Unified Action Partners’
Quick Reference Guide

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Foreword

This quick reference guide describes U.S. Army organizations, planning, and operations. Unified action partners (UAPs) are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and elements of the private sector with whom U.S. Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations). UAPs include joint forces (activities in which elements of two or more U.S. military departments participate), multinational forces, and U.S Government (USG) agencies and departments.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars highlight the necessity for collaboration, cooperation, and synchronization among USG, NGOs, and private sector agencies to focus the elements of national power in achieving national strategic objectives. Our experience in these conflicts accentuates the importance of foreign governments, agencies, and militaries participating, in concert with the United States, to achieve common objectives. Meeting the challenges of complex environments, infused with fragile or failing nation states, non-state actors, pandemics, natural disasters, and limited resources, requires the concerted effort of all instruments of U.S. national power plus foreign governmental agencies, military forces, and civilian organizations.

This guide facilitates UAP collaboration, synchronization, and unity of effort in planning and conducting U.S. Army operations. It provides situational awareness of Army concepts, structures, foundations, and doctrinal implications to enhance UAPs’ understanding and future collaboration and cooperation in collectively achieving common goals, objectives, and end states to secure and protect shared vital interests against all adversaries.

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

**Note:** Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, ADPs, ADRPs, ATPs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Unified Action Partners (UAPs)
UAPs are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 3-0, \textit{Unified Land Operations}).

The purpose of the Unified Action Partners’ Quick Reference Guide is to provide a reference that is easy to use during operations and training. This guide provides non-U.S. Army agencies, organizations, and staff an overview of key Army doctrine, processes, concepts, policies, and structure. The intent of this guide is to allow the user to gain a better understanding of U.S. Army planning activities and operations and to enhance collaboration and coordination when working with U.S. Army Forces.

U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, more recently, Africa confirmed that achieving national strategic objectives in today’s global environment is a task beyond the capabilities of any single U.S. Government (USG) organization. Meeting the current and future challenges of persistent conflict, devastating natural disasters, and pandemics having global implications requires the concerted synergy of all instruments of national power. The release of Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD 23) — Security Sector Assistance, 05 APR 2013, implemented policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. Inherent in the directive was the requirement for the United States to strengthen its own capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance. This is accomplished through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with national security priorities. Further, the diversity and complexity of the threats to the national interest require a collaborative approach among the USG, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector agencies with allies, partners, and multinational organizations, together referred to as UAPs by the U.S. Army.

The U.S. Army 2014 Strategic Planning Guidance embraces PPD 23 in its vision: “The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America’s
Army, the Army guarantees the agility, versatility, and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win.”

The volatility of the global environment envisioned for the 21st century demands an interagency-military marriage that achieves unity of effort in a whole-of-government approach to successfully plan and execute diplomatic and military options. The Department of Defense (DOD) 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review prioritizes three strategic pillars:

(1) Defending the homeland;
(2) Building security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and
(3) Remaining prepared to win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail.

Included in these three pillars is a requirement for innovation within DOD and collaboration with other USG departments and international partners.

The information contained in this guide is intended to enhance UAP understanding of how the U.S. Army is currently organized and how it plans and conducts operations to facilitate common lines of effort in achieving the three strategic pillars. However, the increasingly demanding operational environment requires a fully capable force designed for rapid insertion into joint, multinational and UAP operations across the range of military operations. The factors that affect these operations are so great that our Soldiers, leaders, and UAPs require new and unique solutions to quickly prepare them to execute their new and unexpected missions in varying environments. To meet this challenge, the Army is constantly fielding new information technologies and developing new doctrine, while reorganizing and re-equipping its organizations. As a result, all UAPs should monitor current Army doctrine for the latest information on technologies, organization, equipment, and procedures for Army forces.

**Introduction to the United States Army**

**United States Army Mission**

The mission of the U.S. Army is to fight and win the Nation’s wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force. The Army does this by organizing, equipping, and training Army forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; integrating our capabilities with those of the other Armed Services; accomplishing all missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders; and remaining ready while preparing for the future (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 1, *The Army*).
The Army gives the United States landpower. Landpower is the ability — by threat, force, or occupation — to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADRP 3-0). Landpower includes the ability to:

- Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events, both natural and man-made, to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.
- Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.

The Army Vision
The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. As part of the joint force and as America’s Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility, and depth to prevent, shape, and win. (ADP 1)

The Army and the Joint Force
The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces maximizes the capability of the force. The advantage of a joint team extends beyond the battlefield and across the range of military operations (Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States). Landpower complements air, maritime, and space-based power, and in turn the other Services make the Army the preeminent ground force in the world. Joint interdependence is the evolution of combined arms: the use of a specific military capability to multiply the effectiveness and redress the shortcomings of another. Combined arms is not a new idea. But where combined arms are tactical in nature, joint interdependence is combined arms achieved at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Joint Missions
The current Defense Strategic Guidance specifies the “Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.” These are reiterated in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG). Each mission requires applying conventional and special operations forces in conjunction with the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, economic, and informational. In all but one
mission, maintain a nuclear deterrent, the Army is a vital contributor to the joint force. In several missions, landpower is decisive. The 11 missions are:

- Counter terrorism and irregular warfare.
- Deter and defeat aggression.
- Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges.
- Counter weapons of mass destruction.
- Operate effectively in cyberspace.
- Operate effectively in space.
- Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
- Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities.
- Provide a stabilizing presence.
- Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
- Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

The 2014 ASPG reiterates these missions and states, “In all the mission areas, the Army will consider joint interdependence as a best value solution.” Joint interdependence is the deliberate reliance of one armed service on the capabilities of another armed service. The Army depends on the other Services for their specialized capabilities; likewise, those Services depend on Army capabilities. Army capabilities are extensive and diverse. They range from ballistic missile defense to capabilities such as ground transportation support, veterinary services, engineering, and food inspection. Collectively, the Army calls these capabilities “Army support to other Services.” At the strategic level, the Department of Defense examines the capabilities of all the Services, and determines which capabilities each Service provides best. A significant change in the Armed Forces is a willingness by each Service to specialize in capabilities that it must accomplish while depending on the other Services for additional capabilities. This creates joint interdependence, an integration of complementary means at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The Army gives the combatant commander depth and versatility because landpower expands the friendly range of military options. The Army uniquely provides a combination of armored, medium, light, and airborne forces. Along with a full suite of enablers, this allows the Army to provide tailororable and scalable force packages for various contingencies. By multiplying the range of U.S. capabilities that the adversary must counter, the Army narrows options that the adversary must counter, the Army narrows options that might otherwise work against a lesser opponent or a coalition partner supported only by U.S. air and maritime power.
Army Core and Enabling Competencies

The joint force commander asks for and receives Army forces based upon what they can do on the ground. The Army’s indispensable contributions to the joint force, the core competencies, are combined arms maneuver and wide area security (ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*). But, several vital capabilities, the enabling competencies, are fundamental to the Army’s ability to maneuver and secure land areas for the joint force. These enabling competencies include security cooperation, tailoring forces, entry operations, flexible mission command, the support provided to the joint force and the Army itself, domestic support, and mobilizing Reserve Components. These capabilities are not an exclusive set; the other Services perform similar functions. Nor are these an exhaustive list of what the Army does at the tactical and operational levels.

Organization of the Army

By law, the Army consists of one Regular Army and two Reserve Components (the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard) under different chains of command. Functionally, the Army is made up of those forces organized for combat as part of the joint force and those organizations that support the combat units in garrison and when deployed. Army civilians support all three components. Contractors are not members of the Army profession; however, they provide valuable support and augmentation to the capabilities of the Army and the Army Civilian Corps, both stateside and overseas. Hired under contractual terms for specific tasks of a specified duration, contractors provide essential skills and perform technical and administrative tasks that allow Army professionals to focus on their primary missions.

Functionally, the Army divides into operating forces and the generating force. In broad terms, operating forces deploy and fight while the generating force gets them ready. Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight. They include about two-thirds of the Regular Army, and three-fourths of the Army’s total force. The generating force mans, trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operating forces of the Army.
Chapter 2
Strategic Setting

2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the instruments of national power and some of the key documents that shape the strategy, planning processes, and execution of plans at the national level using a whole-of-government approach to ensure the enduring security of the United States and its partners. A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

2.2 Instruments of National Power
The purpose of this section is to provide unified action partners (UAPs) a basic understanding of the instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) — and how they interrelate. A detailed discussion is found in Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. It is important for UAPs to understand while the military focuses on the use of military force, it must not be considered in isolation from the other instruments of national power. The ability of the United States to advance its national interests depends on the effectiveness of the USG in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council direction, normally coordinate the employment of instruments of national power.

Diplomatic
Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance U.S. values, interests, and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for U.S. military operations.

Informational
Information remains an important instrument of national power and a strategic resource critical to national security. Previously considered in the context of traditional nation-states, the concept of information as an instrument of national power extends to non-state actors — such as terrorists and transnational criminal groups — that are using information to further their causes and undermine those of the USG and its allies.

Military
The United States employs the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals. The ultimate purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars.
Economic
A strong U.S. economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare and the enabler of a strong national defense. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other USG agencies, the governments of other nations, and international financial institutions to encourage economic growth; raise standards of living; and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.

The routine interaction of the instruments of national power is fundamental to U.S. activities in the strategic security environment. The military instrument’s role increases relative to the other instruments as the need to conduct combat operations increases. The USG’s ability to achieve its national strategic objectives depends on employing the instruments of national power in effective combinations and in all possible situations from peace to war.

2.3 National Security Strategy (NSS) Synopsis
Fragile states tend to attract destabilizing forces. This poses a national security challenge unforeseen even a decade ago, yet central to today’s strategic environments. While the phenomenon of fragile states is not new, the need to provide a stabilizing influence is more critical than ever.

The NSS outlines the President’s vision for providing enduring security in a volatile, uncertain, and complex strategic environment. At the heart of this strategy rests the nation’s approach to operations that help to create a world of legitimate, well-governed states. These states can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution resides in engagement. Engagement is the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond its borders. The United States engages the world on a comprehensive and sustained basis. Engagement begins with closest friends and allies. Stability tasks executed as part of theater security cooperation plans generally fall in this category. The national strategy identifies three levels of engagement for addressing conflict:

- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Conflict intervention
- Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization

2.4 National Defense Strategy (NDS) Synopsis
It is important for UAPs to understand that the U.S. NSS and NDS emphasize the threat to national security posed by the inability of fragile states to regulate themselves or to work in cooperation with neighboring
states to ensure long-term security. The NDS recognizes the need for building partner capacity in these states. Security cooperation, the principal vehicle for building security capacity, supports these fragile states. First, it encourages partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the United States and the host nation. Second, it encourages partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in a multinational coalition with U.S. forces. Next, security cooperation facilitates cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense. Lastly, it spurs the military transformation of partner nations by developing training and education, concept development and experimentation, and a security assessment framework.

The NDS facilitates UAP coordination and integration. Such efforts draw a vital link between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) in the conduct of operations underscored by stability tasks. The NDS emphasizes the need to establish conditions of enduring security in military operations, necessary to the success of the other instruments of national power. Unless the security environment supports using civilian agencies and organizations, military forces prepare to perform those non-military tasks normally the responsibility of others.

2.5 National Military Strategy (NMS) Overview

The NMS echoes the NDS on the necessity of interagency coordination and integration, emphasizing the role of interagency partners and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in achieving lasting success in operations stressing stability tasks. It establishes the requirement for the joint force to retain the capability to conduct operations, combining offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously, and to seamlessly transition among them. Finally, the NMS highlights the need to integrate conflict termination measures with the other instruments of national power, ensuring unity of effort toward a common set of national objectives. See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for a discussion of interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations in operations.

2.6 Key Policy Documents

2.6.1 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23 – Security Sector Assistance (SSA) Overview

It is important for DOD and UAP planners to understand the provisions outlined in PPD 23–SSA, approved 05 APR 2013 and summarized here as a handy reference. This directive is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity, consistent with the principles of good governance and rule of law. The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of
the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the USG and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. More than ever before, the United States shares security responsibilities with other nations and groups to help address security challenges in their countries and regions.

Building the necessary security capacity among partners to support these requirements is critical but challenging. Partner forces operate in a complex and interdependent security environment where capacity gaps often affect the entire spectrum of security, law enforcement, and the provision of justice. Short-term efforts without strategic perspective, those lacking viable host nation support, or those that address only one set of gaps in the security sector frequently fail. Multiple actors contribute to SSA, but unity of effort across the USG is essential, both in response to emergent opportunities and in support of long-term partnerships. Further, while SSA can yield significant benefits, the United States cannot build capacity in all countries.

The security sector comprises those institutions — to include partner governments and international organizations — that have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad; to maintain international peace and security; and to enforce the law and provide oversight of those organizations and forces. The security sector includes both military and civilian organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national, and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law enforcement providers; governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies; institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies; and non-state justice and security providers.

SSA refers to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to:

- Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector;
- Help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and,
- Enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

The principal goals of SSA are to:

- **Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges** specifically to:
  - Disrupt and defeat transnational threats;
  - Sustain legitimate and effective public safety, security, and justice sector institutions;
○ Support legitimate self-defense;
○ Contribute to U.S. or partner military operations which may have urgent requirements;
○ Maintain control of their territory and jurisdiction, including air, land, and sea borders; and
○ Help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where U.S. military forces are present.

• **Promote partner support for U.S. interests** through cooperation on national, regional, and global priorities, including but not limited to:
  ○ Military access to airspace and basing rights;
  ○ Improved interoperability and training opportunities; and
  ○ Cooperation on law enforcement; counterterrorism; counternarcotics; combating organized crime, arms trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; intelligence; peacekeeping; and humanitarian efforts.

• **Promote universal values** such as good governance, civilian oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and effective justice, and respect for human rights.

• **Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and organizations**, including:
  ○ Helping to build nations’ capacity to contribute police and troops to United Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions;
  ○ Participating in regional exercises and expert exchanges; and
  ○ Coordinating regional intelligence and law enforcement information exchanges.

To effectively achieve the goals identified above, the United States must strengthen its own capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement SSA through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with the U.S. national security priorities. As such, the whole-of-government process must:

• Ensure consistency with broader national security goals.
• Foster USG policy coherence and interagency collaboration.
• Build sustainable capacity through comprehensive sector strategies.
• Be more selective and use resources for the greatest impact.
• Be responsive to urgent crises, emergent opportunities, and changes in partner security environments.

• Ensure that short-term interventions are consistent with long-term goals.

• Inform policy with rigorous analysis, assessments, and evaluations.

• Analyze, plan, and act regionally.

• Coordinate with other donors.

SSA must be practiced as a shared responsibility across all USG departments and agencies operating with a shared commitment to agility and effectiveness. Clear roles and missions help ensure unity of effort.

Under the President’s guidance, the national security staff monitors the implementation of this policy directive; chairs the SSA Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) to prepare the biennial SSA policy priorities for approval by the President; coordinates with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review agencies’ SSA legislative proposals to ensure consistency with national policy; and, as necessary, convenes the SSA IPC. The SSA IPC comprises each of the offices and agencies listed below, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

• **OMB** will continue to review and allocate national-level resources for SSA through the formal annual OMB budget process under the direction of the President’s policy guidance and in line with the NSS-coordinated policy prioritization process.

• **DOS** is the lead agency responsible for the policy, supervision, and general management of USG SSA and the congressional appropriation for SSA, with the exception of DOD SSA appropriations, to include integration of interagency efforts and between other related assistance activities. The Chief of Mission serves as the lead in-country integrator for SSA. DOS:
  
  ○ Leads the USG’s internal processes for conducting interagency assessments;

  ○ Synchronizes SSA components of department and agency regional and functional strategies;

  ○ Coordinates interagency planning at the country level;

  ○ Oversees discussions with partner governments, donors, and regional organizations on SSA; and

  ○ Integrates various SSA programs across the USG and with broader international initiatives.
• **DOD, Justice, the Treasury, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)** will participate in interagency SSA strategic planning, assessment, program design, and implementation processes, and will coordinate the content of their SSA programs with the DOS.

• **DOD** is responsible for ensuring that U.S. defense strategy and policy priorities are closely synchronized with SSA efforts, especially where a key objective is to strengthen the capacity and willingness of foreign security forces to operate alongside of, in lieu of, or in support of U.S. forces. In these cases, DOD may provide assistance in coordination with the DOS. DOD plays a critical role in strategic planning, assessment, program design, and implementation of SSA programs, and supports SSA interagency processes by providing relevant expertise and information on U.S. national defense objectives. With the concurrence of and in coordination with DOS, DOD assumes the role of lead SSA integrator in specific cases as deemed appropriate and consistent with authority granted by Congress.

• **USAID**, which receives foreign policy and budgetary guidance from the Secretary of State, is the USG’s lead planner and implementer of development assistance. USAID has specific expertise and experience in the SSA areas of citizen security, rule of law, and response to violent extremism and insurgency. USAID also designs and manages programming in conflict mitigation and response, reintegration and reconciliation, democracy, rights and governance, and strengthening civil society and media.

• **The departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security** are the presumptive implementers of SSA involving their expertise, experience, or counterpart ministries, agencies, or equivalents, including in the areas of law enforcement, border and transportation security, counterterrorism, justice, and finance.

• **The Office of the Director of National Intelligence** is responsible for coordinating intelligence support to all SSA efforts by:
  - Ensuring that USG participants receive relevant, timely, and accurate reporting and assessments;
  - Providing guidance for release and disclosure of intelligence to foreign governments; and
  - Producing intelligence partner engagement strategies to support interagency national plans, policies, and strategies.
• **National security staff** will provide ongoing coordination and policy monitoring of PPD 23 and review implementation biannually to evaluate responsiveness, program effectiveness, and alignment with national security and foreign policy priorities.

DOS generally will assume the lead responsibility for SSA implementation. DOD assumes the lead responsibility for implementing its own SSA programs and also for state-funded programs when required by law or as a matter of policy. When identifying its implementing partners, DOS will turn first to USG departments and agencies when appropriate. In particular, given the national security implications of SSA, DOS and USAID will turn first to the departments of the Treasury, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security as the presumed implementer(s) of DOS and USAID programs within their areas of expertise or experience, or counterpart ministries, agencies or equivalents, as set out in PPD 23.

### 2.6.2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 — Management of Domestic Incidents

HSPD 5 (2003) required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and a National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP was replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008. The directive requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and use it in individual domestic incident management programs and activities, as well as in support of state, local, or tribal entities. It also provides detail on the authorities of various government officials within NIMS. NIMS is designed to aid in managing prevention of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. NIMS employs the Incident Command System (ICS), a standardized, on-scene approach to all-hazards incident management.

The NRF presents the guiding principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. It establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. The NRF defines the principles, roles, and structures that organize how the United States responds as a nation. In addition, the NRF:

- Describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal government, the private sector, and nongovernmental partners work together to coordinate national response.
- Describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents.
- Builds upon NIMS, which provides a consistent template for managing incidents.
2.6.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 — National Preparedness

HSPD 8 (2003) is a companion directive to HSPD 5 and establishes policies to strengthen U.S. preparedness to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

2.6.4 Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code)

Posse comitatus refers to a group of men above 15 years of age who can be called upon by the local sheriff to enforce the law; keep the peace; suppress a riot; and pursue, arrest, search, and interrogate criminal suspects. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was passed by Congress in 1878 following the election of President Rutherford B. Hayes and the end of Reconstruction. The act was an effort to prevent troops from performing in a law enforcement capacity except when authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. The PCA applies to all Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) Armed Forces, military personnel in four of the five components of the Armed Forces — the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps (and their respective Title 10 Reserves). The PCA never applies to the fifth component of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard (Title 14 USC, Coast Guard), even when it is placed under DOD command. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, provides a detailed discussion of the PCA.

The National Guard is the only U.S. military force that operates across both state and federal responses, leveraging state active duty (SAD), full-time National Guard duty (Title 32 USC, The National Guard), and active duty (Title 10). While SAD, Title 32, and Title 10 are different statuses and roles, they provide mutually supporting capability. In the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress passed legislation that partially eliminated mutual exclusivity with regard to chain of command, allowing specially designated National Guard officers to command forces in both Title 32 and Title 10 status — designated as dual status commanders. (See Table 2-1, next page.)

2.6.4.1 State Active Duty (SAD)

The governor can activate National Guard personnel to SAD in response to natural or man-made disasters or homeland defense missions. SAD is based on state statute and policy as well as state funds. Soldiers and Airmen remain under the command and control of the governor. A key aspect of this duty status is that the PCA does not apply, giving National Guardsmen the ability to act in a law enforcement capacity within their home state or adjacent state if granted by that state’s governor. (See Figure 2-1, next page.)
Table 2-1. State active duty (SAD), Title 32, Title 10 differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAD</th>
<th>Title 32</th>
<th>Title 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who performs duty</td>
<td>The militia</td>
<td>Federally recognized militia (i.e. National Guard)</td>
<td>Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where duty is performed</td>
<td>Continental U.S. in accordance with state law</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
<td>Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>In accordance with state law</td>
<td>Federal pay and allowances</td>
<td>Federal pay and allowances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.4.2 Title 32 Full-Time National Guard Duty

“Full-time National Guard duty” means training or other duty, other than inactive duty, performed by a member of the National Guard. Title 32 allows the governor, with the approval of the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to order a member to duty for operational homeland defense activities. (See Figure 2-1.)

2.6.4.3 Title 10 Active Duty

“Active duty” means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. It allows the President to “federalize” the National Guard forces by ordering them to active duty in their Reserve Component status or by calling them into federal service in their militia status. (See Figure 2-1.)

Figure 2-1. Duty status and command relationships. (Source: ADP 3-28)

The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits federal, state, and local leaders from using federal forces for direct civil law enforcement. Prohibited activities include searches, seizures, arrests, apprehensions, security patrols, crowd and traffic control, and any other similar activities on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities. Prohibiting direct military involvement in law enforcement is in keeping with long-standing U.S. law and policy limiting the military’s role in domestic affairs.
2.7 Guidance for Employment of the Force Overview

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides two-year direction to combatant commands (CCMDs) for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The GEF is the method through which the Office of the Secretary of Defense translates strategic priorities set in the NSS, NDS, and Quadrennial Defense Review into implementable direction for operational activities. It consolidates and integrates DOD planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, overarching guidance document. It replaces guidance that DOD previously promulgated through the Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, and various policy memoranda related to Global Force Management (GFM) and Global Defense Posture. The GEF is an essential document for CCMD planners as it provides the strategic end states for the deliberate planning of campaign plans and contingency plans. It also directs the level of planning detail as well as assumptions that must be considered during the development of plans. (See JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.)

2.8 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Overview

The JSCP is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercises responsibility for directing the preparation of joint plans. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance to each combatant commander (CCDR), Service chief, combat support agency, and applicable DOD agency for preparation of campaign plans and contingency plans based on current military capabilities. It serves as the link between strategic guidance provided in the GEF and the joint operation planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance. In addition to communicating to the CCMDs specific planning guidance necessary for deliberate planning, the JSCP also translates strategic policy end states from the GEF into military campaign and contingency plan guidance for CCDRs and expands guidance to include global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steady-state activities. (See JP 5-0.)

2.9 Army’s Operational Concept Overview

This section provides UAPs working with the U.S. Army or with joint forces an overview of the Army’s operational concept (AOC). The section begins with a synopsis of the concept of unified land operations (ULO), followed by a discussion on the foundations of ULO, and lastly, the tenets of ULO. For detailed discussions on the AOC and ULO, see ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, Chapter 2, The Army’s Operational Concept.
2.9.1 Goal of Unified Land Operations

The goal of ULO is to apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end state. Today’s operational environments require commanders to demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security through offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks to reach this goal.

ULO are the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. The central idea of ULO is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Where possible, military forces working with UAPs seek to prevent or deter threats. However, if necessary, military forces possess the capability in ULO to prevail over aggression.

2.9.2 Foundations of Unified Land Operations

By integrating the four foundations of ULO — initiative, decisive action, Army core competencies, and mission command — Army commanders can achieve strategic success. Strategic success requires full integration of U.S. military operations with the efforts of UAPs. The foundations of ULO begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative. Initiative is used to gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an organization.

The Army demonstrates its core competencies through decisive action: the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The Army’s two core competencies — combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) — provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions (WfF) within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in the offense, defense, and stability overseas, or DSCA in the United States. (Section 2.10 of this guide provides a synopsis of WfF. ADRP 3-0, Chapter 3, provides a detailed discussion of WfF.) By demonstrating the two core competencies, Army forces defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.

Mission command — the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent — guides leaders in the execution of ULO. See ADP 6-0, Mission Command, and ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, for detailed discussions on mission command. Figure 2-3 (located on Pages 20-21 of this guide) illustrates the underlying logic of ULO and constitutes the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Initiative
All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise.

Decisive Action
Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. In ULO, commanders seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

Figure 2-2. Representation of decisive action. (Source: ADRP 3-0)
Decisive action begins with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0, Joint Operations).

Offensive and defensive tasks defeat enemy forces, whereas stability tasks shape civil conditions. In many joint operations, stability or DSCA tasks often prove more important than offensive and defensive tasks.
Figure 2-3. Unified land operations underlying logic. (Source: ADP 3-0)
To do this we must...

Develop operations characterized by flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization.

Cognitively link tactical actions to strategic objectives.

Organize effort within a commonly understood construct.

Operations Structure

Provide a broad process for conducting operations.

Provide basic options for visualizing and describing operations.

Provide intellectual organization for common critical tasks.

---

Tenets
- Flexibility
- Integration
- Lethality
- Adaptability
- Depth
- Synchronization

Operational Art
The pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.

Operations Process
Plan
- Army Design Methodology
- MDMP
- TLP
Prepare
Execute
Assess

Operational Framework
Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining
Deep-Close-Security
Main and Supporting Efforts

Warfighting Functions
Mission Command
Movement and Maneuver
Intelligence
Fires
Sustainment
Protection

---

DSCA  defense support of civil authorities
MDMP  military decisionmaking process
TLP   troop leading procedures
WMD   weapons of mass destruction
Different elements of decisive action change with echelon, time, and locations. In an operation dominated by stability, part of the force might conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive tasks in support of establishing stability. In short, no single element is always more important than the others. Rather, simultaneous combinations of the elements, which commanders constantly adapt to conditions, are the key to successful land operations in achieving the end state.

**Decisive Action Tasks**

Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of *offense, defense, and stability or DSCA*. Table 2-2 depicts the decisive action tasks and the purposes of each task, and ADRP 3-0 provides a detailed discussion of decisive action tasks.

**Table 2-2. Decisive action tasks and purposes (Source: ADRP 3-0)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasks:</td>
<td>Tasks:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Movement to contact</td>
<td>- Mobile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Attack</td>
<td>- Area defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Exploitation</td>
<td>- Retrograde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Pursuit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes:</td>
<td>Purposes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces</td>
<td>- Deter or defeat enemy offense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Seize key terrain</td>
<td>- Gain time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deprive the enemy of resources</td>
<td>- Achieve economy of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop intelligence</td>
<td>- Retain key terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deceive and divert the enemy</td>
<td>- Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create a secure environment for stability tasks</td>
<td>- Develop intelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasks:</td>
<td>Tasks:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish civil security (including security force assistance)</td>
<td>- Provide support for domestic disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish civil control</td>
<td>- Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Restore essential services</td>
<td>- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to governance</td>
<td>- Provide other designated support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support to economic and infrastructure development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposes:</td>
<td>Purposes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provide a secure environment</td>
<td>- Save lives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secure land areas</td>
<td>- Restore essential services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Meet the critical needs of the populace</td>
<td>- Maintain or restore law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gain support for host-nation government</td>
<td>- Protect infrastructure and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success</td>
<td>- Maintain or restore local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Shape the environment for interagency success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Offensive Tasks
An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. In combined arms maneuver, the offense is a task of decisive action. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock.

Defensive Tasks
A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. The purpose of defensive tasks is to retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attack. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

Stability Tasks
Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0.) Army forces conduct stability tasks during both CAM and WAS. These tasks support a host nation, interim government, or transitional military authority when no government exists. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks also can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting the transition to legitimate host nation governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability.

DSCA Tasks
DSCA is support provided by U.S. federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32 status).

Ultimately the operational concept of ULO aims to accomplish the mission. Execution of ULO through decisive action requires the following:

- A clear commander’s intent and concept of operations that establishes the role of each element and its contribution to accomplishing the mission.
- A flexible mission command system.

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• A shared understanding of an operational environment and purpose of the operation.
• Aggressive information collection and intelligence analysis.
• Aggressive security operations.
• Units that can quickly change their task organization.
• Operational and individual initiative.
• An ability to respond quickly.
• Responsive sustainment.
• Combat power applied through combined arms.
• Well-trained, cohesive teams and bold, adaptive, and imaginative leaders.
• The acceptance of prudent risk.
• An ability to liaise and coordinate operations with UAPs within an operational environment.

Army Core Competencies

Army forces demonstrate their core competencies of combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS) by combining offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks simultaneously. As part of a combined arms force within ULO, Army forces accept prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. Although distinct by definition, CAM and WAS are inseparable and simultaneous. CAM and WAS provide the Army a focus for decisive action as well as a construct for understanding how Army forces use combined arms to achieve success. As core competencies, CAM and WAS uniquely define what the Army provides to the joint force commander. Additionally, the Army is organized and equipped to support the joint force commander through combined arms to cover vast distances for extended periods. ADRP 3-0 provides a detailed discussion of the Army core competencies.

**CAM and WAS are not tasks.** They provide an operational context to assist a commander and staff in determining an operational approach and to combine tasks of decisive action into a coherent operation that assigns missions to subordinates. Army forces execute these missions to defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize or control areas vital to accomplishing their missions, while protecting civilians, infrastructure, and themselves. While all operations consist of simultaneous CAM and WAS in various proportions, most tactical tasks will be predominantly characterized by one
or the other. The preponderant core competency determines the choice of defeat or stability mechanisms to describe how friendly forces accomplish the assigned mission. Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for CAM, while stability mechanisms are best suited for WAS.

**Combined Arms Maneuver**

CAM is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative (ADP 3-0). CAM exposes enemies to friendly combat power from unexpected directions and denies them the ability to respond effectively. CAM throws the enemy off balance, follows up rapidly to prevent recovery, and destroys the enemy’s will to fight. In addition, forces conducting combined arms maneuver threaten enemies indirectly, causing them to reveal their intentions and expose hidden vulnerabilities. CAM primarily employs defeat mechanisms against enemies and is dominated by offensive and defensive tasks.

A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. Defeat mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, they describe broad operational and tactical effects. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Applying focused combinations produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort expended. Used in combination, the effects are likely to be both synergistic and lasting. When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. Commanders dislocate by employing forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations. This action leads to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. When commanders isolate, they deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action.

**Wide Area Security**

WAS is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative (ADP 3-0). Army forces conduct security tasks to provide the joint force commander with reaction time and maneuver space. Additionally, these forces defeat or fix the enemy before the enemy can attack, thus allowing the commander to retain the initiative. As part of ULO,
Army forces may assist the development of host nation security forces, a viable market economy, the rule of law, and an effective government by establishing and maintaining security in an area of operations. The goal is a stable civil situation sustainable by host nation assets without Army forces. WAS includes the minimum essential stability tasks as part of decisive action. Army forces perform five primary stability tasks:

- Establish civil security, including security force assistance.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.

A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are: (1) compel; (2) control; (3) influence; and (4) support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through information operations. Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

Mission Command

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (See ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 for detailed discussions of mission command.) The mission command philosophy effectively accounts for the nature of military operations. Throughout operations, unexpected opportunities and threats rapidly present themselves. Operations require responsibility and decision making at the point of action. Through mission command, commanders initiate and integrate all military functions and actions toward a common goal — mission accomplishment. (See Figure 2-4, next page, for an illustration of the exercise of mission command.)
Unified Land Operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

Nature of Operations
Military operations are human endeavors. They are contests of wills characterized by continuous and mutual adaptation by all participants.
Army forces conduct operations in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments.

One of the foundations is...

Mission Command Philosophy
Exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Guided by the principles of...
- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander’s intent
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Use mission orders
- Accept prudent risk

The principles of mission command assist commanders and staff in blending the art of command with the science of control.

Mission Command Warfighting Function
The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.

A series of mutually supported tasks...

Commander Tasks:
- Drive the operations process through the activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations

Staff Tasks:
- Conduct the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess)
- Conduct knowledge management and information management
- Synchronize information-related capabilities
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities

Additional Tasks:
- Conduct military deception
- Conduct airspace control
- Conduct information protection
- Conduct civil affairs operations
- Install, operate, and maintain the network

Enabled by a system...

Mission Command System:
- Personnel
- Information systems
- Networks
- Facilities and equipment
- Processes and procedures

Together, the mission command philosophy and warfighting function guide, integrate, and synchronize Army forces throughout the conduct of unified land operations.

Figure 2-4. The exercise of mission command. (Source: ADP 6-0)
Mission command has six fundamental principles. (See ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 for detailed discussions of fundamental principles.) They are:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
- Create shared understanding.
- Provide a clear commander’s intent.
- Exercise disciplined initiative.
- Use mission orders.
- Accept prudent risk.

As a philosophy, mission command is essential to the Army’s core competencies. Mission command recognizes that Army leaders command not only Army forces but also work with diverse UAPs. Mission command emphasizes the critical contributions of leaders at every echelon. It establishes a mindset among Army leaders that the best understanding comes from a synthesis of information and an understanding from all echelons and UAPs — bottom-up input is as important as top-down guidance. Mission command is the overarching term for both the warfighting function and the philosophy of command.

2.9.3 Tenets of Unified Land Operations

The tenets of ULO describe the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0).

A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two or more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entities. Army operations are characterized by the following six tenets:

Flexibility

To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders seek to demonstrate flexibility in spite of adversity. They employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. The Army requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to be successful in ULO.
Integration
Army forces do not operate independently but as part of a larger unified action. Army leaders integrate Army operations within this larger effort. Integration involves efforts to exercise information operations with UAPs and efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept.

Lethality
The capacity for physical destruction is a foundation of all other capabilities, the most basic building block for military operations. An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. Finding ways to accomplish the mission with an appropriate mix of lethal and nonlethal actions remains an important consideration for all commanders.

Adaptability
Adaptability reflects a quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit through critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the situation. Army leaders accept that no prefabricated solutions to problems exist. Army leaders adapt their thinking, formations, and employment techniques to the specific situations they face.

Depth
Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose, including deep-close-security operations, to achieve definitive results. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces.

Synchronization
Synchronization is the arrangement of military action in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. It is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each in isolation.

2.10 Army Warfighting Functions (WfFs)
The Army uses six WfFs — mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection — to help exercise command and to help staffs exercise control. A WfF is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. (See ADRP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of the WfFs.) All WfFs possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal
effects. The Army approved a seventh WfF that potentially may address partnership, engagement, and special warfare activities, among others; discussion continues on how best to incorporate it into doctrine.

1. Mission Command as a Warfighting Function

The mission command WfF is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decision making and leadership. The science of control consists of systems and procedures to improve the commander’s understanding and to support accomplishing missions. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of ULO. Commanders use the mission command WfF to help achieve objectives and accomplish missions. (See ADP 6-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 6-0 for detailed discussions on the mission command WfF.)

2. Movement and Maneuver

The movement and maneuver WfF is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. This function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a positional advantage over the enemy.

3. Intelligence

The intelligence WfF is the related tasks and systems that facilitate in understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. It includes the synchronization of collection requirements with the execution of tactical tasks such as reconnaissance, surveillance, and related intelligence operations. This WfF includes specific intelligence and communication structures at each echelon.

4. Fires

The fires WfF is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process.

5. Sustainment

The sustainment WfF is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative.
6. Protection
The protection WtF is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (friendly combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, host nation, and multinational military and civilian partners.

2.11 Army Operational Framework
The operational framework provides Army leaders with some basic conceptual options for visualizing the operation. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations; however, three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past. The higher headquarters will direct the specific framework or frameworks to be used by subordinate headquarters; the frameworks should be consistent throughout all echelons.

1. Deep-Close-Security Framework
The deep-close-security operational framework historically has been associated with terrain orientation; however, it also can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations. (See Figure 2-5, Page 32.)

Deep operations involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. The purpose of deep operations is frequently tied to other events distant in time, space, or both. Deep operations might aim to disrupt the movement of operational reserves, for example, or prevent the enemy from employing long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires.

Close operations are operations that are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations (AO). Operations projected in close areas are usually against hostile forces in immediate contact and are often the decisive operation. A close operation requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and to exploit success.

Security operations involve efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations and to provide time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy. These operations protect the force from surprise and develop the situation to allow the commander to use the force effectively. Security operations include necessary actions to retain freedom of action and ensure uninterrupted support or sustainment of all other operations.
2. Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining Framework

The decisive-shaping-sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation. The decisive operation is the operation that directly
accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the same decisive operation. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s intent. Commanders typically identify a single decisive operation, but more than one subordinate unit may play a role in a decisive operation.

A **shaping operation** is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Shaping operations may occur throughout the operational area and involve any combination of forces and capabilities. Shaping operations preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation.

A **sustaining operation** is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment). They typically address important sustainment and protection actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. Sustaining operations include personnel and logistics support, rear area security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development.

### 3. Main and Supporting Efforts Framework

The main and supporting efforts framework is simpler than other organizing frameworks and focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, leaders can use the main and supporting efforts with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework.

The **main effort** is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources.

A **supporting effort** is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. Commanders may provide augmentation to the main effort or develop a supporting plan synchronized with the higher plan. They resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.
Chapter 3
Operations Overview

3.1 Understanding the Operational Environment

This section describes the Army’s perspective on the operational environment (OE) and provides unified action partners (UAPs) insight into how the Army seeks to understand the environment in which it operates.

The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, *Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing the OE in terms of the operational variables and mission variables. The operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC). How these variables interact in a specific situation, domain (land, maritime, air, space, or cyberspace), area of operations (AO), or area of interest describes a commander’s operational environment but does not limit it. No two OEs are identical, even within the same theater of operations, and every OE changes over time. Because of this, U.S. Army leaders consider how evolving relevant operational or mission variables affect force employment concepts and tactical actions that contribute to the strategic purpose. See Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Chapter 1, Military Operations, and JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, for detailed discussions of an operational environment.

3.1.1 Methods for Understanding the OE

The joint intelligence preparation of the OE is one process that can assist the commander of a joint task force (CJTF) in gaining a greater understanding of the operational environment. Developing a systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the operational environment among members of the interorganizational team, thereby facilitating unified action. A systems perspective of the OE strives to provide an understanding of interrelated systems (PMESII-PT) relevant to a specific joint operation without regard to geographic boundaries. A variety of factors, including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of this perspective. Understanding these systems, their interaction with one another, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the joint force commander’s (JFC) knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. A commonly shared dynamic
visual representation and associated Global Command and Control System (GCCS) data management tools can be used to integrate and manage relevant data sources. This will help the commander and staff analyze centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points; develop lines of operations; refine objectives and desired and undesired effects; and focus limited resources.

### 3.2 Fundamentals of the Operations Process

For a unified action partner (UAP) seeking to influence or integrate efforts with the U.S. Army, it is important to understand the Army’s framework for exercising mission command. The operations process consists of the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (See Section 3.2.1, Page 38.) Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, provides a detailed discussion of the process.

![Figure 3-1. The operations process. (Source: ADRP 5-0)](image)

Both the commander and staff have important roles within the operations process. The commander’s role is to drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing
operations as depicted in Figure 3-1. The staff’s role is to assist the commander with understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. In addition, the staff assists subordinate units (commanders and staffs) and keeps units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the operations process. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Chapter 2, discusses the duties and responsibilities of the staff.

- **Understand.** To understand something is to grasp its nature and significance. Understanding includes establishing context — the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation.

- **Visualize.** As commanders begin to understand their operational environment and the problem, they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve the problem.

- **Describe.** After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. Commanders express their visualization in terms of:
  
  - **Commander’s intent.** The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0).
  
  - **Planning guidance, including an operational approach.** In addition to issuing their commander’s intent, commanders provide planning guidance that conveys the essence of their visualization. Effective planning guidance broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent.

  - **Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).** Commanders use CCIRs to focus information collection on the relevant information they need to make critical decisions throughout the conduct of operations. The two components of CCIRs are friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). FFIRs identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. PIRs identify the information about the enemy and other aspects of the operational environment that the commander considers most important.
o **Essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).** Commanders also describe the information they want protected as EEFIs. EEFIs establish an element of information to protect rather than one to collect, and identify those elements of friendly force information that, if compromised, would jeopardize mission success.

- **Direct.** Commanders direct all aspects of operations by establishing their commander’s intent, setting achievable objectives, and issuing clear tasks to subordinate units. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by:
  
  o **Leading.** Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staff, and Soldiers. In many instances, a commander’s physical presence is necessary to lead effectively. Where the commander locates within the AO is an important leadership consideration. Commanders balance their time between leading the staff through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders and Soldiers away from the command post.

  o **Assessing.** Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to changing circumstances. Commanders incorporate the assessments of the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation.

### 3.2.1 Major Mission Command Activities

The operations process consists of the major mission command activities: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing, each summarized in the sections that follow. It is imperative that UAPs engage the staff during each of these major activities. ADRP 5-0 provides a detailed discussion of the mission command activities. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). Through the mission command warfighting function, commanders and staffs integrate the other warfighting functions into a coherent whole to mass the effects of combat power at the
decisive place and time. Section 2.10 of this guide provides a synopsis of the warfighting functions. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, offers a detailed discussion of mission command and the mission command warfighting function.

### 3.2.1.1 Planning

Planning is very important in the Army – it has been said that “planning is everything, plans are nothing.” This means that in practice everything envisioned may not come to fruition; however, the homework was done to best understand the options and how events may branch out and what sequels may develop. Planning is how the Army seeks to understand a problem – it is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Section 3.6 of this guide addresses the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Section 3.5 describes the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

Planning consists of two separate, but closely related, components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Conceptual planning involves understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of control, including the synchronization of forces in time, space, and purpose. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole toward a common goal. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning.

Planning and operational art. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0).

To facilitate the planning effort, U.S. Army leaders employ the three methodologies for planning: (1) U.S. Army design methodology; (2) military decisionmaking process (MDMP); and (3) troop-leading procedures (TLPs). (See ADRP 5-0.) Commanders and staffs determine the appropriate mix of these methodologies based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with it, the time available, and the availability of a staff. The following summaries are provided to inform UAPs on how to better integrate their efforts into the overall effort.
• **Army design methodology.** The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. Army design methodology is an iterative process of understanding and problem framing that uses elements of operational art to conceive and construct an operational approach to solve identified problems.

• **MDMP.** The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action (COA), and produce an operation plan or order. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of planning and integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners throughout the planning process. Section 3.6 contains an overview of the MDMP, and FM 6-0, Chapter 9, provides an in-depth discussion.

• **TLPs.** Troop-leading procedures extend the MDMP to the company or small-unit level. The MDMP and TLPs are similar but not identical. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLPs to plan and prepare for operations. TLPs are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable small-unit leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. The sequence of the TLP steps is not rigid, and small-unit leaders modify them as required.

3.2.1.2 Preparing

Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Effective preparation helps commanders, staffs, and subordinate units better understand the situation and their roles in coming operations.

Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Higher headquarters may develop the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time. Subordinates need enough time to understand plans well enough to execute them. Subordinates develop their own plans and preparations for an operation. After they fully comprehend the plan, subordinate leaders rehearse key portions of it and ensure that Soldiers and equipment are positioned and ready to execute the operation.
A key ingredient in preparation is the plans-to-operations transition that occurs within the headquarters. It ensures that members of the current operations cell fully understand the plan before execution. During preparation, the responsibility for developing and maintaining the plan shifts from the plans (or future operations) cell to the current operations cell. (See Figure 3-2, Page 42.) The timing of the plans-to-operations transition requires careful consideration. It must allow enough time for members of the current operations cell to understand the plan well enough to coordinate and synchronize its execution.

3.2.1.3 Executing

Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission. During execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They apply combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. This is the essence of unified land operations.

U.S. Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS). Through CAM, commanders seize and exploit the initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. CAM forces the enemy to react continuously until the enemy is finally driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred options and making costly mistakes. As enemy mistakes occur, friendly forces seize opportunities and create new avenues for exploitation. While CAM is about seizing and exploiting the initiative, wide area security (WAS) is about retaining the initiative. In WAS, commanders focus combat power to protect populations, friendly forces, and infrastructure; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative.

The commander and each staff element maintain a running estimate. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADRP 5-0). UAPs who manage their own running estimate will find it easier to integrate their efforts with U.S. forces. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff element continuously consider the effects of new information and update the following:

- Facts
- Assumptions
- Friendly force status
- Enemy activities and capabilities
The commander and the chief of staff set priorities and provide direction and guidance.

### Long-Range Planning
- Develops initial OPLAN and OPORD
- Plans for follow-on phases (sequels)
- Develops branch plans
- Assesses long-range progress of operations

"What next?"

### Mid-Range Planning
- Refines and modifies OPLANs and OPORDs based on current situation
- Develops branch plans
- Assesses mid-range progress of operations

"What if?"

### Short-Range Planning and Execution
- Issues OPORDs, FRAGORDs, and WARNORDs
- Monitors, evaluates, directs, and controls execution of orders
- Conducts limited short-term planning
- Conducts operations update and assessment brief

"What is."

#### Timeline:
- **OPLAN/OPORD**: Months-Weeks *
- **OPLAN/OPORD/FRAGORD**: Weeks-Days *
- **OPORD FRAGORD**: Days-Hours *

*Note: Planning horizons vary based on the situation to include time, events, and anticipated decisions.*

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Each staff element continuously analyzes new information during operations to create knowledge and to understand if operations are progressing according to plan. During planning, staffs develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance to support assessment, including analysis of anticipated decisions during preparation and execution. The assessment of current operations also supports validation or rejection of additional information that will help update the estimates and support further planning. At a minimum, a running estimate assesses the following:

- Friendly force capabilities with respect to ongoing and planned operations
- Enemy capabilities as they affect the staff element’s area of expertise for current operations and plans for future operations
- Civil considerations as they affect the staff element’s area of expertise for current operations and plans for future operations

3.2.1.4 Assessing

Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation — particularly the enemy — and progress of an operation. Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities: monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information; evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks; and recommending or directing action for improvement.

**Primary tools for assessing include running estimates, after-action reviews, and the assessment plan.** Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. The commander and each staff element maintain a running estimate. UAPs, as well, should prepare running estimates to better fulfill information requirements. See Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Chapter 8, for a discussion of developing running estimates.

After-action reviews (AARs) help identify what was supposed to happen, what went right, and what went wrong for a particular action or operation, and how the commander and staff should do things differently in the future. See FM 6-0, Chapter 16, for a discussion of developing AARs.

The assessment plan includes **measures of effectiveness (MOEs)**, **measures of performance (MOPs)**, and **indicators** that help the commander and staff evaluate progress toward accomplishing tasks.
and achieving objectives. JP 3-0 defines MOE as a criterion used to assess changes (positive and negative) in system behavior, capability, or operational environment tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs help to answer the question, “Are we doing the right things?” An MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions such as, “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” An MOP confirms or denies the proper performance of a task. See FM 6-0, Chapter 15, for a detailed discussion on assessment. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into an MOE or MOP.

3.3 Unified Action Overview

In unified action, the U.S. Army seeks the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (ADRP 3-0 and JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support). As military forces synchronize actions, they achieve unity of effort. Unified action includes actions of military forces synchronized with activities of other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector. Unified action partners (UAPs) also include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments. Through engagement, military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is unified land operations (ULO).

Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of DOD involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy.

Combatant commanders play a pivotal role in unified action. However, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations. Additionally, activities of the host nation and local populace should be considered. For the U.S. Army, this is unified land operations (ULO). More specifically, ULO is how the U.S. Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. See ADRP 3-0 for an in-depth discussion of unified land operations.
Unified action may require interorganizational coordination to build the capacity of U.S. partners.

**Interorganizational** coordination is the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*). Building partner capacity secures populations, protects infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The U.S. Army integrates capabilities of the Army’s operating and generating forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation interactions. The U.S. Army’s operating forces consist of those Army forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. The Army’s generating forces consists of those U.S. Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by joint force commanders.

### 3.3.1 Security Cooperation

**Security cooperation activities** are all the DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*). Security cooperation provides the means to build partner capacity. The interactions of security cooperation encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. These objectives include:

- Build defensive and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities.
- Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.

Supported by appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities, the Army supports the objectives of the combatant commander’s campaign plan. The plan supports the objectives by leading security cooperation
interactions, specifically those involving security force assistance and foreign internal defense for partner units, institutions, and security sector functions. The operating and generating forces contribute to security sector programs. These programs professionalize and develop secure partner capacity to synchronize and sustain operations. Army security cooperation interactions enable other interorganizational efforts to build partner capacity. Army operating forces — to include special operations forces — advise, train, assist, and equip partner units to develop unit and individual proficiency in security operations. This type of DOD mission is referred to as foreign internal defense. Army generating forces advise and train partner generating forces to build institutional capacity for professional education, force generation, and force sustainment.

3.3.1.1 Army Cooperation With Civilian Organizations

Civilian organizations — such as other USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and contractors — bring resources and capabilities that can help establish host-nation civil authority and capabilities. Most civilian organizations are not under military control, nor are they controlled by a U.S. ambassador or a United Nations commissioner. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Also, civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun. Thus, personal contact and rapport building are essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with Army and joint operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison.

Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations (e.g., another government agency) when directed because many of these organizations lack these capabilities. **Within the context of interagency coordination, another government agency is a non-DOD agency of the USG** (JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*). A second example of a civilian organization is an IGO. An IGO is created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states (JP 3-08). Examples include the United Nations and European Union.

An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible organizations whose mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives.
Examples include Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (known as CARE) and Doctors Without Borders.

A **contractor** is a person or business operating under a legal agreement who provides products or services for pay. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on the contract terms. Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support but may also include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. Contractor employees include contractors authorized to accompany the force as a formal part of the force and local national employees who normally have no special legal status.

### 3.3.2 Multinational Operations

**Multinational operations** is a collective term used to describe **military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations**, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*). Although each nation has its own interests, and often participates within limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to the operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. (See FM 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations.*)

An **alliance** is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agreements.

A **coalition** is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*). Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Army forces may conduct coalition actions under the authority of a United Nations resolution.

Persons assigned to a multinational force face many demands. These include dealing with cultural issues, different languages, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, and underdeveloped methods and systems for commanding and controlling. Commanders analyze the mission’s peculiar requirements to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations.

Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Normally, each nation provides a national support element to sustain its deployed forces. However, integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When directed, an Army
theater sustainment command can provide logistics and other support to multinational forces. Integrating support requirements of several nations’ forces, often spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries, is challenging. Commanders consider multinational force capabilities, such as mine clearance, that may exceed U.S. forces’ capabilities.

The U.S. Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the U.S. Army; U.S. Army forces cannot operate effectively without support from those joint partners. Likewise, USG agencies outside DOD possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows U.S. Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue with all elements of the friendly force can U.S. Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own efforts and operations.

3.3.3 Joint Operations

A joint operation is one that employs two or more DOD services in a single operation, particularly in combat or stability operations. The general term “joint operations” describes military actions conducted by Joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC).

When conducting operations for a JFC, U.S. Army forces achieve unified action by synchronizing actions with the activities of components of the joint force and unified action partners. This synchronization occurs across the range of military operations during:

- Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.
- Crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Major operations and campaigns.

Military operations vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity (JP 3-0). They include relatively benign, routine, and recurring military operations in peacetime; specific combat and noncombat responses to contingencies and crises as they occur; and less frequent, large-scale combat operations typical of wartime conditions. Army forces are designed, organized, equipped, and trained to accomplish many military operations. Table 3-1 lists examples of military operations. (See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.1, for a synopsis of the range of military operations and JP 1 for a detailed discussion of the range of military operations.)
3.4 Understanding the Joint Phases of Operations

**Phasing is how Joint and U.S. Army forces sequence operations and activities.** UAPs should be cognizant of these phases and what they mean to better integrate UAP considerations into planning.

**Phase.** A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose, but must be planned in support of one another and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Figure 3-3 (next page) depicts notional operation plan (OPLAN) phases and the notional level of effort for each as the operation progresses. Working within this generic phasing construct, the actual phases will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the JFC’s decisions. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for **transitioning from one phase to another** and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. A **sequel** is the subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) or the current major operation or phase. (See JP 5-0.)

**Branches** are the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (See JP 5-0.) Phases are

| Table 3-1. Examples of military operations and their applicable doctrinal references |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| **Arms control and disarmament (JP 3-0)**       | **Large-scale operations (FM 3-90-1)**           |
| **Civil support (JP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28)**       | **Noncombatant evacuations (JP 3-68)**           |
| **Civil-military operations (JP 3-57)**         | **Peace operations (JP 3-07.3)**                 |
| **Combating terrorism (JP 3-07.2)**             | **Raid (FM 3-90-1)**                             |
| **Combating weapons of mass destruction (JP 3-40)** | **Personnel recovery (JP 3-50 and FM 3-50)**  |
| **Counterinsurgency (JP 3-24 and FM 3-24)**    | **Security force assistance (AR 12-1 and FM 3-22)** |
| **Enforcement of sanctions (JP 3-0)**          | **Show of force (JP 3-0)**                       |
| **Foreign humanitarian assistance (JP 3-29)**  | **Stability tasks (ADRP 3-07)**                  |
| **Foreign internal defense (JP 3-22 and FM 3-22)** | **Strike (JP 3-0)**                             |
| **Homeland defense (JP 3-27 and ADRP 3-28)**  | **Unconventional warfare (JP 3-05)**             |
designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary and operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.

**Figure 3-3. Notional operation plan phases versus level of military effort.** (Source: JP 3-0)

**Transition.** A transition marks a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus of operations by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships and priorities of effort. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable break points. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event-driven, not time-driven.
Phasing model. Although the commander will determine the number and actual phases used during a campaign or operation, use of the phases shown in Figure 3-4 and further described below provides a general phasing construct that can be applied to various campaigns and operations. Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their concept of operations (CONOPS). The six-phase model is not intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations and may be tailored to the character and duration of the operation to which it applies.

![Phasing Model Diagram](Figure 3-4. General phasing model construct. (Source: JP 5-0))

3.4.1 Phase Descriptions

Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. These interagency activities are designed to ensure success by
shaping friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.

**Deter (Phase I).** The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful. Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization; tailoring of forces and other pre-deployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; increased security cooperation activities; shows of force; deployment of missile defense forces; and development and maturation of joint or multinational command and control structures.

**Seize the Initiative (Phase II).** JFCs seek to seize the initiative through the application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations, this involves executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the adversary to offensive culmination, and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary’s initial aggression and to deny the initial objectives. If an adversary has achieved its initial objectives, the early and rapid application of offensive combat power can dislodge adversary forces from their position, creating conditions for the exploitation, pursuit, and ultimate destruction of both those forces and their will to fight during Phase III, the dominate phase. During Phase II, operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action continue while the JFC seeks to degrade adversary capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity. In all operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis.

**Dominate (Phase III).** The dominate phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance or, in noncombat situations, control of the operational environment. Success in this phase depends upon overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place. This phase includes full employment of joint force capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. When a campaign or operation is focused on conventional enemy forces, the dominate phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an adversary to culmination and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives.

**Stabilize (Phase IV).** The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority present. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the
population. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. The purpose of stability operations is to help move a host nation from instability (and particularly the violent conflict that often accompanies increased instability) to increased stability (and reduced violent conflict).

**Enable Civil Authority (Phase V).** This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during Phase V may be at the behest of that authority or they may be under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. DOD policy is to support indigenous persons or groups promoting freedom, rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy and opposing extremism and the murder of civilians. The joint force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority phase. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, often will begin during this phase, and deployments, including force rotations, may occur to support and enable civil authorities.

### 3.5 Joint Operation Planning Process Overview

The joint operation planning process (JOPP) used by joint headquarters is an orderly, analytical process that consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The process is similar to the U.S. Army’s military decisionmaking process (MDMP), but accounts for the complexity of joint operations. U.S. Army corps and divisions forming the nucleus of a joint headquarters use the JOPP to plan joint operations. However, U.S. Army organizations use the MDMP when planning U.S. Army operations. (See FM 6-0, Chapter 9; and Section 3.6 of this chapter.)

The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art and operational design and by using the JOPP. **Operational art** is the application of creative thinking by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations. **Operational design** is a process of understanding and construction of the framework that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art and a methodology that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. (See JP 5-0, Chapter 3, for an in-depth discussion of operational art and operational design.) Operational design results in the commander’s operational approach, which broadly describes the actions the joint force needs to take to reach the end state. Together with operational design, the JOPP facilitates interaction among the commander, staff, and subordinate
and supporting headquarters throughout planning. Table 3-2 shows the seven primary steps of the JOPP. A detailed discussion of the JOPP is contained in JP 5-0, Chapter 4.

Table 3-2. Primary Steps of the Joint Operation Planning Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Planning Initiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Course of Action (COA) Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>COA Analysis and War Gaming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>COA Comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Plan or Order Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commanders use operational art to provide the vision that links tactical actions to strategic objectives. More specifically, the interaction of operational art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national strategic aims to tactical combat and noncombat operations that must be executed to accomplish these aims. Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.

### 3.6 Military Decisionmaking Process Overview

The MDMP is a planning methodology the U.S. Army uses for U.S. Army operations to understand the situation and mission, develop a COA, and produce an operation plan or an order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP is similar to the JOPP; however, when U.S. Army corps or divisions form the nucleus of a joint headquarters, the JOPP is used to plan joint operations. The MDMP integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners (UAPs) to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare COAs; decide on a COA that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) for execution.

The MDMP facilitates collaborative planning. The higher headquarters solicits input and continuously shares information concerning future operations through planning meetings, warning orders (WARNORDs), and other means. It shares information with subordinate and adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and UAPs. Commanders encourage active collaboration among all organizations affected by pending operations.
to build a shared understanding of the situation, participate in COA
development and decision making, and resolve conflicts before publishing
the plan or order. **The MDMP consists of seven steps:**

**Step 1 – Receipt of Mission.** Commanders initiate the MDMP upon
receipt or in anticipation of a mission. This step alerts all participants of
the pending planning requirements, enabling them to determine the amount
of time available for planning and preparation and decide on a planning
approach, including guidance on using Army design methodology and how
to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. An abbreviated MDMP is conducted
when units find themselves pressed for time. Before a unit can effectively
conduct planning in a time-constrained environment, it must master the
steps in the full MDMP.

**Step 2 – Mission Analysis.** The MDMP continues with an assessment of
the situation called mission analysis. Commanders (supported by their staffs
and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other UAPs)
gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the
current conditions of the operational environment (OE). The commander and
staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem,
and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must
be done, and most importantly why — the purpose of the operation. Because
no amount of subsequent planning can solve an insufficiently understood
problem, **mission analysis is the most important step in the MDMP.**

**Step 3 – COA Development.** A COA is a broad potential solution to an
identified problem. The COA development step generates options for
subsequent analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander’s intent and
planning guidance. During COA development, planners use the problem
statement, mission statement, commander’s intent, planning guidance, and
various knowledge products developed during mission analysis.

**Step 4 – COA Analysis.** COA analysis enables commanders and staffs
to identify difficulties or coordination problems as well as probable
consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered. It
helps them think through the tentative plan. COA analysis may require
commanders and staffs to revisit parts of a COA as discrepancies arise.
COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA, but it also
uncovers potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. In
addition, COA analysis influences how commanders and staffs understand a
problem and may require the planning process to restart.

**Step 5 – COA Comparison.** COA comparison is an objective process to
evaluate COAs independently and against set evaluation criteria approved
by the commander and staff. The goal is to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of COAs, enable selecting a COA with the highest probability
of success, and further developing it in an OPLAN or OPORD.
Step 6 – COA Approval. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to best accomplish the mission. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff war-games the new COA and presents the results to the commander with a recommendation.

Step 7 – Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition. The staff prepares the order or plan by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations (CONOPS) and the required supporting information. The COA statement becomes the CONOPS for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. If time permits, the staff may conduct a more detailed war game of the selected COA to more fully synchronize the operation and complete the plan. The staff now writes the OPORD or OPLAN. (See FM 6-0, Appendix C, for an example of the U.S. Army’s OPORD format.) The final action in plan and order development is the approval of the plan or order by the commander. Upon the commander’s approval, the plan or order is disseminated. Step 7 also bridges the transition between planning and preparations. (See Figure 3-2, Page 42 of this guide, and FM 6-0, Chapter 9.)

Key MDMP Considerations
Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of a complete and approved higher headquarters’ OPLAN or OPORD. In these instances, the headquarters begins a new planning effort based on a WARNORD and other directives, such as a planning order (PLANORD) or an alert order (ALERTORD) from higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed.

The commander is the most important participant in the MDMP. More than simply decision makers in this process, commanders use their experience, knowledge, and judgment to guide staff planning efforts. While unable to devote all their time to the MDMP, commanders follow the status of the planning effort, participate during critical periods of the process, and make decisions based on the detailed work of the staff.

The MDMP stipulates several formal meetings and briefings between the commander and staff to discuss, assess, and approve or disapprove planning efforts as they progress. However, experience has shown that optimal planning results when the commander meets informally at frequent intervals with the staff throughout the MDMP.
### Table 3-3. Military Decisionmaking Process (Source: ADRP 5-0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key inputs</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Key outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|            | Step 1: **Receipt of Mission** | • Commander's initial guidance  
• Initial allocation of time |
| • Higher headquarters' plan or order  
or a new mission anticipated by the commander | | |
| • Commander's initial guidance  
• Higher headquarters' plan or order  
• Higher headquarters' knowledge  
and intelligence products  
• Knowledge products from other organizations  
• Army design methodology products | Step 2: **Mission Analysis** | • Problem statement  
• Mission statement  
• Initial commander's intent  
• Initial planning guidance  
• Initial CCIRs and EEFIs  
• Updated IPB and running estimates  
• Assumptions  
• Evaluation criteria for COAs |
|            | | |
| • Mission statement  
• Initial commander's intent, planning  
guidance, CCIRs, and EEFIs  
• Updated IPB and running estimates  
• Assumptions  
• Evaluation criteria for COAs | Step 3: **Course of Action (COA) Development** | • COA statements and sketches  
• Tentative task organization  
• Broad concept of operations  
• Revised planning guidance  
• Updated assumptions |
| • Updated running estimates  
• Revised planning guidance  
• COA statements and sketches  
• Updated assumptions | | |
| Step 4: **COA Analysis (War Game)** | • Refined COAs  
• Potential decision points  
• War-game results  
• Initial assessment measures  
• Updated assumptions |
| • Updated running estimates  
• Refined COAs  
• Evaluation criteria  
• War-game results  
• Updated assumptions | Step 5: **COA Comparison** | • Evaluated COAs  
• Recommended COAs  
• Updated running estimates  
• Updated assumptions |
| • Updated running estimates  
• Evaluated COAs  
• Recommended COA  
• Updated assumptions | | |
| Step 6: **COA Approval** | • Commander approved COA and any modifications  
• Refined commander's intent, CCIRs, and EEFIs  
• Updated assumptions |
| • Commander approved COA and any modifications  
• Refined commander's intent, CCIRs, and EEFIs  
• Updated assumptions | Step 7: **Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition** | • Approved operations plan or order  
• Subordinates understand the plan or order |

**CCIR** commander's critical information requirement  
**COA** course of action  
**EEFI** essential element of friendly information  
**IPB** intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) also is a key participant in the MDMP. The COS or XO manages and coordinates the staff’s work and provides quality control during the MDMP. To effectively supervise the entire process, this officer must clearly understand the commander’s intent and guidance. The COS or XO provides timelines to the staff, establishes briefing times and locations, and provides any instructions necessary to complete the plan.

The staff’s effort during the MDMP focuses on helping the commander understand the situation, make decisions, and synchronize those decisions into a fully developed plan or order. Staff activities during planning initially focus on mission analysis. The products that the staff develops during mission analysis help commanders understand the situation and develop the commander’s visualization. During COA development and COA comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the commander in selecting a COA. After the commander makes a decision, the staff prepares the plan or order that reflects the commander’s intent, coordinating all necessary details.

Each step of the MDMP has various inputs, a method (step) to conduct, and outputs, as shown in Table 3-3 (preceding page). The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation and facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion, as they learn more about the situation, before producing the OPLAN or OPORD.

3.7 Crisis Action Planning (CAP) Overview

Joint planning uses two versions: “crisis action” and “deliberate.” Crisis action planning is what the name implies. It is conducted under time constraints and in response to an emerging crisis for which there may or may not be an existing contingency plan on the shelf. Deliberate planning encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations. It is used to develop campaign and contingency plans for a broad range of activities based on requirements identified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or other planning directives. (For a comprehensive discussion of crisis action and deliberate planning, see JP 5-0.) Figure 3-5 (next page) depicts the time and process used in developing deliberate and crisis action planning.

A crisis is an incident or situation that typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may precipitate another crisis elsewhere.
Figure 3-5. Deliberate versus crisis action planning.  
(Source: European Command Interagency Handbook 2012)
Crisis action planning provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and combatant commanders (CCDRs) a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. Crisis action planning facilitates information sharing among the members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, Services, and combat support agencies to initiate detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. It also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

Crisis action planning encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and capabilities in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Although deliberate planning normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Crisis action planning can use plans developed in deliberate planning for a similar contingency. If unanticipated circumstances occur, and no plan proves adequate for the operational circumstances, then CAP and execution would begin mission analysis under the JOPP in a “no plan” situation. Crisis action planning invariably compresses military planning times, which greatly limits the window of opportunity for U.S. forces to solicit interorganizational input. Through all stages of planning for campaigns, contingencies, and crises, CCDRs and subordinate JFCs seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in the planning process. CCDRs should make an early assessment as to those USG departments and agencies that are the most vital in supporting elements of their plans and coordinate early, through the Joint Staff (JS) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (as per guidance in the GEF), with those interagency partners. Generally, interagency dialogue and coordination will be regulated through the in-progress-review process, with SecDef receiving an update on the scope, scale, and substance of planning exchanges with USG, civilian, and multinational counterparts.

Crisis action planning activities are similar to deliberate planning activities, but CAP is based on dynamic, real-world conditions. Crisis action planning procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC. Crisis action planning activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of activities is in fact the crisis. (See Figure 3-6, next page.)
Figure 3-6. Crisis action planning. (Source: JP 5-0)
3.7.1 Crisis Action Planning Activities

The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP.

1. When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or ALERTORD may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated orally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains a force deployment preparation order, SecDef approval is required.

2. The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment, or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment.

3. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint contingency plans for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs and prepares a commander’s estimate that provides recommendations and advice to the President, SecDef, or higher headquarters for COA selection. Based on the supported commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities.

4. Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN or concept plan (CONPLAN) can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) developed for specific plans are stored in the Adaptive Planning and Execution database and are available to the JPEC for review. The TPFDD are the time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the OPLAN or OPORD, or ongoing rotation of forces.
5. The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander’s estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander’s COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

6. Upon receiving directions from the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues an ALERTORD to the JPEC. The SecDef approves the ALERTORD. The order is a record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

7. The supported commander then develops an OPORD using the approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate commanders identify force requirements, contract requirements and management, and mobility resources, and describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. The supported commander reviews available assigned and allocated forces that can be used to respond to the situation and then submits a request for forces to the Joint Staff (JS) for forces to be allocated. The JS tasks a joint force provider (JFP) to provide a sourcing solution for each of the requested forces. The JFPs work collaboratively with the Services (via their assigned Service Components) and other CCDRs to provide recommended sourcing solutions to the JS. Upon receiving the recommended sourcing solutions, the JS recommends the solution to the SecDef to authorize allocation of the force. The JS publishes a modification to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) documenting the force allocation and directing the JFP to publish the GFMAP Annex Schedule as the deployment order (DEPORD), and the JFP publishes a modification to the GFMAP Annex Schedule to deploy forces. Then the supported CCDR, in coordination with the force providers, further refines the TPFDD.

8. The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to SecDef or the President via the CJCS. The President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates.
9. In CAP, plan development continues after the President’s or SecDef’s execution decision. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either CAP or deliberate planning procedures.

**Abbreviated procedures.** The preceding discussion describes the activities sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or considered and eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. It is also possible that the President or SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. Although the allocation process has standard timelines, these timelines may be accelerated, but the force allocation process is still used and SecDef ultimately allocates forces. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information orders orally, including the decision to commit forces. Spoken orders are followed up with written orders.

### 3.7.2 Types of Joint Operation Orders

Table 3-4 (next page) depicts the various types of joint operation orders and is followed by a brief description of each order. **An order is essentially a directive with background information and coordination details.**

**Warning order.** A WARNORD, issued by the CJCS, is a planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate.

**Planning order.** A PLANORD is a planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before the directing authority approves a military COA.

**Alert order.** An ALERTORD is a planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the directing authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

**Prepare to deploy order.** The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a prepare to deploy order (PTDO) or DEPORD to increase or decrease the deployability posture of units; to deploy or redeploy forces; or to direct any other action that would signal planned U.S. military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

**Deployment/redeployment order.** A planning directive from SecDef, issued by the CJCS that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands (CCMDs) by reassignment or attachment. A deployment/redeployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander (CCDR) will exercise over the transferred forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Type</th>
<th>Intended Action</th>
<th>SecDef Approval Required?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| WARNORD (warning order) | • Initiate development and evaluation of courses of action (COAs) by the supported commander  
• Request commander’s estimate be submitted | No; but required if WARNORD includes deployment or deployment preparation actions |
| PLANORD (planning order) | • Begin execution planning for anticipated COA selected by the President or SecDef  
• Direct preparation of OPORDs or contingency plan | No; conveys anticipated COA selection by the President or SecDef |
| ALERTORD (alert order) | • Begin execution planning on President- or SecDef-selected COA  
• Direct preparation of OPORD or contingency plan | Yes; conveys COA selection by the President or SecDef |
| PTDO (prepare to deploy order) | • Increase/decrease deployability posture of units | Yes; refers to five levels of deployability posture |
| DEPORD (deployment/redeployment order) | • Deploy/redeploy forces  
• Establish C-day/L-hour  
• Increase deployability  
• Establish joint task force | Yes; required for movement of unit personnel and equipment into combatant commander’s area of responsibility |
| EXORD (execute order) | • Implement President or SecDef decision directing execution of a COA or OPORD | Yes |
| OPORD (operation order) | • Effect coordinated execution of an operation | Specific to the OPORD |
| FRAGORD (fragmentary order) | • Change or modify OPORD execution as needed | No |
**Execute order.** An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved military CONOPS. Only the President and SecDef have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS.

**Operation order.** An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Joint OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during CAP.

**Fragmentary order.** A FRAGORD is an abbreviated form of an OPORD (oral, written, or digital) that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic OPORD while enabling dissemination of changes to previous orders. It is usually issued as needed or on a day-to-day basis.

### 3.8 Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) Overview

The purpose of this section is to provide an understanding of the JSPS. **The JSPS is the primary system by which the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, conducts deliberate planning and provides military advice to the President and SecDef.** JSPS products — such as the National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) — provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and other Presidential directives. They also provide a means to evaluate extant U.S. military capabilities, assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, and propose changes for consideration by the President, SecDef, and Congress. Other elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS Risk Assessment, the Joint Strategy Review, and the Comprehensive Joint Assessment, inform decision making and identify new contingencies that may warrant deliberate planning and the commitment of resources. The JSPS is described in detail in CJCS Instruction 3100.01B, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.

The JSPS provides formal structure to the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities and considers the strategic environment and the alignment of ends, ways, means, risk, and risk mitigation over time to provide the best possible assessments, advice, and direction of the Armed Forces in support of senior leaders and processes at the national and OSD level. The JSPS aligns with established and emerging OSD and JS processes and documents.

**Relationships.** Figure 3-7 (next page) depicts critical relationships between formal CJCS activities along with the statutory role they fulfill within the larger national and department-level processes. The items listed in red are
Figure 3-7. Joint Strategic Planning System. (Source: CJCSI 3100.01B)

Role of the CJCS and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

POTUS, NSC, HSC Activities

SECDEF Activities

Strategy Development

Roles:
- Principle Military Adviser
- Combatant Commander Spokesman
- Strategic Direction
- Strategic Planning
- Contingency Planning
- Programming & Budget
- Strategic Environment
- Validate Military Requirements
- CJCS Risk Assessment (CRA)
- Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR)
- Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA)
- Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Report
- CJCS Advise in Strategic Documents

ADVISE

CJCS Format
Advice to POTUS / SECDEF / NSC / HSC

DIRECT

Implement POTUS & SECDEF Guidance

Roles:
- Strategic Direction
- Strategic Planning
- Development
- National Military Strategy (NMS) & Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

ASSESS

Comprehensive Assessment

Roles:
- Assess Readiness
- Risk
- Sufficiency
- Joint Military Requirements
- Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) & Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process

Comprehensive Assess, Advise, Direct functions via JSPS

POTUS
President of the United States
NSC
National Security Council
HSC
Homeland Security Council
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
the actual mechanisms or documents that the CJCS uses to fulfill the role. This figure does not depict all interactions and process within the JSPS, nor is it meant to imply a firm sequence of actions.

The JSPS supports the CJCS in the conduct of his responsibilities within the larger cycle of key strategic DOD and national activities. Critically, it provides integrated mechanisms for assessment, advice, and direction and enables assessment through ensuring that the CJCS has the most comprehensive picture of the joint force and the strategic environment. The JSPS further supports the CJCS in performing his statutory responsibility of providing military and strategic advice to senior leadership. The JSPS also enables the CJCS to assist the President and SecDef in providing unified strategic direction to the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Service Components and CCMDs prepare annual assessments for the CJCS that cut across missions, domains, functions, and time. These comprehensive assessments enable the CJCS to meet specified Title 10 U.S. Code (USC) responsibilities and provide a strong analytic basis for advice development. The CJCS’s independent, comprehensive assessment evaluates readiness, risk, and sufficiency, leveraging and linking different processes to gain a more comprehensive picture.

The CJCS conveys military and strategic advice across missions, domains, functions, and time to inform the development of national security and defense strategy, policy, doctrine, and guidance. This advice is transmitted both formally and informally through various strategic documents, speeches, and discussions with senior leadership.

The CJCS implements national and defense guidance through the issuance of direction for strategy, planning, and doctrine development. The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in providing unified strategic direction of the Armed Forces by linking strategic objectives and concepts to the plans, resources, doctrine, and joint activities required to implement them. The National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) are the primary strategic documents within the JSPS that the CJCS employs to assist in providing direction to the Armed Forces.

**JSPS Components.** The three major components of the JSPS that address the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities are CJCS’s assessments, CJCS’s advice, and CJCS’s direction. Figure 3-8 (next page) depicts the major components of the JSPS but does not reflect all documents and processes associated with the JSPS.

**CJCS’s assessments.** The CJCS’s assessments are one of the major components of the JSPS and formalize both the continuous processes and the more deliberate and comprehensive assessment activities of the JSPS.
Figure 3.8: Execution of the formal JSPS. (Source: CJCSI 3100.01B)

**Formal Execution: Major JSPS Components**

1. Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA)
2. Joint Strategy Review Process
3. Advice Development
   - CJA and JSR process support formal and informal advice development for the Chairman
4. NMS and JSCP
   - Assist in provision of unified strategic direction
   - Link strategic guidance to operational planning
   - Guide operational capabilities and priorities
   - Enable assessments of risk

- **POTUS, NSC, HSC, Activities**
- **SecDef/OSD Activities**
- **Advice**
- **INFORM**

**Service Plans**

**NMS**
- **JSCP**
- **Armed Forces**

**Key Terms**
- POTUS: President of the United States
- NSC: National Security Council
- HSC: Homeland Security Council
- NMS: National Military Strategy
- JSCP: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

**Process**
- **Product**
- **Inform**
- **Advise**
- **Direct**
Assessment consists of acquiring and analyzing relevant data to determine:

1. The nature of the strategic environment;
2. The ability of the United States and its allies to operate within and influence that environment;
3. The ability of adversaries and potential enemies to do the same; and
4. The risk to national strategies based upon the first three examined temporally over the near, mid, and long term.

**CJCS’s advice.** One of the CJCS’s principal statutory responsibilities is to provide military and strategic advice to the President, SecDef, National Security Council (NSC), and Homeland Security Council (HSC). Providing formal advice enhances the CJCS’s ability to assist national security, defense, and interagency leaders and their staffs in the development of national security and defense strategies, the development of OSD planning, programming, budgeting documents, and activities, as well as to inform Service Strategic Plans. This formal advice provides the Joint, OSD, Services, NSC, HSC, and defense agency staffs with a framework and military baseline for strategic policy and guidance. The comprehensive nature of the advice ensures that it maintains currency and relevance to changes in the strategic environment.

**CJCS’s direction.** The JSPS enables the CJCS to assist the President and the SecDef in providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces, to assist with their command function as required, and to perform those authoritative directive functions with which he is specifically charged by law, to include: planning, joint doctrine, education, and training. Title 10, USC, Section 153(a), requires the CJCS to assist the President and the SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. This section also directs the CJCS to prepare strategic plans, including plans that conform to resource levels projected by the SecDef to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective. Additionally, the CJCS is charged with developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces, formulating policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces, and formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces. In addition, Title 10, USC, Section 163(a), directs the CJCS to assist the President and SecDef with execution of the command function.

### 3.9 Coordination Challenges

Civilian and military efforts encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Challenges include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes between civilian agencies and military forces. Each USG agency often
arrives in the area of operations with differing, unstated assumptions or interpretations of events and solutions. A successful whole-of-government approach requires that all USG actors:

• Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process.
• Develop and maintain a shared understanding of the situation and problem.
• Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal.
• Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities.
• Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals.
• Allocate resources to ensure continuation of information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts.

Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of U.S. national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well-suited for addressing the range of conventional and irregular challenges that cut across available organizational expertise. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets NSC and HSC policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. These issues are exacerbated by the competing interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities.

It goes without saying that military policies, processes, and procedures are very different from those of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to interorganizational coordination. The various USG agencies often have different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques, which make unified action a challenge. Still more difficult, some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the U.S. military. In addition, many NGOs may not be hostile to DOD goals, but will not cooperate with DOD or USG efforts in order to maintain the perception of neutrality.

The military relies on structured and hierarchical decision-making processes; detailed planning; the use of standardized procedures; and sophisticated command and control (C2) systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies may employ similar principles,
but may not have the same degree of structural process as the U.S. military, and their organizational structure is flatter. Decision processes may be more ad hoc, collaborative, and collegial. Cooperation among IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector is often based on a perceived mutually supportive interest, rather than a formalized agreement. A continuous information exchange among engaged departments and agencies is necessary to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities.

The Armed Forces of the United States have unique capabilities that provide significant contributions to the overall USG effort. These include established military-to-military working relationships, extensive resources (e.g., logistics), and trained and ready personnel able to rapidly respond to multiple global crises. Additional unique military capabilities include C2 resources supported by worldwide communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance infrastructures, and robust organizational and planning processes; civil affairs personnel and their unique civilian-acquired skills; training support for large numbers of individuals on myriad skills; and air, land, and sea mobility support for inter-theater or intra-theater requirements.

Operations involving extensive USG and multinational involvement represents an enormous coordination challenge. Successful execution depends on a mutual understanding of mission objectives and clear lines of authority. In cases where the USG lead is unclear, an agency may be designated by the President or the NSC.

An inclusive view and a should guide a JFC to collaborate with USG civilian partners. The contributions of U.S. military forces can reinforce the initiatives undertaken through diplomatic development, law enforcement, and other activities. The challenge lies in combining each partner’s advantages and capabilities into synchronized lines of effort to achieve common objectives. A proven model is the complementary character of Department of State embassy mission strategic resource plans and geographic combatant commanders’ theater campaign plans.
Chapter 4

Key Concepts

This chapter provides unified action partners (UAPs) an overview of some key U.S. Army and joint concepts to enhance understanding and facilitate improved UAP, U.S. Army, and joint collaboration and coordination.

4.1 Unified Action – Unified Line of Effort

Uniting all of the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in stability tasks requires collaborative and cooperative paradigms that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demand unity of command, the challenge for military and civilian leaders is to forge unity of effort or unity of purpose among the diverse array of actors involved in a stability operation. This is the essence of unified action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (Joint Publication [JP] 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States).

Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach when conducting stability tasks in operations. Unity of effort requires integrating the capabilities of all the instruments of national power, as well as those of other nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector. Many actors, particularly NGOs, participate in unified action at their own discretion. They often define their roles by competing interests, and are governed by differences in policy and mandates. NGOs often have activities driven by fundamental humanitarian principles and goals different from those of the United States Government (USG) or the international community. Most NGOs go to great lengths to ensure that others perceive them as being fair and impartial to all parties, hence their reluctance to collaborate with the USG, especially the military. Effective civilian-military collaboration starts with developing shared objectives, a unity of purpose, and a relationship of shared trust whereby unity of effort becomes possible. The challenge for commanders is to come to a shared understanding, which fosters unity of purpose among partners. (Field Manual [FM] 3-07, Stability, has additional details on humanitarian response principles.)

Unity of effort in such complex endeavors is often the operational goal. Unity of effort leverages the ability of various actors to achieve a cooperative environment that focuses effort toward a common goal,
regardless of individual command or organizational structures. U.S. military forces coordinate their efforts through host-nation civilian agencies to mitigate sources of instability and build the host nation’s legitimacy and capacity. However, if the state has failed through military action or other socioeconomic factors, a transitional authority must assume responsibility for governing. This can be a transitional civil authority (typically authorized by the United Nations and under international lead) or a transitional military authority. (FM 3-07 discusses transitional military authority.)

4.2 Army and Joint Lines of Effort

A line of effort (LOE) is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (Army Doctrine Publication [ADRP] 3-0, Unified Land Operations). The LOE is a useful tool for developing the concept of operations when stability or defense support of civil authorities operations dominate. The LOE links multiple tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus efforts toward establishing end state conditions. Using LOE is essential in planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance.

Based on their understanding of the operational environment (OE) and the problem, the planning team considers operational approaches — the broad general actions — to solve the problem. The operational approach serves as the main idea that informs detailed planning and guides the force through preparation and execution. Planners can depict the operational approach by using an LOE that graphically articulates the links among tasks, objectives, conditions, and the desired end state. (See Figure 4-1, next page, for a sample operational approach depicted by LOE.) Ultimately, the commander determines the optimal method to articulate the operational approach. However, it is important that narratives accompany the LOE to ensure that subordinate commanders and Soldiers understand the operational approach.

An LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose — cause and effect — to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. An LOE is essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, an LOE may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. (See Figure 4-2, next page.)

Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces (MNF) and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical.
Figure 4-1. Sample operational approach by lines of effort. (ADRP 5-0)

Sample Lines of Effort

- **Civil Control**
  - Establish police forces training
  - Integrate trained police into operations
  - Counter organized crime
  - Establish judicial system
  - Transition to host nation police forces

- **Civil Security**
  - Initiate security forces training
  - Establish national security forces
  - Integrate security forces into operations
  - Isolate population from insurgency
  - Defeat insurgency
  - Transition to national security forces

- **Essential Services**
  - Sewage treatment plants operating
  - Establish trash disposal
  - Water treatment plants operating
  - Restore electrical power
  - Reopen hospitals and clinics
  - Identify and recruit local leaders

- **Economic/Infrastructure Development**
  - Implement employment programs
  - Secure vital natural resources
  - Repair/rebuild distribution infrastructure
  - Prioritize reconstruction projects
  - Essential banking services available
  - Implement public works projects

- **Governance**
  - Identify and recruit local leaders
  - Facilitate establishment of sector representation
  - Facilitate establishment of neighborhood councils
  - Facilitate establishment of district councils
  - Support and secure elections

**End State**
- Conditions
  - Adversary defense forces defeated
  - Safe and secure environment
  - New functioning legitimate government

Figure 4-2. Sample lines of effort. (Source: JP 5-0)
Commanders at all levels may use lines of effort to develop missions and tasks and allocate resources. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines of effort. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions.

4.3 Whole-of-Government Approach and Comprehensive Approach

This section provides an overview of a whole-of-government approach to achieve unity of effort among departments and agencies of the USG and a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort among USG entities and interorganizational UAPs. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, provides a detailed discussion of the whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches to achieving unity of effort.

4.3.1 Whole-of-Government Approach

A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. This approach enables achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Accomplishing this approach requires a willingness and ability to share information and resources among USG agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal. These resources — financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communication — are often limited in availability and cannot be restricted to use by a single Service, agency, or entity. The whole-of-government approach relies on interagency coordination among the agencies of the USG, including the Department of Defense (DOD), to ensure that agencies leverage, synchronize, and apply capabilities to address the drivers of conflict and reinforce resiliencies of local institutions to facilitate achieving sustainable peace. Ensuring continued sharing and cooperation requires a balance of activities in time and resources. These activities occur as regular meetings, formal agreements, assignment of coordinators or liaison staff, or even in the development of common communication or information technology platforms, integrated plans, or joint secretariats. Further, leaders maintain strong working relationships that enable collaboration and sharing, based upon mutual trust and shared goals. Table 4-1 (next page) provides a comparison of U.S. agency organizational structures and at what levels of war collaboration usually occurs.
Table 4-1. Agency organizational structures (Source: JP 3-08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Commander (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TACTICAL/FIELD-LEVEL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps, Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy Carrier Strike Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador/Embassy Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Office Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)/Liaison (5) Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Refugee Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Civilian Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA Joint Field Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES**

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector toward theater strategic objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector toward theater operational objectives.

3. The ambassador and embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, any may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF, or may lead an integrated planning team.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other U.S. agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. USAID’s OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART, which includes specialists trained in disaster relief.
All actors involved in unified action integrate with the operation from the onset of planning. Together, they complete detailed analyses of the situation and OE, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation. A coherent whole-of-government approach requires early and high-level participation of national, civilian, and military actors. This approach necessitates active collaboration and dialogue with NGOs, IGOs, the host-nation government, and the private sector.

4.3.2 Comprehensive Approach

A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG and, to the extent possible, IGOs, NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Successful operations involve actors participating at their own discretion or presence in the operational area but not acting as a member of a multinational coalition. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain; however, it is critical to achieving success in an operation with a wide representation.

Achieving unity of effort requires leaders to apply a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. This inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders often is more appropriate than a focused military approach. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships. Unlike a whole-of-government approach that aims for true interagency integration toward those ends, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. Leaders forge a comprehensive approach, leveraging the capabilities of the disparate actors, to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. In a comprehensive approach, actors are not compelled to work together toward a common goal. Instead, they participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. Achieving the end state is in the best interests of the actors participating; the actors recognize that fact and forge the bonds that allow them to achieve unity of effort.

A comprehensive approach has five underlying tenets: accommodation, fostering understanding, unity of purpose, common objectives, and cooperation. Accommodation means including the concerns and contributions of all participants. It determines appropriate priorities for resourcing and sets support relationships as required to deconflict activities. Fostering understanding requires development of a shared understanding that can be leveraged for cooperation toward common
goals. Understanding does not imply conformity; each actor contributes a distinct set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values, and perceptions. Together they provide breadth, depth, and resilience to planning, execution, and assessment. Understanding links discreet, yet interrelated, tasks and objectives to conditions that compose the desired end state. However, actors often do not all share a unity of purpose to achieve common objectives. Even if they do, other priorities, such as a need for perceived independence, often preclude cooperation. Lastly, cooperation reinforces institutional familiarity, trust, and transparency by sharing information. Leaders carefully consider the types of information they need to share with partners and other actors, as well as the means to share it. Information involves not just documentation, but informal knowledge or personal experiences. Leaders can share information by developing communities that provide forums and cooperation for concept development. Higher levels of cooperation could include capacity development, resource sharing, and even decision making. The degree to which any of this may be possible hinges on the degree that goals overlap.

Using a comprehensive approach to cooperate with nongovernmental humanitarian actors often proves challenging. These actors are guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. To many nongovernmental humanitarian actors, adhering to these principles means not participating in any political agendas, regardless of their legitimacy. The actors interpret the principles so that they base providing assistance solely on the humanitarian needs and with the single purpose to address these needs. Often, nongovernmental humanitarian actors will not support any political or military agenda, and will not wish to be perceived as doing so. For many nongovernmental humanitarian actors, maintaining neutrality is purely a means to an end (not a moral or political judgment).

Nongovernmental humanitarian actors refer to maintaining neutrality as “humanitarian space.” This term was created in the 1990s by Doctors Without Borders and has since been adopted by many members of the NGO community to describe an operational environment where NGOs can have access to their client population without actual or perceived interference from parties to armed conflict. The issue of “militarizing” or “politicizing” aid often arises in discussions of humanitarian space (Groves, Brian, Civil-Military Relations and Humanitarian Space, SOLLIMS Lesson 733, 21 APR 2011; website: https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm?disp=Lms.cfm&doit=view&lmsid=733). The importance of preserving this space depends somewhat on the context. In armed conflict, it is absolutely essential (thus, NGOs often do not want military forces to visit them in their offices). In a natural disaster where armies are not belligerents, nongovernmental humanitarian actors often work with military forces. In this context, military forces do not violate the actors’ humanitarian space but — because of their logistics capacities — can significantly contribute
to the humanitarian relief effort. Dialogue between military forces and the humanitarian community defines humanitarian space in other, less clear-cut situations such as a natural disaster in the context of armed conflict.

4.4 Joint Command and Control

This section provides an overview of some of the considerations involved with joint force commanders (JFCs) exercising authority and direction over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. In military (e.g., joint) operations, unity of effort is ensured by establishing unity of command. Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common objective. U.S. commanders exercise military command and control (C2) to ensure that military operations are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or multinational leadership). In operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders, where the commander may not control all elements, he seeks cooperation and builds consensus to achieve unity of effort. (See JP 3-08 and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for detailed discussions of C2.)

Unity of command can be difficult to achieve when working with multiple stakeholders. To compensate, commanders concentrate on working with the participating national forces to obtain unity of effort. Consensus building is the key element to unity of effort.

Commanders must be prepared to accommodate differences in operational and tactical capabilities among multinational forces. The commander must clearly articulate his intentions, guidance, and plans to avoid confusion that might occur due to differences in UAPs’ language, culture, doctrine, and terminology.

While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and operations, unified action among all interorganizational participants is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving engaged civilian organizations and foreign military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. **Unified action is the DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach.**

Joint forces must be prepared to plan and execute operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under U.S. or other than U.S. leadership. However, U.S. forces often will be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role. The military leaders of contributing member nations must emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect. Cultivation and maintenance of personal
relationships among counterparts are fundamental to achieving success. Language and communications differences, cultural diversity, historical animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and multinational partners are among the many factors that complicate the integration and synchronization of their activities during multinational operations. Likewise, differing national obligations derived from international treaties and agreements and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of other members’ treaty obligations or their lack of participation in a treaty, U.S. forces will remain bound by U.S. treaty obligations.

**Command.** Command includes both the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. The C2 function supports an efficient decision-making process. The goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly and effectively than the adversary, with the use of timely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.

**Command authorities.** JFCs exercise command authorities (i.e., combatant command [COCOM] – command authority; operational control [OPCON]; tactical control [TACON]; and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. “Command relationships” is another term for these authorities. JP 1 provides a detailed discussion of command authority.

**Unity of command.** Unity of command in joint operations is maintained through the application of the various command relationships as follows:

1. **COCOM** is the nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands (CCMDs) unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. COCOM, which cannot be delegated, is the authority of a combatant commander (CCDR) to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and U.S. Service and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
2. **OPCON** is inherent in COCOM (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. OPCON is command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

3. **TACON** is inherent in OPCON. TACON is command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON may be delegated to and exercised at any level at or below the level of CCMD. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.

4. **C2 functions of the joint task force (JTF) establishing authority.** The JTF establishing authority exercises either COCOM – command authority or OPCON of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the Commander, JTF (CJTF) and other subordinate commanders to ensure the success of the JTF.

5. **C2 functions of the CJTF.** The CJTF normally exercises OPCON over assigned forces and OPCON or TACON over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. The CJTF also may be a supported or supporting commander. Further, the CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish support relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capabilities to or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. The CJTF is responsible for assigning responsibilities, delegating authorities, and establishing command relationships. Establishing command relationships and delineating coordinating instructions also are particularly important when JTF component and other subordinate commanders are assigned missions that bring their forces into common or contiguous areas.

**Control.** Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander’s command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs
compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control provides the means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

**C2 system.** JFCs exercise authority and direction through a C2 system, which consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, staff functions and procedures, and personnel essential for planning, preparing for, monitoring, and assessing operations. The C2 system must enable the JFC to maintain communications with higher, supporting, and subordinate commands in order to control all aspects of current operations while planning for future operations. The joint force staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since the JFC understands, plans, directs, and controls most aspects of operations through the staff’s expertise and efforts. Liaison is an important aspect of C2. Commanders may exchange liaison teams or individuals between higher, supporting, and subordinate commands as required. Liaison personnel/liaison officers (LNOs) generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters; LNOs should be assigned early during joint operation planning. LNOs from supporting to supported commanders are particularly essential in determining needs and coordinating supporting actions.

**Organization of the operational area.** A critical function of the JTF is to organize the operational area to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations, a joint special operations area (JSOA), amphibious objective areas (AOA), and joint security areas (JSA) to support the organization of the operational area within the assigned JOA. Figure 4-3 (next page) depicts typical JTF operational areas.

**Area of operations (AO).** An AO is an operational area defined by the CJTF for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Within their designated AOs, land and maritime force commanders integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.

**JSOA.** The CJTF may establish a JSOA to execute operations. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. It may
be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations.

AOA. The AOA is a geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by an amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious forces’ mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

JSA. A JSA is a specific surface area designated by the CJTF as critical to facilitate protection of joint bases and support force protection, movement control, sustainment, C2, air bases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements.

Control measures. The CJTF establishes additional control measures to further integrate joint actions within the JOA and subordinate operational areas in coordination with their subordinate commanders. Control measures are directives to subordinate commanders to assign responsibilities, coordinate joint actions, and control operations. Commanders tailor their
use of control measures to conform to the higher commander’s intent, their own mission, and the amount of authority delegated to subordinates. The CJTF employs control measures to achieve the following types of joint actions (Note: This list is not meant to be all-inclusive or restrictive):

- Control of designated air, land, or maritime areas
- Control of movements
- Reconnaissance and surveillance operations
- Security operations
- Fires
- Air defense
- Lines of communications
- Identification of critical logistic nodes or facilities
- Identification of critical communications nodes or facilities
- Command and control architecture
- Control of data management operations

4.5 Shaping Operations and Security Cooperation

This section provides a synopsis of shaping operations and security cooperation. An in-depth discussion of shaping operations and security cooperation is found in JP 3-0 and JP 3-57, Civil Military Operations.

4.5.1 Shaping Operations

Operations and activities in the shape phase normally are outlined in theater campaign plans (TCPs), and those in the remaining phases are outlined in contingency plans directed by the joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP). While most shaping activities are contained in the TCP, contingency plans may include shaping activities that must be accomplished to support an operation. Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Understanding the Joint Phases of Operations (Page 49 of this guide), provides a synopsis of the joint phases of operations and includes a synopsis of the shape phase (Phase 0).

Geographic combatant commanders (GCC) develop a theater strategy focused on achieving specified end states for their theaters. A theater strategy is a broad statement of the commander’s long-term vision for the area of responsibility (AOR). It is the bridge between national strategic guidance and the joint operation planning required to achieve national and regional objectives and end states.
The theater strategy should describe the regional end state and the objectives, ways, and means to achieve it. The theater strategy should begin with the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format for a theater strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources. GCCs employ theater strategy to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their AOR and support and advance U.S. interests. To support this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, building partner capacity, force posture, and preparation for contingencies. Theater strategies typically employ military and regional engagement, as well as close cooperation with the Department of State (DOS), embassies, and other federal departments and agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives.

During the shape phase, joint and multinational operations — inclusive of normal and routine military activities — and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. They are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. They are designed to ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. Shape phase activities must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another. Planning that supports most “shaping” requirements typically occurs in the context of day-to-day security cooperation, and CCMDs will incorporate Phase 0 activities and tasks into the TCP. Planners developing contingency plans must identify shaping requirements that can be accomplished within the scope of the TCP’s steady-state activities; however, planners may also identify shaping requirements specific to their plan that would be implemented only in the event of crisis. Other activities also can be performed during Phase 0, such as establishing logistics capabilities needed to support Phase 1 activities. For example, time and distance challenges may require taking actions or setting the conditions during the shape phase for sustainment to be available should use of military force become necessary.

4.5.2 Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is defined as “activities undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the U.S. to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered
security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations” (DOD Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation).

Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense for and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to respective host nations. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other U.S. instruments of national power. The GCC’s security cooperation strategy provides a framework within which CCMDs engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive U.S. military intervention.

4.5.2.1 Range of Military Operations
The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities; to crisis response and limited contingency operations; and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. (See Figure 4-4, next page.) Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the OE and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining U.S. global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as civil support and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others, as evidenced by Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect U.S. forces while accomplishing the mission. The nature of the strategic security environment may require U.S. forces to engage in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these missions, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability operations and activities to achieve objectives. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity.
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single, small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect U.S. interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict.

Major Operations and Campaigns

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign normally involving large-scale combat. During major operations, joint force actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

4.5.2.2 Types of Military Operations

In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to accomplish a task or mission. Although the U.S. military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, large-scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations also enable a wide variety of other operations. Table 4-2 (next page) shows examples of military operations.
Table 4-2. Examples of military operations (Source: JP 3-0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability operations</th>
<th>Foreign internal defense</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil support</td>
<td>Counter-drug operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Combating terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant evacuation</td>
<td>Homeland defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace operations</td>
<td>Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</tbody>
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**Stability operations:** An umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment; provide essential governmental services; reconstruct emergency infrastructure; and deliver humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-07, *Stability Operations*.)

**Civil support:** DOD support to U.S. civil authorities in domestic emergencies and designated law enforcement and other activities. (See JP 3-28, *Civil Support*.)

**Foreign humanitarian assistance:** DOD activities, normally in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development or DOS, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (See JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.)

**Recovery:** An operation to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (See JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.)

**Noncombatant evacuation:** An operation to evacuate noncombatants and civilians from foreign countries to safe havens or to the United States when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. (See JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.)

**Peace operations:** A category that encompasses operations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. These include peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (See JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.)
Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Activities within eight military mission areas that include WMD-related security cooperation and partner activities, offensive operations against WMD, defensive operations, and managing the consequences of WMD attacks. (See JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*.)

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) consequence management: DOD support to USG actions that plan for, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of domestic and foreign CBRN incidents. (See JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management*.)

Foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Foreign internal defense is an example of nation assistance. (See JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.)

Counterdrug operations: Support provided by the DOD to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (See JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.)

Combating terrorism: Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (actions taken directly against terrorist networks) to oppose terrorism. (See JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*; and JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*.)

Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances. (See JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*.)

Homeland defense: The protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats, as directed by the President. (See JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.)

### 4.6 Security Sector Reform

The purpose of this section is to enable UAPs to better understand how the U.S. Army helps a host nation reform its security forces and policies.

Security sector reform (SSR) is an umbrella term that discusses reforming the security within a given country or nation. SSR includes integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border
management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; or reduction of armed violence. In SSR, the U.S. Army primarily supports reforming, restructuring, or reestablishing the armed forces and the defense sector.

SSR is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. This reform aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It often includes integrated activities in which UAPs would likely participate, such as:

- Defense and armed forces reform
- Civilian management and oversight
- Justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform
- National security planning and strategy support
- Border management
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
- Concurrent reduction of armed violence

SSR reinforces diplomacy and defense while reducing long-term security threats by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. SSR facilitates security cooperation, capacity-building activities, stability tasks, and engagement. Ultimately, SSR builds on the tradition of working in partnership with foreign governments and organizations to support peace, security, and effective governance. Additionally, other national policy documents commit the USG to promoting effective security and governance as a central national security objective.

SSR captures the full range of security activities under the broad umbrella of a single, coherent framework. SSR spans from military and police training to weapons destruction, from community security to DDR of former combatants, as well as security sector oversight and budgeting. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of law, and sustained economic development.

Establishing security in a country or region affected by persistent conflict requires a comprehensive assessment of the drivers of conflict. It also requires applying all available capabilities to reduce or eliminate the drivers of conflict and create an environment of security and rule of law. In non-permissive areas, security is the first priority; therefore, forces must establish security before other external actors can enter the operational area. Such areas typically require the initial use of military forces to achieve security and set the conditions that enable the success of those external
actors. SSR includes reform efforts targeting individuals and institutions that provide a nation’s security as well as promote and strengthen the rule of law. Generally, this includes the military and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; national and local police; justice and corrections systems; coastal and border security forces; oversight bodies; militia; and private military and security companies employed by the state. The security sector represents the foundation of effective, legitimate governance and the potential of the state for enduring viability.

SSR involves reestablishing or reforming institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and provide oversight for the safety and security of the host nation and its people. Through unified action, these institutions and individuals assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role. They provide external and internal security for their citizens under the civilian control of a legitimate state authority. Effective SSR enables a state to build its capacity to provide security and justice. SSR promotes stability, fosters reform processes, and enables economic development. The desired outcome of SSR programs is an effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted in the rule of law.

4.7 The Army in Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

During crisis response and limited contingency operations outside the United States, the U.S. Army and its UAPs are most likely to collaborate. The balance of stability and combat tasks varies with the circumstances. Some crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as FHA, require few offensive and defensive tasks. Others, including some types of peace operations, require a delicate balance of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. (See JP 3-07.)

When conducting operations for a JFC, Army forces achieve unified action by synchronizing actions with the activities of components of the joint force and UAPs. (See ADRP 3-0.) This synchronization occurs across the range of military operations during:

- Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.
- Crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Major operations and campaigns.
The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and sometimes reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case scenario, the security environment would be in chaos and the state would be in crisis or would have failed altogether. In this situation, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and to address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other partners.

Military forces provide support to facilitate the completion of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistics, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. (See FM 3-07.) These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with an operation focused on stability:

1. Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility
2. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but which military forces are prepared to execute until transition to those organizations can safely occur
3. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility

The primary stability tasks are:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
4.7.1 Theater Army/Army Service Component Command (ASCC)
The theater army is the ASCC assigned to a geographic combatant command. Though undergoing significant changes under its current doctrinal design, it is organized, manned, and equipped to perform three roles:

1. Theater army for the geographic combatant command to which it is assigned
2. JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR
3. Joint force land component (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR

The key tasks associated with the theater army/ASCC roles include:

- Serve as the primary interface between the Department of the Army, Army commands, and other ASCCs.
- Develop U.S. Army plans to support the TCP plan within that AOR.
- Tailor U.S. Army forces for employment in the AOR.
- Control reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for U.S. Army forces in the AOR.
- Exercise OPCON of deployed U.S. Army forces not subordinated to a JFC.
- Exercise administrative control (ADCON) of all U.S. Army forces operating within the AOR.
- Provide support as directed by the CCDR to other U.S. Service forces, multinational forces (MNFs), and interagency partners.
- Exercise OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component command or JTF headquarters, as required by the CCDR.
- Provide planning in support to the GCC’s strategic planning, TCP, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation plans, theater global force management planning, deliberate plans, and crisis action planning.

The CCDR relies upon the theater army commander to integrate land power into the combatant command’s plans for that AOR. The theater army coordinates with the Department of the Army and the primary Service force provider, United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), to integrate CCDR requirements within the global force management and Army force
generation (ARFORGEN) processes. The theater army coordinates through FORSCOM for theater-specific training and preparation of regionally aligned forces by providing Army training development capability-approved task names and task numbers to FORSCOM. The gaining theater army commander recommends to the CCDR the composition, sequence of deployment, and operational chain of command for U.S. Army forces deploying to the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON as specified by the CCDR and ADCON as specified by the Secretary of the Army. A detailed discussion of the theater army and ASCC is found in FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*.

### 4.7.2 Army Corps

The Army corps is the Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps must be as adept at planning a rapid noncombatant evacuation operation as it is at supporting a multyear major combat operation. The Army corps is deployable and scalable to meet almost every requirement of the CCDR for a senior-level headquarters. The corps now functions as the principal integrator of land power into campaigns and is the link between the operational and tactical levels of war. In the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, U.S. Army corps have commanded all land forces in those countries. The corps is the preferred Army headquarters for joint augmentation and employment as a JTF. As a joint or multinational land component command, an Army corps headquarters commands multiple Army divisions, brigades, and other formations, as well as MNFs and organizations. The corps headquarters often functions as the Army component and senior Army headquarters (known by the term ARFOR) of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (See FM 3-94, Chapter 1, Paragraphs 1-57 through 1-67, for a discussion of ARFOR.)

The corps headquarters is an essential element of the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. These capabilities enable the Army to deploy combined arms forces into any AOR and operate effectively upon arrival. Contingency operations require the corps and its subordinate forces to deploy quickly and set conditions to seize the initiative and accomplish the mission. **The corps is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four roles:**

1. Provide the ARFOR within a joint force for campaigns and major operations.

2. Serve as the joint or multinational land component command headquarters (with augmentation) in campaigns and major operations.

3. Serve as a JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.
4. Serve as a tactical headquarters commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands in campaigns and major operations.

The key tasks involved in these roles include:

- Command Marine Corps and multinational brigades and divisions.
- As a supported component, integrate supporting joint capabilities with land power within a joint operations area.
- As a supporting component, integrate Army capabilities with supported component operations.
- Exercise ADCON over Army forces in a joint operations area as specified by the ASCC.
- Integrate special operations forces (SOF) with conventional force operations.
- Provide Army support to other Services as required by the JFC.

Each of these roles and tasks is discussed in detail in FM 3-94, Chapter 4.

4.7.2.1 Army Corps as a Joint Task Force Headquarters for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

The corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters. A corps headquarters acting as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The CCDR may form a JTF on a geographic or functional basis, but the corps is normally a geographic JTF, commanding all forces within a joint operations area. Normally, the commander of the JTF exercises OPCON over all forces and other resources within the joint operations area. The JTF includes functional and Service components. It may also have subordinate JTFs. Once constituted as a JTF, the corps operates according to joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33 and JP 5-0.)

The corps headquarters is the most versatile of the echelons above brigades. It may become a joint and multinational headquarters responsible for conducting deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. In campaigns and major operations, the corps commands multiple divisions and attached brigades, serves as the land component, and serves as the operational-level headquarters for the employment of land power. The corps headquarters participates in multinational exercises designed to improve OPLANs and theater security in each of the geographic combatant commands.
4.7.3 Army Division

The division headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters under OPCON of an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force headquarters. It may become a joint force land component command headquarters. In limited contingency operations, it may become a JTF. As a tactical echelon of command, the division task-organizes subordinate units and specifies the command or support relationships needed. The division assesses the effort required for offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in its AO and organizes its subordinate units accordingly. The division headquarters sets the conditions for employment of its brigades, then controls and synchronizes their tactical actions. The division allocates resources, designates the main effort as required, forecasts operational requirements, and establishes priorities of support. Sustainment and other functional units (military police, engineer, air and missile defense, and military intelligence) provide support in accordance with priorities established by the supported division commander. (See FM 3-94, Chapters 6 and 7, for a detailed discussion of the Army division.)

The roles of the division include:

- Serve as a tactical headquarters in campaigns and major operations.
- Serve as the joint and multinational land component headquarters under a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Serve as a JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for limited contingency operations.
- Serve as the ARFOR within a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.

The key tasks for the division include:

- Command two to five brigade combat teams (BCTs) together with supporting brigades in decisive action.
- Serve as the joint or multinational land component headquarters under a JTF (or multinational JTF) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Exercise TACON over Marine Corps units and MNFs.
- Exercise ADCON over attached U.S. Army forces.

Each of these roles and tasks is discussed in detail in FM 3-94, Chapter 6.
4.7.3.1 Army Division as a Joint Force Land Component Command for Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

In a limited contingency operation, the JFC may organize the JTF with the division as the joint force land component command. The joint force land component command of such a JTF may have TACON of Marine Corps personnel and MNFs. The Marine Corps unit may be a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), but is often smaller. When an MEU is under the control of an Army division, the division employs it as a BCT, although with capabilities different from those of an Army BCT. (See FM 3-94, Chapter 7, for a discussion of Marine Corps forces.)

The division headquarters receives staff augmentation from the Marine Corps and other Services, as well as individual Army augmentation and communications support from the theater army. Although the mix of other brigades varies according to the mission, the division should have OPCON of a brigade special troops battalion to meet the demand for intelligence and integration of collection assets. When it is the joint force land component, the Army division becomes the ARFOR.

As the ARFOR, the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To function effectively as both the joint force land component and the ARFOR, the division headquarters requires the support of an expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) and its sustainment brigades. The ESC normally operates in direct support to the division (ARFOR). This enables the division to oversee logistics and administrative support to all U.S. Army forces, while also providing logistics support to other U.S. Services and MNFs. Without it, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment would degrade the operational focus of the division. If the tactical situation permits, the division headquarters and ESC co-locate to integrate land operations and sustainment closely.

4.7.4 United States Marine Corps

Soldiers and Marines have fought together throughout the nation’s history. As a joint force land component, the Army corps may have TACON or OPCON over a Marine Corps force. (See FM 3-94, Chapters 5 and 7.) Normally, the largest Marine Corps force that may be under the corps control is a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) organized as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The MEB normally includes a Marine Corps rifle regiment with attached artillery, armor, and other combat support. Marine Corps combat forces are organized and equipped to fight as air-ground combined arms task forces with their own fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets. The MEB includes a Marine air squadron with both types of assets. A Marine Corps brigadier general commands the MAGTF.
The MEB is a powerful force with capabilities and limitations different from those of an Army BCT. It is well-suited for independent operations under corps control in a large AO. The Marine expeditionary brigade has tanks, more infantry, and more armored vehicles than an infantry BCT, as well as its own close air and attack aviation. It has less tactical mobility than the Stryker BCT and less shock and firepower than an armored BCT, but the MEB can mitigate both with its air squadron. The MEB has its own sustainment unit but requires general support from an Army sustainment brigade for operations lasting more than 30 days. For protracted operations away from the Navy, the MEB requires health service support, and may require missile defense depending on the threat. The MEB also requires Army engineer and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) support. The MEB typically receives additional specialized intelligence support.

A Marine Corps aviation combat element organized as part of the MAGTF includes Marine Corps air C2 system capabilities tailored for the size of the aviation combat element. Smaller regimental-based MAGTFs (with unmanned aircraft systems) may be integrated in a manner similar to BCTs. Larger MAGTFs bring the full joint capability to control airspace over the MAGTF AO. Large MAGTFs include a Marine Corps division and constitute a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The MEF deploys with the full range of Marine Corps rotary- and fixed-wing aviation as well as a robust Marine Corps air C2 system.

The Army division may control an MEU. The normal command relationship is TACON. (See FM 3-94, Chapters 5 and 7.) The MEU consists of a reinforced Marine Corps rifle battalion and a composite air squadron with attached logistics support. A Marine Corps colonel commands the MEU. Although the MEU differs from an Army BCT in capability, the division employs it as a combined arms maneuver formation equivalent to the BCTs. The MEU has less artillery than a BCT, but the Marine Corps air squadron deploys fighter-bombers, assault helicopters, and attack helicopters. The MEU normally includes light armored units. The MEU’s C2 capabilities equal those of a BCT; its airspace control is superior. The MEU normally deploys with 30 to 45 days of supplies. However, medical support away from the fleet is limited. The MEU’s engineer and CBRN assets are normally limited. It has no missile defense capability once it maneuvers beyond the fleet’s air and missile defense capability.

The MEU can conduct independent operations in a large AO. For offensive and defensive operations, the division reinforces the MEU with additional engineers and artillery, typically a battalion of each. The MEU, if available, may be the unit of choice for an economy of force operation within a large AO. The MEU may also follow and support an armored or Stryker BCT.
4.8 Army Command Relationships

Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. (See ADRP 5-0 for an in-depth discussion of U.S. Army command relationships.) By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of the gaining Army commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship with the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide. Army command relationships include organic, assigned, attached, OPCON, TACON, and ADCON. The U.S. Army command relationships are depicted in Table 4-3 (next page).

**Organic.** Organic forces are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in the unit’s table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy (JP 1-02). Joint command relationships do not include organic because a JFC is not responsible for the organizational structure of units. That is a Service responsibility. The Army establishes organic command relationships through organizational documents such as tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowances. If temporarily task-organized with another headquarters, organic units return to the control of their organic headquarters after completing the mission. To illustrate, within a BCT, the entire brigade is organic. In contrast, within most modular support brigades, there is a “base” of organic battalions and companies and a variable mix of assigned and attached battalions and companies.

**Assigned.** To assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such an organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0). Unless specifically stated, this relationship includes ADCON.

**Attached.** To attach is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary (JP 3-0). A unit that is temporarily placed into an organization is attached.

**OPCON.** OPCON is a command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of COCOM. OPCON is inherent in COCOM-command authority and may be delegated within the command. OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving
Table 4-3. Army command relationships (Source: FM 6-0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relationship is:</th>
<th>Have command relationship with:</th>
<th>May be task-organized by:*</th>
<th>Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through:</th>
<th>Are assigned position or AO by:</th>
<th>Establish and maintain communications with:</th>
<th>Provide liaison to:</th>
<th>Establish/Have priorities established by:</th>
<th>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>All organic forces organized with the HQ</td>
<td>Organic HQ specified in organizing documents</td>
<td>OPCON chain of command</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>ASCC or Service-assigned HQ</td>
<td>As required by OPCON HQ</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Combatant command</td>
<td>Gaining HQ</td>
<td>Army HQ</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>Unit to which attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADCON</th>
<th>administrative control</th>
<th>HQ</th>
<th>headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service component command</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>general support</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>reinforcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSR</td>
<td>general support-reinforcing</td>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and U.S. Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training (JP 3-0).
**TACON.** TACON is a command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at, any level at or below the level of COCOM. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task (JP 3-0). TACON allows commanders below COCOM-command authority level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistic assets, but it does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support.

When commanders establish command relationships, they determine if the command relationship includes ADCON. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations (JP 1). ADCON is equivalent to administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON of an Army unit must remain in Army channels. It cannot be transferred to a unit of another Service. Attachment orders normally state whether the parent unit retains ADCON of the unit. If it does not, the attachment order specifically states that the gaining unit has ADCON. For OPCON and TACON, parent units retain ADCON.

### 4.9 Army Support Relationships

Army support relationships are direct support (DS), general support (GS), reinforcing (R), and general support-reinforcing (GSR). Table 4-4 (next page) depicts Army support relationships. Army support relationships are not command authorities and are more specific than joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. Commanders assign a support relationship when:

- The support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the supporting unit rather than the supported commander.

- The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would be inappropriate
The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists. Assigning support relationships is one aspect of mission command.

Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. (See ADRP 5-0 for an in-depth discussion of Army command relationships.) Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units — as in direct support — to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters — as in general support. Support relationships do not alter ADCON. Commanders specify and change support relationships through task organization.
Direct support. DS is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (Joint doctrine considers DS as a mission rather than a support relationship.) A unit assigned a DS relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit.

General support. GS is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). Units assigned a GS relationship are positioned and have priorities established by their parent unit.

Reinforcing. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. Only like units (for example, artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established first by the reinforced unit, then by the parent unit.

General support-reinforcing. GSR is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit. A unit assigned a GSR support relationship is positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit.

4.10 Building the Common Operational Picture

An effective way to communicate relevant information is the common operational picture (COP) — a single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADRP 6-0). The COP integrates many digital information systems to display relevant information. Initially, commanders and staffs analyze their mission using operational and mission variables. They begin to develop the COP. Commanders determine their information requirements, and additional information is collected based on those requirements. Commanders and staffs continue to refer to and refine the COP as the situation evolves. They use the COP as a tool for developing knowledge and understanding. Commanders and staffs are obligated to share their understanding of the COP with subordinate and higher commands to facilitate synchronized operations and parallel understanding. Figure 4-5 (next page) depicts a sample COP.
Figure 4-5. Sample common operating picture.
Chapter 5

Understanding Army Structure

This chapter provides an overview of the operational chain of command, geographic combatant commands, the Army hierarchy within a geographic combatant command, and Army support to an interdependent joint force. The chapter also provides a synopsis of Army structure and an overview of the theater army, corps, division, and specific brigade combat teams. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, provides a detailed discussion of Army structure.

5.1 The Operational Chain of Command and Administrative Control

To best understand chain of command, it is necessary to start at the top with the President, Commander in Chief. The President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) exercise authority, direction, and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. (See Figure 5-1, next page.) One branch runs from the President, through the SecDef, to the combatant commanders (CCDRs) for missions and forces assigned to their commands. For purposes other than operational direction of the combatant commands (CCMDs), the chain of command runs from the President to the SecDef to the secretaries of the Military Departments and, as prescribed by the secretaries, to the commanders of Military Service forces. The Military Departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of that Military Department. The secretaries of the Military Departments may exercise administrative control (ADCON) over Service forces through their respective Service chiefs and Service commanders. The Service chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are directly responsible.

The CCDRs exercise combatant command (COCOM)-command authority over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command within their CCMDs and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders.

The secretaries of the Military Departments operate under the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef. This branch of the chain of command is responsible for ADCON over all military forces within the respective Service not assigned to CCDRs (i.e., those defined in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance as “unassigned forces”). This branch is separate and distinct from the branch of the chain of command that exists within a CCMD.
Figure 5-1. Operational chain of command and administrative control.
(Source: Joint Publication 1)
5.2 Geographic Combatant Command

There are **three types of combatant commands.** **Functional combatant commands** have global responsibilities for U.S. military power, but do not have an area of responsibility (AOR). **Geographic combatant commands** have a regional responsibility defined by an AOR. A **specified combatant command** (there is none currently) is established by the Secretary of Defense for a specific purpose and is normally composed of forces from a single Military Department. Every combatant command has an Army Service component command (ASCC). FM 3-94, Chapter 2, provides a detailed discussion of the ASCC, and Section 5.5.2 of this chapter provides a synopsis of the ASCC. Table 5-1 depicts the existing combatant commands and their ASCCs.

**Table 5-1. Combatant commands and their ASCCs**
(Source: FM 3-94)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant command</th>
<th>Army Service component command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Pacific (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. European Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Europe (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Central Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Central (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Africa Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Africa (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Southern Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army South (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Northern Command (GCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army North (theater army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Transportation Command (FCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Command (FCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command — Army Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command (FCC)</td>
<td>U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FCC** functional combatant command

**GCC** geographic combatant command

Geographic combatant commands are assigned a geographic AOR by the President, with the advice of the SecDef, as specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are responsible for the missions in their AOR, unless otherwise directed. Functional combatant commanders (FCCs) have transregional responsibilities and are normally supporting CCDRs to the geographic combatant command activities in their AOR. FCCs may conduct operations as directed by the President or SecDef, in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted. The SecDef or Deputy SecDef may assign a CCDR global synchronizer responsibilities. The global synchronizer’s role is to align and harmonize plans and recommend sequencing of actions to achieve the strategic end states and objectives of a global campaign plan.
Based on the President’s UCP, the commanders of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), European Command (USEUCOM), Pacific Command (USPACOM), Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) are each assigned a geographic AOR within which their missions are accomplished with assigned and/or attached forces. Forces under the direction of the President or SecDef may conduct operations from or within any geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as mutually agreed by the CCDRs concerned or as specifically directed by the President or SecDef.

The commander of United States Special Operations Command is an FCC who exercises COCOM of all assigned Active Component and mobilized Reserve Component special operations forces (SOF) minus U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs and military information support forces. When directed, the commander provides U.S.-based SOF to a GCC who exercises COCOM (command authority) of assigned SOF and operational control (OPCON) of attached SOF through a commander of a theater special operations (SO) command or a joint SO task force in a specific operational area or to prosecute SO in support of a theater campaign or other operations.

The commander of United States Strategic Command is an FCC who is responsible to:

- Maintain primary responsibility among CCDRs to support the national objective of strategic deterrence.
- Provide integrated global strike planning.
- Synchronize planning for global missile defense.
- Plan, integrate, and coordinate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations.
- Provide planning, training, and contingent electronic warfare support.
- Synchronize planning for Department of Defense (DOD) actions to combat weapons of mass destruction.
- Plan and conduct space operations.
- Synchronize planning for cyberspace operations.
- Provide in-depth analysis and precision targeting for selected networks and nodes.
The commander of United States Transportation Command is an FCC who is responsible to:

- Provide common-user and commercial air, land, and maritime transportation; terminal management; and aerial refueling to support global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces.

- Serve as the mobility joint force provider.

- Provide DOD global patient movement, in coordination with geographic combatant commands, through the defense transportation network.

- Serve as the distribution process owner.

5.3 Joint Task Force

A joint task force (JTF) is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). The JTF establishing authority designates the commander of the joint task force (CJTF), assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment, such as the adversary, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission.

5.3.1 Joint Task Force Headquarters Organization

The preferred approach to forming a JTF headquarters is to do so around an existing C2 structure. Typically this is a CCMD’s Service component headquarters or a subordinate Service component headquarters. The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the operational environment. In addition to other responsibilities that change according to circumstances, the following are typical general responsibilities common to both Service and functional combatant commanders:

- Plan and execute operations to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the higher commander’s plans or orders.
Advise the higher commander of ways to achieve the subordinate commander’s mission objectives, cooperate with appropriate governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and remain cognizant of the potential consequences.

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common
technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an appropriate organizational structure to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These appropriate organization structures facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the headquarters. (See Figure 5-2, preceding page, for an example of a typical JTF staff organization.)
5.3.2 Joint Task Force Joint Planning Group
The JTF joint planning group (JPG) is a planning group charged with writing deliberate plans and orders for the JTF, conducting crisis action planning (CAP), and developing future plans. The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct CAP; assist in developing an operation plan (OPLAN) and operation order (OPORD); and perform future planning. As a JPG works through the CAP process toward developing an OPORD, it is important that the head of a JPG devise a system that analyzes courses of action (COAs).

5.3.3 Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Synchronization
Upon completion of the OPORD or OPLAN and based on CJTF guidance, the designated planning team or teams focus on execution phase planning. Figure 5-3 (preceding page) depicts an example of an organizational strategy to synchronize long-term, near-term, and short-term planning; assessment; and guidance for commanders. JPG members provide analysis to the planning teams to which they are assigned based on their functional expertise. The JPG members maintain staff estimates that are informed through their participation in working groups and through the continued coordination with their parent staff directorate center or cell. Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components will have permanent representation in the JPG. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure.

5.3.4 Joint Task Force Components
A JTF is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single CJTF. The subordinate Service components’ headquarters and their forces provide the basic building blocks for the JTF’s component structure. The CJTF can organize the JTF with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the operational environment. All joint forces include Service component commands because administrative and logistic support for joint forces is provided through Service component commands. Typical JTFs have a combination of Service and functional components. A CJTF also can establish one or more subordinate JTFs if necessary. Figure 5-4 (next page) depicts an example of the possible JTF components and subordinate commands.
5.4 Joint Force Land Component Command

This chapter provides an overview of the joint force land component command. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, provides a comprehensive discussion on the joint force land component command. The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the FCCs based on the concept of operations, and may alter this authority during the course of an operation. The designation of a joint force land component command normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.
The responsibilities of the joint force land component command include, but are not limited to:

- Advising the JFC on the proper employment of forces made available for tasking
- Developing the joint land OPLAN or OPORD in support of the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and optimizing the operations of task-organized land forces
- Directing the execution of land operations as specified by the JFC
- Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other Service components and supporting agencies

5.4.1 Joint Force Land Component Command Staff Organization

The joint force land component command staff is organized based on the mission and forces assigned and attached. Because creating a new staff would be very time-consuming and inefficient, the staff organization most likely will be derived from an existing Service command structure. The most likely candidates are a theater army contingency command post; an Army corps; or a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), most likely a Marine expeditionary force. Augmentees from the other Services are integrated into the core staff to form the joint force land component command staff. Ideally, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and the deputy JFLCC would come from different Services. This construct should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize force employment. Figure 5-5 (next page) depicts a notional joint force land component command staff organization; however, it is not prescriptive. The practical assumption is that the actual staff organization is based on the staff organization that forms the core of the staff with some staff members being dual-hatted. Therefore, the actual location and specific duties assigned to certain sections and the specific special staff vary according to the organization of the core staff.
Figure 5-5. Notional joint force land component staff organization. 
(Source: JP 3-31)
5.4.2 Joint Force Land Component Cross-Functional Staff Organization

The joint force land component command may be required to establish a variety of cross-functional staff organizations and send representatives to the JFCs and other component cross-functional staff organizations. How the joint force land component command interfaces with other joint force C2 mechanisms is depicted in Figure 5-6 (above).
5.4.3 Joint Force Land Component Subordinate Forces

The joint force land component command controls and coordinates the joint land operations of all subordinate forces. (See Figure 5-7 for an illustration of the composition of a notional joint force land component command.) Multinational forces may be provided to the joint force land component command for land operations. Major concerns are command relationships...
and authorities, unity of effort, liaison requirements, intelligence and information sharing, integration of forces, interoperability of equipment, doctrine and procedures, language and cultural factors, mission assignment, areas of operations, rules of engagement, logistic readiness and capabilities, and national direction. When operating as part of a multinational alliance or coalition, military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with U.S. law, regulations, and doctrine. For additional guidance on these concerns, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

**Same-Service Forces.** The JFLCC as a Service component commander normally exercises OPCON of same-Service forces through subordinate Service force commanders.

**Other Service Forces.** The JFLCC normally will be delegated TACON of other Service forces. However, the JFLCC and staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of other Service forces. For example, a MAGTF placed under TACON to an Army-provided joint force land component command normally will include Marine tactical air assets. The MAGTF commander will retain OPCON of organic air assets. Consequently, commanders should specifically address the issue of joint force land component command employment of Marine tactical aviation (i.e., independent functional component air operations) during planning.

### 5.4.4 JFLCC Joint Planning Group

The primary planning element for the joint force land component command to support the JFC’s planning or to perform component planning is the joint planning group (JPG). Planners from the joint force land component command core headquarters staff element are the nucleus around which the JPG is normally built. It includes personnel from each of the primary coordinating, functional, and special staff elements, liaison officers, and when necessary, planners from the joint force land component command subordinate commands or multinational land forces. (See Figure 5-8, next page.) The JPG develops and disseminates staff planning guidance and schedules. It confirms the process and products to be developed and delivered to support the joint force land component command planning effort. The JPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for future plans. The JPG develops the concept of operations (CONOPS) for each plan. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint land force and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. Using mission-type orders, the JPG writes (or graphically portrays)
the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand the commander’s intent, purpose, and any specific tasks or requirements and can innovatively develop their supporting plans accordingly. During development of the CONOPS, the JPG determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission consistent
with the approved course of action (COA). This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link between joint operation planning and force planning. For an in-depth discussion of CONOPS development, see JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

### 5.4.5 Joint Force Land Component Command

#### Plans-Operations Relationship

![Figure 5-9. Plans-operations relationship. (Source: JP 3-31)](image)

**Plans-Operations Relationship.** The joint force land component command headquarters is oriented to three planning horizons: short, medium, and long. These correspond with current operations (J-3), future operations (J-35), and future plans (J-5). Upon completion of the planning products and orders, the JPG (future plans) organizes to conduct a plans transition.
Once plans are prepared and execution begins, the JPG’s focus shifts to planning “what’s next” or sequels primarily with higher headquarters, while handing off the plan to the current operations J-3 for execution and preparation of all necessary fragmentary orders directing tactical action. This requires an organizational procedure to transfer responsibilities and products from the long-range planners to those operators responsible for execution, or “what is.” Key to the success of the plans transition is the requirement that the organization responsible for execution has enough resources, experience, and understanding of the plan to effectively execute it. Experience has shown that the current operations cell is often too immersed in ongoing operations to plan outside the current 24-hour period. This may require the organization of a separate future operations cell (J-35) for focusing on “what if” and branch plans development. Figure 5-9 (preceding page) depicts the plans-operations relationship. See JP 5-0 for more information on planning horizons.

5.5 Army Structure

NOTE: The structure below is current as of this writing; however, pending revisions may modify this structure.) In addition to being the largest of the U.S. Armed Services, the U.S. Army has a greater variety of units than the other Services, each with different organizations and purposes. Therefore, the U.S. Army provides the combatant commander (CCDR) with an interlocking array of modular headquarters trained and equipped to apply land power from the theater level, through the operational level, down to the tactical employment of various brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, corps, and division give the CCDR a menu of options necessary for the employment of land power in an interdependent joint force. Table 5-2 (next page) illustrates the variety of U.S. Army headquarters and units of brigade and larger size. The total number of units and organizations will vary. See FM 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations, for a detailed discussion of Army structure.

5.5.1 Echelons Above Brigade: Theater Army, Corps, Division

The theater army, corps, and division headquarters derive from a common design philosophy. Although commanders have the authority to reorganize the headquarters to best suit the requirements of the mission, the base design of echelons above brigade headquarters stems from a common set of design criteria and organizational principles. Figure 5-10 (Page 126) depicts the responsibilities of a major theater headquarters. Unified action partners (UAPs) should use this diagram to determine where they may best interface with U.S. Army headquarters in order to best meet their requirements.
### Table 5-2. The Army’s structure (Source: FM 3-94)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th># in Army</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Command (ACOM)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ACOMs are four-star Service commands. All Army commands are part of the generating force.</td>
<td>TRADOC, AMC, FORSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct reporting unit (DRU)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>A DRU is a two- or three-star command under the Department of the Army. DRUs fulfill unique Army requirements as part of the generating force.</td>
<td>NETCOM, INSCOM, USACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Service component command (ASCC)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>The ASCC for each geographic combatant command is a theater army (5). There are three ASCCs for the functional combatant commands.</td>
<td>USARCENT, SDDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>A field army commands two or more corps in campaigns and major operations. EUSA is the ARFOR for U.S. Forces Korea, a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific Command.</td>
<td>Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) is the only army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Army Service components</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other Army Service components may be a service component of USCYBERCOM, a sub-unified command of USSTRATCOM.</td>
<td>USARCYBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>A Command is a theater-level headquarters that commands functional brigades and provides support to deployed Army forces across the area of responsibility.</td>
<td>AAMDC, MEDCOM (DS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps headquarters</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>A corps headquarters is the Army’s primary operational-level headquarters. Each corps has training and readiness responsibilities for Army divisions.</td>
<td>I Corps, III Corps, XVII Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>A division is the primary tactical headquarters for operations. Each division headquarters has training and readiness authority BCTs.</td>
<td>101st Abn Div (Regular Army); 40th Div (Army National Guard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade combat team (BCT)</td>
<td>~64</td>
<td>There are three types of BCTs: Armored (ABCT), Infantry (IBCT), and Stryker (SBCT).</td>
<td>1st BCT 82d Abn Div (IBCT); 3d BCT 2d ID (SBCT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multifunctional support brigade</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>A multifunctional support brigade provides support to BCTs. Organization varies. Normally it is attached to a division, but it may be under a corps, or a joint or multinational headquarters. An ESC normally commands sustainment brigades and provides support on an area basis.</td>
<td>5 types of brigades: CAB; MEB; BFSB; sustainment; fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional support brigade</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>A functional support brigade is a brigade or group that provides a single function or capability. These brigades can provide support for a theater, corps, or division, depending on how each is tailored. The organization varies extensively.</td>
<td>ADA, engineer, MP, signal, EOD, medical, regional support groups, theater aviation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5-2. The Army’s structure (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element Description</th>
<th>Example Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A special functional support brigade is a small brigade or group that augments echelon above brigade headquarters and manages Title 10 requirements.</td>
<td>AFSB, Space, TASM-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations units and forces are brigades, groups, and regiments that support the conventional forces or operate under U.S. Special Operations Command.</td>
<td>Ranger, SF, and Special Operations Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Old Guard provides national Army ceremonial support and has operation commitments. It is a part of the operating force.</td>
<td>3rd Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th># in Army</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special functional support brigade</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>A special functional support brigade is a small brigade or group that augments echelon above brigade headquarters and manages Title 10 requirements.</td>
<td>AFSB, Space, TASM-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations unit and force</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Special operations units and forces are brigades, groups, and regiments that support the conventional forces or operate under U.S. Special Operations Command.</td>
<td>Ranger, SF, and Special Operations Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Old Guard provides national Army ceremonial support and has operation commitments. It is a part of the operating force.</td>
<td>3rd Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AAMDC | U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command |
| Abn | Airborne |
| ADA | Air defense artillery |
| AFSB | Army field support brigade |
| AMC | Army Materiel Command |
| ARFOR | senior Army component headquarters |
| BFSB | battlefield surveillance brigade |
| CAB | combat aviation brigade |
| Div | division |
| EOD | explosive ordnance disposal |
| ESC | expeditionary sustainment brigade |
| FORSCOM | U.S. Army Forces Command |
| ID | infantry division |
| INSCOM | U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command |
| MEB | maneuver enhancement brigade |
| MEDCOM (DS) | medical command (direct support) |
| MP | military police |
| NETCOM | network command |
| # | number |
| SDDC | Surface Deployment and Distribution Command |
| SF | special forces |
| TASM-G | Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group |
| TRADOC | U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| U.S. | United States |
| USACE | U.S. Army Corps of Engineers |
| USARCENT | U.S. Army Central |
| USARCYBER | U.S. Army Cyber |
| USCYBERCOM | U.S. Cyber Command |
| USSTRATCOM | U.S. Strategic Command |
5.5.2 Army Service Component Command

The Army Service component command (ASCC) for each geographic combatant command is a dedicated theater army with a common design. It is organized, manned, and equipped to perform three roles:

1. Theater army for the geographic combatant command to which it is assigned
2. JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that area of responsibility (AOR)
3. Joint force land component (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR

The key tasks associated with the ASCC’s roles include:

- Serve as the primary interface between the DOD, Army commands, and other ASCCs.
- Develop Army plans to support the theater campaign plan within that AOR.
- Tailor Army forces for employment in the AOR.
• Control reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) for Army forces in the AOR.

• Exercise operational control (OPCON) of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a joint force commander (JFC).

• Exercise administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces operating within the AOR.

• Provide support as directed by the CCDR to other Service forces, multinational forces, and interagency partners.

• Exercise OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component command or JTF headquarters, as required by the CCDR.

• Provide planning in support to the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) strategic planning, theater campaign plan, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation plans, theater global force management planning, deliberate plans, and crisis action planning (CAP).

The CCDR relies upon the theater army commander to integrate land power into the GCC’s plans for that AOR. The theater army coordinates with DOD and the primary service force provider, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), to integrate CCDR requirements within the global force management and Army Force Generation processes. The theater army coordinates through FORSCOM for theater-specific training and preparation of regionally aligned forces by providing Army Training Development Capability-approved task names and task numbers to FORSCOM. As required, the theater army may also coordinate directly with supporting CCMD ASCCs if the SecDef directs the supporting CCDR to provide forces. The gaining theater army commander recommends to the CCDR the composition, sequence of deployment, and operational chain of command for Army forces deploying to the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON as specified by the CCDR and ADCON as specified by the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy).

The theater army performs a critical task in shaping the AOR for the geographic combatant command. The theater army maintains a theater-wide focus in support of security cooperation. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army, explains: “Shaping the strategic security environment improves the chance for peace around the world. It diminishes regional tensions and is therefore vital to American security interests. Each geographic combatant commander develops programs to improve regional stability and promote peace through security cooperation. American military capabilities can reassure allies, while dissuading adversaries. Shaping by itself cannot prevent conflict, but it nudges global regions away from military confrontation and increases the effect of diplomatic, informational,
and economic instruments of national power. … Soldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces. To the degree that other nations see us as the best army in the world, they gravitate to us to help them achieve the same high standards of military performance, or tie their security to the world’s most capable army.”

The theater army and theater-level commands shift execution of much of the Service-specific functions from the ARFOR, the senior Army echelon in a JTF, to the theater army. This shift allows the corps or division commander to exercise flexible mission command over tactical units and permits the ARFOR staffs to focus on their operational missions.

As required, the theater army provides Army support to other Services, provides common user logistics, and carries out DOD-specified Service executive agent and combatant command support agent (CCSA) responsibilities in the AOR. These ARFOR responsibilities are discussed in more detail in FM 3-94, Chapter 1.

5.5.3 Echelons Above Brigade Headquarters

Each headquarters contains a commander; a command group; and coordinating, special, and personal staff. Regardless of echelon, the headquarters design provides for a main command post and a smaller, more mobile forward command post. The latter is a contingency command post within the theater army structure and a tactical command post at the corps and division levels. All three echelons have a headquarters and headquarters battalion. Additionally, the theater army, corps, and division headquarters, while similar in organizational design, have minor differences in staffing levels, rank structure, and staff sections. (See FM 3-94 and FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.)

The theater army contingency command post enables the theater army to conduct small-scale operations. This may include command of up to two brigade combat teams (BCTs) or their equivalent for 30 days. Environments for these operations vary from peaceful and permissive through uncertain to hostile. Employing the contingency command post for an assigned mission involves a trade-off between the contingency command post’s immediate responsive capability and its known limitations. These limitations address the scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without significant augmentation.

The corps and division tactical command posts are employed for a specific mission for a limited time when the main command post is displacing or otherwise not available. However, the tactical command post, if separated from the main command post, requires augmentation from a main command post to control operations for extended operations.
The corps and division also have the capability to employ a mobile command group. The purpose of a mobile command group is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership at a critical time and place during the conduct of operations. It allows the commander to displace from a command post while maintaining continuous access to the common operational picture. **Mobile command groups allow commanders to:**

- Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place.
- Make a personal assessment of the situation.
- Maintain situational understanding while moving around the area of operations by allowing them to have continuous access to updated information.
- Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation.

**The basis for the organizational design is warfighting functions,** previously discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.10 (Page 29). There are five functional cells in the headquarters design: (1) Intelligence; (2) Movement and Maneuver; (3) Fires; (4) Protection; and (5) Sustainment. Elements from coordinating and special staff sections (and in some cases, the personal staff) work within the functional cells. Most of the functional cells contain representatives from different coordinating and special staff sections; however, their activities fall within that warfighting function. **The sixth warfighting function, mission command, does not form a separate functional cell. The function of mission command applies to the entire headquarters.** The chief of staff directly supervises the coordinating and special staff sections that do not work within a functional cell.

**The movement and maneuver cell provides the nucleus for the three integrating cells:** (1) Current Operations Integrating; (2) Future Operations; and (3) Plans. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon. The current operations integrating, future operations, and plans cells assist the commander in integrating the warfighting functions within the short-, mid-, and long-range planning horizons, respectively. See FM 3-94 and ADRP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of echelons above brigade headquarters design, functional and integrating cells, command group, personal staff officers, coordinating staff officers, and special staff officers. Appendices E and F of this guide provide an overview of the same topics.

**5.5.4 Echelons Above Brigade Headquarters Distribution of Staff Within a Main Command Post**

Figure 5-11 (next page) depicts an example of the distribution of staff sections within a main command post of echelons above brigade. These echelons have large staffs to support the commander. Regardless of whether
the headquarters is a theater army, corps, or division, each has a command group, personal staff, coordinating staff, and special staff. In general, the personal staff works for the commanding general. The coordinating staff and special staff work for the chief of staff.

### 5.5.5 Echelons Above Brigade Headquarters Main Command Post Using a Staff Structure Based on Warfighting Functions

Figure 5-12 (next page) depicts an example of the design of the main command post at theater army, corps, and division using a staff structure based upon the warfighting functions.
5.5.6 Theater Army Contingency Command Post Structure

Although all six theater armies are unique in their organization and specific tasks, theater army contingency command posts are generally organized with a command group, support and security elements from the headquarters battalion, and a staff organized under the same five functional cells found in the main command post organization. Unlike the main command post, the contingency command post is organized with only two
of the three integrating cells — a robust current operations integrating cell and a small future operations cell. The contingency command post depends upon the main command post for long-range planning and special staff functional support, if required. The contingency command post staff can access and employ joint capabilities (such as fires, intelligence, and signal) and coordinate additional required capabilities through the main command post. The contingency command post special staff normally includes personnel from the main command post’s knowledge management and public affairs sections. Sometimes the special staff may include representatives from other special staff elements based on the assessment of the operational variables. See Figure 5-13 for a diagram of the theater army contingency command post.

Figure 5-13. Example of a theater army contingency command post organization. (Source: FM 3-94)
5.5.7 Theater Army as a Multinational Force Land Component in a Theater of War

Large-scale combat operations may require the U.S. Army to conduct land operations with multiple corps-sized formations, either as part of a mature theater of war or under a joint or multinational command. This could require a theater army headquarters to expand and transform into an operational land headquarters (field army equivalent) exercising command over multiple U.S. Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force. This is the original purpose of numbered armies and the role performed by the Third U.S. Army in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. (See FM 3-94, Chapter 2.) In this case, U.S. Army corps would operate as tactical headquarters alongside Marine expeditionary forces. Such a campaign may include large multinational forces and organizations and would operate under a joint or multinational land component. In order to assume this role, the theater army requires extensive augmentation and time.

Figure 5-14. Example of a theater army as a multinational force land component in a theater of war. (Source: FM 3-94)
to assimilate not only the personnel, but also the additional responsibilities. For example, before Operation Iraqi Freedom I, the Third U.S. Army (part of United States Army Central [USARCENT]) received approximately 70 Marine Corps staff officers to enable it to control the Marine expeditionary force. Figure 5-14 (preceding page) illustrates a theater army in the role of a multinational forces land component. If designated as a multinational forces land component, the U.S. Army headquarters will follow joint doctrine contained in JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, and JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. Note that in such a campaign, theater-level commands (such as the Theater Support Command and Army Air and Missile Defense Command) may deploy into the joint operations area (JOA) to control several functional support brigades.

5.5.8 Corps Tactical Command Post

![Diagram of Corps Tactical Command Post](image)

**Figure 5-15. Example of a corps tactical command post.**
(Source: FM 3-94)

The current doctrinal primary role of the corps tactical command post is to function as the alternate command post of the corps. It provides a place from which the commander can exercise mission command while the main command post deploys or displaces. Figure 5-15 depicts an example of a corps tactical command post. In a high-threat situation, the
tactical command post may be offset from the main command post to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main command post. Commanders can also employ it as:

- A task force headquarters.
- The controlling command post for a distinct operation within a phase.
- The controlling headquarters for a distinct portion of the corps area of operations.
- A forward-positioned headquarters during deployment.
- The controlling headquarters for a joint security area.

5.5.9 Division Tactical Command Post

Figure 5-16 illustrates the division tactical command post. The division employs the tactical command post to control specific operations. The tactical command post maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher headquarters, the other command posts, and supporting joint assets. It is also capable of controlling division operations for a limited
time when the main command post is displacing or otherwise not available. However, the tactical command post, if separated from the main command post, requires augmentation from the main command post to control operations for extended operations. The tactical command post contains a robust network capability with many of the same mission command systems as the main command post.

5.5.10 Brigade Combat Teams

![INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM Diagram](image)

Figure 5-17. Infantry BCT. (Source: Maneuver Center of Excellence Supplemental Manual 3-90)

A brigade combat team (BCT) is a modular organization that provides the division, land component commander, or joint task force (JTF) commander with close combat capabilities. Infantry, Armored, and Stryker BCTs are the Army’s combat power building blocks for maneuver, and the smallest combined arms units that can be committed independently. BCTs conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. BCTs conduct expeditionary deployment and integrate the efforts of the Army with unified action partners. Figure 5-17 depicts the Infantry BCT; Figure 5-18 (next page), the Armored BCT; and Figure 5-19 (Page 138), the Stryker BCT.
Figure 5-18. Armored BCT.  
(Source: MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90)

LEGEND FOR FIGURES 5-17, 5-18, AND 5-19

BEB      brigade engineering battalion  
BSB      brigade support battalion  
CAB      combat aviation brigade  
CAV      cavalry  
CBT      combat  
DSMTD    dismounted  
FA BN    field artillery battalion  
FSC      forward support company  
HHB      headquarters and headquarters battalion  
HHC      headquarters and headquarters company  
HHT      headquarters and headquarters troop  
MI       military intelligence  
SBCT     Stryker brigade combat team  
TUAS     tactical unmanned aircraft system  
WPNS     weapons
Figure 5-19. Stryker BCT. (Source: MCoE Supplemental Manual 3-90)
Chapter 6

Missions With High Potential for Unified Action Partnering

This chapter provides an overview of some of the missions having a high potential for unified action partnering.

6.1 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating U.S. citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and third country nationals whose lives are in danger to an appropriate safe haven. The U.S. Government (USG) will consider evacuating HN and third country nationals on a case-by-case, space available/reimbursable basis. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster. NEOs have humanitarian, military, economic, diplomatic, and political implications. NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission.

The command and control (C2) structure and the political and diplomatic factors involved in timing the military support of NEOs make them different from other military operations. During NEOs, the U.S. ambassador, not the geographic combatant commander (GCC) or subordinate joint force commander (JFC), is the senior USG authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the NEO and the safety of the evacuees. The decision to evacuate a U.S. embassy and the order to execute an NEO is political. The GCC may decide to create a joint task force (JTF) to conduct an NEO or may task a component commander to conduct it. Rules of engagement may be such that the JTF should be prepared to protect personnel (military and evacuees) from a wide variety of threats while not necessarily having the authority to preempt hostile actions with proactive military measures.

Evacuation operations are characterized by uncertainty and may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic or military relationships with the United States, a sudden hostile threat to U.S. citizens from a force within or external to a HN, or a devastating natural or man-made disaster. Some key factors in NEO planning are situational awareness; a correct appraisal and understanding of the changing diplomatic, political, and military environment in which the evacuation force will operate; time constraints and risk; and preparation of the evacuation force for a situation that may
rapidly move from permissive to uncertain or hostile. Alternative plans should be developed for permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. At all levels, DOD and DOS personnel need to cooperate to successfully execute the NEO.

The Secretary of State (SecState) and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) establish the Washington Liaison Group (WLG) to ensure coordination of the work of their departments in fulfilling their responsibilities for protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens abroad. The WLG is responsible for coordination and implementation at the national level of all emergency and evacuation plans by DOS and DOD and by other USG agencies as appropriate.

The SecState and SecDef have established regional liaison groups (RLG) collocated with combatant commands as necessary to ensure coordination of emergency and evacuation planning by their departments in the field. Each RLG is chaired by a DOS representative. Membership includes representatives of the appropriate combatant commander (CCDR) and any subordinate component commands as desired.

An emergency action committee (EAC) is established at a Foreign Service post by the ambassador for the purpose of directing and coordinating the post’s response to contingencies as well as drafting the post’s emergency action plan (EAP). The EAC is the focal point for DOS and DOD evacuation site interface.

The SecDef advises and assists the SecState and the heads of other federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, in planning for an NEO. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) coordinates the deployment and employment of U.S. forces in support of the NEO and monitors U.S. force participation in the protection and evacuation of noncombatants. The CJCS also recommends transportation movement priorities to the SecDef and the use of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the appropriate transportation resources in support of DOS requests.

The Secretary of the Army acts as the designated DOD executive agent for repatriation planning and operations, and coordinates within DOD and other USG agencies, as well as state and local agencies, as needed, in planning for the reception in the United States and onward movement of DOD dependents, nonessential DOD civilians, U.S. nationals, and designated aliens evacuated from overseas areas.

The U.S. ambassador, with the approval of the under secretary of state for management, can authorize the ordered or authorized departure of USG personnel and dependents other than uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and designated emergency essential
DOD civilians who are not under the authority of the U.S. ambassador. While the ambassador cannot order the departure of private U.S. citizens and designated other persons, the ambassador can offer them USG evacuation assistance. Normally an evacuation starts in accordance with the embassy’s EAP, using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation. Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador, responsibility for the conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation and security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the designated operational area is vested with the JFC.

The supported GCC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). As such, the supported GCC could decide to assign the NEO mission to a Service component or establish a JTF. The JFC is responsible for all phases of the operation to include the intermediate staging base (ISB) and temporary safe haven (if located outside the United States and within the joint operations area [JOA]). An ISB or temporary safe haven outside the JTF JOA falls under the responsibility of the supported GCC. The NEO JTF is typically responsible for support and transport of the evacuees to ISBs and safe havens outside the JOA. The JFC exercises operational control over assigned and attached forces with the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned tasks based on the CONOPS. For a detailed discussion on NEOs, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

### 6.2 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of DOD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA activities conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces include steady state program activities, security cooperation and related programs, and limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. FHA activities involve foreign disaster relief (FDR) and other activities that directly address a humanitarian need. See JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, for an in-depth discussion of FHA and FDR.

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations can be supported by other activities conducted by U.S. military forces, or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities, such as dislocated civilian support, security operations, and foreign consequence management. FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of USAID or DOS. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration; is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN, which has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other USG departments or agencies.
Although U.S. military forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct military operations that defend and protect U.S. national interests, their inherent, unique capabilities may be used to conduct FHA activities. The U.S. military also conducts FHA activities in various steady state programs as part of a GCC’s security cooperation program and/or to achieve specific theater campaign plan objectives. FHA operations involve interaction among many local and international agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental. During FHA operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Because DOD will normally be in a supporting role during FHA contingency operations, the JFC may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Appropriate organization, C2, and, most important, an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all means to build consensus and achieve unity of effort.

U.S. military forces plan, coordinate, and execute FHA activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to support national security interests as they pertain to geographic combatant command missions. FHA activities typically depend on a whole-of-government approach for success, whether or not DOD is the lead federal agent. Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors involved in FHA activities, command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined, and unity of effort will be achieved with effective, timely coordination and cooperation. Presidential and interagency policy and guidance affect mission statements, implied tasks, and plans. The JFC develops a mission statement with clearly identified and achievable objectives. Key considerations in developing the mission statement include the military role in the specific FHA mission and how DOD is to assist other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

The CJCS is responsible for recommending military capabilities and relationships for FHA operations to the SecDef. Once these relationships have been established, the Joint Staff coordinates detailed staff planning under the cognizance of the CJCS. GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, within their areas of responsibility (AOR). FHA should be done with the concurrence of the chief of mission. GCCs develop and maintain commanders’ estimates, base plans, concept plans, or operation plans for FHA. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF.

A joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed
of USG civilian and military experts apportioned to the geographic combatant command and tailored in staff location or title to meet the requirements of a supported GCC, the JIACG provides the GCC with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG departments and agencies. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the National Security Council.

The nature of the operational environment (OE) obviously affects the conduct of FHA operations. There are three types of OEs when providing FHA: permissive, uncertain, and hostile. The type of OE will have direct impact on the decision to conduct the FHA operation, as well as many planning aspects. Regardless of the OE, force protection will remain of paramount concern to the JFC.

A critical task for the GCC is developing the FHA military mission statement. The mission statement must provide specific direction for attaining the desired end state via clear and attainable military objectives. The GCC normally coordinates the mission statement with the lead federal agent. GCCs consider several factors in developing the mission statement, to include the military force’s role in assisting relief agencies, the OE, and security considerations. In FHA operations, the joint force structure must provide for the means to coordinate and communicate with the numerous military, civilian, U.S., and foreign organizations involved in the overall FHA effort. Effective liaison among these organizations will help reduce organizational conflicts and redundant relief efforts.

6.2.1 Foreign Disaster Relief

DOD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, establishes policy guidance for FDR operations. FDR is assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. This policy does not prevent a local military commander with assigned forces at or near the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from taking prompt action to save human lives. In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the U.S. chief of mission in the affected HN before committing forces. Also, the CCDR shall follow up as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations, to secure SecDef or Deputy SecDef approval to continue assistance. Figure 6-1 (next page) depicts causes of foreign disasters and various types of FDR.
FDR missions provide assistance to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims, including victims of natural disasters and conflicts, internally displaced or stateless persons, refugees, and vulnerable migrants. A comprehensive discussion of FDR is found in JP 3-29. Normally, it includes the provision of basic services and commodities such as food, water, sanitation, health care, non-food items (clothing, bedding, etc.), emergency shelter, as well as support to critical infrastructure and logistics necessary for the delivery of these essential services and commodities. The U.S. military normally will be asked to provide FDR only when it brings a unique capability or when the civilian response community is overwhelmed.

6.2.2 Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance

FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State.

USAID is an independent agency that provides economic, development, humanitarian assistance (HA), and disaster relief around the world in support of the foreign policy goals of the United States. Although a separate
agency from DOS, it shares certain administrative functions with DOS, and reports to and receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID plays a major role in U.S. foreign assistance policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. This agency administers and directs the U.S. foreign economic assistance program and acts as the lead federal agency for USG FDR. USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) coordinates USAID’s democracy programs, international disaster assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict, civil-military coordination, security sector assistance, and volunteer programs. Within DCHA, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Civilian Military Cooperation (CMC) are key offices that interact with the Department of Defense (DOD) during FHA operations. Most USG disaster responses are coordinated by USAID, through the OFDA director.

**OFDA** is delegated the responsibility to provide international disaster relief and HA and coordinate the USG response to declared disasters in foreign countries. (See JP 3-29, Chapter 2, for an in-depth discussion on OFDA.) USAID/OFDA’s mandate is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters. OFDA provides technical support to the administrator of USAID, who serves as the President’s special coordinator for international disaster assistance. OFDA formulates U.S. foreign disaster assistance policy in coordination with other USG departments and agencies. The office:

- Coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies, such as blankets, plastic sheeting, and sanitation hygiene kits.
- Funds implementing partners, including United Nations (UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), to provide direct support and HA.
- Develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses.

Besides its coordination activities within the USG, USAID/OFDA carries out these response options in coordination with the affected state, other donor countries, UN, NGOs, and IGOs. OFDA has **HA advisers assigned to each geographic combatant command to coordinate responses involving DOD assistance, provide training, and advise planning. There are three divisions within OFDA:**

1. The **Disaster Response and Mitigation Division** coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies and HA. It plans for the level of response needed for an emergency and implements and manages USG disaster relief and rehabilitation programs worldwide. It devises,
coordinates, and implements program strategies for the application of the most current science and technology to prevention, mitigation, and national and international preparedness for a variety of natural and man-made disaster situations. It evaluates the impact of previous disaster response initiatives/programs and ensures the integration of this information into future planning and response activities. It coordinates with other USAID geographic bureaus’ donor organizations, UN agencies, NGOs and IGOs.

2. The Operations Division develops and manages logistical, operational, and technical support for disaster responses. It identifies sources for procurement of relief supplies and manages the stockpiling and transportation of those supplies. It maintains readiness to respond to emergencies through several mechanisms, including managing search and rescue teams, maintaining the operational status of the ground operations team, and developing and maintaining the capability to field the disaster assistance response team (DART) and response management teams (RMTs) in Washington, D.C. The DART was developed by USAID’s OFDA to provide rapid response to foreign disasters as mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). A DART provides a variety of trained specialists to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with managing the USG response to foreign disasters. DART activities vary according to the nature, magnitude, and complexity of each disaster and are staffed accordingly. The Operations Division develops and maintains OFDA’s relationship with DOD, DOS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Department of Energy. Within the Operations Division is the Military Liaison Team, which provides technical assistance, guidance, and military liaison for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events. It also provides overseas support to OFDA offices and personnel and to other sectors necessary to ensure OFDA’s capacity to execute and coordinate USG HA and response to natural disasters and complex emergencies.

With the concurrence of the U.S. ambassador, OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to assist coordination of the FDR effort and activate an on-call RMT based in Washington, D.C. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the U.S. military when it is participating in FDR operations. DARTs assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions. They also process, validate, and coordinate external requests for USG assistance.

Figure 6-2 (next page) provides a visualization of the coordination flow between DCHA/OFDA and DOD when both respond to a disaster relief event. For more discussion of DARTs, see JP 3-29, Appendix C.
OFDA’s Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response is an important reference tool for personnel who may be involved in FDR operations. It explains the roles and responsibilities of individuals sent to disaster sites to undertake initial assessments or to participate as members of an OFDA DART. The guide contains information on general responsibilities for disaster responders, formats and reference material for assessing and reporting on populations at risk, DART position descriptions and duty checklists, descriptions of OFDA stockpile commodities, general information related to disaster activities, information on working with the military in the field, and a glossary of acronyms and terms used by OFDA and other organizations with which OFDA works.
(3) The **Program Support Division** provides programmatic and administrative support, including budget/financial services, procurement planning, contract/grant administration, general administrative support, and communication support for both OFDA in Washington, D.C., and its field offices. It supports the OFDA mission by providing centralized control of funds, resources, and procurement to facilitate the time-sensitive delivery of relief assistance. It also maintains and develops administrative and programmatic policy as it relates to OFDA programs.

**CMC** serves as USAID’s primary point of contact with DOD for developmental matters and provides liaison to major military commands, trains USAID and U.S. military personnel, and plans and coordinates assistance in support of all programs of interest to both USAID and the military. It addresses areas of common interests between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination. CMC has assigned senior development officers to each geographic combatant commander (GCC) and usually receives military liaison officers (LNOs) in return.

Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being utilized to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and wish to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner. The same is true for foreign disaster response. Many large private-sector companies maintain disaster/crisis response teams that can respond and add value to USG operations by providing infrastructure and other supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for, train, and implement emergency responses to disasters should consider the private sector. This should be done through USAID OFDA, which maintains communication with UN agencies and other international organizations and private sector donors to ensure the USG complements rather than duplicates existing assistance programs.

The joint force must understand its support role. While UN, NGO, and IGO guidelines stipulate that requesting assistance from the military is a last resort, **some NGOs and IGOs may assume the military has an inexhaustible resource reservoir** and inundate the FHA force with requests for various types of support. Members of the joint force must have a clear understanding of the nature and amount of support they will be authorized to provide. When the joint force commander (JFC) has been delegated the authority to fill certain types of requests from these organizations, the granting of that authority and guidance on its use are reflected in appropriate orders. Normally, FDR requests from non-USG organizations will come to the JFC through OFDA via the mission tasking matrix (MITAM) process or via the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) for refugees.
Coordination with the JFC. Neither the DART nor JFC is subordinate to the other. A successful relationship is based upon close coordination and mutual understanding of each element’s respective mission. Both have a common purpose and, accordingly, have much to gain through close coordination and unity of effort. In some cases it will be appropriate to have a DART member attached to the joint task force (JTF) headquarters. An exchange of personnel can bring clarity to a situation where planning and execution are met with the fog of operations. In most cases, the DART will use the MITAM to identify tasks to be executed by the appropriate organization or agency. The JTF can use the MITAM as a record of requests for assistance (RFA) that will become JTF and component-level tasks. Although the DART represents OFDA, which is the USG lead for the FDR response, the JFC should be aware that the chief of mission is in charge of all USG activities in the disaster-affected country.

6.3 Defense Support of Civil Authorities

In March 2011, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness, to strengthen “the security and resilience of the U.S. through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.” In support of this directive, the Department of Homeland Security, primarily through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), maintains national doctrine for all aspects of incident management, defined as a national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Incident management includes measures and activities performed at the local, state, and national levels and includes both crisis and consequence management activities (JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities). Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Unified Land Operations, states that Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action — the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and NGO entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States).

Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is defined as support provided by federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S. Code [USC], status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. This is also known as civil support (DOD Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities). (See JP 3-28.)
Military forces provide civil support at federal and state levels. Federal military forces are Active Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force; mobilized Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve; and National Guard mobilized for federal service under Title 10, USC. National Guard forces under state control perform DSCA tasks when serving under Title 32, USC.

Numerous features of DSCA are distinct from the other tasks of decisive action — offense, defense, and stability. DSCA tasks stress the employment of nondestructive means to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Domestic operations are operations in the homeland: the physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace (JP 3-28). Domestic operations are constrained by various laws. It is accurate to say that most tasks performed in domestic support are common to overseas operations, but are conducted under very different conditions.

Commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in three warfighting functions: mission command, sustainment, and protection. The requirement to deploy into a domestic OE and to operate with joint and interagency partners requires mission command that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure. The majority of DSCA missions stress the sustainment warfighting function in delivering personnel, medical support, and supplies in areas devastated by a disaster. The protection warfighting function is the third area for readiness assessment, and it is imperative that commanders understand their protection capabilities and which of those capabilities may be exercised legally in domestic environments so they can be properly integrated into the overall scheme of protection.

Army forces operating within the United States encounter operational environments (OEs) very different from those they face outside the nation’s boundaries. Principally, the roles of civilian organizations and the relationship of military forces to federal, state, tribal, and local agencies are different. The differences are pronounced enough to define a task set different from offense, defense, or stability. The support provided by Army forces depends on specific circumstances dictated by law. While every domestic support mission is unique, four defining characteristics shape the actions of commanders. These characteristics are:

- State and federal laws define how military forces support civil authorities.
- Civil authorities are in charge, and military forces support them.
- Military forces depart when civil authorities are able continue without military support.
- Military forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided.
State and federal laws define almost every aspect of DSCA. They circumscribe what units may do and from whom they take direction. Depending on their duty status, laws prohibit undertaking certain missions, especially those associated with law enforcement. Laws also specify professional requirements for skills such as medical treatment.

Rules for use of force (RUF) are the equivalent of rules of engagement (ROE), except that they apply in domestic situations. RUF are established according to state laws. They are restrictive versus permissive and vary from state to state. Commanders stress the same emphasis on RUF as on ROE in a restrictive environment, considering the first purpose of DSCA is to save lives; lethal force is always a last resort.

In DSCA, military forces support a primary (or lead) civilian agency. The command of military forces remains within military channels, but missions begin as requests for assistance from the supported civil authorities. One of the biggest mistakes that tactical commanders can make is to assume they need to take charge upon arrival at the scene of an incident. A primary (or lead) civilian agency establishes the priority of effort for any domestic support mission. At the federal level, this is typically FEMA. At the state level, it is the state emergency management agency or its equivalent. However, civilian agencies do not issue orders to military units. Defense coordinating element planners locate within a multiagency command structure and integrate federal military capabilities within priorities established by the primary civilian agency. Typically, a defense coordinating officer co-locates at a federal joint field office and works in conjunction with the state director of military support and the state emergency manager. These individuals and their staffs ensure that military forces receive the correct priority of effort.

Army leaders must understand how DSCA differs from overseas operations, based on domestic laws and DOD policies. In addition to the limits on types of tasks permissible in domestic operations, the differences are particularly apparent in how forces organize for unified action. Army forces provide the majority of military support for incident management, mainly through the National Guard. State National Guard forces include Army and Air National Guard serving under state active duty status or Title 32, USC. The governor of each state has overall command responsibility for the National Guard and is its commander in chief. State National Guard forces do not include state defense forces organized outside the National Guard. A senior federal civilian official from an agency of the federal government coordinates all federal support. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of federal military forces, including National Guard units mobilized for federal service under Title 10, USC. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico have National Guard forces. The Army
National Guard has a dual role: as a state military force under the governor, and as a Reserve Component of the Army that the President may mobilize for federal service.

The Regular Army’s key capabilities for domestic support missions are its ability to generate large forces rapidly and sustain them for long periods in an emergency in the interim between when a governor calls up the state’s National Guard and the arrival of substantial numbers of civilian responders from outside the state. When directed and with the support of USTRANSCOM, the Regular Army deploys forces ranging from small DSCA detachments to corps-sized formations or larger, supported by the full resources of the DOD. Limiting factors include proximity, legal considerations, and operational commitments.

In 2012, changes to Title 10, USC, allowed the President to alert and mobilize Army Reserve forces for DSCA. The units of the Army Reserve contain some of the capabilities most needed by civil authorities in an incident, such as logistics, medical, construction, and bridging capabilities. Like the National Guard, the Army Reserve is distributed across the states and territories. Traditionally, the Army Reserve has not been organized for domestic operations, but it has been available for sourcing of contingencies for war and national emergencies. Availability may depend on Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) force pools of units and assignment to various force packages. Additionally, unit personnel may not be located near their assigned unit, and their ability to report may be delayed due to transportation issues.

Three categories of duty status apply to domestic operations. These are federal military forces (also referred to as forces in Title 10 status), National Guard forces serving in Title 32 status (conducting DSCA), and National Guard forces serving in state active duty status (conducting National Guard civil support). Tactically, there is no distinction between National Guard forces serving in Title 32 status and those serving in state active duty status. State National Guard units in either status remain under the command of their governor. However, command authority can change for National Guard units if they become federalized. All forces under the command of the President, including federalized National Guard, are federal military (Title 10) forces.

Federal military forces and state National Guard forces conducting DSCA tasks may operate under military command and support relationships different from those encountered outside the United States. The two basic models used in domestic support are “parallel command” and “dual-status command.” Under parallel command, federal military forces take orders from the DOD chain of command, and state National Guard forces take orders from the state’s chain of command. If dual-status command is used,
one officer is appointed to command both federal military and state National Guard forces through an agreement signed by the President and the governor of that state. That officer is serving simultaneously in Title 10 and Title 32 status. Although it contributes to unified land operations, this is not true unity of command. Missions for federal military and state National Guard forces originate separately and must be conducted by their respective forces.

For Army forces, four primary tasks are associated with DSCA:

- Provide support for domestic disasters.
- Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provide other designated support.

In national preparedness doctrine, any type of domestic disaster, emergency, or event requiring support may be called an incident — an occurrence, caused by either human DSCA action or natural phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources (JP 3-28).
Chapter 7

Capturing Lessons Learned

7.1 Army Lessons Learned Program

The Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP) is a knowledge management program established to allow all Army organizations to maximize the benefit of experiential learning to change behavior and improve readiness. Fundamental to the ALLP is the active participation of commanders, leaders, staff, and Soldiers and the importance of gathering, rapidly sharing, and integrating lessons and best practices throughout the Army. The ALLP encompasses actual operations, training events, war games, and experiments along with all activities of the institutional force. The ALLP incorporates all levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic) across the elements of decisive action (offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities). The overarching intent of the ALLP is to systematically refine and improve operations while integrating the lessons and best practices within Army concepts, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and readiness/policy (DOTMLPF-P). (See Figure 7-1, next page.)

7.2 Joint Lessons Learned Program

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) is a knowledge management program established to enhance joint capabilities through discovery, validation, integration (with functional resolution processes), evaluation, and dissemination of lessons from joint operations, training events, exercises, experiments, and other activities involving Department of Defense (DOD) assets of the U.S. Armed Forces and applying to the full range of joint operations in peacetime and war. The primary objective of the JLLP is to enhance joint capabilities by contributing to improvements in DOTMLPF-P. Through its tenet of sharing best practices and lessons learned, the JLLP informs other joint development processes, enables learning and collaboration from joint activities, enhances joint force capabilities, and advances force readiness.

The JLLP influences joint training and education by providing a path to ensure that lessons are injected into joint learning processes, thereby improving their viability and enhancing readiness to meet changing demands. The observations, issues, best practices, recommendations, lessons, and lessons learned of the JLLP influence the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System by identifying gaps and shortfalls with the goal of delivering the best military capabilities in support of our national security. A critical component of the JLLP is for issues to be resolved at the lowest possible level. An equally important aspect is for best practices and lessons learned to be shared with the relevant community of practice.
Figure 7-1. Army Lessons Learned Program.
7.3 Joint Lessons Learned Information System

The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the automated solution supporting implementation of the JLLP. JLLIS facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. (See Figure 7-2, next page.) The validated information also enables actionable DOTMLPF-P changes to improve joint and combined operational capabilities.

JLLIS provides a standard automated process to facilitate discovery, validation, issue resolution, evaluation, and dissemination of critical lessons learned from operations, exercises, training, experiments, and real-world events necessary to operate the JLLP.

JLLP consists of five phases:

**Phase 1: Discovery** – JLLIS facilitates the collection of observations and issues and sharing of summaries, studies, and reports.

**Phase 2: Validation** – JLLIS provides the ability to document observation analysis to support the validation of lessons to conduct learning and issue resolution processes.

**Phase 3: Integration** – JLLIS facilitates the issue resolution process and enables coordination with appropriate functional organizations and subject matter experts for resolution.

**Phase 4: Evaluation** – JLLIS provides the ability to capture and document evaluation and solution monitoring to either accept the lessons as lessons learned or return the lessons to the resolution process for further work.

**Phase 5: Dissemination** – JLLIS provides a search capability and ability to post lessons learned for application to current and future operations.

Benefits and other features of JLLIS include:

- A single, integrated system for the input, collection, analysis, dissemination, integration, and archiving of lessons
- Collaboration and planning interface across organizations
- Automated features to support the Joint Lessons Learned processes:
  - Discovery
  - Analysis
  - Validation
  - Resolution
  - Evaluation
  - Dissemination
Figure 7-2. Joint Lessons Learned Program process.
(Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.01A)
• A standard for JLLP data collection
• Access to events, operations, and exercise data to include, but not limited to:
  ○ Disaster recovery
  ○ Foreign humanitarian assistance
  ○ Provincial reconstruction teams
  ○ Security sector assistance
  ○ Training documents
• Issue management and resolution
• Robust search capability
• Data integration to other joint systems
• Document repository capabilities
• Observation collection capabilities
• Communities of practice
• After-action reports
• Availability of a stand-alone version to support disconnected scenarios, operations, or separate networks
• Enhancement of joint force development
• Visibility and transparency of issues and lessons
• Issue resolution, collaboration, and coordination
• Lessons learned knowledge management
• Assessment and joint forces readiness

JLLIS environments:
• Non-secure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR)
• Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR)
• Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS)
• United States, Australia, Canada, Great Britain
7.4 Center for Army Lessons Learned

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) facilitates the Army Lessons Learned Program by identifying, collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and archiving issues and best practices; and by maintaining situational awareness in order to share knowledge throughout the Army as well as with our unified action partners, enabling them to win in a complex world. CALL provides global support and outreach and may be accessed worldwide. (See Figure 7-3.) These capabilities include:

- Serve as Army lead for lessons learned across tactical, operational, strategic, and institutional levels of war.
- Facilitate the ALLP.
- Deploy worldwide.
- Embed liaison officers to support commanders.
- Collaborate and network daily.
- Produce and distribute handbooks, newsletters, bulletins, and smartcards.
- Archive and update documents in JLLIS.
- Respond to Warfighter requests for information.

Figure 7-3. CALL support to the Warfighter.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) facilitates the Army Lessons Learned Program by identifying, collecting, analyzing, disseminating, and archiving issues and best practices; and by maintaining situational awareness in order to share knowledge throughout the Army as well as with our unified action partners, enabling them to win in a complex world. CALL provides global support and outreach and may be accessed worldwide. (See Figure 7-3.) These capabilities include:

- Serve as Army lead for lessons learned across tactical, operational, strategic, and institutional levels of war.
- Facilitate the ALLP.
- Deploy worldwide.
- Embed liaison officers to support commanders.
- Collaborate and network daily.
- Produce and distribute handbooks, newsletters, bulletins, and smartcards.
- Archive and update documents in JLLIS.
- Respond to Warfighter requests for information.
• Manage the Army Lessons Learned Forum.
• Provide mission-specific support packages.
• Provide mobile training team to facilitate establishing a unit lessons learned program.
• Provide unit after-action report repository.
• Provide units an assessment and feedback mechanism.

CALL environments:
• CALL’s public website (NIPR): http://call.army.mil
• CALL’s restricted website (NIPR), accessible to authorized users

7.5 Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management Systems

Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management Systems (SOLLIMS) is a knowledge management initiative by the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute that offers a collaborative environment for the global peace and stability operations (P&SO) community. It provides multiple references of P&SO, the ability to implement focused communities of practice, professional forums and blogs, as well as a robust, online repository/structured database containing P&SO-related observations, lessons, and best practices. SOLLIMS’ focus is at the strategic theater, strategic national, and operational levels. As such, SOLLIMS contains the most comprehensive set of P&SO-related references and resources at the strategic/operational levels. Authorized users may submit tactical-level observations and issues; however, the SOLLIMS program manager may ask the user or author to resubmit the observation or issue at a higher level, or to submit the observation or lesson within the Army Lessons Learned Information System managed by CALL.

SOLLIMS is designed to allow U.S. military, U.S. Government civilian agencies, multinational military and civilian organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector organizations to engage in a collaborative process for the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned and best practices for peace and stability operations.

SOLLIMS provides many traditional lessons learned functionalities as well as a unique method for tagging and cataloging information with tailored P&SO meta-tags to facilitate more focused data search and retrieval. SOLLIMS supports online data collection and searching from any location with access to the Internet. A mobile app, eSOLLIMS, extends accessibility
when Internet access is not available. SOLLIMS is implemented as an open access site in that it is accessible to the DOD community as well as civilian interagency members and representatives from the multinational P&SO community – without the need for special access cards or certifications.

At the SOLLIMS homepage (master portal), in the SOLLIMS DOCS section, there is a link to “Help and Tutorial Files.” (See Figure 7-4.) This document library includes user-level tutorials on both the basic and advanced functions of SOLLIMS. Additional tutorials are available throughout SOLLIMS.

Information submitted to SOLLIMS is meant to be shared as widely as possible. As such, both the base information and any attachments submitted must meet the “open access” criteria (i.e., the information must be available in the public domain and unclassified, with no other restrictions concerning distribution or sharing — i.e., it CANNOT be For Official Use Only [FOUO]; it CANNOT be copyrighted; and it CANNOT be similarly restricted information).

Content in SOLLIMS is located in the master portal (homepage) and several special focus area portals (e.g., United States Africa Command [USAFRICOM], Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR], and Counter-Corruption). Within each portal there are multiple repositories for finding documents, references, and lessons. This includes a knowledge library, a set of shared document folders, communities of practice, and a lessons learned database. Users can search for information
either within a particular portal, or across the entire site, including all libraries, folders and other repositories, by using the site search link on the homepage in the upper-right corner of the screen. (See Figure 7-5.) The site search allows the user to search globally or to designate which portals and repositories are of interest, to provide more appropriate search results. There are many other tools and functions available in SOLLIMS that the user can learn about using the help and tutorial files mentioned above.

Figure 7-5. Conducting a site search on SOLLIMS.
Appendix A

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAMDC  Army Air and Missile Defense Command
ABCT  Armored brigade combat team
AC  Active Component
ACGU  Australia, Canada, Great Britain, United States
ADCON  administrative control
ADP  Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP  Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AJP  Allied Joint Publication
ALERTORD  alert order
ALLP  Army Lessons Learned Program
AO  area of operations
AOA  amphibious objective area
AOR  area of responsibility
APEX  adaptive planning and execution
AR  Army Regulation
ARFOR  Not used as an acronym in Army doctrine (ADRP 1-02); See Appendix B of this guide, Key Terms and Definitions, Page 173.
ARFORGEN  Army Force Generation
ARSOF  Army special operations forces
ASCC  Army Service component command
ASOS  Army support to other services
ATP  Army Techniques Publication
ATTP  Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BPLAN  base plan
BCT  brigade combat team
BSTB  brigade special troops battalion
C2  command and control
CA  civil affairs
CALL  Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAM  combined arms maneuver
CAP  crisis action planning
CARE  Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBRN  chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear
CCIR  commander’s critical intelligence requirements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan; also contingency plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>community of practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSD</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive</td>
</tr>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>commander, joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>civilian military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan; operation plan in concept format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operating picture</td>
</tr>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>civil support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>democracy, conflict, and humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPORD</td>
<td>deployment order</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>diplomatic, information, military, and economic</td>
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<td>DIRLAUTH</td>
<td>direct liaison authorized</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF-P</td>
<td>doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities-readiness/policy</td>
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<td>DRU</td>
<td>direct reporting unit</td>
</tr>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>defense support of civil authorities</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>emergency action committee</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>emergency action plan</td>
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<td>EECP</td>
<td>early entry command post</td>
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<td>EEFI</td>
<td>essential elements of friendly information</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>expeditionary sustainment command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>functional combatant commander</td>
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<td>FDR</td>
<td>foreign disaster relief</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FFIR</td>
<td>friendly force information requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHP</td>
<td>force health protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>G-4</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, signal</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, civil affairs</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
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<td>GCP</td>
<td>global campaign plan</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>global force management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFMAP</td>
<td>global force management plan</td>
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</table>
GS  general support
GSR  general support reinforcing
HA  humanitarian assistance
HBB  headquarters and headquarters battalion
HD  homeland defense
HN  host nation
HSPD  Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HQ  headquarters
HS  homeland security
HSC  Homeland Security Council
IA  interagency
IBCT  Infantry brigade combat team
ICS  incident command system
IGO  intergovernmental organization
IO  information operations
IPC  interagency policy committee
ISB  intermediate staging base
ISR  intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW  irregular warfare
J-1  manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2  intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3  operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4  logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5  plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6  communications system directorate of a joint staff
JAOC  joint air operations center
JCA  joint capability area
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDN  joint date network
JFACC  joint force air component commander
JFC  joint force commander
JFP  joint force provider
JFLCC  joint force land component commander
JIACG  joint interagency coordination group
JIIM  joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
JIPOE  joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>JLLIS</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Information System</td>
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<td>JLLP</td>
<td>Joint Lessons Learned Program</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JPG</td>
<td>joint planning group</td>
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<td>JPEC</td>
<td>joint planning and execution community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
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<td>JSA</td>
<td>joint security area</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOA</td>
<td>joint special operations area</td>
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<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>lead federal agency or agent</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>line of effort</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>MCoE</td>
<td>Maneuver Center of Excellence</td>
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<td>MDMP</td>
<td>military decisionmaking process</td>
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<td>MEB</td>
<td>maneuver enhancement brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations</td>
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<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<td>MITAM</td>
<td>mission tasking matrix</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<td>multinational force commander</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<td>MSRP</td>
<td>mission strategic resource plans</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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NGO  nongovernmental organization
NIMS  national incident management system
NIPR  Non-secure Internet Protocol Router
NMCS  National Military Command System
NMS  national military strategy
NRF  national response framework
NRP  national response plan
NSA  National Security Agency
NSC  National Security Council
NSS  national security strategy
OBJ  objective
OE  operational environment
OFDA  Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMB  Office of Management and Budget
OPCON  operational control
OPLAN  operation plan
OPORD  operation order
OSD  Office of the Secretary of Defense
PB  peace building
PCA  Posse Comitatus Act
PIR  priority intelligence requirement
PLANORD  planning order
PKO  peacekeeping operations
PKSOI  Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PM  peace making
PMESII-PT  political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-physical environment, time
PO  peace operations
POTUS  President of the United States
PPD  Presidential Policy Directive
PRM  population, refugees, and migration
P&SO  peace and stability operations
PTDO  prepare to deploy order
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
QRG  quick reference guide
RFA  request for assistance
RFF  request for forces
RLG  regional liaison group
RMT  response management team
ROE  rules of engagement
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RUF  rules for the use of force
S-1  personnel staff officer
S-2  intelligence staff officer
S-3  operations staff officer
S-4  logistics staff officer
SAD  state active duty
SAR  search and rescue
SBCT  Stryker brigade combat team
SecDef  Secretary of Defense
SecArmy  Secretary of the Army
SECSTATE  Secretary of State
SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIPR  Secure Internet Protocol Router
SO  special operations
SOF  special operations forces
SOLLIMS  Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management Systems
SPG  strategic planning guidance
SSA  security sector assistance
SSR  security sector reform
TACON  tactical control
TCN  third country national
TCP  theater campaign plan
TLP  troop leading procedures
TPFDD  time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL  time-phased force and deployment list
TSC  theater support command
UCP  unified command plan
UAP  unified action partner
UN  United Nations
U.S.  United States
USAFRICOM  United States Africa Command
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
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<td>USARCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Central Command</td>
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<td>USARNORTH</td>
<td>United States Army North</td>
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<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>United States Army Pacific</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
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<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<td>WLG</td>
<td>Washington liaison group</td>
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<td>WARNORD</td>
<td>warning order</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAS</td>
<td>wide area security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WfF</td>
<td>warfighting function</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XO</td>
<td>executive officer</td>
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</table>
Appendix B

Key Terms and Definitions

**Activity.** A function, mission, action, or collection of actions. (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02)

**Administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. Also called ADCON. (JP 1)

**Alliance.** The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 1-02). Alliances are formalized, usually enduring relationships, such as NATO. The term “combined’ is typically applied to organizations operating within an alliance framework, although “allied” often is used when it is politically desirable to highlight the treaty-based relationship, as in “Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.”

**Area of influence.** A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 3-0)

**Area of interest.** That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0)

**Area of operations.** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)

**Area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)

**ARFOR.** The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). The term is not used as an acronym in Army doctrine (Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 1-02).

**Army design methodology.** A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. (Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0)

**Army generating forces.** Those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army’s capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. (Field Manual [FM] 6-0)
Army operating forces. Those Army forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. (FM 6-0)

Army Service component command. Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command. (JP 3-31)

Art of command. Command is the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel (JP 1). Command is considered more art than science because it depends on actions only humans can perform. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority by commanders through decision making and leadership. Enabled by a mission command system, commanders synthesize and apply this knowledge across all levels of command. They gather knowledge from all levels — higher, lower, and lateral — as well as outside the military. Those in command have authority, decision-making skills, and leadership abilities.

Assessment. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations; determination of the progress towards accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

Battle rhythm. The battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.

Board. A board is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision authority for a particular purpose or function. Boards are similar to working groups. However, commanders appoint boards to make decisions. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum.

Branch. The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruption caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)

C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport.
**Campaign.** A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

**Campaign plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space.

**Campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign.

**Center of gravity.** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

**Chain of command.** The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. (JP 1)

**Close area.** In contiguous areas of operations, an area assigned to a maneuver force that extends from its subordinates’ rear boundaries to its own forward boundary.

**Coalition.** An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

**Combatant command.** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called CCMD. (JP 1)

**Combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**Combined.** A term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together. (JP 1-02)

**Combined arms.** The synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm were used separately or sequentially.

**Combined arms maneuver.** The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy,
and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. (ADP 3-0)

**Command.** 1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. Also called CMD. (JP 1)

**Command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**Command group.** The commander and selected staff members who assist the commander in controlling operations away from a command post.

**Command post.** A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities.

**Command post cell.** A grouping of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission command.

**Commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR).** CCIRs are elements of information that the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus information management and help the commander assess the operational environment and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, and always established by an order or plan. The CCIR list is normally short so that the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources. The CCIR list is not static; joint force commanders add, delete, adjust, and update CCIRs throughout an operation based on the information they need for decision making.

**Commander’s intent.** A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

**Common operational picture.** Also called COP. A single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (JP 3-0)

**Command relationships.** The interrelated responsibilities between
commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1)

**Complex terrain.** A geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space. (ADRP 1-02)

**Component.** 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. (JP 1). 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity (JP 4-0). Also called COMP (JP 1-02).

**Comprehensive approach.** A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government and, to the extent possible, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

**Concept plan.** In the context of joint operation planning, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN. (JP 5-0)

**Concept of operations (CONOPS).** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 1-02)

**Contingency operation.** A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). (JP 1-02)

**Contingency plan.** An OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or an OPORD. Also known as CONPLAN.

**Contingency planning guidance.** Secretary of Defense-written guidance, approved by the President, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which focuses the guidance given in the National Security Strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, and is the principal source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Also called CPG. (JP 1-02)

**Coordinating authority.** The commander or individual who has the authority to require consultation between the specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, joint force components, or forces of the same Service or agencies, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. (JP 1-02)
Course of action (COA). A sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow; a scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (JP 1-02)

Crisis action planning (CAP). The adaptive planning and execution system process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. (JP 1-02)

Culminating point (Army). That point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations.

Current operations integration cell (COIC). The COIC is the focal point for the execution of operations. This involves assessing the current situation while regulating forces and warfighting functions in accordance with the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations. The COIC displays the common operational picture and conducts shift changes, assessments, and other briefings, as required. It provides information on the status of operations to all staff members and to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.

D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (JP 3-02)

Decision point. A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 1-02)

Decisive action. The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

Decisive operation. The operation that directly accomplishes the mission.

Decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

Decisive terrain. Key terrain whose seizure and retention are mandatory for successful mission accomplishment.

Deep area. In contiguous areas of operations, an area forward of the close area that a commander uses to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area.

Delegation of authority. The action by which a commander assigns part of his or her authority, commensurate with the assigned task, to a subordinate commander. (JP 1)
**Department of Defense components.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense agencies, Department of Defense field activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

**Direct liaison authorized.** That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1-02)

**Early-entry command post.** A lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational.

**Effect.** The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect; the result, outcome, or consequence of an action; a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02)

**End state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

**Essential element of friendly information (EEFI) (Army).** A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. (ADRP 5-0)

**Execute order.** An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved military CONOPS. Only the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS.

**F-hour.** The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

**Force.** 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (JP 1)

**Fragmentary order.** An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. (JP 5-0)
**Framing.** The act of building mental models to help individuals understand situations and respond to events. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of an operational environment and a problem by establishing context. (ADRP 5-0)

**Friendly force information requirements (FFIR).** Things the commander must know about his forces to make decisions.

**Functional cell.** Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function (minus mission command).

**Functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1)

**Future operations cell.** The future operations cell is responsible for planning operations in the mid-range planning horizon. It focuses on adjustments to the current operation — including the positioning or maneuvering of forces in depth — that facilitate continuation of the current operation. In many respects, the future operations cell serves as a bridge between the plans and current operations integration cells. The future operations cell monitors current operations and determines implications for operations within the mid-range planning horizon. In coordination with the current operations integration cell, the future operations cell assesses whether the ongoing operation must be modified to achieve the current phase’s objectives.

**H-hour.** The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

**I-day.** The day on which the intelligence community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the intelligence community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

**Information requirement (Army).** Any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0)

**Instruments of national power.** All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). (JP 1)
Integrating cell. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon.

Interagency. Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

Intergovernmental organization (IGO). An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. IGOs may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. They are formed to protect and promote national interest shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 3-08)

Interorganizational coordination. The interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; and the private sector.

Irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

Joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1)

Joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1)

Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The JIPOE is the joint process through which the J-2 (Intelligence) manages the analysis and development of the products that help the commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected operational environment — the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander.

Joint planning and execution community (JPEC). Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed to a joint operation.

Joint planning group (JPG). A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander.
Joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department) that includes members from the several Services making up the force. 2. (Capitalized as Joint Staff) The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that assists the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (JP 1-02)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). A plan that provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. Also called JSCP.

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces.

Joint task force (JTF). A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 1)

L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

Level 1 Planning Detail — Commander’s Estimate. This level of planning involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to address a contingency. The product for this level can be a course of action briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum. (JP 5-0)

Level 2 Planning Detail — Base Plan (BPLAN). A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). (JP 5-0)

Level 3 Planning Detail — Concept Plan (CONPLAN). A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It may also produce a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) if applicable. (JP 5-0)

Level 4 Planning Detail — OPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces,
functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. (JP 5-0)

**Liaison.** That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 3-08)

**Line of effort.** In the context of joint operation planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.

**Line of operation.** A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).

**M-day.** The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. (JP 3-02)

**Measure of effectiveness.** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

**Measure of performance.** A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

**Military decisionmaking process.** An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)

**Military Department.** One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947. They are the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. Also called MILDEP. (JP 1-02)

**Mission command (Army).** The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

**Mission command warfighting function.** The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0)

**Multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02)

**Multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1)
N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

National Defense Strategy. A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 1)

National Military Strategy. A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS. (JP 1-02)

National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. (JP 1-02)

Nongovernmental organization (NGO). (1) NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations. Their mission is often one of a humanitarian nature and not one of assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. (2) A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

Objective. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed; the specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. (JP 1-02)

Operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0)

Operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD.

Operation plan. 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. Also called OPLAN.
**Operational approach.** The broad general actions to solve the problem. The operational approach serves as the main idea that informs detailed planning and guides the force through preparation and execution (ADRP 5-0). A description of the broad actions that the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. (JP 5-0)

**Operational art.** Operational art is the creative thinking used to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military force and allows commanders to better understand the challenges facing them and to conceptualize an approach for achieving their strategic objectives.

**Operational control.** The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**Operational design.** The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution.

**Operational environment** (OE). A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**Operational reserve.** An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation.

**Operations synchronization meeting.** The operations synchronization meeting is the key event in the battle rhythm in support of the current operation. Its primary purpose is to synchronize all warfighting functions and other activities in the short-term planning horizon. It is designed to ensure that all staff members have a common understanding of current operations, including upcoming and projected actions at decision points.

**Option.** A description of how military activity, in combination with other instruments of power, may be used to achieve national objectives. Combatant commanders provide options to the CJCS and SecDef to help shape the development of national policy and strategy. (U.S. Army War College)

**Organic.** Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and assigned to the operating forces for the Navy. (JP 1-02)

**Other government agency.** Within the context of interagency coordination, a non-Department of Defense agency of the United States Government. (JP 1)
**Passage of lines** (DOD). An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat position with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines. (JP 1-02 and ADRP 3-90)

**Plans cell.** The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the long-range planning horizons. It prepares for operations beyond the scope of the current order by developing plans and orders, including branch plans and sequels. The plans cell also oversees military deception planning.

**Planning horizon.** A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events (ADRP 5-0). The three planning horizons are long, mid, and short (generally associated with the plans cell, future operations cell, and current operations integration cell, respectively). Planning horizons are situation-dependent and are influenced by events and decisions. For example, the plans cell normally focuses its planning effort on the development of sequels — the subsequent next operation or phase of the operation based on possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current operation or phase. The future operations cell normally focuses its efforts on branch plans — options built into the base plan that changes the concept of operations based on anticipated events, opportunities, or threats. Planning guidance and decisions by the commander or that of the higher headquarters influence the planning horizons.

**Priority intelligence requirements** (PIR). Things the commander must know about the enemy to make a decision.

**Private sector.** An umbrella term that may be applied in the United States and in foreign countries to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations.

**Reframing.** Involves revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. Reframing can lead to a new problem statement and operational approach, resulting in an entirely new plan. (ADP 5-0)

**Rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

**Running estimate.** The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)
S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more than 200,000).

Science of control. While command is a commander’s personal function, control involves the entire force. Staffs exercise the science of control with their commander’s oversight. In the context of mission command, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders require control to direct operations. Aided by staffs, commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of operations. Staffs coordinate, synchronize, and integrate actions, inform the commander, and exercise control for the commander. (ADRP 3-0)

Security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

Sequel. The subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation or phase. (JP 5-0)

Service. A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, which are: the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. (JP 1-02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1)

Specified combatant command. A command, normally composed of forces from a single Military Department, that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

Stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)
**Strategic estimate.** The broad range of strategic factors that influence the commander’s understanding of his operational environment and his determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. (JP 1-02)

**Subordinate command.** A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (JP 1-02)

**Subordinate unified command.** A command established by commanders of unified commands, when so authorized by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. (JP 1-02)

**Synchronization.** The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 1-02)

**System.** A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 1-02)

**T-day.** The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up).

**Termination criteria.** The specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. (JP 1-02)

**Theater.** The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

**Time-phased force and deployment data.** The time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan or operation order, or ongoing rotation of forces. Also called TPFDD.

**Unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**Unified action partners.** Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. (ADRP 3-0)
Unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JP 1-02)

Unified Command Plan. The document, approved by the President that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant commanders; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical area of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. Also called UCP. (JP 1-02)

Unified land operations. How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (ADP 3-0)

Unity of effort. Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization — the product of successful unified action.

U.S. Armed Forces. Used to denote collectively the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard.

U.S. forces. All Armed Forces (including the Coast Guard) of the United States, personnel in the Armed Forces of the United States, and all equipment of any description that either belongs to the U.S. Armed Forces or is being used (including Type I and II Military Sealift Command vessels), escorted, or conveyed by the U.S. Armed Forces.

W-day. Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

Warfighting function. A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.

Warning order. 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called WARNORD.
Whole-of-government approach. An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

Wide area security. The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative. (ADP 3-0)

Working group. A grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Their cross-functional design enables working groups to synchronize contributions from multiple command post cells and staff sections.
Appendix C

Pertinent United States Law

The authorities of all agencies and departments of the United States Government are vested in the U.S. Code (USC). The following are some of the more pertinent to this guide.

**Title 10 USC, Armed Forces.** This is the governing title concerning the entire Department of Defense community. Authorities of the departments, commands, and agencies are addressed (including Chapter 6, Combatant Commands).

**Title 14 USC, Coast Guard.** See this title for the authorities, functions and powers, and information concerning Coast Guard cooperation with other agencies.

**Title 22 USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.** This title focuses predominantly on the Department of State, United States Agency for International Development, and the Foreign Service. It includes law concerning diplomacy, development, foreign assistance, Millennium Challenge Corporation, mutual defense assistance, funding parameters, and other features that are pertinent to theater-level activities across the spectrum of collaborative plans and operations.

**Title 32 USC, National Guard.** The State Partnership Program is but one example of how the Army successfully integrates the National Guard into theater security cooperation activities. This title provides the legal basis for the National Guard and its authorities.

**Title 50 USC, War and National Defense.** This title covers a wide variety of defense-related matters that cross interagency lines and authorities. Disclosure of classified information, foreign intelligence surveillance, atomic energy, and numerous other themes are addressed.

**The Foreign Service Act of 1980** (Public Law 96-465, Section 207, Chief of Mission). This section defines and establishes the authorities of the chief of mission (COM) in foreign countries as well as the relationship between the COM, “the United States area commander” (geographic combatant commander), and other executive branch agencies and U.S. citizens within the assigned country.
Appendix D

Authorities and Legal Coordination

Although this appendix is particularly relevant to commanders and staff, unified action partners should be familiar with it because legal aspects of security cooperation and the human domain must be taken in account when designing campaigns, major operations, and engagements. The appendix first discusses the general legal foundation and authorities for security cooperation. It then discusses host-country law and status-of-forces agreements. Finally, it presents legal constraints that commanders must consider when conducting security cooperation activities.

General Legal Foundation for Military Actions

Law and policy govern the actions of U.S. forces in all military operations, including security cooperation. For U.S. forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of an operation. It affects the rules of engagement (ROE), how U.S. forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation, and the authority of U.S. forces to detain and interrogate. Under the Constitution of the United States, the President is the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to a combatant commander provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President and treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. Following is a summary of key laws and policies that bear upon U.S. military operations in support of security cooperation. This summary does not replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting staff judge advocate.

Legal Authority for Security Cooperation

U.S. forces participate in security cooperation according to a number of legal authorities, most of which are codified in Title 10 of the United States Code (USC), Armed Forces; in Title 22 USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse; and in provisions of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts. All security cooperation activities must be conducted according to and comply with these authorities, and the chief of mission must approve all security cooperation activities conducted in a foreign country.

Title 10 USC authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative
and technical personnel based on a formal agreement or an exchange of diplomatic letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance provided to police by U.S. forces is permitted but, generally, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not serve as the lead government department. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance.

### Host Country Law and Status-of-Forces Agreements

After considering the type of baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law, the military leader must be advised in regard to the other bodies of law that he should integrate into planning and execution. This includes consideration of host-nation law. Because of the nature of most international missions not involving armed conflict, commanders and staffs must understand the technical and pragmatic significance of host-nation law within the area of operations.

Status-of-forces agreements and other forms of agreements frequently exist. They are essentially contractual agreements or treaties between two or more nations that establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics usually covered in a status-of-forces agreement include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host country, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to the host country’s laws. Commanders ensure that all personnel understand the status of U.S. forces in the area of operations and are trained accordingly.

### Legal Constraints on Missions

U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct missions. These parameters tend to constrain the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the authority to spend government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission.

### Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (Joint Publication [JP] 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there
are no operation-specific ROE, U.S. forces apply standing ROE. When operating with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly and consider the laws of the host country.

Rules of engagement are a critically important aspect of military operations overseas. ROE contribute directly to mission accomplishment, enhance protection, and help ensure compliance with law and policy. Although ROE are ultimately commanders’ rules to regulate the use of force, judge advocate general personnel nonetheless remain involved in ROE drafting, dissemination, interpretation, and training. See Field Manual (FM) 1-04, *Legal Support to the Operational Army*, for further discussion on ROE.

**Authority for Security Cooperation and Security Assistance**

The Department of State (DOS) has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the United States Government (USG). Foreign assistance encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including security assistance (assistance to the internal police forces and military forces of the foreign nation), development assistance (assistance to the foreign government in projects that will assist the development of the foreign economy or political institutions), and humanitarian assistance (direct assistance to the population of a foreign nation). The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195).

All training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically authorized. Military and civilian personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations should typically provide only an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Examples include the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to DOD for its role in training and equipping foreign security forces. For example, in 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, which made the commander of United States Central Command — under policy guidance from the chief of mission — responsible for coordinating USG efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi Security Forces, including police. Absent such a directive, DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and equip its security forces.

Under Title 10 USC, funds may be appropriated to DOD by Congress and managed by combatant commands to conduct military-to-military exchanges and traditional commander’s activities. This does not provide the authority for U.S. forces to train or equip partner nation militaries.
These programs support cooperative military engagement, and fund material support for the following:

- Humanitarian and civic assistance projects
- Participation in exercises
- Traditional commander activities, such as conferences, seminars or military-to-military exchanges

Operations and maintenance funds are provided by the combatant command for support of the DOD or combatant command security cooperation programs other than security assistance in the country. These are DOD funds traditionally provided for the purpose of operating and maintaining U.S. forces such as salaries, exercises, training, operations, and overhead costs.

**General Prohibition on Assistance to Police**

Historically, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance — military training, equipment, and defense articles and services — to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive.

When providing assistance to training, DOS provides the lead role in police assistance through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies, such as when NSPD 36 granted the commander of United States Central Command authority to train and equip Iraqi police. For more information on police assistance, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.10, *Police Operations*.

**Authority for Training and Equipping Foreign Forces**

Title 22 USC authorizes the transfer of defense articles and services (including training) by the USG to friendly foreign countries in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. All training and equipping of foreign security forces are specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States also require the DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of man-hours and materiel requested from the DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely for internal security; legitimate self-defense; preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons; permitting the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter; or supporting economic and social development activities by foreign military forces in less developed countries. As such, all training and equipping of foreign security forces must be specifically authorized. The President may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the mission in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Act and other U.S. law. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal adviser early in the mission planning process will help commanders ensure that any planned effort to train or equip foreign forces is funded and executed in a manner consistent with the law.

**Authority for Foreign Internal Defense**

Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or the SecDef, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the SecDef approves, U.S. forces can participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22 USC. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other laws. It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in Title 10 USC.

Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status-of-forces agreement or pursuant to an exchange of letters with the host nation. Cooperation and assistance are limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. Direct involvement in operations is not included. Assistance to foreign police forces by U.S. forces is permitted but not with the DOD as the lead government department.

Foreign internal defense is a legislatively directed operation attributable to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433), Section 212, Initial Review of Combatant Commands.
Funding Constraints and Programs

Commanders and staffs planning any security cooperation mission must consult a staff judge advocate. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute and require knowledge of the USC. With limited exceptions, DOD may not train foreign security forces under Title 10. All training and equipping of such forces must be specifically authorized. DOD has limited ability to build the capacity of security forces not part of the host nation’s ministry of defense. The primary laws of concern are the Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and various sections of Titles 10 and 22 USC.

The Leahy Amendments prohibit the USG from providing funds to a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if DOS has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. The provisions restrict funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.

Funds Appropriated Specifically for Foreign Assistance

U.S. funds used for weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title 22. Provisions of Title 10 may also authorize amounts of money for these purposes. Standing funding authorities are narrowly defined and generally require advance coordination within DOD and DOS.

Key Security Cooperation Funding Programs

Numerous funding sources and authorities for security cooperation exist. Programs funded under Title 10 that build partner capacity include, but are not limited to:

- Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund
- Joint combined exchange training
- Humanitarian and civic assistance
- The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program
- Traditional commander activities
- Multinational support funds
- National Guard State Partnership Program
- Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies
• Senior Service colleges and professional military education
• Military academy student exchanges
• United States Army Sergeants Major Academy

The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide select levels of funding to combatant commanders for combined exercises, select equipment, military education and training of foreign military and related defense civilians, and the personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.

The joint combined exchange training (known as JCET) program (Section 2010 of Title 10 USC) is conducted overseas to fulfill U.S. forces training requirements and at the same time share skills between U.S. forces and host-nation counterparts. Joint combined exchange training includes the deployment by U.S. special operations forces with the dual purpose of training themselves and foreign counterparts. This funding can be used for the training of the foreign counterpart, expenses for the U.S. deployment, and, for developing countries, the incremental expenses incurred by the country for the training. Joint combined exchange training is carefully followed by Congress because of concerns about inadequate civilian oversight and fears that such training might benefit units or individuals responsible for human rights violations.

Humanitarian and civic assistance during military operations authorizes military forces to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance projects and activities in conjunction with military operations. The primary purpose of the program must be to train U.S. Armed Forces, and it should complement other forms of social or economic assistance. Assistance to the local populace is provided predominantly by U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401 of Title 10 USC and funded under separate authorities.

The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (Section 2010 of Title 10 USC) authorizes the SecDef, in coordination with DOS, to pay for incremental expenses by a developing country as a direct result of participation in combined exercises.

Traditional commander activities are typically referred to as military-to-military contacts. Traditional commander activities authorize the combatant commander and theater army commander to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of partner countries. In the course of this authorization, the geographic combatant commander can designate traveling contact teams, military liaison teams, exchange
of military and civilian personnel, and seminars and conferences within the geographic combatant command’s area of responsibility. Funding for traditional commander activities is provided by the Military Departments that serve as executive agents. Multinational support funds are used to reimburse countries for logistical, military, and other expenses incurred while supporting U.S. operations.

The National Guard State Partnership Program links states with partner countries for supporting the objectives and goals of the geographic combatant command and the U.S. ambassador. The state partnership program actively participates in training events, emergency management, environmental remediation exercises, fellowship-style internships, educational exchanges, and civic leader visits.

International military education and training programs support theater campaign plan objectives by:

- Fostering mutual understanding and relationships between forces.
- Familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other.
- Enhancing cultural awareness.

These programs may have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. They help strengthen foreign defense establishments through U.S. military education with exposure to democratic values necessary for the functioning of a civilian-controlled, apolitical, professional military. The desired strategic effect of these programs is to improve security cooperation and interoperability between the United States and other nations. Examples include programs conducted by DOD regional centers for security studies, senior Service colleges, and military academy student exchanges.

Five DOD regional centers for security studies help communicate U.S. foreign and defense policies to international students. They provide a means for countries to give feedback and communicate their policies to the United States. The regional centers’ activities include education, research, and outreach.

Senior Service colleges and professional military education include the United States Army War College and the United States Army Command and General Staff College. These institutions host senior- and field-grade foreign officers for academic study.

By international agreement, the Military Department secretaries each may authorize up to 24 students annually to participate in the reciprocal exchange of cadets to attend the appropriate military academies. The United
States Army Sergeants Major Academy also hosts foreign cadets at each academy class.

Security assistance programs that build partner capacity, funded under Title 22 USC, include but are not limited to:

- Foreign military financing program
- Foreign military sales
- International military education and training
- Economic support fund
- Peacekeeping operations
- Excess defense articles
- Drawdowns

The foreign military financing program authorizes the President to grant non-reimbursable military assistance to friendly foreign countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles or services through either foreign military sales or direct commercial sales.

Foreign military sales programs allow eligible foreign governments to purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG, administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The International Military Education and Training program authorizes the President to furnish military education and training on a reimbursable basis to military and civilian personnel of foreign countries. The education and training may be paid for with partner nation funds or U.S. grant assistance.

The Economic Support Fund program advances U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. In other words, the primary function is to build the governance capacity of a foreign country.

Peacekeeping operations authorize assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as the President may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States.

The Excess Defense Articles program authorizes the President to transfer certain defense articles designated as excess to U.S. government requirements to eligible countries on a grant basis. This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom. Such articles are sold in “as is, where is” condition.
Presidential drawdowns authorize the President to provide U.S. defense articles, services, and training (up to a specified threshold) to friendly foreign countries and international organizations at no cost during times of crisis. Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act authorizes the president to provide U.S. government articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. This program was used during Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. Drawdowns are grants executed without a letter of acceptance.

**Special Foreign Assistance Authorities**

In addition to the aforementioned authorities, Congress has passed a number of special foreign assistance authorities through the National Defense Authorization Act that are not made permanent law within the USC, but rather are stand-alone authorities contained in annual authorization and appropriation acts. These special authorities often contain “dual-key” or co-approval provisions that grant a certain foreign assistance authority to the SecDef, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State (or in some cases, with the concurrence of the appropriate chief of mission). Examples include:

- Section 1206, also known as Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries
- Global Security Contingency Fund
- Special Operations Forces Support
- Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

The Global Train and Equip and Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries program was initially authorized by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006. It authorized the SecDef (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State) to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces. The purpose of the program is for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces are participating. The program also is meant to build the capacity of a foreign country’s maritime security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.

The Global Security Contingency Fund is a three-year pilot program that began in fiscal year 2012 to deliver security sector assistance to contingency countries through a process jointly managed by DOS and DOD. The fund was intended to explore how to approach building a security sector from a holistic perspective. It was to approach the entire system rather than using specific authorities to target separately the system’s components. It will be applied in cases where emergent challenges or opportunities arise.
that cannot be adequately met through existing resources. This approach
will take immense coordination and cooperation, primarily between DOS,
USAID, and DOD. Coordination and cooperation also must include
other USG, combatant commands, and country teams, as well as other
contributing nations and multilateral organizations. As a pilot, the program
will focus on national-level priorities to prove the concept of a pooled fund
and to develop the new business practices that reflect the principles of joint
formulation and shared responsibility. The fund will be available to the
combatant command and country teams to develop and deliver security
sector assistance in a coordinated fashion. The fund will focus on national-
level priorities and draw on expertise at agencies, combatant commands,
and country teams to develop comprehensive plans that span military,
security, and justice sectors.

Special Operations Forces Support, originally Section 1208, is often
referred to as “Section 1208 funds.” This authorization is the special
operations forces equivalent of “Section 1206.” Its purpose is to provide
support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged
in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by U.S. special operations
forces to combat terrorism.

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program authorizes U.S. military
commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent
humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements
within their AORs.

Many different funding sources may be required for small segments of any
activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants. Determining
which funding sources should be used for various activities is challenging.
Army units can avoid funding problems through early identification of and
application to funding sources for specific activities. This is essential for
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. See Army Regulation
11-31, Army Security Cooperation Policy, for Army policy on security
cooporation. In addition, visit the Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management’s website at http://www.disam.dsca.mil, and click the
publications link for the institute’s textbook, The Management of Security
Cooperation (known as the Green Book).
Appendix E

Army Staff Organizations

S-Staff through G-Staff

This portion of Appendix E provides an overview of Army staffs at battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels and some of their common duties and responsibilities. For a detailed discussion of Army staffs, see Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. The staff is a key component of the mission command system. In addition to executing the mission command staff tasks, the primary responsibilities of any staff are to:

- Support the commander.
- Assist subordinate commanders, staffs, and units.
- Inform units and organizations outside the headquarters.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, provides a detailed discussion of executing the mission command staff task and the primary staff responsibilities.

Staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make recommendations and prepare plans and orders for the commander. Staff products consist of timely and relevant information and analysis. Staff members support and advise the commander within their area of expertise. Although commanders make key decisions, they are not the only decision makers. Trained and trusted staff members, given decision-making authority based on the commander’s intent, free commanders from routine decisions. This enables commanders to focus on key aspects of operations. Staffs support the commander in communicating the commander’s decisions and intent through plans and orders. Staff effectiveness depends in part on relationships of the staff with commanders and other staff. Collaboration and dialogue aid in developing shared understanding and visualization among staffs at different echelons.

Effective staffs establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation with staffs of higher, lower, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Staffs help subordinate headquarters understand the larger context of operations. Staffs keep their units well informed. Staffs also keep civilian organizations informed with relevant information based on security classification and need to know. As soon as a staff receives information and determines its relevancy, that staff passes the information to the appropriate headquarters. The key is relevance, not volume.
The basis for staff organization depends on the mission, each staff’s broad areas of expertise, and regulations and laws. While staffs at every echelon and type of unit are structured differently, all staffs share some similarities. (Note: The commander’s rank determines whether the staff is a “G” staff or an “S” staff. Organizations commanded by a general officer have G-staffs. Other organizations have S-staffs. Most battalions and brigades do not have plans or financial management staff sections.)

The basic staff structure includes a chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) and various staff sections. A staff section is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. A principal staff officer — who may be a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer for the commander — leads each staff section. The number of coordinating, special, and personal principal staff officers and their corresponding staff sections varies with different command levels. FM 6-0 provides a detailed discussion of coordinating, special, and personal principal staff officers and their corresponding staff sections.

Commanders are responsible for all their staffs do or fail to do. A commander cannot delegate this responsibility. The final decision, as well as the final responsibility, remain with the commander. When commanders assign a staff member a task, they delegate the authority necessary to accomplish it. Commanders determine the duties and responsibilities of the deputy and assistant commanders. These duties and responsibilities are formally declared and outlined in a terms of reference memorandum signed by the commander. In a corps or division, the deputy or assistant commander extends the commander’s span of control in areas and functions as the commander designates. The deputy or assistant commander’s specific duties vary from corps to corps and division to division. The corps deputy commander serves as the commander’s primary assistant and second-in-command of the corps. A division has two assistant division commanders who support the commander. The corps deputy commander and assistant division commanders interact with the chief of staff and staff principal advisers based on duties the commanding general assigns.

The COS or XO is the commander’s principal assistant. Division and higher units are assigned a COS. Brigade and battalions are assigned an XO. Commanders normally delegate executive management authority to the COS or XO. As the key staff integrator, the COS or XO frees the commander from routine details of staff operations and the management of the headquarters.

Coordinating staff officers are the commander’s principal assistants who advise, plan, and coordinate actions within their area of expertise or a warfighting function. Commanders may designate coordinating staff officers as assistant chiefs of staff, chiefs of a warfighting function, or staff officers.
Coordinating staff officers may also exercise planning and supervisory authority over designated special staff officers. The coordinating staff consists of the following positions:

- Assistant chief of staff (ACOS), G-1 (S-1) — personnel
- ACOS, G-2 (S-2) — intelligence
- ACOS, G-3 (S-3) — operations
- ACOS, G-4 (S-4) — logistics
- ACOS, G-5 — plans
- ACOS, G-6 (S-6) — signal
- ACOS, G-8 — financial management
- ACOS, G-9 (S-9) — civil affairs operations
- Chief of fires
- Chief of protection
- Chief of sustainment

A chief of fires, a chief of protection, and a chief of sustainment are authorized at division and corps levels. They coordinate their respective warfighting functions for the commander through functional cells within the main command post. (See FM 6-0, Chapter 1.)

**Joint Staff Organizations: J-Staff**

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the joint force commander (JFC) and component commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups:

- Command and control (C2)
- Intelligence
- Fires
- Movement and maneuver
- Protection
- Sustainment
Some functions, such as C2, intelligence, and sustainment, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint function. The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For background information and guidance on joint task force (JTF) personnel and administration matters, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Chapter V, Joint Task Force Manpower and Personnel; and JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support*.

The **basic element of the joint staff is the directorate**. Typically, these are the manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff (J-1); intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2); operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3); logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4); plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5); and communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6). The primary staff directorates provide staff supervision of related processes, activities, and capabilities associated with the basic joint functions. Some directorates, such as the J-2 and J-4, focus on specific functions (intelligence and logistics, respectively), but all directorates have responsibilities that ensure the integration of the joint force’s capabilities and operations across the functions. See JP 3-33 for detailed discussions of the joint staff. A typical JTF staff organization is depicted in JP 3-33, Page II-15, and also depicted in Section 5.3.1 of this guide.
Appendix F

Boards, Cells, Centers, Working Groups, and Other Meeting Basics

This appendix provides an overview of boards, cells, centers, and working groups in which unified action partners (UAPs) might participate when conducting operations with Army or joint forces.

Army

Meetings. Meetings are gatherings to present and exchange information, solve problems, coordinate action, and make decisions. They may involve the staff; the commander and staff; or the commander, subordinate commanders, staff, and others as necessary (including UAPs). Who attends depends on the issue or topic of discussion. Commanders establish meetings to integrate the staff and enhance planning and decision making within the headquarters. Commanders also identify staff members to participate in the higher commander’s meetings, including working groups and boards. Decisions made during meetings must be shared internally within the headquarters, with the higher headquarters, and with subordinate units.

The number of meetings and the subjects they address depend on the situation and echelon. While numerous informal meetings occur daily within a headquarters, meetings commonly included in a unit’s battle rhythm and the cells responsible for them include:

- A shift-change briefing (current operations integration cell)
- An operations update and assessment briefing (current operations integration cell)
- An operations synchronization meeting (current operations integration cell)
- Planning meetings and briefings (plans or future operations cells)
- Working groups and boards (various functional and integrating cells)

Often, the commander establishes and maintains only those meetings required by the situation.

Commanders — assisted by the chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) — establish, modify, and dissolve meetings as the situation evolves. The COS or XO manages the timings of these events through the unit’s battle rhythm.
Boards and working groups. Boards and working groups are types of meetings and are included in the unit’s battle rhythm. A board is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives with delegated decision-making authority for a particular purpose or function. Boards are similar to working groups. However, commanders appoint boards to make decisions. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum. A working group is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and make recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Their cross-functional design enables working groups to synchronize contributions from multiple command post (CP) cells and staff sections. For example, the targeting working group brings together representatives of all staff elements concerned with targeting. It synchronizes the contributions of all staff elements with the work of the fires cell. It also synchronizes fires with future operations and current operations integration cells.

Working groups address various subjects depending on the situation and echelon. Battalion and brigade headquarters normally have fewer working groups than higher echelons have. Working groups may convene daily, weekly, monthly, or intermittently depending on the subject, situation, and echelon. Typical working groups and the lead cell or staff section at division and corps headquarters include the following:

- Assessment working group (plans or future operations cell)
- Operations and intelligence working group (intelligence cell)
- Targeting working group (fires cell)
- Protection working group (protection cell)
- Civil affairs operations working group (civil affairs operations staff section)
- Information operations working group (movement and maneuver cell)
- Cyber electromagnetic activities working group (electronic warfare element)

Within CPs, commanders cross-functionally organize their staffs into CP cells and staff sections to assist them in the exercise of mission command. A CP cell is a grouping of personnel and equipment organized by warfighting function or by planning horizon to facilitate the exercise of mission command. Staff sections are groupings of staff members by areas of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. Elements are groupings of staff members subordinate to specific staff sections. Staff sections and elements of staff sections are the building blocks for CP cells.
Commanders organize their CPs by functional and integrating cells. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function (minus mission command). Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by planning horizon. Not all staff sections permanently reside in one of the functional or integrating cells. The G-6 (S-6) signal and G-9 (S-9) civil affairs sections are examples. These staff sections do, however, provide representation to different CP cells as required, and they coordinate their activities in the various meetings established in the unit’s battle rhythm. (See Appendix G, Battle Rhythm Overview.)

A center is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a specific function within the headquarters. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the operations center, civil-military operations center, air support operations center, and joint air-ground integration center. A detailed discussion of the various centers is found in Field Manual 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*; and Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

Figure F-1 (next page) represents the standard command post organizational design. However, the standard design is tailorable. Commanders organize their command post to meet changing situations and the requirements of their specific operations. The entire command post depicted as the mission command box in Figure F-1 assists the commander in the exercise of mission command. Therefore, commanders do not form a specific mission command functional cell. All of the various command post cells and staff sections assist the commander with specific tasks of the mission command warfighting function.

### Joint

**A Cross-Functional Approach to Staff Organization.** Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an appropriate organizational structure to manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These appropriate organization structures facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the commander, and execution by the headquarters. (See Figure F-2, Page 213.) Although cross-functional in their membership, most of these organizations fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates or their functional chiefs. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its commander in mission execution.
Figure F-1. Standard command post organizational design.  
(Source: FM 6-0)
Cross-functional organizations that support the JTF staff include:

**Center.** A center is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within the JFC’s headquarters (HQ). Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the joint operation center (JOC) and the civil-military operations center (CMOC).

**Group.** A group is an enduring functional organization formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC’s HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ include a joint planning group (JPG) that manages JTF HQ planning. JPG functions include leading designated planning efforts, resourcing and managing subordinate planning teams, and coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, discusses the various working groups and boards used by joint force commanders.

**Cell.** A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC’s HQ. A cell usually is part of both functional and traditional staff structures. An example of a cell within the traditional staff structure could be an information operations (IO) cell subordinate to the operations branch within the J-3. An example of a cell within a functional staff structure could be a current operations cell within the JOC.
Office. An office is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC’s HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the Joint Mortuary Affairs Office.

Element. An element is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC’s HQ. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. An example of an element is the Joint Fires Element.

Boards. A board is an organized group of individuals within a JFC’s HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority), that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority that established the board. (See JP 3-33.) Boards are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate commands, liaison officers, and other organizations as required. There are two types of boards:

- **Command Board.** A command board is chaired by the commander, and its purpose is to gain guidance or decision from the commander.

- **Functional Board.** A functional board’s purpose is to gain functionally specific guidance and decisions from the commander (or designated representative) based on a staff recommendation.

These boards often focus on:

- Synchronizing a particular function (e.g., information operations, targeting, collection, and distribution) across multiple planning initiatives

- Allocation of resources between ongoing or future operations

- Maintaining continuity of purpose across ongoing operations

Working Group (WG). A WG is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC’s HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives. (See Figure F-3, next page.)

Planning Team. A planning team is a functional element formed within the JFC’s HQ to solve problems related to a specific task or requirement. Planning teams and WGs are complementary. WGs enhance planning through their provision of functional staff estimates to multiple planning teams. In contrast, planning teams integrate the functional concepts of multiple functional WGs into plans and orders. The planning team is not enduring and dissolves upon completion of the assigned task. (See Figure F-4, Page 216.)
Figure F-3. Basic working group model. (Source: JP 3-33)
Figure F-4. Basic planning team model. (Source: JP 3-33)
Appendix G

Battle Rhythm Overview

Army Battle Rhythm Perspective

A headquarters’ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings (to include working groups and boards), briefings, and other activities synchronized by time and purpose. The battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. (See Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, Chapter 1, for a detailed discussion of battle rhythm.) The chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO) oversees the unit’s battle rhythm. The COS or XO ensures that activities are logically sequenced so the output of one activity informs another activity’s inputs. Not only is this important internally within the headquarters, the unit’s battle rhythm must nest with that of the higher headquarters. This ensures that the information pertinent to decisions and the recommendations on decisions made in the headquarters are provided in a timely manner to influence the decision making of the higher headquarters, as appropriate.

Understanding the purpose and potential decisions of each meeting and activity is equally important. This understanding allows members of the staff and subordinate commanders to provide appropriate input to influence decisions. The COS or XO balances other staff duties and responsibilities with the time required to plan, prepare for, and hold meetings and conduct briefings. The COS or XO also critically examines attendance requirements. Some staff sections and command post cells may lack the personnel to attend all events. The COS or XO and staff members constantly look for ways to combine meetings and eliminate unproductive ones. The battle rhythm enables:

- Establishing a routine for staff interaction and coordination.
- Facilitating interaction between the commander and staff.
- Synchronizing activities of the staff in time and purpose.
- Facilitating planning by the staff and decision making by the commander.

The battle rhythm changes during execution as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a daily plans update briefing. As the situation changes, the commander may require a plans update only every three days. Some factors that help determine a unit’s battle rhythm include the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, and current mission.
In developing the unit’s battle rhythm, the COS or XO considers:

- Higher headquarters’ battle rhythm and report requirements.
- Subordinate headquarters’ battle rhythm requirements.
- The duration and intensity of the operation.
- Integrating cells’ planning requirements.

**Joint Battle Rhythm Perspective**

Battle rhythm is described as the sequencing and execution of actions and events within a joint force headquarters that are regulated by the flow and sharing of information that support all decision cycles. (See Joint Publication [JP] 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, for a comprehensive discussion of a joint battle rhythm.) A battle rhythm is a routine cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. As a practical matter, the headquarters’ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities. (See Table G-1, next page.) These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly requirements. Typically, the joint task force (JTF) headquarters’ battle rhythm is managed by the JTF COS. There are several critical functions for a battle rhythm; these include (but are not limited to) the following:

- Providing a routine for staff interaction and coordination within the headquarters.
- Providing a routine for commander and staff interaction.
- Synchronizing staff organizations’ activities.
- Facilitating planning by the staff and decision making by the commander.

See Page 220 for factors that shape a battle rhythm.

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**LEGEND FOR TABLE G-1 ON NEXT PAGE**

| CA | civil affairs |
| CJTF | commander, joint task force |
| COS | chief of staff |
| DCJTF | deputy commander, joint task force |
| DSPD | defense support to public diplomacy |
| FP | force protection |
| IO | information operations |
| J-1 | manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff |
| J-2 | intelligence directorate of a joint staff |
| J-3 | operations directorate of a joint staff |
| J-4 | logistics directorate of a joint staff |
| J-5 | plans directorate of a joint staff |
| J-6 | communications system directorate of a joint staff |
| JFACC | joint force air component commander |
| JOC | joint operations center |
| JPG | joint planning group |
| JTCB | joint targeting coordination board |
| PA | public affairs |
| ROE | rules of engagement |
| RUF | rules for the use of force |
| SJA | staff judge advocate |
| VTC | video teleconferencing |
Table G-1: Sample Joint Task Force Headquarters Battle Rhythm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shift change</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Battle staff/others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting meeting</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>As required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation update to CJTF</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF’s personal and special staffs, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans update to CJTF</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF’s personal and special staffs, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF’s VTC call to components</td>
<td>CJTF Conference Room</td>
<td>CJTF, Component commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPG</td>
<td>J-5 Plans Conference Room</td>
<td>J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, core planners, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTCB meeting</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>DCJTF, J-2, J-3, JFACC, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Information Management Board</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>COS, J-3, J-6, staff information management representatives, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO Working Group</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>IO staff, CA, PA, DSPD, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle update assessment</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF’s personal and special staffs, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Working Group</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>FP officer, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift change</td>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>Battle staff/others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE/RUF Working Group</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, SJA component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Assessment Board</td>
<td>Briefing Room</td>
<td>CJTF, DCJTF, COS, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6, CJTF’s personal and special staffs, component liaison, others as required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Event times are situationally dependent. (Source: JP 3-33)
Factors that shape a battle rhythm. Many factors influence the establishment of a battle rhythm. Subordinate commanders are responsible for linking the planning, decision, and operating cycles of their command to those of the higher headquarters and must synchronize their unit’s battle rhythm with that of the higher headquarters. Factors include:

- The higher headquarters’ battle rhythm and reporting requirements.
- The commander’s decision cycle.
- The planning requirements within the headquarters (e.g., future plans, future operations, and current operations).
- Other factors such as battlefield circulation.
Appendix H

Organizing Operational Areas at the Joint Level

Except for areas of responsibility (AOR), which are assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and other joint force commanders (JFCs) designate smaller operational areas (e.g., a joint operations area [ JOA ] and an area of operations [ AO ]) on a temporary basis. Operational areas have physical dimensions that include some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of these operational areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the mission and the projected duration of operations.

Combatant Command-Level Areas

GCCs conduct operations in their assigned AORs. When warranted, the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), or GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation. (See Figure H-1.) GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these operational areas, or they may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose while remaining focused on the broader AOR.

![Operational Areas within a Theater](image)

This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two theaters of operations and a JOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Figure H-1. Operational areas within a theater. (Source: JP 3-0)
Area of Responsibility. An AOR is an area established by the UCP that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef. Combatant commanders may operate forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. All cross-AOR operations must be coordinated between the affected GCCs.

Theater of War. A theater of war is a geographical area established by the President, SecDef, or GCC for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes of command and control (C2), sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not normally encompass a GCC’s entire AOR, but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is an operational area defined by the GCC for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope of the operation in time, space, purpose, and/or employed forces exceeds what a JOA can normally accommodate. More than one joint force headquarters can exist in a theater of operations. A GCC may establish one or more theaters of operations. Different theaters normally will be focused on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war, but is large enough to allow for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters of operations are normally associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross the boundary of two AORs.

Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas

For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, the commander can establish the following operational areas.

Joint Operations Area. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a GCC or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a combined joint task force) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of special operations forces to conduct special operations (SO) activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. A JSOA is defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may
use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO. The joint force special operations component commander is the supported commander within the JSOA. For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations*.

**Joint Security Area (JSA).** A JSA is a specific surface area, designated as critical by the JFC, which facilitates protection of joint bases and supports various aspects of joint operations such as lines of communications (LOC), force projection, movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. JSAs may be used in both linear and nonlinear situations. For additional guidance on JSAs, refer to JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.

**Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).** The AOA is a geographic area within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. For additional guidance on AOAs, refer to JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

**Area of Operations.** JFCs may define an area of operations (AO) for land and maritime forces. AOs typically do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and achieve unity of effort.

**Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas**

Operational areas may be contiguous or noncontiguous. (See Figure H-2, next page.) When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When operational areas are noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher headquarters retains responsibility for the unassigned portion of its operational area.

In some operations, a Service or functional component (typically the ground component) could have such a large operational area that the component’s subordinate units operate in a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually supporting range of each other. In these cases, the JFC should consider options whereby joint capabilities can be pushed to lower levels and placed under control of units that can use them effectively.
Considerations when assuming responsibility for an operational area.
The establishing commander should activate an assigned operational area at a specified date and time based on mission and situation considerations addressed during course of action analysis and war gaming. Among others, common considerations include C2, the information environment, intelligence requirements, communications support, protection, security, lines of communication, terrain management, movement control, airspace control, surveillance, reconnaissance, air and missile defense, personnel recovery, targeting and fires, interorganizational interactions, and environmental issues. For specific guidance on assuming responsibility for an operational area, refer to JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. 

Figure H-2. Contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas. (Source: JP 3-0)
Appendix I

Joint Operation Plan Format

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint operation plan (OPLAN). The exact format and level of detail may vary among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANS and concept plans (CONPLANS) will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as Paragraph 3, Execution) and their primary subparagraphs (such as Subparagraph 3a, Concept of Operations). The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) typically refers to a joint contingency plan that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but joint force commanders (JFCs) prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format. (See Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Appendix A.)

Notional Operation Plan Format

A. Copy number
B. Issuing headquarters
C. Place of issue
D. Effective date-time group
E. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)
F. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO ….
G. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses. (See national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates.)

A. General. This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State U.S. policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve U.S. policy goals and conduct effective U.S. military operations to achieve U.S. military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity.
(1) Environment of conflict. Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context (Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan [JSCP], Unified Command Plan).

(2) Policy goals. This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination objectives to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, and intentions/criteria for termination.

(a) U.S./multinational policy goals. Identify the national security, multinational, or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the combatant command.

(b) End state. Describe the national strategic end state and relate the military end state to the national strategic end state.

(3) Non-U.S. national political decisions.

(4) Operational limitations. List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority (rules of engagement, law of armed conflict, termination criteria, etc.).

B. Area of concern.

(1) Operational area. Describe the JFC’s operational area. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.

(2) Area of interest. Describe the area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.

C. Deterrent options. Delineate flexible deterrent options (FDOs) desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of latest arrival date relative to C-day [unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins]. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-Department of Defense agencies that would support U.S. mission accomplishment. (See JP 5-0, Appendix E, Flexible Deterrent Options, for examples of FDOs.)

D. Risk. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission. List risk mitigation measures.

E. Adversary forces. Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to Annex B,
Intelligence, for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. Identify the adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity (COGs) and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.

1. Adversary centers of gravity
   (a) Strategic
   (b) Operational
2. Adversary critical factors
   (a) Strategic
   (b) Operational
3. Adversary courses of action (most likely and most dangerous to friendly mission accomplishment)
   (a) General
   (b) Adversary’s end state
   (c) Adversary’s strategic objectives
   (d) Adversary’s operational objectives
   (e) Adversary’s concept of operations
4. Adversary logistics and sustainment
5. Other adversary forces/capabilities
6. Adversary reserve mobilization

F. Friendly forces.

1. Friendly centers of gravity. This section should identify friendly COGs, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.
   (a) Strategic
   (b) Operational
2. Friendly critical factors
   (a) Strategic
   (b) Operational
3. Multinational forces
(4) Supporting commands and agencies. Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this contingency plan, that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government departments and agencies that would directly support execution of the contingency plan; for example, United States Transportation Command, U.S. Strategic Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, and so forth.

G. Assumptions. List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the JSCP or other tasking on which the contingency plan is based. State expected conditions over which the JFC has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations (CONOPS). Specify the mobility (air and sea lift) and the degree of mobilization assumed (i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none).

(1) Threat warning/timeline
(2) Pre-positioning and regional access (including international support and assistance)
(3) In-place forces
(4) Strategic assumptions (including those pertaining to nuclear weapons employment)
(5) Legal considerations
   (a) Rules of engagement
   (b) International law, including the law of armed conflict
   (c) U.S. law
   (d) Host-nation and partner-nation policies
   (e) Status-of-forces agreements
   (f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements (agreements between the U.S. and other countries)

2. Mission

State concisely the essential task(s) the JFC has to accomplish. This statement should address who, what, when, where, and why.
3. Execution

A. Concept of operations. For a combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) contingency plan, the appropriate strategic concept(s) can be taken from the campaign plan and developed into a strategic CONOPS for a theater campaign or OPLAN. Otherwise, the CONOPS will be developed as a result of the course of action (COA) selected by the JFC during COA development. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It also contains the JFC’s strategic vision, intent, and design in the strategic concept of operation for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of all participating forces, activities, and agencies. Refer to Annex C of the OPLAN.

(1) Commander’s intent. This should describe the JFC’s intent (purpose and end state), overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and their supporting effects. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the CONOPS.

(a) Purpose and end state (See Joint Publication [JP] 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Chapter II, Strategic Direction and Joint Operation Planning, for details on determining the end state.)

(b) Objectives

(c) Effects, if discussed

(2) General. Base the CONOPS on the JFC’s selected COA. The CONOPS states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved, the phasing of operations, the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted, and the interrelated or cross-Service support. For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the CONOPS should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve Component mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve Component force size requirements. The CONOPS should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans.
To the extent possible, the CONOPS should incorporate the following:

(a) JFC’s military objectives, supporting desired effects, and operational focus

(b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs

(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs

(d) Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase

1. Phase I:
   a. JFC’s intent
   b. Timing
   c. Objectives and desired effects
   d. Risk
   e. Execution
   f. Employment
      (i) Land forces
      (ii) Air forces
      (iii) Maritime forces
      (iv) Space forces
      (v) Special operations forces

   g. Operational fires. List those significant fires considerations on which the plan is based. The fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for application of available fires assets. Guidance for joint fires may address the following:

   (i) Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles
   (ii) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes
(iii) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets

(iv) Areas that require joint fires to support operational maneuver

(v) Anticipated joint fire support requirements

(vi) Fire support coordinating measures, if required (See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for a detailed discussion.)

2. Phases II through XX. Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3A(2)(d)1 above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.

B. Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the operation order (OPORD). The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the CONOPS, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.

C. Coordinating instructions. Provide instructions necessary for coordination and synchronization of the joint operation that apply to two or more elements of the command. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments.

4. Administration and Logistics

A. Concept of sustainment. This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign or operation, with information and instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, transportation, personnel policies, and administration.

B. Logistics. This paragraph should address sustainment priorities and resources; base development and other civil engineering requirements, host nation support, contracted support, environmental considerations, mortuary affairs, and Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of major logistic items for each option and phase of the concept. (Note: Logistic phases must complement the operation’s phases.) Identify strategic and theater ports of embarkation and debarkation for resupply. Outline transportation policies, guidance, and procedures for all options and phases.
C. Personnel. Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required joint individual augmentation to command headquarters and other operational requirements. Refer to Annex E (if published).

D. Public affairs. Refer to Annex F.

E. Civil-military operations. Refer to Annex G.

F. Meteorological and oceanographic services. Refer to Annex H.

G. Environmental considerations. Refer to Annex L. (See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.)

H. Geospatial information and services. Refer to Annex M.

I. Health service support. Refer to Annex Q. Identify planning requirements and subordinate taskings for health service support functional areas. Address critical medical supplies and resources. Assign tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.

5. Command and Control

A. Command

(1) Command relationships. State the organizational structure expected to exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major command and control organizations and the time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those that require development.

(2) Command posts. List the designations and locations of each major headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.

(3) Succession to command. Designate in order of succession the commanders responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.
B. Joint communications system support. Provide a general statement concerning the scope of communications systems and procedures required to support the operation. Highlight any communications systems or procedures requiring special emphasis. Refer to Annex K.

[Signature]
[Name]
[Rank/Service]
Commander

Annexes:
A — Task organization
B — Intelligence
C — Operations
D — Logistics
E — Personnel
F — Public affairs
G — Civil-military operations
H — Meteorological and oceanographic operations
J — Command relationships
K — Communications systems
L — Environmental considerations
M — Geospatial information and services
N — Space operations
P — Host-nation support
Q — Medical services
R — Reports
S — Special technical operations
T — Consequence management
U — Notional counter-proliferation decision guide
V — Interagency coordination
W — Contingency contracting
X — Execution checklist
Y — Strategic communication
Z — Distribution

Note: Annexes A–D, K, and Y are required annexes for a crisis action planning OPORD per Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX). All others may either be required by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or deemed necessary by the supported commander.
Appendix J

Army Operation Order, Annex V (Interagency Coordination)

This appendix provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing an Army Annex V (Interagency Coordination) (referred to as “Annex Victor” representing the letter V in the phonetic alphabet) to the base plan or order. A detailed discussion of Annex V is contained in Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Appendix D. Annex V provides military and interagency personnel with detailed information (mission, scheme of maneuver, and tasks) to direct the necessary coordination and interaction between Army Forces and interagency organizations. It describes how the commander intends to cooperate, provide support, and receive support from interagency organizations throughout the operation. Annex V follows the five-paragraph order format; however, some subparagraphs are modified to accommodate communication with the interagency. The G-3 (S-3), in conjunction with the G-9 (S-9), develops Annex V.

Annex V at the joint level. For a detailed discussion of Annex V at the joint level and consideration of interagency participation for each phase of the operation, see Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, Chapter III, Operational Art and Operational Design. See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for additional information.

Interagency organizations of the United States Government include:

- Central Intelligence Agency
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Justice
- Department of State
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of Transportation
- Environmental Protection Agency
- National Security Council
- Peace Corps
- United States Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
- United States Department of Agriculture
Sample Army Annex V (Interagency Coordination)

[CLASSIFICATION]

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to Army Regulation 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, for classification and release marking instructions.

a. Copy ## of ## copies
b. Issuing headquarters
c. Place of issue
d. Date-time group of signature
e. Message reference number

Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

ANNEX V (INTERAGENCY COORDINATION) TO OPLAN [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]

(U) References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.
b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
c. Doctrinal references for interagency coordination include Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, Stability; FM 6-0; and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

(U) Time zone used throughout the order: Write the time zone established in the base plan or order.

1. (U) Situation. Include information affecting interagency coordination that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion.

a. (U) Area of interest. Describe the area of interest as it relates to interagency coordination. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
b. (U) Area of operations. Refer to Appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

   (1) (U) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact interagency coordination. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
(2) (U) **Weather.** Describe the aspects of weather that impact interagency coordination. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

c. (U) **Political-military situation.** Describe the political-military situation in the area of interest and area of operations. Identify U.S. national security objectives and interests applicable to the plan or order.

d. (U) **Enemy forces.** Summarize the threat to interagency personnel. Identify enemy forces and appraise their general capabilities and impacts on interagency coordination operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

e. (U) **Friendly forces.** Outline the higher headquarters’ interagency coordination plan. Identify and state the objectives or goals and primary tasks of those interagency organizations involved in the operations in subparagraphs below.

f. (U) **Civil considerations.** Describe the aspects of the civil situation that impact interagency coordination. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

g. (U) **Attachments and detachments.** List units attached or detached only as necessary to clarify task organization. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) as required.

h. (U) **Assumptions.** List any interagency coordination-specific assumptions that support the annex development.

i. (U) **Legal considerations.** List any legal considerations that may affect interagency participation, such as applicable international law or the authorities established under U.S. Code Title 10, Armed Forces, and Title 50, War and National Defense.

2. (U) **Mission.** State the mission of interagency coordination in support of the concept of operations in the base plan or order.

3. (U) **Execution.**

   a. (U) **Scheme of interagency coordination.** Summarize the concept of operations in the base plan or order including an outline of the primary objectives and desired effects of each phase. Describe the concept of interagency coordination and how it supports the concept of operations. Describe the areas of responsibility from U.S. Government agencies by major areas of response: humanitarian, economic, political or diplomatic, and others as required. The operational variables are another method to organize major areas of response; they are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT).
(1) (U) **Humanitarian.** Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the humanitarian structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the commander’s phase development.

(2) (U) **Economic.** Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the economic structure and health of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander’s phase.

(3) (U) **Political/diplomatic.** Define, in broad terms, the desired actions and responsibilities for U.S. Government agencies in rebuilding and shaping the political and diplomatic structure of the affected nation. Coordinate these requested actions with the supported commander’s phase development.

(4) (U) **Others.** As required.

b. (U) **Tasks to subordinate units and milestones.** Identify tasks and required milestones of the issuing headquarters and interagency organizations during the conduct of operations.

c. (U) **Coordinating instructions.** List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base plan or order. Identify and list general instructions applicable to other U.S. Government agencies, such as agreements with the host country and multinational forces.

4. (U) **Sustainment.** Identify priorities of sustainment for interagency coordination key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

a. (U) **Logistics.** Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for interagency coordination logistics support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) and Annex P (Host-Nation Support) as required.

b. (U) **Personnel.** Use subparagraphs to identify availability, priorities, and specific instructions for human resources support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

c. (U) **Health service support.** Identify availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Identify specialized medical and veterinary requirements for interagency operations. Identify
availability, priorities, and instructions for medical care. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

5. (U) **Command and Signal.**

a. (U) **Command.** Identify any unique command relationships established for the purpose of interagency coordination. Identify any interagency coordination forms or bodies such as an interagency coordination working group.

   (1) (U) **Location of interagency coordination leadership.** Identify current or future locations of key interagency coordination leadership.

   (2) (U) **Succession of command.** State the succession of leadership if not covered in the unit’s standard operating procedures (SOPs).

   (3) (U) **Liaison requirements.** State the interagency coordination liaison requirements not covered in the base order.

b. (U) **Control.** List the locations of key interagency leaders and contact information.

   (1) (U) **Command posts.** Describe the employment of interagency coordination command posts (CPs), including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing.

   (2) (U) **Reports.** List interagency coordination specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. (U) **Signal.** Describe the communication plan used among the issuing force and interagency organizations to include the primary and alternate means of communications. Consider operations security requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required.

**ACKNOWLEDGE:** Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander’s last name]

[Commander’s rank]

The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters’ files.
OFFICIAL:

[Authenticator’s name]

[Authenticator’s position]

Either the commander or coordinating staff officer responsible for the functional area may sign attachments.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (appendixes, tabs, and exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[CLASSIFICATION]

[PAGE NUMBER]
Appendix K
Planning Tool Kit for Unified Action Partners/Liaisons

This appendix provides some fundamentals and responsibilities of unified action partners/liaisons who integrate and work with U.S. Army forces across the range of military operations. It addresses requirements distinct to contingency operations and unified action. It includes checklists and an example for a unified action partner/liaison officer (LNO) handbook outline.

Liaison Fundamentals
Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (Joint Publication [JP] 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations). Liaison helps reduce uncertainty. Most commonly, liaison is used for establishing and maintaining close communications, and continuously enabling direct, physical communications between military commands and nonmilitary agencies.

Unified action partners in a liaison role seek to ensure:

• Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters and agencies.
• Coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort.
• Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal operations.
• Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.

Liaison Officer
An LNO represents an agency, commander, or staff officer. LNOs transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. Liaisons often are required to plan or represent their unit/agency in planning efforts. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed LNO (the military uses either a commissioned or a noncommissioned officer) is the key to effective liaison. LNOs must have the full confidence of their agency director/supervisor, commander, or staff officer and experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity of operations often requires an increase in the LNO’s rank/civilian grade.

The LNO’s agency, activity, parent unit, or unit of assignment is the sending unit. The agency, activity, or unit to which the LNO is sent is the receiving unit. An LNO normally remains at the receiving unit until recalled.
As LNOs ultimately represent the agency director/commander, they:

- Understand the agency director’s/commander’s aims and goals and interpret the agency director’s/commander’s messages.
- Convey the agency director’s/commander’s intent, guidance, mission, and concept of operations.
- Represent the agency director’s/commander’s position.

As a representative, the LNO has access to the agency director/commander consistent with the duties involved. However, for routine matters, LNOs work for and receive direction from the chief of staff or the executive officer/agency deputy director. Using one individual to perform a liaison mission conserves manpower while guaranteeing a consistent, accurate flow of information. However, contingency operations require a liaison team to conduct around-the-clock operations.

The professional capabilities and personal characteristics of an effective unified action partner LNO encourage confidence and cooperation with the agency director/commander and staff of the receiving unit in which he/she is seeking to integrate or synchronize efforts.

**Effective unified action partner LNOs:**

- Know the sending agency’s mission; current and future operations; logistics status; organization; disposition; capabilities; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
- Possess some knowledge of the military unit or agency they are supporting.
- Appreciate and understand the receiving unit’s TTP, organization, capabilities, mission, doctrine, staff procedures, and customs.
- Know the requirements for and purpose of liaison.
- Know the liaison system and its reports, documents, and records.
- Have received liaison training or have read and understand LNO roles and responsibilities.
- Observe the established channels of command/agency and staff functions.
- Are tactful and articulate and possess strong communication (oral and writing) skills.
- Possess the necessary language expertise.
Example of an LNO Handbook Outline

- Table of contents, with the sending unit’s mission statement
- Purpose statement
- Introduction statement
- Definitions
- Scope statement
- Responsibilities and guidelines for conduct
- Actions to take before departing from the sending agency/unit
- Actions to take on arriving at the receiving agency/unit
- Actions to take during liaison operations at the receiving agency/unit
- Actions to take before departing from the receiving agency/unit
- Actions to take upon returning to the sending unit
- Sample questions. LNOs should be able to answer the following questions:
  - What is your agency’s plan?
  - What is your support plan?
  - Are main supply routes and required supply rates known? Can the controlled supply rate support the receiving unit’s plan?
  - What are your information requirements? At what time, phase, or event are they expected to change?
  - What are the critical decisions for your agency?
  - What are the “no-later-than” times for those decisions?
  - What assets does the agency/unit need to acquire to accomplish its mission? How would the unit use them? How do these assets support attaining the supported agency/commander’s intent? From where can the unit obtain them? Higher headquarters? Other services? Multinational partners?
  - How can LNOs communicate with their sending unit? Are telephones, radios, facsimile machines, computers, and other information systems available? Where are they situated? Which communications are secure?
  - What terrain did the unit designate as key? What terrain was designated as decisive?
  - What weather conditions would have a major impact on the operation?
○ What effect would a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear environment have on the operation?

○ What effect would large numbers of refugees, internally displaced persons, or enemy prisoners of war have on the receiving unit’s operations?

○ What is the worst thing that could happen during execution of the current operation?

○ How would a unit handle a passage of lines, an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat position with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy, by other units through the force?

○ What host-nation support is available to the sending unit?

○ What are the required reports from the receiving and sending units’ standard operating procedures? What are the next higher headquarters’ required reports?

**Packing list:**

- Credentials (including permissive jump orders, if qualified); blank forms as required
- References
- Excerpts of higher and sending headquarters’ operation orders and plans
- Sending unit’s standard operating procedures
- Sending unit’s command diagrams and recapitulation of major systems
- The unit modified table of equipment, unit status report (if its classification allows), and mission briefings; the G-3/J-3 (S-3) and the force modernization officer are excellent sources for this information
- Computers and other information systems required for information and data exchange
- Signal operating instructions extract
- Security code encryption device
- Communications equipment
- Sending unit telephone book
- List of commanders and staff officers
• Telephone calling (credit) card
• Movement table
• Administrative equipment (pens, paper, scissors, tape, notebook, etc.)
• Map and chart equipment (pens, pins, protractor, straight edge, scale, distance counter, acetate, and unit markers)
• Tent and accessories (camouflage net, cots, and stove, as appropriate)
• Foreign phrase book and dictionary
• Local currency as required
• Rations and water
• Weapons and ammunition
• Protective equipment
• Security card with common phrases

Unified Action Partner LNO Checklist
Before departing your agency/sending unit:

• Understand what the sending agency commander/director wants the receiving commander to know.

• Obtain memorandums of understanding/memorandums of agreement (i.e., resourcing, support, funding, lodging, subsistence, medical).

• Receive the appropriate security clearance and have that information transferred to the receiving agency/unit prior to departure.

• Receive a briefing from operations, intelligence, and other staff elements on current and future operations of your agency/unit.

• Receive and understand the tasks from the sending agency/unit staff.

• Obtain the correct maps and disposition of personnel and supplies, etc.

• Arrange for transport, communications and cryptographic equipment, codes, and signal instructions.

• Complete route reconnaissance and time management plans so you arrive at the right place on time.

• Ensure that the liaison team and interpreters have the right identification cards and security clearances for access.
Appendix L
Lessons and Best Practices for Liaison Officers

This appendix contains some examples of lessons and best practices to facilitate effective collaboration and common lines of effort between U.S. military and interagency or multinational staff officers.

- Liaison officers (LNOs) should be well-versed on the missions, organization, operations, and special considerations of their parent unit. LNOs should consider obtaining an approved parent organization briefing for presentation to the supported unit/headquarters/staff section.

- Prior to arrival at the supported unit, LNOs should obtain point of contact (POC) information for an individual at the supported unit. This POC (usually the chief of staff or an operations officer) should be queried to provide key information relating to chain of command, organizational structure, mission, operational plans and orders, environment, logistical considerations, security clearance requirements, read-ahead information, information management systems, office space (staff section, directorate, or office assigned), and any special instructions. Ideally, the chief of staff or operations officer will be somewhat familiar with the supporting LNO’s expertise; however, LNOs should provide their background, subject matter expertise, experience, and specialties to ensure proper placement within the supported headquarters.

- LNOs should consider arriving at the supported headquarters earlier rather than later to have the greatest opportunity to meet the supported headquarters staff prior to initial stages of planning and before the commander issues planning or mission guidance. While this may not always be possible, LNOs should proactively interact with the supported headquarters staff. More specifically, and based upon the LNO’s expertise, the LNO should provide input to the staff section or directorate he is assigned to or working with as early as possible to ensure consideration of that input.

- LNOs should seek to obtain an operations plan briefing upon arrival at the supported headquarters. This briefing provides an overview of the friendly and enemy situation.

- The military uses the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) in developing plans and orders. While LNOs may not be familiar with the MDMP, getting involved will quickly provide a working knowledge of the process. LNOs should understand that even though planning efforts may be in their final stages, military planners and operations officers appreciate germane input and intelligent recommendations to enhance planning leading to decisions.
• Some of the key meetings LNOs should attend are the commander’s update briefing and the operations synchronization meeting. These meetings provide a summary of current operations and future planning and operations. While LNOs may not be able to attend all meetings, some meetings are particularly worthwhile. LNOs should seek guidance from military staff officers as to which meetings to attend.

• LNOs should consider maintaining a journal throughout their assignment to a supported headquarters. The running estimate, for the staff section to which an LNO is assigned, is another document into which an LNO has input. This document captures current operations, status of operations, and planning efforts, and may provide rapid reference to brief decision makers in a quick-breaking or crisis response.

• LNOs should be aware of information management systems used in the headquarters and receive instruction on how to use them. In some instances, however, based upon the security clearance required, communications systems may not be available to LNOs.
Appendix M

References and Resource Websites

Presidential Directives and National Security Strategy
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 – National Preparedness, 30 MAR 2011
PPD 23 – U.S. Security Sector Assistance, 05 APR 2013

2015 National Security Strategy

United States Codes (USC)
Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385)
Title 10 USC, Armed Forces
Title 14 USC, Coast Guard
Title 32 USC, National Guard

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI)
CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, 12 DEC 2008 (current as of 05 SEP 2013)
CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 26 JUN 2015
CJCSI 3155.01A, Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) Operational Framework Policy, 15 AUG 2013

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals (CJCSM)
CJCSM 3130.01A, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities, 25 NOV 2014
CJCSM 3150.25A, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 12 SEP 2012

Government Training Aids (GTA)
GTA 90-01-020, Defense Support of Civil Authorities Handbook, 30 JUL 2010
GTA 90-01-021, Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit (includes Liaison Officer Toolkit), 30 JUL 2010
GTA 90-01-030, Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below), 13 JUL 2011
Joint Publications (JP)

JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 MAR 2013


JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, 16 JUL 2014


JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, 24 JUN 2011


JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, 12 JUL 2010


JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 03 JAN 2014


JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*, 30 JUN 2011


Other Joint Publications


**Department of Defense Directives (DODD)**

DODD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 29 DEC 2010

DODD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, 06 JUL 2012


**Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA PAM)**


**Army Regulations**


AR 380-5, *Department of the Army Information Security Program*, 29 SEP 2000

**Army Doctrine Publications (ADP)**

ADP 1, *The Army*, 17 SEP 2012

ADP 1-01, *Doctrine Primer*, 02 SEP 2014

ADP 1-02, *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*, 31 OCT 2012

ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 OCT 2011

ADP 3-07, *Stability*, 31 AUG 2012

ADP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 26 JUL 2012

ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 MAY 2012

ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 12 MAR 14

**Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP)**

ADRP 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*, 02 FEB 2015

ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 16 MAY 2012

ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 14 JUN 2013
ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 MAY 2012
ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 MAY 2012

**Army Techniques Publications (ATP)**
ATP 3-91, *Division Operations*, 17 OCT 2014
ATP 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, 26 NOV 2014

**Army Field Manuals (FM)**
FM 1-04, *Legal Support to the Operational Army*, 18 MAR 2013
FM 3-07, *Stability*, 02 JUN 2014
FM 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, 08 APR 2014
FM 3-21.21, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion*, 08 APR 2003
FM 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Team*, 14 SEP 2010
FM 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, 21 APR 2014
FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 05 MAY 2014

**Other Army Publications**
2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance
2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance
2014 Army Strategic Guidance for Security Cooperation
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR) Handbook for the Joint Task Force Commanders and Below, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Publications
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, Army Operating Concept, 07 OCT 2014
TRADOC Pamphlet 525.8.5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, 24 FEB 2014
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Manual

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Publications
CALL Newsletter 10-34, Whole of Government in the Economic Sector, MAR 2010
CALL Newsletter 11-02, Complex Operations II, NOV 2010
CALL Newsletter 11-22, The Army in Interagency Operations, MAR 2011

Resource Websites
Army Publications: http://armypubs.army.mil
CALL public website (NIPR): http://call.army.mil

Other References

Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below), Headquarters, United States Southern Command, 13 JUL 2011.


Yodsampa, Andrea Strimling. Coordinating for Results Lessons from a Case Study of Interagency Coordination in Afghanistan, Tufts University, 01 OCT 2013 (available at: https://www.pksoi.org/index.cfm?disp=doc_lib.cfm&pid=146&access=display).


To help you access information quickly and efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL website.

http://call.army.mil

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the “Contact Us” link of the CALL website.

If your unit has identified lessons or best practices or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

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- Initial Impressions Reports

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http://usacac.army.mil

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)


Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/ksi/csipubs.asp.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://finso.leavenworth.army.mil>.
Military Review (MR)
MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)
TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA at <https://atn.army.mil/media/dat/TRISA/trisa.aspx> (CAC login required).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)
CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
JCISFA’s mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

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