The First 100 Days

Operation Enduring Freedom

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
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Combined Arms Center (CAC) • Ft. Leavenworth, KS

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Foreword

The first 100 days of any deployment are the most dangerous. It is the time when you know the least about your environment, the time when most of the team really comes together. The enemy knows the first 100 days are when units are the most vulnerable.

This handbook is written for Soldiers and leaders. It is intended to help you accomplish your mission and stay alive during the most dangerous and uncertain period.

The information presented in this handbook was collected from combat experienced Soldiers, company leaders, and battalion leaders, and it will help you develop your leadership and training skills before deployment and during the first 100 days after deployment.

Key lessons:

- Perform tasks to standard every time.
- Maintain faith in your skills as a Soldier, your fellow Soldiers, and your equipment even when losses occur after enemy contact.
- Avoid becoming complacent. Do not fall into a routine with predictable patterns.
- Focus on cross-training and tough, realistic training in assigned tasks.
- Learn from every mission.
- Practice aggressive execution that integrates nonlethal and lethal tools.
- Follow troop-leading procedures and complete precombat inspections.
- Know your responsibilities in personnel recovery before you recover a lost Soldier.

This handbook draws on the information in the Center for Army Lessons Learned’s First 100 Days series of handbooks (Soldiers, Leaders, Commander and Staff). It contains those lessons that are ubiquitous in both theaters and survival lessons that are unique to the Operation Enduring Freedom operational environment.

Robert W. Forrester
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

**Note:** Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FM, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
Introduction

“Have the mindset as a new private, [just as] most of the senior leaders, that combat is real. Train as you would fight. Listen to what those with the experience have to say. Take all training serious. And always seek ways to improve and be ready.”

–Staff Sergeant, Infantry Squad Leader

“I gave my squad leaders room to build their squad as they saw fit and they accomplished the mission their own way. [The] majority of the time, I just had to spot check for quality assurance. I also made myself visible on missions, showing that we all had to be where the action is.”

–1st Lieutenant, Infantry Platoon Leader

There is a wide-ranging belief throughout the U.S. Army that the first few weeks of combat are the most dangerous for Soldiers. These “first 100 days” are critical to the survival of Soldiers. In this brief initial period, Soldiers and units acclimatize to the tactical environment, the enemy, and themselves. After that early period, casualty rates tend to flatten out. About a year ago, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) set out to examine this period and the casualty issue from a Soldier’s point of view. CALL’s task was to get the Soldiers’ and leaders’ perspectives and insights from their first few months of combat and determine why they survived and what factors contributed most to their survival. Finally, CALL wanted information straight from the Soldiers, in their own words.

From that information and with analysis and writing by subject matter experts, CALL developed the First 100 Days series of handbooks for Soldiers, small unit leaders, and commanders and staffs. These handbooks identified what Soldiers said was important for those first 100 days.

The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) First 100 Days Handbook applies the universal lessons in combat survival in a counterinsurgency from that CALL study, combined with other research collected by CALL from OEF. This handbook emphasizes what experienced Soldiers and leaders said are important in training, skills, and knowledge.

Warfare in OEF is the business of small units, platoons, companies, and battalions. Therefore, this handbook is oriented on the small unit and its Soldiers. Just like the rest of the First 100 Days handbooks, the OEF First 100 Handbook contains no magic formulas, silver bullets, or talismans.

It is straight talk from Soldiers and leaders. Use this handbook to sharpen your focus (whether you are a leader, a Soldier, or a staff member) from predeployment through the initial 100-day period. Rather than telling you what to do, this handbook helps you assess a situation and identify ways to survive those first 100 days unscathed by combat and noncombat injuries or worse.

Keep in mind that you and your unit may need to revisit the “100 Days” in part or in its entirety when shifting to a new operational area or with a change of mission.
Chapter 1
Soldiers
Section I: Predeployment Training

“Predeployment training gave everyone confidence in our battle drills. No one had to think about what needed to be done.”
Staff Sergeant, Infantry Squad Leader

Predeployment training is the most important factor in increasing your ability to survive in combat. Do not take your training for granted. Take advantage of any opportunity to do additional training. Training must be realistic. Look to the combat veterans in your unit as a way of measuring the realism of the training. Soldiers/leaders with combat experience should conduct training for units readying for combat. Predeployment training is important:

- Predeployment training is your opportunity to build combat skills.
- Repeated training builds “muscle memory” so critical in reacting correctly the first time you experience combat.
- You and your fellow Soldiers (your “battle buddies”) can solidify as a team.
- You get comfortable with carrying a weapon with live ammunition and learn “muzzle awareness.”

Critical Training

Improvised explosive device-defeat (IEDD)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent a significant threat to U.S. forces in the Afghan theater of operations; however with the right training and proper practices, you can significantly reduce the threat of an IED attack:

- Get the latest enemy techniques and tactics for IEDs.
- Concentrate on IEDD techniques and practices until they become second nature.
- Use every opportunity to practice the IEDD techniques you learn in training.

Basic rifle marksmanship

You must be able to maintain muzzle awareness, trigger safety, and weapons status on your own:

- Zero your weapon both the back up iron sights and combat optics (M68 close combat optics “red dot” and advanced combat optical gun sight).
• Fire as many rounds as necessary until you are confident in your ability to hit your intended target.

Long-range rifle marksmanship

You must be confident with your weapon and in your ability to hit a target under varied conditions and at long range. This confidence begins with basic weapons marksmanship skills taught in initial entry training and reinforced at home station.

Pay attention to the following fundamentals of advanced marksmanship training and practice these fundamentals until you are proficient:

• Stance
• Grip
• Sight alignment
• Sight picture
• Breathing
• Recovery
• Follow-through

Concentrate on these firing position factors:

• Cheek-to-stock position
• Eye relief (distance from eye to the sight)
• Trigger finger consistency
• Elbows properly positioned for correct support of weapon
• Legs properly positioned for support and steady firing posture
• Non-firing hand positioned to support and steady the weapon

Practice these range estimation methods:

• 100-meter unit of measure: Visualize the number of 100-meter increments between the two objects (up to 500 meters).
• Range card: Use a range card to quickly determine ranges.
• Front sight post: Estimate range by using the front sight post as a scale.
• Appearance of objects: Determine range based on the size and visible characteristics of an object.
• Combination: Use a combination of two or more methods to determine an unknown range.
Convoy training and convoy live fire training

One of the most dangerous activities in Afghanistan is moving in a convoy. Convoy training teaches the responsibilities for each crew position (driver, commander, or gunner).

You must know the following fundamentals of convoy defense:

- **Movement drills:**
  - Scanning responsibilities and 360-degree security.
  - Techniques for keeping standoff with a potential threat.
  - Actions on halts: “5/25” crew halt drill and the “5 Cs.”

- **Battle drills:**
  - React to attack from the driver’s side (left side).
  - React to attack from the vehicle commander’s side (right side).
  - How to exit/enter a vehicle while in contact.
  - How to break contact.
  - What to do at the rally point.

- **Casualty extrication, first aid, and evacuation (including calling for medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]).**

- **Vehicle rollover and evacuation drill**

- **Vehicle self recovery (like vehicles and while in contact).**

- **Reporting (size, activity, location, uniform, troops, and equipment [SALUTE] report, MEDEVAC request, IED/unexploded ordnance report).**

Physical fitness training

You must stay in good physical shape. Soldiers in good shape are better able to handle the fatigue and stress brought on by the rigors of daily tasks. Fatigue is a major reason for Soldiers’ complacency.
Section II: Cross Training

“[Conduct] a lot more rehearsals with the team with each person talking through not only their task, but the task of everyone on the team.”

First Lieutenant, Ordnance Platoon Leader

Every Soldier Should be Ready to Take Charge

Cross training prepares you to function in another Soldier’s role. All Soldiers must be capable of assuming other roles in the team/section/squad:

- Communications is critical in a fight:
  - Know how to operate the basic communications equipment.
  - Know how to report your location and situation, how to request MEDEVAC, and how to identify yourself to friendly forces that are coming to your assistance.

- Be able to perform function checks on and employ every individual and crew-served weapon assigned to the squad or section.

- Be able to drive the vehicle in an emergency situations.

- Be ready to employ other systems that are unique to your unit and its mission:
  - Navigation and reporting systems (Blue Force Tracker)
  - Protective systems (Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices Electronic Warfare).

- Prior to combat, rehearse your personal mission tasks and those of others on your team.

When you cross train, you prepare yourself to take over in any situation and keep yourself and your buddies alive.
Section III: Prior Combat Experience, Learn from the Veterans

“Platoon sergeants with combat experience pass on knowledge that those without experience cannot. My platoon sergeant has been deployed in multiple theaters and has well-rounded experience in a variety of environments.”

Private First Class, Field Artillery

When it comes to combat experience, there are two kinds of Soldiers in the U.S. Army right now—those who have it and those who will soon get it. Pay attention to the men and women around you who have it. Combat veterans are important sources of information. What they know and will share with you might save your life.

If you are a young Soldier still in initial entry training or military occupational specialty-related training, take a good look at your training cadre. Seek out those unit and training cadre who have combat experience. Ask them questions about any combat-related subject that concerns you. Do not worry about their “sensitivity”—if you try to take them down a path they do not want to go, they will stop you.

When assigned to a deploying unit, you will encounter more combat veterans. Now their interest in you will be more personal, because you are part of the same team. Pay attention to Soldiers and leaders you trust to give you straight talk. Compare and contrast what you know from your own training. In the end, you will be responsible for your own conduct.

Take advantage of the experiences of other Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers.
Section IV: Battle Buddy

“We had the same procedures and they were people I could trust because I knew how they did during the training. Most of them were like brothers to me and still are, and I think that is important.”

Specialist, Combat Engineer

Remember the following; they are not cliches:

- Soldiers in combat fight, sacrifice, and survive because of their loyalty to their fellow Soldiers.
- Team-building begins with your unit; train with the Soldiers you will go to combat with.
- Spend time getting to know your fellow Soldiers; know them as a person first and then as a Soldier.
- Build trust with the Soldiers and leaders in your unit.
- Build the expectation that everyone will know his job.
- Train as a team, so that you can react to combat without hesitation.
- Train to the point that you know exactly how everyone in the team will respond in any given situation.
Section V: Every Soldier is a Sensor

“Soldiers must understand what is normal in everyday life. This understanding will better enable them to distinguish dangerous situations from normal situations.”

SFC, Scout Platoon Sergeant

Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2)

Every Soldier, regardless of military occupational specialty or duty position, has a part to play in gathering information for use by intelligence analysts. In the current operating environment there is abundant information to be gathered among the civilian population on the street and in the villages, and that is where the individual Soldier has the edge over technical means. The Army gave this concept a name: “Every Soldier is a Sensor.”

The ES2 concept requires you to be competent in two broad areas:

- You must actively search for details related to the commander’s critical information requirements:
  - Be on the lookout for specific people, vehicles of a certain description or type, particular items of weaponry or equipment, and patterns of enemy or civilian behavior.
  - Before you drive or walk out into the area of operations, your squad or platoon leadership should tell you exactly what to “be on the lookout for.” These are referred to as BOLO items.

- You must competently report experiences, perceptions, and judgments in a concise, accurate manner:
  - Your leaders should tell you what to bring to their immediate attention (as soon as you see or hear it) and what can be reported later.
  - The SALUTE report is still the standard:
    - Size: How many are there?
    - Activity: What are they doing?
    - Location: Where are they (grid coordinates)?
    - Uniform: What are they wearing?
    - Time: When did you see this activity?
    - Equipment: What are they carrying or driving?
As you come to understand the daily or nightly rhythms of life around you, you will develop a “sixth sense” that alerts you to misplaced people or objects and irregular patterns of activity.

Look for anything out of the ordinary!

To further focus Soldiers’ attention on ES2, the Army has identified five specific individual tasks and assigned them to Warrior Battle Drill Task No. 37. These five tasks are found in the Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks, Warrior Skills Level 1:

- Search a detainee.
- Guard detainees.
- Handle enemy personnel and equipment.
- Report information of potential intelligence value.
- Report intelligence information.

If you did not receive hands-on training in these tasks during your initial entry training, take every opportunity to learn them through self-study. Ask for help from your platoon chain of command. Know these tasks before you deploy so you can carry out your ES2 mission.
Section VI: Safety

“Accidents were unnecessary 85 percent of the time, but happen all the time. Vehicle roll-overs, fires, weapon discharges, heat/cold effects.”

—Sergeant First Class, Platoon Sergeant

Avoiding Accidents

Despite regular training and precautions, Soldiers continue to die of non-combat ground accidents. The three leading causes of accidental deaths are motor vehicle accidents, illnesses, and firearms-related incidents.

Motor vehicle accidents

Of these three causes, motor vehicle accidents are the most easily prevented. Approximately two-thirds of fatalities in motor vehicle accidents have occurred in some configuration of the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Most of these HMMWVs were involved in rollover accidents. Factors common to many of these rollover accidents include:

- Collisions with other vehicles or fixed objects.
- Rollovers induced by a sudden collision-avoidance maneuver or swerve.
- Driving along canals or on levees that collapse under the weight of the HMMWV and result in drowning.
- Driving while wearing night vision goggles.
- Soldiers being ejected from a vehicle because they are not wearing seat belts.

Negligent discharge

The M9 pistol is prominent among the relatively few negligent discharge incidents that have resulted in death. Soldiers are failing to clear the weapon properly, handling it carelessly, or both, which results in injuries or death to themselves or other Soldiers.

Other accidental deaths

Other causes of accidental death include:

- Ghillie-suit fire (two fatalities in one incident, smoking related).
- Detonation of unexploded ordnance in a sleeping area.
- Falls from guard towers.
- Falls from helicopters.
- Broken chains during recovery efforts.
Wear Your Interceptor Body Armor (IBA)

You deployed to Afghanistan with an ensemble of personal protective equipment known collectively as IBA. This ensemble includes several components:

- Outer tactical vest (OTV)
- Removable collar/throat protector
- Deltoid (shoulder) and axillary (armpit) protectors
- Removable groin protector
- Upper leg protector (above the knee)

You may curse IBA because it is hot, heavy, and bulky, and it may hinder mobility for tasks such as walking, running, climbing in and out of vehicles and hatches, and aiming a weapon using a telescopic sight. However, wearing IBA may save your life.

For example, the OTV without any small arms protective inserts (SAPI) will provide Soldiers protection against penetration of fragments and bullets up to 9-millimeter (mm) in size. The addition of front and rear SAPI plates increases this level of protection to 5.56-mm and 7.62-mm rounds. The OTV and SAPI plates are available in five sizes—XS to XL. The OTV is further equipped with MOLLE-compatible (modular lightweight load-carrying equipment) webbing hangers, which provide ease in attaching other personal-equipment items. If all components are worn in combination, IBA covers 75 percent of the body with ballistic protection.

The goal of leaders and Soldiers should be to strike a balance between protection and effectiveness. Your unit leaders should carefully evaluate operational factors and determine the appropriate level of IBA to be worn. You should wear at least that level of IBA and more if your personal physique, level of fitness, and duty position permit it.
Section VII: Complacency

“I believe [many casualties] are due to unsafe acts or negligence on the part of the Soldier. A lot of times you hear about Soldiers trying to take short cuts or becoming complacent and that’s when people get hurt.”

Staff Sergeant, Tank Commander

Complacency is cited most often as the primary factor contributing to casualties in Afghanistan. The following descriptive phrases when taken together translate to complacency:

- Being unaware of surroundings (lack of situational awareness).
- Lack of attention to detail.
- Failure to follow established standards or procedures.
- Carelessness.
- Lack of discipline.
- Lost battlefield focus.
- Did not bring “A” game.
- Did not have head in the game.
- Underestimated or did not have respect for the enemy.
- Got too comfortable with surroundings.

Avoid Routine and Patterns

Some routine is necessary to complete tasks on the forward operating bases (FOB); however, that same routine can lead to trouble when applied to tactical actions outside the FOB.

The enemy is always watching, looking for repeated behavior patterns they can exploit. Avoid being templated by the enemy. Vary times, routes, organization of the march column, reactions, and other routine actions. Identify patterns and routines in your own tactical actions and look for creative ways to break the patterns but still accomplish the mission.

Recognizing Stress and Fatigue

Service in Afghanistan is accompanied by a multitude of stressors. A stressor is any event or situation that requires a nonroutine change in adaptation or behavior:

- Physical stressors include external environmental conditions such as heat and noise, equipment weight, and the terrain under foot.
- Mental stressors involve information that places demands on either your thoughts or feelings.
- Combat stressors can be physical or mental and occur during the course of combat-related duties. Combat stressors can result from enemy action, your unit, or your home life.
Stress is what your body and mind do to counteract stressors:

- Positive stress helps you respond appropriately to normal stressors; some amount of stress is necessary to prompt effective responses.
- Too little stress may make you distracted, forgetful, or fall asleep.
- Too much stress may make you focus on only one aspect of a task, neglecting the larger picture.
- Extreme stress may cause you to “freeze up” or become agitated and flee.
- Prolonged extreme stress can cause physical and mental disablement.

Physical fatigue results from:

- Hard or prolonged work.
- Muscle tiredness.
- Aerobic fatigue.
- Sleep deprivation.
- Physical illness.
- Intense emotions, such as anxiety and fear.

Mental fatigue results from:

- Prolonged mental effort on a specific task.
- Emotions such as boredom or uncertainty.

Inappropriate reactions to combat-induced stress are called misconduct stress behavior and include unacceptable and even criminal activities, such as:

- Substance abuse.
- Brutal violence.
- Recklessness.
- Desertion.
- Malingering.
- Fraternization.

Battle fatigue/combats stress reaction is usually present at some level in all unit personnel in a theater of combat operations.
Section VIII: Afghanistan’s Ethnic Groups

The population of Afghanistan includes many different ethnic groups. The Pashtuns (Pushtuns), who make up more than half the population, have traditionally been the dominant ethnic group. Their homeland lies south of the Hindu Kush, but Pashtun groups live in all parts of the country. Many Pashtuns also live in northwestern Pakistan and are called Pathans. Pashtuns are usually farmers, though a large number of them are nomads living in tents made of black goat hair. Male Pashtuns live by ancient tribal code called Pashtunwali, which stresses courage, personal honor, resolution, self-reliance, and hospitality. The Pashtuns speak Pashto, which is an Indo-European language and one of the two official languages of Afghanistan.

The Tajiks (Tadzhiks) are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They live in the valleys north of Kabul and in Badakhshan. They are farmers, artisans, and merchants. The Tajiks speak Dari (Afghan Persian), also an Indo-European language and the other official language of Afghanistan. Dari is more widely spoken than Pashto in most of the cities. The Tajiks are closely related to the people of Tajikistan.

In the central ranges live the Hazaras. Although their ancestors came from the Xinjiang region of northwestern China, the Hazaras speak an archaic Persian. Most are farmers and sheep herders. The Hazaras have been discriminated against for a long time, in part because they are minority Shites (followers of Shi’a Islam) within a dominant Sunni Muslim population. In the east, north of the Kabul River, is an isolated wooded mountainous region known as Noristan. The Noristani people who live there speak a wide variety of Indo-European dialects. In the far south live the Baluchi, whose Indo-European language (called Baluchi) is also spoken in southwestern Pakistan and southeastern Iran.

To the north of the Hindu Kush, on the steppes near the Amu Darya, live several groups who speak Turkic languages. The Uzbeks are the largest of these groups, which also include Turkmen and, in the extreme northeast Vakhan Corridor, the Kyrgyz people. The Kyrgyz were mostly driven out by the Soviet invasion and largely immigrated to Turkey. All of these groups are settled farmers, merchants, and semi-nomadic sheep herders. The nomads live in yurt or round, felt-covered tents of the Mongolian or Central Asian type.

Prior to the war, important political positions were distributed almost equally among ethnic groups, which kept ethnic tensions and violence to a minimum, though the Pashtuns in Kabul were always the politically dominant group. In the mid-1990s, attempts have been made to reestablish shared rule; however, many of the ethnic groups have sought a greater share of power than they had before the war, and violence is a common result of the disputes.
Chapter 2
Leaders

Section I: Effective Leadership

“[Soldiers, noncommissioned officers [NCOs], and junior leaders] must be mentally hardened for the rigors that they will face over here in order maintain their discipline during this mission. Loss of individual discipline is a unit killer, and all small-unit leaders must enforce the standards of discipline that already exist. NCOs must be empowered; they are people who make this mission succeed. Officers are not able to manage company, platoon, squad, and team level actions. They must train and empower their NCOs to lead from their level and do their jobs so that officers can lead platoon and higher operations.”

Captain, Company Commander, Infantry Company

Soldiers quickly assessed their leaders once the unit deployed. The majority of Soldiers said the effectiveness of their leaders contributed to their survival during their first 100 days. According to Soldiers, leaders should:

- Enforce the standards. The ultimate test of a leader is whether his subordinates enforce standards on their own. A leader cannot do everything himself and will be ineffective if he tries.
- Trust their instincts. Many junior leaders commented that their gut feeling was usually the right course. There is little margin for error between right and wrong; if something is wrong, there is no excuse for not fixing it, whether the decision is popular or not.
- Include subordinates in mission analysis and planning. Developing subordinates so they can accomplish the mission on their own is the most important thing a leader can do. Current operations, even at the company and platoon levels, require decentralized planning and execution. Leaders are most effective when they include subordinates in the process.
- Never stop leading. When in charge, effective leaders take charge and accomplish the mission to the best of the unit’s ability. Knowledge and competence do not necessarily equate to leadership ability; there is a certain quality some leaders possess that causes Soldiers to want to follow them.

Effective Leadership

The Army teaches core leadership traits at all levels of professional officer and NCO education. Their importance is echoed in the words of Soldiers surveyed for this handbook.

Good leaders do not compromise the basics; they set the example and enforce the standards. Effective leaders rigorously supervise preparation for combat operations. They execute aggressively but retain the ability to meter the requisite mix of lethal and nonlethal means.
Soldiers want their leaders to:

- Display competence and confidence in skills and duties and take responsibility as the leader.
- Hold subordinates accountable, enforce standards, and always meet standards themselves.
- Have combat experience or learn from subordinates and peers who do.
- Lead from the front and share the risks of combat operations.
- Trust their subordinate leaders and stand by their decisions in the field.
- Adapt quickly to changes in enemy tactics and the situational circumstances.
- Know their Soldiers and care about their protection and welfare.
- Communicate with subordinates and keep Soldiers informed.

Ineffective Leadership

The Army consistently reinforces the skills all leaders should master; however, Soldiers quickly recognized ineffective leaders. According to Soldiers surveyed, ineffective leaders:

- Lacked the interpersonal skills needed to lead.
- Lacked tactical competence.
- Lacked combat experience.
- Were unwilling to listen to experienced subordinates.
- Avoided risk in mission execution or in their personal behavior (seldom going outside the forward operating base or unwilling to share the hardships of combat).

Soldiers had a special disdain for what they categorized as “careerist” leaders, who want to promote themselves or advance through the ranks (get their “tickets punched”), usually on the sacrifices of their Soldiers.

Other characteristics associated with ineffective leadership include the following:

- Micro managing (interpreted as a lack of trust in subordinates)
- Lack of aggressiveness in conducting combat operations
- Failure to solicit or listen to advice from combat veterans
- Willingness to put Soldiers at risk unnecessarily
- Lack of moral character

One quarter of the Soldiers surveyed said that ineffective leadership put them at greater risk.
Section II: Adaptability

“The first 100 days will always be the hardest for survivability. The enemy is testing your unit, looking for strengths and weaknesses, and trying to scare you a little bit.”

1st Lieutenant, Service Support Platoon Leader

Enemy Adaptability

The enemy is intelligent, crafty, and adaptive. They watch what you do and identify habits, patterns, and routines. The enemy studies how you react in a situation, such as your improvised explosive device-defeat practices. He will even contrive false circumstances in order to watch and learn the ways in which friendly forces react. The enemy uses this knowledge to alter his attack tactics, techniques, and procedures and exploit your weaknesses.

The enemy documents many of his attacks on video for use both as a recruiting tool and to dissect the attack (learn what worked and what did not work), and then changes his tactics accordingly.

The best strategy for countering the enemy’s efforts is to be constantly vigilant for signs of enemy observation, while taking steps to vary the manner in which you perform everyday actions. Watch for any civilian that seems to have an unwarranted interest in what you are doing when patrolling and convoying.

It is natural to follow a routine for conducting daily tasks. Soldiers must monitor their personal habits and those of their team when working “outside the wire.” Remember that the enemy will spend days and weeks studying you and your unit in an attempt to template your activities. He will use this template to develop a plan for attacking you. Even small variations in activity can disrupt a planned enemy attack. Imagine an enemy’s dismay when the very day he is ready, your patrol departs the gate 45 minutes early and turns in the opposite direction.

Learn from every mission:

• Seek lessons from other units in your tactical area of operations. Your unit can take advantage of what worked for them and avoid the pitfalls they encountered.

• Conduct a personal after-action review on your own actions:
  ° How well did you execute your mission tasks?
  ° What were the shortcomings in your personal performance and the performance of your unit?
  ° How will you make changes to correct the problem?

• Train and drill your unit to correct known problems before the next mission.

• Analyze every enemy contact:
Examine the encounter from both your perspective and the perspective of your enemy:

* Help your unit leadership reconstruct the actions that took place.
* Be as accurate as your memory will allow.
* Do not embellish.
* Do not avoid talking about mistakes.

Compare what just happened with the experiences of others in your unit. Can you identify patterns in the way the enemy is operating?

Was your unit successful? Why?

Was the enemy successful? Why?

Watch for enemy tactics and techniques. Did the enemy operate differently this time?

**Risk Mitigation**

Consider the following risk mitigation procedures:

- Avoid setting patterns; whenever possible:
  - Alter routes.
  - Alter timing.
  - Alter commonly witnessed procedures.
  - Avoid displaying the extent of your boundary area.

- Assess and plan for the relevant threats, particularly complex attacks.

- Rehearse potential enemy tactics to better prepare yourself for any eventuality.

- Have clearly understood and well-rehearsed “actions on” procedures relevant to the improvised explosive device threat.

- Portray a strong and vigilant presence.

- Always be on the lookout for suspicious activity or indicators.

- Maintain regular communication with your unit while on the move.

- Know the route and look for changes on the return leg (e.g., the sign suspended from an overpass was not there when you passed by earlier).

- Beware of the unusual, expect the unexpected, and react quickly and decisively.
Section III: Predeployment Training

“CEP drills and TTP were gone over so much that they became natural reactions. Even though when we got in country and did our right seat rides and saw how our training was different from what the current threat was...we had no troubles adapting and changing, because we had the basics down.

Sergeant, Squad Leader, Cavalry Troop

What you do for your Soldiers in predeployment training is the most important factor in increasing their ability to survive in combat. Do not take your training for granted. Good predeployment training helps put you and your Soldiers in the right state of mind—ready for the rigors of combat. Predeployment training:

- Is your opportunity to build your team’s combat skills.
- Builds “muscle memory” so critical in reacting correctly the first time your team experiences combat.
- Allows you and your Soldiers to solidify as a team.

Ensure your team’s predeployment training is up to date. Small units are constantly adapting tactics and procedures as the situation and enemy techniques change. Make sure your team’s training is realistic. This realism starts with the training you conduct at your home station. Look to the combat veterans in your unit as a way for measuring the realism of the training. Use those Soldiers with first hand combat experience to lead your unit’s training.

Critical Training

Improvised explosive device-defeat (IEDD)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent a significant threat to U.S. forces in the Afghan theater of operations; however, with the right training and proper practices, you can significantly reduce the threat of an IED attack:

- Gather the latest enemy techniques and tactics for IEDs from veteran Soldiers and small unit leaders.
- Concentrate on IEDD techniques and practices until they become second nature.
- Use every opportunity to practice the IEDD techniques your team learns in training. Put your Soldiers in the role of an insurgent and ask the following questions:
  - What might be a good location to place an IED?
Where would I place an IED so that I know it will hit the intended target (most likely a convoy or mounted patrol)?

How would I hide the IED (remember, “in plain sight” can be an effective way of disguising the IED)?

Where would I put the triggerman?

How would I initiate the attack?

Then reverse the roles and ask Soldiers: If an IED detonated right now, how would you react?

- What are your immediate actions?
- Where is your escape route?

Predeployment or home-station training tips:

- Have Soldiers practice identifying vehicle-borne IED threats and using escalation-of-force techniques
- Have Soldiers determine how quickly an approaching vehicle can close on a traffic control point (TCP) or stationary patrol and where they should establish the stop line, engagement line, and other TCP control measures.

**Basic rifle marksmanship**

Your Soldiers must be able to maintain muzzle awareness, trigger safety, and weapons status on their own. Appropriate training builds proficiency and teaches responsibility.

Teach your Soldiers:

- To take responsibility for their own weapons from day one.
- To zero the iron sights first and then move to the combat optics.
- To repeat this process until they achieve a good zero with all sights.
- To fire as many rounds as necessary to become confident in their ability to hit the intended target.

Soldiers cannot begin training on advanced marksmanship techniques without first being competent at the basics. Proper weapon-ready techniques—stance, aiming, shot placement, and trigger manipulations—constitute reflexive shooting.

**Long-range rifle marksmanship**

Your Soldiers must be confident with their weapons and their ability to hit a target under varied conditions and at long range. This confidence begins with basic weapons marksmanship skills taught in initial entry training and reinforced at home station. Fundamental training requires hands-on training, repetition, and sending
rounds down range. Soldiers need to see the results of their actions and training. No amount of classroom instruction replaces range experience.

Pay attention to the following fundamentals of advanced marksmanship training, and train these fundamentals until your team is proficient:

- Stance
- Grip
- Sight alignment
- Sight picture
- Breathing
- Recovery
- Follow-through

Train Soldiers until they have the fundamentals of marksmanship down.

Teach Soldiers:

- To apply marksmanship fundamentals to every shot.
- To make every shot count.
- How their weapon functions and how that affects their ability to hit a target at long range.
- The basics of range estimation and target identification at long range.
- To work in pairs, record every shot (hit or miss), and adjust accordingly.
- To practice engaging moving targets until there are confident they can hit targets at or beyond 500 meters.

**Convoy training and convoy live fire training**

One of the most dangerous activities in Afghanistan is moving in a convoy. The insurgents’ primary reason for targeting convoys is their perception that convoys are easy prey and cannot conduct a successful defense. The Army has tactics and effective training for Soldiers that make convoys very lethal and well able to engage and defeat any enemy. Convoy training teaches the responsibilities for each crew position (driver, commander, or gunner).

Your team should know the following fundamentals of convoy defense:

- Movement drills:
  - Scanning responsibilities and 360-degree security.
  - Techniques for keeping standoff with a potential threat.
° Actions on halts: “5/25” crew halt drill and the “5 Cs.”

- Battle drills:
  - React to attack from the driver’s side (left side).
  - React to attack from the vehicle commander’s side (right side).
  - How to exit/enter a vehicle while in contact.
  - How to break contact.
  - What to do at the rally point.

- Casualty extrication, first aid, and evacuation (including calling for medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]).

- Vehicle rollover and evacuation drill.

- Vehicle self recovery (like vehicles and while in contact).

- Reporting (size, activity, location, uniform, troops, and equipment [SALUTE] report, MEDEVAC request, IED/unexploded ordnance report).

Physical fitness training

Every Soldier must stay in good physical shape. The extremes of operating in Afghanistan (the climate, combat tasks, and stress) demand even greater emphasis on being in the best physical shape possible. Soldiers in good shape are better able to handle the fatigue and stress brought on by the rigors of daily tasks. Fatigue is a major reason for complacency. Complacency is a major factor in a Soldier’s risk of becoming a casualty. Leaders cannot function if they are not physically ready to “keep up” with their Soldiers.
Section IV: Cross Training

“[Conduct] a lot more rehearsals with the team with each person talking through not only their task, but the task of everyone on the team.”

First Lieutenant, Ordnance Platoon Leader

Every Soldier Should be Ready to Take Charge

Cross training prepares Soldiers in your team to function in each other’s roles. All Soldiers must be capable of assuming other roles in the team/section/squad. Small unit leaders are often the first to become a casualty; therefore, every Soldier must be ready to take charge of a situation in order to continue the fight. Every Soldier:

- Must know the small unit’s mission and commander’s intent.
- Should know the small unit’s general location and be able to determine its specific location on a paper map or electronic locating device.
- Should know the unit’s call sign and the call sign of the next higher echelon.

Communications is critical in a fight. Soldiers should:

- Know how to operate the basic communications equipment.
- Know how to report their location and situation, how to request MEDEVAC, and how to identify themselves to friendly forces that are coming to their assistance.

Soldiers assigned or attached to units in combat must:

- Be able to perform function checks on and employ every individual and crew-served weapon assigned to the squad or section. (Proficiency in the employing crew-served weapons is particularly important to combat support sustainment Soldiers, whose everyday duties do not normally require them to employ weapons.)
- Be able to drive the vehicle in an emergency situations (including specialized engineer or support vehicles).
- Be able to operate radios and other communications gear. (When on a combat logistics patrol caught in an IED ambush and taking small arms fire, it is too late to learn how to operate the .50 caliber machine gun or to call for a MEDEVAC over the radio.)
- Be able to send the required reports:
  - Explosive ordinance disposal
  - IED
  - Situation report
  - MEDEVAC
As a leader, you must also be proficient in operating the vehicle and its communications equipment, protective equipment, and crew-served weapons. As part of precombat preparations, rehearse each Soldier in his personal mission tasks and those of the other Soldiers on the team. Have the driver and the gunner practice radiotelephone procedures and reporting. Have the vehicle commander practice taking over as the driver or gunner.
Section V: Complacency

“[I believe] many casualties are due to unsafe acts or negligence on the part of the Soldier. A lot of times you hear about Soldiers trying to take short cuts or becoming complacent and that’s when people get hurt.”

Staff Sergeant, Tank Commander

Complacency is cited most often as the primary factor contributing to casualties in Afghanistan. The following descriptive phrases when taken together translate to complacency:

- Being unaware of surroundings (lack of situational awareness).
- Lack of attention to detail.
- Failure to follow established standards or procedures.
- Carelessness.
- Lack of discipline.
- Lost battlefield focus.
- Did not bring “A” game.
- Did not have head in the game.
- Underestimated or did not have respect for the enemy.
- Got too comfortable with surroundings.

Complacency among Soldiers differs from the formal definition of the word in one major respect: very few Soldiers are unaware of the actual dangers or hazards of their environment. They are adequately informed of the dangers posed by their environment, and they know what they are being complacent about.

The key element of complacency is the Soldier’s attitude. It is the duty of each individual Soldier not to be complacent. The most important shaper of a Soldier’s attitude, apart from the Soldier himself and his peers, is leadership at the small unit level.

Small Unit Leadership and Complacency

Small unit leaders, just like the Soldiers they lead, have identified complacency as a major contributor to casualties. Furthermore, small unit leaders—noncommissioned and commissioned officers at the company level—are fully aware of their roles in recognizing and preventing complacency. These facts are clear from small-unit leader responses to the 100-day survey. Examples of this stated awareness include the following observations:

- Gave constant training and tried to keep implementing the rules, trying to advise the Soldiers not to get complacent with their territory.

- Always checking my Soldiers to avoid any complacency.
Emphasized proper wear of complete uniform and prevented complacency in the unit. Complacency can be seen as early as two to three months in theater.

Fought complacency with creative training/scenarios.

Trained for our mission. Trained more when the mission changed. Did not let my Soldiers get complacent.

Enforced discipline as it applied to combat situations; tried not to dwell on trivial things. Constantly reminded them during the lulls that we were still in a combat zone; did not tolerate complacency.

Three common threads are contained in the small-unit leader comments shown above: training, checking, and enforcing. These are, in fact, core noncommissioned officer responsibilities.

Training

Every Soldier should be trained in the individual skills required for performing the unit’s mission (mission essential task list) and survival. A commonly heard expression of this principle is “train to shoot, move, communicate, and survive.” While there are countless common tasks in which all Soldiers should be proficient, some Soldiers, by their unit type and duty position, are more exposed to danger from hostile action than others and should be trained with that fact in mind.

Many Soldiers and small unit leaders support the necessity of cross training. Soldiers should be able to accomplish the basic tasks performed by other personnel in their crew, team, or section. One clear example of this principle is the cross-training of vehicle and weapon system crews. Any crewman of an Abrams tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle should be able to perform the duties of any other crewman. In like manner, Soldiers who work side-by-side in a data-processing unit, surgical suite, or maintenance shop should be able to perform the work tasks of their co-workers, within reason.

Additionally, due to the nature of the current conflict, many Soldiers are performing duties outside their primary military occupational specialties (MOSs). Entire units have deployed with none or only a small portion of their major modification table of equipment items. Some units have been assigned missions not typically performed by their type unit. Nonetheless, these Soldiers must remain current in their MOS in order to be competitive for advancement. The brunt of responsibility for this MOS-currency training falls on small unit leaders. Training, whether for current assigned duties or for MOS-proficiency retention, is an effective activity for preventing complacency.

Checking

Everyone has heard some variation of this common expression: “Subordinates perform best those tasks the boss checks.” It is that way in the Army as well as in life. The Army has both informal and formal systems for checking.

The informal system begins with self and buddy checks. Soldiers look at their own work or their own gear to identify shortfalls; then they look at the Soldiers on their
right and left to see if they have forgotten something. Soldiers should ask or remind each other: “Do you have this?” or “Don’t forget that.” Every Soldier should be observant of a fragmentation grenade that is improperly secured to one’s own or a buddy’s outer tactical vest. Every member of a rifle squad should be interested in whether the squad automatic weapon gunner performed proper maintenance on his weapon and if he and his assistant(s) are carrying the appropriate number of rounds for the mission. Every member of a helicopter crew should be interested in whether the crew chief executed the daily pre-flight maintenance tasks with due diligence. Every passenger of a vehicle in a combat logistics patrol should be concerned that the driver and vehicle commander know all the pertinent details of the route to be followed.

The formal systems for checking include but are not limited to precombat checks and precombat inspections. No matter who performs these checks and inspections—a squad leader, senior NCO, or an officer in the chain of command—they should be accomplished before any unit departs on a mission. Failure to conduct such checks and inspections suggests complacency on the part of small unit leaders—a bad example to Soldiers.

**Enforcement**

When a check or inspection reveals a deficiency or shortfall, some corrective action should result. It may be as simple as sending a Soldier back to his personal area to retrieve a piece of missing equipment or as complex as reshuffling the march order of an entire column of vehicles to ensure the gun trucks or counter improvised explosive device equipped vehicles are positioned properly. While corrective action normally suffices, small unit leaders may occasionally have to resort to punitive actions to get and hold Soldiers’ attention. When it comes to their own safety, however, most Soldiers will respond appropriately to positive enforcement measures.

**Avoid Routine and Patterns**

Some routine is necessary to complete tasks on the forward operating bases (FOB); however, that same routine can lead to trouble when applied to tactical actions outside the FOB.

The enemy is always watching, looking for repeated behavior patterns they can exploit. Avoid being templated by the enemy. Vary times, routes, organization of the march column, reactions, and other routine actions. Identify patterns and routines in your own tactical actions and look for creative ways to break the patterns but still accomplish the mission.

** Recognizing Stress and Fatigue**

Service in Afghanistan is accompanied by a multitude of stressors. A stressor is any event or situation that requires a nonroutine change in adaptation or behavior:

- Physical stressors include external environmental conditions such as heat and noise, equipment weight, and the terrain under foot.
- Mental stressors involve information that places demands on either your thoughts or feelings.
Combat stressors can be physical or mental and occur during the course of combat-related duties. Combat stressors can result from enemy action, your unit, or your home life.

Stress is what your body and mind do to counteract stressors:

- Positive stress helps you respond appropriately to normal stressors; some amount of stress is necessary to prompt effective responses.
- Too little stress may make you distracted, forgetful, or fall asleep.
- Too much stress may make you focus on only one aspect of a task, neglecting the larger picture.
- Extreme stress may cause you to “freeze up” or become agitated and flee.
- Prolonged extreme stress can cause physical and mental disablement.

Physical fatigue results from:

- Hard or prolonged work.
- Muscle tiredness.
- Aerobic fatigue.
- Sleep deprivation.
- Physical illness.
- Intense emotions, such as anxiety and fear.

Mental fatigue results from:

- Prolonged mental effort on a specific task.
- Emotions such as boredom or uncertainty.

Inappropriate reactions to combat-induced stress are called misconduct stress behavior and include unacceptable and even criminal activities, such as:

- Substance abuse.
- Brutal violence.
- Recklessness.
- Desertion.
- Malingering.
- Fraternization.

Battle fatigue/combat stress reaction is usually present at some level in all unit personnel in a theater of combat operations.

Small-unit leaders have the ability to apply the following treatment steps:

- Reassure Soldiers.
• Provide Soldiers opportunities for rest and sleep.
• Provide food and fluids.
• Provide opportunities for personal hygiene (potable water and clean uniform).
• Provide a time and place for the Soldier to talk about what happened.
• Restore the Soldier’s identity and confidence by assigning useful work.

These treatment steps should be administered quickly and simply and as close to the Soldier’s unit as possible.

Soldiers and leaders are responsible for identifying personnel who require treatment for battle fatigue or combat stress reaction. Small unit leaders should observe all their subordinates on a regular basis to identify the need for stress-relief measures.
Section VI: Combat Lifesavers

“First aid and CLS was force-fed to all of our Soldiers. It was frustrating and annoying going through the training, but it all paid exponential dividends. I took my first casualty our second day... The Soldier lost five pints of blood. He and the two other Soldiers who helped treat his amputated leg were able to keep him alive due to the high level of medical training that they received.”

Staff Sergeant, Infantry Team Leader

There is no doubt that the presence of combat lifesaver (CLS)-trained Soldiers in small units is saving lives. It is the responsibility of every leader to see that his unit gets CLS training for Soldiers, including the routine refresher training for those who are already CLS qualified.

Soldiers must be trained in CLS and keep their skills current with regular refresher training. Army Medical Department (AMEDD) has specific criteria for CLS trainers and for the skills required for CLS qualification. Train a sufficient number of Soldiers to have at least one CLS per team/crew.

Emergency medical technician (EMT) (or first responder) training is the next step above CLS. When possible, train select Soldiers as EMTs. They can augment your organic medics in severe situations. On a combat mission, one medic and one EMT per platoon is a good planning factor.

Equip every vehicle and squad with a CLS medical supply bag. If not covered by your higher command, include inspecting the contents of the CLS bag in your unit standing operating procedures. Inspect CLS bags regularly as part of precombat inspections.
Section VII: Safety

“The best thing to do to ensure survivability is to stress safety. There are more non-combat related deaths than actual combat deaths.”

1st Lieutenant, Transportation Platoon Leader

Avoiding Accidents

In the 20 months that immediately preceded the writing of this study, approximately 150 U.S. Army Soldiers died of non-combat ground-incident causes. While the readily available data do not permit a detailed examination of the causes of each non-combat death during this specific period, anecdotal data suggests that the leading cause of accidental Soldier deaths is motor vehicle accidents (approximately 60), followed by illnesses (15), and then firearms-related incidents (10). This data is consistent with peacetime experience. Among these three causes of non-combat deaths, motor vehicle accidents are the most easily prevented.

Given the prohibition on consumption of alcoholic beverages by military personnel throughout the theater of operations, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs is not the issue. Approximately 67 percent of the 60 fatalities in motor vehicle accidents in the theater of operations over the past 20 months have occurred in some configuration of high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Most of these HMMWVs were involved in rollover accidents. Factors common to many of these rollover accidents include:

- Collisions with other vehicles or fixed objects.
- Rollovers induced by a sudden collision-avoidance maneuver or swerve.
- Driving along canals or on levees that collapse under the weight of the HMMWV and result in drowning.
- Driving while wearing night vision goggles.
- Soldiers being ejected from a vehicle because they are not wearing seat belts.

Negligent discharge

The M9 pistol is prominent among the relatively few negligent discharge incidents that have resulted in death. Soldiers are failing to clear the weapon properly, handling it carelessly, or both, which results in injuries or death to themselves or other Soldiers.

Other accidental deaths

Other causes of accidental death include:

- Ghillie-suit fire (two fatalities in one incident, smoking related).
• Detonation of unexploded ordnance in a sleeping area.
• Falls from guard towers.
• Falls from helicopters.
• Broken chains during recovery efforts.

Operating motor vehicles and heavy equipment safely is both an individual and collective responsibility. The natural tendency of many young Soldiers is to operate close to the limits—their own or the limit of the equipment. More self-control is needed, along with small unit leader supervision and intervention. Operator training is important, and every vehicle operator should be trained in the safe operation of the vehicle he or she is currently driving. Enforcing safety standards in everyday activities is absolutely necessary. “Vehicle commander” is not just a seat and a title—it is a responsibility to oneself and to the Army for the safe operation of a motor vehicle.

Wear Your Interceptor Body Armor (IBA)

You deployed to Afghanistan with an ensemble of personal protective equipment known collectively as IBA. This ensemble includes several components:

• Outer tactical vest (OTV)
• Removable collar/throat protector.
• Deltoid (shoulder) and axillary (armpit) protectors.
• Removable groin protector.
• Upper leg protector (above the knee).

Every Soldier who has worn IBA has an opinion about it. It is hot, heavy, and bulky, and it may hinder mobility for tasks such as walking, running, climbing in and out of vehicles and hatches, and aiming a weapon using a telescopic sight.

The same Soldiers, however, will acknowledge that wearing IBA has saved many lives. For example, the OTV without any small arms protective inserts (SAPI) will provide Soldiers protection against penetration of fragments and bullets up to 9-millimeter (mm) in size. The addition of front and rear SAPI plates increases this level of protection to 5.56-mm and 7.62-mm rounds. The OTV and SAPI plates are available in five sizes—XS to XL. The OTV is further equipped with MOLLE-compatible (modular lightweight load-carrying equipment) webbing hangers, which provide ease in attaching other personal-equipment items. If all components are worn in combination, IBA covers 75 percent of the body with ballistic protection.

The goal of leaders and Soldiers should be to strike a balance between protection and effectiveness. Unit leaders should carefully evaluate operational factors and determine the appropriate level of IBA to be worn. Soldiers should wear at least that level of IBA and more if their personal physique, level of fitness, and duty position permit it.
Section VIII: Intelligence

In the current operating environment, the Army uses many high-tech gadgets to collect information about the enemy. These information sensors include satellites; special high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft; unmanned aerial systems; and ground-mounted radars, cameras, and listening devices. These technical, sophisticated means of gathering information are photographing the enemy and terrain, listening to enemy voice and digital communications, and capturing other types of raw intelligence data. Specialists in each intelligence discipline collect and analyze this data to build a picture of enemy capabilities and sometimes predict enemy actions.

Every Soldier, regardless of his or her military occupational specialty (MOS) or duty position, has a part to play in gathering information for use by intelligence analysts. In the current operating environment, there is abundant information Soldiers can gather from the civilian population on the street and in the villages, and that is where the individual Soldier has the edge over technical means. The Army gave this concept a name: “Every Soldier is a Sensor,” commonly referred to as ES2.

The ES2 concept requires Soldiers to be competent in two broad areas:

• They must actively search for details related to the commander’s critical information requirements:
  ° Be on the lookout for specific people, vehicles of a certain description or type, particular items of weaponry or equipment, and patterns of enemy or civilian behavior.
  ° Before Soldiers drive or walk out into the area of operations, squad or platoon leadership should tell them exactly what to “be on the lookout for.” These are referred to as BOLO items.

• They must competently report experiences, perceptions, and judgments in a concise, accurate manner:
  ° As their leader, you should tell Soldiers what to bring to your immediate attention (as soon as they see or hear it) and what can be reported later.
  ° The SALUTE report is still the standard:
    * Size: How many are there?
    * Activity: What are they doing?
    * Location: Where are they (grid coordinates)?
    * Uniform: What are they wearing?
    * Time: When did you see this activity?
    * Equipment: What are they carrying or driving?
As your Soldiers come to understand the daily or nightly rhythms of life around them, they will develop a “sixth sense” that alerts them and you to misplaced people or objects and irregular patterns of activity.

Train your Soldiers to look for anything out of the ordinary!

**Leader Situational Awareness**

Know the local area:

- Before deployment:
  
  - Learn simple phrases that will enable you to communicate with the people
  
  - Understand the customs (cultural and local), social practices, and holiday/celebration periods

- During the relief in place/transfer of authority determine:
  
  - What is normal for the local community and markets; what are the normal transportation patterns.
  
  - Whom do the outgoing Soldiers talk to and trust; get an introduction by your counterpart.
  
  - What areas are prone to frequent insurgent attack.

Get to know the locals:

- Spend time getting to know the local citizens. Who lives in the villages/community? Who belongs and who does not?

- Gain the trust of local citizens:
  
  - Simple manners and courtesy go a long way.
  
  - Humanize yourself to the local citizens; shake hands and smile.
  
  - When you give respect, you get respect. Respect equals information

- Remember that not every one is out to kill you; helping them will help you

- Children are often more receptive than the adults; use this knowledge to your advantage.
Know your surroundings:

- Generally, a vehicle-borne IED attack is not likely when women and children are in a car.

- Generally an IED attack is not likely in an area where children are playing.

- Watch for the signs and signals that tell you something is wrong; for example, a usually busy area empty of people may indicate a potential attack.
Section IX: Biometrics at the Company Level

What is Biometrics?

Biometrics is a method of measuring an individual’s physiological and behavioral characteristics in order to establish that individual’s identity with certitude. Biometrics is part of the Department of Defense (DOD) effort to gain “identity dominance” in the counterinsurgency operational environment.

Identity dominance occurs when the DOD can identify, track, and further exploit persons of intelligence and national security interest despite their efforts to hide within a population. With identity dominance, the DOD can link an enemy combatant or similar national security threat to his previously used identities and past activities.

Biometrics captures physiological characteristics (iris, fingerprints, face), along with other physical features (height, weight, hair and eye color, and gender) and tags the data to an individual. The biometric data is then archived to a common database for future reference.

Information gathered during military operations is processed and compared to biometric information in the database. The resulting intelligence information is provided to the Soldier conducting the operation. Additionally, biometrics collection supports establishing overall census data of a given population area.

Biometrics is becoming part of many operational missions. The Army is fielding select biometric collection systems down to the squad level. Leaders and Soldiers must have biometric training prior to deploying into combat. This training should begin at home station and continue with collective training events at a combat training center or mobilization station.

Leaders must understand how to integrate biometrics into their mission planning and execution. Platoon and company leadership must have situational understanding on biometric capabilities to ensure their Soldiers can use this equipment.

Company leaders will use two biometric systems: the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE). BAT is generally employed as a company- and above-level biometrics collection, database and repository tool. HIIDE collects biometric data on individuals during tactical operations. HIIDE has a database that can store “watch lists” and information on persons of interest (downloaded from the BAT). Information stored in HIIDE can provide Soldiers the necessary information to determine whether an individual should be detained or released.

At the end of a mission, the Soldier uploads data collected in HIIDE to the BAT system. The BAT system then moves this data to regional and national databases for sharing, storing, and matching.
Biometrics supports the mission in the following ways:

- The BAT system can confirm a person of interest’s identity by performing a search against a local, regional, or national database. The enemy can easily alter or falsify paper documents and identification cards; however, biometrics identification is unique to each individual.

- Whether Soldiers are on patrol, conducting a raid, operating a checkpoint, screening a local national for a job, or conducting operations to confirm a high value target (HVT), a biometric device enables them to know if the person in front of them is who he claims to be.

- Biometrics positively identifies persons of interest, insurgents, terrorists and others who would harm forces and facilities.

- Force protection relies on the accurate identification of individuals. Biometric devices will help to save lives.

Planning considerations for company leaders:

- The company must have at least two trained BAT operators and eight HIIDE trained operators. HIIDE is a train the trainer (T3) device requiring limited, but focused operator-level training.

- The BAT database is classified Secret/No Foreign Disclosure. Commanders must be aware of this and ensure operations security considerations are followed.

- HIIDE requires minimal logistical and maintenance support. HIIDE requires two internal batteries and a spare that can provide up to six hours of operation.

- Operators must upload HIIDE collected biometric files and tracking reports to the BAT to ensure conversion to the BAT database.

- Data transfer between BAT to HIIDE and HIIDE to BAT must be well planned. When operating at remote sites where only HIIDE is available, transportation assets may be required to enable download and upload of the most current information.
Chapter 3
Staff

Section I: Predeployment Site Survey (PDSS)

“We delayed the [PDSS] trip until three months out, and it allowed you to see the fight, see what the unit was doing, and get a very good feel for the battle space, and what was required.”

Major, Primary Staff Officer

U.S. Forces Command mandates that all units brigade and above conduct a leaders’ reconnaissance before the unit begins its collective training cycle in preparation for deployment. An effective PDSS will inform the unit on the area of operations (AO) and the combat tasks and missions the unit is expected to fulfill once deployed. The PDSS drives the training plans for all of the predeployment activities. After the initial PDSS, the staff and commanders should conduct an internal briefing (similar in format to a quarterly training brief). This briefing helps to outline the training needed and focus the leadership on those core issues and shortfalls critical for preparation.

A good window for scheduling the PDSS is three to six months out (norm is 90 days) from the start of the deployment. This time frame is close enough to the rotation period that the mission and AO of the unit being replaced is not expected to change significantly and far enough in advance to allow for programming resources and scheduling training. This schedule also provides the staff sufficient time to review and adopt the staff practices and products it expects to use after the transfer of authority (TOA).

Share the information gathered by the PDSS team with the rest of the staff and the subordinate commanders and staffs. The period immediately after the staff and leaders return from the PDSS is a good time to begin following the expected battle rhythm of the outgoing unit at a pace similar to operations in the AO. Over time, the staff will build the “muscle memory” for daily operations. This practice goes a long way in easing the transition once the brigade/battalion deploys.

Who should go (or can go) on the PDSS? What should the team do while in the AO? Some general considerations from the survey include the following:

- Take enough personnel to reasonably cover all the areas concerned in the time allotted for the PDSS. The PDSS team should include representatives from each staff section. In addition to the commander and the command sergeant major, a recommended minimum team should consist of:
  - S3 representative for current operations.
  - S2 representative for current intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.
° Plans (combined S2/S3).
° S4/Property book officer representative (identify stay behind supplies/equipment and inventory/hand receipts).
° S6 representative (communications and networks).
° Headquarters Company (mayor cell/life support cell).

• The PDSS process should focus on staff functions and the transition and not exclusively on the commander.

• Prepare a list of requests for information (RFIs) from the staff and subordinates to go with the PDSS team. The team uses this list to ensure all the key information is covered during its time with the outgoing unit.

• Have a checklist of staff materials/documents for the PDSS team to obtain during its time with the outgoing staff. See “What to bring back” below.

• Open a line of communication with the outgoing unit. Establish a routine means and schedule of communicating between units to allow for coordination prior to the PDSS. Use this communications link to continue the dialogue with the outgoing unit, answer additional RFIs, and update both staffs to any changes that occur after the PDSS.

The staff must prepare a PDSS checklist based on the commander’s guidance and its initial mission analysis. The staff survey suggested including the following areas/items on a PDSS checklist:

• Digital pictures of key places, infrastructure, and local persons of importance or influence. The commander and the staff should conduct a reconnaissance of the real estate where the unit will operate (“boots on the ground”).

• Current enemy situation. Include current enemy tactics and practices, incidents, and experiences of enemy operations.

• Current tactics, techniques, and procedures and best practices used by the outgoing unit.

• Changes in the operational environment that have taken place during the deployment of the current unit.

• Day to day functional schedule of the staff and subordinate staffs:
  ° Battle rhythm
  ° Reporting schedules
  ° Briefing schedules
Battle tracking methodology

Daily information requirements (lower and higher)

- Any additional or different staffing requirements and duties that your unit must fill prior to deploying, including liaison officer requirements.

- Policies and practices for dealing with contractors working on the forward operating base (FOB) (U.S., local nationals, and third country nationals).

- Support relationships (especially with contract support).

- Intelligence resources available from assets external to the unit.

- Answers for all RFIs or arrangements to get follow-up information.

Personnel should bring back the following from the PDSS:

- Current operations summary and intelligence summary with operational maps/overlays.

- Copies of all standing operating procedures, report formats, and standardized briefing formats, digitally if possible.

- Maps/drawings of the FOB and digital pictures of the facilities, if possible.

- A list of stay-behind or theater-provided equipment, materials, and supplies that will pass from the outgoing unit to your unit. Include maintenance status and identify any equipment shortfalls.

- Continuity books for each staff section.

Relief in Place Planning

A good PDSS followed by continuous communication and information sharing contribute to a successful relief in place (RIP)/TOA. Planning for the RIP/TOA should begin just after the PDSS (or about 90 days out). During the planning, the staff needs to do a good troops-to-task evaluation to ensure that the correct staff members with the right staff skills are employed in the RIP.
Section II: Staff Predeployment Training

“TOC operations was the most important staff training we accomplished in predeployment”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

The end state of staff predeployment training is a seamless assumption of staff responsibility within the area of operations. When properly executed, the unit going through predeployment training assumes the deployed commander’s overall plan.

Key Staff Tasks

The survey identified the following key staff tasks as essential to mission execution in the first 100 days of deployment:

- Tactical operations center (TOC) operations:
  - Battle rhythm and reporting
  - Battle drills and standing operating procedures (SOPs)
  - Orders development
- Battle tracking
- Targeting cycle
- Military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and staff integration
- Intelligence collection
- Command and control systems integration (Command Post of the Future, Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Blue Force Tracker, etc.)

Predeployment Training

Keys to effective predeployment training program:

- Immediate actions upon receiving the deployment order. At receipt of a deployment order, many significant transactions should occur immediately between the deployed unit and deploying unit:
  - As soon as possible, establish contact with the unit in country. The unit going through predeployment training needs to receive the outgoing unit’s staff assessment of the current operational situations and tactical tasks, the area of operations, and the enemy.
  - This information should drive the training plan and prepare the staff for its deployment. Establishing this early planning and
sharing of information will ensure continuity and unity of effort as the commander and staff prepare for deployment.

- Initially, accept what products and tactics, techniques, and procedures the currently deployed unit provided during the predeployment site survey and then build from there.

- Study this initial information carefully, noting differences in your unit’s resources, organizational structure, and functions. Consider how your staff will adjust to compensate for these differences.

- Replicate the operational environment during predeployment training. Begin by building a TOC within the current garrison headquarters’ building. Replace the standard staff geometry (compartmented by staff sections) with a unit TOC. Have the staff configure the unit’s garrison headquarters to mirror the field command posts in form and function:

  - Find a large, open room or a number of adjacent offices in which to locate the TOC. Convert this area into a facsimile of a field command post (using tactical SOPs and faces, places, systems, and displays, including Secret Internet Protocol Router [SIPR] connectivity). Make the headquarters the TOC for sustained operations.

  - Organize the staff around functional operations rather than separating it into different offices or cubicles. For example, position the S3 Battle Captains’ desks next to the battalion S2’s desk.

  - Practice the staff MDMP; identify steps that can be abbreviated when a hasty MDMP is needed.

  - Functions or systems that are not organic or unmanned should be left empty as visible, continual reminders of that gap in capability and “who else needs to know.”

  - Begin to build the staff and headquarters battle rhythm and reporting schedule. The staff can begin to conduct commander updates using a battle update briefing format.

  - Adapt current staff SOPs to this environment or develop new ones. This is a good time to design and implement staff tools, aids, and data-tracking products. Adapt the battle tracking tools/formats used by the unit you will replace to track predeployment preparations.

  - Look for ways/means to immerse the staff (especially intelligence, current operations, and staff planners) in the on-going operations conducted in theater. Use your staff to conduct “long-range” planning for the unit presently operating in the area your unit will assume (they retain the close-in fight). This arrangement allows the commander and staff to avoid stove piping and to train as they will fight in the upcoming deployment.
• Design realistic and rigorous training events. The predeployment training must be a forcing mechanism for training unit staffs to conduct staff planning and execution within the current operating environment. All battalion-level commanders require an external evaluation. Brigade headquarters requires a Battle Command Training Program-type command post exercise:

  º Train-up exercises should immerse the commander and the staff in the counterinsurgency (COIN) environment and the actual operational environment. If possible, connect via SIPR to the current unit to enable the staff to coordinate, fuse intelligence, and obtain situational awareness in the area where it will fight.

  º Significant battalion staff functions such as pattern analysis, intelligence-driven operations, area of operation development, and engagement strategies should be included in the exercise design.

  º During train-up, commanders and staffs must visualize their systems of meetings, attendees, products, and formats in a manner similar to the MDMP or targeting drills. After these systems are identified, form the staff teams/working groups and practice formatting and developing products.

  º Train-up scenarios must focus on training company/troop leaders on information collection, collation, and dissemination.

  º Other governmental agency role players must be replicated by representative role players.

  º Use a scripted and Joint Master Scenario Event List (JMSEL)-driven exercise. Base JMSEL events on actual recent message traffic to replicate the environment.

• Integrate brigade and battalion staff operations. Use this time to integrate requirements from the brigade staff to the battalion staffs. Pay particular attention to:

  º The difference between size and functions of the brigade staff compared to the battalion staffs. The brigade can easily overwhelm the battalion staffs with requirements.

  º The unique challenge of operating a battalion in a COIN environment. Many functions, such as nonlethal effects coordination, civil affairs, information operations, and increased intelligence analysis workload migrate to the battalion staffs.

  º Information requirements placed on the battalion in order to keep the volume of requests manageable. Eliminate overlapping or redundant reporting and consolidate information in existing reports. Have the brigade staff share information from the existing battalion reports.
Augmenting battalion staffs with additional skilled personnel from the brigade staff, such as engineer, civil affairs, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and contracting officers.

The immense volume of reporting requirements, both internal and external. Consider that the number and types of sources providing and requesting information may double or triple.

Train rear detachment headquarters and staff. Early in the predeployment process, build the rear detachment team with a quality staff. Remember that the rear detachment is important to the success of your mission. A brigade’s rear detachment staff should be equal to other battalion staffs, with a clear chain of command and unit identity:

Stand up the rear detachment headquarters at the same time you convert the headquarters to a TOC footing.

Use the rear detachment staff as a rear command post. Assign all administrative predeployment tasks and missions to the rear detachment headquarters to include all the tasks required to get the unit off the installation. Have the rear headquarters battle track these requirements.

Replicate the deployment conditions and ensure the rear detachment headquarters and staff train and exercise the systems necessary to succeed once the unit departs home station. (The brigade and battalion staffs will have limited contact with the rear detachment staff once the unit deploys).

Include the rear detachment staff when building your battle rhythm and battle tracking.

Include the rear detachment headquarters in the brigade mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). Use the time between the MRE and deployment to correct identified deficiencies.

Plan to conduct training events simultaneously. Brigade-size units should plan to conduct coordinated simultaneous training events and predeployment activities to ensure successful predeployment operations. Major events that must be planned and coordinated simultaneously include:

Organizing the battalions and brigade for combat.

Unit personnel fills and Soldier readiness processing.

Equipment maintenance and preparing for deployment.

Getting Soldiers and units validated for deployment.

Developing and publishing the deployment order and operations plan.

Refining rear detachment and Family Readiness Group structures and responsibilities.
Section III: Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority

“Establishment of [early] contact with your replacement [unit] ensures a successful RIP/TOA. We were in contact with them as our footprint changed, and any other major issues/concerns that occurred that would impact them.”

Command Sergeant Major

The relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) process can make or break the first 100 days of a unit’s rotation. An effective RIP/TOA eases the transition between units and allows the staff to adapt to the operational environment and the unit to prepare to execute combat tasks and missions. Every rotation is different; therefore, every RIP/TOA transition is unique; do not short-change the process.

The incoming and outgoing staffs must meticulously plan RIP activities and designate responsibilities. The finished plan should consist of a detailed list of tasks to accomplish.

The commander should consider sending some of the key primary staff forward early (with the advanced echelon). The S2, S3, and S4 can begin the preliminary work for the execution of the RIP before the remainder of the staff and the subordinate headquarters arrive.

Conducting the Relief in Place

Most transitions span a ten- to fourteen-day period; however, the more time your unit and the outgoing unit can spend together the better. The staff must make the best use of the time available for the RIP and both staffs should strive to make the RIP successful. The incoming unit staff must discard any perception that it is better or smarter that the staff it is replacing or that staff members “know it all.” The standing operating procedures (SOPs) and continuity books obtained during the predeployment site survey will assist the incoming staff in adapting to day-to-day requirements. The outgoing staff must make every effort to answer all requests for information from the incoming staff.

The outgoing staff must get the new staff up to speed. The outgoing staff should be wary of distractions, especially the desire to “get out of Dodge.” Take the time and make the effort to do this right. The success of the mission and the well-being of Soldiers depend on it!

Both staffs should work side by side during the transition period (the left seat/right seat ride). The incoming staff should assume responsibility for the daily operations as soon as feasible; the outgoing staff should conduct the “over-the-shoulder” watch. During this initial period, concentrate on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and SOPs that are working and adapt them to your unit. A longer RIP process provides more time for the incoming staff to become comfortable with implementing the existing SOPs. Avoid changing the existing SOPs and TTP until after your staff has had several weeks to settle in. After a considered evaluation as to why changes are needed, adjust them as needed. When feasible, the outgoing
unit should leave in place all computers/software/databases. In the first few weeks after the TOA, the “status quo” is usually the best policy.

Inventory equipment and transfer accountability for material that stays in place. Work the process between the staffs before the incoming unit deploys. The outgoing staff cannot clear the operational theater until it completes this process.

RIP is the time for the outgoing unit leaders to introduce the incoming unit leaders to the local community leaders they deal with on a routine basis. This practice helps avoid breaks in the intelligence networks developed over the time by the outgoing unit and will reduce the time the citizens need to build their trust in you after the old unit departs.

The outgoing unit leadership should not hide any shortcomings in its conduct of operations. The incoming unit will discover any faults in time anyway. Do not try to mask the bad news or avoid the discussion of any “unfinished business.” If there are problems, inform the incoming unit leadership. It may save someone’s life!

TOA should occur at the point when:

- The incoming staff has established the battle rhythm.
- The incoming staff has effective battle tracking and good operational awareness of the area of operations (AO).
- The incoming staff is comfortable with SOPs and staff TTP.
- A liaison is established with higher and adjacent headquarter and other agencies as required.
- Supply accountability is transferred to incoming staff.
- Support relationships are in place (including contractor support).

Signs of potentially ineffective RIP:

- Outgoing unit is focused on going home rather than completing an effective RIP process.
- The process is rushed or allocated insufficient time to complete.
- Key personnel (incoming or outgoing) are not present during the RIP activities.
- The outgoing unit is slow to answer or ignores requests for information or provides irrelevant information.
- Operational summaries (OPSUMs), intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), and significant activities (SIGACTs) are not up to date.
- Execution of RIP/TOA is disorganized, not synchronized with higher command and subordinates, or skips key steps.
The outgoing staff does not provide an “over the shoulder look” of the incoming staff.

The outgoing staff offers false reassurances that “you can handle it” even if something is not covered in the transition.

Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority Guides

Use the following guides to help plan and conduct your RIP/TOA. They are not intended to dictate exactly how your staff conducts the RIP/TOA, nor are these guides all-inclusive. Use these as staff guides in building the battalion and brigade RIP checklists that are specific to your mission.

When planning the RIP, be sure to read and adhere to the SOPs of your headquarters and its next higher headquarters. If it is available, get a copy of the outbound unit RIP/TOA after-action review, which should suggest areas that you must include in the transition.

The information included here will assist the commander and staff in putting together an effective RIP so that your unit is ready to take charge of the mission at the TOA. The guides list a task and standard for each of the RIP areas concerned. These guides also support reporting with a tracking methodology (Go-No Go, Red-Amber-Green). The staff can use these to preload tasks and issues for the RIP process.

Split the time available equally for your RIP. During the first half, the outgoing unit leads and the incoming unit observes. Mid-way through the process, the outgoing unit switches seats with the incoming unit, and the incoming unit works through the process. Right seat leads, left seat observes.
**Operational Overview Briefs (All Staff)**

**Staff preparation:** Both staffs have copies of the existing written guidance and policy letters and operational and tactical maps of the operational environment.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff conducts operational overview brief to incoming staff members.
- Outgoing staff highlights types of missions and roles performed with incoming staff.
- Outgoing staff highlights location and contact numbers for other U.S. and NATO forces operating within the area.
- Outgoing staff highlights location, activity, and contact numbers (if known) for other U.S., NATO, and other nonmilitary agencies operating within the area.
- Incoming staff receives copies of all briefings, operations orders, and fragmentary orders from the last 60 days.
- Incoming staff understands location and boundaries of adjacent U.S. and NATO forces operating within its AO.
- Incoming staff members complete question and answer periods with outgoing staff members following all briefings.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff is oriented on all aspects of current operations within its operational environment.
Standing Operating Procedure, Battle Rhythm, and Battle Drill Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (All Staff)

Staff preparation: Incoming staff has all units’ tactical SOPs, special (section) SOPs, staff battle drill (TTP), and reporting requirements to higher headquarters.

Tasks:
- Outgoing staff executes SOP orientation brief to incoming staff members (by section).
- Incoming staff personnel learn SOP requirements during the “left-seat ride” portion and implement SOP requirements during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming staff members adapt to outgoing staff’s battle rhythm (standard meeting and reporting schedule) during the “left-seat ride” portion and incorporate this into their battle rhythm during “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Outgoing staff briefs tactical TTP and battle drills used and refined over the length of its tour, to include:
  - Vehicle load plans.
  - Pre-setting frequencies in communications equipment.
  - Monitoring different communications nets while mounted and dismounted.
  - Damaged vehicle security and recovery.
  - Landing zone security in event of aerial medical evacuation.
  - Over watch of discovered or suspected improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
  - Receiving reports and battle tracking.
  - Reporting to staff tactical operations center (TOC) during operations.
- Incoming staff observes the execution of staff TTP and battle drills by outgoing staff during the “left-seat ride” portion of RIP.
- Incoming staff incorporates and further refines learned staff TTP and battle drills during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.

End state: Incoming staff has established a battle rhythm and incorporated existing SOPs and TTP in its staff functions.
Area of Operations (AO) Orientation and Reconnaissance (Executive Officer [XO], S2, S2X, S3, S7, S9, and Chaplain)

Staff preparation: Outgoing staff plans and leads the AO reconnaissance. The incoming staff has the current OPSUM and situational maps and photographs for situational awareness.

Tasks:
- Incoming staff receives operational overview brief from outgoing staff prior to reconnaissance of the AO.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on all key tribal and religious demographics prior to conducting the reconnaissance.
- Incoming staff has knowledge of friendly situation, to include locations and actions of active combat patrols and combat logistics patrols within AO.
- Outgoing and incoming staff execute reconnaissance of key terrain and key infrastructure facilities within the AO.
- Incoming staff possesses situational awareness and understanding of key terrain, key infrastructure facilities, key government facilities, and religious sites located within its AO.
- Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on prominent local nationals within the AO (known tribal, religious, political, police, and military leaders) friendly to U.S. and coalition forces.
- Outgoing staff provides a list of points of contact and phone numbers.
- Incoming commander and key staff members are introduced to prominent local leaders when and where possible.
- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on local nationals that are suspected of directly supporting insurgent or criminal groups within AO.

End state: At TOA, incoming staff members have conducted a reconnaissance of key physical terrain, key infrastructure, key facilities, and influential leaders within AO.
AO Intelligence Review (S2, S2X, S3, S7, S9, and Chaplain)

**Staff preparation**: Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with the current OPSUMs, INTSUMs, and SIGACTs for the last 60 days.

**Tasks**:
- Outgoing staff briefs the current INTSUMs and SIGACTS.
- Outgoing staff briefs threat groups, affiliations, and persons of interest suspected of being involved in insurgent activity.
- Outgoing staff briefs insurgent and criminal activity in AO during past 60 days.
- Incoming staff understands predominant insurgent tactics used within AO.
- Incoming staff understands location of all areas where enemy activity is high.

**End state**: At TOA, incoming staff has situational understanding of all insurgent and criminal activity within AO during the past 60 days.
### Intelligence Exploitation Review
(S2, S2X, S3 [Battle Captain], S7, and Chaplain)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with a list of the current intelligence operations and assets operating within its AO.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on organic and available intelligence systems including the process for attaining intelligence and/or collection support from adjacent and higher headquarters’ assets.

- Incoming unit understands all current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity in the AO.

- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on available sources of and how to request best practices to leverage imagery products.

- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on available sources of:
  - Signals intelligence products and cell phone exploitation procedures.
  - Computer exploitation procedures.

- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on current human intelligence operations, (passive collections and every Soldier is a sensor).

- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on the process for targeting and target folder development.

- Incoming staff observes reporting and tracking of enemy activity in AO by outgoing staff during the “left-seat ride” portion and implements method during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.

- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on intelligence support to its information operations (IO). Incoming staff assumes support to IO during the “right-seat ride” portion of RIP.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff understands all of the present intelligence exploitation processes and intelligence activities in its AO.
## Detainee Operations (S2, S2X, S3, Military Police Platoon Leader)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with its SOP and TTP for processing detainees.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on its detainee operations:
  - Rules for determining who to take as a detainee
  - Procedures for collecting evidence and maintaining the chain of custody
  - Rules for tactical questioning and who conducts interrogations
  - Procedures for tracking detainee information
- Outgoing staff instructs incoming staff on its procedures for using biometrics tools (enrolling detainee, screening locals, and transferring data to higher headquarters).
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on the current be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) for persons of interest and high-value target lists.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on evacuation timeline requirements in theater, location of the internment facilities, and procedures for detainee transfer. Incoming staff must demonstrate understanding during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on the procedures for evacuating detainees needing medical treatment at the time of capture. Incoming staff must demonstrate understanding during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Incoming staff assumes control of detainee operations during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.

**End state:** At TOA, incoming staff has control of the detainee operations within the AO.
Personnel Operations (S1)

Staff preparation: Outgoing staff provides the incoming staff with the higher headquarters’ SOP and policy letters (awards, evaluations, reports, personnel actions, etc.).

Tasks:
- Outgoing staff briefs incoming staff on higher headquarters’ and supporting headquarters’ SOPs, policies, and TTP for personnel actions.
- Incoming unit understands all theater policies for forms and publication management, official mail, and Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act and Congressional inquiries.
- Incoming staff understands the process and requirements for personnel accountability and strength reporting in theater and demonstrates this knowledge during the “right-seat ride” portion of the RIP.
- Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on responsibilities for casualty correspondence (letters of sympathy and condolence).
- Incoming staff understands the procedures for reporting casualties, tracking status through evacuation, and recovery and evacuation of personal effects.
- Incoming staff understands the theater replacement operations process.
- Outgoing staff instructs the incoming staff on local policies for conducting public affairs operations.
- Incoming staff understands how to obtain external legal affairs support to include service transfers, line of duty investigations, conscientious objector processing, summary court officer appointments, and military justice.
- Incoming staff understands the postal operations process.
- Incoming staff takes over all personnel actions and stay-behind military records.

End state: At TOA, incoming staff has assumed control of human resources core missions and actions.
### Conduct Property Inventories and Physical Property Transfer of Stay-Behind Equipment (Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and Theater-Provided Equipment)

**S4, Property Book Officer, Hand Receipt Holders**

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing staff has all installation and organizational property hand receipts and shortage annexes on hand. All applicable technical manuals are available for reference.

**Tasks:**

- Outgoing staff has all identified shortages on a valid requisition and provides the document numbers to the incoming staff.
- Both staffs conducting inventories have copies of the hand receipts and shortage annexes prior to beginning the inventory.
- Outgoing units lay out 100 percent of the equipment for inspection and inventory. Incoming and outgoing staffs complete a joint inventory of all equipment (by serial number, where applicable).
- Both staffs verify serial numbers of all sensitive items.
- Outgoing staff initiates reports of survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.
- Incoming staff verifies and signs installation and organizational hand receipt and takes physical possession of all equipment.
- Incoming staff submits hand receipt paperwork to property book team in sector in accordance with applicable policy directives.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming staff has conducted a 100 percent inventory, accounted for (by serial number where required), signed for, and possesses 100 percent of all designated stay-behind equipment (SBE) with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Conduct Installation Property Transfer (S4, Property Book Officer)

Staff preparation: Outgoing staff provides the installation property hand receipt with all shortage annexes. Applicable owner’s manuals and operating manuals are available to the staff for reference.

Tasks:
- Outgoing staff provides incoming staff with any owner’s manuals or product components’ listings for off-the-shelf items.
- Outgoing staff personnel have 100 percent of the equipment laid out or have identified the equipment’s location (if item cannot be disconnected) prior to the inventory.
- Both incoming and outgoing staffs complete the joint inventory of all equipment (by serial number, where applicable).
- Outgoing staff initiates reports of survey based on discrepancies found during the joint inventory.
- Incoming staff verifies and signs installation hand receipt and provides copies to installation property book team in sector and takes physical possession of all installation property.

End state: Prior to TOA, incoming staff has conducted a 100 percent inventory, accounted for (by serial number where required), signed for, and possesses 100 percent of all installation property with valid shortage annexes and requisitions for missing items.
Maintenance Program for Stay Behind Equipment  
(XO, Maintenance Officer)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing maintenance staff has provided all valid Department of the Army Form 5988, *Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet*, to the incoming staff. Outgoing maintenance staff provides all technical manuals to the incoming maintenance staff.

**Tasks:**
- Outgoing and incoming staff conduct joint preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).
- Outgoing staff briefs process for maintenance and repair at the direct support maintenance level, and incoming maintenance staff understands how to contact the direct support maintenance activity.
- Outgoing staff conducts orientation visit to external maintenance facilities (i.e., contract maintenance support and/or U.S. staff maintenance collection point) and receives points of contact for scheduling maintenance repair to vehicles, radios, and weapons.
- Outgoing maintenance staff briefs incoming maintenance staff on the current periodic services schedule for SBE.
- Incoming staff establishes necessary maintenance accounts and verifies equipment in Unit Level Logistics System-Ground.
- Outgoing staff briefs service data for all ancillary equipment (weapons, communications equipment, and night vision goggles).
- Incoming staff understands method of reporting battle losses and requisitioning replacement equipment.
- Incoming staff assumes maintenance mission.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming maintenance staff has conducted a 100 percent PMCS on all SBE, understands the procedures for external maintenance support, and has assumed maintenance mission.
Religious Support Program (Religious Support Team)

**Staff preparation:** Outgoing chaplain and chaplain assistant have provided incoming chaplain and chaplain assistant with the current religious support summary and all SIGACTs for the last 60 days.

**Tasks:**

- Review and transfer battle book.
- Review operations orders and fragmentary orders.
- Review command and religious support reports.
- Reconnaissance forward operating bases, medical treatment facilities, morgues, and chapels.
- Rehearse mass casualty plans.
- Transfer worship service coverage.
- Transfer casualty ministry coverage.
- Transfer property and hand receipts.
- Transfer morgue ministry.
- Review memorial service SOP.
- Review religions coverage plan.
- Review advising the commander and staff products.
- Review military decisionmaking process products.
- Meet leaders of civil-military operations.
- Meet leaders of information operations and psychological operations.
- Participate on operational planning boards and cells.
- Participate in operations and situational update briefings.
- Meet key religious leaders.
- Review religious leader liaison materials and products.
- Review environmental leave, suicide, and reunion briefings.
- Review funding procedures.
- Review religious support team travel and security procedures.
- Conduct TOA.

**End state:** Prior to TOA, incoming chaplain and chaplain assistant have a thorough knowledge of the command’s religious support program and key religious leader points of contact and are integrated into the staff decision-making process.
Section IV: Intelligence

“We had every patrol come and debrief the battalion S2. We equipped every patrol with IRs and IO messages to discuss with people they met.”

Major, Battalion Executive Officer

Discussions with commanders and staff reveal several common trends. Recurring topics included the importance of human intelligence (HUMINT) and every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2), as well as the need to develop detailed means and methods of pre-briefing and debriefing all operations, the need to disseminate information quickly and accurately both up and down, and the need to quickly identify actionable intelligence and integrate it into operations. Understanding, training for, and incorporating these concepts into operations during predeployment and the initial phases of deployment will streamline organizational adjustments and enable commanders and staffs to be effective in the initial phases of the unit’s operational deployment. Consideration of these ideas and concepts will aid commanders and staffs in the collection and analysis of data that build a picture of enemy capabilities and sometimes predict enemy actions.

In a counterinsurgency (COIN) operating environment, the very nature of the enemy dilutes the capacity of many of the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) technical means for collection. Insurgents use the cover of everyday life and the people to mask their activities. Therefore, high-tech means for collection give way to basic HUMINT collection at the battalion and brigade level.

Battalion and Brigade Intelligence Staff Sections

The survey indicated many S2 sections were not prepared for the volume of intelligence generated in a COIN environment. The volume of HUMINT reports, the infusion of automated information management systems (Force XXI battle command—brigade and below, Command Post of the Future, All Source Analysis System, etc.) coupled with information from higher sources, detainee debriefings, and informer walk-in information can and will quickly overwhelm the intelligence staff section. The surveys recommended a range of measures S2 sections used to help meet this challenge:

- Augmenting the S2 section with “non-intelligence” Soldiers. The non-intelligence Soldiers selected had to possess the necessary metal aptitude and skill sets and have good critical thinking skills. Rank is less important than skill. Augmentation was usually “out-of-hide” from within the unit’s headquarters

- Company-level intelligence officers (or sections). Units developed company-level intelligence sections, very often using the fire support officer. The company intelligence teams augmented the S2 by doing most of the up-front work for HUMINT collection (with their Soldiers on the ground) and by working with the S2 to disseminate intelligence.
Refining intelligence. Better understanding the commander’s critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements allows the S2 to focus the efforts of the section and reduce the number of specific items of information the section must track.

Automated systems. Using automated information storage for later analysis and building tools, such as simple spreadsheets, assists the analysis process.

Cross training. Cross training the members of the S2 section in the skills of others allows the section to provide 24-hour operations.

Before deployment, be sure the intelligence officer (section) understands the basic intelligence functions of battle tracking, pattern analysis, and debriefing. Link these company intelligence officers with the battalion S-2 before deployment.

Human Intelligence and Every Soldier is a Sensor

Basic HUMINT collection is the business of every Soldier who walks a patrol, moves in a convoy, or occupies a checkpoint. Every Soldier, regardless of his military occupational specialty or duty position, has a part to play in gathering information for use by intelligence analysts. This concept is the essence of “Every Soldier is a Sensor,” commonly referred to as ES2. Every commander should constantly reinforce the ES2 concept with his Soldiers. As part of your ES2 training, require Soldiers to be competent in techniques for gaining situational awareness within the area of operations.

The S2 supports this effort by providing every convoy and every Soldier that moves outside the wire the information requirements. Staffs must develop ways to provide Soldiers with the most updated information available and develop systems to debrief, collect, consolidate, and analyze information derived from ES2. The S2 should subsequently debrief every patrol, conduct analysis for actionable intelligence returned to the company, and pass information attained from the patrol up the chain to the next higher headquarters.

Every mission is a source of information. Every mission should end with a written “patrol report.” Patrol leaders and convoy commanders are responsible for preparing this report. Patrol members should put the information collected into a written patrol report. These reports form the basis for the S2’s analysis of intelligence for immediate action and the trends the S2 forwards to the next level intelligence fusion section.

Information Dissemination

Another area addressed repeatedly in the survey was the need to disseminate information quickly and accurately. Respondents identified many methods and techniques; however, whatever methods the unit uses should ensure the timely and accurate dissemination of information. Some methods identified in the survey include the following:

- Battle update brief
- Daily intelligence update
• Synchronization meeting
• Morning update brief
• Daily staff update
• Back briefs:
  ° Guard force
  ° Quick reaction force
  ° Contract workers
  ° Patrols
• Daily report
• Shift change briefing
• Detailed prebriefings and debriefings before and after every operation

**Integrating Actionable Intelligence into Operations**

The survey results also clearly articulated the need for intelligence to drive operations and the necessity of quickly transforming raw information into actionable intelligence. Commanders and staffs must understand and capitalize on the fact that Soldiers on patrols and convoys are the best collectors of intelligence. The S2 staff, working with the company intelligence officers, must have an effective mechanism for recording this information, analyzing it for actionable items, and getting it to both the companies and the higher headquarters.

For example: A patrol brings back documents or equipment found in a cache. The S2 section evacuates these to an exploitation cell that returns a set of fingerprints in the form of biometric data. A follow-up cordon and knock operation near the cache and the proper use of biometrics equipment produce a matching set of fingerprints from a detainee. Thorough tactical questioning of the detainee produces a name and a meeting location. A surveillance operation of the meeting location produces further intelligence and a subsequent raid, which produces more intelligence and evidence.
Section V: Battle Tracking

“Electronic status board used Excel spread sheet to track all ongoing missions from pre-execution through post execution shared via SIPRNET with all primary and secondary staff, company commanders, ISGs, and company OPS NCOs. Status updated by battle captains as required or at least hourly.”

Lieutenant Colonel, Commander

Battle tracking is not easy, and staffs learn best by doing. The commander depends on the staff for accurate information; the staff must be able to provide near accurate information all the time and access to assets that can influence the fight as it develops. There is not much room for error in battle tracking; the commander needs precise and complete information to prevent misfortune.

The commander relies on the staff to fill that critical role in tracking the day-to-day operations of the battalion and brigade and his units’ operations and force status. A lot is riding on how well the staff performs its tasks in battle tracking. The information the staff provides enhances situational awareness for the commander. The better the commander’s situational awareness, the better his situational understanding, and the easier it is for him to make correct command decisions.

Communication

Communication is the most important thing in battle tracking, and staffs cannot function without effective communication with their subordinates and their higher headquarters. In the survey, staff officers and noncommissioned officers say there are still times when units are allowed to go “outside the wire” with minimal communications. Communication is the only link to pass on reports and information that are critical to mission success. The staff must establish redundant communication means for every mission.

Staffs must take steps to ensure that what is reported to them and what they report to the next higher headquarters are accurate and timely. Any first report is usually sketchy, may be missing key elements of information, or may be out right wrong. Treat any initial report as a “contact report” that will have some truth but is often incomplete. The staff should follow up this contact report with a second report once it verifies the information and sorts out the details. In this way, the staff mitigates the possibility of reporting confusing or conflicting information.

Tracking Execution of Tasks and Operations

The staff must have its own form of a current operation tracker that allows anyone to see what happened and what is currently going on. Most staffs used a simple matrix table with units listed on one side and events and actions listed on another side. This simple but effective matrix works and is applicable to manual (paper and pencil) and automated displays of information.

As in any battalion mission, sometimes the commander or staff officer may get distracted by events in one of the sectors and lose track of the others. A current
operation tracker allows them to reference anything they might have forgotten or missed. Other key personnel can familiarize themselves with events as they occur without requiring a staff member to give them a rundown of current events.

The current mission tracker allows the staff to cross-reference current reports with earlier reports and get clarification on any report as the situation develops. This tracking tool paints a picture of the situation on the ground as reported by the maneuver units. Later, the staff can use this tracker for an after-action review to help identify what went well and what needs improvement.

**Tracking Requirements**

This section provides the commander with a list of the tracking requirements presently being used in active combat theaters. This list is not an all-inclusive menu but can be a guide for the commander and his staff to use in preparing for operations. Each commander should tailor this list to his specific operational requirements, deleting or adding items as necessary.

Commanders and staffs should track the following:

- Serious incident reports:
  - Death or serious injury of a NATO servicemember
  - Any report of a NATO servicemember missing in action
  - Death of or life-threatening injury to a Department of Defense contractor, Afghan official, or Afghan soldier or policeman
  - The crash, hard landing, or precautionary landing of a NATO aircraft in the area of responsibility
  - Any aircraft mishap
  - Serious injury to or death of a detainee in custody
  - Unauthorized or unaccredited media in the unit area of operations
  - Rule of engagement (ROE) violation or human rights violation or any engagement where there is a question about ROE application
  - Escalation-of-force (EOF) incidents that result in local national (LN) injury or property damage.
  - Behavior by unit personnel that discredits the U.S.
  - Any alcohol or drug-related incident or any allegations of sexual misconduct by Soldiers
  - Any incident that creates negative media
  - Allegations of war crimes against NATO forces or Afghan security forces
Negligent discharge of a weapon

Loss of communications with any element

Injury or death of a LN to NATO action

Injury or death of a LN through insurgent actions

Hostile contact between LNs

Breach of the perimeter of any NATO installation

Loss of a sensitive item or communications security compromise

U.S. forces vehicle, equipment, or property damage in excess of $2000

Incapacitation of any leader, staff sergeant or above

Any action against top ten high-value individuals

Commitment of the quick reaction force (QRF) or reserve forces

Three or more Soldiers wounded in the same incident

Reports of potential riots or demonstrations by 200 or more LNs

Any attack by Taliban forces against essential services

Any confirmed involvement of Afghan National Army or civil authorities in illegal activities, to include Taliban actions, black marketeering, or sectarian violence

Border crossing incidents

**Significant activities (military):**

- Apprehension or release of detainees
- Employment or change in status of any QRF
- Direct or indirect fire incidents
- Ordnance release by aircraft
- Movement of enemy personnel against NATO forces
- Location of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO)
- Reports of possible improvised explosive device (IED) locations
- Any IED detonation
- Reports of successful psychological operations
° Reports on the status of routes within the area of operations
° Main supply routes and lines of communication locations
° Emergency resupply requests
° Sniper engagements, both friendly and enemy
° Location of captured enemy vehicles, caches, vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), and personnel
° Any change in graphic control measures
° Change in supporting military hospital bed status

• Current operations:
° Results from missions conducted during the past 24 hours
° Planned missions for the next 24 hours
° Enemy situation update
° Weather report and weather affecting mission execution
° Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and aviation support (direct support and general support)
° Status of enabler support to include attack aviation, Tactical Unmanned Aerial System [UAS], close air support, and artillery assets/gun status
° Cross-boundary issues for combined and temporary operating areas
° Special operation forces operating in the area of operations
° Airspace deconfliction (restricted operating zone issues)
° Airspace clearance for controlled detonations
° Fragmentary orders received from higher
° “Green 2s” (weapon accountability reports) received and sent
° Preparation of daily operations summary
° Preparation of daily commander’s battle update brief
° Information for division and corps requests for information
° Priority set for UAS coverage
- Evaluation and processing of mosque and sensitive-site entry requests
- Process and creation of storyboards and specific mission operational summaries
- Hot spots found by fixed-wing assets
- Threat tips passed to subordinate units

• Enemy tracking requirements list:
  - Reports of civilians with video cameras
  - Reports of civilians in possible observation post positions using cell phones or other early warning methods
  - Threatening anti-NATO propaganda
  - Incidents of graffiti and what it means
  - Inter-ethnic clashes
  - Any event in the media that is anti-NATO or anti-Afghanistan government
  - Discovery of enemy propaganda (video, printed matter, digital files)
  - Reports of anti-NATO forces by LN
  - Reports of assemblies, crowds, or rallies (scheduled or unscheduled)
  - Reports of negative perception in the local news media
  - Apprehension or release of detainees
  - Movement of enemy personnel against NATO forces
  - Location of UXO
  - Any IED detonation.
  - Reports on possible IED locations
  - Sniper engagements (both friendly and enemy)
  - Indirect fire attacks, including point of origin and point of impact
  - Hand grenade attacks
  - Location and capture of enemy caches and VBIED factories
- Damage or destruction of completed or ongoing projects
- Disruption of water, power, or sewer service
- Loss of commercial radio or television broadcast capability
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting LN businessmen
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting road and/or bridge infrastructure
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting petroleum infrastructure (pipeline, refinery)
- Threats against or criminal acts targeting any other significant infrastructure facility or object
- Intelligence summary
- Enemy situation update
Section VI: Personnel Recovery

Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of U.S. military, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contractor, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment.

Army component commanders are responsible for PR within their areas of operation (AOs) unless directed otherwise by the joint force commander. Army component, corps, and division commanders establish a personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) to provide PR expertise for coordinating PR missions within their AOs and with other components. Major subordinate commands (brigades and battalions) coordinate PR using the expertise of their respective personnel recovery officers (PROs). PROs perform PRCC-like functions at brigade and below.

At the battalion and brigade level, planning for PR includes the integrated efforts of commanders and staffs, forces available and tasked organized to support PR, and personnel who evade and survive until they are recovered and reintegrated into their unit.

PR planning and preparation begins with the commander’s critical information requirements and the commander’s intent, which enables the vertical and horizontal PR preparation and guides activities for subordinate commanders, staffs, forces, and potential IMDC personnel.

Units must routinely rehearse PR command and control processes and procedures. These rehearsals are essential to successful actions at all levels and the recovery of IMDC personnel.

The first focus of any brigade or battalion PR plan is proactive measures to prevent incidents that result in personnel becoming IMDC. These measures require education, training, and preparation of Soldiers and other U.S. personnel under the control of U.S. forces. Commanders and staffs must integrate capture avoidance techniques into every training scenario. Leaders at all levels are accountable for personnel assigned and attached (including contractors) and other U.S. persons working in their areas (when possible).

The second focus for PR is the recovery of personnel. A well-educated, trained, and prepared force denies its adversaries the opportunity to exploit IMDC personnel for purposes detrimental to the U.S. government or U.S. military forces. Leadership, accountability, force preparation, and executing operations in a synchronized manner are keys to success and risk management.

During the execution phase of a PR mission, units must accomplish five tasks:

- **Report.** This task includes the rapid recognition and notification vertically and horizontally that personnel are suspected or known to be IMDC.
- **Locate.** This task includes actions taken across all sensors to find IMDC personnel.
• Support. This task includes actions taken to sustain IMDC personnel and their Families mentally, physically, and emotionally throughout the five tasks.

• Recover. This task includes employing all capabilities to regain positive and procedural control of IMDC personnel. The Army uses four principal methods to conduct recovery (see below).

• Reintegrate. This task includes immediate medical assessment and appropriate debriefings before returning recovered personnel back to duty and ultimately to their Families.

The Army uses four principal methods when planning and executing military recoveries:

• Immediate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by any Army capability in or adjacent to the area of the isolating event to rapidly locate and recover IMDC personnel using the PR execution tasks.

• Deliberate recovery is the sum of actions conducted by Army forces when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible, unsuccessful, or requires additional Army support.

• External supported recovery is the support provided by the Army to or received from other joint or multinational force components, including interagency organizations.

• Unassisted recovery is the sum of actions taken by IMDC personnel to achieve their own recovery and return to friendly control without assistance.

The ability of the Army to meet its PR responsibilities hinges on leaders at every level preparing their personnel for isolating events and recovering IMDC personnel. Leaders must integrate PR into ongoing planning, preparation, and execution activities as part of every day operations in all environments.

Staff Planning and Integration

The key to effective PR is a well-integrated, fully synchronized, rehearsed plan. Commanders and staffs must integrate existing command and control systems into PR planning, preparation, execution, and assessment at all levels.

The commander’s principal roles in PR are establishing a PR command and support relationship; incorporating PR into his overall intent; delegating PR decision-making authority to the lowest possible level; and allocating adequate resources to plan, prepare, rehearse, and execute PR missions throughout the operating environment.

The staff members perform a pivotal function in planning PR missions by providing the following relevant pieces to the overall brigade or battalion plan:

• S1 provides and sustains a system for immediate personnel accountability information.
• S2 is responsible for specific intelligence on the conditions/locations/or situations where insurgents have the opportunity to take U.S. personnel.

• S3 establishes a PRCC or a PRO that is the PR focal point for planning and execution.

• S4 coordinates and plans for logistical support of PR missions.

• S6 establishes dedicated PR communication nets and frequencies for survival radios and deconflicts frequencies between PR nets and other operations.

• The chaplain plans the religious support to IMDC personnel during reintegration operations.

• The staff judge advocate advises the commander on rules of engagement and their impact on the execution of PR missions.

• The public affairs officer ensures PR information in the public affairs plan does not contradict civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and deception plans.

The PRCC or the PRO is the central point for gathering information from the staff sections into a cohesive plan. During execution of a PR mission, the PRCC and PRO become the focal points to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. The PRCC and PRO are best located in the operations section. While PR normally requires all staff functions for support, it is principally an operations function and responsibility.

Recommended grades for PROs are combat arms E-7s and above with Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information access and intermediate PR skills training. PRO responsibilities include:

• Ensuring reliable communications with subordinate units.

• Coordinating immediate recoveries for units.

• Gathering PR-specific information developed by PRCCs and disseminating information to subordinate units.

• Coordinating for unit fire support coordination measures and control measures.

• Ensuring subordinate units have access to standing operating procedures (SOPs) developed by the PRCC.

• Identifying subordinate unit PR equipment shortfalls to the PRCC.

• Ensuring sufficient evasion aids are available within subordinate units.

A PRCC/PRO SOP establishes procedures and actions required for effective PR missions. PR SOPs should standardize actions between the brigade and the battalions, and to be effective, all Soldiers should understand and rehearse these actions.

Examples of what a PR SOP might cover include:
The collaborative efforts of the entire staff facilitate the collection of relevant PR information so the commander can make effective decisions. Some specific staff duties (not all-inclusive) listed below illustrate how PR is integrated throughout individual staff functions (brigade staff).

### Typical Specific Staff Duties for PR Operations (not all-inclusive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical staff member duties</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>S-1 (Personnel)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain accountability of all forces (military, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, and DA contractors) and information.</td>
<td>Provide accountability information to PR cells and other staff agencies to ensure 100 percent force accountability is maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain a personnel information database.</td>
<td>PR cell requires information on IMDC personnel. This is especially important if the individuals in question did not complete DD Form 1833, Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), or civilian equivalent form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty reporting.</td>
<td>PR cell must be informed of duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN) incidents and casualty reports. Additionally, ongoing IMDC events require support to the Family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze personnel strength data to determine current capabilities and project future requirements. Track the status and location of recovered personnel until they complete the reintegration process.</td>
<td>PR cell might require additional staffing to fulfill assigned responsibilities. Additional maneuver forces may also be required for PR missions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-2 (Intelligence)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Manage intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and integrate IPB efforts with other staff members and echelons.</td>
<td>Support PR planning and execution with PR-specific intelligence planning. Counter-PR capabilities and potential adversary courses of action with respect to IMDC personnel, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and maintain relationships and procedures with other intelligence staffs, units, and organizations.</td>
<td>Provide conduit to other intelligence agencies including theater and national level for collection of PR-specific intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disseminate intelligence.</td>
<td>Ensure PR cell is informed of PR-specific intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store sensitive materials.</td>
<td>Maintain isolated personnel reports and evasion plans of action completed by potential IMDC personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S-3 (Operations)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish operations center.</td>
<td>Establish PR cell. Cell functions as the PR focal point for the commander and staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare, coordinate, and distribute SOPs and plans and orders information management, etc.</td>
<td>Establish IMDC reporting requirements and PR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend task organization of and mission assignment to subordinate elements.</td>
<td>Assist commander in identifying and organizing subordinate units that are PR mission capable. Synchronize all required assets for PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan, coordinate, and supervise training, exercises, and rehearsals.</td>
<td>Include PR training for commanders and staff, recovery units, and individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical staff member duties</td>
<td>PR Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-4 (Logistics)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate with G/S-5 for host nation (HN) support.</td>
<td>Provide conduit for PR cells to coordinate HN support of PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop logistics plan to support operations (with the G/S-3).</td>
<td>Forward arming and refueling point locations, Class III/V availability, and equipment procurement specific to PR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify contracting requirements.</td>
<td>Access to contractor information will be required during an IMDC event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate or provide mortuary affairs.</td>
<td>Ensure information on recovered remains is shared with PR cells (they might be tracking an IMDC individual when that individual is in the mortuary).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| <strong>S-5 (Civil-Military Operations)</strong>         |                |
| Establish and operate the civil-military operations center to maintain liaison with other U.S. governmental agencies, HN civil and military authorities, and nongovernmental and international organizations in the area of operations. | Conduit for PR cells to coordinate support with these agencies. |
| Provide G/S-2 with information gained from civilians in the area of operations and assist the G/S-2 with the analysis of the civil dimension. | Nongovernmental organizations or local civilians may have information related to an IMDC event. This information must be shared with the G/S-2 staff and PR cells. Identify (before an IMDC event occurs) medical facilities and other key structures where IMDC personnel might be taken and held by hostile forces. |
| Coordinate with the public affairs officer and PSYOP officer to ensure that disseminated information is not contradictory. | Ensure PR information in the CA plan does not contradict public affairs, PSYOP, and deception plans. |
| Exercise supervision over attached CA units. | Conduit for PR cells to gather information on possible IMDC events. |</p>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-6 (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide the architecture necessary to collect, process, display, store, and disseminate relevant information to support command and control functions.</td>
<td>Dedicated systems for PR cell computers, communications, software, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate, plan, and direct all command, control, communications, and computer operations support interfaces with joint and multinational forces to include HN support.</td>
<td>Interoperability of these systems is critical across the entire joint force during PR missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that redundant communications means are planned and available to pass time-sensitive information.</td>
<td>PR cell must have alternate systems for collecting and disseminating PR relevant information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage radio frequency allocations and assignments and provide spectrum management.</td>
<td>Dedicated PR communication nets, frequencies for survival radios, and frequency deconfliction between PR nets and other operations nets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S-7 (Information Operations [IO])</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend IO effects to influence adversary perceptions, decisions, and actions.</td>
<td>Integrate PR considerations into PSYOP, deception, and public affairs plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronize and coordinate offensive and defensive IO with the overall operation.</td>
<td>Mislead the enemy about the purpose of recovery operations or mask the capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures of recovery units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate preparation of the IO portions of plans and orders.</td>
<td>Include PR IO actions in the plan or order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate IO with other agencies (such as U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Ambassador).</td>
<td>Conduit for PR cells to gather information from these agencies.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S-8 (Resource Management)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor resource utilization.</td>
<td>Program funding for reintegration activities, PR equipment acquisition, and PR education and training initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulate and justify funding requirements.</td>
<td>Articulate justification for PR funding requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize requirements.</td>
<td>Prioritize PR funding requirements with other command requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop future budgets.</td>
<td>Include PR in future budget formulation.</td>
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<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Surgeon</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), including Army dedicated MEDEVAC platforms (air and ground).</td>
<td>Recovered personnel may require MEDEVAC from the recovery vehicle to a location where definitive medical care is available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate for aeromedical evacuation aircraft.</td>
<td>Recovered personnel may require inter-theater MEDEVAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide health care and support for the force.</td>
<td>Coordinate medical (including psychological) personnel to assist during reintegration of isolated personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalization support of sick, wounded, or injured personnel.</td>
<td>PR cell must know location of available hospital facilities in the event recovered personnel are injured or wounded.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Typical staff member duties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Sergeant Major</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitor unit and enlisted Soldier training (including sergeant’s time training), making corrections as necessary.</td>
<td>Ensure PR training is included in unit enlisted training programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend/coordinate rehearsals.</td>
<td>Ensure IMDC events are evaluated during unit rehearsals.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chaplain</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advise the commander and staff of the impact of the faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations.</td>
<td>Indigenous population reactions to IMDC personnel can be affected by the religious and cultural beliefs of the population. Assess feasibility of utilizing local religious elements to prevent IMDC events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide religious support to hospitalized personnel.</td>
<td>Provide religious support to IMDC during reintegration operations.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)</th>
<th>PR Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide international and operational law assistance, including advice and assistance on implementing the Department of Defense Law Of War Program.</td>
<td>Advise commander on the impact of rules of engagement on PR missions. Assess feasibility of and advise commander on legal use of funds to effect recoveries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personnel Recovery Mission Execution**

During execution, PRCC/PRO must be able to process large quantities of information. Information from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; on-scene observations; and radio communications may be reported at close intervals and via different methods. PRCC/PRO filters and sorts this information to identify and validate PR relevant information into an operating picture focused on the operational PR environment and disseminates this picture to all concerned. Information collected may contain the following:

- Location, intentions, medical condition, and identity of IMDC personnel
- PR training level of IMDC personnel
Tactical situation around IMDC personnel
Communications capabilities of IMDC personnel
Location and capabilities of enemy forces in proximity to IMDC personnel
Location, status, and capabilities of Army forces
Location, status, and capabilities of other component forces
Terrain and weather enroute to and near IMDC personnel
Assets available to execute and or support PR missions

Immediate response to an IMDC situation includes the following:

- Notify through command channels, immediately.
- Begin troop leading procedures for an immediate recovery.
- Seal the area with local ground forces.
- Request additional ground forces for outer perimeter.
- Request aviation assets to prevent vehicles or personnel from leaving area.
- Verify 100 percent personnel accountability.
- Conduct immediate recovery, if feasible.
- Inform PRCC (vertical) and other PROs (horizontal) of situation.
Missing U.S. Personnel Staff Battle Drill

**Situation**
U.S. military person is declared duty status whereabouts unknown (DUSTWUN)

**Triggers:**
1. Service member missing during routine accountability check
2. Media announcement/SIGINT hit of captured U.S. soldier
3. Service member unaccounted for during consolidation after combat action

**CCIR**
1. Is the person legitimately unaccounted for?
2. Last confirmed location and time seen.
3. Is the person isolated/missing?
4. Is the person detained/captured?
5. If detained/captured, are abductors identified?
6. Can we confirm location?

**Effect: Clarify Status; Determine Location; Return Service Member Unharmed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Staff</th>
<th>PRCC/PRO</th>
<th>PAO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Battle CPT</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S2/S2X</td>
<td>S6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Tasks**
- Initiate 100% accountability check
- Initiate focused intelligence and activate HUMINT teams
- Divert aerial assets into over-watch of last known location
- Build IO story line; discourage non-compliant actors from supporting hostage-takers
- Commander develops full situation awareness/understanding
- Neutralize abductors
- Return U.S. personnel safely

**Decision Points**
- IMDC Alive
- Abductors Identified
- Location Known

**Flow Chart**

- Event Occurs
  - Immediate Actions/Brief
  - Review Options
  - SM Alive
    - Yes
    - Status Isolated/Missing
      - Yes
      - Abductor ID'd
        - Yes
        - Execute Recovery Operations
        - No
        - Location Known
          - Yes
          - Execute Rescue Operations
          - No
          - Demand Made
            - Yes
            - Focus Intel
              - Yes
              - Execute Recovery Operations
              - No
              - No
            - No
            - Demand Made
              - Yes
              - Execute Rescue Operations
              - No
              - No
    - No

---

Figure 3-5-1
Decision making during a PR event mirrors the decision-making process used during overall execution. During execution, decision making focuses on the five PR execution tasks and selecting the appropriate recovery method to conduct those tasks based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations coupled with the situational understanding of commanders and staffs. As execution decisions involve routine actions or actions that differ from the plan with minor variance, the immediate recovery method is a course of action suitable to execution decisions.

Continuous assessment is essential during execution. PR execution assessment involves deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes and the current situation. Assessments during execution are often constrained and may dictate immediate changes to the plan. The most important question when assessing execution is whether the existing PR plan is still valid based on the current situation.

Successful PR mission execution requires effective PR information management and communicating that information to those who are in a position to act on it. Successful execution is contingent upon the brigade or battalion having a designated and trained PRO. The PRO must have a useable PR SOP, understand PR doctrine, and have rehearsed contingency plans for PR. PR rehearsals are the most important preparation activities. Practicing PR actions prior to an actual IMDC event is critical to successful PR operations.

Once recovered personnel are back in friendly control and the recovery task is complete, the reintegration task begins. The level of reintegration varies with each recovered person and is specific to his or her experiences during the event. During reintegration, recovered personnel receive medical support required because of the event. If medical evaluations and debriefings indicate that recovered personnel are fit for duty, they are returned to their parent units. If initial debriefings and medical evaluations indicate that further actions are required, recovered personnel are generally transported out of the area of operations for further debriefings and/or medical care. Final reintegration efforts are not complete until recovered personnel are returned to their units and a duty status determination is made.
Chapter 4
Threats

Section I: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and IED-Defeat

“IEDs are proving to be an adaptive and difficult weapon to protect against, and the urban and COIN environments are extremely challenging.”

Captain, Armored Cavalry Troop Commander

The IED Threat

The improvised explosive device (IED) remains a significant threat to Soldiers, mounted or dismounted. IEDs may be simple or sophisticated in their construction, with a variety of triggering devices.

Bomb makers use abandoned military ordnance as the main component of their IEDs. Any enemy bomb-making cell with access to artillery or mortar rounds can put together an IED. The composition of IEDs is expanding and so are the delivery means. IEDs can be mobile (e.g., a car loaded with propane gas tanks) or stationary (e.g., an artillery shell buried along a roadside). The enemy makes every attempt to conceal an emplaced IED in the surrounding environment. The newest insurgent tactics is to combine IED explosive force with a chemical attack by attaching the IED to large toxic chemical containers.

Timers on IEDs are normally used to act as a safe separation barrier. On many occasions, timers will be used to initiate the IED. When used as a barrier, the timer separates the power source from the electric blasting caps to provide the insurgent more safety during emplacement and time to leave an area. This technique permits unskilled emplacers to arm a device with less likelihood of premature detonation.

Command-Initiated IED

Command-wire IEDs use a wire that directly connects the triggerman and the IED. Command-wire IEDs take time for the enemy to emplace. Because of this, the enemy often attempts to emplace command-wire IEDs at night. The wire leading from the device to the firing point may be concealed (although not always). Once the IED is in place, the firing point is fixed. Know your terrain and put yourself in the position of the enemy to determine possible triggerman positions. Expect the enemy to locate in a hidden position (behind an earthen berm or in an abandoned house/building) that may be up to 1,000 meters from the IED location. Recent improvements in this capability include micro-thin wires that make spotting the wire leading to the device very difficult.

Radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs) are the most common variant of command-initiated IEDs currently used by the enemy. A variety of radio-control (RC) devices are used to activate IEDs. Anything that transmits a radio signal can be adapted to function as a triggering device. Examples include modified car alarms, garage-door openers, car-door openers, Motorola hand-held radios, toy car or airplane controllers, wireless doorbells, long-range cordless phones, family radio
system (FRS) radios, and cellular telephones. With time, the enemy has continued to improve device design and construction techniques. RCIEDs also have a reduced signature and can be emplaced more quickly than command-wire IEDs. RC devices give the enemy standoff capability.

**Victim-Operated IED (VOIED)**

VOIEDs include booby traps, pressure strips, passive infrared actuators, and trip wires. The devices have been created as a response to the actions of Soldiers when they encounter IEDs. VOIEDs are often located where Soldiers might easily find them or where Soldiers previously have been observed handling discovered IEDs. VOIEDs also have been placed on less-trafficable roads primarily used by friendly forces. The initiation systems range from the simple pull pin to much more complicated devices, such as passive-infrared-actuated shaped charges.

**Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)**

The potential for a VBIED to employ huge amounts of explosives against a fixed or moving target with catastrophic results makes them one of the most deadly forms of attack. Defense against VBIEDs requires alert Soldiers, good tactics, and constant evaluation of the local situation. VBIEDs are employed either as a stationary attack (a parked car along the roadside) or in a mobile attack with a suicide driver.

Mobile VBIEDs move to the intended target. A common tactic used by insurgents is to park alongside a route and wait for a convoy to pass. The bomber then drives the VBIED into the convoy and detonates it. A variation of this technique is a “straggler” vehicle that drops behind moving civilian traffic. As the patrol/convoy passes the straggler, the vehicle swerves into the patrol and detonates.

Stationary VBIEDs typically occur along convoy/patrol routes. The bomber parks the VBIED on the roadside and initiates the attack as a convoy/patrol passes.

**Directional IED**

Directional IEDs contain explosively formed projectiles/penetrators (EFPs), also referred to as a “self-forging fragment” due to its unique ability to shape itself into a molten-metal slug. EFPs are capable of penetrating the toughest armor in the world, creating catastrophic kills.

**Hoax IED**

The enemy uses hoax IEDs to accomplish two things:

- Observe how Soldiers react to the hoax IED in order to prepare a later attack
- Set up a patrol for an attack in another kill zone.

First, insurgents place the fake device in an easy-to-spot location. Enemy forces watch or videotape the friendly force’s security, command post locations, distances, and explosive ordnance disposal team actions. The enemy reviews this information to identify patterns. When he thinks he can predict the friendly force’s actions, the enemy uses that information to place actual IEDs for an attack. Because the enemy has watched the reaction of previous patrols, he puts genuine IEDs at likely
checkpoints or security locations. After he sets off the genuine IED, the enemy might also attack with shoulder-fired anti-tank (RPG) rockets or small-arms fire.

**IED-Defeat (IEDD) Principles**

Soldiers and units are defeating IED attacks every day as they conduct combat operations and tactical convoys. Over the years, the Army has developed effective IED defeat mechanisms and principles. If you practice these basic principles, you greatly increase your chances of spotting and neutralizing IED attacks. Remember to maintain an offensive mindset and consider every IED attack as enemy contact.

Every enemy bomb maker will use any available components, but he will normally have a preferred technique. Regardless of the construction method used, every IED has five basic components:

- Container
- Power source
- Switch or circuit
- Initiator
- Main charge

The most common containers are:

- Roadside rocks, rubble, or trash
- Old blast craters
- Vehicles
- Concrete curbing
- Concrete (cinder) blocks
- Project boxes
- Guard rails
- Animal carcasses
- Human remains

**IEDD Measures**

Look for IEDs in the following areas:

- In the median, by the shoulder, buried under the surface of any sealed or unsealed road
Be alert for:

- Vehicles following or ahead of your convoy for a long distance and then pulling off to the side of the road.
- Dead animals along the roadways.
- Freshly dug holes or pavement patching on or along the road that may serve as possible IED emplacement sites.
- New dirt, rock, or gravel piles.
- Obstacles and craters in the roadway used to channel the convoy.
- Personnel on overpasses.
- Signals with flare or city lights (switched off/on) as convoy approaches.
- People videotaping ordinary activities or military movements.
- Wires laid out in plain sight.

**IEDD Fundamentals**

1. Maintain an offensive mindset.

2. Develop and maintain situational awareness before the mission begins and maintain it throughout execution. All Soldiers should be observing their sectors and communicating what they see up, down, and laterally. You should continuously ask yourself: “What is the enemy’s most probable course of action?” A common operating picture is a clear understanding of the current situation in all adjacent units’ areas of operation (AOs). You can reduce the risk associated with any situation by increasing your knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces.

3. Avoid setting patterns and predictability. The enemy has demonstrated the capacity to assess unit actions and develop tactics, mitigating the effectiveness of
unit battle drills. You should presume the enemy is watching during all missions. Avoiding repetitious actions will confuse enemy perceptions.

4. Use 360-degree security. This should be a constant consideration for Soldiers and leaders at every level during execution. It is the responsibility of every Soldier to coordinate their left and right limits with the adjacent Soldiers to ensure sectors of scan are always interlocking. As a leader, you should be asking yourself: “How can I cover likely threats?”

5. Maintain your standoff distance. Standoff is essential to correctly distinguishing threats and civilians on the battlefield. It is critical for units to use escalation of force (EOF) effectively. All Soldiers should be asking themselves: “How can I maintain a safe distance?”

6. Keep tactical dispersion. To reduce risk, patrols must maintain as much separation between vehicles and personnel as the situation dictates. You must fight the tendency to close formations during halts.

7. Use armor protection. Armor saves lives. Use it, but do not become tied to it. When the situation allows, take advantage of opportunities to dismount for interaction with civilians or when carrying the fight to the enemy.

8. Use Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) devices. Plan where to position the CREW to defeat RCIED threats during movement and at halts. During planning, consider observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover/concealment, and pattern analysis in order to identify likely threat locations:

   - Maintain tactical intervals to mitigate other existing threats.
   - Use two CREW vehicles in a five-vehicle patrol.
   - When approaching likely attack spots, lead and scan with CREW vehicles.
   - Use CREW vehicle to cover likely attack spots while the remainder of patrol passes.
   - When establishing a security perimeter, place CREW vehicle(s) to cover likely triggerman locations.
   - When cordonning IEDs, position CREW vehicle(s) between likely triggerman location(s) and friendly forces.

CREW systems are effective for countering RCIED attacks. The CREW works to break the electronic link between the IED and the trigger (triggerman). CREW comprises a variety of devices that collectively form a reliable defense against RCIEDs. Because of its sensitive nature, details about the CREW system will be shared with you when you reach the AO. Although there is some disagreement about the reliability of the CREW, proper training and adhering to correct techniques for employing the CREW make the system work. Treat the CREW as a crew-served weapon system.
Section II: Small Arms Fire

“We treated most of our contacts as near ambushes. We took cover and achieved fire superiority, and then maneuvered on the enemy.”

Sergeant, Infantry Platoon

Reacting to Small Arms Attack

If the unit is stationary or moving dismounted, makes visual contact with the enemy, and the enemy initiates contact with direct fire weapons, execute the following drill:

1. Immediately occupy the nearest covered positions and return fire.
2. Squad/team leaders locate and engage known or suspected enemy positions with well-aimed fire and pass information to the platoon leader.
3. Team leaders control their Soldiers’ fire by marking targets with lasers or marking intended targets with tracers or M203 rounds.
4. Soldiers maintain visual or verbal contact with the Soldiers on their left or right.
5. Soldiers maintain contact with their team leader and relay the location of enemy positions.
6. Squad/team leaders visually or verbally check the status of their Soldiers.
7. Squad leaders maintain contact with the platoon leader.
8. Unit leader reports the contact to higher headquarters.

If the unit is stationary or moving mounted, makes visual contact with the enemy, and the enemy initiates contact with direct fire weapons, execute the following drill:

1. If moving as part of a combat logistics patrol, vehicle gunners immediately suppress enemy positions and continue to move.
2. Vehicle commanders direct their drivers to accelerate safely through the engagement area.
3. If moving as part of a combat patrol, vehicle gunners suppress and fix the enemy, allowing others to maneuver against and destroy the enemy.
4. Leaders visually or verbally check the status of their Soldiers and vehicles.
5. Unit leader reports the contact to higher headquarters.
React to Ambush (Near)

If the unit is moving dismounted, execute the following drill:

1. Soldiers in the kill zone execute one of the following two actions:
   a. Return fire immediately. If cover is not available immediately, without order or signal assault through the kill zone.
   b. Return fire immediately. If cover is available, without order or signal occupy the nearest covered position and throw smoke grenades.

2. Soldiers in the kill zone assault through the ambush using fire and movement.

3. Soldiers not in the kill zone identify the enemy location, place well-aimed suppressive fire on the enemy’s position, and shift fire as Soldiers assault the objective.

4. Soldiers assault through and destroy the enemy position.

5. Leader report the contact to higher headquarters.

If the unit is moving mounted, execute the following drill:

1. Vehicle gunners in the kill zone immediately return fire while moving out of the kill zone.

2. Soldiers in disabled vehicles in the kill zone immediately obscure themselves from the enemy with smoke, dismount if possible, seek covered positions, and return fire.

3. Vehicle gunners and Soldiers outside of the kill zone identify the enemy positions, place well-aimed suppressive fire on the enemy, and shift fire as Soldiers assault the objective.

4. Soldiers in the kill zone assault through the ambush and destroy the enemy.

5. Unit leader reports the contact to higher headquarters.

React to Ambush (Far) Battle Drill

If the unit is dismounted, execute the following drill:

1. Soldiers receiving fire immediately return fire, seek cover, and suppress the enemy positions.

2. Soldiers not receiving fire move along a covered and concealed route to the enemy’s flank in order to assault the enemy position.

3. Soldiers in the kill zone shift suppressive fires as the assaulting Soldiers fight through and destroy the enemy.

4. The unit leader reports the contact to higher headquarters.
If the unit is mounted, execute the following drill:

1. Gunners and personnel on vehicles immediately return fire.

2. If the roadway is clear, all vehicles proceed through the kill zone.

3. Soldier in the lead vehicle throws smoke to obscure the enemy’s view of the kill zone.

4. Soldiers in disabled vehicles dismount and set up security while awaiting recovery.

5. Remainder of platoon/section follow the lead vehicle out of the kill zone while continuing to suppress the enemy.

6. Unit leader reports the contact to higher headquarters.

After executing any of these battle drills, render immediate medical assistance and evacuate casualties that result from these contacts.
Chapter 5

Operations

Section I: Operations Against Cave Complexes

In the Operation Enduring Freedom operational environment where mountains often dominate the terrain, enemy and insurgent forces make extensive use of cave complexes. Caves provide a natural hiding place for caches of food, weapons and ammunition, and personnel. Caves provide limited protection from air strikes and artillery fire. Some cave complexes are extensive and can house headquarters facilities, conference rooms, storage areas, and hiding rooms as well as interconnected fighting points.

Cave complexes that require a systematic, careful, and professional approach to clearing, exploiting, and denial present a formidable and dangerous obstacle to current operations. After the unit has neutralized a cave complex, the complex is typical destroyed (at least the entrance) to deny future use by the enemy.

Tactical Considerations for Cave Operations

Cave techniques:

• A trained cave exploitation and denial team is essential to the expeditious and thorough exploitation and denial of enemy caves. Untrained personnel may miss hidden cave entrances and caches, take unnecessary casualties from concealed mines and booby traps, and may not adequately deny the cave to future enemy use.

• Each unit should designate cave teams. Cave teams should be trained, equipped, and maintained in a ready status to provide immediate expert assistance when caves are discovered.

• Two- and three-man teams should enter caves for mutual support.

• Monitor the cave team members; claustrophobia and panic could well cause the failure of the team’s mission or the death of its members.

• Train cave team to work its way through the cave, probing with bayonets for booby traps and mines while looking for hidden entrances, food, arms caches, and air vents.

• As the team moves through the cave, it should transmit compass headings and distances traversed to the surface. A team member at the surface maps the cave as exploitation progresses.

Cave exploitation:

• Site security:
  • Establish a 360-degree secure/defensive area in the immediate vicinity of the cave to protect the cave team.
The presence of a cave complex within or near an area of operations poses a continuing threat to all personnel in the area. Never consider any area containing cave complexes completely cleared/secured.

Before entering any cave complex, carefully examine the entrance for mines and booby traps.

- **Exploitation and destruction:**
  - Since cave complexes are carefully concealed and camouflaged, search and destroy operations must provide adequate time for a thorough search of the area to locate all caves. Complete exploitation and destruction of cave complexes is very time consuming. Leaders must plan accordingly to ensure success.
  - Careful mapping of a cave complex may reveal other hidden entrances as well as the location of adjacent cave complexes and underground defensive systems.
  - Constant communication between the cave and the surface is essential to facilitate cave mapping and exploitation. Consider using wire communications to the surface.
  - Caves are frequently outstanding sources of intelligence; search them to the maximum extent practicable to exploit all possible information available.
  - Upon completion of exploitation, secure captured arms retrieved for destruction or analysis. Secure documents for intelligence analysis by a document exploitation team.
  - Plan for the destruction of the all known cave entrances to seal each and prevent reuse by the enemy.

Dangers inherent in cave operations fall generally into the following categories and should be taken into account by all personnel connected with these operations:

- Presence of mines and booby traps in the entrance/exit area.
- Presence of small but dangerous concentrations of carbon monoxide produced by burning-type smoke grenades after caves are smoked. (Note: Protective masks will prevent inhalation of smoke particles but will not protect against carbon monoxide.)
- Possible shortage of oxygen as in any confined or poorly ventilated space.
- Enemy still in the cave who pose a danger to friendly personnel both above and below ground. (Note: In some instances, dogs can successfully detect enemy hiding in caves).
Section II: Operations in a High-Altitude Environment

Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan must understand the simple rules of soldiering at high altitudes including some significant health problems they otherwise may never encounter. High-altitude operations increase energy requirements by as much as 50 percent and coupled with cold temperatures and increased physical activity have the potential of making the mission secondary to just surviving. The increase in physical activity is only offset by thorough acclimatization, conditioning, special skills and training, and using equipment designed for the conditions.

High-Altitude Sickness

Acute mountain sickness may begin at 8,000 feet above sea level. Many factors influence who becomes ill and who does not; however, the following symptoms are typically linked to a high rate of ascent:

- Headache and possible dizziness
- Sleep disturbance
- Fatigue

A more serious high-altitude sickness, hypoxia, has life-threatening implications and the potential for disrupting military operations. Hypoxia occurs when the tissues of the body are starved for oxygen. The body reacts to this loss of oxygen by increased breathing to get more air. The physical activity of the body increases the heart rate and can cloud judgment. Symptoms of hypoxia include dizziness, giddiness, a tingling sensation, euphoria, blurred and/or tunnel vision, lack of muscle coordination, and slow reaction time. The condition affects every Soldier differently depending on the Soldier’s age, general health, physical conditioning, and training.

The results of hypoxia can have minimal effect on an individual at 10,000 feet, but effects increase as the individual increases altitude. Loss of consciousness and possible death can occur above 35,000 feet. Operations above this level require an oxygen supply.

High-Altitude Weight Loss

Weight loss is a characteristic of operations at high altitudes. The average weight loss for a special forces team living on Pakistani rations and working with the high-altitude mountain school in 1994 was 20 to 25 pounds. Working at high altitudes requires more energy and Soldiers will lose weight, but weight loss must be controlled so it does not become incapacitating. Weight loss leads to fatigue; loss of strength; and psychological changes such as decreased mental capacity, alertness, and low morale. All of these conditions can contribute to accidents and a failure to accomplish the mission.

You should eat and drink the following while operating at high-altitudes:

- High-complex carbohydrates
- Portions of the complete ration verses one item or the other
• At least one hot meal a day, using whatever heat source is available (i.e., chemical heat packs in meals, ready to eat)

• A variety of foods and nutritious snacks

• Four to six quarts of non-caffeinated beverages a day

You should not do the following while operating at high-altitudes:

• Skip meals, although you will not feel like eating; consume a little of everything in your ration.

• Eat high fat snacks or fatty foods or consume alcohol of any type.

• Force yourself to eat. This will result in vomiting and make the situation much more hazardous.

• Drink unpurified water or melted snow that is not properly treated.

• Restrict water intake to save it for later or attempt to avoid urinating.

Altitude sickness in most forms is preventable. Leaders must take precautions to protect their Soldiers at moderate altitudes to avoid illness. Successful strategies to prevent altitude sickness are simple and inexpensive: spend a night at an intermediate altitude before moving higher, take it easy one day at each succeeding altitude level, drink plenty of fluids, eat a full diet, and avoid all alcohol.
Section III: Operations in Cold Weather

To win in cold weather, Soldiers must also overcome an additional enemy: the extreme and unforgiving cold-weather environment. This means preventing and defeating cold injuries such as hypothermia and frostbite. If allowed to develop, cold injuries become debilitating (or in the case of hypothermia, fatal) to the Soldier and threaten the unit’s ability to defeat an enemy force in cold weather operations.

The four essential requirements for survival in cold environments are warmth, food, water, and shelter.

Keeping the Soldier warm and nourished are essential factors in preventing cold injuries and sustaining the combat power of the fighting force. Shelter is particularly important. Without shelter, it is difficult to provide warmth and nutrition to Soldiers in a cold environment.

Heat Production

The body’s three main physiological means for producing heat are metabolism, exercise, and shivering.

- Metabolism. Biochemical reactions that keep us alive produce heat as a by-product. An individual’s basal metabolic rate is a constant internal furnace. However, when exposed to cold, wintry conditions for long periods, metabolism by itself does not produce enough heat to satisfy the body’s entire heat requirements.

- Exercise. Exercise is an important method of heat production. Muscles, which make up 50 percent of our body weight, produce most of the heat during work. Short bursts of hard, physical effort generate tremendous amounts of heat. Moderate levels of exercise can be sustained for relatively longer periods. There are limitations, however. Physical conditioning, strength, stamina, and fuel in the form of food and water are necessary to sustain activity.

- Shivering. Shivering is a random, inefficient quivering of the muscles. It produces heat at a rate five times greater than the basal metabolic rate. It is the body’s first defense against cold. Shivering occurs when temperature receptors in the skin and brain sense a decrease in body temperature and trigger the shivering response. As with work and exercise, the price of shivering is fuel. How long and how effectively we shiver is limited by the amount of carbohydrates stored in muscles and by the amount of water and oxygen available.

Heat Loss

There are five mechanisms by which our bodies lose heat. The primary means of heat loss is through the skin:

- Conduction is the transfer of heat through direct contact between a relatively hot and a relatively cold object. Heat moves from the warmer to the colder object. Soldiers lose heat when they lie on snow, ice, and
cold or wet frozen ground (foxholes) or sit or lean against floors and bulkheads in unheated interiors of armored, mechanized, or wheeled vehicles.

- Convection is the transfer of heat by the circulation or movement of a relatively colder ambient environment (air or water) around the body.

- Evaporation is heat loss in the form of vapor. Heat is necessary to the evaporation of perspiration from the skin’s surface. Evaporative heat loss accounts for 20 percent of the body’s normal total heat loss. When Soldiers become overheated through physical exertion, evaporation becomes the major mechanism for heat loss. Sweating accounts for roughly two thirds of evaporative heat loss; the remaining one third is lost through breathing.

- Respiration also cools the body. As a Soldier breathes in cold dry air, it is warmed and humidified in the lungs. As it is exhaled, as much as 25 percent of the body’s heat can be lost. Placing a wool scarf or mask over the mouth and nose warms inhaled air and assists in keeping the body warm.

- Radiation is the emission of heat energy in the form of particles or waves. Energy is emitted by one body, transmitted through an intervening medium, and absorbed by another body. Infrared or heat radiation is transferred from a relatively hot to a relatively cold object. In winter, individuals lose heat to the environment through radiation. Soldiers can receive radiative heat input from fires; from the sun; or from reflection off snow, water, or light-colored rocks.

When exposed to the environment, the skin serves as a radiator. Unlike the rest of the body, the blood vessels in the head do not constrict and reduce the blood supply flowing to the scalp. The head is, therefore, an excellent radiator of heat, eliminating from 35 to 50 percent of total heat production. In cold weather operations, dry insulation, especially on the head, is essential in minimizing heat loss.

The right approach to winning in the winter keeps Soldiers healthy and focused on the mission. There are four basic rules to remember:

- Keep soldiers in shape. Cold weather clothing is heavy and presents an additional burden to a Soldier’s normal equipment. The additional equipment coupled with the difficulty of trudging through the snow causes Soldiers to expend extra energy. The importance of maintaining a high level of physical conditioning cannot be overemphasized.

- Eat to keep fit. Regular, satisfying hot food is essential for sustained performance. Even if Soldiers are not hungry, they must eat or they will lose physical conditioning. They will also lower their threshold of resistance to cold stress because their bodies will not have the fuel they need to sustain heat production and protect against lowering the core body temperature.
• Drink plenty of water. Normally, in cold climates, Soldiers drink only when they are thirsty. This will not give them the water needed to avoid dehydration. Drinking plenty of water avoids dehydration and the fatigue that comes with it. Irritability is often an early sign of dehydration. Soldiers should not eat snow as a water substitute; the moisture content of snow is relatively low and eating it will lower the body’s core temperature. Also, there is a danger of illness from bacteria. However, melted snow can be consumed after treatment with water purification tablets.

• Maintain a positive attitude. In cold weather operations, Soldiers will face many new challenges but none that they cannot overcome. Leadership will be reflected in Soldiers’ attitudes and performance. Leaders must watch for early signs of cold stress in their Soldiers, such as fatigue, lethargy, apathy, irritability, withdrawal, loss of dexterity or decision-making ability, decreased group cooperation, disorientation, or slurred speech.

**Leadership in Cold Weather Operations**

The process of developing Soldiers into cold weather fighters requires positive leadership. Leaders must understand the environmental threat and include plans for countering this threat in their operational plans or tactical standing operating procedures.

Initially, the cold environment may be alarming even frightening to Soldiers unaccustomed to operating in wintry conditions, especially when deployed to unfamiliar, remote areas. Some Soldiers will find themselves confronted with challenges they have not encountered before. The cold becomes a constant reminder to the Soldier of his vulnerability in the extreme environment and the likelihood of becoming a casualty should he make a mistake. As Soldiers gain experience, they develop confidence in themselves, their clothing, and their equipment. They learn to fight and win in winter, defeating both the cold and the enemy.

Aggressive, cheerful leadership is essential in helping Soldiers overcome the challenges of the cold environment. To defeat the enemy, Soldiers must first overcome the cold by learning how to live and survive the elements so they can focus on the enemy. Leaders must maintain a positive attitude toward the mission, their Soldiers, and the equipment they have to carry out the tasks at hand.

Intense cold affects the mind as well as the body. Essential tasks take longer to perform and require more effort than in temperate climates. Consider this situation when planning operations and giving orders—even for such routine tasks as vehicle maintenance and making or striking camp. The time required to accomplish tasks varies with differing conditions, state of training, and degree of troop acclimatization. Plan accordingly for the extra time required for accomplishing tasks.
Tips for leaders in cold weather operations

Leaders should be aware of the symptoms that characterize difficulty coping with the cold environment. The following tips will help combat the effects of the cold when it begins to affect the minds of Soldiers.

Tip 1: If Soldiers find it hard to remember things they have been taught, show patience and review orders and drills. Get them to think through the challenges of the environment and the mission. Encourage them to ask questions. Keep their minds busy.

Tip 2: Be alert for Soldiers who tend to withdraw from the group’s focus; keep them involved. Soldiers who withdraw into themselves should be paired with Soldiers who are well acclimatized to the cold environment. Remind them that everyone is in the same situation, including the enemy.

Tip 3: If Soldiers get depressed, moody, or blue and do not want to talk, encourage them to chat with each other. Circulate among the troops in their duty areas. Keep them talking and interacting.

Tip 4: Keep in mind that Soldiers will become irritable and get on each other’s nerves. Maintain your sense of humor and show patience. Vary their duties.

Tip 5: Be aware that Soldiers may tend to shirk from some tasks to keep themselves warm. Remind them that their job is to fight and that weapons and equipment must be kept in fighting order. During winter training, do not let the training become a camping trip; this is a common trap.

Tip 6: Do not accept the cold as an excuse for not carrying out orders or routine tasks. It may be the reason for taking longer, but it is not a reason for letting things slide. Remember that although the cold may make tasks more difficult to accomplish, it does not make them impossible. With knowledge, equipment, and proper training, leaders and Soldiers can defeat the cold and be successful in combat.

Tip 7: Plan the frequent rotation of Soldiers into warming tents/areas to provide relief from the cold.

Tip 8: Provide warm liquids (non-caffeine) at frequent intervals, especially when rotating Soldiers into warming tents/areas.

Tip 9: Plan and provide extra insulating material for individuals, when available.

The Cold Weather Clothing System

Leaders should understand the design principles of the military cold weather clothing system: insulate, layer, and ventilate:

- Insulation allows the creation of a microclimate around the body through which the amount of body heat lost to the environment can be regulated. By varying the amount of insulation, a Soldier can regulate the amount of heat lost or retained.
• Several layers of clothing provide more insulation and flexibility than one heavy garment, even if the heavy garment is as thick as the combined layers. By adding or removing layers of clothing (insulation), the Soldier can regulate the amount of heat lost or retained.

• Ventilation helps maintain a comfortable microclimate around the body, thereby helping control body temperature. By ventilating, the Soldier can release excess heat and minimize sweating, which can lower body temperature later as it evaporates.

There are four ways to apply the principles of the military cold weather clothing system:

• Keep clothing clean. Dirt and grease clog the air spaces in clothing and reduce the insulating effect. Dirty clothes are cold clothes.

• Avoid overheating. Select the clothing needed to stay comfortable or even a little cool. Leaders should ensure their Soldiers are not overdressed for the job they are performing.

• Wear it loose. All items of the cold weather uniform are sized to allow wearing the appropriate number of layers. This means, for example, that the field jacket may appear too large when worn without all of the layers designed to fit under it. If the uniform items do not fit loosely, the insulation will be substantially reduced.

• Keep it dry. It is vital that all layers of clothing be kept dry because wet clothing conducts heat away from the body, compromising the microclimate around the body and making it difficult to regulate body temperature. Moisture soaks into clothing from melting snow and frost that has collected on the outside of the clothing and from perspiration. Leaders should ensure that Soldiers brush snow and frost from clothing before entering heated shelters or vehicles.
Annex A

Helping a Soldier/Buddy in Distress

In Operation Enduring Freedom, Soldiers face difficult situations every day:

- Seeing destroyed homes, dead bodies, and human remains
- Being the object of hostile reactions from civilians
- Being ambushed, receiving small arms fire, or being attacked with improvised explosive devices
- Knowing or seeing someone seriously injured or killed and having close calls with death
- Enduring long deployments and the lack or privacy and personal space
- Being separated from family or having difficulty communicating with home

If you see a fellow Soldier who is upset, fuming, or brooding alone, you can help him through a painful and sometimes risky time. Emotionally distracted Soldiers can endanger the mission, the unit, and themselves. Often, just talking to a friend (or leader) who listens, tries to understand, and praises his strengths is all a Soldier needs to find his own answers.

Consider the following tips for helping a Soldier in distress:

- Be a good friend. You might say, “Something seems to be bothering you. How can I help? I can listen without being upset.”

- Listen attentively and encourage the Soldier to tell you what is wrong. Stay calm and objective. Do not criticize or argue with the Soldier. Listen to the Soldier’s thoughts and feelings and allow time for him/her to find words.

- Acknowledge the Soldier’s grievances against others but do not amplify them by agreeing too strongly.

- Ask questions to help you understand the problem and the Soldier’s feelings. If communication stalls, try to summarize what has been said and ask if you understand the issue correctly.

- Delay offering different perspectives or practical advice until you grasp the situation and understand why the Soldier is upset.

- Plant the seeds of new ideas. Do not drive them in with a hammer.

- Praise the Soldier for his/her work under difficult circumstances and for talking with you.
Sometimes the problems are too big to resolve after one talk or without additional, outside help. Additional help for Soldiers is available from:

- Unit ministry teams (UMTs) in the maneuver battalions, brigade headquarters, and hospitals. UMTs also provide area support in corps areas.

- The primary medical providers in battalion aid stations and medical companies. As well as providing support to Soldiers, they should know where other support assets are located and how to contact them.

- Mental health officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists at the brigade, division, and area support medical companies.

- Mental health officers and enlisted personnel in combat stress control teams.

If the Soldier seems preoccupied with death, hints at having thoughts of suicide, or makes threats toward others, remember your suicide prevention training:

- Say something such as, “I can see that you feel distressed.” “Have you thought of hurting yourself or someone else?” or “Do you wish you were dead?”

- Follow-up with, “Have you thought of how you could kill yourself (or others)’’.

- Don’t act shocked or alarmed. Encourage the Soldier to talk using the techniques on this card.

- If the Soldier is armed, say something such as, “Let me unload your weapon and keep it safe for you while we talk.’’

- After the Soldier has talked as much as he wants, say something such as, “I need to get you help for this. There are people near who can help you.’’

- Don’t leave this person alone. Secure any weapons. Immediately take the Soldier to your chain of command or to a medical care facility.

A Suicidal Person Needs Immediate Attention!
Annex B

How to Face the Injured and Dead

In combat or disaster situations, you may see, hear, smell, and perhaps have to handle badly injured and dead men, women, and children of all ages.

You may be struck with mixed feelings of pity, horror, revulsion, and anger at the senselessness or malice of the event. It is even more painful when a victim reminds you of someone you love or yourself. You may feel guilty for failing to prevent it, for surviving it, or for not helping enough. These reactions are normal, a part of being human. You may blame yourself or the United States.

Keep in mind that these feelings are honorable and confirm your humanity. At times, however, you may feel emotionally numb and may use “graveyard humor” to make the suffering and deaths seem less terrible. Whatever you feel, remember that the mission must continue.

What follows are lessons learned from people who have faced such horrible experiences. These tips can help you conduct the mission and live with the memories without being haunted by them.

1. Remember the larger purpose of what you must do. You are showing care, giving hope, and preventing disease for the living. You are recovering the bodies for registrations and respectful burial.

2. Limit exposure to the stimuli: Do not sightsee; use screens, poncho curtains, partitions, covers, body bags, and barriers to keep away anyone who does not need to see.

3. Wear gloves and disposable uniforms if available.

4. Mask odors with disinfectants, deodorants, or air fresheners. Save perfumes or aftershaves for afterwards. Do not be surprised when odors trigger memories.

5. Be compassionate, but avoid focusing on any individual victims, especially those you most identify with. Do not focus on personal effects.

6. Personnel who did not search the body should examine any materials collected for identification of the body or intelligence.

7. Remind yourself the body is not “the person,” just the remains.

8. Keep humor alive, even “graveyard humor” with buddies who understand it, but do not get too graphic or too personal (do not pick on each other).

9. Do not desecrate or steal from the victims; those actions are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

10. Ask unit or local ministers to conduct memorial services and perform personal religious rituals as appropriate.
11. Schedule frequent breaks; maintain hygiene, drink plenty of fluids, and eat good food. Command should arrange facilities for washing hands and face, followed later by showers and fresh clothes.

12. Have your team get together for mutual support and encouragement. Acknowledge the horrible aspects of the situation but do not dwell on detailed memories.

13. Help buddies or subordinates in distress by being a good listener. Do not jump in with “off the shelf” answers. Do not mistake feelings as weakness; communicate that these feelings are normal and honorable. Remind subordinates that the mission must go on, and the team needs everyone.

14. If forewarned of the mission, prepare yourself for what you will see and do and take the supplies and equipment mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4.

15. After the mission is complete, do not feel guilty about distancing yourself mentally from the suffering or tragic deaths of individuals.

16. Do not be disheartened by horrible dreams, feeling tense, or intrusive memories. These reactions are normal, and it is better to acknowledge them now than to suppress them. Share these reactions with your buddies, and keep positive humor alive.

17. One to three days after the exposure to a stressful event, participate in a critical event debriefing with trained people from your supporting unit ministry and/or behavioral health/combat stress control team.

These techniques and coping skills cannot make a horrible and tragic event acceptable or easy, but they can help you and your teammates better cope with the stress in order to complete the mission. Be proud of what you have done, and use these lessons learned to take care of yourself, your buddies, and your family when you get home.
Annex C
Leader’s Guide to Dealing with Soldier’s Stress

In Operation Enduring Freedom, Soldiers face difficult situations every day:

- Seeing destroyed homes, dead bodies, and human remains
- Being the object of hostile reactions from civilians
- Being ambushed, receiving small-arms fire, or being attacked with improvised explosive devices
- Knowing or seeing someone seriously injured or killed and having close calls with death
- Enduring long deployments and the lack or privacy and personal space
- Being separated from family or having difficulty communicating with home

If you see a fellow Soldier who is upset, fuming, or brooding alone, you can help him through a painful and sometimes risky time. Emotionally distracted Soldiers can endanger the mission, the unit, and themselves. Often, just talking to a leader who listens, tries to understand, and praises his strengths is all a Soldier needs to find his own answers.

Consider the following tips for helping a Soldier in distress:

- Be a good friend. You might say, “Something seems to be bothering you. How can I help? I can listen without being upset.”

- Listen attentively and encourage the Soldier to tell you what is wrong. Stay calm and objective. Do not criticize or argue with the Soldier. Listen to the Soldier’s thoughts and feelings and allow time for him/her to find words.

- Acknowledge the Soldier’s grievances against others, but do not amplify them by agreeing too strongly.

- Ask questions to help you understand the problem and the Soldier’s feelings. If communication stalls, try to summarize what has been said and ask if you understand the issue correctly.

- Delay offering different perspectives or practical advice until you grasp the situation and understand why the Soldier is upset.

- Plant the seeds of new ideas. Do not drive them in with a hammer.

- Praise the Soldier for his/her work under difficult circumstances and for talking with you.
Sometimes the problems are too big to resolve after one talk or without additional, outside help. Remember the Army deploys additional help for Soldiers with such problems. Beyond yourself and other NCOs and leaders, additional help for Soldiers is available from:

- Unit ministry teams (UMTs) in the maneuver battalions, brigade headquarters, and hospitals. UMTs also provide area support in corps areas.

- The primary medical providers in battalion aid stations and medical companies. As well as providing support to Soldiers, they should know where other support assets are located and how to contact them.

- Mental health officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists at the brigade, division, and area support medical companies.

- Mental health officers and enlisted personnel in combat stress control teams that can come forward to battalions and companies.

If the Soldier seems preoccupied with death, hints at having thoughts of suicide, or makes threats toward others, remember your suicide prevention training:

- Say something such as, “I can see that you feel distressed.” “Have you thought of hurting yourself or someone else?” or “Do you wish you were dead?”

- Follow-up with, “Have you thought of how you could kill yourself (or others)?”

- Don’t act shocked or alarmed. Encourage the Soldier to talk using the techniques on this card.

- If the Soldier is armed, say something such as, “Let me unload your weapon and keep it safe for you while we talk.”

- After the Soldier has talked as much as he wants, say something such as, “I need to get you help for this. There are people near who can help you.”

- Don’t leave this person alone. Secure any weapons. Immediately take the Soldier to your chain of command or to a medical care facility.

**A Suicidal Person Needs Immediate Attention!**
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**Military Review (MR)**

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