internal disk drive affected by a harsh environment, reduce information assurance patching requirements, and require less power.
Coordinating with Maneuver Units

The deployed team’s signal and IT personnel will coordinate and request assistance from commands in the operational area to take advantage of any established networks, facilitating terrestrial network connectivity to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) base infrastructure to communicate sensitive and classified information via data, voice, and video transmission. USACE requires SIPRNET and coalition Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) classified networks to communicate across classified data system links.

Network Types

The contingency theater will have network types that may or may not allow data exchange, such as the following:

- Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)
- SIPRNET
- CENTRIXS
- NATO unclassified
- International Security Assistance Force SECRET

The theater may also have different video teleconference capabilities such as the following:

- SECRET video teleconference
- Unclassified video teleconference equipment (conference room/desktop)

The commander and S-3, along with the IT personnel, identify the information requirements and support for units at each site. Network links are generally either terrestrial or satellite; preparations are made to provide cabling tools when using satellite links. Some links require an authorized request. For example, if the CED requires a satellite link, IT personnel must submit a request for connectivity through the DISA, the Defense Communications and Army Transmission System, or the Defense Wide Transmission System office.

The G-6/S-6 and IT section determine whether the mission requires contracted (rather than organic) communication services. The contingency district’s office of contracting must procure this service. While staffing times differ, it should be assumed that acquiring contracting services will require 45 to 60 days, or longer.

Before beginning to establish a new network system, previous contingency IT offices should be checked for SOPs or continuity books. Because of the nature of IT equipment, procedures become outdated quickly and these documents may offer updated information.
2.2 Equipment Acquisition and Life Cycle

The supporting CONUS district (e.g., Transatlantic Middle East District [TAM]) should acquire IT equipment for the deployed district. Currently, deployed district personnel submit a request via a web application, which tracks the request from the initial call to product delivery.

Deployed equipment life cycles may differ greatly from those within CONUS. Enemy activity, power surges, and dust and heat are just a few of the potential stressors on contingency district equipment (see Figure 12-3). The automated data processing life cycle management (LCM) should consider the needed capabilities and configurations of new equipment to:

- Improve current capabilities
- Minimize technical obsolescence and IT footprint
- Maximize results based on available financial resources

Figure 12-3. Sandstorms, such as the one pictured in April 2008 on Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq, may severely limit the lifespan of IT equipment.

The LCM’s length is based on equipment wear and tear in the austere environment. A 12- to 18-month cycle is a good rule of thumb for equipment deployed in United States Central Command austere environments. The CONUS information management team should coordinate IT property with respective logistics teams downrange to maintain appropriate equipment accountability.

2.3 Sustained Operations in the Contingency Environment

Once the network is established, the IT team maintains daily operations by supporting USACE senior leadership’s vision, mission, and goals. The IT team provides technical expertise in customer support, server, and network health. Robust network systems are critical to mission accomplishment because of USACE’s technical mission, multi-layered communications requirements among physically-separated elements, and the requirement for digital project management and archiving.
Maintaining the information technology infrastructure is paramount to keeping the contingency engineer district mission functioning.

Maintaining Information Technology Systems

Maintaining IT systems is both proactive and reactive and requires the deployed and CONUS district IT teams working as a single team. Some duties of the CONUS district IT team include:

• Installing information assurance and vulnerability assessment patches and upgrades remotely as much as possible

• Conducting remote services for help desk issues, desktop maintenance, servers, and network hardware operating systems as much as possible

Duties of the deployed IT team include:

• Establishing and publishing secure and nonsecure video transmission capabilities and testing the systems with CONUS nodes (e.g., TAD, TAM, and the USACE Reachback Operations Center) to ensure connectivity

• Establish VOIP communications and publish local numbers to reachback district and higher headquarters

• Request teleconference call and web meeting capabilities through the supporting CONUS enduring district to facilitate discussion for all communities of practice

• Perform any elements of the supporting CONUS enduring district duties that must occur on-site

Use reachback to assist in information management and information technology administrative requirements to keep deployed information management and information technology assets focused on the deployment mission.

Hardware and Tools

Each deployed office requires a core router and various Power over Ethernet switches depending on the number of supported personnel and their locations within the office space. Deployed information management professionals should consider using wide area application services to accelerate applications, optimize bandwidth, and help improve the end user’s productivity. A network equalizer should also be considered, because it provides simple, turn-key bandwidth control and internet and wide area network (known as WAN) optimization appliances to any network topology. The network equalizer is a flexible, scalable, “plug-and-play” bandwidth-shaping appliance.
The local information management team requires tools to install fiber optic and CAT6 cable medium to support the mission. Suggested basic tools include the following:

- Fiber splicing kit
- Light meter
- Fiber optic tester
- CAT6 cable tester
- Crimpers
- RJ45 ends
- Cabling tools

Information management should use multifunction printers versus separate machines for document printing, copying, and scanning, allowing centralized document management, use of less office space, and reduced cost when compared to the total individual component prices. One consideration is issuing voice communication headsets to co-located personnel in cramped workspaces. Headsets allow for fewer communal disruptions when multiple conference calls occur at the same time giving the individual more freedom to conduct business. In addition, if the CED uses VOIP technology, it may wish to eliminate phone sets by using VOIP software and headsets.

**Network Access**

All network users must complete the required information assurance courses before receiving network login permission. After completing information assurance training, the information management team must also vet the individual’s trustworthiness to protect the IT system from vulnerabilities, which is currently accomplished using a system authorization access request, which is completed, submitted, and reviewed by the information management team for each system user.

**2.4 Data Backup**

Information management personnel should perform and verify routine data backup for data integrity. Once verified, the deployed team sends the medium to the CONUS enduring district (e.g., TAM) for data recovery verification and archiving. Data backups are critical to information requests that may come weeks, months, or years after of FOBs close or personnel redeploy.

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**Enduring Lesson**

Data backups are critical to support information requests that may come weeks, months, or years after the mission’s end.
Depending on the environment and the mission, IT professionals need to decide on specific protocols for data backup including:

- Timeframes for backup (daily, weekly, monthly)
- Type of backup (full, incremental, differential)
- Length of time backups should be retained in theater in case of data loss or system failure

A robust data backup plan also includes a continuity of operation plan that ensures mission continuity in the event of data loss or system failure.

2.5 Information Technology Property Accountability and Movement

As with many other offices, IT equipment accountability during OIF and OEF was lax. Property tracking and accountability processes were not completely in place, even during the later phases of the operations. As a result, many high-value items were moved around easily and lacked proper stewardship. Contingency commanders must ensure property accountability remains a priority even during high operating tempo.

Moving IT equipment from location to location in theater was sometimes complicated by the equipment’s size; some was too large for SUVs or even MRAPs, requiring a secured shipping container or trailer. New equipment must be signed for on a sub-hand receipt upon arrival at a site.

References


Chapter 13

Authorities, Authorizations, and Funding

Introduction

As in peacetime, all federal spending in support of a contingency operation must comply with standard fiscal law principles. Managing resources in contingency creates two additional challenges for resource managers (RMs):

1. The operational tempo increases.
2. The RM will most likely face greater external pressure to bend rules.

This chapter focuses on some of the basic resource management principles that the contingency RM and command must keep in mind.

Enduring Lesson

Standard fiscal law principles remain unchanged during contingency operations.

This chapter is not an authority for any particular use of funds or other fiscal action. Rather, it provides a general overview of fiscal principles. All particular fiscal situations must be addressed through careful review of the references listed in this chapter (and other documents as pertinent), along with full coordination of the project delivery team to include resource management and the office of counsel.

The annual National Defense Authorization Act includes any special or additional authority related to a contingency operation. During contingency operations, Congress may authorize special authorities or appropriations. Examples include the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Contingency Construction Authority (CCA), and Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). Special conditions related to the appropriations that fund these activities may appear in annual appropriations acts.
1. Contingency Resource Management Basics

As in the peacetime operations, approving expenditures requires adherence to fiscal law principles of purpose, time, and amount. The main difference is that the RM professional must apply these rules within the overseas contingency framework.

1.1 The Deployed Resource Manager Professional

While standard fiscal law principles remain unchanged in the contingency, the largely military, deployed contingency support organization may be unfamiliar with applying these rules in a contingency environment. Some basic guidance to the newly deployed RM is to:

- Acquire the current statutory and regulatory sources for the appropriations. These authorities, in addition to providing definitive source information, may help explain how to interpret and apply the appropriation language.

- Acquire an organization chart for the overarching joint task force (JTF) and resource management functional areas in the deployed environment. Often, these charts are classified, and may only be viewed by personnel with a need to know. Because of this limitation, the organizational framework may seem murky before deployment. These charts will help illuminate who works for who, and who is responsible for what.

- Be aware that some (non-United States Army Corps of Engineers [USACE]) individuals in the RM functional management areas may not fully understand their own roles and responsibilities within the JTF. Ask questions when a line of authority or responsibility is unclear. Many RMs will not have previously worked in a largely military framework; therefore, expect a learning curve at the beginning of the operation.

1.2 Purpose

Congress must authorize any funding obligation or expenditure. The contingency engineer district (CED), as with peacetime USACE engineer districts, must only use funds for the purposes Congress provided them.

If a proposed fund use is inconsistent with the statutory language, then the expenditure is improper, even if it would result in substantial savings or other benefits to the government. For example, even if sufficient Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds are available to construct a facility for Afghan forces, the purpose of that appropriation is not to construct foreign troop facilities. Accordingly, such use of OCO funds would constitute a purpose violation that could result in a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

The spending agency has reasonable discretion in carrying out the objects of the appropriation, commonly known as the “necessary expense doctrine.” The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated “the important thing is not the significance of the proposed expenditure itself or its value to the government or to some social purpose in abstract terms, but the extent to which it will contribute to accomplishing the purposes of the appropriation the agency wishes to charge” (GAO Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Vol. I, Chapter 4, p. 4-22). The local RM, program managers, and legal counsel should evaluate together whether a particular expenditure is a necessary expense of a given appropriation.
As in peacetime, when two appropriations are potentially available for a purchase, the RM must use the more specific appropriation. Necessary expense determinations may be reviewed by special investigators and auditors from the Department of the Army (DA), Department of Defense (DOD), and the GAO.

1.3 Time

Salient Title 31, United States Code (USC) References:

- **Title 31 USC 1341 (a) (1) (B).** Funds may not be obligated before an appropriation act is made unless authorized by law.

- **Title 31 USC 1502.** Funds limited for obligation to a definite period are available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of availability or to complete contracts properly made within the period of availability and obligated consistent with law.

All funding obligations must occur within the appropriation’s stated time period provided for new obligations. When an appropriation has a time limitation (i.e., expiration date), this rule applies only to new obligations and does not affect when the funds can be expended or disbursed. With few exceptions, appropriations legally obligated during their period of availability may be expended for a period of five years after they expire for new obligation.

Congress determines the availability period for all appropriations. Generally, Congressional appropriations fall into three categories:

- **Annual** may be obligated for one year.

- **Multiple year** may be obligated for a designated number of years (i.e., two, three, or five years).

- **No year** has no obligation expiration date.

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An *obligation* is a legally binding agreement or action that will result in outlays, immediately or in the future. Funds that are not legally obligated before their period of availability expires are no longer available for new obligations. The period of availability applies to the obligation of funds, not the liquidation of the obligation by disbursement of payment (expenditure).


**Duration Links with Purpose**

The appropriation’s duration is linked to its purpose. For example, Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) are one-year appropriations, because this funding supports daily, weekly, monthly, and seasonal Army operations installations, camps, post, and stations. Research and development is funded with two-year appropriations. Systems and weapons procurement is generally funded through three-year appropriations. Construction appropriations are generally five-year
appropriations, because federal construction projects tend to be large in scope, requiring multiple years to plan and complete. Government functions operating similar to businesses, such as stock, or capital or revolving funds, tend to be “no-year” appropriations; their annual revenues are expected to fully cover their annual expenses without a net profit. For example, during named contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, because of specific language included in the annual appropriations acts, although Military Construction, Army (MCA) funds were generally five-year funds; OCO appropriations were one-year funds, or, infrequently, two-year funds.

Funds Expiration

Once appropriated funds expire, they can no longer be used for new obligations (e.g., a new contract award). After an appropriation expires, it can still be used for five years to pay any legitimate expenses resulting from legal obligations that occurred during the period of availability of the appropriation, and before its expiration. No new obligations can be made after the appropriation expires; however, in-scope contract modifications may still occur. At the end of this additional five-year “expired” period, the appropriation is closed. At this point, it cannot be used even for payments against legitimate obligations or contract modifications. Obligations requiring payments after an appropriation closes must be made from currently available funding with the same purpose.

Table 13-1 shows the availability period for various Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Title 10 appropriations.

**Table 13-1. Period of availability for various appropriations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding type</th>
<th>Availability Period (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Funds (AIF)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account (DODFIRA)</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction, Army (MCA)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Many periods of availability are based on appropriations language that generally appears every year. Because the language may change in any given year, the period of availability should be verified each year.
1.4 Bona Fide Needs Rule

All expenditures must meet the bona fide needs rule, meaning that a fiscal year appropriation may be obligated only to meet a legitimate requirement in the fiscal years for which Congress provided the appropriation. For example, the CED may not purchase excess supplies that the CED will not need until the following fiscal year using an appropriation only available through the current fiscal year. Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (DOD FMR), Standards for Recording and Reviewing Commitments and Obligations, Chapter 8, includes guidance for assuring bona fide need when incurring obligations, including special cases, such as:

- Service contracts crossing fiscal years
- Advance purchase because of delivery lead-time
- Estimating stock levels required for normal operations

1.5 Amount

In authorization and appropriations acts, Congress limits the amount of a particular appropriation that may be spent. Therefore, any obligation exceeding (or in advance of) an appropriation constitutes an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation. Chapter 3 of Engineer Regulation (ER) 37-1-30, Financial Administration—Accounting and Reporting, contains information on ADA violations and the ADA flash reporting process.

1.6 USACE Funding Types

USACE receives and expends both direct and reimbursable funds in contingency and peacetime operations. Geographically specific funding can denote funding appropriated for specifically named operations within that geographic location.

*Direct funds* are funds received on a funding authorization document from Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers for execution on assigned programs.

*Reimbursable funds* are funds received from a customer on a military interdepartmental purchase request to perform work on their behalf.

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*ER 37-1-30, Financial Administration—Accounting and Reporting*

**Operations and Maintenance, Army Funds**

Commanders may use OMA funds to support a wide range of operational necessities (non-construction). Higher headquarters typically guides commanders’ discretionary OMA fund expenditures by annual budget guidance via execution orders. The CED resource management officer should review current thresholds for repair and maintenance between OMA and MCA funding, because facility upkeep and relocation in a contingency environment is continuous and costs often approach threshold levels. For example, OMA can be used for unspecified minor military construction (UMMC) not exceeding $750,000. This threshold is strictly enforced; exceeding the threshold is an ADA violation.
Congressional Oversight

Congress exercises extensive and pervasive oversight of the military construction (MILCON) program. MILCON projects include constructing, expanding, or repurposing facilities and infrastructure and are either specified (specifically authorized and appropriated by line item in an appropriations act) if expected to exceed $2 million, or unspecified (i.e., charged to a lump sum appropriation for UMMC). Congress provides authorization for specified projects in the Military Construction Appropriations Act (see Figure 13-1). Congress provides the funding for UMMC, but the funds are not appropriated by project as with specified projects.

Figure 13-1. Tom Bender (right), District Chief of Engineering and Construction, discusses a military construction project on Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, with MG Jeffrey Dorko, USACE Deputy Commanding General for Military and International Operations. (Photograph by Karla K. Marshall)

During a contingency, Congress can authorize OMA fund use or other contingency and area-specific funding sources for a particular operation. In doing so, Congress will typically limit the uses of the authority granted, ensuring the authority is only used to directly support the contingency. For example, in 2004, and through later amendments, Congress temporarily authorized (with the CCA) military services to use operations and maintenance (O&M) funds for construction exceeding $750,000 in the United States Central Command or Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa area of responsibility under limited circumstances. Among others, restrictions on this authority included:

- The authority may only be used where the construction is needed to meet urgent, temporary military operational requirements involving Armed Forces use supporting a war declaration, national emergency declaration, or contingency operation.
- Construction may not be carried out at a military installation where the U.S. is reasonably expected to remain long-term with narrow exceptions.
- Construction is the minimum necessary to meet the temporary operational requirements.
1.7 Direct Funds

Congress appropriates funds to the U.S. Army, which, in turn, may allocate these funds to USACE to accomplish programs the Army directs it to implement in accordance with legal limitations. Direct funding for Army programs is different from reimbursable funding USACE receives from other customers to accomplish work on behalf of such customers under the Economy Act or other statutory authority.

The Army may allocate different military appropriations to USACE, including research and development, O&M, and MILCON funds, depending on the program involved. Direct funding is provided to USACE districts (including CEDs) via a funding authorization document (FAD) from Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE). Funds are issued from HQUSACE to allot serial numbers assigned to each USACE activity (and are not routed through USACE divisions before being provided to districts). The work allowance documents identify to the district level where the funds will be executed. The CED must also receive the directive or work authorization document before RMs can load funds into the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). HQUSACE distributes FADs to the districts, and district personnel load the funding into CEFMS.

In contrast with the funding allocations to USACE from Headquarters, Department of the Army (and directives to execute the work), the RM will also work with direct fund citations. These can sound confusingly alike. However, the first term is a means of tasking workload and providing funding through the federal budgetary system; the second is an accounting mechanism for reimbursable work.

A direct fund citation is an accounting mechanism used only by DOD organizations. Direct fund citations can be used for contracts, travel, and permanent change of station orders, but generally not for any other type of expense. In particular, direct fund citations cannot be used for labor.

1.8 Reimbursable Funds

Reimbursable service or reimbursable work means the requesting agency fully provides the cost for USACE to perform work, payable to the USACE activity performing the work. Statutory authority, such as the Economy Act, is required for an agency (or other authorized entity) to place or accept a reimbursable order.

USACE performs reimbursable work by accepting a reimbursable order from federal customers and advance funding from non-federal customers. Common reimbursable customers in a contingency environment include the Department of State (see Figure 13-2), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USACE charges reimbursable customers the full burdened labor rate for work performed, ensuring USACE recoups its total cost. Burdened labor rates include an increment for bonuses, danger pay, and post differential for the contingency location.
Figure 13-2. Reimbursable funds from the U.S. Department of State’s Iraqi Reconstruction Relief Fund provided $23.4 million for the Al Mamoon Exchange and Telecommunications Center in western Baghdad, shown in this photograph from 2010.

Within DOD, USACE receives reimbursable funds via military interdepartmental purchase request (MIPR), Department of Defense Form (DD Form) 448, *Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request*, known as a customer order in CEFMS. Outside of DOD, different forms of customer orders are used. Depending on the agencies involved, a memorandum of agreement, support agreement (such as DD Form 1144, *Support Agreement*) and/or an Economy Act determination and findings is required before the customer order is processed. The district budget analyst receives the customer order and then loads the information into CEFMS. Reimbursable orders identify funds from another federal agency’s treasury account and provide USACE obligation authority via a funding document, such as a MIPR.

USACE temporarily finances reimbursable orders because it first incurs costs and then invoices the federal customer for reimbursement using intra-governmental payment and collection. USACE regulations require temporarily financing reimbursable work in various appropriations. Funds received by MIPR can be accepted as Category I (reimbursable) (preferred) or as Category II (direct fund cite).
1.9 Contingency and Area Specific Funds

Congress generally mandates contingency or area-specific funding to support a particular contingency operation. USACE may receive these funds as either direct or reimbursable, and they are subject to the same purpose, time, and amount rules as other appropriations. These funds are usually single- or multi-year rather than no-year. Figure 13-3 illustrates an example with the Afghanistan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) showing how USACE typically receives and processes area specific funds.

![Figure 13-3. Responsible parties and their associated actions in processing Afghanistan Security Forces Funds received during Operation Enduring Freedom](image)

1.10 Supervision and Administration Rates

USACE is not authorized to use supervision and administration (S&A) flat-rate accounts for special contingency appropriations (e.g., for OIF and OEF contingency appropriations). S&A must be calculated “at cost.” However, flat-rate accounting procedures might be permitted for funds management purposes, so long as the contingency S&A is charged at cost, and the corresponding S&A accounts are operated and managed separately from the flat-rate OMA and MILCON outside the continental United States (OCONUS) accounts.

Any deviation from at-cost S&A accounting procedures must be expressly approved by HQUSACE Directors of Military Programs and Resource Management. See Appendix B of this chapter for more information on determining S&A rates.

When S&A carryover legislation applies to a particular activity, USACE policy requires obligating the entire estimated in-house costs to be incurred during the reimbursable order, upon receipt of the reimbursable order. The most well-known carry-over authority appears in Section 8070 of Public Law 108-287 and is for limited activities. Guidance on this specific carryover provision is contained in ER 37-3-22, *Financial Administration–Carry-Over Supervision and Administration*.

At various times during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Congress passed specific carry-over legislation for specific activities. RM professionals should consult the annual Appropriations Act to determine if additional carry-over authority exists for specific activities. For example, the 2013
DOD, MILCON and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act addresses carry over for O&M, AIF, and ASFF:

Supervision and administration costs associated with a construction project funded with appropriations available for operation and maintenance, “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund,” or the “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund” provided in this act and executed in direct support of overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, may be obligated at the time a construction contract is awarded. Provided that for the purpose of this section, supervision and administration costs include all in-house government costs.

Although all authorizations may not cover the same items, ER 37-3-22 includes information about potential in-house costs. See Appendix B of this chapter for more information.

2 Execution of Funding Authority

The daily funds execution process and RM duties are the same in the contingency environment as in a standard district. The following paragraphs provide an overview of normal RM processes.

2.1 Funds Management

RMs establish and maintain district funds control. Funds are issued to the commander; the commander then authorizes individuals by letter to establish fund certification and other fund controls. Fund certification can be further delegated by name via letter. Project managers may approve specific fund use after the commander delegates authority and responsibility to them. Project managers must abide by all funding limitations established in governing laws and regulations. In USACE’s capacity as an agent for the ultimate requestors (customers), USACE helps shape the performance work statements and orders, oversees, and receives projects before turning them over to the customer.

2.2 Fund Commitment

Committing funds is administratively reserving funds. RMs commit funds using CEFMS purchase requests and commitments.

2.3 Fund Obligation

Obligating funds refers to legally reserving funds for a specific purpose. A contract between two parties creates an obligation. The contract must be recorded and meet specific, legally binding criteria. Only contracting officers or individuals with properly delegated contracting authority (e.g., administrative contracting officers) can legally obligate the government. For more information, see DOD FMR, Chapter 8.

The binding contract agreement between the two authorized parties must adhere to specific parameters. Improperly authorizing obligations may violate the Anti-Deficiency Act and expose individuals to criminal or administrative penalties. Some aspects of a proper contract include:

- The contract must include an offer, acceptance, and consideration.
- The contract must be written and supported by documentary evidence.
• The contract must be for specific goods or services.
• The contract’s cited funds must be the correct appropriation for the contract’s purpose.
• Authorized personnel must sign the contract before the appropriation expires.

Enduring Lesson

USACE may only obligate funds in accordance with its own authority.

Importantly, USACE can only obligate funds in accordance with its own authority, even if the customer has different funding authority. For example, in September 2010, USAID set aside one-year funds (expiring at the end of the year) for USACE to execute a project. When USAID ran out of time to formally send USACE the funds, it obligated the funds in a special account allowing carryover until the next fiscal year. USACE was unable to use the funds the following year when USAID wanted to provide them because USACE did not have similar authority to carry over and subsequently obligate the funds.

2.4 Accrued Expenditures

After the district incurs an obligation, the contractor performs the work and sends an invoice requesting payment. The responsible USACE person who ordered the work and who can validate its performance (usually the project manager or resident engineer) completes either a receiving report or approves a progress payment (Engineer Form 93, Payment Estimate-Contract Performance). This creates an accrued expenditure or account payable in CEFMS.

The same person should not order and receive goods; another authority (such as a contracting officer or supervisor) must be included in this process to provide a check and balance.

2.5 Disbursements

The United States Department of Treasury disburses funds to the contractor after the USACE Finance Center certifies the invoice or Engineer Form 93.

2.6 Fund Flow

As the district receives funds, they sequentially flow through CEFMS. Every dollar entering the district follows a similar path. Each funding step must occur in sequence:

1. At the district, certify availability (purpose, time, and amount)
2. Commitment
3. Obligation
4. Expenditure
5. Disbursement
3. Appendixes

3.1 Appendix A. Common Financial Resources

Table 13 A-1. Common financial resources

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<td>Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Manual 37-100</td>
<td>Financial Management</td>
<td>Common departmental appropriations and codes for reporting unexpired and expired funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>Title 41 USC, Section 23</td>
<td>Orders or Contracts for Material Placed with Government-Owned Establishments Deemed Obligations</td>
<td>Authority for project orders</td>
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<tr>
<td>ER 37-1-26</td>
<td>Acceptance and Use of Project Orders</td>
<td>Prescribes the conditions and terms for USACE commands to issue and accept project orders</td>
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<td>Reimbursable Operations, Policy, and Procedures: Project Orders</td>
<td>• Regulations governing project orders • Definitions</td>
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<td>MCA funding account types</td>
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<td>AR 420-1</td>
<td>Army Facilities Management (Rapid Action Revision 002, 24 AUG 2012)</td>
<td>• Policies, responsibilities, and business practices for Army military construction, including major military construction, unspecified minor military construction, Army family housing, non-appropriated funded construction and facility acquisition with both military construction and other than appropriated funds • Project funding limitations • Project authorization approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA PAM 420-1-2</td>
<td>Army Military Construction and Non-Appropriated Funded Construction Program Development and Execution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA PAM 420-11</td>
<td>Project Definition and Work Classification</td>
<td>• Provides guidance in project definition and performance of work classification by authorized entities • Explains procedures to promote uniform classification of work interpretation Army-wide • Maintenance and repair OMA funding limitations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13 A-1. Common financial resources (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title 10 USC, Section 2805</td>
<td>Unspecified Minor Construction</td>
<td>Authority to execute unspecified minor military construction projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD FMR 7000.14-R, v. 12, Ch. 27</td>
<td>Special Accounts, Funds, and Programs</td>
<td>Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funding limitations – Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Instruction 32-1032</td>
<td>Planning and Programming Appropriated Funded Maintenance, Repair, and Construction Projects</td>
<td>Air Force funding limitations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Appendix B. In-House Costs

In-house costs are those charged to customers or incurred on direct appropriations, especially labor. In-house costs include the following:

- Planning and design:
  - Related to construction
  - Not related to construction
- Supervision and review:
  - Of architect-engineer design
  - Of in-house design
- Construction contracts supervision and administration
- Design during construction: design changes occurring after construction is initiated, including design extensions, plan preparations, specifications, and cost estimates for change orders
- Value engineering
- Miscellaneous: all others, including mobilization, contracting division fees for job order contract actions, computer-aided drafting and design training, and reimbursable work unrelated to design or construction

Supervision and Administration Rates

HQUSACE sets S&A rates. Within USACE, the basic rule is that all DOD-funded traditional MILCON or traditional O&M-funded work is subject to a flat rate for S&A. The flat rate does not depend on the individual appropriations, but rather on the nature of the project and program involved. Executing flat-rate traditional MILCON on an at-cost basis is, therefore, a deviation from standard USACE accounting practices, must be authorized by HQUSACE, and is used
only in special circumstances significantly outside of normal cost/risk tolerances for MILCON or O&M-type work and associated flat rates. In these cases, USACE must obtain a waiver from HQUSACE resource management and enter into an appropriate formal agreement with the customer. Districts and divisions must work with HQUSACE RMs, the program and project management division, and contracting officer to determine when the at-cost method is warranted and an appropriate rate for billing and accounting purposes.

Appropriate S&A rates ensure the district recoups full costs, including projects at close-out. The district requires higher rates in contingencies to account for increased contingency costs. A flat rate is not always appropriate for contingency construction, which, if not subject to the USACE standard flat rate for OCONUS construction, is to be charged at cost. S&A rates will vary with many actors, including fiscal year, country, contingency operation, etc. The following rates are a few examples of percentagages that applied to fiscal year 2013 Afghanistan construction projects:

- MILCON: 7.7 percent
- O&M: 12.0 percent
- Afghanistan National Army infrastructure: 9 percent
- Afghanistan National Army sustainment: 18 percent
- Afghanistan National Police Infrastructure: 9 percent
- Afghanistan National Police Sustainment: 18 percent

(Note: Sustainment projects tend to be of smaller value but the costs to oversee these projects are not proportionately lower compared to overseeing large infrastructure projects. Therefore, a special S&A rate higher than the standard flat rate for construction may be appropriate in certain circumstances.)

Exempt (Actual Cost) Supervision and Administration

Although the complete list is more extensive, actual cost S&A rates apply to the following:

- Construction performed for agencies or performed with special contingency-related appropriations
- Non-appropriated funds (Army, Air Force, etc.)
- Joint operating concept delivery orders (may be flat-rate as well)
- Foreign military sales (see Figure 13 B-1)/foreign military financing
USACE OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS PLAYBOOK

Figure 13 B-1. Representatives from USACE conduct a site visit of Umm Qasr pier and seawall in the Al Basrah Province of southern Iraq in May 2010. Umm Qasr was the first foreign military sales project for USACE in Iraq. The foreign military sales program allows the host nation to pay the U.S. government for construction and supplies related to its military.

3.3 Appendix C. Glossary of Common Resource Management Terms

**Accounting classifications** (fund cites) are codes used to manage appropriations and administratively control funds. Accounting classifications identify the appropriation (and thus its purpose) and the funds availability period.

**Administrative control of funds** (or funds control) is a system to ensure obligation and expenditure of federal funds, do-not-exceed amounts, time constraints, and purposes as established, imposed or intended by law, statutes, directives, instructions, policies, procedures, regulations, etc.

**Allocations, allotments, and apportionments** are formal federal fund subdivisions established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other federal entities as funds flow downward from higher headquarters.

**Appropriation Act** is legislation that gives legal authority to spend or obligate money from the United States Department of Treasury. Appropriation bills originate in the U.S. House of Representatives who grant the money approved by authorization acts; however, an appropriations act may not appropriate the full amounts permissible under the authorization.

**Appropriations** are federal funds identified by unique four digit codes, referred to as Treasury Account Numbers. In CEFMS, the field is named “appropriation symbol.” Appropriation symbol examples are 2020 for OMA and 3122 for construction general (civil works).

**Authorization Act** is an act of Congress that permits a federal program or activity to begin or continue from year to year. It sets limits on funds that can be appropriated, but does not grant funding, which must be provided by a separate congressional appropriation. A resource manager requires both an authorization act and accompanying appropriation act to obligate or expend funds.
Canceled or closed appropriations are appropriations that are no longer available for any purpose. An appropriation closes or cancels five years after it expires. Non-expiring appropriations do not close.

Customer order is an incoming reimbursable order from another USACE district, government agency, or non-federal customer providing funding for work to be performed. Government customers generally provide orders via MIPR (within DOD) or equivalent (from non-DOD federal customers), but may also include orders from non-federal customers if accompanied by advance funds.

Direct funds are appropriated funds allocated by Congress to USACE for direct programs. USACE receives direct funds via FADs from HQUSACE.

Direct programs are activities/customers to which USACE provides core missions, including legislatively mandated programs/projects/activities. USACE commands receive congressionally appropriated funds directly from OMB.

Expired appropriations are appropriations no longer available for new obligations, but which retain fiscal identity and are available to pay and adjust (modify) obligations made during the appropriation’s period of availability. Although most appropriations expire, some are non-expiring (“no year appropriations”) and remain available until expended. Most USACE civil works appropriations are non-expiring, as are foreign military sales and foreign military financing appropriations.

Funding account is a specific designation for depositing funds, available for a designated purpose, amount and sometimes a specific period. A FAD for direct funds, or a MIPR, interagency agreement, advance funds, or other reimbursable order supports a funding account.

Non-appropriated funds are cash and other assets received by a non-appropriated fund instrumentality from sources other than monies appropriated by Congress. Non-appropriated funds are primarily sourced from the sale of goods and services to military personnel, dependents, and authorized civilians.

Obligation is any act legally binding the government to make payment. Obligations represent the amounts of orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions during an accounting period that will require payment during the same or a future period.

Period of availability is the limited time in which appropriated funds can be used, usually coinciding with the fiscal year. If activities do not obligate the funds during the period of availability, the funds expire and generally are unavailable for new obligations thereafter. The period of availability constrains the time for awarding contracts, and obligating and expending in-house actions.

Project order is a specific, definite order for in-house services issued between DOD components under the authority contained in Title 41 USC 23. When accepted, the order obligates appropriations for the full amount and for the full performance period, similar to contractually obligated appropriations. Project orders only apply to DOD components, and generally have many restrictions on their use.
**Reimbursable, reimbursable service, or reimbursable work** refers to USACE work fully funded by the requesting activity and is payable to the USACE activity performing the work. USACE performs reimbursable work through a reimbursable order for federal customers and advance funds for non-federal customers.

**Reimbursable order** is a financing method in the form of a funding document. Reimbursable orders identify funds from another federal agency treasury account and that agency provides USACE obligation authority via a funding document (e.g., MIPR). USACE incurs costs when it accepts reimbursable orders, then bills the customer for reimbursement.

**Reprocurement** refers to pursuing a replacement contract for a contract terminated for contractor default or for the government’s convenience.

**References**


Appropriations Acts (provisions pertaining to contingency operations).


Title 10 United States Code (USC) 114(a), *Authorizations Required*.

Title 10 USC 2801, *Definitions*.

Title 10 USC 2802, *Military Construction Projects*. 

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Title 10 USC 2804, Contingency Construction.

Title 10 USC 2807, Architectural and Engineering Services and Construction Design.

Title 10 USC 2808, Construction Authority in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency.

Title 10 USC 2805, Minor Military Construction.

Title 10 USC (other sections in this general group of statutory provisions, as appropriate).

Title 31 USC 1301(a), Purpose Statute.

Title 31 USC 1502(a), Statute Pertaining to Time (availability for an appropriation for new obligations).

Title 31 USC 1535, Economy Act, 02.
Chapter 14

Acquisition

Introduction

This chapter describes the special character of acquisition and contracting during a military contingency. However, even during contingency conditions, basic procurement tenets and contracting rules still apply and must be followed. There are three federal procurement tenets that guide the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contracting officers:

1. **Transparency**, documenting all decisions and strategies
2. **Competition**, helping ensure fairness and reasonable prices
3. **Ethical conduct**, ensuring USACE spends tax dollars with integrity

Due diligence in the above three tenets results in fair competition, the best value at reasonable prices, and greater resource availability (such as personnel, funds, and time) to support USACE missions and the warfighter.

**Enduring Lesson**

Standard contracting rules continue to apply during contingencies; contracting professionals must adhere to these rules even when under operational pressure to obligate and award.

1. **Acquisition in the Contingency Environment**

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) applies equally in both peacetime and wartime. Standard FAR requirements are not relaxed within the contingency environment. However, the FAR does contain procedures the contracting professional may use to expedite the acquisition process and contracting during contingency operations. These procedures provide contingency contracting officers with added flexibility to respond to contingency requirements. The contracting officer should know these specific procedures of the FAR before deploying into the contingency environment. These procedures include:

- Specific exceptions to competition (FAR Part 6)
- Micro-purchase threshold increased to $30,000 for any contract action to be awarded and performed or purchased outside the United States (FAR 2.1)
• Class deviations by the United States Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

### Enduring Lesson

Before deploying, contingency contracting officers should understand established procedures in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, which are used to expedite the acquisition process during contingencies.

2. Contracting Organization

The contingency engineer district (CED) and contingency division contracting organization require appropriate organization and staffing for full effectiveness (see Figure 14-1). A senior contracting professional must serve as chief. The organization minimally requires pre-award, post-award services and oversight branches.

![Figure 14-1. Gulf Region Division contracting team, March 2007, Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq](image-url)
Enduring Lesson
Ensure sufficient staffing levels to maintain effectiveness during periods of rest and recuperation and unexpected curtailments.

The integrated manning document should allow for sufficient staffing to ensure all functional areas continue operating regardless of absences due to rest and recuperation leave and unexpected curtailments. Hiring should be centralized and conducted by a contracting professional because of the stringent requirements for the 1102 series.

The contingency division offers contracting personnel continuity that the deployed contingency engineer district generally cannot maintain because of tour length and personnel rotations. This continuity is an important benefit the division brings to the contingency contracting community.

3. Contracting Business Practices
3.1 Leadership and Supervision

The contracting organization must have clear, documented business rules, and a clear chain of command with adequate risk management and oversight to monitor contract execution. A key feature of this oversight is direct supervisory interaction and guidance. The contracting chain of command should be well understood by all organization members and all actions should be managed within this oversight structure. Leadership should correlate assignments and magnitude of warranted contract staff authority to the supervisory structure. High risk is introduced when contract warrant authority operates separately from the contracting supervisory structure.

The contingency division establishes policy and coordinates among functional chains, implementing guidance specific to the contingency theater of operations. The contingency division also standardizes contract oversight procedures including service contracts, especially with multiple CEDs.

3.2 Control Procedures

The contracting organization must periodically review control procedures, ensuring they remain valid and effective for the current situation. The division should conduct staff assistance visits at least three times a year. When possible, assistance visits should include assets from contracting, project management, and engineering and construction (E&C).

Transparency is an important contracting business practice. All contracting professionals should document their decisions and actions, maintaining a clear audit trail. The contingency division and/or Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) should vet responses to audits and investigations. Complete documentation by all contracting professionals may protect the government in what may turn out in hindsight to appear to be a poor business deal.
3.3 Contracting Reachback

Like other functional areas, contingency contracting depends on reachback, especially during pre-award for major services and some construction. Successful reachback requires extensive, regular, and recurring training for both reachback and deployed districts. Successful contracting reachback also requires proactive communication, tracking, and reporting through project management, and project managers must be assigned both forward and rear.

4. Contract Work Acceptance

4.1 Accepting Projects and Acquisitions

In contingency contract construction, USACE’s first decision is whether to accept a project or acquisition. The Quality Management System Process 1000 outlines USACE’s work acceptance process. For each contingency, USACE follows the guidance of an assigned executive agent. The Army was the executive agent for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Just as each contingency’s joint task force organization adapts to the specific mission, the theater contracting hierarchy also reflects the contingency operation. During OIF and OEF, USCENTCOM designated its Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) as the contracting lead. C-JTSCC maintains a set of acquisition instructions for the USCENTCOM AOR, including the requirement to comply with theater business clearance requirements in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) policy. Acquisition instructions are issued under the authority of FAR 1.301, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 201.304, and Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) 5101.304. Although the USCENTCOM acquisition instruction does not apply directly to USACE, C-JTSCC must authorize USACE to contract using its theater business clearance process and USACE must follow appropriate procedures. In accordance with DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction, USACE is the lead construction agent for USCENTCOM and provides construction support services throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.

4.2 Service and Supply Acquisitions

During OIF and OEF, deployed USACE personnel expended substantial resources working service and supply acquisition and oversight outside of the USACE core competencies. When contracting for services outside its core competencies, USACE has difficulty resourcing post-award surveillance and oversight for the contract’s life cycle.
Further, USACE designed its project management business process and automated tools (such as the Project Management Business Process Automated Information System [P2] and the Resident Management System [RMS]) to manage projects with specified beginning and end dates and interim milestones. These tools do not adapt well to managing recurring services.

In hindsight, USACE should have directed these service and supply contracts to agencies better equipped to manage them (see section 4.3). To facilitate this, USACE must maintain relationships with these agencies between contingency operations so they may effectively plan for supporting USACE’s contingency requirements in future contingencies. USACE participates in USCENTCOM contingency exercises for this reason. Transatlantic Division (TAD) contracting officials participate in monthly meetings with USCENTCOM’s Theater Engagement Team, Command Logistics Procurement Support Board, Combating Trafficking in Persons Task Force, and Task Force 2010.

### 4.3 Other and Assisting Contract Organizations

The contracting agencies identified below also operate in the contingency theater. USACE contingency contracting officers must familiarize themselves with these agencies and leverage them to support missions outside of USACE’s core competencies, releasing USACE from executing these contracts internally.

**Logistics Civil Augmentation Program**

If the Army leads the contingency, the Army Materiel Command Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provides support shown in Table 14-1. Army Materiel Command is headquartered in Alexandria, VA.

**Air Force Contract Augmentation Program**

The Air Force’s version of LOGCAP is the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, administered by the Air Force Civil Engineering Center, Detachment 1, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL.

**Navy Global Contingency Contract**

The Naval Facilities Engineer Command in Pearl Harbor, HI, administers the Navy Global Contingency Construction Contract and the Global Contingency Services Multiple Award Contract, which assist with Navy-led contingencies.
United States Transportation Command

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, IL, provides air, land, and sea transportation for the DOD in both peacetime and war. USTRANSCOM coordinates missions worldwide with both military and commercial transportation resources using its three component commands: the Air Mobility Command (Air Force), Military Sealift Command (Navy), and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (Army).

Defense Logistics Agency

The Defense Logistics Agency assists with petroleum products and provides food, clothing, textiles, medical supplies, equipment, and construction equipment and supplies to government organizations.

Defense Contract Management Agency

Headquartered at Fort Lee, VA, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provides contract administration services for DOD and other authorized federal agencies. Pursuant to DFARS 242.202, DOD contracting activities retain administration for construction and architect-engineer services. The installation or tenant commander normally administers contracts for base, post, camp, and stations on military installations. DCMA often handles foreign military sales contracts and, if requested by the military department and agreed upon, administers contracts for a military installation.

Table 14-1. Support provided by the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Support/General Support Operations</th>
<th>Field Services</th>
<th>Other Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class I (Subsistence)</td>
<td>Billeting</td>
<td>Airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II (Clothing and Equipment)</td>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>Retrograde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III (Petroleum)</td>
<td>Food services</td>
<td>Engineering and construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV (Construction Material)</td>
<td>Operations and maintenance</td>
<td>Power generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V (Ammunition)</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI (Personal Demand Items)</td>
<td>Personnel and administrative</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII (Major End Items)</td>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>Maintenance and motor pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII (Medical Supplies)</td>
<td>Morale, welfare, and recreation</td>
<td>Medical services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IX (Repair Parts)</td>
<td>Mortuary affairs</td>
<td>Physical security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
General Services Administration

General Services Administration (GSA) supplies products (offices supplies and equipment, tools, cleaning supplies, paper products, etc.) and communications for U.S. government offices and provides transportation to federal employees. GSA assists with procurement for other government agencies. As part of this effort, it maintains the large GSA schedule, which other agencies can use to purchase goods and services.

USCENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command

C-JTSCC-awarded contingency contracts for supplies and services during OIF and OEF including construction projects usually valued at less than $1.5 million.

249th Engineer Battalion

The 249th Engineer Battalion provides power generation and support. Currently, tools to contract its services can be accessed through USACE’s Philadelphia District.

Self-Service Supply Centers

Self-service supply centers may be located on the forward installation. Deployed units may establish an account through the forward district’s logistics office.

Department of Defense Coordinated Acquisition Program

Discussed in DFARS Subpart 208.70, the DOD Coordinated Acquisition Program assigns contracting responsibility for certain commodities to a single department, agency, or the GSA.

5. Selecting the Contract Type

5.1 Regional Acquisition Strategy Board

The contingency division oversees the mission’s program requirements and the acquisition tools to meet those requirements. TAD accomplishes this with contracting and business operations co-chairing the Regional Acquisition Strategy Board (RASB). The RASB identifies division-wide shared needs for the current fiscal year (CFY), CFY+1 and CFY+2.

The RASB develops and recommends contracting strategies to enhance mission execution, better support customers, and executes other items of regional concern relative to the RBC’s acquisition mission. Some of the RASB’s specific duties include the following:

- Validating the division’s current and future workload
- Ensuring the division maintains its required technical competencies
- Identifying division-wide shared needs
- Facilitating in developing regional acquisition strategy plans
- Identifying small business opportunities
The RASB provides its recommendations to the project delivery team (PDTs), which then recommends to the contracting officer whether the contract should be fixed-price or cost-reimbursement. Before advising the contracting officer, the PDT must conduct current, accurate market research gathered through the Department of State, DOD, commercial, and industry sources. The PDT should also consider the use of incentives that may prove especially effective when innovation is needed to address mission challenges (including diminishing resources).

Cost-reimbursement contracts require evidence of adequate resources for post-award management and oversight throughout the contract’s life cycle. An enduring reachback district should manage cost-reimbursement contracts because the CED cannot retain necessary expertise and provide continuity in the contingency environment because of frequent personnel rotation.

### 5.2 Avoiding Overdependence on Cost-Reimbursement Contracts

In the contingency’s early stages, contracting professionals may use cost-reimbursement contracts because of uncertainties in security, contingency duration, availability of labor, and materials, etc. Cost-reimbursement contracts are not as flexible as fixed-price contracts, and the government primarily bears this financial risk.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Enduring Lesson</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contracting officers should challenge dependence on cost-reimbursement contracts as the contingency matures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Converting to Fixed-Price Contracts

To ease this burden and provide equitable risk sharing, contracting officers should explore converting cost-reimbursement contracts to fixed-price contracts. As the contingency matures and requirements stabilize, contracting officers should instruct that customers gather and document metrics for their requirements. With stable conditions and known metrics, contractors can price and deliver against fixed-price contracts.

### Cost Comparison

Figure 14-2 illustrates an example cost comparison loosely based on two actual Afghanistan Engineer District contracts. In this scenario, USACE awarded Company A a firm, fixed-price contract for $36 million to build concrete masonry unit barracks and awarded Company B a $32.7 million cost-reimbursement contract for a similar project. Company B’s contract allowed reimbursement for supply, personnel, and additional fees. Although initially less expensive, Company B’s fixed-price contract ultimately was more expensive. Contracting officers should use cost contracts judiciously, as they require considerable post-award oversight.
5.3 Risk

Assessing Risk

When recommending contract type, the PDT must always assess risk, and document the assessment in the project management plan. The risk assessment should consider the contingency pre-initiation criteria such as the “Six Pack” (see Chapter 8, Project and Program Management) and any other contingency-specific risk factors. The “Six Pack” outlines critical planning elements to guide the PDT from initiation and planning to request for proposal development and, ultimately, to contract award. These critical planning elements include the following:

- Agreement on scope of requirements
- Appropriate project site
- Validated funds available
- Available water supply
- Physically accessible location
- Situationally secure construction location

See the construction contract type decision model in Appendix A of this chapter for more information.
Risks Associated with Multiple Projects Per Contract

All acquisition strategies involve risk and second- or third-order effects which the contracting professional must consider before engagement. Consolidating multiple projects into a single contract has had limited success in the contingency environment, and this may persist in future contingencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lesson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examine every major acquisition strategy for second- and third-order effects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Responsibility Determinations

Government contacting officers must determine that the contractor is responsible to perform the work. The contracting officer must conduct a pre-award survey, and consider and document all responsibility determination elements to determine a vendor’s ability to execute the contract. Contracting officers must consult several automated systems in determining responsibility in accordance with FAR Subpart 9.1. Lacking an information repository, the contracting officer will need to request information from offerors and bidders as a proposal submittal or after receiving proposals and bids. Appendix B of this chapter includes a sample request for information form.

At a minimum, the responsibility determination should ensure the contractor meets the seven requirements from FAR 9.1 (a partial list of sources that the contracting professional may consult for information are listed after each criterion). The contracting officer may need to consider other information as determined by the particular acquisition (e.g., content of audit reports, issues with obtaining business licenses, etc.):

1. Contractor possesses adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the ability to obtain them. Consult: Request banking or other information from the offeror. Request other responsibility-related information from the offeror if not received with proposal.

2. Contractor will deliver or perform according to the required schedule, considering all existing commercial and governmental business commitments. Consult: Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS) and past performance questionnaires, if required as part of proposal submittal.

3. Contractor possesses a satisfactory performance record. Consult: PPIRS; and past performance questionnaires if required as part of proposal submittal. Consider other “close-at-hand” information regarding past performance.


5. Contractor possesses the necessary organization, experience, accounting, and operational controls and technical skills, or the ability to obtain them (including, as appropriate, such elements as production control procedures, property control systems, quality assurance measures, and safety programs applicable to materials to be produced or services to be performed by the prospective contractor and subcontractors).
Consult: Organization structure showing command and control; key management resumes and initial schedule as part of proposal submittal. If not received with proposal, must request for responsibility determination.

6. Contractor possesses the necessary production, construction, technical equipment and facilities, or the ability to obtain them. Consult: PPIRS; may provide evidence of experience as part of proposal submission. If not received with proposal, must request for responsibility determination.

7. Contractor is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and regulations. Consult: DOD’s JCCS and Task Force 2010 or its equivalent vendor vetting organization.

7. Vendor Vetting

The contingency contracting process must vet potential business partners before they may be awarded contracts. Contracting officers must anticipate that many government contractors in a contingency environment may not have USACE’s best interests in mind. Some local and international contractors are expected to directly or indirectly fund insurgency activities with their revenues.

Concurrently, contracting officers must anticipate clashes with Western culture, under whose rules contracts are awarded and countries (especially in the USCENTCOM AOR) where corruption is a commonly accepted business practice. The contracting officer must counter insurgency support and corruption with available resources and contracting tools to include the following:

- Legislation, such as Section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2014 (P.L. 113-66), prohibiting contracting with the enemy
- Regulation and Policy, such as DFARS class deviations pertaining to contingency contracting
- Vendor vetting
- Responsibility determinations
- Terminations for default
- Suspension and debarment process

**Enduring Lesson**

The contracting officer must anticipate and oppose contractor corruption and fight insurgency support.
Potential debarment and suspension of individuals and firms is an active challenge in the contingency contracting environment. Suspension and debarring officials are reluctant to take action against foreign firms with no business ties (other than the contingency contract itself) to the United States.

8. Construction

8.1 Construction and Design Standards

Contingency operation success depends on appropriately managing expectations. For example, Western or international building specifications are not always appropriate in contingency environments. The contracting officer should consider local contractor capability, materials availability, and locally provided facility operations and maintenance, especially when USACE reachback is involved with design specifications. In host nations (HNs) with substandard or nonexistent building codes, future contingencies could avoid inappropriate and impractical building code standards if the combatant command developed a nation-specific contingency code, including construction and design standards.

Enduring Lesson

Combatant commands are encouraged to develop nation-specific building codes to avoid inappropriate and impractical construction and design specifications.

8.2 Construction in the Contingency Environment

Contingency construction usually requires more time than CONUS construction. USACE staff must educate stakeholders on local contractor construction capabilities and anticipated quality of service. Stakeholders, including internal USACE staff, construction firms, operational staffs, commanders, and customers must all have appropriate expectations. Customers purchase and deserve USACE’s best construction timeline estimates, rather than simply set schedules based on customer need. Milestone scheduling and management should be continuously updated and communicated to all stakeholders. Some additional considerations for contingency construction include use of bid and performance and payment bonds, use of liquidated damages, and Defense Base Act (DBA) insurance and security plans.

9. Protections for the Government

9.1 Bonds and Other Financial Protection

To protect the interest of the government and subcontractors (labor, material, etc.) the Miller Act (Title 40 United States Code [USC] 3131) and FAR 28.102 require that before any contract of more than $150,000 is awarded for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the federal government, a person must furnish to the government the following bonds, which become binding when the contract is awarded:

1. The **performance bond** is a bond with a surety satisfactory to the officer awarding the contract, and in an amount equal to 100 percent of the original contract price, for the protection of the government.
2. The **payment bond** is a bond with a surety satisfactory to the officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in carrying out the work provided for in the contract for the use of each person. The amount of the payment bond should equal 100 percent of the original contract price. The amount of the payment bond should not be less than the amount of the performance bond.

**Bonding Exceptions**

The Miller Act and the FAR also provide exceptions to the 100-percent bonding requirement. The Miller Act provides that a contracting officer may fully waive the performance bond and payment bond requirements for contract work to be performed in a foreign country if the officer finds it impractical for the contractor to furnish the bonds. Additionally, Title 40 USC 3134 provides waiver authority to the secretaries of the armed forces and transportation for certain contracts. The FAR also authorizes reduced bonding requirements. Under FAR 28.102-2(b)(1), the contracting officer has authority to decrease the amount of a construction performance bond by determining “that a lesser amount is adequate for the protection of the government.”

FAR 28.102-2(b)(2)(i) further provides that the contracting officer may decrease a payment bond’s amount by making a written determination “supported by specific findings that a payment bond [for 100 percent of the award amount] is impractical.” FAR 28.102-2(b)(2)(ii) provides that the amount of the payment bond must be no less than the amount of the performance bond. It is important to note that if the contract price increases, the government must secure any needed additional protection subject to the above contracting officer’s authority.

**Review of Available Bonding**

As part of market research, the contracting officer should include a review of available bonding in order to determine the amount, if any, of bonding available. The contracting officer should determine the level of bonding available to allow maximum competition among contractors. Contracting officers should not limit competition by making a determination based on the capacity of a limited number of firms that can obtain bonding. The contracting officer should include questions about available bonding in sources sought notices and during industry day forums. As experienced in the USCENTCOM AOR, USACE contracting officers should not be averse to reducing bonding requirements to 30 percent or less if that is all the market research reflects is available to industry.

The C-JTSCC issued guidance in its acquisition instruction (August 2013) waiving the requirement to obtain performance and payment bonds for Afghanistan construction projects. Further, the C-JTSCC acquisition instruction states,

> [It] has been determined that the requirement for both performance and payment bonds would effectively eliminate Afghan firms from the competitive process. In addition, it is impracticable to obtain a performance and payment bond in Afghanistan because there are no specific business establishments to provide this service.

USACE contracting officers will likely reach the same conclusion, but must document the determination to waive or reduce performance and payment bonds. The contracting officer should make any determination to waive or reduce bonding before solicitation issuance.
9.2 Liquidated Damages

Should the Procurement Include Liquidated Damages?

In accordance with DFARS 211.503, use of the liquidated damages clause is mandatory on all construction contracts exceeding $650,000, except cost-plus, fixed-fee contracts or for contracts where the contractor cannot control the work pace. The contracting officer is still required to complete the determination as required by FAR 11.501(a) and must document the determination in the contract file. In evaluating liquidated damages, the project manager coordinates with the customer to determine whether both of the following guidelines apply:

- The delivery or timely performance is so important that the government may reasonably expect to suffer damage if the delivery or performance is delinquent.
- The extent or amount of such damage would be difficult or impossible to estimate accurately.

The contracting officer must then consider the potential effects on pricing, competition, and contract administration. Contingency construction often involves the consideration of multiple factors, including personnel security and safety, materials availability, transporting construction materials to job sites, preventing construction material theft, and a compromised or non-existent banking system (for construction loans, etc.).

**Enduring Lesson**

Including liquidated damages in a contingency construction contract must be based on the government’s best interest.

Procurements Including Liquidated Damages

When procurements include liquidated damages, the contract file must record the basis for the liquidated damages and calculations for the damage amount. The record, at a minimum, should consider the following factors:

- The potential effect on pricing, competition, and contract administration
- Validating the work site’s relative stability (obtain a report from the intelligence officer)
- Validating reliable material supply and unimpeded ground movement
- Explaining why timely performance is so important that the government may reasonably expect damage from delinquent delivery or performance
- Determining the amount of such anticipated damage would be difficult or impossible to estimate or accurately prove
- The government’s daily expense rate, including supervision and administration and any other anticipated government expenses
The E&C office calculates liquidated damages based on actual anticipated damages; liquidated damages are not punitive. Rates should include the estimated daily cost of government inspection and supervision, and other expected expenses associated with delayed completion.

The contracting officer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate liquidated damages. If the contract contains a liquidated damages clause and the contracting officer is considering terminating the contract for default, the contracting officer should promptly attempt to obtain contractor performance or terminate the contract and repurchase (see FAR Subpart 49.4). Swift contracting officer action will prevent excessive loss to defaulting contractors and protect the government’s interests.

10. Special Considerations for Overseas and Contingency Acquisitions

10.1 USACE Contracting Requirements in a Contingency

Potential requirements that may be satisfied through contingency contracts include the following:

- Construction:
  - With government- or contractor-provided design
  - Can be discrete, small-scale projects, or large-scale projects, in number, magnitude, and complexity of facilities requirements
  - Vertical or horizontal

- Architect-engineer services

- Construction management services using local national support (personal services if authorized, or employed through the embassy)

- Service contracts, if not available through Army or DOD, may include the following:
  - Life support, if LOGCAP is not available
  - Transportation services if USTRANSCOM or GSA cannot provide those services
  - Generator maintenance
  - Power generation
  - Security services, both static and mobile, to allow access to construction sites if not prohibited by the HN, and if not supplied by military forces
  - Operations and maintenance if not provided by Army or LOGCAP
10.2 Defense Base Act Insurance

DBA insurance is a congressionally mandated workers compensation insurance program effective since 1941 and administered by the Department of Labor. Federal law requires contractors and subcontractors to buy DBA insurance for employees working outside the 50 states, unless the contractor provides a comparable self-insurance program approved by the Department of Labor, or the Department of Labor issues a DBA waiver (see FAR 28.305). Waivers do not apply to U.S. citizens or foreign nationals hired in the United States. A waiver will not be granted if no comparable local compensation law exists in the HN.

Because of experience in OIF and OEF, and findings of the DOD, Army Audit Agency, and the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, USACE should not require contractors to separately price DBA insurance, use cost-reimbursement contract line item number (CLIN) for DBA insurance premiums, or use a single-source DBA provider.

Although using a separately priced CLIN allowed gathering cost data so contracting officers knew the payment amount to withhold if the contractor did not prove that it had acquired a DBA policy, withholding the notice to proceed was much more effective. Further, identifying a separate CLIN per contract opposed the industry practice of administering or rebating insurance premiums by contractor rather than by contract or task order. This practice caused potential funds to commingle and potential Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations. Deleting the DBA insurance premiums as a separate CLIN allowed contractors to treat the costs in accordance with their standard company accounting practices, as well as eliminating potential ADA issues.

Using cost-reimbursement CLINs added to the overall project cost by requiring continuous actions by the USACE Finance Center, contracting, resource management, office of counsel, and project management personnel. USACE began using a single provider because only three providers were available, and because USACE needed to leverage lower premiums paid by larger firms to offset potential high costs by smaller, less-established firms. The market shows these issues are no longer relevant and contractors should be free to obtain DBA insurance from any viable source. USACE believes market competition will assure fair and reasonable premiums for all size firms.

Before issuing a notice to proceed, post-award contracting officers must verify valid policies by obtaining copies of paid DBA insurance premium invoices for prime and subcontractors. Contracting officers must also verify the task order or contract number is on policy or endorsement and that prime contractors understand their responsibility for ensuring all tier subcontractors have adequate DBA insurance.

If a contractor fails to maintain DBA coverage, the contracting officer must take progressively more serious action to address and resolve the contractor’s non-compliance with its contract’s DBA insurance requirements. These progressive steps include the following:

1. Issue a suspension-of-work or stop-work order
2. Withhold progress payments
3. Issue cure notice (or show-cause notice, if applicable)
4. Terminate the contract for default

### 10.3 Security Plans

In Section 1040 of the technical specifications in the contract, the project manager/technical section requires the contractor to provide a security plan. It is imperative that the project manager considers the threat assessment and involves the operations or security office in the bidability, constructability, operability, environmental, and sustainability review to ensure inclusion of any contingency-specific requirements in this specifications section. The project manager should also ensure that the operations and security office reviews the security plan submitted by the contractor for compliance with local laws and regulations and U.S. government and contingency specific requirements.

Many customer requirements include construction of sensitive compartmented information facilities, and other projects require certain contractor personnel to have U.S. SECRET or higher-level security clearances; in both of these instances, it is imperative that the PDT work with the customer to complete a Department of Defense Form 254, *Contract Security Classification Specification*, in draft form prior to releasing solicitations (and to include the form in the solicitations), and in final form as an attachment to the subsequent contract awards. Classification of information may present significant challenges, depending on the end user’s clearance level.

### 10.4 Combating Human Trafficking

USACE upholds the U.S. zero-tolerance policy for human trafficking and expects its contractors and subcontractors to do likewise. USACE uses all the contractual remedies at its disposal, including the strong remedies under FAR 52.222-50, against those engaging in this activity. Construction field office personnel should familiarize themselves with the two required contract clauses: FAR 52.222-50, *Combating Human Trafficking*, and Acquisition Instruction 22.1, *Prohibition Against Human Trafficking, Inhumane Living Conditions, and Withholding of Employee Passports*.

These clauses obligate each contractor to notify its employees and subcontractors of the U.S. human trafficking policy and of the actions the U.S. government will pursue against policy violators. The clauses also require notifying the contracting officers of any allegations that a contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee has violated this policy and the actions taken against such violators. Contractors must further ensure all subcontracts include the substance of FAR 52.222-50 and Acquisition Instruction 22.1, including flow-down provisions. The clauses require that information on the U.S. human trafficking policy be passed to every employee working on or being transported to work on USACE job sites or projects.

### 10.5 Ensuring Subcontractor Payments

Recent contingency experience has shown that many prime contractors fail to timely pay their subcontractors, or in some cases, pay them at all. Several factors exacerbate this problem, such as limited use of payment bonds in a contingency, local national prime contractors with a lack of internal funding, and prime contractors assuming too many concurrent contracts. In accordance with FAR 52.232-5(c), contracting officers and their representatives must insist that
the prime contractors’ progress payment requests be accompanied by a certification of payments to subcontractors, and be prepared to use all allowable remedies to ensure timely payments to subcontractors. The principles under FAR 32.112-1(b) and (c) should guide the contracting officers in determining which course to take upon notification from subcontractors that they have not been paid by their prime contractors.

10.6 Capacity Development

Part of the “money as a weapons system” strategy is stabilizing the economy using local supplies and services and providing jobs for local citizens who will spend most of their earnings locally (see Figure 14-3). This mimics the Stafford Act for CONUS contingencies and resembles socio-economic programs in the U.S. where certain projects may allow only local competition. Using local HN firms may require construction field personnel to offer similar support as that offered to 8(a) Business Development Program firms in the U.S. with regard to preparing schedules, invoices, and entering data in the RMS, among other items.

Figure 14-3. Construction business conference hosted by Transatlantic Division contracting, Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2010. Participating were approximately 400 contractors, the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, and about 35 government personnel. The speaker is presenting her award-winning project on improving Afghan agriculture. (Photograph by William M. Weaver)
11. Oversight

Effectively overseeing the diverse technical and logistical functions performed by U.S. government contractors requires personnel with training, skills, and abilities in contracting officer representative (COR) oversight and in the use of local nationals for quality assurance.

Ineffective transitions between the contracting and construction branches after contract award can negatively affect project management, especially when using reachback in pre-award. To improve post-award contract oversight, an effective project transition should be provided, contract and oversight documentation should be improved, and trained administrative contracting officers and CORs need to be available — planning is done early to ensure at least one administrative contracting officer is located in each area office.

11.1 Contracting Officer Representative Oversight

CORs technically oversee the contractor’s performance. However, because of high personnel turnover and difficulty in maintaining trained, qualified technical personnel, the government may have difficulty maintaining effective technical oversight of contractor performance during a contingency. In OEF and OIF, USACE mitigated this by using local national personal services contractors to assist in providing quality assurance oversight. USACE can also use automated data systems such as the RMS to document and plan oversight efforts.

11.2 Using Local Nationals for Quality Assurance

During OIF and OEF, USACE often contracted with local nationals for project quality assurance (see Figure 14-4). Trained by USACE in quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) and construction administration, local nationals provided many advantages, including:

- Increasing the local engineering capacity
- Understanding local customs
- Speaking the local language
- Utilizing local nationals from the local area reduces risk from rival tribes and insurgents
- Cost effective labor
- Representing USACE at otherwise inaccessible project locations and reporting on project conditions
Enduring Lesson
Contracting with local nationals as quality assurance personnel brings many benefits to USACE projects and programs.

![Figure 14-4. Then, BG David Halverson, Deputy Commanding General Support for Multi-National Division–Baghdad, talks with residents near a local power generator at Adamiyah, Iraq, during OIF in 2006. The residents of the Baghdad neighborhood were without power for three months. BG Halverson spent the day visiting essential services projects and gathering feedback.]

12. Contract Closeout

USACE encountered many final contract closeout issues at the end of OIF. Unresolved issues on open contracts created a large administrative burden on the CED staff. Complicating this matter, many of the personnel with knowledge of the contracts had moved on, leaving a gap in institutional knowledge for follow-on personnel. Future USACE contingency contracting teams should anticipate difficulties with contract closeouts by forming a special PDT, which focuses on ensuring all actions required by the FAR and agency regulations are properly completed. Generally, this is to ensure that the following actions are complete:

- Proper acceptance of project
- Contractor receives final performance rating
- Final payment is made
- Contractor signs and completes a release of claims
After these four steps are complete, the contracting officers close the contract and the contract documents are archived. Inefficient contract closeouts result from spending significant time locating critical contract documents, processing an unusual number of requests for equitable adjustment and claims, and difficulty identifying the correct systems and personnel for handoff. While standard procedures and tasks for completing project closeouts exist, the increased level of anticipated requests for equitable adjustments and claims requires extra resources and training.

During OIF, USACE Gulf Region District staff consumed inordinate amounts of time locating physical project files. Many files were still dispersed across field offices, while others had been sent to area offices or the district. The CED maintained a consistent contract filing system for hard-copy files, but digital copies were less organized. All of this resulted in extra time trying to locate documents critical to the contract closeout process. Additionally, to be prepared to defend contract claims, it is imperative to develop and maintain an effective and reliable electronic and hard-copy recordkeeping and preservation system to comply with strict court rules on records retention and document production in contract litigation.

**Enduring Lesson**

Difficulty in contract closeout should be anticipated. A special project delivery team should be formed for closeouts focused on requests for equitable adjustments, customer interface, and reporting.

Finally, difficulty identifying an appropriate point of contact for specific handoffs or process/data ownership also slowed the closeout process. Forming a contract closeout PDT early will help mitigate some of these issues, as would employing and enforcing a consistent knowledge management plan from the beginning of the contingency. See Appendix C of this chapter for a project closeout checklist.
13. Appendixes

13.1 Appendix A. Construction Contracting Decision Model

![Construction Contracting Decision Model Diagram]

**Figure 14 A-1. Construction contracting**
13.2 Appendix B. Responsibility Determination

**SECTION I - GENERAL**

1. TYPE OF COMPANY
   - CORPORATION SUBSIDIARY PROPRIETORSHIP PARTNERSHIP DIVISION OTHER (Specify)

2. YEAR ESTABLISHED:

3a. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PARENT COMPANY

3b. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SUBSIDIARIES

**SECTION II - BALANCE SHEET/PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT**

**PART A - LATEST BALANCE SHEET**

1. DATE
2. FILED WITH

3. FINANCIAL POSITION
   - a. Cash
   - b. Accounts Receivable
   - c. Inventory
   - d. Other Current Assets
   - e. Total Current Assets
   - f. Fixed Assets
   - g. Current Liabilities
   - h. Long Term Liabilities

**PART B - LATEST PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT**

1. CURRENT PERIOD
   - a. FROM:
   - b. TO:

3. NET SALES
   - a. Current Period
   - b. First prior fiscal year
   - c. Second prior fiscal year

4. NET PROFIT BEFORE TAXES
   - a. Current Period
   - b. First prior fiscal year
   - c. Second prior fiscal year

**PART C - OTHER**

1. FISCAL YEAR ENDS (Date):
2. total Liabilities
3. Net Worth

4. WORKING CAPITAL (Current assets less Current Liabilities)

5. RATIOS
   - a. CURRENT ASSETS TO CURRENT LIABILITIES
   - b. ACID TEST: Cash + Accounts Receivable - Current Liabilities
   - c. TOTAL LIABILITIES TO NET WORTH

**3. OTHER PERTINENT DATA**

Figure 14 B-1. Request for information for responsibility determination
### 13.3 Appendix C. Closeout Checklist

#### TAS/TAM – Closeout Procedure Checklist/Flowchart Checklist/Flow Chart -- Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Closeout Requirements</th>
<th>Team Responsible</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Action By (Name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Quality Assurance Requirements (Field Office)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Contractor provided O&amp;M training for new personnel (if applicable).</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Spare parts received and turned over to project (if applicable).</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Return of excess Government Furnished Property (GFP) (if no GFP on this contract check here__________________).</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Punch-list items complete.</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e Complete DD1354 (Property Transfer generated from RMS under the closeout tab), signed by AE and customer (Customer is determined by the PMI).</td>
<td>PE/PM/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f Contractor demobilized from site (KTR ID cards return to COR/security office).</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2 Contract Administration Requirements (Field Office / Area Office)** |                 |                |                  |
| a Final As-built drawings/CD-ROM sent to Engineering | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| b Final As-Built contract drawings provided to customer by serial letter (ATTN:__________________). Memo prepared in RMS under “Closeout Items” in Correspondence. | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| c Final O&M Manuals provided to customer by serial letter (ATTN:__________________). Memo prepared in RMS under “Closeout Items” in Correspondence. | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| d Update/complete mandatory milestone dates in the schedule Tab in RMS except for Contractor Final Payment, Project Fiscal completion, and the DD Form 1594 (Signed). (See attached page 4 of close-out checklist - RMS Closeout Milestone Guidance and Procedures). | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| e Warranties approved. Prepare notice of implementation of construction warranty and transfer extended warranties to customer. Upload signed letter to RMS/files. | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| f Acceptance Letter from the COR to the KTR stating the date of Acceptance/Substantial Completion. | PE/QA/COR        |                |                  |
| g Initiate Final Performance Evaluation (DD 2626) in RMS, (Required for contracts ≥ $650,000). Note: The DD Form 2626 Block 12 is signed by QA, PE or COR and Block 13 is signed by the RE or AE, except for Unsatisfactory Evaluation, which is signed in Block 12 by RE or AE, and Block 13 by the Contracting Officer. Include signed RMS generated DD 2626 in closeout package. | QA/PE/COR        |                |                  |

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**Figure 14 C-1. Closeout procedure checklist**
### TAS/TAM – Closeout Procedure Checklist/Flowchart Checklist/Flow Chart – Part 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Closeout Requirements</th>
<th>Team Responsible</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Action By (Name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>h</strong> Final Payment Certificate signed by the COR, RE, or the AE (prepared in RMS under “Closeout” Tab).</td>
<td>PE/COR/AE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>i</strong> Reviews retainage and/or liquidated damages on all contractual obligation lines. &lt;br&gt; 1. If there are LDs to assess, process MFR with KO’s signature. 2. Annotate LDs to be assessed and/or refund of any appropriate retainage in the remarks on Final ENG93 invoice. This has to be done before the invoice is approved by the KO (LDs can only be assessed in CEFMS by the KO after pushed from RMS).</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>j</strong> Provide Final Pay Package to Contractor for signature and return. Package includes: &lt;br&gt; - Release of Claims Cover letter - prepare in RMS under “Closeout” Tab  &lt;br&gt; - Release of Claims &lt;br&gt; They should be returned signed with a signed ENG93 along with the Prompt Payment Certification if Earnings by Obligation (not needed if refunding retainage). The invoice is ready to be accepted in RMS if ALL Documents have been received.</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>k</strong> Forward ALL CLOSE-OUT DOCUMENTS BELOW to the CAB electronically: &lt;br&gt; * Estimate Email Account and CC respective Area Office Admin and OE POC &lt;br&gt; * Closeout Checklist/settlement day (date received from KTR, the ENG93) &lt;br&gt; * Release of Claims (with total release amount-should match &lt;br&gt; * Prompt Payment Certification (not for refund of retainage) &lt;br&gt; * Final Payment Certificate &lt;br&gt; * RMS Milestones Report &lt;br&gt; * Signed DD1354 &lt;br&gt; * Signed DD2626 Contractor Performance Evaluation</td>
<td>PE/OE/AE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 14 C-2. Closeout procedure checklist (continued)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Closeout Requirements</th>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Action By (Name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Box all hard copy project files (everything pertaining to project). Copy all electronic files (including email*) onto a CD. Annotate the contract number on each box to be shipped. Ship all contract files to the CAB Closeout Coordinator.  * Although difficult, maintaining complete email files is legally important. Many people will have email pertaining to a particular contract, and ensuring all email is captured and copied for the official file can be quite complex. E-Discovery rules now apply in contract litigation, requiring that all electronic records be preserved and produced when requested. This is a monumental task but one that we must deal with – agencies can be sanctioned severely for not preserving and producing relevant electronic records in the discovery phase of litigation. Contract professionals may want to discuss email record-keeping strategies with the Office of Counsel at the beginning of a contract.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROJECT/CONTRACT FILES: QA/QC plans, reports, inspections; Project Scope Change; Photos, Maps, Designs, Fact Sheets, PNM (pre/post for MODS); Emails, Meeting minutes/notes and Sign-in sheets; Correspondence (RFI, LOC, Cure, etc.); Construction Schedules; Submittals (material, register, etc.); Actual Cost Documents; Beneficiary Occupancy Letter/Certificate; Safety plan, reports, AHA; Closeout Summary; and everything else pertaining to the project.</td>
<td>PE/QA/COR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contracting Officer’s Representative</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Contract Administration Requirements (CAB Section)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a CAB prints Final Payment Package documents, reviews for completeness and puts in folder with this Checklist attached to front. Check S&amp;A leakage, retainage, LDs, DBA refunds, CFR, etc.</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Complete CPARS and CCASS actions in RMS.</td>
<td>CAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c CAB forwards Final Payment Package to CETAM-Closeout mailbox (with electronic copy):  * ENG93 with contractor’s signature /settlement day (date received from KTR)  * Release of Claims (with total release amount-should match the ENG93)  * Prompt Payment Certification (not for refund of retainage)  * Final payment certificate  * RMS Milestone Report  * Signed DD 1354 (property transfer document)  * Signed Form 2626 Contractor Performance Evaluation</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d REMIND the FIELD to box all hard copy project files (everything project). Copy all electronic files (including email) onto a CD. Send to Coordinator.</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e DISTRICT Contract/Project files boxed and shipped to TAM Closeout Coordinator.</td>
<td>CAB/CT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14 C-3. Closeout procedure checklist (continued)
### TAS/TAM – Closeout Procedure Checklist/Flowchart Checklist/Flow Chart – Part 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Closeout Requirements</th>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Action By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4</strong> TAM Contingency Closeout Section</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Prepare Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) Transfer Modification.</td>
<td>CT/TAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>TAM push Final ENG 93 to CEFMS from RMS.</td>
<td>TA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Contracting Officer signs documents and approves ENG 93 in CEFMS, retains copy for close out. Check “Final” and “Claims Released” boxes in CEFMS. (make sure LDs have been assessed in CEFMS before approving the final payment).</td>
<td>KO/TAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| d  | Signed final pay package scanned and emailed to Finance Center.  
   - ENG93 with contractor signature/settlement day  
   - Release of Claims  
   - Prompt Payment Certification | TA |           |
| e  | Contractor final payment actual date in RMS (check automatic download from CEFMS. If actual final payment date is not visible in RMS, confirms payment in CEFMS and change manually if needed). | TA |           |
| f  | Check S&A leakage, retainage, LDs, DBA refunds, CFR, etc.  
   **NOTE** If no S&A leakage, clear after FP made.  
   Confirm S&A percentage and income earned. | TA |           |
| g  | De-obligates all remaining funds (if applicable). | KO/TAM |           |
| h  | Prepare and finalize Contract Completion Statement (DD1594 and PD2). | TA |           |
| i  | Prepare and finalize Contract Closeout. | TA |           |

**Figure 14 C-4. Closeout procedure checklist (continued)**
### TAS/TAM – Closeout Procedure Checklist/Flowchart Checklist/Flow Chart – Part 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Closeout Requirements</th>
<th>Team Responsible</th>
<th>Date Completed</th>
<th>Action By (Name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>j Verify and input all milestones dates (i.e. Final Pay/ROC Letter, Actual Final Payment, Actual Fiscal Completion and Contractually Closed dates) in RMS and Reprint RMS Milestone Report for the closeout package.</td>
<td>TAM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| k Closeout Package, Final Payment Package and DD Form 1594 scanned and imported into RMS under Closeout – Contract Documents and titled “Final Payment Package”, Package to include these SIGNED AND DATED items:  
  - Signed DD 1594  
  - ENG93 with contractor signature  
  - Release of Claims  
  - Prompt Payment Certification  
  - Final payment certificate  
  - Updated RMS Milestone Report  
  - Signed DD 1354 (property transfer document)  
  - Form 2626 Contractor Performance Evaluation | TAM | | |
| l Send Notification and completed Closeout package above to the Estimate Mailbox (DLL-CETAS-PAY-ESTIMATES@usace.army.mil) | TAM | | |

**Contracting Officer**

**Date**

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Figure 14 C-5. Closeout procedure checklist (continued)
Figure 14 C-6. Closeout milestone guidance and procedures

References


United States Central Command, Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, USCENTCOM Acquisition Instructions, August 2012.

Department of Defense Joint Ethics Regulation 5500.7-R (Change date 17 NOV 2011).


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Chapter 15

Personnel Sourcing

Introduction

This chapter is designed to assist and enable sourcing officials in future contingency operations to benefit from past experiences. This chapter serves as a guide to highlight what sourcing initiatives that work and how to identify pitfalls in the sourcing arena. This chapter addresses sourcing peculiarities for the various labor categories, highlights enduring lessons about sourcing in the contingency environment, and provides insight about how USACE and the Transatlantic Division (TAD) provided sourcing for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Human resources (HR) professionals in future contingencies will probably need to adapt these processes to fit their specific situations. This chapter is provided to aid future contingency sourcing personnel perform the mission in less time, with fewer setbacks, and at a lower cost.

1. Choosing the Right Labor Category

During an overseas contingency operation (OCO), the government can select from several categories of staffing and labor. These sources may include military service members, U.S. government civilian employees, local national (LN) employees, U.S. contractors, employees of international firms, and employees of host nation (HN) firms. In the contingency environment, determining the appropriate type of labor to perform each activity requires considering a myriad of factors including, but not limited to, political, economic, capability and capacity, security, and available resources. Labor category decisions should result from a high-level, deliberative process.

1.1 Sourcing Officials Participate in Choosing the Labor Category

While choosing the most appropriate labor category, each contingency position is a corporate-level decision. Personnel responsible for sourcing must advise decision-makers on the probability that the position can be adequately sourced with the selected labor category. They can highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each category and describe the staffing challenges from a sourcing perspective.
1.2 The Right Combination: USACE, Schedule A, Contractor, Local Nationals

When the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) decides to use government employees, the sourcing official must consider positive and negative attributes of each labor category, ensuring an appropriate balance of USACE (see Figure 15-1), federal, Schedule A, and LN employees. Each category’s positive and negative attributes may not be immediately obvious to the organization’s leadership.

Figure 15-1. An electrical substation outside of Erbil, northern Iraq. This under-construction substation supplies electrical load to three area villages and supply power to local industrial customers. (Photograph by Jim Gordon)

2. Sourcing in the Contingency Environment

The ideal sourcing process ends with a qualified, motivated employee expertly performing duties in an assigned position. The process — from advertising a position to an employee performing a job — is long and difficult.
When the contingency division decides to perform an activity internally (i.e., using military service members, U.S. government employees, or direct-hire LN employees) sourcing presents a unique set of challenges. Some challenges arise from the unpredictability associated with a contingency mission, because factors influencing the sourcing requirement are less reliable (e.g., magnitude, skill set, timing, duration, and turnover). Other challenges result from the HR laws, regulations, practices, and protocols. This chapter discusses these challenges and highlights the lessons learned from past and ongoing contingency operations.

3. Sourcing Military Positions

The contingency engineer district (CED) consists of both military and civilian positions. Almost all of the military positions were specifically created and funded for the overseas contingency missions. Depending on the immediacy of need, duty location, and intra-service agreements, military personnel sources may include the following:

- Active component
- Reserve component:
  - Individual ready reserve
  - Troop program unit (with unit commander’s concurrence)
  - The 416th Engineer Contingency Response Unit
- National Guard
- Retiree recall

USACE fills most military positions using three mechanisms: the joint manning document (JMD), a request for forces (RFF) and reserve component mobilization teams. The supported combatant command and the Joint Staff source the CED’s JMD; the Department of Defense (DOD) then approves or disapproves these positions. The four service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) fill the approved positions and then deploy service members into theater. An RFF solicits a group of military personnel that deploys to theater as a team. The unit will consist of personnel with grade and military occupational skill to match the contingency division’s request.

The contingency division can also advertise unsourced positions with the United States Army Reserve (USAR) or the Army National Guard (ANG). In these instances, personnel from the USAR or ANG volunteer to fill an advertised position.

Personnel force innovation is a fourth, less-utilized sourcing mechanism. These vacancies are also filled by the USAR and ANG; however, the contingency division’s operational funds pay for these employees, rather than Army funds. Personnel force innovation vacancies are advertised to reservists from all branches of service.
The contingency division fills military positions mainly using three mechanisms, including
the joint manning document, a request for forces, and reserve component mobilization teams.

4. Sourcing Civilian Positions

The USACE wartime contingency staffing faces several unique difficulties. First, the continental United States (CONUS) USACE workforce is almost entirely civilian. While military personnel understand that overseas deployments may be required of them, USACE cannot compel civilian personnel to deploy. HR personnel require skill, incentives, and management to fill civilian positions that may place the employee in harm’s way.

4.1 Deployment Coordination Administrators

USACE must recruit for contingency civilian positions because all positions are voluntary. USACE established deployment coordination administrators (DCAs) in each major subordinate command (MSC) to solicit volunteers and help them complete predeployment requirements. OCO funds pay for the DCA concept, which has been successful in providing information and maintaining visibility over the volunteers.

Enduring Lesson

Provide job position return rights to any federal employee volunteering to deploy.

The DCAs nominate employees for contingency positions, defined, in this case, as positions paid with OCO funds. Volunteers selected for OCO assignments are reassigned to the contingency division at their current grade in a temporary duty (TDY) status. Although assigned to the contingency organization, their duty location remains their home station so they continue receiving the same base and locality pay. During OIF and OEF, USACE employees from Pacific Ocean Division, the Far East District and Japan District remained on their home station roles instead of being reassigned to the Transatlantic Division (TAD) because of housing allowances for their families.

4.2 Vacancy Announcements

In addition to staffing through DCAs, district positions may be filled through vacancy announcements. Applicants selected from Army vacancy announcements may be temporarily reassigned or temporarily promoted to the contingency district. These candidates have return rights to their permanent positions, meaning they may return at the end of the temporary assignment. During the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, applicants selected from Army announcements could choose either a TDY or temporary change of station (TCS) tour. Although DOD policy stated that employees would generally deploy in TDY status, TCS could be authorized for deployments longer than six months because of cost savings, increased employee morale, and job performance.
Vacancy announcements have different levels of exposure, and may be open to Army candidates only, candidates from all federal agencies, or all U.S. citizens.

Employees deploying in TCS status change their duty station to the overseas location and do not receive locality pay; however, they are eligible for other benefits, such as non-temporary storage of household goods and separate maintenance allowance. See Appendix A of this chapter for a list of sample benefits and entitlements.

4.3 Reimbursable Details

The contingency division may use reimbursable detail agreements to assign applicants selected from announcements open to all federal employees. In this case, the employee’s home agency retains the employee on its rolls while the CED funds the employee’s labor and benefits, which helps ensure the return rights of employees from other federal agencies because the employee remains on the home station rolls.

Reimbursable details can be time-consuming and confusing for the applicants and their home agencies. Although DOD required its agencies to provide return rights to any employee volunteering to deploy, future contingencies would benefit from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requiring this of all federal agencies. Vacancy announcements could then be open to all Federal applicants, without the need for reimbursable details. In addition, employees on reimbursable details do not receive relocation incentives unless their home agencies approve them because they are not assigned to USACE’s rolls, creating an inequity in employee treatment.

4.4 Schedule A Appointments

Schedule A appointments are a special authorization from OPM allowing expedited hiring for positions directly supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under the original Schedule A authority that expired on 01 OCT 2012, applicants were not required to compete through posted vacancy announcements. Schedule A employees are generally hired on 13-month term appointments. However, the revised Schedule A appointment authority issued on 12 OCT 2012, contained more stringent requirements, including the application of veterans’ preference. Agencies are to use other applicable hiring authorities, such as reinstatement eligibility and veterans hiring authorities, where possible. Generally, these additional restrictions apply only to positions in CONUS.

Curtailments, Voluntary

Because all civilian employees are volunteers, USACE cannot require them to complete their agreed-upon tours. Given this situation, voluntary tour curtailments are unavoidable, and employees give many reasons to curtail. USACE pays the relocation and recruitment incentives biweekly; employees who voluntarily curtail are entitled to retain any incentives already received. Complicating this issue, some employees give little notice before curtailing.
Management should remind employees requesting to curtail of their signed emergency essential agreement, in which they agreed to remain in position until properly relieved. Employees should provide maximum notice to avoid workforce gaps.

Curtailments, Involuntary

Reasons for involuntary curtailments include conduct, performance, medical, and lack of work or funds. During deployments, current federal employees will be on temporary reassignments, temporary promotions, or reimbursable details, and have permanent positions to which they may return. If an employee is curtailed for conduct or performance, the in-country commander generally provides the reason to the home station commander, who may take disciplinary action.

Tour Length Considerations for Schedule A Employees

Hiring officials should consider possible tour length projections when hiring Schedule A personnel. Schedule A employees typically receive a 13-month employment term and are protected as Tenure Group III employees if work or funding decreases eliminate their positions before the term expires.

Enduring Lesson

Timing, tour lengths, and number of Schedule A employees must be carefully considered to coincide with the decrease and eventual end of the contingency operations.

If an employee is separated before the tour ending date because of decreased workload or funding, reduction in force procedures apply. Reduction in force procedures do not apply when term employees separate on their appointment expiration dates.

Termination during the trial period (generally the first year after appointment) is relatively easy; after this period, supervisors must conduct more formal reviews and decisions.

Consistent Personnel Policy

Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) and the contingency division should establish standard and consistent deployment policy for all USACE elements. During OIF and OEF, employees questioned and complained about several policy inconsistencies among different USACE elements in theater. For example, one USACE element authorized per diem for deployed personnel, other USACE elements did not because meals, laundry services, etc., were all provided.

Enduring Lesson

HQUSACE and the contingency division should establish standard and consistent deployment policy for all USACE elements.
In other examples, one USACE element did not offer temporary promotions, whereas another did. Some elements viewed the 120-day assignment as beginning when an individual reported to the CONUS Replacement Center, while others started the clock upon arrival in theater.

5. Sourcing Local Nationals

5.1 Contract Hiring of Local Nationals

LN contract employees provide invaluable augmentation to the USACE workforce, thus minimizing the USACE footprint (see Figure 15-2). The Transatlantic Middle East District has been successful in using LNs as part of their long-term construction mission in their field offices in the Middle East.

![Image](image-url)

Figure 15-2. An Iraqi engineer inspecting construction at the Basrah Courthouse. USACE hired several hundred Iraqi engineers supporting the nationwide construction effort. Most of the U.S.-funded construction work in Iraq is accomplished by Iraqi contractors and workers with oversight by USACE and Iraqi engineers. (Photograph by Betsy Weiner)

One of the most important aspects of employment of LNs is that they can travel to sites that would be difficult for USACE personnel to access. For instance, the Afghanistan District North (TAN) and the Afghanistan District South (TAS) employed approximately 212 LNs under a personal services contract. This contract provided administrative, public affairs, engineering, quality assurance, logistics, facility maintenance, project management, travel assistance, realty specialists, and linguistics services, among others. Both TAN and TAS also relied on LN quality assurance representatives and employees in a variety of other fields, who served as an extension of the CED. Even so, LN contract employees cannot perform inherently governmental functions, such as signing contractual documents or supervising federal civilian employees.
5.2 Direct Hiring of Local Nationals

With support from DOD, TAD, TAN, and TAS explored directly hiring Afghan LN as USACE employees. If implemented, direct-hire authority could have augmented the civilian staff in TAN and TAS, provided continuity and institutional knowledge as the U.S. presence in Afghanistan decreased, and provided skills and knowledge to Afghan workers to allow them to maintain their facilities and equipment. The direct-hire program was never realized because establishing the program required prohibitive action and effort, including an in-depth cost/benefit analysis, designing, and implementing modifications to the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System, and finalizing a HR plan. In November 2010, the TAN and TAS commanders concluded that although the program had enormous potential benefits, they could not support the administrative burden on the in-country staff. Future contingency leaders may want to explore directly hiring LN early in the operation.

*Enduring Lesson*

Explore directly hiring LN early in the contingency operation.

A signed waiver from the designated approving authority and data owner is required before allowing any LN access to the USACE unclassified network and automation information systems. The waiver process may require up to a year for approval; therefore, early submission is necessary.

6. Sourcing High-Turnover Positions with Contractors

In Iraq, military and civilian personnel were typically assigned for six months to one year. The resulting high turnover was disruptive and hampered mission execution (i.e., new staff had much much to learn and a relatively short period of maximum performance). The result of the frequent rotations was that many key staff positions were filled by new people each month, often without overlap with outgoing personnel. Future contingency personnel may wish to consider using contractor personnel to mitigate the effect of high personnel turnover. Alternatively, personnel may need to consider extending the standard tour beyond six months.

*Enduring Lesson*

Consider using contractor personnel for selected activities to mitigate effects of high personnel turnover.

7. Sourcing Joint Organizations, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and Multiple Elements

7.1 Sourcing Joint Organizations

The sourcing and funding for joint organizations should be defined at the outset of the operation through a memorandum of agreement defining roles and responsibilities. The memorandum of agreement provides guidance and operational continuity that might otherwise be lost given the high staff turnover in contingency organizations.
7.2 Sourcing the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

The civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) is a mandatory program established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy to fill joint positions in theater (Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, Civilian Expeditionary Workforce). Currently, TAD assigns all USACE employees selected for CEW positions to an organization code on TAD’s rolls to ensure centralized funding, Administrative Personnel Processing Office (APPO) support, and consistent treatment with other deploying individuals.

7.3 Sourcing Multiple Elements

During the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies, HQUSACE requested TAD provide personnel to support various unique USACE elements in theater in addition to its organic positions. These entities included CEW positions, the headquarters augmentation cell, reimbursable labor, and civilian-military entities such as provincial reconstruction teams. Future contingencies may require different sourcing support.

Enduring Lesson

The contingency division should formally present unique support requests to the headquarters G-3 to determine if USACE can support the mission.

TAD assigned reimbursable personnel using a pseudo integrated manning document (IMD) populated with authorizations from the CEDs on TAD’s IMD. This approach created challenges in funding, sourcing, and mission command. In future operations, the contingency division should present these requirements to the headquarters G-3 using a formal RFF so headquarters can determine if USACE can support the mission. A program manager position should also be established to request and receive timely funding and to coordinate issues between USACE and the organizations requesting USACE support.

8. Sourcing Special Position Requirements

8.1 Positions Requiring USACE Personnel

Generally, USACE prefers filling contingency positions with internal personnel who are already familiar with both USACE and federal government processes. Early in planning to staff the Afghanistan districts, TAD coded positions clearly requiring USACE knowledge as USACE-unique on the IMD, limiting them to approximately 30 percent of the total positions. Later, DCAs at each division recruited volunteers for the USACE-unique positions.

Ultimately, USACE-unique position coding had little effect on how positions were actually filled. As the DCAs provided the resumes of interested candidates, hiring officials generally considered USACE candidates first. Ultimately, lacking qualified USACE candidates, they considered candidates from other Army activities, other federal agencies, or Schedule A personnel from outside the federal government. Many Schedule A candidates had to learn both USACE processes and federal government processes, initially limiting their productivity.
8.2 Civilian Critical Fill Positions

TAD had an especially difficult time assigning qualified area engineers, who must hold a professional engineer or registered architect license, a $500,000 administrative contracting officer warrant, and experience using the warrant within the last six months. Because of the limited pool of qualified candidates, HQUSACE should consider developing a training program for future contingencies.

Certain specialized civilian contingency positions are especially important to mission accomplishment, including the following:

- Deputy district program manager
- Chief of engineering and construction
- Area engineers

| To predictably and continually fill critical contingency positions, HQUSACE published an operation order requiring each USACE division to nominate well-qualified candidates to specific positions within certain time frames. The order also described the critical skills each candidate must possess. |

9. Reachback, an Alternative to Deployment

USACE recently developed the certified reachback system, leveraging certified and trained CONUS reachback districts. Previously deployed employees in the reachback districts perform virtual work as specialty support cells to the contingency operation.

| Enduring Lesson |
| Reachback is employed early in the contingency to reduce the mission’s risk, hazard exposure, and cost. |

Reachback allows for fewer deployed contingency forces, minimizing the forward footprint, reducing risk and hazard exposure, as well as cost. Future contingencies should implement reachback early in the operation to maximize these benefits. Chapter 7, Reachback, Engineering, and Business Process, discusses reachback in greater detail.

10. Security Clearances

During OIF and OEF, TAD required deployees to Iraq and Afghanistan to either have or obtain at least a SECRET security clearance. This policy limits available candidates because many issues may prevent an employee from receiving a security clearance, including financial reasons or dual citizenship. As a potential solution, TAD security requested the districts review the IMD to determine which positions required SECRET clearances. The districts felt differentiating between cleared and uncleared personnel in the operational environment would be too difficult. For example, uncleared employees might be present at meetings in which classified information is discussed. Future contingency leadership may wish to revisit the security requirements.
If they are willing to assume the risk, district commanders may approve interim SECRET clearances for certain positions (the requirement for a security clearance in key positions cannot be waived). However, if an employee is not approved for a final SECRET clearance, the employee’s tour may have to be curtailed. Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Program, provides the authority for commanders to issue interim clearances and provides additional guidance.

11. Benefits and Recruitment, Relocation, and Retention Incentives for Civilian Volunteers

Contingency operational conditions are generally austere and hostile. Separation from family, exposure to enemy activity, and general discomfort are just a few of the reasons why civilians may not volunteer for open positions. Contingency hiring personnel along with division and district leadership use recruiting incentives to help staff the contingency IMD. HR personnel, along with the division and district leadership, must manage the duration and amount of incentives to balance mission accomplishment with mission cost. Incentives generally change during the contingency in response to changing variables including the number of personnel applying for positions.

11.1 Relocation Incentives

The Chief of Engineers authorized relocation incentives of 12.5 percent of basic annual salary for six-month tours and 25 percent of basic annual salary for 12-month tours from 2003 through 2012. Basic annual salary includes base pay plus locality pay, if applicable. In February 2012, a fragmentary order changed tour lengths to nine and 12 months. Relocation incentives also changed to 18.75 percent for nine-month tours and 25 percent for 12-month tours. Such incentives are at the will of the government and subject to unilateral termination for a number of reasons, including funding shortfalls.

Employees wishing to remain in their contingency positions for an additional tour must return to their home stations for at least one pay period and then return on the new tour in order to renew the relocation incentive. Returning to the home station rolls and subsequent return to the OCO organization is a leave between taskers. Future operations may want to consider whether employees should be limited to one relocation incentive to avoid the administrative requirements associated with the leave between taskers process and whether relocation incentives should be limited to certain series, such as contract specialists, engineers, and architects. Another approach would be to discontinue the practice altogether.

11.2 Recruitment Incentives and Benefits

Although Schedule A employees are not eligible for relocation incentives if hired from outside the federal government, they may be authorized recruitment incentives. Hiring Schedule A employees for a 13-month tour allows them to elect for Federal Employee Health Benefits, Federal Employee Group Life Insurance, Thrift Savings Plan, etc.

11.3 Retention Incentives

Retaining well-qualified Schedule A employees is a challenge for the CEDs. Because Schedule A employees have no permanent positions to which to return at the end of their deployed assignments in the OCO districts, they may leave the CED to accept a permanent job offer. To
help mitigate this issue, the division commander signed a Redegation of Authority to Approve Retention Incentives in August 2011. The redelegation authorized the district commanders to approve individual retention incentives. This policy required that part of the retention justification incentive include documentation, such as a job offer from outside the federal government, showing that the individual would be likely to leave federal service in the absence of a retention incentive.

Retention incentives are complex and may change with time and situation. However, contingency HR personnel should be aware of the value of retention incentives and their availability as a tool to fully staff the contingency workforce. Appendix A lists the current benefits and entitlements authorized under Fragmentary Order 2 of Operation Order 2011-03, effective 01 MAY 2012.

11.4 Family Readiness Program

USACE regional Family readiness coordinators at each MSC support Soldiers, civilian employees, and families before, during, and after extended deployments to overseas contingency and disaster response operations. Some MSCs also established district-level family readiness coordinators. USACE cannot require families to accept such support. USACE leadership honors the requests of Soldiers or civilian employees who do not wish for their family members to be contacted and family members themselves who decline support. USACE provides Family readiness services to all categories of employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lesson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The family readiness network prepared deployees’ families to function independently, allowing USACE employees to more fully focus on the mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research and experience show that preparing deployees’ Families to manage diverse situations enhances Army readiness. As Soldiers and civilians prepare their Families to function independently in peace and war, they become more confident, train faster, perform better, and can focus more fully on the mission. Army research indicates that spouses and Families satisfied with the Army lifestyle more significantly develop and enhance Army employee performance.

12. Tour Limitation

Recognizing the toll that contingency assignments take on deployees, USACE reviews all requests to extend tours beyond two years. The division commander must approve all extensions past 24 months and coordinates with the employee’s home district commander before approving or disapproving the extended tour. DOD Directive 1404.10, Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, states, “Individual deployment tours shall not exceed 2 years. Consecutive deployments should generally not be approved without at least a 90-day period of reintegration between deployments and assurance that medical clearance requirements are met.”

| USACE developed internal procedures requiring higher-level review for tour extension requests beyond 24 months, to ensure the employee can physically and mentally complete the extension. |
The USACE process to review requests for tour lengths past 24 months is cumbersome. An alternative would be to discontinue the practice of tours longer than two years altogether in future contingencies.

12.1 Recognize Warning Signs of Staff Experiencing Difficulties

Individuals react to wartime activity differently. Even personnel with previous military or deployment experience may become unusually stressed or very concerned for their personal safety when exposed to indirect fire or other enemy activity. It may be difficult to predict which individuals will find the deployment experience unusually traumatic. Teammates should remain vigilant looking for warning signs of individuals having problems and ensure they receive counseling or other any other support required.

13 Organizing Human Resources Support for Contingencies

13.1 Consolidating Human Resources Support at the Contingency Division

HR responsibility in support of contingencies was fragmented before HQUSACE established TAD. TAD HR provides consistent HR policies for each contingency. Moreover, TAD HR is an advocate for standardization of benefits, extension policy, and rest and recuperation policy — initiatives which make HR sourcing more efficient in providing timely contingency sourcing.

13.2 Afghanistan Recruitment Cell

The TAD commander determined that TAD-Winchester should select most civilian personnel for the CEDs. The district commanders requested this process, because reviewing resumes, conducting reference checks, and interviewing candidates was placing an administrative burden on the in-country supervisors. TAD established the Afghanistan Recruitment Cell (ARC) to allow the in-country supervisors to concentrate on the mission.

Directed by the TAD HR office, the ARC consisted of three (and later, five) subject matter experts. The subject matter experts reviewed resumes, conducted reference checks and interviews, and either made or recommended selections. Two additional ARC administrative personnel maintained the IMD, requested taskers, made selections from vacancy announcements, and compiled and prepared metrics. Appendix B shows the ARC hiring process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enduring Lesson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONUS-based personnel recruiting and hiring are used so deployed assets can focus on the contingency mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selecting and hiring personnel in a reachback capacity generated some initial skepticism. However, after six to nine months, the ARC had either hired most of the district supervisors or had provided hired personnel to those supervisors. The ARC developed a collaborative partnership with contingency managers through weekly teleconferences to determine hiring and skill requirements. Collaboration and communication are key to the success of any similar future hiring element.
13.3 Training Supervisors in the Contingency Hiring Processes

USACE is a volunteer organization requiring continuous recruiting. Often, volunteers are not from USACE and not familiar with USACE personnel processes, which is further complicated by the high turnover resulting from short tours. To maintain continuity of operations and enhance recruiting and staffing, supervisors should be trained in contingency-specific hiring processes.

**Enduring Lesson**

Contingency-specific hiring processes are used in deployment training for supervisors.

13.4 Administrative Personnel Processing Office

USACE established the APPO to conduct predeployment support to the OCO mission and civil emergency deploying personnel. The APPO initiated contact with individuals selected for deployment, advising them of predeployment requirements, assisted with their paperwork processing, and answered questions about the deployment process. Specifically, an APPO has expertise in the following administrative duties:

- Prepares TCS and TDY travel orders in the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) ensuring all necessary information is provided for successful deployment.
- Advises supervisors and managers throughout the organization on the provisions of the Joint Travel Regulations as technical expert on TDY and TCS travel policy.
- Reviews and prepares travel vouchers upon completion of travel for submission to the USACE Finance Center for payment via CEFMS, and audits travel vouchers for deployed and other personnel, as required by the USACE Finance Center.
- Assists employees with their TDY and TCS voucher processing and related problems, coordinating as necessary with the USACE Finance Center.
- Serves as an organization travel expert, and meets with re-deployees to advise and assist in completing their final close-out vouchers.
- Provides overview for a variety of financial services including payroll data entered in CEFMS (time and attendance).
- Supports the USACE Deployment Center by providing briefings to deployees in regard to time and attendance and voucher completion and processing.
- Supports the USACE Deployment Center mobile unit during contingency and training deployment and deploys as an administrative team member, and provides support to personnel processing into contingency operation areas.
14. Predeployment Training

All deploying personnel must invest significant time in predeployment training. While each contingency will have unique requirements, deployees can expect required training specific to the theater of operations, required training specific to their positions within the CED, and optional training that may enhance their duty performance.

14.1 Theater-Specific Training

Each contingency will require training specific to the theater of operations, including the HN culture, threat situation, operational security, etc. Deployees will conduct some of this training online before arrival at the deployment center or replacement center. As an example, personnel deploying to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are required to take approximately 40 hours of online training before arrival. Table 15-1 includes a sample of this required training.

14.2 Required Position-Specific Training

Some positions within the CED require specific training before the individual may perform duties in the contingency environment. While this training varies with the contingency, two examples of required position-specific training during OEF and OIF included the Area Office University and the Contingency Engineer Management Course (CEMC). Students for these courses may request exceptions for attending based on their qualifications. Contingency leadership should exercise caution in allowing these exceptions, considering that the student may not be the best judge of his or her own requirement for the training.

Area Office University

Area Office University is a 36-hour course designed to provide basic construction management to field staff, including construction contract management, administration at the area and resident office levels, an overview of business processes, contractual/regulatory authorities, and other fundamental information. During OIF and OEF, the USACE Deployment Center provided this training on location. The target audience for this course is new and recently assigned area and resident engineers, project engineers, quality assurance representatives, engineer technicians, and area and resident office support staff.

Contingency Engineer Management Course

The CEMC is a four-day course offered both online and at the United States Army Engineering and Support Center at Huntsville, AL. The course is required for key positions in the CED and includes curriculum designed to help the student understand engineer organizations (strategic to tactical) present in the USCENTCOM AOR. It provides a working knowledge of each organization’s roles and responsibilities in the contingency theater. The CEMC course focuses
on engineering projects from initiation through post-construction turnover, including topics in acquisition, engineer services, reachback, funding, and other aspects of contingency engineering.

14.3 Optional Position-Specific Training

The USACE Learning Center, also in Huntsville, AL, provides a variety of training courses designed for all aspects of USACE requirements (real estate, contract law, design build construction, etc.). These courses are available online and on-site.

Table 15-1. Predeployment Training for the USCENTCOM area of responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accident Avoidance General Orders</th>
<th>Accident Avoidance General Orders</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accident Avoidance</td>
<td>General Orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiterrorism, Level I</td>
<td>Heat Injury Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Fraternization Policy</td>
<td>Operational Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Development</td>
<td>Prevention of Human Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core Army Values</td>
<td>Reporting Intelligence Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
<td>Suicide Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>Threat Awareness and Reporting Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Appendixes

15.1 Appendix A. Sample Benefits and Entitlements

Table 15 A-1. General Schedule benefits and entitlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit/Entitlement</th>
<th>TDY (Any length)</th>
<th>Nine Month TCS</th>
<th>One Year TCS</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Required or discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay or Allowance</td>
<td>Basic general pay schedule including locality pay</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime (all are exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act under foreign exemption rule)</td>
<td>1.5 x GS-10/1 or regular hourly rate, whichever is greater; below GS-10, 1.5 x regular hourly rate</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>5 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 550</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 15 A-1. General schedule benefits and entitlements (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit/Entitlement</th>
<th>TDY (Any length)</th>
<th>Nine Month TCS</th>
<th>One Year TCS</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Required or discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holiday Pay</td>
<td>Two times hourly rate for regularly scheduled hours</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>5 CFR 550</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Differential</td>
<td>After 42 consecutive days in country, 35 percent of basic pay (includes locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week, retroactive to the 1st day</td>
<td>35 percent of basic pay (no locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week, effective after one day in country</td>
<td>35 percent of basic pay (no locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week, effective after one day in country</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger Pay</td>
<td>Effective from 1st day, 35 percent of basic pay (includes locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week</td>
<td>In effect from 1st day, 35 percent of Basic Pay (no locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week</td>
<td>In effect from 1st day, 35 percent of Basic Pay (no locality pay) for basic 40-hour work week</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotions</td>
<td>Interested persons must apply for opportunities</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>TAD-A/TAA leadership</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Shift Differential</td>
<td>10 percent for all regularly scheduled hours from 1800 to 0600</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>5 CFR 550</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Maintenance Allowance</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Annual rate varies based upon number of family members; pro-rated based tour length</td>
<td>Annual rate varies based upon number of family members; pro-rated based tour length</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<tr>
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<th>One Year TCS</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Required or discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation incentives (Army employees only; other federal agency employees on reimbursable detail are not authorized relocation incentives)</td>
<td>Up to 18.75 percent of annual salary for a 9-month tour (includes locality pay); 25 percent of annual for 12-month tour; 12.5 percent for a 6-month tour (TAD deputy commander must approve case-by-case)</td>
<td>Up to 18.75 percent of annual salary (no locality pay)</td>
<td>Up to 25 percent of annual salary (no locality pay)</td>
<td>CEHR memorandum dated 18 SEP 2008</td>
<td>Discretionary, may be terminated at any time per 5 CFR 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment incentives (For employees on initial federal government appointment or previous federal employees after at least 90 day break in service)</td>
<td>Up to 25 percent of annual salary (includes locality pay) for 12 months regardless of tour type. Generally, initial tours are 13-month term appointments.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CEHR memorandum dated 18 SEP 2008</td>
<td>Discretionary, may be terminated at any time per 5 CFR 575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest and Recuperation Leave</td>
<td>Same as TCS except TAD deputy commander must approve six month tours case-by-case and receive zero R&amp;R trips.</td>
<td>Eligible for 1 R&amp;R trip. Employees must serve at least 60 days in country for eligibility</td>
<td>Two R&amp;R trips within the 12-month service period for employees signing up for 12 consecutive months; must serve at least 60 days in country for eligibility.</td>
<td>USD P&amp;R memo dated 12 FEB 2008, Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity</td>
<td>Discretionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave Accrual</td>
<td>No change to regular accrual and carryover</td>
<td>Employees may carry up to 360 hours (45 days) of annual leave to next leave year</td>
<td>Employees may carry up to 360 hours (45 days) of annual leave to next leave year</td>
<td>5 CFR 550</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15 A-1. General schedule benefits and entitlements (continued)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>One Year TCS</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Required or discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-temporary storage (NTS) of household goods (effective approximately 90 days from effective appointment date for Schedule A employees)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>At government expense. NTS concludes at the beginning of the second month upon return</td>
<td>At government expense. NTS concludes at the beginning of the second month upon return</td>
<td>Joint Travel Regulations</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation of dependents and shipment of household goods</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>At government expense</td>
<td>At government expense</td>
<td>Joint Travel Regulations</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual premium pay waiver (includes overtime, night, holiday, and Sunday pay)</td>
<td>Eligible employees are entitled to premium payments as long as their combined payable basic and premium pay for Calendar Year (CY) 2011 does not exceed the U.S. vice president’s annual salary ($230,700 for CY 2011). Employees assigned to Iraq and/or Afghanistan for at least 42 consecutive days are deemed to meet eligibility requirements for increased premium pay cap effective 1 January 2011. Secretary of the Army delegated authority to USACE, which re-delegated to USACE MSC commanders, to determine when employees not assigned to Iraq/Afghanistan may receive premium pay.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15 A-1. General schedule benefits and entitlements (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit/Entitlement</th>
<th>TDY (Any length)</th>
<th>Nine Month TCS</th>
<th>One Year TCS</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Required or discretionary?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate pay limitation (includes premium pay, basic pay, bonuses, etc.)</td>
<td>Eligible employees (see &quot;Premium Pay Waiver&quot; for eligibility standards) are limited to base pay and premium pay payable in CY 2012 not to exceed $230,700 but all other compensation will be paid as it is earned.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premium Pay References:</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Increased Annual Pay Limitations, 11 April 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Pay Reference:</td>
<td>Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Memorandum, Delegation of Authority Increased Annual Premium Pay Limitation for Calendar Year 2011, 29 July 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* As of 29 April 2012, standard tours in USACE are nine and 12 months. TAD deputy commander may approve six month tours by exception.
**Schedule A Appointments of 13 months are eligible for a recruitment incentive of 25 percent and are eligible for two R&R trips.
15.2 Appendix B. Afghanistan Recruitment Cell Hiring Process

Figure 15 B-1. Afghanistan Recruitment Cell hiring process flow chart

References


Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Memorandum, Delegation of Authority — Increased Annual Premium Pay Limitation for Calendar Year 2011, 29 JUL 2011.


OSD, Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, Increased Annual Pay Limitations, 11 APR 2011.


USACE OPORD 2011-03, Personnel Support to Overseas Contingency Operations, including Fragmentary Orders 1 through 5, March 2011.
Annex A

Forward Engineer Support Team-Advance

Introduction

The forward engineer support team (FEST) provides agile and responsive technical engineering and contract construction management support to combatant commands (CCMDs) and their Army components worldwide during contingencies, exercises, and peacetime engagement with joint and coalition forces. FESTs implement USACE field force engineering (FFE) doctrine by supporting CCMDs in an operational theater. Deployed FESTs can leverage continental United States-based technical engineering centers and subject matter experts (SMEs) to fulfill technical engineering requirements using the reachback network (see Figure A-1).

Figure A-1. Structural engineer discussing a raisin factory project with an Afghan engineer
FEST is a generic term encompassing both the forward engineer support team-advance (FEST-A) and forward engineer support team-main (FEST-M) modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) teams. This playbook focuses on FEST-As because they are organic to the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

USACE MTOE FEST-As are staffed with part-time civilian volunteers with a full-time active duty officer and noncommissioned officers in charge. Reserve engineer military personnel with civilian-acquired skills populate the reserve component FESTs.

1. Mission and Mission Essential Task List

The FEST-A mission is:

On order, provides responsive engineer planning and limited design capabilities to support military and civilian contingency operations to brigade and higher commands.

The FEST’s mission essential task list (METL) includes providing technical engineer support to deployed engineer assets as well as its supporting missions (see Table A-1). Typical FEST missions include base camp master planning and design, infrastructure assessment, route reconnaissance, preparing joint facilities utilization board packets, and other technical engineering missions.

Table A-1. Forward engineer support team mission essential task list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Subtask</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct mobilization operations</td>
<td>Conduct predeployment activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct demobilization operations</td>
<td>Conduct redeployment activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the force</td>
<td>Employ survivability measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employ chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct personnel recovery operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical engineer support</td>
<td>Manage construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Design and plan projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control project quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A-1. Forward engineer support team mission essential task list (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Subtask</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical engineer support</td>
<td>Conduct engineer estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct engineer reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct consequence management</td>
<td>Prepare engineer estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct stability operations</td>
<td>Assess infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restore essential services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct project pre-contracting package</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Organizational Structure

Each USACE FEST-A consists of two full-time military personnel and six volunteer civilians identified to fill slots on the FEST-A, should it deploy. Civilian personnel perform normal day-to-day jobs in their home districts to maintain their technical engineering skills. The civilian and military personnel meet periodically to perform individual and collective training, conduct exercises, and maintain readiness. Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) funds its organic MTOE FESTs for periodic skill and predeployment training.

USACE places the teams in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) system for potential deployments in support of contingency operations. The standard FEST-A deploys with the following experts (see Figure A-2):

- Civil engineer
- Civil engineer (with environmental engineering experience)
- Civil engineer (with structural engineering experience)
- Electrical engineer
- Mechanical engineer
- Cartographer/topographical engineer
Civil and electrical engineers are the highest-demand FEST-A specialties. Within the civil engineer specialty, the structural engineer is the next in demand. Personnel authorizations should reflect the mission set for the specific contingency operation. USACE supplements the FESTs with SMEs as needed to fill mission requirements in real estate, environment, prime power, and other USACE specialties.

The FEST-A provides direct support during a contingency deployment to the commanders in the operational environment or at the component command level where they assist in the planning efforts. Figure A-3 shows where FESTs may typically attach to support a battlefield contingency. Each team is responsible for its own operational area with communications, movement control, working area, transportation, and life support, all of which the supported unit usually provides.

Figure A-3. The FEST-A may attach at different levels within the JTF, depending on the contingency operation requirements. The typical command relationship of the FEST-A is OPCON to the CED and in direct support to a JTF unit at brigade level or higher. Although this figure shows the FEST in direct support to the brigade combat team, the brigade combat team is only one unit to which the FEST can potentially provide direct support.
The reserve component also has FEST-As. Each position in these teams is populated with a military reservist.

3. Deployment

3.1 Deployment Preparation

FESTs are an MTOE organization and follow an ARFORGEN cycle that prepares them to deploy by following a standardized process for training and validation. This cycle takes a unit through a period of reset after deployment, technical training, FFE training to include a training center rotation, an availability period ready for any unforeseen contingency, and into a deployment period. The cycle then repeats. The units maintain their structure throughout the ARFORGEN cycle.

FEST members should be ready to deploy depending on their status in the ARFORGEN cycle. The team must register on the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army database in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation (AR) 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies, and reports its readiness status on equipment, personnel, and training like other MTOE Army units.

3.2 Disseminating Information

The division or district should conduct weekly secure video teleconferences and conference calls no later than 90 days before deployment to disseminate information and address concerns. This promotes teamwork between the FESTs and division as well as reinforces the initial chain of command. The weekly meetings can be a venue to:

- Establish and coordinate for team members’ medical and logistical requirements such as physicals, passports, visas, transportation, etc.
- Quickly identify training and equipment requirements based on the mission set.
- Work with all outside agencies to deconflict training inconsistencies and redundancies, FEST mission command, mission requirements, and funds availability.

*Enduring Lesson*

Conduct weekly secure video teleconferences with the FEST-A to disseminate information and lessons from previously deployed teams, address concerns, and provide visibility and assistance in predeployment requirements.

3.3 Assigning FEST Tasks

FESTs can assign specific responsibilities to individual team members based on their experience, knowledge, and capabilities, which enhances team building and communication, and eliminates the commander and noncommissioned officer in charge being solely responsible for deployment tasks. Tasks assigned to individual team members may include the following:

- Civilian administrative requirements
• Deployment equipment ordering
• Rear detachment actions and property accountability
• Training
• Unit movement, equipment
• Unit movement, personnel
• Soldier and civilian readiness processing

Because most FEST members are civilians, they will likely have limited or no military deployment experience. The team may need to pay particular attention to training in deployment and field skills and equipment packing. In addition, predeployment activities often require the cooperation and endorsement of the team members’ home districts.

3.4 Movement

Teams must establish a movement plan and communicate to the supporting division and division-forward before deployment. Teams should consider shipping equipment separately to reduce total number of bags and weight. Upon arrival into the area of operations, FEST-As conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration through the supported unit. Initial entry operations typically require personnel to rely on the supported unit for transportation (if not coordinated before deployment), life support (subsistence, billeting, and sanitation), fuel, and security. Interpreters are coordinated through the supported unit.

4. Mission Command

The FEST’s command relationships depend on the assigned mission. This mission-specific command relationship must be clear to all parties involved as early as possible in the mission to ensure best use of the FEST’s capabilities. The mission command structure may also change during the mission.

Enduring Lesson

USACE must tailor command and support relationships specifically for each deployed FEST, which requires thoughtful consideration of anticipated missions, threat level, etc.

For much of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the FESTs were typically placed under operational control (OPCON) by the joint task force (JTF) or joint forces land component command. The FEST was then tactically controlled by a theater engineer command and directly supporting a brigade combat team or subordinate command at brigade level or higher.
Enduring Lesson
The FEST commander should distribute the specific predeployment duties among the team members, ensuring the burden does not rest solely on the team leadership.

The organization providing OPCON to the FEST must set clear mission priorities. With the FEST’s broad capability, but narrow capacity, combined with its relative autonomy, specific guidance on mission prioritization helps the FEST commander understand which missions can be accepted. Written priority orders allow the FEST leadership to explain to the supported units how U.S. commanders set priorities, and to who they must request a change in priorities.

Administrative control (ADCON) — Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

Operational control (OPCON) — Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.

Tactical control (TACON) — Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

— Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols, February 2015

4.1 Forward Engineer Support Team Command Realignment

In the late stages of OEF, FEST command structure was realigned to more closely resemble standard joint forces doctrine. In this realignment, contingency engineer district (CED) assumes TACON, and is prepared to assume OPCON of the FEST-As. However, the FESTs still directly support a brigade combat team or higher-level unit in the JTF. Alternately, the FEST may be in general support to all units within a region of the combined joint operations area.

The FEST accomplishes its tasks with its own organic capabilities combined with reachback support from the USACE Reachback Operations Center (UROC), as required. If a project requires greater capability, the FEST then works with the district associated with its area of
operations and determines if the project is within the district’s requirements. The FEST-A cannot accept a project on behalf of a USACE district. The directly supported unit will provide all logistical requirements to support the FEST’s mission.

4.2 Relationship with the Contingency Division

The USACE contingency division may retain ADCON support relationship for specific requirements to their assigned FEST-As, through the subordinate CEDs. The ADCON relationship ensures FEST members retain division administrative support for items such as pay, leave, and benefits through normal USACE channels. For example, the Transatlantic Division provides administrative, information technology, personnel services, and other specified services to deployed FEST-A units supporting the United States Forces-Afghanistan contingency mission. The FEST-As supporting district human resources office processed their civilian personnel administrative requirements as much as possible.

USACE assigns the FEST-A to the contingency division before deployment to account for each civilian. If possible, the CED provides network capability to the FEST. Otherwise, they use their own satellite capability to establish network connectivity. Teams must coordinate with the supported command to establish network accounts before departure, complete theater-specific predeployment training, and hand-carry required training certificates for submission and review in theater for classified network system access.

The ADCON relationship may not be required for reserve component FEST-As, because these teams have no civilian members requiring support. Department of Defense activity address codes and unit identification codes for deploying FEST-As should be coordinated with HQUSACE and the Department of Logistics. The team uses these codes for logistics support during deployment.

5. Forward Engineer Support Team Responsibilities

5.1 Host-Nation Engagement

Depending on the mission, occasionally FESTs may discuss their project planning with host-nation (HN) representatives to better understand the project requirements. The FEST should coordinate most HN engagements with brigade combat team representation to ensure all stakeholders understand the project’s scope and that cost increases are not incurred simply because of the HN’s desire to expand the requirements.

5.2 Engineering and Project Management

USACE designed the FESTs with organic expertise in several engineering disciplines allowing them to assess requirements or provide solutions using only team personnel.

Engineer Reconnaissance

The FEST may be tasked to conduct engineer reconnaissance to identify appropriate engineer expertise and materiel to support U.S. strategic and operational objectives. The FEST should accomplish this reconnaissance early in the deployment, allowing the supported command to address these objectives and prioritize assets arriving in theater. The reconnaissance could include identifying electrical and water treatment requirements or setting priorities for expertise and supporting materials.
6. Reachback

USACE has robust field force engineer reachback capability to satisfy any requirements beyond that of the organic team. UROC provides greater detailed technical engineer services through SMEs and specialized computer modeling software. The supporting USACE division may also provide support with specific districts and centers of expertise to deployed FESTs.

Project Support

FESTs provide technical engineer support as well as initiate, plan, coordinate, and conduct construction quality assurance. These tasks might include resource management, assuring project quality, coordinating with contractors and end users, and interacting with contracting officer representatives (CORs). FESTs also support projects by refining material specifications, overseeing delivery, and coordinating with other engineer organizations. They support regional contracting command and regional support command engineers with evaluation, inspections, and project assessments and may assist units with environmental assessments and compliance and supporting inspections.

Typical FEST missions include the following:

- Assess a damaged diversion dam (see Figure A-4)
- Conduct quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) site visit with the COR
- Provide electrical engineer assessment support
- Train QA/QC personnel
- Assess a 200-person life support area
- Assess electrical system upgrades for a clinic and/or district center (see Figure A-5)
- Design upgrade the force protection for a police headquarters
- Draft a statement of work for a HN security compound repair
- Develop a hazardous waste and spill prevention plan
Figure A-4. Civil engineer and cartographer assess a diversion dam in Afghanistan, July 2012

Figure A-5. USACE electrical engineer with a Royal Australian Air Force electrician assessing electrical system upgrades for a camp
Project Management

Although FEST-As can conduct limited project and construction management, it is not one of their core missions.

6.1 Information Management

FESTs can operate and complete their mission using organic computer equipment. Communications requirements include classified and unclassified network systems and voice landline. If USACE has an engineer office deployed near the FEST-A, it may provide network connectivity. If not, the FEST can use its organic satellite link through the Tele-engineering Communications Equipment-Deployable and Broadband Global Area Network to establish a network; however, this solution provides only limited data transfer capabilities and is expensive to use. USACE network connectivity is required to download data to a SharePoint site or server organic to USACE.

USACE computers must retain their disk image and installed software tools that assist the team in working project requirements and sharing information with the supported unit when required via compact disc. USACE maintains all project information in a central repository at the UROC, so users may access the data after the deployment or as connectivity allows.

6.2 Movement and Security

The FEST does not have organic movement control operations capability and must coordinate with the supporting command (usually a brigade combat team) when the team travels outside secure bases. The team must be aware of every team member travelling outside of secure areas. The team normally co-locates with the supported unit’s engineers to sustain synchronization and mission situational awareness. The supported unit usually provides for the FEST’s transportation requirements within the secure area. However, in missions where a FEST unit is deployed with its full complement of organic equipment, the team uses its assigned vehicles.

While the supporting/host organization bears most responsibility for the FEST security outside the wire, all FEST members inherently share some duty for the security of missions in which they participate. Although only military members usually carry weapons, in some cases, the theater commander allows civilian arming if civilians have proper certification and training. Civilians are not trained in crew-served weapons operation or security operations. If the FEST is supported by a brigade combat team, then this brigade combat team will normally conduct security for the team while conducting missions.

6.3 Acquisition and Contracting

In infrequent instances when FEST missions require contracted construction, the team receives support proportional to the magnitude and type of contract. The theater contracting command normally provides regional support for projects less than $100,000 if QA/QC requirements are minimal. If the mission requires, the supporting USACE district can execute large reimbursable construction contracts. The funding level of contract construction award is based on the mission and duration.
6.4 Resource Management

The supported unit pays for the civilian labor and associated costs during a deployment. Managing this process requires coordination between the resource manager and the USACE liaison officer to the CCMD or USACE division military planner to ensure funding is available when the FEST requires it. Before deployment, the division military planner must develop the cost estimate to train and prepare the team for deployment. Projected deployed labor costs must be sent to the supported command’s resource management to ensure appropriate funding is provided to USACE.

References


Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration-Consolidated Policies, 15 APR 2010.

Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers Operation Order (HQUSACE OPORD) 2012-11, USACE ALL Hazards Events, 141700R May 2012.


USACE Forward Engineer Support Team-Advance Deployment Order 2012-09 (S)231700R February 2011.


TAD OPORD 2012-13, TAD Support to FEST-A Units Deployed for OEF, 111600R April 2012.
Annex B

Resident and Area Offices

Introduction

Resident and area offices conduct the contingency engineer district’s (CED’s) daily construction management activities associated with executing construction contracts. The engineering and construction division supports these offices with technical expertise and project management. The CED’s area of responsibility (AOR) is subdivided into areas of operations, each responsible for construction activities within their designated geographical areas.

1. Contingency Engineer District Organization

Each area office has subordinate reporting resident and project offices appropriate to the workload and needs of the area office’s geographic area. Achieving quality construction is a combined responsibility of the construction contractor and the government. Their mutual goal must be a quality product conforming to the contract requirements. The contract documents establish the quality required specific to each construction project. The organization chart in Figure B-1 shows area offices in relation to a generic CED organization.

Figure B-1. Generic contingency engineer district organization with area and resident offices
This annex discusses in detail the general duties of the area office and specific roles and responsibilities of area office personnel. In general, area offices perform the following functions:

- Provide active construction contract administration to ensure quality military facilities
- Develop long-range plans and goals for the construction projects assigned to the office
- Implement established United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) business practices for construction contract administration
- Provide technical and contract administration assistance to resident offices
- Ensure appropriate training and personnel actions for office staff
- Maintain liaison with host-nation (HN) government officials and other clients
- Inspect construction projects periodically
- Serve as the administrative contracting officer (ACO) or contracting officer representative (COR) for security services, life support, or other contracts, as needed
- Support maneuver units within their areas of operations by providing updates on projects significantly affecting the local threat situation and other atmospherics, supporting project openings (such as ribbon cuttings) when feasible, and sharing passive intelligence gathered by the USACE security contractor

2. Roles and Responsibilities

2.1 Area Office Officer in Charge

The area office officer in charge (OIC) divides time between supervising daily operations of offices (area, resident, and project) and broadly overseeing construction management. The area office OIC typically works the broad aspects of project management, communicates the current project status, and identifies and addresses any potential completion delays.

Communicating Project Status

Project status becomes important as customer and/or command interest increases. One of the main duties of the area office OIC is to convey the project status to the command, visiting very important persons, customers, or other stakeholders. The area office OIC must interact effectively with a wide range of individuals. For example, the OIC must:

- Lead both military and civilian personnel within the office.
- Interact with construction workers on-site who may not speak English or who have never interacted with Americans.
- Effectively connect with local tribal or government officials, high-ranking U.S. officers, and government officials.
Funding Sources, Engineering, and Relationships

The OIC must fully grasp different funding sources for USACE projects. Funding is complex, non-intuitive, and differs with each contingency. The area office OIC does not necessarily require an engineering degree; the OIC will have many engineers within the office who can offer their expertise and answer questions. Additionally, the area office OIC is the USACE link to the local tactical commander at the brigade (colonel) or division (general officer) level; the resident office OICs should share a similar relationship with units (colonel or lieutenant colonel level) in their immediate areas.

The area office OIC is responsible for reporting on USACE activities in his area of operations and should be prepared to provide slides, before-and-after photographs, and project updates to customer units. Sharing information through telephone and video teleconferences, and answering questions pays dividends in creating mutual understanding and preventing problems (see Figure B-2).

General Responsibilities

The area office OIC has the following responsibilities:

- Responsible for supporting staff functions including operations, intelligence, communications, security, life support, and personal security detachment and security escort team mission execution

- Identifies future events, sets priorities, and addresses conflict

- Responsible for the supervision and safety of employees (military, civilian, and local nationals [LNs])

- Supports reconstruction program execution

- Ensures mission focus in providing engineer services and construction management to the HN

- Supports intergovernmental coordination and engagement with senior military commanders, Department of State (DOS) representatives, and regional HN government officials

- Is responsible for keeping higher headquarters and supported agencies aware of project progress and issues, as necessary, through correspondence, briefings, and meetings

- Ensures legal compliance involving project construction, administration, and management
2.2 Area Office Engineer

The area office engineer is the office expert concerning construction and technical matters, USACE administrative and business practices, and civilian workforce management. Ideally, the area office engineer mentors and advises both the resident engineers (often, the critical node for project management) and the area office OIC. The area office engineer’s experience and judgment are vital to mission success, as is a smooth working relationship between the area office engineer and the area office OIC.

The area office engineer’s responsibilities include the following:

- Maintaining the quality assurance program
- Ensuring expeditious project completion
- Resolving contractor performance issues
-Providing assistance and guidance with claim settlement
- Handling personnel issues
- Providing organizational management
- Coordinating with higher headquarters and customers to achieve district, division, and national goals
- Mentoring and training the resident engineers and other senior leaders in USACE business practices and contracting processes, and resolving contractor performance issues and claims
• Establishing local policy and procedures enhancing quality construction

• Serving as the alternate COR on most contracts within his AOR

2.3 Area Noncommissioned Officer in Charge

The area noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) is the central facilitator for daily operations. The NCOIC coordinates private security team (PST) moves, air transport, lodging, logistics, and other administrative requirements. The NCOIC may be especially effective engaging other units (particularly other engineer units) on the installation or post to access resources the area office may lack. The NCOIC is typically the leader for monitoring antiterrorism and force protection measures, and training at the area and resident offices. Because USACE does not possess organic, internal noncommissioned officers, most of the NCOICs come from outside and are unfamiliar with the organization.

3. Project Management

Managing projects is the heart of the area office duties. The management of contingency projects shares many aspects with continental United States (CONUS) projects, but also presents unique challenges. HN contingency construction workers may be unskilled or possess different skills from U.S. workers. Often, project workers do not speak English and possess different cultural norms, which U.S. personnel should be aware of.

Digital tools, including both hardware and software, may be unavailable to the contractor, or the contractor may lack the necessary training to use them. Electrical sources are often unreliable, further complicating the use of tools requiring electrical connections. Further, most LNs are not able to access the USACE networks because of security reasons.

3.1 Resident Management System

USACE has standard business practices and tools for project management. However, these tools and policies may change before the next contingency operation. The Resident Management System (RMS) is the current and accepted method for tracking and managing projects. Although this specific tool may change, only accurate and meaningful information should be entered into any formal management system.

Data in RMS is frequently shared with customers because they have a direct interest in projects within their AOR. All entries into the project management system must be professional, well written, and should not suggest frustration with the contractor; RMS is not the venue for airing grievances. If LN engineers are given access to RMS, a USACE member should review their comments. The CED must check current policies and regulations that can prohibit or limit LN access to RMS and government networks.

3.2 Site Visits

Each visit to a project site must have a clear purpose. Visitors must research the project before appearing on-site and bring along the RMS data sheet (providing these sheets to visiting dignitaries is also helpful) (see Figure B-3). Visiting sites can expose personnel to enemy and
criminal activity, and vehicle accidents whenever they leave the secure compound. All movement away from a secure compound, or “outside the wire” must be justified by the mission and productive rather than an opportunity to sightsee.

Figure B-3. The Mosul resident engineer briefs the Gulf Region Division Commander and Deputy for Program Management on an expedient police station in Mosul, Iraq, in 2009. The structure in the background is one of four guard towers built to provide security for Iraqi police working at the station.

While visits enhance USACE leaders’ project understanding and ability to articulate project status, they are only one type of project management tool. Solving significant issues while on-site is not practical, because time is limited and visits are unannounced.

3.3 Contractor Office Meetings

Contractor office meetings are essential to resolving issues found during project site visits and for establishing a positive working relationship with contractors. Most, if not all, construction contractors are LNs who have a limited understanding of USACE administrative requirements (for example, the submittal process). Office meetings offer an opportunity to partner with the contractor and assist with difficulties that limit performance. Using LN engineers to assist the contractor can further advance relationships and reinforce the partnering effect.

**Enduring Lesson**

Meeting with the contractor inside the secure USACE office compound is key to resolving issues that were identified during the site visits and to establishing an effective working relationship with the contractor.
USACE members should also address procuring long lead-time, major-end items critical to project completion. Most LN contractors are under funded and essentially operate payment-to-payment while completing the project.

The area office OIC and area engineer should attend meetings to reinforce the importance of both the contractor and the project. USACE members should be fair and firm with contractors and need to avoid appearing arrogant and viewing the contractor as a “problem.” USACE members must uphold sound construction (not necessarily CONUS) standards and not preclude progress by applying overly stringent standards.

### 3.4 Liquidated Damages

The area office OIC must work with the contracting officer to ensure the assessment of liquidated damages when the contractor has failed to complete work within the time specified in the contract (refer to Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] 52.211-12). Liquidated damages are used to compensate the government for probable damages, but they are neither punitive nor negative performance incentives. Although the assessment of liquidated damages may, in some cases, have some negative consequences (e.g., causing some contractors to walk away from the project), the area office OIC does not have the authority to reduce or waive the assessment of liquidated damages. Prompt coordination with the contracting officer concerning liquidated damages facilitates the assessment and recovery of liquidated damages amounts. The area office OIC should consult FAR Subpart 11.5 for more details on liquidated damages.

**Enduring Lesson**

Collecting liquidated damages from contractors in the United States Central Command area of responsibility is often not effective.

### 3.5 Contracting

Although essential, contracting support is often inadequate at the district considering the workload. If possible, the area office should maintain dedicated contracting expertise within its district offices, which can greatly expedite the contract award and re-award process and other procurement actions that could significantly delay projects. At a minimum, USACE should train area office personnel who oversee contracts in the contract type they will manage. Assigning an ACO to each area office enhances contracting expertise at the execution level. Assigning ACOs poses sourcing challenges, but the advantages outweigh the liabilities and can result in superior contract administration and oversight.

### 4. Operations

#### 4.1 Maneuver Units

The area office operational staff must maintain contact with the division and brigades in the AOR in which it is operating. The maneuver unit leaders need to be aware of project statuses, because they potentially affect their relationships with local governments and the populace at large. The area office OIC should inform the maneuver unit leadership of project cancellations that significantly affect the local population. In addition, it is vital that the maneuver unit is aware
of USACE operations and movements within its battlespace. This awareness will assist the unit with coordination and management, if needed, and serving as a rapid response force for medical evacuation or response to enemy contact.

4.2 Host-Nation and Local-Government Authorities

The area office OIC must engage with the local government at project initiation and throughout the construction cycle (see Figure B-4). Key concerns include corruption, site security and access, availability of utilities, and the populace’s desire for the project. Positive or negative responses on any of these concerns can indicate project success or failure.

![Figure B-4. Commander of the contingency engineer district with Afghan officials during a project opening in February 2012.](image)

**Enduring Lesson**

Pay attention to local host-nation authorities for indicators about corruption, security, utilities, and local sentiment about the project. This knowledge, along with establishing rapport with the host-nation’s armed forces and police, can save lives.

Having a good working relationship with HN armed forces and security forces is critical to the area office’s success, as are understanding and respect for HN customs and culture.
4.3 Intelligence

Accurate intelligence must be incorporated into each operation and movement. Cultivating relationships and sources with maneuver units and HN entities is imperative. The area office OIC must understand the intelligence atmosphere, regularly engage with district or area office intelligence assets (J-2 office), read daily reports, and ask questions. Reports may come from USACE’s private security contractor. Understanding the private security contractor’s capabilities and recognizing its importance are critical to understanding the area climate and enemy situation.

4.4 Dissemination of Critical Information

Area office personnel must remain aware of critical incidents within the CED. The CED must disseminate any information qualifying as critical from the commander’s critical information requirement list. This information can be shared during command and staff meetings, commander’s update briefings, or by any other consistent method appropriate to the CED.

4.5 Private Security Teams

Use of PSTs (or security escort teams) during the Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies was not unique (see Figure B-5).

Figure B-5. USACE ceremony honoring a fallen security contractor at Camp Wolfe, Victory Base Complex, Baghdad, Iraq, in November 2010.

PSTs perform two main functions: transportation and protection of CED personnel and conduct reconnaissance. Most transportation and protection movements include visits to construction sites. The PST reconnaissance mission allows it to be the commander’s eyes and ears on the ground relative to security conditions. Generally, private security contractors have longer
residence times in the country that affords them greatly enhanced situational awareness and the ability to liaise with key political and tribal leaders. Relationships with local police and military authorities are critical to freedom of movement and security during movements. PSTs can assist both USACE and local maneuver units.

4.6 Information Technology

Loss or discontinuity of information can disrupt mission accomplishment. Continuity of information can be reinforced during initial network setup and requiring the use of file naming standards. Mission-critical data can be lost without network redundancy and back-up measures.

Enduring Lesson

Information technology support personnel should remain on-site at the area office, ensuring adequate mission support.

Further, contingency operations are time sensitive by nature and require immediate response to network issues. Although mission requirements drive the delegation of network administrative rights, in-theater personnel require this authority to resolve problems freely and swiftly. Contingency operations area offices and districts need network specialists with administration skills and privileges. The area office OIC should rate the information technology personnel to avoid conflicting mission requirements.

4.7 Civilian Personnel

The area office OIC usually cannot control who is assigned to area and resident offices. However, area office leadership should determine how these personnel are used. The area office engineer should decide how to best use civilian personnel. The area office OIC should broadly understand civilian compensation and entitlements and ensure civilians are treated appropriately. Pay issues can significantly and adversely affect morale and undermine mission effectiveness.

Personnel assigned to area offices, regional offices, and project offices, particularly those sourced from outside USACE, must possess sufficient vocational training and experience, especially during the drawdown period when time is critical. Solutions include stringent recruiting or extensive predeployment training. Civilian engineers should possess at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering and receive training in fiscal law, COR responsibilities, and USACE-specific, design-build training. The OIC should consider redeploying civilians who are disruptive, do not maintain an appropriate work ethic, or refuse to travel outside the wire.

Enduring Lesson

Deploy only fully-trained personnel during the drawdown — operating tempo precludes on-the-job training.
4.8 Maintenance and Logistics

Movement throughout the area of operations depends on properly maintained vehicles. The deployed environment may be physically harsh and wears out equipment quicker than in a CONUS environment. Compounding vehicle wear is the security teams’ practice of avoiding well-traveled, more predictable hardened roads in favor of low-profile, secondary routes (or off road and cross country). The area offices must either maintain or ensure the contractor maintains adequate stock of tires, ballistic glass, and repair parts. If possible, vehicle maintenance should occur within the USACE compound.

Logistics support at area offices and at each resident office is critical during stand-up and drawdown, given the need to meet initial shelter and equipment requirements and to conduct turn-over and turn-in operations. Steady-state logistics, once offices are established, requires significantly fewer personnel. It is critically important that the area office OIC controls and rates logistics personnel in the area of operations.

4.9 Security and Force Protection

USACE compounds within the area office and each resident office must enforce theater force protection standards. T-walls, sandbagging, access controls, and a standing reaction force (using PST personnel) are measures within the OIC’s authority and control. Security posture should be improved as much and as often as possible given the environmental, resource, and logistical constraints.

All personnel in the area offices should receive periodic incident reaction training, particularly for indirect fire and first aid. Civilians may deploy to theater with minimal training in hostile environments and may only have minimal training with standard theater self-protection techniques and procedures. Although the forward operating bases (FOBs) are somewhat secure against enemy activity, personnel within the FOBs are not immune to criminal activity, including assault, robbery, and rape. USACE compounds should have standard operating procedures for periodic security briefings and maintaining personnel accountability, especially after regular business hours.

4.10 Badging Access

Security personnel require official identification badges to enter and sometimes exit the FOB entry control points. Badging requirements and personnel who enforce them change frequently (U.S. citizen, military, third-county national, etc.). USACE’s badging requirements can be especially complex because of USACE’s frequent outside-the-wire travels and the employment of private security contractors originating from many different nations.

Maintaining close working relationships with the badging offices can ease frequent issues. As a general rule, common access cards (CACs) should not be issued to contractors. Issuing CACs potentially enables contractors to access military air travel, dining facilities, and post exchanges. Badge coding is typically insufficient to prevent access violations.
4.11 Supply and Logistics

In most cases, the area office and regional office are located away from the district headquarters. As a result, they must coordinate their logistics support with the U.S. military command, multinational forces, garrison command, and/or HN. The supply support activity requires the organization’s derivative Department of Defense activity address code and unit identification code to establish an account. In most cases, the organizations must also provide Department of Army Form 1687, Assumption of Command Orders, and an alpha roster.

Postal service support may also be available. A trained mail handler, designated by the commander on appointment orders, is required to collect mail from the postal facility. Finally, Logistic Civil Augmentation Program-contracted services provide sustainment life support, including bottled water, trash removal, and facility, power, and other types of services. The area office and regional office should plan to internally manage or make arrangements for logistical support in the following areas:

- Property accountability
- Supply and services
- Vehicle maintenance
- Transportation and movement
- Facility management
- Postal services

5. Department of State

The DOS is a powerful in-theater player that establishes many of the national priorities on which construction projects are based. In turn, the DOS is also a primary customer for a significant number of USACE construction projects. However, the DOS mission of interacting with local governments and representing the U.S. government may be removed from the daily operations of the CED or the supporting area offices.

Although the DOS generates many of the construction priorities and requirements, its staff often has minimal construction experience, making it difficult to appreciate project execution issues. For example, photograph opportunities figure prominently in DOS planning; DOS personnel may widely advertise project completion ribbon cuttings, revealing dates, times, names, and units participating at the expense of security and force protection. USACE must weigh carefully the benefits of participation in these events.

The U.S. Ambassador is the senior ranking individual in country.

DOS provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) also operate in theater. Although USACE personnel and engineer officers may be assigned to these teams, they are not under the direction of USACE.
Reference

Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.211-12, *Liquidated Damages-Construction*, March 2005
Annex C

Drawing Down the Contingency Engineer District

Introduction

Drawing down the contingency engineer district (CED) generally consisted of collapsing the project, resident, and area offices, and reducing the in-theater footprint. A contingency’s closeout process must be considered and established at the beginning of the operation; otherwise, there could be difficulty conducting the drawdown.

There are four key components to a smooth drawdown:

- Clearly identifying the *mission end state* and initiating a drawdown plan at least 12 months out
- *Synchronizing* staff structure, personnel end strength, and property management with a drawdown process, and balancing the staff expectation for tours of duty and retention with the reduction in organizational structure
- Conducting *in-progress reviews* to facilitate the drawdown timetable in accordance with local command and United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) guidance
- *Maintaining* adequate logistics personnel to perform a variety of logistics and administrative tasks for theater property and equipment turn-in and/or disposal (*Increasing logistics personnel* may be required to facilitate the drawdown.)

Enduring Lesson

The contingency engineer district must coordinate its own drawdown with the theater operational drawdown.

The drawdown timetable is determined through mission analysis for specific projects, by the local command directive and/or USACE command authority. Drawdown is initiated when:

- A specific operational end date or withdrawal date has been established.
- Newly awarded projects are reduced or programmed projects are reaching the completion dates.
• The theater campaign plan objectives are concluding.
• The USACE command determines that limited funds are available for new requirements.

Drawing down the CED can be the most difficult aspect of the mission if not properly planned. The drawdown’s complexity is directly related to the longevity of contingency operations and the district’s organizational structure and personnel strength. With dwindling resources, the CED commander must continue to accomplish program objectives, while also engaging in deliberate drawdown execution. During drawdown, the CED commander must address competing requirements to balance project deadlines with the customer’s ability to accept and use projects, security concerns and policies, logistical operations, and administrative actions.

Additional factors during the drawdown include increasingly austere living conditions for USACE personnel, limitations on personnel mobility within theater, and increasing security risks. CED leadership may wish to limit the amount of new personnel in theater, as there is less time available for job training. The joint task force (JTF) may also limit the overall personnel end strength for the theater, ultimately affecting USACE’s ability to forecast rotations for replacement personnel. The CED can experience more team members leaving than arriving, and, therefore, must plan for personnel reduction.

1. Planning the Drawdown

1.1 Drawdown Operation Order

The contingency division, in coordination with JTF directives, publishes an operation order (OPORD) directing the district to draw down. Subsequently, the CED commander publishes an OPORD, providing each component’s responsibilities along with an overall timeline. The OPORDs synchronize the drawdown process across multiple staff levels (divisional and district) and coordinate actions, including security, logistics, funding, and other administrative requirements.

Enduring Lesson

The contingency engineer district should publish its drawdown operation order one year before its projected closing date.

The district commander should publish the OPORD about one year from the projected end state or when the division directs it to draw down. Without the OPORD, each section and office plans and works independently. Their individual end states and timelines may not align with the commander’s vision. The OPORD should be staffed within the CED headquarters and among the area and resident offices before it’s published.

Operation Order Responsibilities

The CED’s operations chief (J-3) is responsible for generating the drawdown plan. The OPORD synchronizes efforts throughout the CED, establishing standards, milestones, and a timeline. The CED commander appoints a responsible person to enforce and oversee the drawdown once the order is published. This person may be the J-3, J-4, the district’s deputy commanding officer
(DCO), or a special staff officer. Because the drawdown plan occurs concurrently with the main mission of contract construction, a person with higher rank should oversee the drawdown plan and push the plan forward.

Planning the Operation Order

The drawdown planning process begins with project closeout dates. Then, a personnel drawdown plan may be drafted that includes the staff components. From the personnel drawdown plan, a vehicle drawdown plan and a container drawdown plan should follow. Some trigger points to consider may include the following:

- What are the project completion dates?
- How and when is the CED’s ability to visit project sites affected?
- When will tactical vehicles be turned in?
- How much life support is required and how will remaining personnel in theater adjust to limited life support?
- How will decreasing projects affect the district’s affordability?
- When will the supporting forward operating bases (FOBs) close?
- When must theater-provided equipment (TPE) be turned in? (The Headquarters, Department of the Army G-4 redistribution plan may mandate a timeframe for equipment turn-in or disposal.)
- Does the operation have a hard deadline for completion or for U.S. forces to depart theater?

Operation Order Components

Basic components of the drawdown plan may vary by operations, but generally include the following:

- Project drawdown plan
- Human capital plan
- Life support drawdown plan
- Security and force protection plan
- Property closeout plan

Synchronization Matrix and Closeout Timeline

The drawdown OPORD should include both a synchronization matrix and a closeout timeline, which are actively managed at the district. These documents should state when each office will close, when items will be turned in, and when personnel will ultimately leave theater.
and resident officers in charge (OICs) execute the synchronization matrix at their levels. The noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) or area engineer may be appointed to coordinate the drawdown activities and actions.

In coordinating with the FOB mayor cell or garrison command, USACE elements should try to close their own operation at least two months before the FOB on which they reside. This action prevents problems with services closing, and addresses the potential to be tasked by the FOB or theater command to assist with closing the FOB as personnel decrease. The closing process at a resident office may take seven to eight months. However, USACE is often called upon to provide subject matter experts for real estate and environmental concerns during final FOB closeout operations.

1.2 Drawdown Metrics

Although project closeout ultimately drives the drawdown synchronization matrix, each facet of the drawdown may be separately managed. For example, a simple metric could be used to project the quantity of containers, such as the number of containers on-hand divided by the number of months remaining.

1.3 Nesting Into the Theater Drawdown Plan

The CED OPORD must be nested within any written guidance or OPORDs from the division or theater JTF. The contingency division should establish policy and procedure for the CED’s drawdown. At the end of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Transatlantic Division (TAD) published a drawdown order that helped the CED understand how drawdown constraints would affect them.

“Just as laws and regulations change across U.S. city and state lines, the regional commands in Afghanistan and the coalition forces supporting them must follow differing local rules. For example, the disposal requirements of used Hesco containers change per region. In some places, they may be given away...in others buried. Each requirement...affect[ed] the timeline of retrograde operations differently.”

— CPT Thomas N. Page, A New Metric: Measuring Retrograde Progress in Afghanistan

The theater commander’s drawdown plan may conflict with the USACE’s project timetable; therefore, USACE planners will need to adjust their program completion to meet the theater timeline rather than vice versa. Similarly, individual FOB closeout plans may not consider USACE’s program completion in their planning process. Project officers must integrate the FOB closing with construction project schedules and plan resources accordingly. To address closeout activity and issues, a USACE representative should coordinate with the garrison command, mayor cell, or other appropriate closeout entity.

A regional command may issue its own guidance for a drawdown procedure, which may not be coordinated or consistent with other regional commands. For example, during OEF, leadership at Kandahar Airfield provided drawdown metrics regarding TPE, personnel, property, and rolling and non-rolling stock. In an adjacent regional command, the resident office on the leadership’s
The initiative began the closeout process seven to eight months before the final closing date, because the hosting FOB’s drawdown plan did not account for USACE’s mission in the process.

### 1.4 District J-4 Responsibilities

As expected, the greatest proportion of drawdown responsibilities falls to the CED J-4 office. These responsibilities are outlined throughout this chapter. Table C-1 summarizes many of these responsibilities.

**Table C-1. Contingency engineer district J-4 drawdown responsibilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CED Internal</th>
<th>With Supported CED Offices/Elements</th>
<th>With Army/DOD/NATO support elements and contracts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare OPORD logistics annex</td>
<td>Turn in theater-provided equipment and clear hand receipts</td>
<td>Turn in theater provided equipment and clear hand receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute OPORD logistics annex</td>
<td>Turn in intermodal containers and clear hand receipts</td>
<td>Turn in intermodal containers and clear hand receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan to close property book and hand-receipt accounts</td>
<td>Turn in fuel cards and clear hand receipts</td>
<td>Turn in fuel cards and clear hand receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan property movement from supported sites to disposition sites</td>
<td>Turn in meal cards and clear hand receipts</td>
<td>Turn in meal cards and clear hand receipts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify property requiring shipment to CONUS and plan movement</td>
<td>Turn in material and materiel to Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services</td>
<td>Turn in material and materiel to Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and close support arrangements with support organizations</td>
<td>Close supply accounts and supported supply support activities</td>
<td>Turn in serviceable items and ammunition to supply support activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and execute published retrograde/disposition policy</td>
<td>Turn in vehicles and clear hand-receipt accounts and contracts</td>
<td>Turn in vehicles and clear hand-receipt accounts and contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deactivate property book accounts after all property is transferred</td>
<td>Terminate support arrangements with regional support group/LOGCAP</td>
<td>Close hand receipts and accounts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.5 Drawdown Meetings

A planning development team is established to synchronize the drawdown efforts. The planning development team should conduct routine meetings and provide update briefs to the command and staff to ensure all elements coordinate with each other and do not work independently of the command’s goals and objectives. At the district level, the DCO or other officer responsible for the drawdown should attend drawdown plan meetings. At the area- or resident-office level, OICs can expect to attend regional or FOB drawdown meetings.
During the drawdown at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, the theater engineer and garrison commanders reported routine progress reports and updates to the theater deputy commander. United States Forces-Afghanistan Chief of Staff was the lead for this meeting.

1.6 Shifting Functions to the Rear

The CED may not have the resources or personnel to maintain all its functions in the deployed environment. One solution is to begin transferring and transitioning functions to the rear or to a sister CED in theater. Shifting to a sister CED may also help streamline processes and reduce redundancy. Functions to transition may include engineering, resource management, contracting, and human resources. In addition to specific functions, the CED may wish to transfer remaining programs — not necessarily projects— to the rear, or a sister CED as well.

1.7 Closeout Team and Closeout Liaison Officer

The CED may want to establish a liaison officer (LNO) closeout position, or a closeout surge team dedicated specifically to closing offices at each FOB. This LNO or team could provide personnel with subject matter expertise, closeout lessons learned and best practices, and experience. This information is especially important as personnel draw down, leaving just a few individuals to turn in equipment and close the office. Introducing a closeout surge team also allows office personnel to focus on the remaining construction tasks.

Enduring Lesson

The contingency engineer district may want to establish a liaison officer closeout position, or a closeout surge team dedicated specifically to closing offices at each forward operating base.

A closeout team member should arrive at the closing site approximately 90 days before closure to help the OIC and NCOIC understand closeout requirements and prepare the site for closure. A closeout team member should be present on-site about two weeks before closure to ensure property is appropriately dispositioned, accountability paperwork is correct, buildings are properly transferred, and USACE is cleared to leave the FOB.

2. Managing Projects While Closing

One of the most difficult aspects of drawdown is managing drawdown while concurrently executing the construction program. Drawdown management is complicated by the increasing difficulty reaching project sites, because of the decrease in theater supporting elements, such as medical evacuation and a quick-reaction force. District offices should leverage resources from local national (LN) contracted services, or cross consolidation within the organization’s security and force protection during project site visits. Once mobility to project sites is significantly curtailed, the closure and/or consolidation of project offices should be accelerated to consolidate resources, leverage capabilities, and reduce costs.
Unlike other units on individual FOBs that focus exclusively on closeout, USACE offices still have an active outside-the-wire mission. One way that USACE has mitigated this issue is by increasing use of LNs to visit projects during the drawdown process (see Figure C-1). In reviewing the remaining work, project managers may want to consider project complexity and the self-sufficiency of the local national quality assurance representative (LNQAR) staff while considering increasing LNQAR project site visits. Annex E discusses project drawdown in more detail.

Figure C-1. Project managers and engineers discuss final Salang Tunnel repairs during a September 2013 meeting with Omran Holding Group. Funded by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, tunnel repairs included pavement improvement and construction, drainage system rehabilitation, an electrical power plant (for lighting and ventilation systems), fuel storage, a camera monitoring system, and necessary site work. An Afghan firm also successfully constructed the project with quality assurance oversight from the USACE Local National Quality Assurance Program.

(Photograph by Alicia Embrey, courtesy of USACE)

Local National Program

**Enduring Lesson**

Local national quality assurance representatives trained by USACE become especially important in the contingency engineer district’s drawdown, because as personnel decrease, visiting project sites with U.S. personnel becomes more difficult.
The Local National Program is a USACE-sponsored capacity and sustainment program providing education, training, and mentorship to host-nation (HN) engineers. These trained individuals assist the CED by acting as site quality assurance representatives and assisting in project design and construction management. In this program, USACE trains LN personnel with degrees in engineering and construction management in USACE processes. The LNQARs trained in this program become especially important in the CED’s drawdown, because as personnel decrease, visiting project sites with U.S. personnel becomes more difficult.

**Hiring Local National Quality Assurance Representatives**

An HN company hires and vets LNQARs, and then provides management, pay, and administration. This company becomes a USACE contractor, with USACE establishing personnel qualifications and pay rates. LNQARs must have engineering or construction management college degrees, to ensure they understand facility specifications, layouts, and design. This knowledge, combined with understanding HN language, cultural nuances, and environment, can greatly enhance the contract construction mission. Ability to speak English, or a willingness to learn, is also an asset.

Hiring LNQARs of multiple ethnicities and tribes is paramount to mission success; often, the HN is divided with internal anger and hatred among ethnicities, religion, or tribe. The project location may require that LNQARs of specific upbringing or ethnicity cannot conduct site visits safely and effectively. Vetting, hiring, and assigning LNQARs of the same ethnicity or tribe to a particular project, located in the same region may be important.

**Local National Quality Assurance Representative Training Program**

LNQARs train after being vetted, hired, and assigned to a field office work location. Field offices typically conduct weekly training sessions under an area engineer’s management. LNQARs are trained in engineering construction design, techniques, and processes, and construction processes and material deficiencies. They are also educated in how to write reports using job-site photos and videos. LNQARs become proficient at learning to read, write, and speak English.

**Local National Quality Assurance Representative Site Visits**

After a new LNQAR has been vetted, hired, and trained, this LNQAR is paired with a more experienced LNQAR, enabling the new representative to gain first-hand experience with contractors and subcontractors, writing and submitting reports, and learning through experience and mentorship. LNQARs must spot deficiencies in construction material and design while inspecting project sites. They also check on the contractor and subcontractor work to ensure it is built to design standard. LNQARs can be essential in preventing and reporting HN corruption. LNQARs can use camera and video recorders to validate submitted information, allowing the USACE personnel to examine the information from the reports and take proper actions. As the LNQARs become more proficient in English, they can also serve as impromptu translators and advocates for USACE standards.
Enduring Lesson
The local national quality assurance representatives can be essential in preventing and reporting host-nation corruption.

3. Closing Project and Resident Offices

The closeout of projects and contracts must be planned side by side with the closeout of field offices, to help the CED maintain appropriate project oversight. Determining the close dates of these offices requires careful planning and disengagement criteria, as well as communication between the offices and the CED leadership. The OIC, area engineer, and NCOIC manage office closure.

3.1 Office Closure Trigger Points

The trigger point to close an office is often based on whether the CED can afford to keep the office open given its current project load and whether or not the location is projected to close. These estimates can be made by examining the office’s project load and expected completion dates in coordination with examining the joint force’s closeout plan. Optimally, this closeout is synchronized with the project or area officer’s in-theater tenure. Ideally, the offices close at least two months before the supporting FOB closes to ensure adequate support for the closure actions associated with the site. The area project manager, area OIC, and area engineer help decide when they can assume risk in closing. Some considerations include the following:

- When does the workload allow an office to close?
- What is the requirement to maintain construction representatives and engineers physically at the office location?
- When will the projects be completed? (Having fewer than 20 projects remaining may be an approximate benchmark.)
- What is the cost of keeping the office open and does the supervision and administration rate cover the costs?
- When does the supporting FOB close?

3.2 Project Closeout

The CED should plan the closeout of projects and contracts in conjunction with the closeout of field offices, allowing the CED to maintain appropriate project oversight. The CED should establish the closing dates as early as possible to afford the project office staff maximum time to execute drawdown activities. See Annex E, Project Closeout, for more information about project closeout.
3.3 Operational Effects

The CED should balance the number of projects managed with the operational area commander’s intent and the end user’s ability to accept the projects. Early withdrawal from the project area can limit the operational area commander’s options, while late departure can create additional force protection issues for the CED.

3.4 Security Considerations

Having the forward office location at or near the construction site provides ready access to oversee work progress and conduct routine site inspections. The ability to move securely outside the wire can become limited if U.S. military forces, multinational military forces, HN support, and/or contracted security teams are not available to facilitate freedom of movement. Once the offices lose internal capability to move outside the wire, it becomes more difficult to conduct a project site visit and manage project completion schedules. Mobility will typically depend on operational area maneuver units, whose priority will be combat and combat support tasks. In addition, maneuver units’ missions are subject to change at any time, which can potentially result in fewer opportunities for them to support site inspections.

Many projects are located on HN bases; the project officer may be able to coordinate with advisors when they travel to check on work. These types of informal cooperative relationships lower risks, the foreign footprint, and costs.

3.5 Office Closure Process

When the CED’s leadership agrees to close an office, the following activities are required:

- Contractors are notified of changes to meeting locations. Contractor meetings can still take place at the job site, or at an alternate district office location. The district should consider the contractor’s travel and facility access when determining new meeting locations.

- Office facility and services are closed, for example, disconnecting power, water, sewerage, and communications lines, and transporting or turning in office equipment.

- Installation services on the FOB are closed out, such as fuel, maintenance, vehicles, access, etc.

- The property book for billets and other equipment are cleared.

The closeout process at a resident office may require three to eight months of coordinated activities with several organizations or agencies on the FOB. The project office is considered closed when all closeout activities for installation and contracted services are complete and all USACE personnel assigned to the officer depart the FOB.

Because the equipment turn-in process and closing an office site are physically demanding, the district should maintain a sufficient number of personnel to assist with lifting and transporting property. Without the assistance from a logistics surge team, all office hands must participate in labor, including construction representatives, project engineers, and field grade officers. CED leadership must decide if tasking experienced professional engineers for office closings and
property movement is the best use of labor resources. Most personnel on a logistics surge team will be at the General Schedule 09 level and below. Local contracted services or logistics surge personnel are considered to augment the office teams for turn-in activities.

The in-theater district property book officer (PBO) or primary hand-receipt holder plays a major role in office closure. These individuals assist with coordinating disposal of major items (such as tactical vehicles) with the JTF J-4 office or local FOB mayors.

The Regional Command-Southwest in Afghanistan retrograded Camp Bastion/Leatherneck at a pace of 20 buildings a week. This aggressive tempo resulted in a commensurate drawdown of support services on the base for which USACE personnel were not prepared. Forward operating base closure dates and rates are important considerations for USACE office closure.

3.6 Real Estate Closeout

The real estate contracting officer and real estate team are integral to the drawdown and closeout process pursuant to Title 10 United States Code (USC) 2675. Real estate closeout functions include disposing or discharging of real property (land and facilities) acquired for USACE offices and installations used by U.S. forces in theater. Close communication between the closeout team and the real estate office is critical to ensure the following:

- Real estate instruments are concluded in accordance with specific written agreements and/or HN agreements.
- HN agreements and written requirements are following during real estate transfer.
- The turn-in or discharge process is pursuant to the land and facility owners’ written agreement.

A real estate representative or team should co-locate with a USACE office and/or with the engineers, to the degree possible.

Abandon in Place

If the FOB or other units will not accept ownership of a USACE building, and tearing down the building is not possible, the CED relies on real estate expertise for appropriate procedures to abandon the property in place. The “abandon-in-place” procedure requires considerable time; therefore, the J-4 should involve the real estate team as soon as it becomes evident that the abandon-in-place procedure can be used.

Real Estate Claims

Any claims settlement and resulting retroactive leases must be coordinated with the foreign claims commission office to adjudicate the claims in accordance with Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 27-162, Claims Procedures. Claims resulting from real property use are normally settled by a retroactive lease as authorized by Army Regulation (AR) 405-15, Real Estate Claims Founded Upon Contract.
4. Logistical Turn-In Tasks

A large portion of the drawdown involves physical turn-in of equipment. Categories of equipment vary with specific requirements for documentation and accountability for each type of equipment. Haphazard accountability procedures during the stand-up and sustainment phases of the operation create negative consequences during this phase. Maintaining sound property management policy and procedures throughout the duration of the deployment avoids costly financial liability investigation for property loss.

**Enduring Lesson**

Haphazard accountability procedures during the stand-up and sustainment phases create negative consequences during the drawdown as property receipts are reconciled. Avoid costly, potentially career-damaging financial liability investigation for property losses by maintaining good property stewardship throughout the operation.

Logistic management specialists should understand that some logistical turn-in tasks require significant planning timelines. Backward planning is used to prepare and execute the turn-in and disposal procedures. During the contingency in Afghanistan, the CED used two major automated systems to account for property:

- The Automated Personal Property Management System (APPMS), used for USACE property
- The Property Book Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUSE), required to account for TPE and property purchased using contingency funds

This difference in systems makes contact and integration with the local logistics organizations of great importance to the success of the drawdown operation. *(Note. The Army will discontinue using PBUSE in 2017, replacing it with the Global Combat Support System-Army.)*

4.1 Property Disposal Policies

Because local FOB mayors may issue their own guidance for property turn-in, local procedures and time schedules are followed for property disposal. Additionally, the major commands, and JTF and multinational force commanders may also publish property disposal guidance (for example, the United States Central Command [USCENTCOM] established the USCENTCOM Material Recovery Element). The overall drawdown plans must satisfy the redistribution, redeployment, reset, return, and disposal (R4D) policy that is published by the Headquarters, Department of the Army G-4 and re-issued through subordinate commands. In the absence of specific guidance, Army regulations remain in effect. Some enduring sources may include the AR 700 series, especially AR 735-5, *Property Accountability Procedures*; the Defense Logistics Agency website; and Engineer Regulation 700-1-1, *USACE Supply Policies and Procedures*. Resident OICs should remain in close contact with their local FOB logistics personnel and should ensure they understand the appropriate points of contact and entities for base closure.
4.2 Property Book Disposal

Unless otherwise authorized through the appropriate theater command policy and procedures, all contingency-purchased property and TPE must be returned and/or disposed of in country, which is a statutory requirement. The CED must consider the total life-cycle costs, the operational need (operational need statement), transportation costs (agricultural inspection and country clearance), and storage and maintenance costs in comparison to the procurement cost of the item or items to be retained and shipped to the continental United States (CONUS). When all factors are considered, it is more cost effective to dispose of property in country. A disposal option is to gain approval to issue the property to another governmental agency, military organization, or local government following all local and regulatory policies and procedures.

Equipment Retention Versus Turn-In

Generally, the Defense Reutilization Management Office (DRMO) is the central U.S. government agency for turn-in of unwanted property whether for disposal or re-issue. However, some property can be transferred to another military organization, U.S. government agency, or garrison base operations using appropriate documentation such as Department of the Army Form (DA Form) 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In. The garrison command, or designated agency within the command, has the authorization to formally transfer approved property to the HN and other foreign government. The base support group (BSG) can help determine which types of property can be transferred to foreign governmental agencies.

In-Theater Property Book Officer

A PBO should be located in theater with the CED throughout the operation. A rear-based PBO who is outside the area of responsibility can create unintended accountability issues; even simple property book maintenance is sometimes not conducted properly. In addition, the CED commander may not be able to reconcile the property with the property records or documentation. In the absence of a PBO in theater, the command must at least locate a forward PBO representative in theater with full permissions and operational knowledge of APPMS.

The time difference between the United States and the contingency location makes working and interfacing with the rear-based PBO difficult. Having the forward PBO co-located with and in the same time zone as in-theater personnel makes property book management simple and routine.

Enduring Lesson

A property book officer, or a representative with full permissions, should be in theater with the contingency engineer district from the beginning of the operation.

Because Army organizations use PBUSE for property management, all contingency-procured property and TPE should be recorded in PBUSE, rather than APPMS. PBUSE facilitates turn-in of equipment and affords logistics planners the opportunity to forecast and program property disposal through the R4D process. APPMS can preclude purview and visibility of USACE’s property by the theater command, resulting in an extra challenge for transferring and disposing of property through the DRMO.
Hand Receipts and Equipment Turn-In

The office NCOIC is often the primary hand receipt holder for office property, although the OIC may retain responsibility for larger end items. The primary hand-receipt holder maintains accountability for the property and is responsible for planning and executing disposal of property. The hand-receipt holder must ensure all transactions are properly documented and accurate records are maintained.

In Afghanistan, primary hand-receipt holders were required to validate their cleared hand receipt with the district commander and logistics personnel. The commander’s policy was to retain personnel in theater until the hand receipt was appropriately cleared.

Office personnel must often transport property to another FOB, if their resident FOB does not have a DRMO yard. The DRMO close date at each FOB is important; USACE should depart the FOB before the DRMO closes, if at all possible.

Enduring Lesson

USACE offices should close before their forward operating base Defense Reutilization Management Office, if possible, to avoid transporting equipment for turn-in to other forward operating bases.

All personnel should clear their hand receipts before redeploying. Because CEDs have a high personnel turnover, the out-processing clearance procedures should include the property book office. Physically moving items to the DRMO may become problematic near the end for the office closure. As FOBs draw down, vehicles and personnel available to transport items will reduce significantly, requiring all personnel (regardless of grade or position) to be involved in the closure process.

During the closeout of contingency operations in Afghanistan, some equipment and property could be left in place and collected by the garrison’s United States Central Command Materiel Retrograde Element (CMRE). Proper paperwork must be signed by an authorized CMRE or FOB representative to absolve individuals from financial liability for the property.

4.3 Information Technology Equipment

The CED’s information technology (IT) equipment will involve special turn-in and closeout procedures. IT equipment used in the deployed environment is similar to that used in a CONUS district. This equipment includes routers, servers, personal computers, monitors, printers, copiers, scanners, or projectors.

Information Technology Equipment Closeout Plan

Often, computers, voice over internet protocol phones, and printers are among the last equipment to remain. The amount of IT equipment remaining on hand depends on the number of employees and user requirements. Therefore, the IT closeout plan often mirrors the personnel drawdown (human capital) plan.
As with other CED responsibilities, the district is responsible for providing guidance to the subordinate offices; it should send an IT representative or team to the office to assist with closeout. The office should anticipate losing communications earlier than planned if pieces of the network are dismantled.

**Information Technology Equipment Turn-In**

For users at USACE offices, turning in IT equipment is fairly easy and straightforward. When a piece of equipment is no longer needed, an IT help ticket is submitted to turn in the equipment and an IT representative collects the equipment. The hand-receipt holder completes a turn-in document. Turn-in processes depend on the theater disposal plan and the type of equipment involved. IT personnel may have the latitude to decide whether the equipment will go in the DRMO yard or if it will be retained to continue its life cycle. This decision depends on the type and cost of the equipment.

Sometimes, items are discovered during the closeout. For example, a server used at an office location in Afghanistan was a USACE asset, but did not belong to the CED. If found property is not on the hand receipt and is not needed, it should be turned in. However, if the property is needed, then the PBO should initiate the appropriate property book transaction to bring the item to record.

**Contractor Teams**

The CED may wish to consider using a contractor team for IT daily maintenance and drawdown processes. There are some advantages of contracting this service:

- Strict accountability procedures and timelines are included in the contractor scope of work to prevent the contractors from working on their own schedule or starting the drawdown process at the wrong time.

- Contractors with experience in drawing down in-theater IT equipment can be hired. Experienced contractors may have standard operating procedures in place and understand theater-level requirements.

- DA Civilians can be responsible for many functions, possibly even overseeing a large operation, but a contract team may only have a single function.

*Three days before leaving the Helmand Project Office in Afghanistan, a contractor on-site at the forward operating base disconnected the USACE net, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network, office computers, and other office equipment too early.*

**4.4 Sensitive Items**

**Classified Equipment and Documents**

Classified material requires special handling and disposal. The CED and offices may possess SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) hard drives, phones, printers, scanners, and paper documents.
Security containers (such as safes) must have locks reset and must be inspected to ensure all classified material is removed and the container is empty before it is sent to the DRMO or put in a container for transport to another FOB. All documents in classified containers must be reviewed and either destroyed or appropriately transported to a new secure location. Once a container is empty and the lock is reset, it is no longer treated as classified equipment.

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Vaults, secure rooms, incinerators, shredders, or other classified material destruction devices, as well as the rooms in which they are located, will be thoroughly inspected to ensure no classified material remains.

— AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program

CED leadership and the J-2 must ensure appropriate security measures are followed on all USACE sites for all USACE facilities, especially remote project sites distant from the CED headquarters. In no case should any USACE building or container have classified material remaining when given to the local base support group for use or destruction. Likewise, containers with classified material may never be transported without strict adherence to classified document handling, including the use of personnel with a courier card and appropriate clearance. Military members should be aware that their knowledge and training on classified document handling is often greater than that of civilian counterparts.

Transporting or possession of classified equipment or materials outside of a secure facility requires a courier card and a vetted security clearance. During contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, most classified documents were destroyed in place without issue. Classified documents up to the SECRET level may also be transported through U.S. Postal Service registered mail within and between the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico (see AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program).

Classified equipment may be turned in on the resident FOB, and is usually a shared responsibility of the J-2 and J-6. Usually, the J-4 is not responsible for classified equipment turn-in requirements, although USACE’s SIPRNET computers are tracked using APPMS.

**Communications Equipment**

Handling and disposing of communications equipment may present special challenges to the CED commander. Because the CED has no organic communications equipment, during the contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, these items were purchased (see Chapter 11, *Conflict-Related Requirements: Operations and Intelligence*). The CED also drew some additional communications equipment (some sensitive for secure communications) from the theater for tactical vehicles. Because most communications equipment requires special handling, and the CED has no assigned signal personnel, the CED commander may quickly run into trouble, especially during the drawdown.
Enduring Lesson

Because communications equipment often has special handling, accountability, and disposal requirements, and the CED has no assigned signal personnel, the CED commander may quickly run into trouble during the drawdown.

Some communications equipment contains classified elements restricted to U.S. only personnel purview. Therefore, only appropriately cleared personnel may oversee the equipment. CED personnel may not be aware of these restrictions or may be complacent about handling the equipment around nongovernment personnel. These restrictions become especially important if the CED’s security contractors are non-U.S. citizens. Logistics, intelligence, and IT personnel must proactively handle and dispose of sensitive communication equipment and ensure it is properly safeguarded against unauthorized access and use.

Ammunition

Ideally, ammunition turn-in is simple and straightforward. Usually, either the J-4 or the J-3 office manages ammunition storage and disposal. USACE military personnel carry their own basic loads in theater. Depending on theater policy, ammunition is usually turned in to the unit as individuals redeploy.

If the CED finds excess or unaccounted rounds, the ammunition supply point usually accepts these under an amnesty policy. The office responsible for managing ammunition should be familiar with theater and amnesty ammunition policies, and should be aware of the ammunition supply point closing dates.

The contingency engineer district may need to assign a senior supply noncommissioned officer to the J-4 office responsible for issuing all weapons and ammunition, because most civilians are untrained in military requirements for maintaining or handling weapons and ammunition.

Weapons

Drawing weapons from the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) before deployment, then turning in weapons back to the CRC greatly streamlines the weapons turn-in process. Although USACE has the ability to purchase its own weapons, disposing of these weapons can create difficulties because they are not standard Army weapons. In addition, attempting to ship these weapons back to the rear can create additional difficulties. For these reasons, CED personnel found it easier to use existing issue and turn-in processes through Army command.

Although weapons require strict accountability, some weapons may be left in containers and arms rooms at the end of the contingency. Enemy weapons may possibly be turned in using theater amnesty policies. Disposal of enemy weapons depends on the situation. U.S. weapons not on the hand receipt should be placed on the property records. More than likely, another unit is searching for the weapon.
The turn-in of U.S.-owned weapons from security contractors follows the same procedures as other U.S.-owned weapons, but more time and energy is required to account for, ship, and turn in these weapons during a drawdown. J-4 personnel should be aware that contractors may depart theater leaving behind unauthorized weapons and ammunition, requiring USACE to appropriately dispose of the equipment.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Equipment**

Although the CRC issues mission-oriented protective posture gear to deploying personnel, the CED may have additional chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment. Some of this equipment has special disposal requirements that need to be confirmed with the central issue facility in theater or the local command.

**Other Sensitive Items**

The CED may possess other sensitive items, such as personal locator beacons. These items are usually on the theater property book hand receipt and can be turned in without issue.

**4.5 Theater-Provided Equipment**

TPE turn-in is generally simpler than the CED’s own property book disposal:

- TPE usually has an established and published standard operating procedure.
- TPE is issued in theater and stays in theater.
- Once the CED turns in TPE, it is no longer responsible for transporting the material.

The local command may decide not to create new TPE accounts that were established after a certain point in the drawdown process.

**4.6 Vehicle Drawdown**

Drawing down vehicles may be complicated, especially the longer the operation has endured. The CED generally possesses both non-tactical vehicles (NTVs) and tactical vehicles; each will have distinct drawdown considerations. A fleet manager within the J-4 section manages vehicle drawdown and writes the CED’s vehicle drawdown plan using guidance from the theater. In Afghanistan, United States Forces-Afghanistan issued a drawdown OPORD with a phased timeline for vehicle turn-in. Individual FOBs also issue vehicle drawdown orders that can change frequently.

**Tactical Vehicles**

In some environments, the CED may acquire tactical vehicles from the local command, such as mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAPs) vehicles. Turning in TPE MRAPs takes up to three to four weeks, because different system components must be turned in to several locations on the FOB. Once MRAPs are turned in, the USACE’s operation changes significantly, because site visits become much more difficult. As with DRMOs, tactical vehicle equipment turn-in may be available only at certain FOBs. The CED must plan for additional security and force protection measures for off-FOB movement when MRAPs are no longer available.
CEDs in both Iraq and Afghanistan used up-armored vehicles for off-FOB movement. These vehicles were either leased from a local contractor or owned and provided by the General Services Administration (GSA). CED personnel should be aware that, although up-armored vehicles are considered as tactical vehicles, they are often accounted for as non-tactical vehicles within supply systems.

**Non-Tactical Vehicles**

There are two categories of non-tactical vehicles: hardened and non-hardened. Non-hardened NTVs are used for secure on-FOB movement only and resemble standard U.S. vehicles. Hardened NTVs include up-armored vehicles for secure off-FOB movement.

Generally, NTVs are either leased (contracted) or GSA vehicles. During the closure in Afghanistan, the BSG issued guidance requiring a 1:20 relationship between NTVs and personnel. Within 30 days of closure, this ratio changed to 1:40. Reducing available NTVs can negatively affect the quality of life and the USACE mission in several ways: Reducing available NTVs resulted in:

- Reducing available vehicles to visit on-FOB construction sites
- Limiting the USACE reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) mission
- Limiting off-FOB movement to construction sites as up-armored vehicles decrease

Office personnel can petition for an exception to the theater drawdown plan based on operational needs, retaining NTVs beyond the normally authorized limitation. This action may be required to retain up-armored vehicles to complete site visits that support the USACE mission.

Toward the end of the operation, CED personnel may wish to consider swapping standard NTVs with vehicles that are easy to turn in. At the end of the operation, the theater J-4 may transfer all remaining vehicles to other military or U.S. organizations.

Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the U.S. government is not responsible for the turn-in or disposal of contractor-procured vehicles, and should not accept or agree to acquire these vehicles (contractor-procured) without the CED commander’s approval. Any request to acquire vehicles from the contractor must be staffed and coordinated through the J-4, G-4, contracting, the office of counsel, and other appropriate staff elements and local command.

**Leased and Contracted Vehicles**

In the sustainment phase, the theater J-4 is more likely to allow use of contracted or leased vehicles. This option may incrementally decrease or desist near the end of the operation. In Afghanistan, the BSG favored GSA vehicles. Contracted vehicles required a contracting officer representative to manage the contract. Contracted vehicles can provide significant advantages, to include the following:

- Contracts may be written to turn in the vehicles at any time convenient to the CED.
• Vehicle turn-in requirements may be much simpler and easier than turning in GSA vehicles.

• Vehicle services and maintenance can be included in the lease contract with a loaner or replacement vehicle option.

In addition, if the CED uses contracted security, the vendor should obtain its own vehicle pool, which is separate and distinct from the CED-leased or Army-owned fleet. Conversely, leased vehicles can be expensive, and are not usually supported by the on-FOB maintenance support operations.

**Vehicle Maintenance Support**

Vehicle maintenance support draws down commensurately with the number of authorized vehicles on the FOB or installation. Vehicle maintenance shops on smaller FOBs usually close first. Available vehicle maintenance options can include the following:

• Travelling to other FOBs for maintenance support

• Requesting support from units with organic maintenance on the FOB

• Establishment of mobile maintenance yards by the theater J-4 that are staffed by redistribution property accountability team personnel

• Establishment of a local maintenance contract by the CED

4.7 Intermodal Containers

Intermodal storage containers can cause excessive problems during the drawdown. Because the offices tend to use these containers for storage, the containers tend to fill with miscellaneous equipment that must be disposed of before the container is turned in. In addition, USACE may have modified some containers while in its possession, therefore, affecting their seaworthiness and creating turn-in complications (see Figure C-2).

**Enduring Lesson**

Intermodal storage containers may cause excessive problems during drawdown. These containers tend to fill with miscellaneous equipment that requires disposal before the container may be turned in.
The CED should assign a J-4 individual to oversee container accountability and drawdown; this individual should be certified and trained. The designated logistics person or persons should properly mark seaworthy containers and upload the container identification, location, and condition in the Army Intermodal System, which will facilitate the use of the container for redeployment of authorized equipment and property.

**Retaining Adequate Containers During Drawdown**

During drawdown operations, the CED must retain adequate containers and supplies to sustain the operation. If the operational end date is delayed, the CED may need to repurchase containers and supplies that were turned in earlier. Turning in usable supplies and containers to DRMO makes it easier to re-procure items later determined as essential.

**Theater Container Drawdown Plan**

The theater may issue container drawdown guidance similar to vehicle drawdown, with a mandated incremental decrease in containers as the operation ceases. Containers are usually turned in at the DRMO yard, which often required a full day to complete the process. Alternatively, the theater may have established a container holding unit for container collection. The container must be shipped to a FOB that has a DRMO yard.
Container Transportation

When a FOB closes, the required containers should be shipped to an enduring location for storage. Containers with sensitive items must be shipped with oversight appropriate to their contents, potentially requiring movement by a military convoy. Containers that do not have sensitive material may be shipped with local contractors.

Container Tracking

Containers are tracked using the container management system. The JTF tracks all containers in theater. The CED should also issue its own container drawdown guidance to offices and district headquarters. Many containers are Army-leased commodities, rather than Army-owned. Because these leased containers accrue monthly lease costs and other fees, the designated container manager must track and report the status of all leased containers. Throughout the contingency, the J-4 should monitor which containers are leased and replace them with government-owned containers, if possible.

Project Containers

Contractor-procured lease containers are primarily used at the project construction site. The CED is not responsible for the contractor’s leased containers and should avoid taking responsibility for the management and disposal of contractor property.

4.8 Fuel and Meal Cards

Fuel Cards

Fuel supply processes may become more restrictive near the end of the contingency; these processes will generally be FOB-dependent. For example, near the end of the contingency in Afghanistan, fuel draw policies on Kandahar Airfield became much more restrictive, changing from a letter requesting fuel from the unit commander to needing specific fuel cards assigned to each vehicle. The types of fuel available may also decrease.

In addition to individual fuel cards, the FOB may issue bulk fuel cards. Both bulk and individual fuel cards must be turned in when no longer required. As with vehicle maintenance points, fueling locations may decrease as the contingency draws down, resulting in using a more distant fuel point and more exposure to enemy activity.

Meal Cards

Although many FOBs require only common access cards for dining facility access, some require individual meal cards. The BSG handles issue and turn in of meal cards. Offices must ensure that personnel who are redeploying should turn in their meal cards. Individual USACE offices may also retain a small number of meal cards for visitors.

4.9 Disposing of Property Purchased with Overseas Contingency Operations Funds

Unless the designated theater command authority (normally joint forces command logistics element) grants specific written approval, property purchased with overseas contingency operations (OCO) funds is not to be shipped outside the theater of operation. Violation of
this statutory rule could result in punishable legal action on the responsible person. Property purchased with OCO funds is treated as TPE and does not belong to USACE.

If the CED desires to retain and ship OCO-funded property back to CONUS for continued use, the J-3, in coordination with the J-4 and PBO, must process a request for an exception to policy with appropriate justification or an operational need statement. Resource management, legal counsel, and other appropriate staff officers should review and concur with the justification before the CED commander approves the request. The overall life-cycle costs for the property should be considered before requesting retention and shipment of the OCO equipment.

The CED should establish procedures for requesting, approving, and shipping any OCO assets back to CONUS before drawdown operations commence. Drawdown should include coordination with key component commands (e.g., USCENTCOM, United States Forces-Afghanistan G-3). The R4D process should be used for obtaining approval for retention of OCO-funded property. Department of Army Financial Management Guidance for Contingency Operations, addresses the status and disposition of property purchased with OCO funds.

5. Drawing Down Life Support

USACE used several different life support methods during contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The levels of available life support varied during the drawdown process. At one end of the spectrum, all life support may be received from the BSG, including facilities, power, water, sewer, and building maintenance. At the other end of the spectrum, USACE may contract for its own life support separately from the standard Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) or FOB system. The CED’s headquarters and headquarters detachment may coordinate life support requirements with the garrison command.

**Enduring Lesson**

Most logisticians agree that using the forward operating base-provided life support offers the greatest simplicity, especially during drawdown.

**Life Support Contracts**

Although USACE can contract for its own life support, this practice often proved problematic during Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF. Although the CED holds the option to retain its own contracted life support, the theater LOGCAP provided the best solution. Advantages to using theater life support include the following:

- No cost involved for USACE to use the support
- No contract oversight responsibility or contract administrative costs
- No requirement to secure additional facilities
- No requirement to obtain escort services and access badges for local contracted personnel
In Afghanistan, the Helmand project office had several life support contracts requiring cancellation, including janitorial, power, and generators. Transferring the facility to the garrison was relatively easy, but it did require the remaining personnel to move to a new office.

Buildings

The CED is responsible for disposing of facilities acquired or constructed during the operation. Most real property (buildings, utilities, perimeter walls, etc.) remain in place for transfer to the garrison FOB mayor for disposal by CMRE. In some cases, re-locatable buildings are removed. The FOB decides building disposition, including whether buildings will be retained, closed, or destroyed (see Figure C-3). Usually, the BSG accepts only empty buildings free of property and trash.

Figure C-3. Buildings adjacent to Castle Compound on Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, are bulldozed during the operational drawdown phase. (Photograph by Scott C. Farquhar)

In future contingencies, USACE should consider building camps with the intent to easily dismantle. For example, using bolts rather than welds. USACE usually focuses on building for permanence; however, this is not always the most appropriate approach in a contingency. Permanent structures are much more difficult to demolish, move, and dismantle.
Because of the quality of life that USACE compounds provide, USACE personnel may resist moving from buildings on the established timeline. Requiring USACE members to move from their compounds and into BSG housing will often have the effect of energizing the drawdown to proceed more quickly.

Turning in buildings on non-U.S.-owned forward operating bases may be especially difficult and include unexpected requirements. In one case, the foreign nation required that USACE return the land with nothing on it, but the J-4 office was unaware of this contract until three months before the site’s retrograde. As a result, the contingency engineer district had insufficient time to dismantle its building. Although the building was usable and well-constructed, USACE had to pay the foreign nation to accept it.

Furniture

Furnishings tend to be retained until toward the end of the contingency. Local command may issue guidance on how to dispose of furnishings by burning or demolition. Many BSGs have programs to give excess furniture to HN organizations such as schools or orphanages. The BSG coordinates these programs and manages the logistical aspects of transporting the furniture.

6. Non-Logistics Closeout Considerations

6.1 Personnel (Human Capital) Drawdown Plan

The personnel drawdown plan requires careful planning and oversight, and a long lead time to ensure smooth execution. The human capital plan (HCP) is essentially a matrix showing each position in the CED; it also shows when positions or personnel are no longer needed. For staff accountability and visibility, the HCP should be a command product, rather than a J-1 product.

Because project funding is one of the main drivers of the HCP, the tendency is to reduce the logistics positions early. However, as permanent personnel positions decrease, the need for logistics personnel or other local contracted personnel will increase. Plans should be made to surge logistics personnel forward or to secure local service contracts to augment the J-4 staff.

Military Versus Civilian Personnel

The HCP only manages civilian personnel. Military personnel are managed using the joint manning document. Similar drawdown requirements apply to both military and civilians, but the theater JTF maintains separate numbers for both. The JTF commander pays stricter attention to the number of military persons in theater versus civilians. Therefore, the JTF commander may mandate a designated level for overall military forces, which may result in decreasing military end-strength faster than anticipated, leaving the CED with an unexpectedly reduced workforce.

Managing the Human Capital Plan

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the JTF mandated overall numbers of personnel allowed in theater, which decreased with time. These JTF numbers is what primarily drives the personnel drawdown, followed by project and program completion.
**Enduring Lesson**

The joint task force mandated overall numbers of personnel in theater. These numbers drive the personnel drawdown in the contingency engineer district, followed by project and program completion.

For the personnel drawdown, the first step is to determine what functions can be accomplished in the rear or through reachback. The project glide path also helps the leadership determine the number of required personnel. Several issues may complicate executing the HCP:

- Instances existed where the tours of volunteers were not shortened. Although mission accomplishment is paramount, disgruntled employees may negatively affect mission accomplishment for the current or future missions.

- Significant lag time existed between recruiting and identifying volunteers and the volunteers arriving in theater to perform duties.

- In some cases, incumbent personnel will leave before the positions they fulfill conclude, but the time remaining is not long enough to warrant deploying other personnel into that position. In these cases, leadership must execute judgment on whether to fill the position.

- Employees on term appointments cannot be terminated before their appointment expiration date (except for conduct or performance) without conducting a reduction in force. Requesting approval for a reduction in force is a lengthy process. Management needs to closely consider the closeout date when hiring or extending term employees.

**Socializing the Human Capital Plan**

The CED must continually liaise with the JTF J-1 to ensure overall theater target numbers for personnel are met. Facing pressure to redeploy personnel, the CED may need to justify why individuals must remain in theater in order to accomplish the mission, oversee projects, and visit project sites.

The CED leadership should meet regularly to discuss and evaluate the HCP, including identifying appropriate personnel to backfill each enduring position. The HCP can be managed by the J-1, the DCO, or the executive officer.

**Departure Dates**

To assist with personnel management, the human resources section may wish to separately calculate and track eligible departure dates, actual departure dates, and end of tour dates. Tracking these dates helps clarify when positions will be occupied and helps deployed personnel understand their redeployment timing. Without this tracking, variations in redeployment time (related to pay period end dates, travel time, and requested or accrued leave time) may result in personnel departing the CED before expected, leading to gaps in coverage.
Logistics Surge Team Versus Local Services

There is an option of surging either logistics personnel from CONUS or logistics augmentation from local contractors. The CED should factor overall cost, deployment timeline, training, theater command guidance for personnel end strength, security and force protection, living space and life support, or amount of sensitive property when making the decision to either surge or contract augmentation support.

6.2 Retaining Knowledge

Effectively capturing and archiving information and historical items from the CED require planning before the drawdown phase. With pressing operational concerns, knowledge management (KM) and historical preservation may not receive attention until too late. Without this information, future personnel in similar operations may experience unnecessary difficulty, and find themselves re-learning the same lessons and processes.

Knowledge Management

KM involves appropriately capturing and archiving information for future use. Both the Army and USACE have KM programs, but enforcing use of these programs and communicating their importance is difficult during high operational-tempo contingencies.

Enduring Lesson

Without appropriate information for archiving and knowledge management, even the most basic information about USACE’s contingency contributions may be difficult to discern later, including number of projects, program values, personnel involved, and combat losses of contracted personnel.

Without appropriate records, even the most basic information about the contingency may be difficult, or even impossible to discern later. Although Projectwise and other standard USACE business processes provide some standard information archiving, the CED must ensure KM is implemented throughout the contingency. Some consequences of ineffective KM include the following:

- Loss or difficulty retrieving continuity books and standard operating procedures for individual CED sections, requiring this information to be re-created in the future
- Lack of supporting documentation or evidence to refute future claims against USACE
- Difficulty documenting or communicating USACE’s contributions during the contingency (number of projects, program value, number of persons involved, etc.)
- Difficulty quantifying damage, injuries, and even deaths suffered by the CED during the contingencies, which is especially true when trying to quantify private security contractor injuries and deaths
Public Affairs Knowledge Management

Public affairs office file management must be standardized at the division level and its archiving process must include plans for capturing Web-based information. Public affairs offices may wish to input digital information into standard Department of Defense repositories, such as the Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System.

Lessons Learned

The contingency division should implement a deliberate lessons learned program to retain knowledge gained during the contingency operations. This program should include debriefing redeploying personnel, focusing on personnel who held key positions or were identified as exceptional performers.

Historical Documentation

The USACE history office at HQUSACE can provide advice and subject matter expertise in identifying, storing, and preserving items of historical significance. If possible, the CED should appoint a person responsible for historical item identification and care, including notations on the significance of the items. The DCO and/or command sergeant major may perform this duty. The J-4 office must maintain at least one seaworthy container in which to store historical items. The contingency division should coordinate with the history office to write a history of the contingency operation.

7. Miscellaneous Closeout Considerations

7.1 Badging

As the FOB closes down, the access badge process may become much more difficult. Frequent changes in badge procedures are expected during the drawdown. In some cases, obtaining visitor access may require as much as 12 hours.

7.2 Unclassified Paper Disposal

Given the amount of paper a USACE office generates, disposing of paper must be considered in the closeout plan. As required for operational security considerations, shredding and transporting unclassified paper to a burn location, and appropriately disposing of all paper required considerable time. Effective records management throughout the contingency would not only lessen this burden during drawdown, but ease transportation each time the office moves.

An archive team in Afghanistan could fill a 40-foot container with paper for disposal in approximately one month. Arrangements must be made for the container to be moved to a burn site once it is full.
7.3 Trail Party Considerations

The trail party depends significantly on the mission and on JTF restrictions and requirements. The CED should plan for the trail party to include at least two logistics management specialists, a PBO forward, an IT specialist, and RSOI personnel. The trail party also needs a command element, including an OIC or commander, and an NCOIC or sergeant major. Retaining a J-4 in country past the time of a site’s closure also helps maintain continuity during the drawdown, especially if not all drawdown procedures have been completed. The trail party should remain in country for at least 30 days after the CED closes and all other personnel have redeployed.

7.4 Final Items Remaining

Determining what equipment should remain on the compound until the end requires planning and compromise. For example, the district offices may wish to retain the ability to establish a defensive perimeter in case of a ground attack, requiring certain protective equipment. IT equipment was often the last items remaining. However, retaining too much equipment is unmanageable. Discerning this balance requires the leadership to conscientiously plan final property disposition.

7.5 Account Deactivation

CED personnel must deactivate service accounts. Because the types of accounts vary with the operational theater, it is impractical to give specific direction on closing accounts. Accounts that the CED may need to close include TPE, APPMS, PBUSE, and various BSG accounts.

8. Drawdown Timeline

A suggested timeline and activity list for a drawdown phase is provided and is based on a study conducted during the closing of the Gulf Region District. Some tasks and times may not apply to all OCO. The timeline may give some perspective to drawdown transitioning for developing OPORDs and other documents. It includes actionable items listed in descending order from the earliest to the latest based on the transition D-day. The timeline identifies the responsible party in parentheses.

As Soon As Possible

- The major subordinate command (MSC) ensures personnel across the division follow data management standards to include file naming conventions and database structures (command group).

D-540

- MSC and CED engage HQUSACE to identify the BSO’s intent and customers’ intents of end states and the BSO’s drawdown plan, facilitating USACE’s long-range planning (D-540 or as soon as any drawdown is indicated) (command group).

- Begin personnel requirements and logistical planning efforts (human resources and logistics management).
D-420

- Separately calculate and track eligible departure dates, actual departure dates, and end of tour dates for all personnel (human resources).
- CED identifies Schedule A staffing requirements (command group).
- The J-4 and real estate personnel formalize a procedure for performing abandon-in-place procedures for real property not accepted by the FOB or HN, and for which teardown is not possible (J-4 and real estate team).

D-365

- MSC and CED determine end and intermediate states for project loads, staffing requirements, equipment requirements, and reachback procedures to compensate for support withdrawn from the field offices and/or the contingency district (D-365 or before) (command group).
- CED identifies security requirements and resources (i.e., contractor versus military versus U.S. Embassy Regional Security Office) (command group).
- CED develops a base plan, to include staff and higher coordination (command group and J-3).
- MSC publishes contingency drawdown OPORD (command group and J-3):
  - MSC OPORD recommends that the CED OPORD emphasize two concurrent tracks: project closeout and operations closeout (command group and J-3).
  - Require CEDs to publish district-level OPORDs no later than D-270.
  - Ensure CEDs include back-brief schedule to MSC leadership, end state, and commander’s guidance (J-3).
- Identify personnel (military or civilian) who will fill end state positions and who will be in theater for three to four months before and three to four months after the transition date, which will likely involve transferring the personnel and projects from the CED to the end state USACE organization (command group).
- Continue enforcing a consistent file-naming structure and publish the KM archiving process, including instructions for file centralization and retention (information management).
- Begin file organization and archiving and review files to ensure compliance with file-naming structure (all personnel).
- MSC reviews full program life-cycle budgets and ensures:
  - Sufficient funds remain to fully close out projects and programs.
○ Timely redistribution or return of excess customer funds (continuous, and verified by D-365) (program and project management and resource management).

• CED defines the responsibilities of military field office positions, such as area office/resident office/project office OICs and deputy officers in charge (commander).

• Establish a common personnel accounting system with consistent and specific data field definitions across all contingency districts within theater (human resources).

• Develop a personnel drawdown plan and identify end state and transition-period personnel requirements (human resources).

• MSC and CED identify property disposition options (logistics management).

• Review or execute memorandums of understanding/memorandums of agreement, to include property disposition, with base camp mayors (logistics management).

• Include service contractors in the office closure/relocation process (D-365 and then ongoing) (logistics management and contracting).

• MSC and CED determine team members and location of a cross-functional project closeout team (project management).

• MSC develops communications plan for internal and external stakeholders to ensure continuity of effort and customer support (public affairs office).

• Establish a project closeout team and project closeout process, ensuring physical, fiscal, and contractual closure. Team members must be able to use relevant functions in RMS, Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, Standard Procurement System, and Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (project management, resource management, and contracting).

• MSC coordinates with the geographic combatant command to determine transitional and end state command relationships for all subordinate units (i.e., CED and final USACE footprint in theater) (J-3).

• Develop criteria and process to address problem projects (J-7 and project management).

• CED meets with customers to set expectations on construction quality, local contractor capabilities, and USACE management processes and communications (D-365 and ongoing) (project management).

• Determine number of initial logistics surge team members required to draw down the operation (logistics).
D-270

- CED identifies non-Schedule A (military and DA Civilian) requirements (command group and human resources).
- Identify property disposition for the various classes of supply (logistics management).
- Establish drawdown battle rhythm, including frequency and content of command and staff updates (command group and J-3).
- Evaluate value of LNO positions (command group).
- CED publishes drawdown OPORD, including:
  - Key event timeline and milestones.
  - Concept of operations, including office and project closure scheme.
  - Synchronization matrix.
  - Plan to maintain supply discipline throughout the drawdown (J-3).
- CED coordinates with U.S. forces to ensure movement tracking of security contractors (J-3).
- CED and CONUS district deputy for programs and project management identify any handoff dates by program with a specified minimum transition time (project management).

D-180

- Review security contract to ascertain:
  - Extension and curtailment options.
  - Required size of security force (main office support and field and mobile teams) during downsizing (J-3 and contracting).
- Review customer reporting requirements to identify how to support customer needs (project management).
- Determine number of secondary logistics surge team members that will need to be sourced to close out the country (logistics).

References


AR 405-15, Real Estate Claims Founded Upon Contract, 01 FEB 1980.


Gulf Region District Closeout and Lessons Learned, 8 May to 6 June 2011, 21 pp (draft).


Title 10 United States Code 2675, *Leases: Foreign Countries*. 
Introduction

This annex is designed to help the reader understand how reconstruction program integration occurs in the joint theater of operations. Although the contingency district and division play roles in customer interface and construction integration into theater counterinsurgency objectives, appropriate strategic integration requires an office specific to this function.

A clear strategic vision for the overall host-nation (HN) reconstruction requires an office integrating all reconstruction efforts in the theater of operations. Ideally, this entity would integrate all reconstruction programs, including those from the Department of Defense (DOD), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (DOS), coalition partners, humanitarian aid agencies, and the HN. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lacked such an office. Creating an office to integrate all reconstruction missions is beyond the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE’s) scope as a DOD construction agent. USACE was, however, able to achieve DOD program integration by creating the Joint Programs Integration Office (JPIO). The JPIO conducts the following:

- Plans, programs, and oversees all major DOD construction programs
- Develops strategies for implementing DOD programs related to HN water, energy, and transportation infrastructure
- Provides program management and technical expertise in real estate, electrical/fire safety, and environmental elements of DOD programs
- Creates short-, medium-, and long-term goals for DOD programs and an action plan to attain these goals, in cooperation with senior military staff in the operational environment, DOS, and USAID (require complete integration of all stakeholders)

In coordination with JPIO, the Transatlantic Division (TAD) Forward Programs Office synchronizes and integrates construction program and project management with USACE elements to ensure program execution meets stakeholder requirements. In this relationship, the JPIO is responsible for the requirements and USACE is the executing agency.
1. Sourcing and Establishing the Joint Programs Integration Office

1.1 The Headquarters Augmentation Cell

At the beginning of contingency operations, USACE uses an element called the Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE) augmentation cell to initially source the contingency division. The augmentation cell is the initial deployable team that shapes the deployed contingency division forward. Personnel from the augmentation cell form the JPIO after the contingency division’s presence is established. This section describes this team’s transformation from the initial deployed element to the JPIO.

TAD’s table of distribution and allowances (TDA) provides the joint staff authorization for the team’s structure and required skills. The augmentation cell is an HQUSACE asset that USACE sources with personnel, as required.

Augmentation Cell Mission

The HQUSACE augmentation team performs two main functions:

- Initially, it assists with standing up both the contingency division and the JPIO. During this phase, any HN engagement depends on the division’s mission and requirements.
- After the contingency division stands up, personnel from the augmentation cell migrate to the JPIO.

The headquarters augmentation cell is a modular team, designed to provide contingency division forward and Joint Programs Integration Office capability.

Deployment

The headquarters augmentation cell initially deploys with 15 team members who augment the deployable division staff. These 15 personnel attach to the division headquarters forward until permanent personnel replace them as the division structure and mission evolve. The overseeing contingency division provides direction and duties for the augmentation team until it transitions to permanent duties under the JPIO director and stand-up the JPIO as contingency programs require.

Standing up an augmentation cell requires executing HQUSACE Operation Order (OPORD) 2011-11, USACE Response to All Hazards Events. The OPORD requires identifying personnel from a sister division and deploying them to meet the need either of a division forward or the JPIO.

Initial Organizational Structure

The augmentation cell consists of three major units. A business resources unit and a program management unit executes program management, supported by an administrative and office support unit. A director oversees the three units, assisted by a deputy director and a sergeant
major (see Figure D-1). HQUSACE human resources department provides the personnel to meet the required team strength. If requested, the contingency division may provide sourcing after the team is deployed within theater. The contingency division TDA defines the initial personnel requirements, which are adjusted as the mission dictates.

![Figure D-1. Headquarters augmentation cell initial structure](image)

Because the augmentation cell manages programs, most of its authorized personnel are program managers and analysts. This concentration of management and analytical skills allows the augmentation cell to focus on program responsibilities, especially overall project alignment, to ensure they support the DOS and HN objectives. Figure D-2 shows the positions listed in the current headquarters augmentation cell TDA (note the concentration of program managers, business managers, and analysts).
Figure D-2. Positions in the current headquarters augmentation cell table of distribution and allowances and their functions

**Mature Joint Programs Integration Office Structure**

The JPIO structure matures with contingency mission requirements. Before the drawdown at the end of OEF, the JPIO framework consisted of a directorate with four subordinate divisions (see Figure D-3). During this time, the JPIO operated in a collegial relationship with the TAD forward programs office. The number of civilian, military, and contractor personnel under each of these divisions is mission dependent. Divisions may be responsible for managing programs for large offices. For example, JPIO managed programs for the 249th Prime Power Battalion assets in theater.
The deliberate drawdown of the JPIO will be mission dependent, with the senior executive service leadership and other positions downgrading to lower-ranking individuals as mission requirements decrease.

2. Program Management Responsibilities

In direct support to the theater engineer, the JPIO manages joint task force (JTF) Title 10 programs directly linking stakeholders, including the United States Central Command, United States Army Central Command, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, the U.S. Embassy, USAID, in-theater USACE elements, and reachback districts and centers. The JPIO focuses on programming and integration rather than project or construction management.

Enduring Lesson
The Joint Programs Integration Office focuses on programming and integration rather than project or construction management.

2.1 Restoring Critical Services

The contingency environment requires a cooperative team to restore critical services and infrastructure to the HN with the intent of ultimately restoring civil order and stabilizing a country or region, and, in some cases, providing services that did not exist in the HN before the contingency (see Figure D-4). Establishing critical services facilitates other construction efforts, especially those depending on readily available electrical power, water, and fuel (see Figure D-5). Conversely, to the extent JTF requirements relate to building the capacity of the HN armed forces, the JPIO must consider how these efforts integrate with one another within the context of DOD Title 10 programs.
Initially, critical services may be limited to military installations, although some military organizations may require critical service restoration to HN locations to gain popular support. Integrating these efforts is essential to conserving resources and maximizing efficiency both on and off military installations. JPIO’s operational charter contemplates that it will integrate all DOD construction efforts as well as define programs for restoring and providing critical services.
2.2 Program Integration

The program integration role requires assessing the DOS, HN, and JTF common operating picture, understanding the different agency roles, and meeting the contingency plan strategy. This team integrates theater construction efforts for the JTF commander.

2.3 Deconflicting Host-Nation Construction

The headquarters augmentation team considers how to unify all permanent construction work occurring in the theater of operations to achieve operational goals. As a part of this effort, the team should deconflict duplicate construction efforts within the same areas. If the JPIO is part of a multinational task force, deconflicting becomes more complex because the JPIO is only designed to integrate and manage DOD Title 10 programs.

An example of deconflicting construction may be a DOS education program requiring a school building in a specific location to meet the minister of education’s student capacity requirements. A command may separately arrange to fulfill the same requirement with Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds. In this case, two organizations could potentially plan and construct the same project in the same location, although the region requires only a single school. The JPIO must coordinate planning efforts for construction under its purview, thereby avoiding duplication of effort and conserving funds.

3. Joint Programs Integration Office in the Force Structure

3.1 Joint Programs Integration Office in the Joint Task Force

When the augmentation cell initially deploys to assist with standing up the contingency division, it is under the JTF maneuver division’s operational control until the contingency engineer division is at full operational capability. After full operational capability is achieved, the Joint Engineer (J-ENG) Office, within the Theater Engineer (T-ENG) Directorate, oversees operations of the JPIO (see Figure D-6).
The J-ENG Office is a U.S. organization responsible for U.S. engineer missions in the theater of operations. Because the JPIO is responsible for DOD Title 10 construction, it naturally falls under the J-ENG Office. The T-ENG Office consists of several components, including J-ENG and engineering organizations within the international coalition. During late stages of OEF, the USACE contingency division commander (forward) served in several capacities simultaneously, including the T-ENG Office. Nesting the JPIO within standard joint doctrinal organizations helps maintain clear lines of responsibility and control.

### 3.2 Joint Programs Integration Office in the Multinational Coalition

When U.S. forces operate on the battlefield as part of a multinational coalition, coalition components usually execute their own international construction programs with different authorities, funding for which the JPIO has no oversight or authority. Therefore, the T-ENG Office must ensure visibility of the theater construction common operating picture and synchronize various reconstruction elements.
References


USACE Forward Engineer Support Team-Advance Deployment Order 2012-09, (S)231700R February 2011.

Transatlantic Division OPORD 2012-13, *TAD Support to FEST-A Units Deployed for OEF*, 111600R April 2012.
Annex E

Project Closeout

Introduction

Beginning the operation with the end in mind is critical for the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contingency personnel who are building infrastructure, capacity, and stability for a campaign or host nation (HN). Focusing on delivering a functional project or program to an end user or customer helps members of the contingency engineer district (CED) remember their ultimate goals of user beneficial occupancy and project closeout. This annex explores how the CED can appropriately manage projects as they close, deliver projects on time, and manage multiple projects closeouts as the campaign tapers toward its end.

Begin with the end in mind.

— Stephen R. Covey, Seven Habits of Highly Effective People

1. Contingency Project Closeout Overview

1.1 Closeout Planning

The end-of-mission transition creates logistical, internal review, financial, real estate, legal, and closeout challenges. Many of these challenges are predictable and include personnel issues such as curtailments and in-theater limits on personnel, fiscal constraints, increased in internal and external reviews, increased logistics accountability, increased closeout costs, and high demand for limited funds for legal direct support charges. Drawdown planning and project closeout must begin early in the planning cycle to identify requirements and effects on personnel and the mission.

Planning may start with defining the end-state organizational footprint based on project load and knowledge about USACE’s long-term presence in the contingency area. Intermediate milestones are then planned, such as field office closure dates. Field-office collapse and the physical contract closeout plan require a full year of planning.

Closeout truly begins before projects are awarded. Effective and efficient closeout begins with process development, record keeping, and a focus on the overall program. Early in the process, project and program managers should make the following considerations:
• What documents will be required for closeout (both electronic and hard copy)?

• Will different types of contract completion require different processes/documents (i.e., termination for convenience (T4C), termination for default (T4D), contracts with claims, etc.)?

• Where will documents be stored (both electronic and hard copy)?

• What processes are needed to track closeout from the beginning of the project?

• What are obstacles to developing processes up front (e.g., release of claims, training, etc.)?

1.2 Closing Field Offices

The closeout of projects and contracts must be planned side by side with the closeout of field offices so the district can maintain appropriate project oversight. Determining the closing dates of these offices requires careful planning and disengagement criteria, and communication between the offices and the district leadership.

The trigger point to close an office is often based on whether the district can afford to keep the office open given its current project load. These estimates can be made by examining the office’s project load and expected completion dates in coordination with examining the joint forces closeout plan. Optimally, this closeout is synchronized with the project or area officer’s in-theater tenure. More information about closing offices can be found in Annex C, Drawing Down the Contingency Engineer District.

1.3 Project Versus Contract

USACE personnel tend to use the terms “project” and “contract” interchangeably, although these terms are not the same. In many cases, a construction project consists of a single contract. Confusion may occur if a project consists of multiple contracts, or if one construction contract is a combination of two or more projects. In this instance, the term “project beneficial occupancy date” (BOD) has less meaning, because the project may involve multiple BODs.

Within USACE, a project is defined by parameters of performance, cost, and time. A project is also an entry in the Project Management Business Process Automated Information System.

A project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or service.

— Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge

Contract means a mutually binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish the supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. It includes all types of commitments that obligate the government to an expenditure of appropriated funds that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing.

— Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 2, Definitions of Words and Terms
1.4 Project Closeout Versus Project Completion

A project delivery team (PDT) may over-focus on the project’s BOD or date in which the end user may occupy the building or begin using the project for its purpose. Significant work remains after the BOD, and may include completing final punch list items, contract closeout, facility management and sustainability training, warranty work, and operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements. Additionally, the PDT must account for other user requirements that the CED is not administering to ensure the project is fully prepared for use. Recognizing these remaining tasks may prevent stakeholder disappointment after the BOD and keep CED personnel focused on project excellence throughout the entire process.

Ensuring Full Project Completion

In spite of pressures created with multiple project closeouts and impending hard deadlines, the CED must ensure the contractor adheres to contract specifications and requirements. All punch list items and other deficiencies are completed before turning the project over to the customer, otherwise, nothing holds the contractor responsible for completion. These items can include any necessary O&M manuals, initial stock of spare parts required under the contract, and other commissioning tasks. The PDT must schedule these project completion items along with final user actions.

Special inspectors general in both Iraq and Afghanistan found instances of USACE projects turned over with deficiencies. Turning over incomplete projects to the customer can potentially obligate the U.S. government for additional costs of O&M and repairs not included in the original contract.

Incomplete project closure results in follow-on tasks that are more difficult for the enduring staff to pursue after current project staff redeploy. Creating cross-functional project closeout teams helps ensure proper project closures such as physical, financial, and contractual closure.

1.5 Contract Closeout Focus

Contract closeout focuses primarily on construction completion, O&M set-up, fiscal closeout, and other contract details. Most contracts require one to three months to close. Stakeholder expectations are managed by emphasizing this time requirement early in the project process. USACE personnel can educate stakeholders on the contracting process so they may better develop their capacity to maintain and manage the resultant project.

Underestimating contract closeout efforts resulted in a significant resource shortage during operations in Iraq. Using formal project closeout as a key metric helped accurately determine the effort required during the CED’s drawdown phase. Higher visibility metrics, such as physical and fiscal completion, can mask a material number of man hours needed to properly close, especially for older projects where the personnel involved have long since redeployed.

1.6 Closeout Documentation

During contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most difficult part of closeout was the effort to gather necessary documents. Gathering documents becomes more difficult in a contingency environment with the added challenges of project team members changing during the project and
multiple means of storing electronic and hard files. Closing offices toward the end of the program further complicates this process, as hard files and electronic files (stored on local computer hard drives and office servers) tend to become lost.

**Enduring Lesson**

Locating appropriate project documentation is often the most difficult closeout task.

To mitigate problems, the CED leadership should mandate use of the Resident Management System (RMS) as USACE’s established construction management tool. Using RMS alone significantly increases closeout efficiency and effectiveness in tracking milestones, correspondence, and memos. Using RMS also increases efficiency and communications with offices not co-located with the PDT.

**Enduring Lesson**

Mandating USACE RMS use for all project record keeping can significantly mitigate the frustration of locating closeout documentation.

Efficient RMS use requires a robust Internet system with appropriate speed and bandwidth. Without this system, PDT members may feel pressure to take shortcuts to managing their records when pressured with time constraints and other contingency pressures.

2. Project Closeout Entities

In a contingency environment, closeout will be a lower priority for the deployed team attempting to complete the construction program. Assigning closeout to the deployed team as a supplemental responsibility can be self-defeating because when a project is completed, another critical project often immediately follows. Establishing a small closeout cell from the beginning can mitigate this issue.

Closeout entities can be established concurrently as other contingency offices are developed with the primary objective of program closeout. These entities are responsible for developing the processes for various contract closeout types, record storage (electronic and hard copy) processes and locations, tracking mechanisms, and training.

**Project Closeout Manager**

The project closeout manager (PCM) tracks and manages each awarded CED contract and ensures the projects are brought to completion. The PCM should be extensively experienced in completing the final 20 percent of a project and well-experienced in contract modifications. PCMs should also have experience and knowledge in contract funding including purchase requests and commitments, military interdepartmental purchase requests, unliquidated obligations, accounts payable, retainage, permanently withheld liquidated damages, funding work items, and knowledge of expiring funds.
The district PCM is usually a General Schedule (GS) 12, whose qualifications include the following:

- Three to five years of project engineer experience in the construction branch
- Professional engineer licensure
- Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Level I in contracting, or higher

CED leadership must give the PCM appropriate authority to ensure projects are brought to completion or this person’s efforts may be ignored by those in higher grades.

**Project Closeout Team**

Because the deployed contingency project manager will heavily focus on placement, creating a team to focus on project closure helps complete all the closeout steps. This team can reduce the work backlog as programs close. Especially during the drawdown phase, CED personnel may focus on physical completion. However, projects are fully closed only when physically, contractually, and fiscally complete. A project enters the closeout phase once the project manager physically closes the project.

**Enduring Lesson**

Creating cross-functional project closeout teams helps ensure proper physical, financial, and contractual closure.

CED leadership should consider establishing the closeout team concurrently with development of other offices. The closeout team is responsible for closeout processes, tracking, and training, and should be consistently included in start-up meetings and throughout the project. This team (with established responsibilities and processes) provides consistency throughout the life of the project and high turnover of on-site personnel. This team can help ensure appropriate customer service regarding closeout documents, including warranty documents, warranty processes, O&M manuals, training, as-built specifications, etc. These document may also include the following:

- Standard warranty specification section for inclusion into each contract
- Developing warranty process to be used by the customers for contracts
- A checklist of turnover documents to the customer

Delays also create hardships for follow-on staff to close the projects as the original project staff redeploy and files are archived or forgotten. During the drawdown, project and program managers may find themselves handling many projects, creating even more difficulty in attending to project closeouts, resulting in sequestering considerable funds that otherwise could be applied to other projects or released back to the customer.

Key requirements for the closeout team include a working knowledge of USACE project systems and access to project managers and support staff to obtain decisions. The area or resident office engineer completes the requisite physical closeout documents and sends the packet to the
closeout team. The closeout team, using the USACE project and financial systems and processes, completes or coordinates the completion with the appropriate staff elements. The project closeout team should encourage end-user participation.

The project closeout team uses USACE software systems for ensuring the contractual and fiscal closeout. Key USACE systems include the RMS, Standard Procurement System, Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, and the Contractor Performance Assessment Rating System module of the Construction Contractor Appraisal Support System.

**Military Personnel**

During drawdown, CED leadership may wish to increase the percentage of deployed military personnel in required positions. Unlike civilians, military personnel do not financially charge to projects, allowing better conservation of funds. In addition, the security situation may degrade during the latter stages of a counterinsurgency campaign, underscoring possible benefits of increasing armed personnel. (*Core Counterinsurgency Asset: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan for United States Army Corps of Engineers Leaders*, Glenn, p. 147)

**Contract Closeout Project Delivery Team**

Forming a PDT may be helpful for contract closeouts as the CED approaches the end of the contingency. The team may particularly focus on handling requests for equitable adjustment (REAs) and claims, and handover of customer interface and reporting responsibilities.

Closing contracts appropriately is difficult in the contingency environment for many reasons, such as difficulty locating critical contract documents, processing an unusually high number of REAs and claims, and difficulty identifying correct enduring systems and personnel to receive duties. While standard procedures for completing project closeouts exist, the exceptional number of anticipated REAs and claims requires extra resources and training for this aspect of closeout. Also, locating hard copies of project files was time-consuming, as many were still dispersed across field offices, while others were returned to area offices or the district.

Some recommendations for the contract closeout PDT include the following:

- Transfer contract closeout duties to the rear as soon as possible, or establish and retain the PDT in the continental United States (CONUS)
- Establish streamlined standard practices
- Centrally locate the team so all offices have access as needed

**Enduring District and Continental United States District**

Some projects may endure after the CED leaves the contingency area. In this case, an enduring USACE entity will be given responsibility for the project. This entity may be a supporting enduring district within the contingency division. The program and project management transition processes must be deliberately mapped between the CED and enduring district. The districts must anticipate differences between the CED and the enduring organization’s structures and their assignment of responsibilities. The districts must also establish clear processes on how to transition responsibilities and customer relationships.
Enduring Lesson

The contingency engineer district and enduring district must deliberately map program and project management transition processes, anticipating differences between organizations’ structures and assignment of responsibilities.

Transitioning responsibilities may be complex. For example, the CED may assign project managers for the full life cycle of a project and a single program manager for a particular funding program. Conversely, the enduring district may assign projects based on phase (pre-award, in-progress, closeout). The CED project manager may be required to hand over a single project to multiple project managers. The enduring district may also assume project responsibilities along with a reachback provider, further complicating the project handover.

2.1 Reachback Versus In-Theater Closeout

Sending a project to closeout through CONUS reachback versus conducting the same work using an in-theater project closeout office involves many considerations, including time and cost. A reachback closeout cell consisting of a multifunctional team dedicated solely to the financial, contractual, and archival actions necessary to properly closeout contracts brings many advantages. This team should include contracting officers, contracting specialists, project managers, program analysts, attorneys, and ad hoc technical experts such as construction and engineer professionals.

The reachback closeout cell works with the forward deployed team to gather needed or missing information, although different time zones and work hours may present communication challenges. Reachback closeout reduces requirements for deployed civilians, decreasing costs and minimizing the forward footprint. By removing the need for a CED to monitor closeout actions, deployed personnel can focus on near-term project execution rather than long-term closeout actions, which may span years in cases with pending REAs, claims, and appeals.

2.2 Documentation and Files

USACE requires all contracts to be documented and archived. The CED should establish a standard process of archiving and documentation and should ensure its consistent use. In addition to contract documentation, files and whole databases transferred between offices during the transition may present obstacles if inconsistently stored and named. At a minimum, the district should have a standard filing and naming convention. Database turnover must be designed from the start. The district should enforce guidance for file organization, maintenance, and archiving.

The Baghdad Resident Office assumed projects from five other offices as they closed. Because the district had no protocol on storing and naming electronic files, a significant amount of time was spent searching through files to ensure all the required documentation was present and consistently restructured and named. High turnover within each office as project engineers rotated every six months exacerbated the process.
2.3 Strategic Communication

CED leadership must be proactive in managing the strategic communications messaging to USACE customers to ensure they do not receive unintended messages. The CED does not wish to convey the message to HN customers or stakeholders that USACE is abandoning them or leaving promises unfulfilled. Positive messaging requires deliberate coordination between CED leaders and outside stakeholders.

3. Project Closeout Methods and Tools

As the contingency district transitions or closes, the commander and contracting officers may face a definite timeline for ensuring all construction contracts within the operational area are concluded. This completion plan is sometimes called the “glide path,” as the number of active projects approaches zero. Ideally, the district remains on its planned glide path. However, the commander has several methods to push the projects to conclusion as the district approaches its redeployment date or the date when its assets substantially decrease. Changing the established glide path may have strategic implications. For example, extending a project BOD or terminating a project may cause an end user to question the U.S. commitment to the HN or region, resulting in decreased security and disrupting local relationships.

3.1 Complete as Awarded

Ideally, all the district’s projects will be completed as awarded, with contractors meeting contract specifications and concluding with established close-out processes. Allowing a contractor to “complete as awarded” is a determination based on multiple factors such as the contractor’s ability to complete work in a timely manner and the work left to be completed. In contingency operations, and especially as operations approach conclusion, the commander may need to modify the glide path of expected completion dates.

3.2 Restricting or Precluding New Project Awards

The date after which the CED will not award any or the few new construction contracts is a critical point in the commander’s closeout timeline. The commander, deputy for program and project management (DPPM), and contracting officer will decide the date in concert with the division commander, the joint task force (JTF), the HN, and other stakeholders in the HN’s stability. Strategic considerations may require that USACE award some projects late in the contingency, or that some projects achieve full completion.

Enduring Lesson

The contingency engineer district should establish the timeline for final project delivery as early as possible, allowing time to consider whether completing the project as awarded, descoping, or terminating the contract is in the best interest of the government.

CED in-country leadership is better able to judge which projects are likely to be completed in a timely way with the limited time remaining. Senior USACE leaders serving in the Iraq and Afghanistan drawdowns varied in allowing subordinates to decline project requests. (Glenn, p. 148)
3.3 Contract Descope or Modification

Descoping a project involves reducing the contract requirements specified in the statement of work. Only contracting officers functioning within their authority can legally execute contract modifications on the government’s behalf. This authorization allows the contracting officer to scale down a project, shortening the CED’s completion glide path. Part 43, *Contract Modifications*, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) has additional information.

Contract modifications may be bilateral, signed by both the contracting officer and the contractor, or unilateral, signed only by the contracting officer. Unilateral modifications may be used to make administrative contract changes, issue change orders, make changes authorized by clauses other than a changes clause (e.g., property clause, options clause, or suspension of work clause), and issue termination notices.

A method to execute a bilateral modification includes sending the contractor a letter advising that the government intends to descope the contract, specifically identifying what will be descoped. The contracting officer should then request the contractor to provide a descope proposal, showing reductions in material, personnel, labor hours, and funding. The contractor’s proposal will often be lower than the government estimate. The contracting officer should then evaluate the proposal and negotiate the reduction. The contracting officer issues a bilateral contract modification once an agreement is reached.

3.4 Contact Termination

The contracting officer may terminate contracts for the government’s convenience, such as T4C, or because of contractor default. Both of these termination methods involve specific legal procedures and requirements outlined in the FAR, especially in FAR Part 49, *Termination of Contracts*. Termination of contracts is coordinated with the office of counsel before taking action.

**Termination for Convenience**

Although the government can terminate a contract for its own convenience at any time (absent bad faith or improper motive), the T4C option may receive greater consideration as the contingency nears its end. T4C involves ending a project before it comes to conclusion within the original contract scope. This option can save the government time and money, especially if the ultimate project efficacy is questionable. Evaluating the schedule and work remaining helps identify the optimal termination point. Ideally, the customer can use the completed portion of the project, and remaining work can be completed later.

The T4C has several considerable drawbacks. First, most or all of the project benefit will be lost, because the project will not be completed as planned. Second, the local population and HN personnel may object to the T4C and react negatively, which may include degradation to security in the project’s vicinity.
**Termination for convenience** is the exercise of the government’s right to completely or partially terminate performance of work under a contract when it is in the government’s interest.

— Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 2, *Definitions of Words and Terms*

**Termination for Default**

A contracting officer may terminate a contract for default if the contractor fails to meet a material requirement of the contract that endangers overall contract performance. The FAR outlines specific stipulations required when exercising a T4D. In addition, the contracting officer must decide if the contract should be re-procured with another vendor and must evaluate any potential tactical, operational, or strategic implications terminating the project may have.

**Termination for default** means the exercise of the government’s right to completely or partially terminate a contract because of the contractor’s actual or anticipated failure to perform its contractual obligations.

— Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 2, *Definitions of Words and Terms*

### 3.5 Determining the Project Closeout Method

Tension may occur toward the end of an operation between those wanting to terminate contracts and project requirements and those wanting to complete them. The last remaining projects often have difficult unresolved problems, contractor capabilities issues, or logistical challenges (materials or construction oversight). District leaders may wish to develop a process for determining disposal of projects, enabling consistent decisions during this period of change and high staff turnover. The contracting officer retains the final decisional authority regarding the need to terminate the project for convenience and/or default.

A risk-based decision analysis should be performed to effectively identify projects deserving resources for completion and projects that deserve elimination. This process should be established early and should include criteria from both the customer’s perspective and USACE’s perspective. Potential criteria include construction performance history, operational impact, and the ability to oversee construction. Ideally, if the project has problems and negative impact on the mission, it may be a candidate for cancellation or curtailment.

CED personnel should be aware that terminating projects the HN expected to receive and use may have negative strategic communications effects. Terminating or descoping projects risks creating resentment or hostility from HN officials, contractors, and customers and should be considered when determining the project closeout method. In addition, removing the remains of unfinished projects is taken into consideration so they do not serve as a reminder to locals and insurgents that the project was not completed. (Glenn, p. 93)
4. Guidance in Managing Projects and Project Closeout

Maintaining an accurate, realistic project delivery schedule was one of the greatest challenges during the contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The CED leadership must actively manage delivery dates and schedules in all phases of the operation, which becomes especially critical near the end of the operation when the number of project deliveries increases and deadline delivery dates become more static. In some cases, these deadlines involve dates by which USACE or other U.S. agencies must depart the HN.

An additional complicating factor is the projects remaining near contingency’s end that have the greatest difficulties and complications. Along with increased project delivery and stricter deadlines, the CED leaders may inherit these projects and the issues that prevented their completion. In some cases, project management during closeout was complicated by projects with lifespans lasting longer than the funding programs for the projects; synchronizing contract completion dates and funding minimizes this conflict (Glenn, p. 150).

Analyzing more than 1,000 USACE projects in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that initial project duration calculations often significantly underestimated actual duration.

Meetings and reviews can help USACE leaders in achieving their delivery objectives (see Figure E-1). Guidance for project closeout should be included in the theater operations plan’s engineer annex. The contingency division or CED may provide additional or refined guidance in operation orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), addressing the strategic, operational, and tactical leadership and desired effects.

![Figure E-1. Contingency engineer district meetings to assist with project delivery and closeout for all leadership levels within theater.](image)
4.1 Strategic Level (Division) Meetings and Reviews

Program Management Review

Once monthly, the executing districts and district-forward program office present the monthly program management review to theater Title 10 authorities. The program management review tracks all construction and the facility management programs’ progress. The Title 10 audience may include United States Forces (USFOR) command representatives, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, and USACE leadership. The review focuses on the programmatic issues or challenges that currently face the team.

Engineer Synchronization Board

The biweekly Engineer Synchronization Board (ESB) is a theater-level meeting facilitating priority-setting, project progress reporting, and open discussion among theater construction agencies. This meeting is generally a secure video teleconference lasting 60 to 75 minutes, chaired by the senior engineer in theater.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the senior engineer chairing this meeting had three separate duty titles, including the USFOR engineer, JTF deputy chief of staff engineer, and the USACE Transatlantic Division deputy commanding general-forward. This “triple-hatting” of the senior engineer made the ESB an especially important venue for ensuring all engineering construction projects were synchronized and transparent to stakeholders. ESB attendees included the advisory or transition command engineer, the CED commanders, maneuver division engineers, and the HN chief of engineers.

Military Construction to Maintenance Working Group

The Military Construction To Maintenance Working Group (MMWG) verifies that facilities are constructed to acceptable quality standards. The MMWG also aids in transitioning facilities to the density list, if applicable. The MMWG primarily strives to ensure stakeholders communicate effectively and coordinate throughout military construction (MILCON) project construction to include the following:

- Establishing a standard technical inspection protocol and timetable
- Prioritizing projects for review
- Facilitating and mitigating issues to avoid delays or additional costs
- Facilitating successful completion and turnover of facilities including transition to the density list, if applicable

The working group consists of key stakeholders in the project execution and turnover process. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contractors actively participate, providing input through phased technical inspections and communicating with USACE and the working groups throughout the construction process. Although not listed below, the facility end user often participated because of any delays that directly affected the organization.
Once a facility passed its final LOGCAP inspection, it began providing O&M). During contingency operations in Afghanistan, MMWG members included the following:

- Chair-Director, Joint Programs Integration Office (JPIO) (senior executive service [SES])
- Vice-Chair, JPIO, Chief of Infrastructure Division
- USACE
- Defense Contract Management Agency representatives
- United States Army Sustainment Command
- United States Army Contracting Command
- Safety representatives
- Theater MILCON program manager
- Base operating support-integrator
- Army Materiel Command
- United States Air Force/United States Air Forces Central Command

### 4.2 Operational-Level District and External Agencies

Two meetings synchronize projects with the theater/USFOR commander’s guidance: the construction and facilities engineering (CAFE) working group that acts as the theater program review board, and the BOD summit, a theater-wide, line-item review. Both these meetings join senior leaders from unified action organizations to discuss MILCON and HN capacity building challenges.

**Construction and Facilities Engineering Working Group**

The CAFE working group is a programmatic project review focusing on concerns and/or issues that may require senior leadership guidance (see Figure E-2). It provides unified program oversight with senior leaders to determine operational and strategic effects. The CAFE working group’s has four focus areas:

- Programmatic requirement owner topics
- Project performance
- Issue and project decisions
- Project oversight challenges

The CAFE working group provides a forum for senior leaders to apply the commanding
general’s guidance, facilitates senior leader project decisions, and assesses the HN program operational and strategic effects. The CAFE working group seeks to create a transparent project schedule and completion timeline, identify problems, and present courses of action for decision making, discussion, and planning.

Figure E-2. The construction and facilities engineering working group focuses on end user needs (although end users do not participate in the meeting). This figure shows potential customers, agents, and end users involved in the CAFE working group.

Led by a joint engineer (O-7), and JPIO director (SES), the CAFE working group brings together the CED commander, O-6, and senior staff with customers that may include the advisory or transition command engineers and maneuver division engineers as customers. The senior command and customer are the CAFE working group proponents; the deputy commander with the DPPM leads the agenda.

The CAFE working group’s review of the HN’s developmental infrastructure and capacity building helps ensure stakeholders share a common understanding. The review provides a forum to discuss the HN capacity-building progress, the overarching plan for the HN infrastructure, and each stakeholder’s role in that plan.

Although the CAFE working group meets biweekly with senior leaders, a working-level, in-progress review is held in the intervening week, and a rehearsal is conducted the two days before the CAFE working group (see Figure E-3). All meetings are held via secure video teleconference.
Figure E-3. Preparation for the construction and facilities engineering working group includes an in-progress review a week before the meeting and a full rehearsal three days before the meeting.

Beneficial Occupancy Date Summit

The BOD summit is a project/program manager working group that includes outside stakeholders. Members of the summit review all projects for timely completion, reviewing the support each project requires and resolving deficiencies. The BOD summit focuses on project execution rather than pre-award and solicitation. It allows for discussion to improve project execution, better track and meet BODs, manage project closeout, and re-assert the master planning process.

The BOD summit meets quarterly over three days (see Figure E-4). During the first two days, working group participants review every active project in depth, transparently and face to face. During the third day, the working group briefs its recommendations to senior leaders for discussion and decision making. BOD summit analysis considers construction completion date and the BOD as the key project delivery measures. The summit allows key individuals to provide information for the master planning review used in the CAFE working group. The summit also makes changes to the master-planning process for the HN.

Enduring Lesson

A quarterly review of all project beneficial occupancy dates facilitates project status transparency and delivery timeline certainty with customers and other stakeholders.
Figure E-4. The beneficial occupancy date summit process includes actions taken before, during, and after to ensure a successful summit.

The BOD summit provides better fidelity on project delivery dates to the customer and elements subordinate to the JTF (corps, divisions, and brigades). The face-to-face project review among the senior command and the district representatives includes program managers, project managers, area engineers, resident engineers, and project engineers. Subordinate tactical echelon representatives may also participate, as well as infrastructure training assistance teams. The glide path provides key information at the BOD summit and shows the scheduled number of active projects per month.

The division forward provides projected BODs for comparison based on a BOD duration statistical analysis model and a projection based on recent placement trends of each contract. This model includes data for projects previously completed in the region and provides a baseline on which to compare future BODs. While it changes from region to region based on culture, geography, contractors, and weather, this tool provides leaders at all levels with a historical overview of multiple projects.
During the BOD summit, participants should consider all risk factors potentially affecting the BOD. Figure E-5 provides factors that may be considered. The team may wish to assign a weighing factor from zero to ten based on the likelihood of each factor negatively influencing the BOD. The sum of all 25 factors can help quantify project risk. “Projects in a combat environment, on average, considerably exceed the completion time the same undertaking would require in a permissive environment with experienced contractors.” (Glenn, p. 94)

![Risk Factors that May Influence Project Delivery Dates](image)

Figure E-5. Evaluating these 25 risk factors may help determine the potential for a project beneficial occupancy date to shift.

If the district commander has identified BOD changes on the list of commander’s critical information requirements, any new BOD must be formally reported to the command. The commander’s critical information requirements should state that the BOD change was prepared and coordinated with the end user and customer.

**Primary Customer and District Meeting**

The biweekly primary customer/district meeting maintains open lines of communication between the primary customer and the primary construction agent. This meeting involves in-depth discussion of project execution with the district commander (O-6) and the DPPM (the senior command’s engineer). The O-6 and senior staff members such as the HN Army branch chief, HN
police branch chief, and liaison officers. The meeting synchronizes actions between the district (as the construction agent) and senior command (as the customer) on all programs and projects. Large programs and projects include acquisition and resource discussion (e.g., vehicles and generators).

### 4.3 Tactical-Level Area Offices

Following standard USACE business processes down to the tactical area office level can substantially increase the CED’s proficiency. While some processes are commonly used (line item review, project review board [PRB]), others are used less frequently (closeout review). Their use may still enhance transparency and accountability for every project.

**Project Review Board**

Districts conduct the monthly PRB to identify programmatic trends, review individual projects enabling programmatic progress, and discuss projects by exception experiencing issues, resourcing problems, or obstacles. The PRB seeks to resolve issues to facilitate program progress. Typical PRB attendees include the following:

- District commander
- Deputy for programs management
- Program managers
- Office of counsel
- Resource management officer
- Chief of engineering and construction
- Engineering chief
- Construction chief
- Contracting chief
- Area office representatives

The division forward and the joint engineer often monitor for situational awareness.

**Line Item Review**

The district conducts a monthly line item review staggered with the PRB so that the meetings occur biweekly. The line item review looks at the project list and discusses every active project in detail, focusing on projects with issues. Participants review the projects’ current state and communicate support actions required to key district sections and personnel. Line item review attendees are similar to the PRB with representatives attending in person or virtually.
Contract Review and Closeout Meeting

The district conducts a biweekly contract review/closeout meeting to discuss active projects and reviews projects in the closeout phase. Participants coordinate necessary contract actions for active projects and then for project closeout actions to ensure project delivery and closeout procedures and paperwork are completed per USACE requirements. The meeting attendees typically include the chief of contracting, contracting officers, office of counsel, closeout manager, and deputy for program and project management.

Ideally, a resource manager should also attend this meeting to provide financial review. If a resource manager is not present, other means to obtain a separate financial review are needed for actions affecting resource management. For example, resource management in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) held weekly closeout meetings separately with area engineers, contract administration staff in the construction branch, and the closeout engineer, in addition to joining in a weekly teleconference focusing on contract closeout and canceling appropriations. A similar, separate review may be required for any other staff proponent not present at the meeting.

Area Office and Garrison Meeting

The area office may meet weekly with garrison or base representatives at the working level and again at the leadership level. This meeting allows discussion on progress, issues, and obstacles to the area office’s active projects on garrisons or airfields. This meeting typically focuses on MILCON projects constructed for U.S. or coalition forces.

4.4 Ninety-Day Emergency Closeout Process

The CED should have both a standard and an emergency closeout process within its base OPORD. While the previous material in this annex provides normal closeout processes, an accelerated process may be necessary in contingency environments. The tools necessary for such a closeout are the same as a normal project closeout process, with some additional guidance to simplify the process. Accelerated closeouts require a cost analysis for projects that will be terminated for convenience or modified for descoping, allowing project managers to determine if the project costs more to either T4C or descope than it would to complete the project within its contract purview.

If the contingency elements enduring in the area include an area office, the project or program has strategic value, and regional or theater-wide implications, it may be best to complete the project as awarded. Projects completed within 90 days are usually best to complete as awarded. If necessary, final local national quality inspectors and local national technical teams with appropriate training may complete and submit the reports through the area office.

Projects are modified with more than 50 percent placement and construction via descoping to austere conditions, if possible. Projects with less than 50 percent placement may require T4C, depending on the circumstances. A best practice is to identify responsible stopping points for each project during the pre-award process or within the risk analysis, giving the field offices more leeway to truncate projects when required.
5. Closing Project and Resident Offices

The closeout of projects and contracts must be planned side by side with the closeout of field offices, so the district can maintain appropriate project oversight. Determining the close dates of these offices requires careful planning and disengagement criteria and communication between the offices and the district leadership.

The trigger point to close an office is often based on whether the district can afford to keep the office open given its current project load. These estimates can be made by examining the office’s project load and expected completion dates in coordination with examining the joint forces closeout plan. Optimally, this closeout is synchronized with the project or area officer’s in-theater tenure. More information about closing offices is included in Annex C, *Drawing Down the Contingency Engineer District*. 
6. Appendix A. Transatlantic Afghanistan District Closeout Procedure Checklist and Flow-Chart

![Flow-Chart Image]

**Figure E A-1. Transatlantic Afghanistan District closeout procedure checklist/flow chart**
Figure E A-1. Transatlantic Afghanistan District closeout procedure checklist/flow chart (continued)
Figure E A-1. Transatlantic Afghanistan District closeout procedure checklist/flow chart (continued)
References


### Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Afghan 1st Limited Competition</td>
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<td>authority having jurisdiction (relating to building codes)</td>
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<td>APPMS</td>
<td>Automated Personal Property Management System</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARCENT</td>
<td>United States Army Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM CCR</td>
<td>United States Central Command Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR</td>
<td>United States Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>very high frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOIP</td>
<td>Voice over Internet Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSAT</td>
<td>very small aperture terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHNS</td>
<td>wartime host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>work plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>wastewater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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