



NEWSLETTER



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Security Force Assistance



Shaping and Mentoring Afghan Police

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

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Introduction

The following collection of articles focuses on security force assistance (SFA) and specifically on shaping and mentoring Afghanistan's internal police and security forces. Afghanistan presents a unique challenge to U.S. Army forces in the geographical, cultural, economic, political, and security dimensions. Providing protection and security to a unique and diverse tribal population is an essential aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. The proficiency, integrity, and loyalty of Afghan police forces are essential to accomplishing a secure environment and to sustaining success. The following articles cover a range of issues related to SFA and the training of Afghan national police and border police with the specific intent of establishing best practices and lessons learned. The collection should not be considered all-inclusive. This is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional journals or maintained by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other joint archives to inform Soldiers about relevant observations, insights, and lessons and to provide a historical document for future reference.

In many instances, the ideas presented in these articles are personal opinion; in some cases, they are not limited to Army doctrine. The recommendations in these articles should always be validated with the latest approved Army and joint doctrine.

CALL acknowledges and thanks the professional journal staffs and authors who permitted, and in some cases assisted, with the reprinting of these articles. CALL would also like to express its appreciation to U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Brian P. Seymour for the photograph used on the front cover.

Minor modifications to format were made to support the CALL newsletter format. In some instances, pictures not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space. Additionally, biographies were eliminated to avoid release of personal information.

Community Defense in Afghanistan

Dr. Seth Jones

Reprinted with permission from the 2nd Quarter 2010 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

Since the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, which established an interim Afghan government, the United States and international community have focused on building Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces as the linchpin to security. While necessary, national security forces have never been sufficient to establish security in Afghanistan. This strategy reflects a Western understanding of the “state,” more appropriate for U.S. efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II. Both of these nations had histories of strong central governmental institutions and competent technocrats. But Afghanistan is a much different state and combines a central government in Kabul, fiercely independent tribes in Nuristan and Pashtun areas, and a range of ethnic minorities in the west, north, and center. As illustrated during Afghanistan’s most recent stable period, from 1929 to 1978, security has historically required a synergy of top-down efforts from the central government and bottom-up efforts from local tribes and other communities. Based on this reality, America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy needs to better incorporate working with tribal and other community forces in Afghanistan, with a direct link to the Afghan government.

This article outlines the development of *local defense forces in Afghanistan*, which should be leveraged along with other efforts to build the ANA and ANP, counter the pervasive corruption, and improve governance.¹ It begins by outlining the importance of protecting the local population, especially the challenge of relying only on Afghan National Security Forces to establish order in rural areas. It then examines the historical precedent for working with tribal and other local defense forces. It concludes by outlining a community defense initiative that needs to be carefully monitored and shaped by the Afghan government and international community.

Protecting the Population

Successful counterinsurgency requires protecting the local population and gaining its support — or at least acquiescence. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents need the support of the population to win. “The only territory you want to hold,” one study concluded, “is the six inches between the ears of the *campesino* [peasant].”² British General Sir Frank Kitson argued that the population is a critical element in COIN operations, as “this represents the water in which the fish swims.”³ Kitson borrowed the reference to the water and fish from one of the 20th century’s most successful insurgents, Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, who wrote that there is an inextricable link in insurgencies “between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it.”⁴

One of the most significant challenges in Afghanistan has been protecting the local population, especially in rural areas. Some studies argue that a rough estimate needed to win a counterinsurgency is 20 security forces per 1,000 inhabitants.⁵ As the U.S. Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency* manual notes, “Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.”⁶ This ratio translates into a force requirement of approximately 660,000 troops for Afghanistan, which

has approximately 33 million people. Yet these numbers do not provide a clear roadmap, and they certainly do not take into consideration such variables as the competence of local forces and what types of forces should be used. For example, what percentage of the forces should be international versus Afghan? Among Afghan forces, what percentage should be national versus local?

There is no clear-cut answer — and certainly no magic number — of U.S. and Afghan forces to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign and establish security. Most public discussions in the United States have focused on increasing the number of international, ANA, and ANP forces. But there will likely be a gap of at least 150,000 troops to secure the Afghan population, even with the projected increases in Afghan National Security Forces.⁷ More importantly, even during Afghanistan's most recent stable period — the 1929–1978 Musahiban dynasty led by Nadir Shah, Daoud Khan, and Zahir Shah — central government forces generally did not establish security at the village level. Instead, local forces assumed that task in rural areas. In Pashtun areas, the role of tribes has been particularly important.

The tribal structure has evolved over the past several decades because of such factors as war, drought, migration patterns, and sedentarization.

Tribes, subtribes, clans, *qawms*, and other local institutions have historically played an important role in Afghanistan. A *qawm* is a unit of identification and solidarity, and could be based on kinship, residence, or occupation.⁸ Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of behavior, shapes daily life through such concepts as *badal* (revenge), *melmastia* (hospitality), *ghayrat* (honor), and *nanawati* (sanctuary). The tribal structure has evolved over the past several decades because of such factors as war, drought, migration patterns, and sedentarization, the process by which tribes cease seasonal or nomadic lifestyles and settle in permanent habitats. The 1978 tribal rebellion against the communist regime and subsequent Soviet invasion initiated a cycle of warfare causing massive displacement among tribes.⁹ The departure of the Soviets in 1989 ushered in another civil war among competing factions that triggered mass migration.¹⁰

Nonetheless, the tribal structure remains strong in many Pashtun areas of western, southern, and eastern Afghanistan, and *jirgas* and *shuras* remain instrumental in decision making at the local level. A *jirga* has historically been a council established on a temporary basis to address specific issues, while a *shura* has been a more permanent consultative council. However, the terms are often used interchangeably. Tribes tend to be more hierarchical in southern and western Afghanistan than in the east. The southern Durrani tribes, for instance, are divided between the Panjpai (including the Alizai, Ishakzai, Khugiani, Maku, and Noorzai) and the Zirak (Achakzai, Alikozai, Barakzai, and Popalzai). In some areas, the Taliban appear to be currying favor with some of the Panjpai tribes—including some of the Ishakzai, Alizai, and Noorzai subtribes—against the Zirak tribes.¹¹ However, there appear to be opportunities to coopt a range of Durrani and other communities across Afghanistan to help them establish village-level security.

A History of Bottom-up Security

Establishing security in Afghanistan has generally been a combination of top-down efforts by the central government, whose forces have established security in major cities and along key roads, crushed revolts and rebellions, and mediated intratribal disputes, and bottom-up efforts from local tribes and other communities, whose forces have established security at the village level in rural areas.

The bulk of the current insurgency is occurring in Pashtun areas. There are at least five traditional Pashtun institutions for organizing local security forces. In each case, they implement decisions of tribal jirgas or shuras. A *tsalweshtai* is a guard force. Members of the tribe are appointed for a special purpose, such as protecting a valley from raiding groups. An *arbakai* is similar to a *tsalweshtai* and is a tribal police force. Members supervise the implementation of the tribal jirga's decisions. *Arbakai* have been most prolific among the Pashtun tribes in such eastern provinces as Paktia, Khowst, and Paktika. A *chagha* is a group of fighters raised spontaneously within a village when faced by a bandit raid, robbery, or similar threat. *Chagha* is also the word for the drum used to alert villagers of the need to organize and drive off invaders. A *chalweshtai* is a larger force than a *tsalweshtai* and is raised by the tribe from families to implement tribal decisions. A *chalweshtai* may be engaged in community projects, such as digging a canal or building a dam, but they are more commonly used to perform security tasks. A *lashkar* is a body of tribesmen organized to deal with a large-scale problem, and is often used for offensive purposes.¹²

Tribal and other local forces have been used throughout the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Beginning in 1880, Abdul Rahman Khan made one of the first attempts at modern state-building in Afghanistan and tried to establish an independent army. But he still relied on tribal levies in Pashtun areas. During his two-decade rule, the tribal levies were helpful in establishing order, though he still faced armed opposition from Hazaras, Aimaqs, Nuristanis, and various Pashtun tribal confederations throughout the country.¹³

In 1929, Nadir Shah assembled a tribal army to capture Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani, and he used tribal forces against an uprising by the Shinwari subtribes and Tajiks in Kabul. These forces were effective in overthrowing the Kalakani government and establishing order, though they did face some resistance from Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras.¹⁴ When Nadir Shah took power, he exempted some tribes in eastern Afghanistan from conscription in the military and police. *Arbakai* were used as a police force by tribal jirgas to implement their decisions or to respond to specific threats against the community or tribe. During the reign of King Zahir Shah, the government often did not provide direct salaries to the *arbakai* in Loya Paktia, but instead gave privileged status, property, money, advisory roles, and exclusion from military service to tribal authorities.¹⁵

Pakistan also has a history of using tribal institutions. In 1947, the newly formed state used *lashkars* in an attempt to seize Kashmir before the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir could join India. Most were from the Mahsud, Afridi, and Mohmand tribes, though there were also some Kashmiri auxiliaries. Pakistan General Akbar Khan organized the forces and had loose command and control. Ultimately, however, the *lashkars* were not effective in securing Kashmir because they faced a much better organized Indian army, and many of the *lashkar* fighters were not from the areas they fought in, undermining their legitimacy.¹⁶ Pakistan also used *lashkars* during Operation Gibraltar in 1965 to liberate Kashmir from Indian control. They were trained and led by Pakistan's Special Services Group, as well as Azad Kashmir and Jammu officers. Much like in 1947, however, they were ineffective. The *lashkars* were defeated by regular Indian forces, and were viewed as illegitimate by locals since few if any of the commanders spoke Kashmiri.¹⁷ In both the 1947 and 1965 cases, tribal *lashkars* were used with little success for prolonged offensive operations against much better equipped and organized armies.

Tribal and other local forces have been used throughout the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Afghan government used tribal forces more effectively in some areas. The Zahir Shah government used Shinwari, Mohmand, and Khogyani *arbakai* to establish order in eastern Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s. The government handed over a section of irrigated land to the tribal jirgas, which was intended to help cover *arbakai* expenses. The amount of land ranged from 1,000 square meters per small village with one or two *arbakai* members to 8,000 square meters for bigger groups of *arbakai*.¹⁸ Unlike the previous Pakistan *lashkars*, these *arbakai* were used primarily for defensive purposes and were organized under the auspices of legitimate tribal institutions, contributing to their effectiveness. In Nuristan, villages established local defense forces to protect their areas. As one assessment of the Vaygal Valley of south-central Nuristan concluded, “The survival of Kalasha villages depended on careful, unrelenting attention to defensive arrangements” since there was virtually no government presence in the area.¹⁹

By the time the Soviets invaded in 1979, a range of anti-Soviet and progovernment militias were established throughout the country. Some were tribal forces, while others — such as Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Jowzjani militia — were centered on charismatic, powerful commanders. There were some successful uses of *arbakai* during the Soviet era. In several Afghan refugee camps in the Haripur area of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, for instance, *arbakai* were raised from among the refugees. These groups of unpaid volunteers worked effectively to help maintain law and order, discourage harassment of girls, and prevent theft.²⁰ The Soviets attempted to establish a range of tribal militias, mostly under the direct control of the Afghan Ministry of Interior. They were not particularly effective, partly because the Afghan government was so illegitimate, and they were used for offensive purposes.²¹ In addition, each of the main mujahideen parties had fairly large militia forces.²² Those forces were helpful in overthrowing the Soviet-backed government and driving Soviet forces out of Afghanistan, but they were deeply counterproductive over the long run as Afghanistan slipped into anarchy. Many turned on each other in a bid to control Kabul, creating a window of opportunity for the Taliban to rise in 1994. Ultimately, they were not effective in establishing order because they centered on charismatic individuals rather than legitimate tribal institutions, were excessively large and well armed, used for offensive missions, and operated in a governance vacuum since the government had stopped functioning. The accompanying table highlights some of the most significant historical uses of local forces.

| Tribal and Other Local Forces, 1880 until Today | | | |
|---|--------------------------|---|--|
| Case | Dates | Objective | Effectiveness |
| Abdul Rahman Khan's Pashtun tribal levies | 1880–1901 | Establish order with aid of army | Established order, though Abdul Rahman Khan had to deal with some rebellions |
| <i>Arbakai</i> and other tribal forces during Musahiban dynasty | 1929–1978 | Establish village-level security with aid of government | Established security |
| Pakistan <i>lashkars</i> in Kashmir | 1947–1948 and 1965 | Seize Kashmir | Did not secure Kashmir; <i>lashkars</i> not local and minimally effective for offensive purposes |
| Anti-Soviet tribal forces | 1979–1989 | Defeat Soviet and Afghan armies | Ultimately defeated the Soviet and Afghan armies |
| Pro-Soviet tribal forces | 1984–1989 | Help establish order in rural areas | Not effective, partly because Afghan government was so illegitimate and used for offensive purposes |
| Militias during the civil war (Dostum, Massoud, and Hekmatyar) | Late 1980s/early 1990s | Control Kabul | Did not establish order because militias were large, offensive, and ultimately unpopular among Afghans |
| Popalzai, Barakzai, and other tribal forces | November 2001–March 2002 | Control Uruzgan, Kandahar, Zabol, and Helmand Provinces | Helped overthrow Taliban and established initial security and order |

Table 1-1

A Community Defense Approach

Based on the historical use of local security forces and the current realities in Afghanistan, a community defense strategy should be organized around several principles:

- identifying grassroots initiative
- utilizing legitimate local institutions such as shuras and jirgas
- ensuring the Afghan government is the lead for monitoring and overseeing community defense programs
- providing a quick reaction force to aid endangered communities
- establishing development assistance.

The term *community defense* is used here instead of *tribal defense* or *tribal engagement* because, as noted earlier, the tribal structure has weakened or ceased to exist in some areas.

Grassroots. A community defense initiative should begin from the bottom up, not from top-down efforts by the Afghan government or coalition forces. This development is critical; a local defense force will only be effective where locals view it as in their interest. Two types of opportunities are particularly apropos. The first are cases where tribes, subtribes, clans, *qawms*, or other local communities have already come to the Afghan or coalition governments asking for assistance against insurgent groups. The second are cases where tribes or other local institutions have already resisted insurgents. Fortunately, there are a range of grassroots initiatives where local tribes and communities have resisted insurgents or asked Afghan or coalition forces for assistance. They extend from Noorzais, Barakzais, and Alikozais in the west and south to Shinwaris, Kharotis, Mangals, Chamkanis, and Jajis in the east. Even in such northern provinces as Konduz and Baghlan Districts, there are ongoing local efforts by Tajiks, Uzbeks, and even Pashtuns to fight the Taliban and other insurgents. There appear to be several reasons for these developments. In some areas of eastern Afghanistan, such as Konar and Nangarhar Provinces, some communities have lost faith with local police forces, which are perceived as corrupt and incompetent. In such northern provinces as Konduz and Baghlan, locals have created forces because they fear a spreading Taliban insurgency and are seeking additional protection.

Legitimate Local Institutions. Local forces such as *arbakai* have generally been most effective when they are developed through legitimate local institutions. Indeed, jirgas and shuras represent the Pashtun version of a democratic institution, since participants are leaders who represent their tribal and other constituents.²³ In practical terms, the jirga or shura should decide whether they want a local defense force, choose who should participate, oversee what tasks it performs, coordinate with Afghan government officials, and decide when to disband it. A 2008 survey by the Asia Foundation indicated that most Afghans did not trust warlords, and only 4 percent would turn to a local warlord to deal with a security problem.²⁴ As noted earlier, forces under the control of warlords have generally been unpopular because they are used to benefit individuals rather than tribes or other institutions. In addition, local forces have often been most effective when they are viewed as supporting nearby interests, especially defending villages for the sake of the village rather than the central government or foreigners.

Afghan Lead. Any community defense program must be Afghan-led. Xenophobic Afghans oppose a large, overt foreign military footprint.²⁵ Taliban propaganda consistently refers to the war as one against foreign occupation. One Taliban propaganda message warned Afghans that “the Americans themselves have unveiled their antagonistic nature toward the Afghans, and disclosed their ill-fated objectives considering the killing of the Afghans, burning them in more furnaces of war, and torturing them as a U.S. duty and main course of action.”²⁶ A community defense program must be perceived by the local population as defending their own interests, organized and run exclusively by the local jirga and shura, and not beholden to any outsiders. Nonetheless, the Afghan government can — and must — provide the resources and capabilities to support community defense programs. This could be done in several ways. Provincial governors and district subgovernors should participate in community defense shuras and jirgas to help oversee the program and provide assistance when able. Their role may be particularly important when community defense programs occur in areas with multiple tribes to assist in mediation. In Chamkani District in Paktia Province, for example, many tribes have opposed the Taliban and other insurgents, including the Jajis, Chamkanis, Mangals, and Moqbils. But they have also engaged in land and other disputes among themselves. In addition, ANA and ANP forces must be involved in helping vet community defense members, training them in basic defensive tactics, sharing information with them, and establishing a community system that can respond in emergencies.

A local defense force will only be effective where locals view it as in their interest.

Avoiding the appearance that a local defense force is an American program does not mean withholding U.S. participation. Instead, the American footprint should be minimal. There are several specific actions that U.S. forces can take to minimize public exposure. One is to work with ANA and ANP forces to provide basic training and guidance to a local defense force (a train-the-trainer program). A case-by-case evaluation should be made on what training is needed based on the competence of local security forces, threat level in the area, and competence of ANA and ANP forces conducting training. To facilitate these activities, coalition forces should live in or around the villages where community defense programs are established to help ensure that they are not used for offensive purposes or come under the control of warlords. This means buying or renting *qalats*, or safe houses, in villages. U.S. Special Forces are ideally suited for implementing this type of program, which has similarities to the Robin Sage training exercise conducted at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Quick Reaction Capability. Pakistan has repeatedly tried to raise *lashkars* against militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province but has often failed to protect them from retaliation. In December 2008, Pir Samiullah organized a *lashkar* against militants in Swat, but the retaliation from local militants was swift. He and eight supporters were captured and executed publicly.²⁷ In Bajaur, local militants retaliated by conducting a series of suicide bombings and assassinations when the Salarzai tribe established *lashkars* to assist Pakistan security forces. They slit the throats of four Hilal Khel tribal leaders from the Charmang area of Bajaur who had organized a *lashkar* against militants, dumping their bodies along a road.²⁸

Consequently, an essential part of any local defense force should be establishing a rapid reaction capability that is on standby to come to the assistance of the community. This quick reaction force could be composed of ANA, ANP, and coalition units. It would be counterproductive to have local communities stand up to the Taliban, Haqqani network, and other groups and be overrun. Providing security to the local population should be the top priority of coalition forces, as opposed to chasing the enemy and killing enemy combatants.²⁹ This requires establishing a communications system that connects villages to the quick reaction force to ensure the call for help is received in a timely manner. It may require providing cell phones, Thurayas satellite phones, or radios to villages to contact ANA, ANP, and coalition forces. Communication between a local defense force and the quick reaction force should be not only for rapid response, but also for general intelligence regarding enemy movements in the area and information on their activities and capabilities.

Development. U.S. and other coalition forces should generally not pay local defense members a regular salary, since they should be motivated to work for their communities and not outsiders. A better approach may be to provide development aid that benefits the communities. A rising complaint against the Afghan government is that it has not provided basic services to the population, especially in rural areas.³⁰ To achieve maximum impact, community elders should be asked what projects their communities need rather than have outside development experts make that determination. Indeed, the U.S. Agency for International Development has developed a framework to identify, prioritize, and mitigate the causes of instability — and to serve as a baseline for development aid — called the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework. It includes a range of questions to ask villagers, such as: Have there been changes in

the village population in the last year? What are the most important problems facing the village? Whom do you believe can solve your problems? What should be done first to help the village?

The goal should be to implement development projects with a COIN focus. The primary goal should not necessarily be to improve literacy or infant mortality rates, but to encourage more people to turn against insurgents. Coordination with Afghanistan's Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other development organizations is important to facilitate the implementation of projects and to provide incentives for communities establishing local defense forces.

An effective COIN strategy that secures the local population needs to focus on improving the competence of the ANA and ANP, counter corruption, and improve broader governance in Afghanistan. But it also needs to include leveraging a range of bottom-up initiatives where tribes and other local communities have resisted the Taliban. Former U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O'Neill could have been talking about Afghanistan when he quipped that "all politics is local." Establishing local defense forces where there is a local initiative should be encouraged. But the efforts also need to be carefully managed by the Afghan government, with support from coalition forces. "We need to subcontract security in some areas to local villagers," Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar remarked. "And then let Afghan and coalition forces target insurgents in between."³¹ In short, villages that established local defense forces would provide self-defense in their villages — and only in their villages — and ANA, ANP, and coalition forces could conduct offensive operations outside of villages.

Coalition forces should live in or around the villages where community defense programs are established.

A carefully implemented and managed community defense initiative should be able to minimize the risks and maximize the benefits of leveraging local security forces. Keeping forces small, defensive, under the direct control of local jirgas and shuras, and monitored by Afghan national and coalition forces should prevent the rise of warlords in Afghanistan. Indeed, Afghan and coalition forces can learn several lessons from the successful and unsuccessful use of local security forces to establish security.

One is that local defense forces need to be tied to legitimate community institutions, especially village-level shuras and jirgas. This means empowering legitimate institutions that have historically contributed to local security and the rule of law. It also means preventing local forces from becoming hijacked by warlords. The last three decades of warfare in Afghanistan were littered with efforts to establish forces under the control of warlords, whose fighters were loyal to them and not the communities. Another lesson is that local forces need to be small, defensive, and geared toward protecting villages. Between 1929 and 1978, Afghan leaders such as Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan supported local security forces in much of rural Afghanistan. A final lesson is that the Afghan government needs to manage the process. The objective should be to help tribes, subtribes, and communities provide security and justice in their areas and help the government manage the process. When tribes rebel against the government or fight each other, Afghan government and coalition forces can crush the uprising or mediate the disputes.

A range of tribes and local communities have already expressed a desire to stand up to the Taliban and other insurgents. The Afghan government and coalition forces need to take advantage of these opportunities. As one senior Afghan government official recently said to me, "It's the only way out of this situation."³²

Endnotes

1. The World Bank ranked Afghanistan among the top 1 percent of countries as most corrupt, and Transparency International ranked it 176th of 180. See World Bank, *Governance Matters 2009: World Governance Indicators, 1996–2008* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009); Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index* (Berlin: Transparency International, 2008).
2. Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, “El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited,” in *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties*, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 119.
3. Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971), 49. On counterinsurgency strategies, also see C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3d edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 34–42; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1964), 17–42.
4. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 93.
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**The Maneuver Company in Afghanistan:
Establishing Counterinsurgency Priorities at the District Level**

COL Michael R. Fenzel

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The basic unit of counterinsurgency warfare is the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This is the most important unit in counterinsurgency operations, the level where most of the practical problems arise, where the war is won or lost.

— David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

The recent shift in national concern from Iraq to Afghanistan and the increase in forces committed by the Obama administration have directed greater attention to the current problems in Afghanistan. United States forces and coalition partners are working on many fronts to secure a stable future for the country, but they face more than a few obstacles. At the macro level, the Afghan central government is weak and plagued by corruption and indifference to the plight of its rural constituency, yet without tribal accord, the government has no real chance of extending its reach to the rest of the country. The Afghan National Army, Police, and Border Police are increasing their numbers and improving their skills but, with the exception of a few exceptional Afghan National Army battalions, they are not yet capable of operating on their own. The poppy fields and drug trade in southern and eastern Afghanistan continue to flourish. The border with Pakistan remains porous enough for a resurgent Taliban to use it as its primary and most unfettered means of infiltration into remote rural sections of the country. These are just a few of the many problems for the government of Afghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition.

Many authors, strategists, and politicians have offered measured opinions and recommendations on how to improve the situation, but most agree that to fix these problems and allow Afghanistan to develop without the constant pressure of an insurgency, we must establish and maintain security and develop governance in the rural districts.

Completing these tasks may appear impossible to a casual observer of the conflict. Indeed, while fighting a growing insurgency, coalition casualties mount. Historically, the rural population in modern Afghanistan has rejected all large-scale reforms attempted by a central government. Unfortunately, change acceptable to the tribes will simply not come from the center. Establishing security in this war-torn land is achievable only if we focus our efforts and resources at the district level, where the sub-tribes are culturally dominant.

Nowhere in Afghanistan is this more pressing than along the border of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is commonly accepted that the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other foreign fighters use the FATA as a safe haven from which to plan, resource, stage, and launch attacks in the border districts and deeper into Afghanistan's interior. Since 2006, the number of foreign insurgents involved in the border fight has substantially increased, which strengthens the insurgency and decreases security. The struggle to secure this area has become the front line in the counterinsurgency fight and the coalition's most important strategic task.

If we can establish security and stabilize the border provinces and districts in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the accompanying momentum may guide the rest of the country to a sustainable peace. The problem is that the insurgents are most effective in these rural areas, and limited troop levels make challenging them on a wider scale a confounding proposition.

I propose a fundamental shift in the way we think about fighting the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. To set the conditions for success, we need to engage tribal leaders and establish a district-level security architecture in which the district governor is the key leader elected by the *shura*. In conjunction, we need a bottom-up focus that places the coalition maneuver company commander where he can work closely with the district governor. Next, we need to redistribute critical assets now located at the provincial level down to the district level. Afghan security forces should be redistributed to districts and rural areas, and we should dismantle entities like the provincial reconstruction teams and reassign those assets to the maneuver battalions for use in the maneuver companies at the district level. Finally, we need to integrate native Afghan intellectual capital into our maneuver company operations to improve cultural engagement and provide expertise in critical development skills.

Tribal Influence

To create the environment for such advances, we begin by reinforcing the role of the tribes. We've taken the first steps toward establishing security when we recognize and embrace the prestige and broad power base of tribal elders and accept the influence of the mullahs. Invading armies throughout history have failed to understand the tribal structure that has always defined this nation. Breaking this troubling paradigm is the first challenge for a refocused U.S.-led coalition. We cannot engage just a handful of tribes for this mission. There is no one ruler in Kabul that can consolidate the loyalty of all tribes in Afghanistan. Rather, we must reach out to every sub-tribe in each of the 398 districts across the country. The real power and potential in Afghanistan exists among the local tribes in the rural areas.

Developing governance capacity at the district level is a low-level affair, but hugely important. Currently, provincial governors appoint district governors, often favored friends and acquaintances, not men of the people or even of the local tribes. The vast majority of provincial council members do not live in the provinces they represent. For this reason, provincial councilmen are almost entirely irrelevant to their constituencies. The current flawed process of selection, rather than election, almost guarantees that the appointed district governor will be irrelevant as well. This method rarely yields a close connection with the elders—it must be changed to meet the cultural threshold of what is acceptable and suitable.

Everything of intrinsic value to Afghans is rooted in honor, reputation, and familial pride. The current method of selecting district governors is arbitrary and antithetical to the tribal culture and Pashtun traditions of selecting leaders. There should be no quibbling with a method that meets the demands of democratic traditions, eschews the non-inclusive self-selection modes of warlordism, and reinforces the real power and influence of Afghan communities—the *shura* of elders.

Setting conditions for success. Counterinsurgency forces routinely engage the leaders of the district sub-tribes, or *shura* elders, throughout Afghanistan. Once legitimate governors take office, the coalition must integrate them into the counterinsurgency effort. The key component

for successful counterinsurgency efforts is the coalition maneuver company and its commander. A company commander is, in effect, the counterpart to the Afghan district governor. The tribal elders are not his counterparts; indeed, it is the responsibility of the company commander to ensure that the district governor maintains a close relationship with the elders and acts as the immediate interlocutor between them and the provincial government.

When these young commanders have proper direction and focus, they can identify where to channel resources and effort in a way no other counterinsurgent leader can replicate. Much of their insight comes from the weekly shuras in the district centers where they are often guests. District centers are the focal point for all government and economic activity and clearly places where counterinsurgent forces must have a significant presence. Coalition forces that have spent considerable time among the people understand that these district centers are the places that must become well-defended Afghan National Security Force bastions and political centers from which the district governors function. A district governor should conduct business with the full backing and strength of a sizeable Afghan police and security force operating from the district center. Where better to position Afghan forces in a rural Afghan counterinsurgency than among rural Afghans?

The vision for effective local government administration in Afghanistan includes the district center as the point of initiation for all Afghan-led political, development, and security operations. The district center is already a local nerve center—it must also become the security epicenter. This is the first fundamental change to effect across the country. There are six important steps to take in every district in every province:

- Tribal elders within a district shura must elect a district governor they trust.
- A well-trained police chief must be appointed and he should have no less than 30 police officers to maintain order.
- District centers must be reinforced with coalition support and funds for governance and economic activity (with a designated development stipend to facilitate reconstruction programming).
- Each Afghan district must have no less than one company of the Afghan National Army garrisoned at the district center; their mission must be to conduct counterinsurgency operations and their primary task must be to engage daily with the population.
- A point security force must be emplaced (Afghan public protection force of 30 guards) in each district that reports directly to the district governor and guards the district center and other sites at risk of Taliban attack (i.e., girls' schools, bazaars, etc.).
- A district-level and native Afghan National Directorate of Security chief must be assigned and, through appropriate coalition oversight, a robust informant network developed to counter Taliban human intelligence efforts and provide early warning.

These six critical steps would set the stage for an immediate counterinsurgency advance because they focus exclusively on the protection of the Afghan people, the center of gravity in this war. The adoption of this district-centric approach places the execution of the war at the appropriate level.

Blended security architecture. Putting this strategic approach into operation demands a security architecture with an appropriate blend of command, control, coordination, and crosstalk among the key players. Figure 2-1 illustrates how the district-level structure might look. Establishing these baseline capabilities would empower district governors to move beyond their understandable preoccupation with self-preservation and begin working for the people in the villages that comprise each district. The direct link between the district governor and the district shura is deliberate. The district governor should be answerable to the shura of elders that elect him to the office. This will require a paradigm shift and support for this method at the national level in Kabul.




Figure 2-1. Optimal Afghan district security structure.

Once these changes are in place in the districts, the governors will be in a much better position to counter Taliban intimidation. A great deal of credence is paid to the importance of governance and development in Afghanistan, but until there is an environment where the average Afghan feels empowered to resist the armed thugs that fill the ranks of the Taliban, the insurgency will continue to grow. We must integrate the district governor into the security architecture and support him over time to ensure sustained advances. Until this type of structure exists at the local level, no political official will enjoy credibility among the tribes. Stability in Afghanistan will emerge at the district level through a structure that reinforces cultural traditions and provides an armed force to underwrite the authority of a district governor elected by the district’s tribal elders.

Stability in Afghanistan will emerge at the district level through a structure that reinforces cultural traditions.

Optimizing Afghan National Security Forces

The current number of coalition forces available in Afghanistan, even with the original 2009 surge of 21,000 Soldiers and Marines, is insufficient to combat the Taliban’s district offensives. The coming surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops should address this short-fall, but it is not likely to change insurgent tactics or what up until now has been an effective strategy. Despite

what the high number of coalition casualties since 2008 reflects, the Taliban and foreign fighters focus more on preventing cooperation and severing the link between the coalition force and local Afghans than they do on direct action against coalition forces. This adjustment in insurgent strategy was a matter of necessity. Because U.S. and other coalition forces have continually dealt significant blows to the insurgents in direct contact, the insurgents have turned to coercion, intimidation, and terrorism to send a clear message to the Afghan population—“coalition and Afghan security forces cannot protect you.” The insurgents reiterate this message in night letters with accompanying threats to the local population. Historically, the Taliban has targeted district governors, contractors, and coalition force base employees and their families. The Taliban has displayed a knack for attacking targets of opportunity. Increasingly, these targets have become Afghan security forces and Afghan Public Protection Force personnel. As an insurgent strategy, this approach is very effective in keeping counterinsurgent forces off balance and preventing the population from believing that things have somehow improved.

The center of gravity of this mission is protecting the Afghan people and assisting them in meeting their basic needs. This requires robust Afghan security resources at the local and district level, not at the regional level. This comprehensive effort should start with a more optimal distribution of Afghan National Security Forces.

The Afghan National Security Forces living on large forward operating bases need to move into the rural districts ...

The Afghan National Security Forces living on large forward operating bases need to move into the rural districts where the population is at risk and position themselves in the locations that can best facilitate constant engagement with the people. Only then can we effectively cross the pronounced cultural divide into the tribal areas of rural Afghanistan. In order for Afghan National Security Forces to become capable enough to meet this challenge, every single unit and detachment must formally partner with coalition forces. This will only lead to positive effects. Some of these changes are already underway.

Afghan National Army. With the current top-down approach, Afghan National Security Forces are often in general support at the provincial level with specific fixed site security responsibilities. We must change this relationship to make the district level the ascendant strategic focus. The Afghan National Army is growing steadily in capability. However, its soldiers are typically deployed in battalion-sized elements and centrally located. In fact, the rural areas generally do not benefit from the existing array of these forces in Afghanistan. We need to consider where they can achieve the most positive effects in counterinsurgency terms.

Optimally, one company of the Afghan National Army should be in each district and one coalition maneuver company should partner with it. These partnerships are necessary among the district governor, the district police chief, the Afghan National Army company commander and battalion commanders, and the coalition force company commander. Depending on the level of violence in a given district and the district’s size, it may well be feasible for one coalition force company to manage security in more than one district. In fact, in some cases one maneuver company could handle up to three districts, though there are obvious exceptions in larger districts. The commander would become the liaison to the district governors and have regular dealings with his counterparts. He would become the subject matter expert responsible for overall security and development in the districts. In this scenario, the primary task for coalition forces would be to achieve and maintain security, apply resources, help in reconstruction and

development, assist the district governors in matters of governance, and increase capacity with partnered Afghan security forces. This would continue until the Afghans are able to do the work themselves. Until they reach that point though, coalition forces must take the lead to establish a secure environment and foster growth.

Each Afghan National Army battalion currently deploys to a major forward operating base intended as a launching pad to project force. However, these forward operating bases have essentially become shields from insurgent forces and impediments to maintaining contact with the rural populations. Ideally, one brigade-sized element of the Afghan National Army should deploy to each province in Afghanistan. In certain larger provinces (with more districts) or where the threat is substantially higher, up to two Afghan National Army brigades may be appropriate. Afghan National Army battalions should be distributed over a series of districts and address security in no more than three districts. At least one Afghan National Army company should have a headquarters in each district. A “company-per-district” strategy should drive refinements to the Afghan National Army battalion and brigade battlespace. Every Afghan National Army element—whether company, battalion, or brigade—should have a coalition force counterpart unit to facilitate training, drive combined operations, and provide reinforcement *in extremis*. The logical formula is coalition maneuver companies paired with Afghan National Army battalions, and coalition battalions paired with Afghan National Army brigades.

At the district level, Afghan National Army companies should conduct counterinsurgency operations partnered with coalition forces based out of district centers, rather than from forward operating bases. This partnership must encompass all operations, from patrolling to training to regular engagement and standard counterinsurgency operations. Although this proposal may appear overly prescriptive, it is the only effective means to build a genuine and lasting capacity in the Afghan National Army and to strengthen the Afghan National Security Force’s connection to the Afghan people. Both of these goals are imperative to success.

Afghan National Police. The Afghan National Police suffer from a similarly poor distribution of forces. Often the provincial police chief has only a small pool of dependable Afghan police under his control. This makes clear the dearth of well-trained police available at this stage in the war. The police also suffer from insufficient resourcing, ineffective recruiting, and poor local training compared to the army. Ideally, the police would have no less than a platoon-sized force (30 police officers) in each district to back up the district governor and provide a credible deterrent to insurgents.

The appointment of an effective district police chief is critical to this process. In many ways, the mission of the Afghan National Police is more complex than that of the Afghan National Army because the police are responsible for enforcing Afghan law. The police need to focus on maintaining order, rooting out crime, and protecting the district center. Indeed, they should serve as the governor’s police force and operate out of a police station adjacent to the district center to facilitate their subordinate relationship to the governor and his priorities.

The demand for manpower is a significant issue. In larger districts, there might be a need for satellite district centers and police stations, and multiple checkpoints in between them and the district center. Securing all these locations is an incredible manpower drain. This role should be shouldered by the Afghan Public Protection Force, or a point security force, a brilliant innovation already in place that keeps the Afghan security force focused on its core counterinsurgency mission.

Innovation is an incredibly effective tool in a counterinsurgency unless it distracts from fundamentals. However, when it comes to establishing an overarching security structure, we must keep in mind that interactions through representatives, by either proxy or the Afghan Public Protection Force, cannot substitute for direct and constant contact with the population. The Afghan National Police must partner with other forces to optimize effectiveness and ensure direct contact with the Afghan people as the conflict continues. The Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army must routinely work together. At a more fundamental level, the seat of district-level government and focal point of counterinsurgency efforts must be both secure and dynamic.

Afghan Border Police. In districts along the border with Pakistan, the Afghan Border Police are charged with disrupting infiltration by the Taliban and foreign fighters. However, the border police are currently the most disorganized and least supported component of the security forces. Yet, in some districts, the border police are supplementing the Afghan National Police. The border police should focus exclusively on operating border combat outposts and checkpoints or they will lose their relevance as a part of the larger national security network. When coalition forces construct a combat outpost, a joint team of coalition forces and Afghan Border Police should initially operate the outposts along the border. When the border police are trained and strong enough, the coalition forces can pull back and let them handle it. The very nature of their mission requires that they work closely with the Afghan National Army to develop a sense of partnership and solidarity in the counterinsurgency fight.

The last refinement to the development of Afghan National Security Force capacity is the command relationship of the coalition force trainers to the maneuver battalion task force. Trainers must be responsive to the maneuver battalion and company task force priorities, instead of either developing their own independent priorities or following those of a distant headquarters detached from ongoing operations. Indeed, the coalition force trainers must be woven into a direct support relationship with the maneuver company to reinforce the already existing lines of control. For the training mission to be effective, coalition force trainers must be answerable to the maneuver battalion task force commander. Otherwise, there will always be the potential and even likelihood to work at cross purposes. Coalition training teams not directly responsible to a maneuver battalion task force commander may plan and conduct independent operations completely unaware of the threat picture or ongoing operations that may impact their plans. This is the complex reality of the training mission as it is carried out in the midst of a violent counterinsurgency. Training the Afghan security forces will always be a task that is carried out inside the combat mission, and it should be subordinate to that mission, given the consequences of failure. Partnership with the Afghans must be constant (both on patrols and in training)—we need to build their capacity and take the requisite and valuable time to coach, teach, and mentor. The combat mission is led by the maneuver force, and it is only logical that the training mission not ever be separated from it. The relationship of all security enablers to the maneuver task force must be clear and direct. It follows then that the reconstruction teams should fit into the same command structure.

... interactions through representatives ... cannot substitute for direct and constant contact with the population.

Push Down Critical Assets

Most important to this concept of reorganization in Afghanistan is empowering the company maneuver unit. We must meet the challenges unique to the Afghan counterinsurgency environment with new capabilities to lessen insurgent influence and provide a powerful advantage to the counterinsurgent. Key enablers and assets that perform more complex functions in the development realm have historically been distributed to the provincial and regional level. The value of these enablers at the district level is far greater, and the tactical impact is often immediate. These enablers have the potential to dramatically improve security and even achieve transformational effects.

To develop capacity at the district level we should consolidate certain critical assets at the maneuver company level. A maneuver company commander is the coalition lead at the local level for security, development, and governance. He is responsible for synchronizing the efforts of Afghan security forces and coalition enablers. If we keep development and security assets separate, efforts will be uncoordinated and fleeting at best, and damaging to district- and provincial-level counterinsurgency efforts at worst.

The provincial reconstruction team concept remains sound and still addresses a need that counterinsurgent strategists widely agree is imperative—building capacity and proceeding steadily along the development and governance lines of operation. Yet, eight years into the conflict, we must adapt the concept to the changed situation on the ground. The inefficiencies of the provincial reconstruction team model have become more apparent over the last three years. These teams need to be disassembled and the assets distributed to the district level to support counterinsurgency efforts in the rural areas and improve unity of command.

Provincial reconstruction teams are ill-equipped to address broader development and district-level governance challenges. Nearly all reconstruction teams are geographically separated from the rural sections of their assigned province, and they do not possess the capability to venture far beyond the population centers unless they plan their movements well in advance and operate in tandem with the maneuver battalion task force. This is certainly no fault of theirs and would be the case regardless of how well a provincial reconstruction team functioned. Regardless of the wealth of talent infused into the teams, circumstances and conditions will always challenge them and put them at a disadvantage. The reality is that a provincial reconstruction team's infrequent contact at the district level has the potential to render the concerted efforts it makes a distraction from the development plan a maneuver company may already be in the midst of implementing.

Provincial reconstruction team architecture and location is not the only problem with the teams. One imperative that we must address is the absence of true unity of command. By definition, establishing the hierarchy of command in a conflict environment requires clear lines of responsibility and authority that are not open to interpretation or dispute in the field. Units that fall outside of these command lines can become "orphans on the battlefield" and far more vulnerable to enemy attacks than a cohesive force that works through one commander. In a post-conflict environment, this may evolve to a looser structure where the objective is to achieve a cooperative—if not harmonious—effort. But when an enemy is actively threatening all lines of operation, the responsibility must be that of one military commander at the appropriate level in each battalion-level sector.

To address the existing problems of cooperation and coordination, we must abolish the stand-alone provincial reconstruction team and integrate its assets into the maneuver task force at the battalion level. This should remain a Joint and interagency effort, given the unique talents and perspectives each service and department brings to it.

In this case, a major or lieutenant commander, rather than a lieutenant colonel or Navy commander, would be the commander. Under these conditions, the existing civil affairs B-Team (the provincial reconstruction team project management section focused on brigade priorities) would then become part of the battalion civil affairs section to expand the maneuver battalion task force governance and development staff capabilities. The senior major would then become the seventh organic company level commander in the task force and the interagency representative advisor to the commander.

... we must abolish the stand-alone provincial reconstruction team structure and integrate its assets into the maneuver task force at the battalion level.

Instead of one internal civil affairs field team, there would be five developed for the maneuver battalion task force. One would work directly for each company level commander and become a formal part of their “company team,” while the senior major and civil affairs company commander would consolidate and be responsive to their requirements with the dual hat of battalion S9. This system would create an organic capability to draw on during company level maneuver operations and engagements with the district governors.

Integrating these assets would require significant development funding, but as General David Petraeus said early on in Operation Iraqi Freedom, development dollars are as important as bullets in a counterinsurgency. Adopting this decentralized and maneuver-fused approach to development would dictate that all provincial reconstruction team funding earmarked for a given Afghan province be diverted to the maneuver task force at the battalion level and subsumed into its overall development budget.

This integration would empower the battalion-level commander to focus on areas of concern, synchronize mission with maneuver priorities without additional coordination or competition (with a provincial reconstruction team), and push the funds down to the company level for development in the districts. This new capability at the maneuver company level would become one of the two cornerstone initiatives for the counterinsurgency in rural Afghanistan. The other and more potent initiative would be adding native Afghan staff officers with critical expertise to the maneuver company.

Integrating Afghan Intellectual Capital

Recent policy discussions about the need for a civilian surge of U.S. government agency personnel with development expertise overlook a central point—suitable candidates already exist in Afghanistan. We must reverse the flight of intellectual capital from rural areas to the cities. It is the rural areas where agricultural and innovative engagement expertise is most needed. Native Afghan cultural, agricultural, and communications experts are a powerful resource in this type of war. Each district requires certain assets and capabilities that native Afghan experts are in the best position to provide. While these experts would work for coalition forces, they would also be

valuable for the district governor to use for governance and development purposes. In an agrarian society, these advisors would have a positive effect on the overall agricultural output in the district and help to develop a closer relationship between the population and local government.

Adding these key Afghan positions to a maneuver company headquarters would ideally have two predictable effects. First, it would produce a far superior product because these positions demand an in-depth understanding of cultural nuances that coalition forces can never possess. Second, the population’s negative perception of the Afghan government would ideally diminish as a direct consequence of the increased responsiveness to the people’s concerns and needs. And these effects would be felt none too soon, because most Afghans currently feel little connection with their government and lack confidence in its capabilities.

We should add three key Afghan positions to a company commander’s counterinsurgency team—a native cultural adviser, an agricultural adviser, and an information operations specialist. The addition of these three Afghan professionals has the potential to transform a plodding counterinsurgency effort at the district level into one that is vibrant and connected to the Afghan people. This small group of Afghan professionals would eventually become permanent members of the district governor’s staff. In the end, this effort would focus on what the local community and tribes value and would build capacity. The creation of these three key Afghan positions at the district level would provide the capacity for substantial counterinsurgency progress and set the stage for development of a district governor’s professional staff to sustain that progress after we leave. Figure 2-2 depicts how these three key positions and the Afghan National Security Force embedded tactical trainers would fit into the existing coalition maneuver company structure.




Figure 2-2. Expansion of coalition maneuver company assets.

Afghan cultural adviser. In light of how critical culture awareness is in any counterinsurgency, and the vast challenge of grasping the nuances of tribal culture in Afghanistan, it is a wonder that the concept of assigning a native cultural adviser at the company level has not yet become formally established. A cultural adviser who is well educated and familiar with the sub-tribal structure and key-elders network in local areas of operation can work directly with a coalition company commander to prevent missteps that have negative effects on the operation.

The cultural adviser should advise the company commander on all matters concerning culture. In this capacity, the advisor would help coalition forces avoid pitfalls, understand cultural mores, and engage the population. Moreover, he could facilitate a close working relationship between the company commander and the district governor. A strong cultural adviser can help develop

information operations messages to connect the district governor with the Afghan people. The adviser can take the governor's vision and a commander's intent—weave in Islamic principles, tenets of the Pashtunwali code and tribal history—and communicate with the population.

When I commanded Task Force Eagle in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2008, we found ourselves tapping into the experience of the Afghan cultural adviser continuously. For example, in March 2008, an improvised explosive device killed four Afghan guards in the Bermel district of Paktika Province. The Afghan cultural adviser quickly created an information operations message condemning the attack. The message was so compelling that, for the first time, members of the local population conducted their own investigation, discovered the culprits and their location, and informed the Afghan district police chief, who arrested the terrorists responsible for the attack. This was not the first message crafted by the Afghan cultural adviser in the district, but it showed that consistent, compelling communication with the population can transform the environment. Developing civic pride is one thing, but working to improve every Afghan citizen's quality of life is quite another.

Afghan agricultural adviser. The vast majority of Afghans in the rural areas, where the Taliban have historically enjoyed freedom of movement, are farmers. An enabler who possesses agricultural expertise has the potential to be a powerful counterinsurgent weapon. The most important economic indicators in most areas of rural Afghanistan relate to agriculture. Because Afghanistan is a largely agrarian society, an adviser with a degree in agriculture should work with the company commander at the district level to develop, plan and carry out agricultural initiatives.

Such an advisor can be a useful tool for the district governor and coalition forces in developing a close relationship with the population. He may run seminars and courses for the local farmers to help them produce larger crops, conduct assessments, advise local farmers on irrigation projects, and distribute agricultural humanitarian assistance. Participants in agricultural seminars may improve their farming operations and perhaps receive a tool-kit, wheat and corn seed, or fruit tree saplings upon graduation.

Task Force Eagle arranged agricultural seminars to help improve agricultural production. The seminars became so popular in Paktika province that we hired an additional agricultural adviser for each company in our battalion task force. In addition, locals requested an agricultural radio program be broadcast on the local radio station. Farmers began asking advisors questions by mail and during visits to the district center. Clearly, such seminars and other initiatives can help the local government win over the population. Creating an institutionalized Afghan capability that focuses exclusively on developing and distributing this sort of critical information is the next logical step to make this approach systematic.

Afghan information operations specialists. The most effective information operations in the Afghan war are conducted by Afghans and supported by coalition forces. For best results, we need to fuse coalition force and Afghan information operations. The company headquarters platoon should have an Afghan information operations cell composed of native Afghan experts familiar with the districts in question. One of the experts should be the advisor for the maneuver company commander, offering insights and proposing methods to “reach” the people most effectively. Another should work at the battalion level to coordinate battalion support for the company under the coordinating hand of the battalion fire support officer. At the company level, at least one Afghan specialist should program and announce radio material. The battalion-level cell should help create messages that resonate with the population and demonstrate that the

Afghan district government (district governor) and coalition forces (company commander) speak with one voice to the population. The district governor would have the lead in these efforts, and the coalition force commander would play a supporting role, offering ideas, pressing for action where appropriate, and adding a degree of quality control to the system.

The Afghan information operations specialists can produce leaflets, run the radio station (if available), and ensure that all communications with the populace are well thought-out and effective. These Afghan professionals can play a critical role as they inevitably become the voice of the district government to the population and help break the cycle of rumors and lies propagated by the Taliban through night letters and other forms of intimidation. They could conduct interviews with the district police chief, Afghan National Army commanders, or the district governor to assist in getting important messages out to the people. Local mullahs, loyal to the Afghan government, could run radio shows coordinated by the Afghan information operations team to challenge the inflammatory rhetoric put forth in radical madrassas and mosques across the border in Pakistan. In Paktika province, the Afghan workers that ran the mobile radio station (called a “radio in a box”) typically received over 500 letters a week from the local population in an overwhelmingly favorable response to the programming. The letters ranged from requests for programming to both pro-government and anti-Taliban poetry, essays, and songs designed to be read or sung on the air.

Adding positions for a native Afghan cultural adviser, agricultural adviser, and information operations specialist has the potential to provide formidable expertise to a counterinsurgency force. These Afghan experts might also advise on the best way to invest the development resources crucial to success in counterinsurgency operations. The possibilities to favorably shape the environment and create even greater opportunities to exploit are innumerable. Figure 2-3 illustrates relationships across a maneuver company’s sphere of influence. This model optimizes all assets and creates an atmosphere to unify effort at the company level.

The Power of the People

With the ongoing policy debate surrounding the war in Afghanistan, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that, in the end, the success of the mission is not dependent upon the actions of the Taliban. The mission depends first on the people of Afghanistan contributing to a more secure environment, then on a dramatically improved performance of the Afghan National Security Forces, and only then on our efforts as a coalition force. The mission to establish a secure environment in Afghanistan can succeed, but with modifications to the distribution plan for Afghan national security forces and refinements to the command structure of enablers and tactical assets already in the fight, the momentum will swing toward greater stability.

The mission depends first on the people of Afghanistan contributing to a more secure environment ...




Figure 2-3. Proposed maneuver counterinsurgency structure in Afghanistan.

We must make President Hamid Karzai and his provincial governors see the value of empowering the tribal shuras to elect their own district governors. The voice of rural Afghanistan would then emerge. Indeed, district centers must become the security epicenters where Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police co-locate and support a district governor in the daily business of engaging the people and addressing their needs and concerns. Longer-term stability in Afghanistan depends upon the creation of a district-level structure built around the leadership of district governors partnered with coalition maneuver company commanders and a full complement of Afghan security forces.

The more urgent proposition is to redistribute Afghan National Army forces from forward operating bases into Afghan communities and rural areas to live among the people and partner with the Afghan National Police. This move alone would send a powerful message to the people and to the Taliban that the stability and future of the nation is in the hands of the Afghan people and protected by a unified security force. Although the signature elements of this reorganization proposal are Afghan led, coalition maneuver company commanders must partner with district and their Afghan National Army battalion commander counterparts to coordinate governance and security efforts.

Structures that worked well through the first several years of the war must evolve to this decentralized approach to countering the insurgency. An important feature of this restructuring plan is disassembling provincial reconstruction teams in favor of a company level construct that focuses on distributing robust development assets to the maneuver company and interagency advisers to the battalion task force level. We must expand the battalion-level development function to address the distribution of development teams to every maneuver company and empower them to manage more development funds and projects.

The cornerstone of this new tactical realignment of assets will be the integration of Afghan intellectual capital into maneuver companies to assume roles as both conduits and primary staff to their district governor counterparts as native Afghan cultural and agricultural advisers and information operations team specialists. They can provide a stronger capability to wage the counterinsurgency than has yet been at our disposal. Afghans must win this war, but an appropriate cross-fertilization of assets and capabilities will facilitate that victory.

Extract: Shaping Afghan National Security Forces

Mr. Anthony H. Cordesman

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The Afghan National Police (ANP)

Much of the Afghan police force still lags far behind the Afghan National Army (ANA) in development. With the exception of the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) part of the forces, it cannot operate effectively in the face of serious insurgent threats. Improvements in pay do not solve its problems with power brokers, and corruption. Further, it lacks anything approaching effective civil partners and the other components of an effective prompt justice system and rule of law. Moreover, corruption within the Ministry of the Interior remains a serious problem – compounded by corruption in other elements of the Afghan government at the national, provincial, district, and local levels.

Improving the various elements of the ANP, while less time critical in terms of direct combat operations, will be equally urgent if the ANP is to play a central role in performing the hold and *build* functions in population centers, without which counterinsurgency (COIN) will not succeed. Such improvement, however, presents different challenges than improving the ANA. The ANP currently suffers from critical problems in capability, leadership, corruption, supporting governance, and the district and local levels of courts, legal services, and detention facilities necessary to implement prompt justice and a rule of law.

Most of the ANP lack the ability to support the hold and build missions in the face of insurgent attacks, bombings, and subversion. In July 2009, the Afghan Uniformed Police had an authorized strength of 47,000 and 51,000 assigned – although no one had reliable statistics on its actual level of day-to-day strength or levels of attrition. Some experts put the current percentage of ANP who have received no meaningful training as high as 78% of the force. Strength and capability are also only part of the problem. The ANP faces critical problems in winning popular support and acceptance. Unlike the ANA, which is the most respected institution in the Afghan government, there is a wide consensus that many elements of the ANP are too corrupt, and too tied to politics and power brokers, to either be effective or win/retain popular support.

This presents serious problems in carrying out ANP operations and in improving its force quality. Yet, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) must act on the reality that such an effort is critical and do its best to train the entire force and accelerate the Focused District Development (FDD) program. The initial phase of the hold function will require a transition to providing regular policing activity and supporting the prompt administration of justice. The ANP are not yet sufficiently trained, effective, and free of corruption in this regard. At the same time, the *build* phase cannot be properly implemented until the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and custom.

This means there are several areas where International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S. need to work with the Afghan government at the central, provincial, and local level to shape the future of the ANP:

- *First, reducing current levels of corruption in the ANP, and limiting the impact of political abuses and power brokers must be part of the operational plan for shape, clear, hold, and build.* ISAF cannot succeed in its mission unless these problems are sharply reduced, and the ANP can carry out the political aspects of the hold mission and show that they provide real security and prompt justice. As is the case with the ANA, fighting corruption and political misuse of the ANP are as critical as expanding forces. This can only be done through great improvements in ANP leadership, facilitated by far more robust mentoring and training efforts.

The FDD program is one possible key to this process. The program is still in development, and any effort to apply it is necessarily slow, because it is time and trainer/mentor limited. The Directed District Development program may offer a possible solution to provide an additional quick reaction capability, and this will need continuing reassessment to determine what scale of effort is practical. Both programs also need to be tightly focused on ensuring that they meet the needs in the population areas most threatened by insurgent activity and where providing the hold function is most urgent.

No ANP programs can succeed, however, where political interference, corruption, and power brokers block effective ANP action or ensure it cannot be reformed. Power brokers have a clear incentive and need to disrupt this process, as it directly threatens their operations. This must be understood and be included as part of the planning for ANP improvement. The political dimension of ANP development is as critical as the military and civil dimensions.

- *Second, major efforts need to be made to simultaneously increase the size and quality of the ANP.* Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan/Combined NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (CSTC-A/NTM-A) reported that the ANP was at an authorized strength of 94,958 in December 2010, and there were tentative plans for it to grow to 96,800 (or 109,000 with Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board [JCMB] approval) by October 31, 2010, 123,000 by July 2011, and 160,000 by 2013. Current plans call for eliminating the backlog of untrained police (which as mentioned before some experts put as high as 78% of the existing force) within two years. Yet these plans seem to leave the ANP underequipped for some aspects of its mission, in spite of current orders, and that additional attention is needed to improve the quality of its leadership and facilities. The ANP's most urgent immediate need in order to execute this expansion, however, is for adequate numbers of qualified trainers and mentors who have the military experience and counterinsurgency background that will be required for several years to come. These must be placed under CSTC-A and the NTM-A, and not under civil leadership or trainers. The day may come when the ANP's main mission is conventional law enforcement in a secure environment, but that day is years away and the ANP needs to focus on security.

Filling these gaps will be difficult. The ANP faces even more severe shortfalls in training, mentoring, and partnering than the ANA. A CSTC-A report in July 2009 stated that the ANP needed at least 98 additional Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (POMLTs) plus added U.S. Police mentor team (PMT) trainer/mentors by the end of CY 2010, and 46 more by the end of CY 2011. It is requesting a total of 182 POMLTs and border mentor teams (BMTs) by the end of CY2011. There will be a need for added PMTs as well. The current 2 year timeline for training the police force is based upon estimates of police trainer contributions from European nations that may prove overly-optimistic. If European partner nations do not deliver the required numbers of trainers, NTM-A will have to reassess its police training timelines. However, these requirements will be substantially increased if the goal for the end-strength of the police was raised to 160,000.

- *Third, a major reorganization is needed to strengthen several major elements within the ANP.* These include elite gendarmeries or paramilitary elements to deal with counterinsurgency and key hold missions. These could build on ANCOP and police commando cadres. The ANCOP are designed to provide more capable forces that can defend themselves, perform key hold functions in urban areas, and provide a lasting police presence in less secure remote areas. Its assigned strength was 3,345 in July 2009, and it had four fielded brigade headquarters and 16 fielded battalion headquarters. It could grow to 20 battalions by the end of the year; and significant further increases could take place in 2010. Other special elements may be needed to work with the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ANA to eliminate any remaining insurgent shadow government, justice systems, and networks; and to deal with the investigation of organized crime and power brokers involved in gross corruption. The majority of the Afghan police can be trained to the levels of police capability suited to meet Afghan standards and needs.
- *Fourth, as with the ANA, ISAF must focus on building up the capability of deployed units, rather than over-relying on formal training.* Once again, even the best formal training process is only the prelude to shaping the capabilities of new units, testing leaders, providing practical experience, and supporting ANA and key ANP units with experienced cadres of mentors and partner units. Practical training in both operations and unit management and leadership are more critical with newly-formed units than is formal training, and are critical to limiting corruption and the scale of retention and absent without official leave (AWOL) problems.
- *Fifth, the development of the ANP must be linked to improvements in the Afghan formal and informal legal processes to provide prompt and effective justice.* The ANP cannot succeed in meeting one of the most critical demands of the Afghan people – the need for prompt justice – unless ANP development is linked to the creation of effective courts and the rest of the formal justice and corrections systems, or use of Afghanistan’s informal justice system. The ANP’s problems with corruption also cannot be corrected unless the criminal justice system is seen as much less corrupt and subject to political influence. Fixing these problems reflects one of the most urgent demands of the Afghan people. An integrated approach to ANP development and improved popular justice is critical and may need substantially more resources on the justice side of the equation.

This latter point is critical. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF success in the military dimension will have limited impact if the ANP cannot perform a combination of the Afghan formal and informal justice systems and cannot function at the civil level. They are in competition to replace the Taliban which now dominates the prompt justice system at the local level. So far, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) the U.S. and other nations have yet to demonstrate that they have effective plans to combine civil policing with an effective civil justice effort.

Past rules of law programs have often been failures described as successes. They have been programs that lacked the scale and coverage to meet immediate and urgent needs, which focused far too much on formal justice systems that were not in place and could not be put in place for years, and focused on foreign values rather than Afghan values. Like far too many civilian programs in Afghanistan, they did not seek an effective partnership with ISAF military and tie such effort to successfully implementing hold, build, and transfer – and winning the war.

The Afghan Border Police (ABP)

The ABP already has an authorized strength of 17,600 authorized and 12,800 assigned. Afghanistan will require a competent and sufficient border police function in the future. However, border forces are notoriously difficult to create and make effective under counterinsurgency conditions. Afghanistan's geography and historical border disputes make border enforcement even more difficult than usual, and ISAF and the ANSF have more urgent priorities.

Present plans to develop the ABP should be executed, and the Focused Border Development program may help to improve performance, reduce corruption, and increase government revenues. These efforts should be complemented by specific technologies, including biometrics and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), to the extent feasible.

Border protection, however, should not be a priority area for ISAF action relative to building up the ANA or ANP, or for allocating additional forces, resources and other capabilities. A tightly focused effort may be able to help the Afghan government get more revenues from commercial vehicle traffic across the border than are now being lost through corruption.

There is no prospect, however, that the ABP can seal the borders or do more in the near-term than harass the insurgency while becoming a source of casualties and more corruption. Afghanistan's borders have never been fully secured, and likely never will be. This is predominantly true as long as elements of the Pakistan government and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) covertly support key elements of the Taliban. Moreover, it is not apparent just how much additional revenue will be provided, how well it will be collected and allocated, and whether it will make a real difference in reducing GIROA dependence on outside aid.

Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan National Police

COL Lewis G. Irwin, U.S. Army Reserve

Reprinted with permission from the January 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. . . . [T]hese campaigns will fail if waged by military means alone.¹

The Afghan barber cutting my hair at an American installation in Kabul had a good life by Afghan standards. So when I asked what he thought of the post-Taliban era, I had every reason to expect a favorable review. But as he pondered his response, I could tell that he was choosing his words carefully. Finally, he answered, “I don’t approve of what the Taliban did to the people, but it is now very difficult to move around the country . . . and there is a lot of corruption in the government.” The first part of his response was ironic, as it was the Taliban’s insurgent activities that had created the need for the heightened transportation security that made travel slow. But the second part of his response was telling. For him, it would be the success or failure of our non-traditional, nonmilitary stability and reconstruction operations that would ultimately shape his decision whether to support the popularly elected government of Afghanistan.

My interest in his response was as much professional as personal, since my mission in Afghanistan was to lead the team charged with designing and implementing a nation-wide reform of the Afghan National Police (ANP). While most Afghan governing institutions had long been viewed with suspicion by the people, the Afghan police were especially distrusted as a result of their lengthy history of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Furthermore, these same police officers served as the real face of the Afghan government for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine basis.² So in keeping with the basic tenets of our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies administering them—as a critical step toward convincing the people to support the popularly elected government instead of the Taliban alternative. This article describes the scope and challenges of these major stability operations missions, while highlighting relevant elements of our new COIN doctrine—central to the IW concept—as they relate to operationalization, or using the COIN doctrine as the basis for specific action plans.

A few comments are appropriate at the outset. While some of what follows may sound like criticism, the exact opposite is true. In my experience, our leaders and troops are working extremely hard to realize success in these missions. As an institution, however, we have not gotten our planning and operating mechanisms right just yet. At the same time, it is likely that our military will be called upon to carry out many more of these missions, given the nature of IW operations and the “long wars” currently under way. One only has to look at the structure of U.S. Africa Command to see more evidence of our military’s likely future role in the application of soft power instruments of American influence. Furthermore, it is likely that our political leaders will continue to expect the military to take a leading role among the other U.S. Government

agencies participating in these missions, given our comparative advantages in organizational structure, resources, and sustainability. Accordingly, this article outlines some potential pitfalls and challenges facing the leaders who will plan and execute these stability missions in the years to come.

The Mission

Arriving in Kabul in August of 2007, I had no idea that I would be handed the mission of a lifetime: in a few short weeks, I was assigned to the Force Integration and Training section of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A). Our mission was to oversee the design, fielding, and development of the Afghan National Army and ANP, as well as the Afghan government agencies administering those security forces. My arrival coincided with the conclusion of a multilateral conference aimed at considering plans to reform the ANP, as the Afghan government and the international community had come to recognize both the criticality of the police force to the COIN effort as well as the ANP’s glaring lack of success to date. The major product of the conference was a set of PowerPoint slides that generally described a district-by-district approach to police reform, dubbed “Focused District Development” (FDD).³ As is often the case, the Afghans and their international community partners—except for the Americans—had hedged their bets by expressing tentative support for the police reform concept in principle while simultaneously avoiding any firm commitments of assistance or resources.

Political leaders will expect the military to take a leading role in these missions, given our comparative advantages in organizational structure, resources, and sustainability

Typical of any stability or reconstruction mission, reforming the ANP would be a multilayered, complex undertaking. In Afghanistan, the police forces consist of seven different public safety and security organizations, with basic missions and organization outlined in the Afghan government’s Strategic Capabilities Plan.⁴ National civil order police, border patrolmen, district police, the counternarcotics force, the counterterrorism force, criminal investigators, and even the Afghan fire departments all fall under the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) umbrella. But while each of these agencies has its own distinct set of issues and challenges, the leadership decided to reform the traditional district-level police first, given their direct interactions with the people. At the same time, reforming the police would require further developing the MoI’s administrative capabilities, as well as other elements of the civil justice system and Afghan society, in order to enable the Afghans to manage their own security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) identified these elements as vital steps toward the ultimate goal of creating a stable, secure, and self-sustaining Afghanistan.⁵

Put into a broader context, this undertaking would be a daunting one. The local Afghan police are organized into almost 400 police districts outside of Kabul, as well as dozens of police precincts in the capital itself. Numbering about 82,000 altogether, the police are often called upon to fight as frontline first responders in the counterinsurgency in addition to carrying out their basic law enforcement and criminal investigative responsibilities. This reform process would be made even more difficult by the fractious nature of internal Afghan politics, as well as the remnants of Soviet organizational culture that persist in Afghan government agencies.⁶ Added to this challenging mix was the fact that corruption is an entrenched feature of Afghan culture, where “one-fisted” corruption—or theft perpetrated to feed one’s family or tribe—is viewed as just another routine feature of life. Any effort at professionalizing the police would have to take place within a context of abject poverty, wide-spread illiteracy, a thriving and well-connected drug

trade, porous borders, and an almost total absence of the basic elements of rule of law, ranging from criminal investigators to lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and jails. Without doubt, we had our work cut out for us, and this problem would not be solved in a matter of months, but rather years.

The Operational Environment

Armed then with about 60 PowerPoint slides and a rough idea of how this nationwide reform ought to look, our team set to the tasks of fleshing out a specific structure for the FDD program and pitching the concept to the numerous players who would have to be brought on board for the initiative to achieve legitimacy and success. Ultimately, this effort would involve interacting with the highest levels of NATO, U.S., international community, and Afghan leadership, but the nature of the operations would also require involving key leaders all the way out to the point of the spear in crafting and executing the plan—and getting the warfighters’ “buy-in” as a precondition for participation. Unlike conventional military operations, which derive their unity of command through a hierarchical chain, stability and reconstruction operations by their nature require negotiation, compromise, and the inclusion of a wide variety of actors in the decision making process, each bringing to the table different resources, concerns, and areas of authority. Our COIN doctrine speaks to this challenge in its section on “unity of effort.”⁷ Without question, achieving consensus around a plan of action is often the most difficult aspect of successful stability operations.

In the ANP case, the relevant U.S. agencies and actors included the U.S. Ambassador and Embassy; U.S. Central Command and its subordinate CSTC–A; the U.S. national command element and subordinate brigade combat teams; the Department of State’s Justice Sector Support Program, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and numerous others. The long list of relevant international entities and nongovernmental organizations included the European Union Police, United Nations Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, International Police Coordinating Board, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and an extensive array of embassies, international organizations, and other actors with widely varying interests, resources, and agendas. Representative of the convoluted decision making structures in these types of operations, CSTC–A answers directly to U.S. Central Command but must consult with the Ambassador and Embassy while working in parallel with the U.S. warfighters, themselves at least nominally subordinate to the NATO ISAF commander. It was not unusual to find our allies’ military commands disagreeing with their own embassies regarding the shape and direction of their countries’ politics and preferences.

Similarly, it was commonly understood within NATO, the European Union Police, and other multinational organizations that the constituent members were far more concerned about the reactions of their home governments to their decisions and actions than they were to the reactions of the appointed leaders of the organizations in Afghanistan. Likewise, CSTC–A has to deal with its own internal array of interests, as a combined (allied), joint, interagency, and multicomponent headquarters organization, one ultimately working through the interagency process while sharing key decisions with the sovereign Afghan government. CSTC–A also depends heavily on contracted civilian police mentors for the Afghan police training effort, though ironically those contractors are employed by the State Department and ultimately accountable to that agency rather than the military. Conversely, CSTC–A controls the massive funds associated with the development of the Afghan forces, and as such can wield disproportionate influence over that aspect of the process.

Nevertheless, both our international partners and the Afghan leaders would not hesitate to let us know when they disagreed with us, or when their interests did not coincide with ours. For example, a senior representative from an allied embassy stated bluntly to me on one occasion, “If you Americans succeed, then we are with you. If you fail, you are on your own . . . and we think you will fail.” At another juncture, the U.S. Ambassador directed me not to consult with one very senior Afghan official because he felt that U.S. interests were a mismatch with that official’s political goals. Privately, some leaders believed that there were governments operating with us in Afghanistan that wanted to see the Afghans succeed while the United States failed. But in any event, the decision-making authority and jurisdictional centers of gravity routinely shifted along with changes in key leaders, allied government agendas, Afghan preferences, and various elements of U.S. policy. Leaders cannot underestimate the challenges associated with this tough operational environment or the amount of effort it takes to build and maintain consensus around any major new initiative.

Without question, achieving consensus around a plan of action is often the most difficult aspect of successful stability operations

Key Lessons Learned

What follows are 10 key lessons I learned from the experience of designing and setting in motion one of these major stability operations, offered as food for thought for the rising leaders who will carry out similar missions, as well as those charged with refining our emerging IW doctrine.

Fragmented Decision Making Authority and Incoherence of Vision. One of the key challenges of the operations in Afghanistan and in other IW environments is the fragmented nature of decision making, with numerous actors bringing their own agendas, interests, resources, and areas of authority to the table on most decisions of consequence. This situation can be frustrating for U.S. leaders, as they see the United States providing the preponderance of the resources earmarked for Afghan development but then having to accommodate various international players who insist on having input into key decisions on the commitment of those funds. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), an international panel charged with setting Afghan police salaries, is a good example of this convoluted organizational structure. LOTFA is an international body, with United Nations and allied representation, although the United States provides the great majority of the funds used to pay Afghan police. Thus, the United States often has to negotiate with LOTFA before spending its own money. Similarly convoluted interagency decision making occurs between CSTC–A and the State Department.

With all of these players active in the decision making process, the different governments and nongovernmental organizations involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future, and too often they pursue these visions regardless of decisions or agreements to the contrary. With no one player having enough leverage or authority to direct otherwise, this fragmentation leads to incoherence in the collective international redevelopment effort in Afghanistan, resulting in a great deal of wasted effort and generally ineffective results. Not surprisingly, the Afghans often play one international actor off against the other until they find the answer that they want. The internal U.S. organizational structure, with its interagency, combined, and joint flavor, adds to this challenge, as each of the key agencies operating in Afghanistan experiences frequent turnover and shifting internal visions, providing the Afghans additional opportunities to exploit seams. In one telling example, a high-ranking NATO ISAF leader felt that he could not pledge the support of his subordinate Provincial Reconstruction

Teams to the police reform effort, as he believed that they would continue to pursue their own governments' visions of Afghan redevelopment, regardless of what vision was put forth by the ISAF leadership.

While a certain amount of this fragmentation and incoherence of vision is unavoidable, there are steps mission leaders can take to mitigate challenges. Keeping in mind that “unity of intent” is the goal, constant communication and negotiation are both critical to success. Typical mechanisms for bringing about this communication are standing work groups, joint planning groups, civil-military operations centers, joint interagency coordinating groups, and other ad hoc steering groups.⁸ Wherever possible, it is important to get leaders with real decision making authority, both host nation and coalition, to participate routinely in these groups. By definition, the decentralized and fluid nature of stability operations requires leaders at all levels and in all interested organizations to understand the broader goals and specific objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the effort. Leaders cannot underestimate the amount of effort it will take to get everyone on the same page.

Force Structure Mismatches with Mission Requirements. Stability and reconstruction operations usually require a variety of skills and resources that do not routinely reside within the U.S. military. Furthermore, by definition these missions, with their emphasis on mentoring and coaching, place a premium on senior-level leaders with the talent, experience, temperament, and credibility to interact effectively with indigenous leaders. Put another way, these operations require augmentation with subject matter experts from various fields relevant to the tasks at hand, as well as enough senior leaders to build the developing agencies and organizations. Unfortunately, our force structure—in Afghanistan at least—falls well short of this standard, in terms of both the required skill sets on the ground and the adequacy of the mentor coverage. For example, the basic number of police mentor teams falls far short of the number needed to provide district-level coverage throughout the country, resulting in some districts only being visited sporadically or not at all.⁹ At the same time, the civilian police mentors hired by the State Department to provide civilian law enforcement expertise to the developing Afghan police forces do not have the flexibility to deploy into the areas where they are needed the most, for reasons of force protection and nonpermissive threat conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Soldier's mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, there is a real mismatch between the force structure needed to carry out the Afghan police development mission and the resources available on the ground.

With all of these players active in the decision making process, the different governments and nongovernmental organizations involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan's future

In terms of potential corrective courses of action, John Nagl has suggested the creation of a “combat advisory corps,” consisting of professional Soldiers organized and trained to meet these specific needs as their primary mission.¹⁰ At the very least, however, there are three corrective courses of action that leaders can take to mitigate the effects of force structure/mission mismatches. First, we should choose our best leaders to interact with the indigenous leaders, essentially placing the “A team” in those positions of responsibility. Second, we can collocate our mentors, supporting staff operations, and the developing indigenous leaders and their staffs. Too often, U.S. staffs work so hard to meet current mission requirements that they lose sight of the longer term objective of the effort—training the host nation forces and agencies to sustain themselves and their own operations. Collocating the two parts of the team would force that

development to occur. Finally, strip all nonessential staff personnel from the supporting staff functions and place them into positions where they can make the most significant and direct contribution to the mentoring effort.

Weak Interagency Coordinating Mechanisms and Execution. The prevailing model of interagency coordination in Afghanistan could be described as the “bubble up” method. Periodic direct coordination among the highest level leaders occasionally generated broad policy compromises, but those meetings did not provide the specific terms needed to implement the agreements reached. Instead, routine interagency coordination took place in lower level work groups that identified and attempted to resolve problems at the lowest level possible. Theoretically, then, problems that could not be resolved at the lower level would bubble up to successive levels until they reached a level at which the participants had the authority to make a decision.

While this system offers advantages in terms of managing senior-level work load, it also brings with it some major disadvantages. For example, this model assumes that the lower level participants in the process remain engaged, informed, and responsive, and it assumes away the stovepiping of information typical within most agencies, as well as the frequent turnover and absences of agency representatives from the working groups that occur for all manner of reasons. Given that these optimistic assumptions never held up over time, the bubble-up system tended to exacerbate the fragmented and incoherent nature of policymaking and implementation, too often thwarting the unity of effort that we aim to achieve. Likewise, this decentralized, bottom-up process too often delayed collective action because key decision makers were not engaged until late in the process. Viewed comprehensively, the interagency process was weak and largely ad hoc in nature.

There are several ways that mission leaders can improve this process, however. The first potential corrective for systemic interagency problems involves seeking senior-leader command emphasis, not only from the military side of the interagency process, but also from the senior and midlevel leaders of the other participating agencies. It is also critical to identify key leaders of real ability, with resources of organizational political capital and sharing like-minded visions for the desired end state, in each of the participating agencies. Another related and complementary approach is to develop ad hoc, agile information-sharing and decision making structures, consisting of participants with the ability to establish priorities, make resource decisions, and pull together the systems, products, consensus, and resources needed to move the mission forward.

Allied Relationships. While we like to think that we are all members of the same team, the basic reality of U.S. relationships with our coalition and international community partners is that each player brings different interests, visions, and resources to the table. Furthermore, the NATO and European Union agencies operating within Afghanistan are not unitary actors, as the various leaders of those organizations ultimately answer to their home governments before yielding on policy questions. As a result, it can be difficult to gain approval for significant new initiatives, or to steer an existing program in a different direction.

Moreover, it is important to understand that while all aim to achieve “progress in Afghanistan,” each country and each participating organization has different interests that they are protecting and different definitions of that end. Our effort may require overcoming outright opposition or resentment, or major constraints on resources. Along these lines, one allied ambassador, for

domestic political reasons, was quite open about his country's inability to deliver on its major commitments to the police reform effort. Another international coordinating body was wholly incapable of performing the basic functions for which it was created, but it was nevertheless important to include that agency in every deliberation to maintain the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the international community. Therefore, as is the case with the interagency process, in dealing with these various players, it is critical to share as much information as possible, while negotiating openly and in good faith with the talented and like-minded leaders identified in each organization. In a real sense, we are creating and bringing together an ad hoc version of what Hugh Hecló called an "issue network," consisting of all of the players with an interest in a desired outcome.¹¹

Challenges of Host Nation's Politics, Leadership, and Society. As military officers, we are by nature action-oriented people; that is, give us a mission and get out of the way. By definition, however, stability operations take place within a political context, subject to the influences and vagaries of host-nation politics and economics. In the case of the Afghan police reforms, the impact of Afghan politics, leadership, and operating context added another—and ultimate—layer to the process of securing approval for the direction and shape of the nationwide reform. That is, it was necessary not only to negotiate the shape of the program with the international community, but also to seek guidance and approval from the Afghan leaders at the outset of the enterprise, as well as final approval once a rough consensus was achieved among the international community players. Likewise, the fact that this country is one with no connectivity, no electricity, limited public infrastructure, no legitimate economy, and a government with only limited influence across the country makes the simplest activities, including paying the police or providing uniforms and training, extremely difficult.¹² It is critical to identify the right indigenous "go-to" leaders and to develop their staffs to set the conditions for success. In the case of Afghan police reform, Deputy Minister for Security Mohammad Munir Mangal was that critical leader in the MoI, though we spent a great deal of time with other key Afghan leaders as well in order to navigate through competing Afghan interests and factions. It was also necessary to train the midlevel Afghan staff officers needed to support the operations within MoI, as those staff capabilities did not yet exist within the Afghan government.

This decentralized, bottom-up process too often delayed collective action because key decision makers were not engaged until late in the process

Lack of Doctrine and Accountability. As members of an action-oriented organization, another of our tendencies as military officers is to want simply to "get something done." Partly as a result of this tendency, the police force's basic doctrine lagged well behind the actual fielding of personnel, equipment, and facilities, with many adverse consequences. The Army uses the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) model of force development captured in Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*, as the guide for creating and modifying U.S. force structure.¹³ There is good reason that the D—doctrine—comes first in that acronym. However, in Afghanistan it has been necessary to get as much force structure into the field as fast as possible due to the ongoing insurgency. As a result, there are major gaps in the base doctrine covering police force structure, roles, and missions. Likewise, the CSTC-A leaders who validate the force structure decisions and the training, equipping, and fielding priorities largely do so on the basis of their perception of the current situation, rather than basing those decisions on some coherent, commonly understood vision of the force's end state.

Not surprisingly, then, the development of the Afghan army is well ahead of the development of the Afghan police, as we are much more comfortable building an army than a police force, most often applying our own doctrinal template in building their army. The challenges of this process are exacerbated by a lack of accountability mechanisms, forcing functions, deadlines, or other benchmarks and metrics for measuring progress holistically. The solution for this challenge involves establishing both the basic doctrine for the forces as well as creating and implementing any necessary accountability mechanisms and performance measures. Both of these efforts are under way now in Afghanistan. Section 6–64 of the COIN doctrine makes mention of this challenge, but it is notably thin in terms of proposing particular standards or evaluation techniques.¹⁴ As such, the mission leader will have to consult with the various players to define the standards and implement the corresponding assessment mechanisms.

The police force's basic doctrine lagged well behind the actual fielding of personnel, equipment, and facilities, with many adverse consequences

Preparing Junior Leaders for Challenging Missions. As a young company commander in the 1st Armored Division in the early 1990s, my professional challenges were fairly straightforward, and the Army had prepared me well for them. Like other young leaders, I fit comfortably into a structured and hierarchical environment that reinforced success while self-correcting any problems that emerged. Conversely, modern operations provide few if any similar opportunities for our junior leaders, in spite of the fact that it is they who have the most profound impact upon the success or failure of these decentralized operations. Our junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the key executive agents, but they typically lack the basic frame of reference and experience needed for interacting with the local power-brokers, indigenous trainees, local citizens, international players, and others who will determine the success or failure of the broader effort.

Furthermore, awareness of other cultures is not a strong suit in the U.S. military's own organizational culture. So instead of tapping into the intelligence resources available to us through indigenous partners, too often we draw our own conclusions about the "good guys and bad guys," in some cases equating speaking English with being a "good guy." We also tend to impose Western models where they do not necessarily fit, setting up the new host nation organizations for failure and arousing resistance from our partners. A strength of the COIN manual is that it defines this problem while taking the first steps forward in changing the military's basic mindset.¹⁵ In the case of the Afghan police reforms, we sought to overcome this institutional bias through intensive NATO-Afghan combined reform team training, conducted in both Dari and English and involving mission planning with the U.S., allied, international community, and Afghan leaders who would actually carry out the reform tasks within the districts. This training and mission preparation covered a full spectrum of topics and tasks relevant to the reformers, from police operations to administration to Afghan culture to local intelligence, and was taught by subject matter experts from throughout the international community and the Afghan government. It is vitally important to listen to the indigenous leaders and local citizens on the ground in the reforming areas, and there is no substitute for the leader's own consistent interaction with the personnel actually executing the mission.

Decentralized Execution. IW missions require leaders who can move easily between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of planning and execution. So while my interactions with senior U.S., Afghan, and international leaders were vital steps, the truth was that these leaders' agreements and directives would not go far without buy-in and vigorous execution by

a wide variety of subordinate leaders spread throughout the operational theater. Furthermore, the ultimate success or failure of these operations would depend upon the mission preparation, comprehension of intent, and commitment to the mission by the captains, lieutenants, NCOs, and Soldiers carrying out reform and training missions. Since we were using four different regional training facilities spread across Afghanistan for police overhaul, this decentralization meant working hard to ensure that all of the players had a common operating picture of the standards, procedures, and expectations of the FDD program.

Decentralized execution of these missions also means that we cannot expect cookie-cutter results, as variability in local circumstances, resources, and leadership will lead to a variety of outcomes. Accordingly, it is critical to achieve clear lines of communication; common training and reform standards clearly articulated in a mission order; and centralized mission preparation and training. It is important to share lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures as the process unfolds. This goal involves setting up a robust communications network, securing vertical and lateral coordinating authority across commands, and conducting recurring and widely distributed after-action reviews. Lastly, it is important to create and maintain knowledge centers—secure and nonsecure share points—where the most current implementation documents, such as inspection checklists, points of contact, and operations orders, are available as appropriate. In these IW environments, published documents tend to be out of date by the time they are approved and published. In the case of the ANP, the *Afghanistan National Police Smartbook* was published just prior to my arrival in theater, but it was far out of date by the end of my assignment six months later.¹⁶

The ultimate success or failure of these operations would depend upon the captains, lieutenants, NCOs, and Soldiers carrying out reform and training missions

Challenges of Training Indigenous Forces. Training host-nation forces is hard work, particularly when the people are illiterate and poor while the society has a history of government incompetence and corruption. Leaders need to guard against focusing exclusively on the training of the individual police officers, or the lower level units of the particular security forces. Additionally, it is important to build a force appropriate to that society's culture and circumstances, rather than trying to impose an inappropriate Western model or process. In Afghanistan, the German government had the original responsibility for developing the police forces, and it attempted to create a highly professional Western-style police force comparable to ones found in Europe. The approach fell short for a variety of reasons, but chief among them was the mismatch between the German model and Afghan circumstances, as well as the low rate of production of trained personnel. Upon taking responsibility for police development, the United States initially replaced this focus on quality with an emphasis on quantity. That approach, while fielding individual police at a far higher rate, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of the police leadership at the district level, or in the administration of the police forces at the national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders must take a holistic approach—or systems perspective on the operational environment approach—if there is to be any chance of overcoming the wholesale political, organizational, and societal challenges of creating a functioning and professional institution. The scope of the problem includes economics, cultural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of identification, illiteracy, and a range of other major challenges.

Impact of the Nonpermissive Security Environment. As our COIN doctrine states, insurgents understand that the essential objective is to undermine the people's confidence in existing governing institutions. They use terror as a means to this end, and these nonpermissive security

environments have a profound impact upon a leader's ability to reach out to the people and indigenous leaders who are partners in the enterprise. Given our usual force protection posture, it is common for U.S. forces to rush from one secured site to another, thus limiting their interaction with the average citizens and reducing the sense of actually living with their Afghan partners. The enemy understands the costs and other effects of their asymmetric threats, and they aim to create a "bunker mentality" within the security forces that further separates the people from their government and their protectors. Mission leaders must seek every opportunity to overcome this institutional bias, enhancing the interaction among the people, the indigenous government, its security forces, and our own troops. Ideally, we will find a way to work side by side with our counterparts so that eventually we can "leave quietly," having helped them to develop procedures, infrastructure, and relationships needed to enable their government and their security forces to function effectively. In the complex world of IW operations, that seamless transition represents the ultimate success.

Implications

Much like Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, our COIN doctrine and the broader IW joint operating concept offer key guiding principles that help to inform the stability mission leader about the challenges of the IW operating environment and the planning and preparation needed for success in these critical endeavors. In some instances, the doctrine offers particular techniques that can be used to craft specific action plans, providing our leaders with a means to operationalize those key guiding principles to accomplish their mission. But in many more cases, the doctrine and operating concept merely redefine the nature of the problem at hand, as our leaders are challenged to figure out for themselves how to go about solving complex problems for which they may have little relevant training, experience, or background. Without question, the COIN doctrine and IW joint operating concept make important contributions to our joint force through their respective calls to leaders to rethink the basic approach to stability missions. However, we still have much work to do in preparing our leaders to provide the innovative, creative, and nuanced thinking that is required for mission success—thinking that goes far beyond the traditional mission preparation that has dominated our institutional training and leader development in the past. Accordingly, the next step forward for our joint force is to redevelop the institutional training base, and to identify and disseminate the tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to achieve success, thus enabling our leaders to appreciate the magnitude of the challenge and to succeed in these soft power missions. Put another way, now is the time to work smarter, rather than harder, and to equip our force with the skills and tools needed to enable success in these complex, challenging, and vital tasks—while developing the specific, dedicated subject matter expertise within the force that will enable us to fall in effectively with the various theaters in which we will likely operate.

As a joint force we have made great strides in the last several years in this "change of mission," and it is likely that our military will be called upon to conduct many more stability missions in the future, applying American soft power using the military's organizational capabilities as the coordinating delivery mechanism. So there is no question about the importance and relevance of these missions, but it is also clear that we have not quite gotten the model right just yet. The counterinsurgency manual and irregular warfare joint operating concept are fine first steps, and they outline the basic core principles that are central to mission success. But these documents are no substitute for innovative, enlightened, and informed leadership—leadership that must fully understand the cultural, political, and economic parameters of the particular IW environments in which they will serve. We simply cannot afford to continue to take an ad hoc approach to missions that will be increasingly central to U.S. national security interests in the 21st century.

Endnotes:

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The Combined Training Advisory Group–Police: A New Organization for Training the Afghan National Police

COL Rick McConoughey

Center for Army Lessons Learned News From the Front, March 2010

On 21 November 2009, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A) was officially stood up under the command of LTG William B. Caldwell, IV. LTG Caldwell is dual-hatted as both the commander of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan and the NTM–A. Under the recent reorganization, NTM–A assumed responsibility for the force generation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), known collectively as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Subordinate to NTM–A are the Combined Training Advisory Group–Afghanistan (CTAG–A) and the newly created Combined Training Advisory Group–Police (CTAG–P). CTAG–A has been in operation for years and its organization and infrastructure is mature but still growing. CTAG–P, on the other hand, is brand new as is the Afghan organization it mentors, the Afghan National Police Training Command.

As of October 2009 approximately 93,000 patrolmen are in the ANP, broken into three subcomponents:

- Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP).
- Afghan Border Police (ABP).
- Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP).

Each group has specific functions in addition to general law enforcement duties.

AUP officers are the police officers most people see in the street. They handle traffic and routine police activities. AUP training is six weeks long and is run by contractors with European Police (EUPOL) oversight. The AUP is the largest subcomponent of the ANP numbering at about 67,500 patrolmen as of August 2009.

The ABP is a relatively new organization and is responsible for 14 border crossings, patrolling the 5,529 kilometers of Afghan border, and the security at four international airports. The ABP is the first line of defense to stop the flow of illegal drugs, weapons, and explosives into Afghanistan. ABP training is also six weeks in length and run by contractors with EUPOL oversight. The ABP had approximately 12,800 patrolmen as of August 2009.

The ANCOP is the elite component of the ANP. The ANCOP is highly trained and better equipped than the other types of ANP. The organization is similar to U.S. special weapons and tactics police. ANCOP training is 16 weeks long and is conducted primarily by the French *Gendarmerie* and Italian *Carabinieri* with contractor support. Like most elite units, the ANCOP constitute a small percentage of its parent organization, accounting for only 3,200 policemen within the entire ANP. Each region of Afghanistan has roughly one battalion of ANCOP for emergency response in its area of operations.

Two training programs have been developed to increase the professionalization of the ANP. Selected ANP noncommissioned officers (NCOs) undergo a five month training course that also ensures a minimum literacy level. ANP officer candidate training is competitive and takes three years to graduate qualified ANP officers.

The strength goal of the ANP is to have 160,000 patrolmen in uniform by October 2013. To achieve this goal, three critical factors will impact whether or not the NTM–A and the ANP are successful in their mission. These factors are:

- Recruiting.
- Retention.
- Attrition.

Recruiting is the process of attracting qualified applicants into the ANP. Monthly goals for new ANP recruits vary from 1,000 per month to 3,000 per month depending on the time of year. Recruiting goals must increase if the other two factors (retention and attrition) don't improve.

Retention is the recontracting of serving patrolmen upon expiration of their current contracts. The monthly target is to re-contract 60 percent or more of the eligible patrolmen. From March 2009 to August 2009 retention rates varied between a low of 13 percent to a high of 31 percent. There are many reasons for this low retention rate, not the least of which is the high casualty rates the ANP suffer in the conduct of their duty.

Attrition is the unforecasted loss or removal of patrolmen from the force prior to the end of their contracts. The attrition goal is 1.6 percent or less of the force each month. As with recruiting and retention, there are many reasons this rate fluctuates. Drug use, corruption, and abuse of position are common reasons for discharging patrolmen from the ANP. Between March and August 2009, the attrition rate fluctuated from a low of 1.23 percent and a high of 2.2 percent.

Reforms have recently been made in the ANP, with rank and pay reform among the most significant. Until recently the ANP was rank heavy and underpaid compared to the ANA. Over the last year the number of senior officers decreased and the number of patrolmen and NCOs increased significantly so that the organizational pyramid is much flatter. Pay reform brought ANP pay to parity with the ANA. The pay reform has improved morale significantly, especially at the middle grade NCO and junior officer ranks where pay more than tripled.

The NTM–A, CTAG–P, and the ANP have major challenges ahead of them to nearly double the size of the ANP from 94,000 to 160,000 by October 2013. The NTM–A, CTAG–P, and the ANP — with a lot of hard work and emphasis on training, recruiting, retention, attrition, and the requisite resources — will meet that goal. The Afghan people will benefit from a safer and more secure country.

Police Mentoring in Logar and Wardak Provinces

MAJ Kit Parker

Center for Army Lessons Learned News From the Front, June 2009

The Afghan National Police (ANP) deployed in mid-2006, about three years after the genesis of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The government of Afghanistan has established individual training centers throughout the country for the initial entry training of ANP recruits. The Focused District Development (FDD) Program selects Afghan police officers in critically identified provincial districts and sends them for collective training. Other police officers supplied by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) temporarily replace the officers in their provincial districts. Upon successful completion of the FDD Program, the ANP is entitled to additional uniforms; weapons; communications equipment (Codan radios, similar to citizens band radios); contracted U.S. civilian law enforcement mentors; and additional field ordering officer (FOO) funds (an increase from \$10,000 to \$15,000, administered by the appropriate program management district team). FOO funds allow the ANP to purchase materials for position improvement and to hire local nationals for work details.

Police Mentoring Teams

ANP training and development is not a new mission; however, International Security Assistance Forces are focusing on joint operations that include ANP, ANA, and allies to accomplish the following:

- Put an Afghan face on allied operations.
- Provide on-the-job mentoring and training.
- Allow allied personnel to evaluate ANP competency.

The U.S. assigned police mentoring teams (PMTs), supplemented with U.S. civilian contracted law enforcement personnel to accomplish this mission. The military personnel are either police mentors or security forces, and predeployment training differs significantly for the two positions. Police mentors train at Fort Riley, Kansas. They receive two months of training that includes lectures from returning PMT commanders, cultural orientations, and additional theater-specific training. Civilian contractors are experienced civilian law enforcement veterans. They train for two weeks in Virginia, and after they arrive in Afghanistan, attend an additional two weeks of theater-specific orientation.

PMTs are assigned areas of operation (AOs) that include districts within a province. It is the PMT's responsibility to mentor, train, and assess the ANP. During PMT patrols, PMTs traditionally interact with the ANP at the district centers or ANP outposts within the district. During these meetings, they can assess the security situation within the immediate vicinity, gauge ANP efforts to improve the security situation, assess ANP equipment and supply issues, and conduct classes on a range of topics, including map reading and weapons maintenance. Security forces are personnel trained specifically to provide security for the PMT during its mentoring and training activities.

The PMT mission exploits the multidisciplinary expertise of reserve component Soldiers. In a recently deployed PMT, three National Guardsmen were civilian law enforcement officers and another was an inner city high school teacher. The benefits of a Soldier who is also a trained and experienced civilian law enforcement officer is readily apparent, but in Afghanistan, where the vast majority of the population is illiterate, a trained educator brings additional expertise. A trained educator can assess the reading ability and study skills of ANP officers, help tailor training classes to improve those skills, and make the subject matter more accessible to those who need assistance. The PMTs train five core systems within the ANP: personnel, finance, operations, training and education, and logistics.

Challenges with the Substrate

Training illiterate ANP recruits is one of the challenges facing the PMTs. For example, in the Charkh district of Logar province, there are total of 50 ANP officers; only six of these officers can read and write. An additional challenge is the linguistic heterogeneity in the district. Approximately 60 percent of the residents speak Pashto and only ten police officers speak Pashto. The remainder of the population speaks Dari. This situation complicates the mentoring and training mission of the PMT, as Pashto-speaking U.S.-contracted interpreters often must translate conversations and instructions for some ANP officers.

Sustainment training is an additional challenge. PMTs report that the ANP claim they have already been trained on the topic the team is currently training. This situation illustrates the difficulty associated with training uneducated police officers. They do not understand the concept of perishable skills. An example is map reading. PMTs observe that the ANP appear to read map grids backwards. During sustainment training, even literate ANP continue to make the same map-reading mistakes.

Challenges with the System

With remote ANP outposts dependent on the MoI for fuel (for vehicles and generators) and provisional resupply, logistical challenges are commonplace. Mentoring logistics, especially to those Afghans who are illiterate, is very difficult. Recent proposals have included paying ANP by electronic funds transfer through the fledgling Afghan banking system. These payments would include allowances comparable to the military's basic allowance for subsistence. This process would eliminate the need for these outpost personnel to draw rice, cooking oil, meat, and firewood from their chains of command and push them to buy these items on the local economy. The process has the added benefit of pushing the ANP into the community, which has proven to be difficult.

Because of the MoI's practice of deploying ANP into a district that is not its own, the ANP's tribal and language differences, coupled with the public perception of a corrupt central government and national police, make it the target of violence. This situation often makes ANP officers reluctant to patrol and adopt a community-policing model. Additional tasks routinely performed by civilian law enforcement agencies in the U.S., such as conducting evidence investigations, canvassing witnesses, maintaining evidence chains of custody, processing crime scenes, employing proper arrest procedures, and conducting tactical questioning, are beyond the capabilities of most district ANP units.

Additional challenges arise in understanding how the tribal and government legal system hand off legal issues. Tribal shuras or meetings handle many transgressions and try defendants in accordance with the laws of Islam or tribal codes. At times, the exercise of tribal justice can conflict with that of the government. For example, tribal authorities in a village in Logar Province accused a married woman of adultery. She and her accused boyfriend were killed and placed in a field. The ANP arrested two men for the deaths; however, the district sub-governor secured the release of the accused to the custody of the village elders. How the government of Afghanistan resolves such conflicts has yet to be determined, which creates a legally nebulous situation and puts the ANP in an awkward position of potentially offending the tribal customs of those they are hired to protect.

What Works?

In the PMT mission of mentoring, assisting, advising, training, and educating the ANP, the following methods have emerged as effective strategies for building relationships with local ANP and developing its capabilities and professionalism:

- Conducting regular meetings to build rapport and develop relationships at a personal level.
- Teaching in parables. The single most effective means of teaching the ANP how to properly execute its law-enforcement mission is the use of oral histories by both civilian law-enforcement contractors and reservists, who serve as law-enforcement personnel in their civilian careers. Developing and rehearsing the discussion points following these oral examples are important parts of developing professional rapport.
- Conducting role-playing exercises where U.S. personnel demonstrate the role-playing techniques and then integrate role-playing into ANP training. Role-playing is an effective exercise in assessing individual ANP officers and selecting those with exceptional ability or leadership skills.
- Limiting the duration of training blocks. When training exercises exceed two hours, effectiveness drops off quickly. Civilian contractors recommend training blocks of no longer than two hours. After the two-hour block of training, an ANP officer in charge continues training and reports on continued training at the next meeting.
- Accompanying ANP members throughout the FDD Program. During the FDD Program, allied personnel and civilian contractors work as instructors and can order the ANP to perform operations during training. Once deployed in the area of operation, allied personnel and civilian contractors can only mentor, advise, and train. ANP members still recognize the authority of those civilian contractors or PMT members who accompanied them through the FDD program, and these personnel can be more effective in driving the evolution of the ANP to a competent local player.
- Managing FOO funds. Promises of or threats of loss of FOO funds are the most effective tools the PMT has in motivating ANP and its local leaders to train and execute assigned law enforcement tasks within the district. PMTs should be careful how they use FOO funds and recognize that it may be the only means available to influence their ANP counterparts.

- Separating ANP leadership from rank and file ANP for training exercises. One of the most challenging aspects of working with the ANP is weak and corrupt leadership. Separating ANP commanders allows them to “save face” during mentoring or advising sessions when certain actions could be perceived as denigrating their authority. It also allows political, transient officers to be separated from officers who may be more permanent and salvageable.
- Training the interpreter to be the trainer. Taking time to train the interpreter on the equipment fielded to the ANP and on proper procedures for range fire, room clearing, and land navigation can make blocks of instruction more rewarding for both parties.
- Building rapport quickly. Many PMTs report it takes weeks or months to build a relationship and establish trust and rapport with ANP counterparts. Recognizing the Afghan cultural values of a relationship is important and when properly established can make for a more effective mentoring relationship.

PMTs recommend the following methods for building rapport with the ANP:

- Assign training buddies. A U.S.-ANP buddy team for training exercises allows relationship building at all levels and exploits Afghan definitions of friendship and culture to drive training effectiveness. Furthermore, in training exercises such as range fire, it allows for train-the-trainer situations.
- Rehearse and agree on lesson plans to include parables or other oral history training tools before training, Make sure all PMT members are aware of the intended lessons beforehand. Support discussions between U.S.-ANP buddy teams.
- Use range fires to build ANP unit cohesion. Competing for scores is a means to motivate improved performance of ANP personnel.
- Use contests and rewards. Prior to deploying, work out papers, stamps, and other necessary office supplies to build official certificates of achievement or appreciation.
- Be prepared to offer instruction in literacy and English. Reviewing U.S. first-grade reading texts may help develop literacy and English competency training prior to deployment.

Conclusion

PMT assignments can be challenging and at the same time rewarding. Proper problem analysis and debriefs of redeploying PMTs for lessons learned and best practices can lead to more successful deployments. Many of the tools required to train the ANA may rely on nonmilitary skills that exploit the expertise of reserve component Soldiers. Assessing the nonmilitary skills of the PMT members prior to deployment may assist in assigning personnel responsible for organizing role playing classes, literacy, and English instruction.

Mentoring and Growing the Afghan National Police

LTC Keith Stone and LTC Jonathan P. Liba

Center for Army Lessons Learned News From the Front, February 2010.

Background

Upon assuming command of North American Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Training Advisory Group–Afghanistan (NTM–A/CSTC–A), LTG William B. Caldwell, IV directed a transition team “quick look” (TTQL) be completed in 30 days. The collective efforts of the quick look facilitated “seeing ourselves” as well as identifying key issues that require immediate action. Several concerns triggered initiatives that NTM–A command and staff requested assistance to address, such as internal manning and organizational adjustments. What follows is a summary of findings based upon personal observations, self-assessments of NTM–A/CSTC–A staff, and the insights and reports of the TTQL that included 10 external members representing a wide range of talent, including members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the war colleges, and the military academies as well as several members who had served previously in Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and CSTC–A. This paper is drawn from one of the TTQL tasks.

Observation: For NTM–A/CSTC–A to mentor the growth of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in both numbers and capabilities, it must assess its capacity to train and advise the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), applicable ministries, and recruiting and training commands to determine whether current efforts are sufficient to support potential growth decisions. This paper makes recommendations on how to improve ongoing efforts and potential growth decisions, including evaluations of the need to modify leader training. It specifically examines measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).

Discussion: An examination of the capacity of the NTM–A/CSTC–A to train and advise the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and ANP recruiting and training commands is primarily an examination of resources. In two cases, the complete answer must be deferred until the Afghan National Police Training Command (ANPTC) and Recruiting Command are actually formed. Following a review of plans for the Recruiting Command and ANPTC, this response will address the capabilities of NTM–A/CSTC–A to advise the MoI. In all cases, NTM–A/CSTC–A require greater resourcing to accomplish these important tasks.

Recruiting Command

The MoI and NTM–A/CSTC–A agree that the formation of an ANP Recruiting Command is critical to facilitate the accomplishment of two vital objectives: accelerate growth of the ANP and reform the large number of ANP who have never received training. Currently, the training capacities of the MoI and NTM–A/CSTC–A cannot address both requirements simultaneously. Nor does the operational environment allow for quick and simultaneous reform of all ANP forces. Currently, about 75 percent of the ANP has not completed any formal training. The effort to “reform” the untrained police fills the ANP training centers. In the past, new recruits bypassed filled training centers and reported straight to the district. As NTM–A/CSTC–A, contract trainers, and Afghan trainers worked feverishly to train and reform Afghan forces, the untrained manpower of the ANP decreased only slightly at best.

The development of the ANP Recruiting Command is seen as one method to break the cycle of using untrained police and instead employ a recruit-train-assign model. The intent is to create nine collection points to gather recruits in a secure area and then assign them to training areas in a short period of time. Recruits will be in-processed, entered into the ANP biometrics database, drug tested, and entered into the electronic pay system before reporting for training. Recruiting Command will manage and maximize training capacity. The MoI will issue equipment to recruits before they report to a district for employment. Currently, untrained ANP are not fully equipped until the district conducts reform training.

The Recruiting Command will be a primary enabler to conduct future growth in the ANP, and to do so without adding more untrained police to the force. However, the Recruiting Command cannot address the full reform of ANP. Reform of the ANP must not take a majority of seats in training centers. The Directed District Development (DDD) program is one way to further ANP reform. In this program, coalition ground commanders conduct training in the local area and mentor units to reform their districts. In addition, the MoI has proposed a project to train and certify Afghan training teams to conduct local DDD. This plan allows coalition units to emphasize partnering and mentoring over conducting in-district training.

The combination of ANP growth and completion of ANP reform would allow for increased leader training currently lacking within the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). The MoI is evaluating the use of training sites outside of Afghanistan because it lacks training capacity. Police officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) must wait until their district is selected for Focused District Development (FDD) for the chance to conduct leader training. Officers and NCOs who have already received the eight-week basic police course attend NCO and officer courses during FDD. Capacity regained from ANP reform could be used for officer and NCO leader training which in turn could be developed into an entire program of increased professional development within the officer and NCO corps of the ANP. Such a program should improve leadership and increase police capabilities at the district level, reduce corruption, and positively influence retention and attrition rates. The availability of training capacity and a larger, more capable force would allow for dedicated officer and NCO training and increase the professionalism of the AUP.

The proposed Recruiting Command will play a central role in supplying recruits to the processing centers first instead of straight to the district. Currently, NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ-1 provides advisers to the chief of personnel and the chief of recruiting. In terms of coalition manpower, one position should be added to the CJ-1 joint manning document (JMD) or NATO Crisis Establishment (CE) for an adviser to the collection points. Additionally, due to the importance of Recruiting Command in supporting the growth of the ANP, NTM-A/CSTC-A should assign a high priority to the construction and resourcing of the collection points.

Recommendations:

- Add 1 x Major/OF-3 to the CJ-1 JMD/CE.
- Assign high priority to projects to build collection point infrastructure where needed.
- Assign more districts to DDD training with coalition units to increase reform.
- Resource and assist in the development of the Afghan DDD plan.

MOP/MOE: Recruiting measures are clearly important to the growth of the ANP. MOP including monthly recruiting, retention, and attrition totals are high visibility to support the MOE of increased ANP end strength. Lesser MOP that the Assistant Commanding General for Police Development (ACG-PD) and CJ-1 will track include monthly throughput at the collection points, average time spent processing before moving to training, and Combined Training and Advisory Command – Police (CTAG-P) will track percentage of training capacity used per course to gauge the Recruiting Command’s ability to manage recruiting, in-processing, and movement to training.

Afghan National Police Training Command

The ANPTC shares some similarities to the ANP Recruiting Command situation, but also enjoys some differences. ANPTC is a planned but not yet formed Afghan command. Unlike Recruiting Command, ANPTC will be readily trained and advised by NTM-A/CSTC-A’s CTAG-P. CTAG-P grows in size and capacity every day preceding the formation of ANPTC. Its structure mirrors the planned structure of ANPTC, so advisers will be assigned at every level of the ANPTC. As long as CTAG-P’s CE is filled, NTM-A/CSTC-A will have the capacity to train and advise ANPTC.

Recommendation: Resource CTAG-P to 100 percent of its CE.

MOP/MOE: CTAG-P will track the percentage of capacity for each training course as a MOP leading to MOE numbers of ANP trained monthly and annually.

Ministerial Development

Unlike ANPTC and Recruiting Command, NTM-A/CSTC-A currently does provide advisers and training to the Afghan MoI. The NTM-A/CSTC-A’s MoI ministerial development (MD) plan is a deliberate process grounded in the 2008 Campaign Plan. NTM-A/CSTC-A and European Union Police (EUPOL) currently manage the MoI Ministerial Systems Development plans. The ACG-PD supervises staff sections to write and implement development plans, and then reviews revised plans annually. As mandated by the campaign plan, the development plans contain metrics on rating the capability of the ministerial systems using capability milestone (CM) ratings.

The Ministerial Development Board (MDB) is a group that includes Afghan owners of each ministerial system and their NTM-A/CSTC-A advisers, EUPOL representatives, and NTM-A/CSTC-A senior leadership. The MDB reviews progress monthly and quarterly. If there is a criticism of this process, it is the resulting extremely long MDB review meetings that may diminish participation and attendance by key members of the agencies involved.

The greatest weakness of NTM-A/CSTC-A’s Ministerial Development program is the number of full-time advisers. The ACG-PD JMD contains authorizations for the adviser to the Minister of Interior, but only advisers to three of the four deputy ministers (DMs), and no full-time advisers to the commanders of the four branches of police. In addition, the authorizations to the advisers to the DM for administration and support and the MoI chief of staff are coded for coalition sourcing. These positions were not filled before the development of the current NTM-A/CSTC-A CE. Because NATO rejected ministerial development as a core task, it is extremely unlikely that any nation will fill these coalition positions on the JMD.

Recommendation: Grow the JMD to create more full-time adviser positions. Recode positions to U.S. sourcing for the advisers to the DM for administration and support and the MoI chief of staff. Add and fill authorized positions for advisers to the deputy minister for strategy and policy, commander of Afghan Border Police, commander Afghan Civil Order Police, commander of Afghan Uniformed Police, and chief of anti-crime.

MOP/MOE: The MDB reviews clearly indicates the MOP for ministerial development through the CM rating assigned and as explained by the adviser for each Ministerial System. The MOE is the overall assessment rating given the MoI.

Final Comments

The MoI's planned Recruiting Command and Afghan National Police Training Command represent tremendous potential for the development of the ANP. Both will play major roles in the future growth of the ANP, and can be instrumental in developing institutional leader training. The combination of increased quality and quantity of forces and improved governance by the MoI will be a huge step forward for Afghanistan. The application of resources identified in this paper will substantially support these advances in capacity and capability. The successful growth of the ANP to the approved objective of 109,000 members depends first on the formation of the recruiting and training commands and second on the effective partnering and advising of the MoI and the ANP.

Delivering Pay to the Afghan National Police

COL Rick McConoughey

Center for Army Lessons Learned News From the Front, January 2010

The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A)/ Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) is committed to reforming how pay is delivered to the Afghan National Police (ANP) by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Afghan police pay is highly vulnerable to corruption at numerous points in the pay cycle. The NTM–A/CSTC–A is cooperating with the MoI to improve payroll security. Afghanistan’s infrastructure is a combination of 19th century Wild West and 21st century technology, and pay methods reflect these conditions. U.S. military forces have a discrete payday, but the ANP receive pay during a monthly 10-day pay window. The MoI provides payment authority documentation to Da Afghanistan Bank (the central bank of Afghanistan) during the pay window. After the bank provides payment authority, the MoI delivers pay to the Afghan police.

Currently, the MoI has the following four methods to deliver police pay:

- Pay by list (PBL).
- Trusted agent (TA).
- Electronic fund transfer (EFT) or direct deposit.
- M-Paisa (mobile or cell phone money transfers).

Advantages and Disadvantages of Payment Methods

The PBL process includes the following:

- The MoI provides a list of police officer names and authorized pay amounts to the provincial branch of Da Afghanistan Bank.
- Each police officer must appear in person at the bank to collect pay and must present an identity card.
- The bank verifies the identity of the police officer and then disburses the cash funds to the individual.
- The police officer is not required to have a bank account and does not use a bank card.

The PBL security disadvantages are as follows:

- As with EFT, issues of distance and risk are also present in the PBL method, but are more severe because the ANP are required to report to a single bank.
- Robbery and checkpoint shakedowns are serious risks for the PBL delivery method.

Approximately 8 percent of the ANP use the PBL delivery method.

The TA process includes the following:

- A TA transports the police payroll to a single location for distribution.
- The TA typically charges a fee up to 33 percent of the police officer's pay for delivering the funds.

The TA security disadvantages are as follows:

- A TA is exposed to the same serious risks the police would encounter by traveling to remote areas where the pay is delivered.
- The TA is not paid directly for collecting and delivering the funds since the compensation fee is from the police officers' pay. The fee amount is subject to variation and is a source of corruption, especially given the low literacy level within the police force. The low literacy rate opens the ANP, particularly patrol officers, to pay skimming because many of the police officers do not know their proper salary rate.

Approximately 19 percent of the ANP use the TA delivery method.

From the MoI perspective, direct deposit or EFT is the preferred method to move funds.

Advantages of EFT include the following:

- EFT is a fast and reliable method to send money to the banks.
- EFT limits the opportunity for corruption in delivering pay to the ANP.

The EFT process includes the following:

- Funds are transferred to one of Afghanistan's commercial banks and requires police officers to have a bank account.
- A police officer collects pay by presenting a bank card and official identification to a bank teller.

The EFT security disadvantages are as follows:

- Access is difficult for the ANP in rural districts because the Afghanistan commercial banks are moderately distributed and are typically located near the center of a province. Rural police officers encounter long distances, lack of reliable transportation, and poor roads to collect pay from the banks.
- Travel by road with large amounts of cash is dangerous and a security challenge. Many police officers carrying cash are open to robbery and unofficial checkpoints that charge a bribe to pass through unhindered.

Approximately 73 percent of the ANP use the EFT delivery method.

M-Paisa is a recently introduced method of paying the ANP that is undergoing testing in the Jalrez District of Wardak Province.

Major advantages of M-Paisa include the following:

- Speed and effectiveness. The ANP receive 100 percent of pay.
- Convenience. Family members with cell phones can receive cash anywhere there is an M-Paisa agent.
- Security. Corruption is reduced because personnel handling the cash in payment operations are minimized.
- Accountability and transparency. All transactions are logged and traceable.
- Decreased risk. Dangerous travel to conduct banking transactions is minimized.

The M-Paisa testing process includes the following:

- A police officer signs up for M-Paisa and receives a free cell phone. The Roshan phone company provides cell phones for the test; however, the NTM-A/CSTC-A is seeking donations for expansion of the program.
- The police officer receives a cell phone text message notification when pay is available.
- The police officer reports in person to a local M-Paisa agent authorized by the cell phone service provider.
- The police officer presents identification, the phone text message, and a private personal identification number to the M-Paisa agent to verify identity.
- Depending on the police officer's preference, the M-Paisa agent pays all or some of the pay.
- After payments are disbursed, the M-Paisa agent uses the payment record to recoup the funds paid out from the commercial bank where the district's salary was deposited.

Key features of the M-Paisa delivery method include the following:

- The M-Paisa agent receives payment after the distribution of funds, which reduces cash on the battlefield.
- The M-Paisa system allows the ANP to electronically transfer funds to relatives at other locations, which eliminates the physical movement of cash within the country. For example, a police officer in Wardak can send funds to a relative in Helmand with no cash being physically transported between the two provinces. As a result, the M-Paisa agent is never in possession of Afghanistan government funds that are not disbursed.

Roshan pays a small fee to the cell phone company to provide the M-Paisa service.

An M-Paisa disadvantage is that the ANP are required to have Roshan cell phone coverage to use the M-Paisa system. Afghanistan (similar to rural areas in the United States) does not have 100 percent cell phone service in the country because of the remoteness and mountainous nature of large areas of territory.

Early testing results suggest M-Paisa is successful in reducing corruption in the Jalrez District. An example of the effectiveness of the process is an incident that occurred during the November pay cycle. A district ANP commander attempted to circumvent the M-Paisa system by presenting 45 cell phone subscribers identity module (SIM) cards to the M-Paisa agent to collect the pay of 45 police officers. The cell phone dealer refused to pay the district ANP chief, and the M-Paisa agent quickly reported the incident to the service provider. The cell phone service provider contacted the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ8 (comptroller). The matter was immediately referred to the director of the Afghan major crimes task force and unspecified action was taken. The cell phone SIM cards were returned the next day to the police officers to collect their pay. The NTM-A/CSTC-A encouraged the MoI to investigate further and, if justified, to terminate the district ANP chief. It is not surprising that someone would try to circumvent the M-Paisa system. The surprise is the person was caught, the incident was reported quickly, and action was taken.

Because of the success of the M-Paisa system, the MoI has set a goal for all ANP to receive pay using either direct deposit or M-Paisa by 31 December 2010. It is a highly aggressive goal that will be difficult to achieve because of the limited infrastructure and the lack of cell phone coverage. However, the intention is good.

It will be some time before the PBL and the TA are no longer used in Afghanistan to pay the ANP. The remote, rugged nature of the country and the security challenge will delay infrastructure improvements needed to allow more ANP to use direct deposit and M-Paisa. The MoI is moving toward 100 percent EFT. As the country develops, there will be less opportunity to corrupt the pay of hardworking police officers trying to protect Afghan citizens. The NTM-A/CSTC-A and the MoI are helping to ensure the ANP are paid and their families are fed.

Police Training: A How-to Vignette

Dr. Terry Tucker

What do counterinsurgency and stability operations have in common with security force assistance? The common element is the need to build the internal capacity of the police forces. Building police force capacity while developing other Afghan institutions enables the international community to assist the government of Afghanistan to exercise and extend its authority and influence, which in turn shapes the conditions for effective governance, reconstruction, and development.

Building police force capacity is essential to providing security and stability. Increased capacity ultimately affects multiple lines of effort and operation crucial for both improving the present situation and for developing an exit strategy.

The influence of police advisors and the training strategies and tactics used by police trainers directly affect capacity and professionalism displayed by law enforcement institutions. Trainers must have cultural understanding; be tactically proficient; understand intradepartmental, interagency, and interdepartmental operations; and build lasting relationships and competence in core, secondary, and tertiary skills.

A few years ago, U.S. and coalition forces stood up operational coordination centers (OCCs) — localized centers at the regional and provincial levels designed to coordinate security activities. The mission was to teach the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to coordinate, communicate, conduct operations, and collect intelligence. The ANSF was then to synchronize each of these elements with the National Command Center, the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), the National Security Directorate (NSD), and the coalition.

Because different coalition partners and organizations were responsible for sections of subordinate OCCs within each region, everyone involved had to be trained in American doctrine, which was the basis for how the OCC would organize, train, and execute its mission.

A key component of this process was to integrate intelligence collection and analysis with mission analysis. In essence, this involved teaching intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) for counterinsurgency in a joint and combined setting. Afghan counterparts were expected to develop an appropriate course of action with the right mix of capability based on available assets and agencies in the operating environment. If they did not have the assets or capabilities immediately under control, they had to request them from an interagency or intra-agency element or from next higher headquarters, even if it meant going all the way to the National Command Authority.

After training a series of individual basic, intermediate, and advanced tasks, the trainers organized a situational training exercise (STX) to exercise and train collective tasks. Afghan forces were asked to react to improvised explosive devices, ambushes, night letters, natural disasters, and different types of criminal activities.

At the beginning of the process, mobile training teams were sent to each region to implement a training program that culminated in a three-day STX. The initial basic OCC organization called for combined task organization of officers and noncommissioned officers from the ANA, ANP, NSD, and ABP. The OCCs would operate 24/7, and each combined team would provide staff members who would function as S-1s, S-2s, S-3s, S-4s, and S-6s. Each team would be responsible for lateral communications and for reporting up to the National Command Center and down to the provinces. A region could have as many as nine or 10 provinces reporting to it, and the ability to communicate with each province was reflected in the training and STX.

Assigned mentors were crucial during this process. The mentors developed personal relationships with their counterparts and established lateral networks with other mentors and agencies. Mentors were also instrumental in talking and walking through course-of-action development with their counterparts, demonstrating unity of understanding and execution of doctrine. Although some coalition elements were not familiar with U.S. doctrine, the concepts were not entirely foreign to them and they learned quickly. Translating and defining acronyms used in U.S. military doctrine was difficult, but this problem was remedied with the introduction of a military terms dictionary produced — in English and Dari — by the Afghan National Army Doctrine Division.

At times, seemingly simple tasks — such as posting unit graphics to maps, submitting situation reports, using brevity codes, and following proper radio-telephone operator procedures — seemed to create chaos. In some cases the STXs came to a standstill as we reset player units to adapt to organizational differences, and trainers and students worked together to create new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) templates; standing operating procedures; or reporting procedures to handle inter/intra-agency challenges.

A mentor's adaptability and creativity, along with the strength of his relationship with his counterparts, determined the speed, receptiveness, frequency, and level of competence in which the Afghan police learned and adapted.

In some cases, difficulties were overcome by correctly translating and conveying the meanings of doctrinal acronyms. Sometimes, civilian police trainers had to be trained and mentored on U.S. doctrine, processes and equipment. In some cases we had to simultaneously train U.S. and coalition members on the same IPB or MDMP processes the Afghan partners were expected to know after 10 full days of training.

Each partner and organization brought a unique perspective on how to manage, track, disseminate, and plot information in the OCC. The challenge was to attempt to integrate these perspectives while adhering to the spirit and intent of the program of instruction and while maintaining balance between doctrine and the TTP.

In essence, the trainer's function was to facilitate, mentor, train, and operationalize not just the Afghan police counterparts but coalition and other governmental organizations as well. Both functions were necessary to meet the end goal of standing up an operational and capable OCC.

The trainers quickly discovered they were building essential relationships for future operations across multiple cultures, languages, and degrees of experience. To increase understanding,

trainers used analogies that cut across cultural barriers. For example, one staff element seemed unable to get through the MDMP to develop courses of action for the commander. The trainers called a tactical pause in the training, then reset the coalition and host-nation actors by asking them to imagine how they would plan for a wedding, including the timeline they would use to arrive at the end goal. An older Afghan police officer was asked to walk the group through the process of planning and executing an Afghan wedding. The trainers and students then spent the afternoon dissecting his wedding plans and discussing how each planning element related to the MDMP. The process was enlightening for everyone: the students gained insight into MDMP and how it leads to the development of courses of action, and the trainers met the training objectives and gained cultural understanding.

The mission and training success of security force assistance is directly related to a host of soft and hard variables, including the following:

- Cultural awareness.
- Projecting credibility and competence.
- Ability to ask the right questions.
- Ability to effectively work with interpreters.
- Adaptability and creativity.
- Tactical and technical knowledge and experience.

The mission of training police capacity is not new to the U.S. Army; the Army has a long history of training and assistance missions. Although most will say Afghanistan is historically a special operations forces mission, the U.S. Army has been performing training and assistance missions in Afghanistan at least as far back as 2005.

The training and assistance mission has evolved over time, and the creation of advise-and-assist brigades is recognition of the importance of this aspect of capacity building in security force assistance. The skills and abilities the trainers demonstrate are key elements to the success of the mission.

Training Afghanistan's Police Force

SGT Spencer Case

Reprinted with permission from 304th Public Affairs Division.



Figure 10-1.

PARWAN PROVINCE, Afghanistan (May 31, 2010) — One of the fundamental steps to defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan lays in providing law and order for the people.

This responsibility falls on the Afghan National Police (ANP), a branch of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which is now some 100,000 members strong and includes the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan Border Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and a few other policing and paramilitary entities.

In many ways, the Afghan National Police have more of an impact on counterinsurgency efforts than the Afghan National Army, said U.S. Army Major James A. Ramage, a deputy provost marshal for ANP development for Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82).

“If the police are legitimate, if they’re out there doing their job providing law and order; that goes a very long way toward de-legitimizing an insurgency,” said Ramage, who hails from Hope Mills, N.C. “If people are secure in their homes and their neighborhoods, they aren’t going to join an insurgency.”

Much has changed with the relationship between ANP and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) since CJTF-82 assumed command of Regional Command-East (RC-East) June 3, 2009. The biggest change has been that the regional task forces became directly responsible for ANP progress last fall, an event which allowed for greater opportunities for combined action, Ramage said.

The new relationship between the ANP and ISAF battle space owners, combined with initiatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has helped combat two obstacles to developing a professional police force: corruption and lack of adequate training.

“In our rotation we’ve seen improved training and pay for the police, which in turn helps with the corruption issues,” Ramage said. “If you’re making a living wage, you’re not going to make a buck on the black market or make a buck by fleecing down civilians for illegal tolls or some other racketeering type of crime. So on our rotation, the partnership we’ve been able to do with the police along with the training, that’s helped dramatically in terms of shaping a professional police force.”

Ramage’s claim that progress has been made with the development of the ANP over the last year is corroborated by the results of a survey conducted by ISAF.

Twenty male surveyors and 20 female surveyors gathered the viewpoints of more than 6,000 Afghans residing in every district of RC-East on issues related to security and development.

According to the most recent quarterly survey completed in April, 88 percent of Afghans in RC-East reported that they agreed with the statement, “The ANP is capable of protecting.” Only 10 percent said they thought that they’re in danger from the ANP, a 7-percent decrease from April 2009.

Afghan Uniformed Police

The AUP are the largest and most frequently seen face of the ANP and first line representatives of Afghan government.

The AUP is approximately 65,000 patrolmen strong and they are charged with the day-to-day policing of Afghanistan at the district level.

Keeping the force trained and competent is a high priority for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and ISAF.

To this end, troops in RC-East have increased partnership with the AUP during the course of CJTF-82’s deployment. Of the nearly 160 districts in RC-East, troops are now conducting combined action in over 60, Ramage said. Most of this is being conducted by military police and other maneuver units who live at forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) near district centers.

The Afghan Ministry of Interior has sought to build the competence of the AUP through two main training programs: the Focused District Development Program (FDDP) and the Directed Police District Development Program (DPDD).

The FDDP extracts troubled AUP units from the districts where they operate and places them in a Regional Training Center for a period of eight weeks. While they are away, the Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), an elite federal response force with more than 3,000 members comparable to U.S. police Specialized Weapons and Tactics teams, step in to fill the vacuum.

A newer program, the DPDD, is essentially an inverted version of FDDP. It allows the AUP units to remain in place and has trainers from the Ministry of Interior embed with the unit to conduct on-site training for a period of 12 weeks. During that period, half the unit trains for six weeks while the other half conducts regular operations; the two halves then switch.

This puts less stress on the ANCOP and allows law enforcement to stay local, Ramage said.

“The local elders, the local villagers, can all see the immediate benefits,” he said. “They don’t have to become accustomed to an ANCOP or some other police agency coming into their district the whole time.”

There are currently more than 50 districts in RC-East whose police are in either the FDDP or DPDD program, of which 18 began training during CJTF-82’s tour.

At that rate, the Ministry of Interior is on track to meet its goal of having all AUP “key terrain districts,” which the Ministry of Interior has selected for focused development efforts, trained by 2011.

Afghan Border Police

The ABP are composed of more than 12,000 police officers and are responsible for providing security at Afghanistan’s four international airports and 3,435 miles of border with six countries. The total length of Afghanistan’s borders is about the combined length of the U.S. border with Mexico and Canada’s border with Alaska.

Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan is its longest, stretching 1,509 miles. Of that, 450 miles is in RC-East, a distance about 100 miles longer than Arizona’s border with Mexico. The Pakistan border is particularly important because of the threats posed by the narcotics trade and organized crime groups like the Haqqani Network.

Due to other challenges facing Afghanistan, capacity building for ABP has not been a priority over the last few years. However, progress in RC-East has allowed CJTF-82 to focus on the ABP more than predecessors. They have focused on education and partnership.

The ABP have made progress over the course of CJTF-82’s deployment.

Many ISAF troops have partnered with ABP. Soldiers from C Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment at Waza Khwa, Paktika province conducted over 100 patrols jointly with ANSF in their first 100 days. These troops found the ABP to be competent partners and loyal servants of their country.

“Working with the ABP is a rewarding challenge and a unique experience,” said U.S. Army First Lieutenant Dave Hanson, a platoon leader with C Company from Endicott, N.Y. “The level of partnership we have been able to develop in such a short time frame demonstrates their willingness to protect their country and the promise of a bright future.”

U.S. Army First Lieutenant Scott Harris, the C Company executive officer, gave a similar assessment of the ABP.

“The ABP have been instrumental in our fight against the insurgents,” said Harris, who hails from Fayetteville, N.C. “Whether they are working side by side with Coalition Forces or they are out conducting independent operations, the results are always the same—success.”

Education is another area where progress has been made on CJTF-82’s watch. When CJTF-82 assumed command of RC-East June 3, 2009, no leadership development program existed for ABP non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

A March 11 graduation ceremony shows that has since changed. Eleven members of the ABP completed the first iteration of a course run by Afghan instructors. The course, held at Gardez, Paktya Province, included classroom training, weapons instruction and field exercises. All of the graduates were promoted to 3rd sergeant – the equivalent to sergeant in the U.S. Army – upon completion of the course.

“This course was critical to the ABP solving their own professional development needs and reinforces a continued emphasis of development of a professional NCO Corps,” said U.S. Army Master Sergeant Jason Dodge of Stanley, N.Y., Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 3rd Special Troops battalion (STB), who helps supervise ABP NCOs.

Afghan National Police Mentor Guide Section 3: Mentoring Challenges, Strategies, and Tools

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

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Overview

Helping their Afghan Police counterparts develop a safe community in the middle of an insurgency, exacerbated by uncontrolled criminal activity and terrorism, will be one of the toughest challenges police advisors will face. The cultural and ethnic differences discussed previously make the task even more complex. At times, these differences may appear to be too difficult to overcome, but they can be minimized with patience, understanding, and determination.

The Afghan National Police (ANP) do not now, nor will they probably ever, look similar to a Western police force. This section will explain some of the key challenges the ANP face in their day-to-day operations in policing their communities and providing law and order under the precepts of the Rule of Law and Democratic policing.

To provide the advisor a baseline from which to begin effecting change, the advisor should know that the ANP have very little history since the Taliban really did not have a formalized police force in the manner that westerners think of one. In fact, most local ANP were nothing more than a local warlord's "militia" that would extort the local population or passers-through in order to make money. They also served to keep the local population in line through intimidation and would serve as a protection force to handle conflicts with other tribes.

Leadership in the police during this time, and after the 2001 fall of the Taliban, was generally based on patronage or influence as opposed to competence. Additionally, since the pay differential between ranks was so small (a lieutenant general [LTG] only made \$30/month more than a captain [CPT]) promoting officers to very high ranks regardless of position or ability was a low cost way for local government officials to curry favor.

Under the Taliban, law enforcement took a back seat to "morality" enforcement through the Ministry of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This organization, with its 30,000 enforcers, would pursue such critical crimes as men shaving their short beards too short, kite flying, listening to music, or failing to attend prayers. Punishments for violations of these and other "crimes" were swift and brutal.

In the traditional justice system, the focus on "morality" crimes as well as Shari'a law's focus on testimonial evidence for conviction has led to the ANP having almost no investigative capability beyond obtaining confessions. The Taliban further perpetuated this focus on confessions by staging public trials where "criminals" (read enemies of the state) would "confess" (often after being tortured) to a crime, after which they were found guilty and executed. As a result of this history, most ANP have no ability to collect or process evidence and many judges do not know how to use it in determining guilt or innocence. Advisors should expect that, for the near future, obtaining confessions will remain the principal mechanism for prosecution in the justice system.

ANP Development Mission

The development of an effective Afghanistan Police Force is critical to the overall strategic goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan. The police force is necessary to provide security and establish the rule of law, which are critical for gaining and maintaining popular support for the Afghan government and the eventual withdraw of NATO combat troops from the nation. Unfortunately the resurgence of the Taliban over the last two years, coupled with dysfunction local government and courts and the public perception of ANP corruption, has set these goals back.

ANP Development Goals

Each of these development goals represents a key area in any unit's functioning. Depending on the time available to advisor teams, they may have to choose one or two areas to focus on since they may not have the ability to focus on each area. Areas for development include:

- Fill key leadership positions with qualified and competent personnel.
- Full personnel accountability (identification cards and biometrics) on all district police.
- Fill the district with all key equipment; document the accountability chain.
- Fill the district to full Tashkil manning.
- Ensure that every policeman is trained to uphold the rule of law and takes pride in his work.
- Conduct individual training proficiency to support key collective tasks.
- Train key collective tasks to ensure police survival and district security.
- Train district staff to effectively manage key tasks in finance and budget, logistics, operational planning, personnel and training, and education.
- Train the staff to accurately track current operations.
- Train the staff to properly plan and execute key collective tasks
- Train the staff to conduct timely coordination with other supporting agencies and security forces.
- Continue to train districts through Focused District Development.

Focused District Development (FDD) Program

The FDD program is a Command Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) initiative implemented in late 2007 to increase the effectiveness of the training and equipping process for district stations. Advisors found that ANP districts were unlikely to send their ANP to training under the older "slots available" system. Also, the piecemeal nature of equipment distribution across the ANP coupled with their ineffective supply tracking system made it

impossible to ensure every station had the required equipment. In order to alleviate these problems as well as to help foster esprit-de-corps and professionalism in the ANP, CSTC-A implemented the FDD.

The principal operation of the FDD is the removal of an entire district station's personnel to a regional training center for screening, equipping, and training. Upon completion, the ANP return to their district, which has then received all required station equipment as well as any building repair or replacement. A dedicated police mentor team (PMT) is also assigned to further the training and development started at the academy. To date, the FDD program is a success. Communities that have their police go through the process all agree that the newly trained ANP demonstrate a higher level of professionalism and competence and add to the security of the area. Unfortunately, the process is very slow and will take six to seven years more to train all 400+ district stations. Due to the success of the FDD in training the ANP districts, CSTC-A plans to expand the program to begin training the 135 border police companies in the same manner.

Comparison of Western vs. Afghan Police

It is important to note that it is not the purpose of police advisors to make the ANP look like a Western police department. The fact is that many facets of the western police model will not work in a tribal culture of Afghanistan. Ultimately it is up to the Afghan people to decide how their police will function and the models they will use to develop their force and responsibilities. The key role for the advisors is to encourage the ANP to ensure that however they structure themselves and perform their mission, that they enforce the law equally to all.

The importance of the Afghan people's perception of the ANP cannot be overstated. Coalition efforts, such as the FDD are helping change the view of the ANP. Generally, when the community is told that their local police are leaving for training, they are very hesitant to allow Afghan National Civil Police Order (ANCOP) into their area since they are outsiders. This reluctance is in spite of the fact that the local police are corrupt. Often, however, once ANCOP begins working and the people see how a fair, values-based organization operates, they want them to stay as opposed to having the local police return.

Police Advisor Principles

The most important principal for improving the ANP is the development of their competence and professionalism. The police must act as trusted agents of the government that both leaders and citizens see as a fair and impartial arbitrator of justice. The police must have the respect of the people and represent them from a demographic and cultural values standpoint. They must have the training, expertise, and equipment to successfully conduct law enforcement operations. Finally, they must demonstrate that they are dedicated to the welfare of the citizens and the nation; combating insurgents and criminals while protecting the rights of the people and creating security that allow growth in opportunity.

Six Advisor Imperatives

The six imperatives for effective advising are:

- Understand the operating environment
- Leadership and Influence

- Promoting legitimacy
- Ensuring unity of effort and purpose
- Managing information
- Developing self-sustaining systems

Working with Interpreters

Interpreters are among the advisor's greatest assets. Advisors will find it next to impossible to get anything of value done in the absence of an interpreter. Advising through an interpreter is a skill. Interpreters are valued members of an advisor team. Advisors will be responsible for the safety, billeting, nutrition and pay of the team's interpreter. Sharing the time of the interpreter will be a mission-critical task. Advisors will need to be aware of the time sheet process to ensure that the interpreter is paid in a timely manner. Advisors often find that their interpreter becomes as much a part of the team as any individual advisor, and that they can help solve many problems at the local level.

Interpreters often possess intuition regarding the behaviors of other Afghans that many advisors lack or gain slowly at best. Advisors are sometimes surprised at the level of feedback that the interpreter can provide following an engagement.

Remember to speak to the person you are addressing, not directly to the interpreter. Keep sentences short so as not to overload the interpreter. Include interpreter in rehearsals. Limit private conversations between the interpreter and the local national.

Advisor Reporting Requirements

Advisors will be required by the Regional Police Advisory Command (RPAC) to provide reports on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. Advisors will be required to perform district and provincial assessments periodically. The local battlespace commander will most likely wish to be copied on some or all of these reports. Formats for the reports have changed considerably over time. Advisors will want to acquire the reporting formats upon assignment to an RPAC.

Be careful not to give your ANP the impression that reporting is the top priority, but do convey that accurate reporting is important.

Policing in a Divided Society

One of the most difficult things for American advisors to understand when dealing with their Afghan counterparts is the importance that the ANP place on local affiliation as opposed to a national identification. While many ANP will claim to be working for a greater Afghanistan, they will almost always place family, tribal, or ethnic priorities ahead of national priorities. Police leaders see no conflict in values when, for instance, local tribal leaders asks them to do something that may run counter to national priorities.

In most western cultures, the values of certain organizations are expected to trump local values. For instance, when a person joins a city police force, he or she is expected to subordinate the needs of a particular neighborhood to the needs of the community as a whole. This is known as

“cross-cutting” a value system. As a result, the society expects the police to enforce laws equally across the city and not give friends or family a better deal. While this type of soft corruption does happen in America, if the police hierarchy learns of it the officer will be punished. However, in Afghanistan, treating your family or tribe differently, is expected, if not encouraged.

Tribal domination of the arms of local government is the norm in Afghanistan. Advisors should expect the local police to draw men exclusively from the dominant tribe in the region. While this may not be a problem in areas with only one tribe, in mixed areas it can cause strife as the un-represented groups will see the police as a functionary of their rivals. ANP leaders have to be responsive to their local tribal leaders, especially when the police leader answers to the tribal leader for tribal matters. While advisors may be invited to meetings between these leaders, most will occur at times when the team is not there.

Advisors must address issues of obvious favoritism, especially at the expense of other groups in the area, but realize that the chief’s loyalty will, for the time being, remain linked to those local leaders. Chiefs are frequently not from the area where their command is located. In these cases, the ANP who are under the sway of the local tribal or village leaders may attempt to manipulate or subvert the chief. Since Afghanistan has yet to develop a strong national identity, it is impossible to convince the ANP why they must put concepts such as national values or rule of law above the tangible responsibilities they have to their tribes and families.

The ANP, in their mind, exist to protect their families and tribes, not to protect the rights of the accused. As a result of this mindset, activities such as torture or summary execution of threats are an acceptable way of protecting the community. This value system is reinforced by the dysfunction of the judicial system which may not provide justice to a victim. Almost any action, regardless of the extreme, is allowable if it protects the family or tribe.

Not only do the vast majority of ANP feel that police work is no place for women, many also believe that women have no right to bring complaints before the police. In Afghan culture, the family protects or punishes women. Therefore if a woman is a victim of a crime, it is up to the men of the family to avenge her. Also, the police may feel they have no right to interfere in the disciplining of a woman by her family, regardless of the end result.

Each province will have an officer dedicated to women’s issues such as the reduction of domestic violence. This officer may be the only female ANP in the province, or it may be a male officer. It is a requirement to have such an officer, but whether or not the position is more than just a title varies from province to province.

Coercive Interrogation

Afghan law places a primacy on confessions to obtain a conviction. Under the Taliban, this belief was corrupted through the use of torture to maintain a veneer of justice. Those practices, combined with the nonexistent ANP evidence collection and analysis systems, have led them to think the only way they can get a conviction is through a confession.

Corruption

The hardest part of dealing with corruption in the ANP is that in many cases they do not see it as corruption; merely as a way of doing business. Even practices that, if committed on the ANP, would be seen as corruption, may be seen as acceptable when perpetrated by them on someone

else. Police advisors cannot allow any instance of corruption to go unchallenged. While the challenge may not stop the practice completely, it will often stop it at that moment and will reinforce to the leaders that their activities are under scrutiny.

Arrange to be present during events where corruption is likely to occur. Any negotiation for services, especially if it involves coalition money or resources, should be attended. If the district is unable to have electronic funds transfer due to the banks or lack thereof, make it a point to always attend pay operations.

Advisors may find the level and depth of corruption to be overwhelming. Make ethics a key point of discussion whenever possible, using analogies and casual conversation to illustrate these points rather than lecturing behavior. Combined with formal training, these efforts will slowly bear fruit. Target the corruption which has a disabling effect first. Once the ANP reach what could be described as a more “functional” level of corruption, then more subtle methods may bring the most progress. If the leadership is corrupt beyond any recoverable point, the advisor may be forced to press for the relief of the leadership. If this occurs, they will most likely be reassigned to a similar position elsewhere. Advisors must do their best to work with the personnel who are found in place.

Corruption or criminal activity involving weapons and/or ammunition is the most serious of all and will require agencies outside of the advisor team to become involved to investigate and apprehend violators. Detection of this type of activity will often happen while making spot assessments of arms rooms or ammunition storage.

The judicial system is rife with corruption and inefficiency. Tribal loyalties may play a role in this, but most often it is money and influence that will allow apprehended criminals to go free. Civilians cannot approach a court with a civil problem, such as a land dispute, with any reasonable expectation of satisfaction. Seeing this, the ANP may find themselves in a “corruption race” with prosecutors and judges to be the first or only ones to benefit from a situation. The advisor will likely have no impact on the other agencies, but needs to report observations of corruption to the appropriate agency/person.

Corruption can be found at all levels, and may be justified by reasoning that the ANP risk much and are underpaid. One favorite tactic is to “shake down” travelers at traffic control points (TCPs). Another is to steal various items while conducting the search of a home. Leaders must be encouraged to follow up on reported acts such as these and to resolve them. Unresolved issues such as these can and will lead to more violence against the ANP and more support for insurgents.

Infiltration

Infiltration of the ANP by insurgent or criminal groups is a fact that will not be easily changed. Some stations are almost completely controlled by insurgent or militia groups while others may just have a scattering of members. The key for the advisors is analyzing how the station’s effectiveness is impacted by the infiltration.

For instance, in some villages, the entire police force may belong to a warlord militia, but they also do nothing but protect their village. On the other hand some stations’ militias use the cover

of their district stations and ANP uniforms to perform illegal or terrorist acts. In the first case, the infiltration is probably not a pressing issue while in the second the advisor team will probably need assistance from the brigade combat team (BCT) in eradicating the infiltration.

Intimidation

The police are very susceptible to intimidation, either directly or through threats to their families. Advisors must remain aware that the ANP may want to do the right thing, but fear is guiding their actions. Since the coalition cannot protect every ANP and his family, this is a very real threat.

Inadequate System Support

One of the most constant refrains the advisors will hear from the ANP is they don't have enough... be it fuel, ammunition, weapons, uniforms, etc. This lack of equipment is a function of the dysfunctional Ministry of the Interior (MoI) logistics system working its way down through the various headquarter (HQ) levels. The team must work to improve the system but not to circumvent it. Everything the coalition does to augment the supply system with direct support only sets it back from self-sufficiency.

Police Filling Paramilitary Role as Opposed to Law Enforcement Role

While police play a key role in effective counterinsurgency (COIN), currently most police are serving more as under equipped military units as opposed to police units. Local police are not expected to enforce laws, investigate crimes, or police their communities. Instead they are a front line combat force. While this role is driven by the current security situation, it will delay the development of a true police force in the country.

It is not inappropriate for the ANP to actively engage in COIN, even at the kinetic level, however, all COIN activities by the ANP should have as their end goal the provision or improvement of security for the population.

ANP Leadership Challenges

Leaders vary from great to worthless

As with every organization, some leaders are better than others. The problem with the ANP, with its consolidated control structure is that it is hard to find a subordinate leader to step up when the chief is ineffective. The advisor team may gain more effect working with higher PMT to try to get the chief replaced or transferred to a non-leadership position. ANP do a terrible job of developing subordinates. Advisors will find themselves mentoring leadership skills insubordinate leaders and pressing a reluctant leader to delegate authority. Afghans will hoard not only supplies but authority, disabling the organization in their absence or under stress.

Many ANP leaders are in their position due to influence or patronage

The decentralized command appointment structure of the ANP has led to many leaders with no police or leadership experience receiving key leadership roles because they were either able to

convince a local leader to put them there through influence or intimidation. Senior officers have been known to “purchase” their position. Such a “purchase” is not for prestige, but to position the senior officer where he can maximize personal profit through coercion and corruption.

Few leaders have formal police training

Although leader training exists at the various training centers and the Kabul Police Academy (KPA), many station leaders have not attended any of the training. Many feel the trip is too dangerous, they cannot afford to leave their station, or that the training is a waste of time because of their leadership experience in other areas (usually militia). This lack of training coupled with a promotion system that favors influence and patronage has led to a very ineffective leader corps.

None of this is meant to imply that all leaders are bad. Some are very brave and truly want to make the ANP better. They just lack the talent, training, or experience to effect the changes needed. Advisors will need to become familiar with their provincial or district officers to ascertain the level of professional education possessed by the leadership as well as the soldiers.

NCO Corps

Under the Afghan leadership model, which we are trying to change, non-commissioned officer (NCOs) are most often given absolutely no authority and are not expected to take initiative, as their view of NCOs is built upon the Russian military tradition. This is unlike the American Army where NCOs have wide decision making latitude. This notion about NCOs provides two challenges: first, ANP leaders are hesitant to empower their NCOs to function as leaders among the ANP and second, the ANP leader may show less respect toward an NCO police advisor than he would an officer. Advisors will need to lead by example, demonstrating that NCOs are respected, professional, empowered members of the PMT.

Similar problems developing an effective NCO Corps have been experienced in the Afghan National Army (ANA), who are now developing an NCO tradition. Officers must empower and enable while NCO's take the lead in assisting in the development of the infant NCO Corps. Officer advisors must also work the issue from the top down as the NCO advisors work with ANP NCOs. ANP officers need to learn how to make the best use of an NCO Corps. Advisor officers set the example in this area. NCO advisors lead by example with their ANP NCO's. This is a persistent problem for Afghans, again relating to their Russian military and police traditions.

Advisors will notice a tendency for Afghans to fear developing other strong leaders within their organization.

Some leaders do not understand the benefits of training

Most Afghans, even those who fought the Soviets, have never seen the total impact of effective training. Many ANP leaders do not understand the benefits or effects of good training. As a result, they sometimes pay “lip service” to the importance of training and will only minimally support it. The advisors will have to work hard to convince the leaders of the importance and effectiveness of good training and connect it with the leader's ability to accomplish his mission.

Afghan leaders are not expected to lead from the front or take responsibility for their subordinates

The Afghan leadership model does not require that leaders share the risks that face their subordinates. It also inexplicably allows leaders to be in charge until things go wrong, at which time the responsibility is not theirs. This lack of willingness to assume responsibility makes it difficult for advisors to convey the value of recommended changes since the problems are not the leader's fault; so why should he work to fix them?

Enterprises that support insurgent or warlord/militia activity

Some ANP are still choosing what side of the fight they are on and others have chosen the enemy's side. The corruption and insurgent influence in some communities has led some police to feel that the right side is the winning side. Advisors who identify chiefs who support or condone insurgent or criminal activity must immediately report their suspicions to land owners.

Police Capabilities and Limitations

The capability of a typical Afghan policeman is often misunderstood. Because the police operate in an insurgent environment, they are often used in combat operations. The ANP are not ideally trained or equipped as a combat force; however, they are often the only force available. The ANA was intended to clear out cities and rural areas of major resistance, and the police are supposed to enforce the rule of law and conduct community policing after the areas cleared by the ANA become relatively secure.

The police advisory program has brought along most of the stations it has partnered with to a point where they can perform the basic missions. More advanced law enforcement functioning along with continuous systems development from the MoI through the district stations remain problematic at best. Further, due to the shortage of PMTs, many stations have yet to undergo long term effective partnering. These stations may not be able to perform any tasks effectively. It is important for the advisors to remember that just because a station *can* perform the mission does not mean it *will* perform it.

Some police do have advanced training. Investigators assigned to some stations are very helpful. They have enough knowledge to secure a crime scene, collect evidence, and conduct interviews and interrogations. Unfortunately many district stations do not have regular access to investigators, prohibiting them from effectively solving crimes or preparing case files. The typical police station can handle normal policing duties in their community: mounted and dismounted patrols, checkpoints, force protection, cordon and searches, and limited intelligence operations. Each station will be at different levels of proficiency depending on the leadership and the experience within the ranks. The advisor will assess each station's capabilities and adjust its training and mentorship accordingly.

Systems development will remain the biggest hurdle the advisors will face when trying to develop their stations. A station with the best leaders and competent and confident ANP will have no more effectiveness than the station conducting illegal activities if the former station cannot acquire basic supplies such as fuel or ammunition.

The Court System

As mentioned under Corruption, the court system is most often dysfunctional and does not have the trust of the populace. Riddled with corruption and unable to bring cases to trial quickly and resolve them, prisoners who were unable to bribe their way out of trouble often find themselves incarcerated for long periods of time awaiting resolution.

The main challenge here to an advisor is the public perception of a total lack of objective justice, and the painting of the ANP with the same brush. Although “outside the lane” of a PMT, report observations relating to judicial corruption or abuse.

The National Directorate of Security (NDS)

The National Directorate of Security has personnel collocated with the ANP at the district and provincial level. NDS officers do not answer to the ANP chain of command. They often wield considerable influence. They are capable of sharing information, but may not choose to. NDS chiefs will sometimes work to “poison the well” for chiefs of police (CoPs) and others who they disagree with or who resist their influence. NDS officers can be very helpful or they can be an operational detractor. A good relationship with the NDS can be very beneficial when it is possible.

Advisors will have to determine for themselves based on local conditions what type of relationship they and their ANP have with the NDS. If the NDS appear to be counterproductive to security, report the facts.

Working with Coalition Forces

PMTs will find themselves working within a battlespace which has a Coalition Forces Commander. This may be an American officer, but may not be. Most PMT's assigned to this mission will be assigned to TF Phoenix, but some may be ad hoc teams assembled by a battlespace owner as part of his local counterinsurgency plan. If a PMT is part of TF Phoenix, the advisor may find himself with separate reporting responsibilities. The advisor will be required to provide periodic reports as required by the RPAC; and the battlespace owner will also want to know what is being done in the battlespace to support the counterinsurgency plan within that commander's battlespace. Advisors will need to become aware quickly of any reports, their schedules and formats. Much of the data reported will be the same.

The local battlespace owner will also have coordination requirements for such things as movement within the battlespace. There may be local requirements for minimum convoy size based on the commander's threat assessment. PMT's may find themselves challenged by these requirements and while some may be negotiable, the battlespace commander is the approval authority within that battlespace.

The staff in the battlespace where the PMT is operating can be a valuable asset in providing local intelligence and coordination. Establishing a good working relationship will bring positive results.

A PMT may arrive in an area to find that the local battlespace commander has fielded his military police (MP) assets as trainers/advisors to the ANP in the battlespace. The advisor will need to work with the battlespace owner to clarify the relationships and responsibilities of the PMT and MP assets. Chain of command issues can interfere with effective use of all available assets in these situations and must be avoided.

Logistics and Support

PMT's will often find themselves seeking support from units that they are not organic to. Establishing good relations with local logistics and support providers, such as maintenance shops and contractors, is essential. Advisors will sometimes find themselves cast far from TF Phoenix's ability to materially support them and will have to be flexible in their relationships. Advisors will often be supported by the battlespace owning unit, including housing. The landowner may or may not have been expecting to support the team when in the planning stages. The ability to form positive relationships will significantly impact the ease with which the team integrates into disparate support systems. These relationships most often work out very positively.

Civilian Police Advisors

PMTs will most often find themselves partnering with civilian police (CIVPOL) advisors. These contractors are capable of significantly adding to the mentoring capability of the team. They have civilian policing experience and are typically very knowledgeable in the areas of community based policing, administration, crime scene management, interviewing and fiscal management. They will generally have up-armored commercial vehicles and private security, often a Gurkha. Smoothly integrating them into the team is essential in order to gain the most impact from their skills, knowledge and abilities.

Contractors may have caveats on their employment due to contractual requirements and the laws of war. CIVPOL do not have law enforcement authority and are prohibited from engaging in combat except in self defense and the defense of others. CIVPOL advisors need to be integrated into the team's security plans and defensive battle drills, but must not engage in "offensive operations." Advisors will need to become aware of any areas operationally or geographically in which their partners cannot participate.

Conclusion

Current goals call for a fully constituted, professional, functional, and ethnically balanced ANP force with a combined force of 82,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable by the end of year 2010.

Achieving the above goal will require:

- Reforming the MoI command structure.
- Reforming MoI local government structures.

- Instituting legislative roles in the MoI.
- Training and equipping the ANP to full staffing establishment.
- Fully integrating all payments into normal government budget procedures.
- Policing national borders against crime with ANA support.

Advisor teams have the point in this development. Provincial and district teams will not need to concern themselves with reforming major ministerial structures. Mentoring leaders to improve systems and leadership, as well as training soldiers will be much of the effort. It is important to understand the climate in which the advisor will work and the effects that may be seen from other actors. The goal of this document is to give the new advisor a head start in getting oriented to the ground upon which he will operate.

Note: The complete Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) *Afghan National Police Mentor Guide* is available on the Center for Army Lessons Learned and JCISFA websites for review or download.

**The Afghan National Police:
Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution:
Recommendations and Conclusion**

MAJ David J. Haskell

The following portions of this graduate thesis are used with permission of the author.

Recommendations

[President Barack Obama's] administration has acknowledged the importance of the police and announced its intentions to expand and improve the [Afghan National Police] as a key part of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan.¹

The recommendations presented in this thesis draw from my experiences in Afghanistan and academic research at the Naval Postgraduate School. These recommendations are meant to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan National Police (ANP), one of President Obama's top priorities in *The Way Forward in Afghanistan*.²

First, as suggested in the introduction, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) need to make the police their number one priority for resources and manpower because a legitimate and effective police force is better suited than the military to defeat insurgencies.³ Currently the Afghan National Army (ANA) receives more attention and resources than the ANP. While the army has an important role to play in Afghanistan's clear, hold, and build strategy, it is only organized to clear areas and is not designed to permanently hold ground. Police forces, on the other hand, are organized and designed to permanently hold ground, protect the population, and provide the security required to improve governance and services.⁴ The first step toward improving their effectiveness is to reallocate some of the assets currently dedicated to the ANA to increase training, improve support, and restructure portions of the ANP. While more assets will improve the capability and capacity of the police, how those assets are utilized is even more important. Efforts need to be made to reorganize the ANP to best meet the needs of rural Afghans while simultaneously improving the security situation in Afghanistan.

The second recommendation is to fundamentally restructure the ANP in accordance with traditional and cultural precepts. Most rural Afghans do not trust the ANP or consider them legitimate. In rural areas where kinship and customary law are more important than the government, all the training in the world will not make the police legitimate in the eyes of the local communities.

The Majority of Rural Afghan Police Must be Local

Communities need to select and sanction police through local *shuras* or *jirgas*. A collective decision made by the community is binding, confers instant legitimacy, and guarantees mutual support of the community for the police and vice versa.⁵ Additionally, both parties will hold each other accountable according to customary law and kinship. Patronage and extortion would be out of the question because the individual would not risk shaming his entire family who are members of the community.

Many will argue that if local communities select their own police, the police will be more loyal to the community than to the central government. This is a valid argument, but even in the U.S. a local sheriff adheres to federal laws, yet is loyal to the community he or she serves. The two are not antithetical. Besides, in many cases, there is no tension with the central government; instead, friction arises over control and patronage by the provincial and district governors. This is one reason why many districts and provincial governors have resisted the Focused District Development (FDD) program.⁶ ISAF and the GIRoA need to closely examine what is more important, a police force that executes the will of the central government at the expense of the community, or a community-based police force that may not be totally loyal to distant politicians, but is capable of administering justice and denying the Taliban sanctuary.

Establishing a local police force in rural Afghanistan would not require disbanding the ANP, or even creating a new police organization. What it would instead require is reorganizing the existing force. Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A) maintain personnel records on all ANP. This database can be used to put ANP soldiers back into their own communities after a *shura* or *jirga* decision to accept the soldier. If the community is not willing to sanction the individual, he or she should probably not be an ANP soldier in the first place. In the rare instances when the community does not want the ANP soldier, that soldier should either be transferred to the army or released from service. In the event that there are not enough local ANP to provide security in a particular area, more police should be recruited through the local *shura* or *jirga* and then put through the ANP training program.

Establishing a System of Checks and Balances

A system of checks and balances can limit patronage and reduce corruption. While every situation will vary according to the local environment, there should be at least three local police soldiers to everyone that is brought in from outside the community. Additionally, the district police chief should be nominated by the district *shura* or *jirga* and then approved by the MoI, and the MoI should have the authority to fire the district police chief in the event that he or she performs unsatisfactorily. The provincial and regional police chiefs should remain government appointees to provide oversight for the local districts. Finally, police salaries, along with equipment, and government projects could be used to incentivize good performance or penalize poor performance.

Reform the Recruiting Process

Currently, district police chiefs and district governors can recruit their own ANP soldiers, as long as the individuals are not drug users, or have a criminal record. The initial vetting process requires two tribal elders to verify the character of the individual.⁷ (See Appendix B: Afghan National Police Vetting and Recruiting Presentation) Because any two elders can vouch for an ANP recruit, district police chiefs and governors have the freedom to build their own ANP units. Unfortunately, these units often execute the bidding of the governor or police chief and frequently do not have the interest of the community in mind. At a minimum, police recruits should be sanctioned by a district *shura* or *jirga* to prevent patronage or clan rivalries.

The Importance of Islam

Islam is the ultimate source of legitimacy for all Afghan leaders, government officials, and holders of authority.⁸ Because good Muslims and religious scholars are afforded special privileges, respect, and authorities, it should be a goal of the Afghan government to religiously educate select members of the ANP. Government run religious schools for the ANP could have two positive effects. First, receiving religious schooling should elevate the legitimacy of the police soldiers. Second, it can reduce the effects and legitimacy of the Taliban. Mullah Omar recognizes the importance of Islam and Pashtunwali and used them both to discredit Afghan police in a press release:

If the police of a state consist of people who are immoral and irreligious, who are drug addicts and whom their families turn away, how can they protect the property, dignity and honor of the people?⁹

The Taliban use Islam as a weapon to drive a wedge between the people and the government. However, police who are educated and well versed in Islam can thwart the Taliban and actually bring the people closer to the government. I had the privilege of working with an ANA battalion commander who was also a *mullah*. This battalion commander would recite from the Koran and lead prayers at the local mosque, which gained him instant respect and credibility in the community.

Focus on Quality not Quantity

In his initial assessment, General Stanley McChrystal (the ISAF commander) concluded, “The ANP must increase in size in order to provide sufficient police needed to hold areas that have been cleared of insurgents, and to increase the capacity to secure the population.”¹⁰ The current authorized strength of the ANP is 96,800, and General McChrystal is recommending further growth of the ANP to a total of 160,000 as soon as practical.¹¹ While increasing the number of ANP may be necessary, three factors must be carefully considered. First, the Afghan government depends on the international community to sustain the current costs of its ANP. Significantly increasing the numbers of ANP when the Afghan government cannot afford to pay them is potentially disastrous, especially if the international community decides to cut funding. Second, there are literally thousands of ANP who are on the payroll, but do not exist. This is because numerous police officials provide false reports to receive payments for ghost soldiers (ANP soldiers who only exist on paper).¹² While CSTC–A and the MoI have made significant improvements in this area, there is still major reform that needs to take place vis-à-vis police accountability. Fixing the accountability problem will put more police on the ground, save money, and prevent it from recurring in the future. Third, the vast majority of the existing force is incompetent and corrupt and needs to be reformed prior to expanding the police force. If efforts and resources are dedicated to growing the force, fewer will be available to reform the existing police. Even worse, putting more police into a corrupt system will only make more corrupt police. The system has to be fixed first, or growth will do more harm than good.

When it comes to growing the police, quality is more important than quantity. This means taking the time to draw the right recruits and then place them in the right areas. If we look back to the demobilization and enlistment of the thousands of well-trained Afghan security guards, or the

creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, we see that a rapid increase in police numbers without strict oversight can actually weaken the state and create a less stable and less secure environment for the Afghan people. The priorities should be to clean up the existing force, hold police officials accountable for extortion and corruption, identify the personnel actually on the ground, and put the right individuals in the right positions and communities. Finally, the government of Afghanistan and its coalition partners must make every effort to enhance the image and status of the ANP. Accomplishing this will require improving literacy, providing Islamic education, investing in persistent training, and paying heed to community consensus.

Recruit, Vet, and Develop Local Police During the Hold and Build Phases

The ANA is best suited for clearing an area, and when present in a local community, can deny the Taliban sanctuary. During this time of denial, the Army can provide the temporary security and assistance needed to engage the community in a police recruitment drive. Once an adequate number of local recruits are sanctioned and trained, the ANA can gradually withdraw to a less secure area, where it can begin the process again. This would be similar to what the FDD program is trying to achieve, except that instead of retraining existing police, large numbers of the recruits would be drawn directly from the community. The ANA should then augment the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) in order to reduce resource requirements and expedite the growth of the ANP. This bottom-up approach would facilitate long-term security, reduce resource requirements, and help ensure the police meet the needs of both the people and government.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is currently at a tipping point where its government's legitimacy (and that of its international backers) is being openly challenged by an array of antigovernment forces.¹³

The Taliban have come full circle and are regaining their primacy among rural Afghans. Their growing influence and legitimacy directly challenge the government of Afghanistan, and, if drastic measures are not taken, the state will fail. The U.S. and international community can only do so much to support the host nation government. The people ultimately decide who wins or loses an insurgency, and for the last five years, more and more Afghans have decided to choose the Taliban over the government of Afghanistan.

The reason more Afghans are siding with the Taliban is because the Afghan government has failed to establish legitimate government services that support the people and address their fundamental needs. The two biggest needs that the Afghan government has failed to meet are security and corruption and, because of the government's failure, the Taliban are gaining support in the same way they came to power in 1994.¹⁴ The Taliban are gaining legitimacy by filling the security and injustice voids created by the Afghan government itself.

The Taliban have been most successful at capitalizing on the failures of the ANP. While it is the responsibility of the ANP to provide security, justice, dispute resolution, and community service, many ANP abuse their authority and exploit the very people they are charged with serving. The effects of corrupt police are twofold, and are exceptionally damaging in an insurgency. First, corrupt police delegitimize the government. Second, they create a permissive environment for insurgent support. This is why it is absolutely critical that police should be a number one priority for reform and for resources.

Making the ANP a top priority will help stem corruption and facilitate security, but resources and training alone will not produce competent or legitimate police capable of reversing the Taliban's influence. The ANP must meet the traditional and cultural precepts of rural Afghan communities.

ANP candidates must be nominated by local community elders and then, upon successful completion of training, returned to serve in their local community. Community and tribal ties will help ensure that policemen are accountable for their actions. This will also provide a measure of protection from insurgents, particularly now when the people are looking to the Taliban for justice and security in areas that are bankrupt of social capital and where locals have no faith and confidence in the Afghan police.

In sum, the most foolproof way to ensure ANP legitimacy in the eyes of rural Afghans is to make the police answerable to the people they serve. This can be accomplished by applying customary law. Although the specific rules of customary law may vary between solidarity groups, customary law is common throughout rural Afghanistan.¹⁵ Most notably, ANP who are members of the community and have been endorsed by the community elders share a common social code of behavior and therefore are accountable to the people they serve; who are, after all, *their* people. If local police understand the complex social rules, reciprocal rights and, most importantly, have the precious social capital needed to bridge the gap between the government and their community, then they not only have legitimacy, but embody it. Ultimately, nothing may be more important to the long-term stability of the Afghan state than for the police to be of, by, and for the people.

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Endnotes

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Things to Ask the Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan National Police

Lt. Col. S.G. Fosdal, U.S. Marine Corps

Embedded Training Team (ETT) 2-4 learned during a deployment to the Bermel District of the Paktika Province in Afghanistan that certain questions must be asked of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Police (ANP). ETT 2-4 recommends that units deployed to Afghanistan ask these questions of Afghan forces in their areas of operation, and that the questions are asked sooner rather than later.

Personnel Questions

Who pays the soldier or police officer?

- The answer may be that the salary is paid by a regional pay team or by the soldier's or police officer's commander. Keep in mind that the more local a pay system, the greater the chance of corruption. The use of direct deposit has been explored, but only about five cities in Afghanistan have banks. A soldier or police officer attempting to take money home to his family would have to travel to one of those cities before traveling home, greatly increasing time away from work as well as danger to the employee.

How often is the soldier or police officer paid?

- It should be once per month. If the soldier hasn't been paid for a while, find out why he is still working. Is he receiving compensation from a different source?

Does the soldier or police officer receive his full salary, or is someone taking money from him?

- If the pay goes to higher headquarters and then filters down, there is a chance at each bureaucratic layer for someone to skim money.

Are the soldiers or police officers from the local area or a more distant location?

- Regional loyalties are tied to tribes. A police officer or soldier from the local area will have greater cultural insight but could also be susceptible to tribal pressures; he will be predisposed to favoring his own tribe in a dispute.

What languages do the police officers or soldiers speak?

- Dari is the official language of the ANA, but most of its members speak Pashtu. Some soldiers and police officers from border areas will speak Urdu. Those from Nuristan/northern Kunar will speak Pashay. The ANP and ABP recruit regionally, so police officers are most likely to speak only the language of the region.

What percentage of the soldiers or police officers read and write?

- Only 15 to 25 percent of soldiers in the 1-2 Kandak (battalion-size unit) of the ANA are literate. Some of the soldiers or police officers will be literate in Dari, while others will read and write in Pashtu or some other language.

How many soldiers or police officers have been formally trained?

- The ANP consists of national police and support police. National police have 20 days of academy training; support police have no formal training. The standard for training is an eight-week course at a regional training center. ANA soldiers have, at minimum, attended training at the Kabul Military Training Center.

What is the leave policy for local units?

- ANA soldiers get about 30 days of leave per year, with extra leave for emergencies. In this very family-oriented society, that means that a soldier stationed in remote Bermel, who would require at least four days travel time (via convoy) in each direction to get anywhere else in Afghanistan, would be able to deliver money and spend time with family only about twice a year.

How frequently is leave granted?

- Watch out for huge disparities in leaves granted. Officers often take excessive and frequent leave while some soldiers don't get leave at all. ANA units should have a leave schedule and stick to it. Soldiers who aren't allowed to go on leave will go absent without leave.

How long is an average leave?

- In Bermel, leave periods were often 30 days long.

What form of transportation is most often used for leave?

- A taxi from Bermel to Kabul costs half a month's pay, and if the anti-coalition militia stops the taxi and determines the occupant is employed by the government, he'll most likely be killed. Busses are available from the Ring Road in Kabul, but may not travel to the soldier's village. For these reason, soldiers often wait to catch rides with convoys. Convoys are cheap and secure, but also infrequent.

What does a soldier do with his weapon and equipment when he goes on leave?

- Most units do not have personal areas for equipment storage. An ANA soldier will often lock his weapon and equipment in the company connex when he goes on leave and collect them from the supply sergeant when he returns.

How are officers and NCOs selected?

- Some officers and NCOs are selected through demonstrated competence, but officers are often selected based on referrals from highly placed officials.

How many people are assigned to the unit and how many are actually present?

- The ANA's 1-2 Kandak has 446 soldiers assigned but on any given day can muster only 310 of them for duty.

Is the unit equipped and fed based on numbers assigned or numbers present?

- If supplies and food are based on the number of soldiers present, keep in mind that the unit benefits by not reporting a soldier's unauthorized absence.

Operations Questions

What is the unit's mission?

- Answers to this question may be surprising. The Bermel ANP has only enough police officers and fuel for guarding the District Center and collecting taxes at the bazaar. A citizen who needs a police officer's assistance must go to the District Center to find one. The ANP focuses less on the mission of policing and more on simple survival.

Where is the unit's higher headquarters?

- Often the headquarters will be hours away from the unit and will not be readily aware of the situations at outlying sites. Supervision is not the strong point of Afghan forces.

How does the unit communicate with higher headquarters?

- There are no phone lines and radios are expensive to buy and maintain. Bermel ANP has a truck-powered radio, but it is high frequency and susceptible to atmospheric conditions and interference. Often units have satellite phones; find out who pays for the phone card. The Bermel ANP police chief buys his own phone cards to talk to higher headquarters.

How often do police officers or soldiers meet with local citizens?

- Interaction with the locals is the only way for government representatives to gain respect and legitimacy. This includes the commanders and chiefs as well as police officers and soldiers. It is essential to attend shuras, talk to "the man in the bazaar," and help solve villagers' problems.

Have the police and soldiers asked local citizens to cooperate in the mission?

- Villagers will not be helpful if they have not been respected. Elders should be consulted on issues that arise and asked for assistance in fighting crime. When someone commits a crime, the elders should be asked if they can guarantee the individual will not commit additional crimes. If the elders cannot give that guarantee, the person should be locked up. If the shura and the soldiers or police cannot agree, the mayor will serve as the final mediator.

Have the police or soldiers developed informers?

- Respect for and cooperation with local residents will eventually lead to the development of informers. Police and soldiers should take care to ensure that informers are not compromised. Information provided by an informer should be cross-checked to ensure government authorities are not being drawn into tribal disputes.

What plans do the police and soldiers have for forward operating base and observation post security?

- Ask this question immediately — before you awaken and find the anti-coalition militia on your compound. Ensure that heavy weapons have been operationally checked and have ammunition. Make sure everyone knows where to go in the event of an attack.

Who is responsible for posting and inspecting the security?

- Again, supervision is not a strong point for Afghan forces. Find out who posts security, how often it is checked and by whom it is checked. It is painful, but it must be done.

How many vehicles does the Afghan force have?

- In many areas, vehicles equate to operational flexibility. Follow up the vehicle question with questions about the drivers. Being assigned to driving doesn't mean the person knows how to drive; he may have just crashed less frequently than everyone else.

Does the Afghan force have medical support?

- The ANA has designated medics, but these soldiers are part of the headquarters and headquarters company and also serve in guard and security duties. Combat lifesaver bags are finally being pushed down from higher headquarters, but it is important to make sure that medics know how to use them and that the medics are taken on patrols. Even with trained medics, the first impulse of Afghan forces seems to be to immediately ground MEDEVAC the patient to the nearest aid station — without first stabilizing him or conducting initial assessment.

Logistics Questions

How much fuel does the force receive each month?

- The ANA, which is allotted 400 liters of fuel each month, orders the fuel and waits until it is eventually delivered. Again, vehicles equate to operational flexibility, so it is important to identify the force's "keeper of the fuel."

Where does the fuel come from?

- The Bermel ANP drives to Sharana to draw fuel from the provisional reconstruction team. The trip takes five hours in each direction and requires a three-vehicle convoy for safety. Add a couple of supply runs to Sharana each month, and the fuel allotment is gone with none left over for the mission.

Where is the fuel stored and how is it controlled?

- Fuel is another area with the potential for corruption. If a truck routinely leaves with a full tank and returns on empty, it is a good bet the fuel has been siphoned and sold. ANA units rarely fill fuel cans because the cans end up being sold at the bazaar. Find out who controls the fuel and ensure that checks are in place to prevent theft.

What weapons does the force have?

- The Bermel ANP have dilapidated weapons. Many have carved butt stocks to replace those that have broken. Each police officer or soldier should have at least a couple of functional magazines.

Are the soldiers or police officers basic issue-item complete?

- ANA soldiers have Russian mortars, Chinese sights, Romanian ammunition, and firing tables written in Chinese. The firing tables are not very useful. The Bermel ANP doesn't have cleaning rods or gear.

How much ammunition does the force have?

- The ANA likes to hold all its ammo in operational reserve, even though it has enough for training. Determine how much ammo is needed for reserve and how much should be allotted for training.

Where is the ammunition stored?

- The ANA's ammunition supply point organization hasn't demonstrated itself as a strong point for the force. Check how the ammunition is organized and stored and who has access to it. Ammo is another item that can be sold at the bazaar; it needs to be controlled. Train soldiers and police to issue ammo and control it during exercises and operations, to turn it back in when the exercise or operation is over, and to avoid hoarding it in the company connex for a rainy day.

How is ammunition ordered?

- Find out where and from whom to get more ammo and how long it takes to get it. Know which forms are needed. Chances are that ammo requests will have to be made through both the Afghan chain and the ETT/coalition chain. The ANA lives on donations from other nations, so check ammo packaging and serviceability. Russian 9mm ammo is inexpensive but doesn't produce enough recoil to function in ANA-issued Smith & Wesson automatics.

Where does the unit get its food?

- ANA units contract for most fresh food deliveries and pick up their durable goods (beans, rice, cakes, cooking oil) at corps once a month. The contracting works through a central contractor in a larger city who then subcontracts through local vendors. The idea is to take the money out of the transactions. Some things to look for are subcontractors who submit bills to the unit when getting paid by the contractor. Also, the price per head for soldiers has been fixed and doesn't reflect the inflation. The vendors may cheat by accepting five rupees for a fresh apple but supplying only aged fruit that would normally cost two rupees. Additionally, there is always the possibility that someone is accepting lesser quality food and taking a kickback from the vendor.

Does the unit get money for food?

- The Bermel ANP gets about 23,000 Afghani per month for food. That amount isn't enough to pay for quality food, and they often run low. When money is issued always check with higher to see what the unit is supposed to be getting to ensure no one is skimming money as it filters down.

How much food does the unit get and is it enough?

- This question must be asked, and most likely the answer will be that it is not enough. As mentioned before, ANA units will sometimes inflate the number of soldiers present for duty (by not reporting unauthorized absences and leaves) so they will get more food. Watch for similar practices in other units.

Does the unit have cooks or does it contract for cooking and bread making?

- The ABP and ANP do their own cooking but the ANA contracts out its bread making. Bread is a highly perishable staple, and the soldiers will riot if fresh bread isn't available. Let the bread maker know if an early morning mission is planned; the soldiers will insist upon waiting around for the bread delivery.

Where does the unit get its water?

- Wells are a bonus and some units rely on contracted water deliveries. No matter how the water arrives, it must be distributed to the shower and kitchen water towers by water truck. The ANA will go through more water in the field than U.S. forces. The soldiers' religious practices require them to conduct ablution (washing) before prayer, which means they must wash their feet, hands, face, and mouth five times a day. They also use large quantities of water for cooking and for washing their giant pots. Be prepared for massive water requirements in the field and at combat outposts.

Where does the unit store its water?

- Usually, it will be in giant, elevated tanks. The overly engineered methods they use to get the water out of the ground and into the tanks are amazingly complex and involve pumps and generators requiring regular attention from seasoned mechanics. Seasoned mechanics will not be available. Rely instead on intuitive Afghans who are apparently immune to electrical shocks and exhaust. They will usually need motor gas (MOGAS) instead of diesel fuel for some of the pumps and smaller generators.

Where are the unit's toilets?

- Afghans squat to defecate; they require a sturdy place to stand over a relatively large hole. Toilet seats are foreign. Afghans also squat to urinate and loathe letting others see them do it. Provide short urination tubes in an enclosed area or they'll find someplace else — often a bunker or a corner of a Hesco cell. U.S. forces will rebel if they have to use squat-style toilets. Plan for this and make two separate toilet facilities. Be advised that rural Afghans are not averse to going to the bathroom where they please and marking the spots they use with pink toilet paper or stained rocks, so adequate squat-style toilets are essential.

Who cleans the toilets?

- Afghan and U.S. troops should police and clean their own toilets. Make sure they do, or they will default to going everywhere else. Getting them to burn the waste barrels may be too much to ask, and this is often contracted out for both U.S. and Afghan personnel.

Who is responsible for repairing vehicles?

- Toyotas are the most common and dependable vehicles in Afghanistan and spare parts are abundant; the Afghan national forces have Fords. The ANA have contracted vehicle maintenance to RM Asia maintenance teams, but the service facilities are located at the corps level and it is a chore to get vehicles there and wait for them to be repaired. Maintenance teams will come to the unit's location but they must be transported via up-armored high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), and they need to know what parts they will need before they travel. This is problematic if you don't know what is wrong with the vehicle. Most of 1-2 Kandak's repairs are conducted at the local bazaar. Parts are scrounged from wherever, and contractors making supply runs to the larger cities are asked to buy parts and bring them back. The roads eat vehicles in Afghanistan and the sooner the maintenance issue is addressed, the better it will be for all concerned.

Who is responsible for repairing the facilities?

- When working with the ANA, Title 10 field ordering officer (FOO) funds can be used to repair facilities as long as the price is below a certain dollar amount. FOO funds cannot build new facilities; that is something that needs to be submitted for bids and contracting. I don't know how it works for Ministry of Interior forces (ABP and ANP), but I suspect those ETTs will have to draw Title 22 funds. Ask higher headquarters how this is done. Be sure to submit all paperwork for drawing funds in advance. Keep in mind that transportation and other inefficiencies may keep the FOO team out of pocket for 15 to 20 days. Include the supported commander's desires when designing and writing the contract, and have him to walk through inspections with you. Keep him out of the payment/bargaining process to avoid making him vulnerable to charges of collaboration and corruption.

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Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp>>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <<https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>> (requires AKO password and ID).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid/index.asp>>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <<https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>>.

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