Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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Foreword

The focus of a counterinsurgency (COIN) is the people, and nothing moves the population against one side or another as much as the indiscriminate use of force. Force may be unavoidable, but through planning, preparation, and training, the number of those incidents can be decreased and the lethality of the incidents reduced. Force must be perceived by the people as judicious, appropriate, and proportional to the threat, while still protecting our Soldiers.

- Plan for both lethal and nonlethal means during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process.
- Soldiers and leaders must know and rehearse escalation of force (EOF)/rules of engagement procedures.
- Detailed and innovative planning can extend reaction time.
- Develop contingencies for even routine missions.
- Battle staff planning and oversight can de-escalate situations.
- Consider available enablers in task organization -- unmanned aerial vehicle, counter improvised explosive device electronic warfare, quick reaction force, and biometrics -- to mitigate risks and prevent potentially volatile events.
- Cultural sensitivities affect setup and operation of traffic control points, cordon and search, and convoys.
- Patterns kill: Change routines to decrease the ability of the insurgents to attack coalition forces, reducing the need for EOF.
- Plan for and employ force protection equipment to help increase reaction time and reduce unnecessary casualties.

Leaders must do all they can to increase the time a Soldier has to make an EOF decision. Increased reaction time begins with recognizing situations likely to lead to an EOF event. Shaping the environment, anticipating follow-on effects of decisions, and developing contingencies all facilitate the right response to a given situation. Rigorous, realistic, and innovative EOF predeployment training integrated into mission planning and execution will better prepare units to visualize upcoming challenges in a complex and often ambiguous COIN environment.

Steven Mains
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned
# Escalation of Force Handbook

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Introduction

The companion piece to this publication, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook No. 06-15, *Traffic Control Point Operations: OIF*, examined rules of engagement (ROE) and escalation of force (EOF) during traffic control point operations. In full-spectrum operations it is important to meet stringent force protection requirements, accomplish the mission, and minimize chances for collateral damage against coalition forces and friendly civilians. Soldiers must balance these force protection requirements against maintaining the ability to effectively communicate and interact with the civilian population.

**EOF-Related Definitions**

- **EOF** is defined as sequential actions that begin with nonlethal force measures (visual signals to include flags, spotlights, lasers, and pyrotechnics) and may graduate to lethal measures (direct action) to include warning, disabling, or deadly shots to defeat a threat and protect the force.

- Defensive actions are defined as EOF procedures that terminate with successful employment of nonlethal means (hand/arm signals, colored flags, spotlights, pyrotechnics, or any other available resource).

- EOF procedures are not substitutes for, but are a part of ROE. EOF is an aspect of ROE that helps commanders and Soldiers apply ROE principles for self-defense, use of force, military necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering. However, commanders and Soldiers must understand that ROE may limit EOF options. For example, warning shots may not be authorized by the ROE for a given operation.

This handbook expands the discussion of ROE/EOF beyond traffic control point operations, to include convoy movement, cordon and search, and mounted/dismounted patrols. The terms EOF and graduated response are used interchangeably throughout this handbook.

A digital versatile disc (DVD) is enclosed with this handbook. The scenarios included on the DVD depict how to set up and execute a snap traffic control point under potential hostile conditions in urban and open terrain. The DVD was developed in conjunction with the National Simulation Center (NSC)–Futures, the Combined Arms Center, and the United States Army Infantry School and Center. The DVD also includes a video insert from the Rapid Equipping Force describing EOF kits.

In March 2007 representatives from CALL, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the JFK School of Government, Harvard University, co-hosted an EOF conference at the Carr Center for Human Rights in Washington, D.C. Conference attendees met with key members representing multiple nongovernmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), and the International Red Cross. The impetus for the conference was a mutual realization of the participants that coalition forces and nongovernmental organizations share similar force protection concerns for civilians on the battlefield. Perspectives, observations, and insights to mitigate civilian casualties are included in this handbook.
The operational environment in Iraq is a complex and challenging one in which the insurgency is trying to kill not only US military personnel, but civilians as well on a daily basis. Under the terms of successive [United Nations] UN Security Council resolutions, US forces operate with the consent of the Iraqi government and a mission to provide security and stability in Iraq. This is of necessity includes providing security to the population... [This] manual can become yet another important step towards minimizing harm to civilians.

Human Rights Watch Organization

The importance of EOF is illustrated in the following memorandum for all members of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq from Commanding General Raymond Odierno:

 HEADQUARTERS
 MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS - IRAQ
 BAGHDAD, IRAQ
 APO AE 09042

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS – IRAQ

SUBJECT: Warrior’s Edge

1. I am extremely proud and honored to command the finest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines in the world as we assist the Government of Iraq secure peace, stability, and freedom from terrorist oppression for the people of Iraq. Without any doubt, the barbarism we witness gripping this nation confirms that we are on the front lines of the fight against terrorism. By standing with the Iraqi people to bravely fight for liberty, prosperity, and justice under the rule of law, we deny terrorists a haven from which to advance their ideology of hate, violence, and chaos. Our cause is just and right.

2. As we advance our noble task, I demand that each of you maintain the MNC-I Warrior’s Edge. Our advantage over the enemy consists of a moral, physical, emotional, and military superiority. Our edge is based upon always doing right, maintaining the legal and ethical high ground while taking full advantage of our dominant strength in personnel, equipment, training, and doctrine. The most vital component of our Warrior’s Edge is individual discipline, initiative, and fighting spirit.

3. In that light, I charge you to maintain an offensive mindset to drive our enemies to defeat. From every private to every general, I challenge you to be an expert in your field, to study your opponent with intensity and to capitalize on your problem-solving skills, preparation, and professionalism. Without tiring, increase the pressure on him at every turn. The Warrior’s offensive spirit enables us to focus the full power of the Corps relentlessly against the enemy while protecting Iraqi civilians from unnecessary harm.

4. MNC-I Warriors know that the undisciplined use of force reduces our effectiveness and greatly undercut the justness of our cause. Our respect for non-combatants is not incompatible with the offensive mindset. In fact, an offensive mindset requires you to always be mentally alert to identify hostile acts and hostile intent and be ready without hesitation to defend yourself and others with necessary force.

5. To that end, trust your training, battle drills, other operational procedures, and judgment. Our Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Exigency of Force (EOF) practices are fundamentally sound. They protect our forces and help to accomplish the mission with honor and precision by dramatically reducing needless civilian casualties. Continue to follow those standards and proven techniques with confidence. Do not be reluctant to root out the enemy and to engage him IAW the ROE whenever and wherever found.

6. Keep in mind, however, that EOF practices DO NOT replace the exercise of reasonable discretion and judgment. Under the ROE and EOF practices, persons committing hostile acts or exhibiting hostile intent may be engaged with necessary force to eliminate the threat without progress through EOF measures. The split-second decision on when and how to eliminate a threat is a matter of sound judgment left to individual troopers, leaders, and commanders.
7. You often make these life and death decisions in just a few seconds under arduous and tense circumstances. I, along with my subordinate commanders, proudly stand by your performance record in these trying situations. Understand that the various forms of information gathering through SIGACTS, AARs, Inquiries, and Investigations are tools for your leaders to assess the effectiveness of ROE and EOF practices, to capture TTP lessons learned, and to preserve evidence of Law of Armed Conflict and ROE compliance in case of later inquiry. You have nothing to fear from these necessary information gathering tools. They assist us to maintain the Warrior's Edge and improve our fighting efficiency.

8. In conclusion, Iraq is a complex battlefield where we are engaged in counter insurgency operations against a devious and despicable enemy. To win we must take full advantage of our Warrior's Edge, seize and maintain the offensive, and remain vigilant, honorable, and professional in every action.

9. My God bless each and every one of you and thanks for all you do every day.

Original Signed
RAYMOND T. ODIerno
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
Chapter 1

Mission Planning

Predeployment training to support escalation of force (EOF) planning must be rigorous, realistic, and innovative. Results of well-thought-out EOF-integrated training will help prepare small units for the complex challenges they will face in counterinsurgency operations. Detailed and innovative planning, battle staff oversight, and strong troop-leading procedures (TLP) can extend EOF reaction time, allowing Soldiers to mitigate potentially volatile engagements. During intelligence preparation of the battlefield, both lethal and nonlethal means of force must be incorporated into mission planning, and follow-on effects must be weighed and adjusted during execution. Soldiers and leaders must know and rehearse rules of engagement (ROE) and EOF procedures, and units should develop contingencies for even routine missions. Planning for the emplacement of force protection equipment enhances security and is a proactive measure to increase Soldier reaction time at potential EOF event areas.

EOF Mission Planning Considerations

Leaders at all levels should strive to constantly stay current on the area of operations (AO) and area of responsibility (AOR). Leaders gain and maintain situational understanding by using digital and analog communications to leverage information gathered from higher, lower, and adjacent units. Other sources of information include maps, intelligence summaries, situation reports, and reports from the local populace. The eight steps of TLP are the framework for small unit EOF mission planning considerations. Integrate EOF into the eight TLP steps:

1. Receive mission. Units must consider the ROE/EOF implications of the mission.

2. Issue warning order. Leaders must allocate time to integrate EOF procedures into preparation, to include precombat checks (PCC), precombat inspections (PCI), rehearsals, and movement.

3. Make a tentative plan.
   - Assess your training, equipment, and force protection capabilities (including nonlethal means) to counter threats.
   - Consider current and review past EOF incidents and locations in your AO/AOR.
   - Determine/assess if the civilian population is pro, anti, or neutral toward coalition forces (CF).
   - Incorporate enemy pattern analysis into EOF planning.
   - Consider enemy composition, disposition, strength, recent activities, ability to reinforce, and possible enemy courses of action, to include using civilians as cover.
   - Assess the size, capabilities, and potential tactics within and outside the AO.
• Consider incorporating an execution time line as a planning factor (the
time of day may have a significant impact on the number of vehicles and
personnel a unit may encounter during the execution of an operation).
The increased density of traffic and personnel require additional risk
analysis and resources to mitigate possible EOF incidents.

4. Initiate movement. Be prepared to execute preplanned and rehearsed ROE/EOF
procedures, including the effects of integrating enablers: fire support, explosive
ordnance disposal, attack aviation, quick reaction forces, medical evacuation, and
force protection equipment.

5. Reconnoiter. Civil considerations that can affect ROE/EOF employment are:
• Areas: urban or rural
• Structures: built up, battle damaged, religious, etc.
• Local population disposition
• Local leaders’ (tribal, religious, and civic) allegiance to CF and influence
  on local population

6. Complete the plan.
• Provide clear ROE/EOF guidance in commander’s intent; develop
  contingencies that are adaptive to changing battlefield conditions.
• Include information operations to get the message out, mitigate local
  population misunderstanding of events, and de-escalate volatile
  situations.

7. Issue the operations order.
• Include mission, risk management/safety considerations, and current
  ROE/EOF policies/procedures.
• Adjust the plan based on updated intelligence, surveillance, and
  reconnaissance; troops-to-tasks; and available force protection
  equipment.
• Make final coordination with adjacent units, ready-reaction forces, and
  higher headquarters prior to issuing the order.
• Conduct an updated combined mission, safety, ROE/EOF briefing, and
  backbrief to commander/designated representative.

8. Supervise. Leaders at all echelons must keep the higher headquarters’ command
post informed of the unit’s status, tactical situation, and force protection posture.
Leaders and Soldiers enforce ROE/EOF procedures during operations and report
incidents.

Leaders must set the conditions for executing EOF-related tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Leaders must understand the critical aspects of successful EOF: early
warning for people approaching a CF position, clear intent of what the CF unit wants people approaching the position to do, and clear triggers for when Soldiers should escalate force. Having this understanding, leaders then set conditions for success through training, resourcing, establishing, and reinforcing standards for Soldiers to achieve the critical aspects of EOF.

Each EOF incident is unique and requires assessment. Soldiers and innocent civilian lives depend on the ability to be mentally and physically prepared to deal with each conceivable EOF situation that may arise. The mission comes first; however, judicious use of force is a proven combat multiplier supporting mission accomplishment. Lack of planning and rehearsing EOF-integrated scenarios during training may result in unnecessary casualties in operations. Effective EOF integration into predeployment training, mission planning, and execution reinforce CF force protection, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success.
Chapter 2
Training

Escalation of force (EOF) training improves leader and Soldier awareness when planning, preparing, executing, and assessing methods to prevent unnecessary casualties of Soldiers and civilians. Synchronizing rules of engagement (ROE) with EOF is vitally important to shaping EOF training. The desired end state is for Soldiers and leaders at all levels to understand and apply EOF procedures in order to lengthen response time and prevent unnecessary lethal force engagements. The following EOF-related tasks should be integrated into training:

- Soldiers at every level must understand EOF procedures before, during, and after an EOF event to include the possible second- and third-order effects and/or the strategic impact of EOF incidents, which can lead to misperceptions by the local populace.
- Soldiers must continually train and rehearse EOF procedures at home station, during mobilization training and mission rehearsal exercises, and while deployed to a designated theater of operation.
- All Soldiers must understand EOF in order to prevent hesitation or second-guessing when making a decision to apply force.
- Units should be resourced with the correct force protection equipment in order to increase reaction time, reduce unnecessary EOF incidents resulting in the use of lethal force, and reduce casualties.

If these important EOF-related tasks are successfully integrated into training and Soldiers and leaders adhere to the training principles, unnecessary lethal force engagements can be reduced or eliminated. Adhering to EOF-trained principles also supports the goal of enhancing the partnership with local governments by reinforcing a positive image of coalition forces.

- EOF-trained Soldiers are able to make the right decision on what is a legitimate target.
- EOF training lengthens the time available to positively identify targets and apply force commensurate with the level of threat.
- EOF never limits the Soldiers’ inherent right to self-defense in accordance with the established ROE.

Note: For information on ROE training in the United Kingdom, please see Appendix A.

Section I: Training Scenarios

Scenario #1: Securing incident site

Your squad/platoon/patrol is providing security in a built-up area when a vehicle explodes, killing two civilians and wounding several others. Civilians are trying to surround the vehicle, while your squad/platoon/patrol tries to keep them back.
People are observed moving on the rooftops (dense, urban environment). Shots are fired. Your squad/platoon/patrol reacts to the situation while still providing security.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Weapons observed in crowd or on top of roof.
- Suspicious personnel in crowd.
- Hostile and/or curious crowd.
- Crowd responds to instruction or does not respond favorably.
- Shots fired at coalition forces.

Scenario #2: Cordon and search

U.S. and coalition forces receive an intelligence report that suspected enemy has bomb-building devices in an apartment building. There is an extended family living there. Your squad/platoon/patrol task is to search and clear the building. You could receive light to heavy resistance when you enter the building.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Personnel with weapons in rooms.
- Discovery of bomb-building material.
- Separate and search occupants.

Scenario #3: Mobile/hasty traffic control point (TCP)

Your squad/platoon/patrol is part of a security force in an improvised explosive device (IED) clearing operation. A vehicle in your convoy is hit by an IED. You take immediate action by employing the “5Cs” — confirm, clear, check, cordon, and control.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Unmarked vehicles approaching the area (unable to identify occupants).
- Unmarked vehicle approaches your position and does not heed warnings.
- Shots are fired at the convoy by an unknown assailant.

Note: Scenarios 4 through 14 apply to convoy movement/combat logistics patrols.

Scenario #4

Your convoy/patrol reports a vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed from the rear. You apply all available nonlethal procedures and equipment, including hand and arm signals, followed by the use of a laser device (visual signal) and a bullhorn.
(audible signal), to wave the vehicle off, but the vehicle continues. You fire a warning shot (nonlethal or lethal), and the vehicle stops. The two civilians in the vehicle jump out.

**Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:**
- Vehicle’s high-speed approach.
- Driver does not respond to warnings.
- The occupants’ reaction (threatening or nonthreatening posture) after vehicle stops.
- Trigger point: safe separation.

**Scenario #5**

Assume the same facts as the above scenario, but now you have confirmed that you are being engaged. You can see and hear the rounds impacting. You can identify the general direction from where they are originating, but you have not yet fixed the point of origin. What do you do?

**Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:**
- **You cannot engage the target until you get positive identification (PID)** (a reasonable certainty that the object of the attack is a legitimate military target). This is made more difficult because it is at night.
- You must get a fix on the source of fire before you can engage the target. In this circumstance, you may engage the origin of the muzzle flashes.
- You do not need absolute certainty for PID; rather, you just need reasonable certainty.

**Scenario #6**

You are a gunner in a convoy heading southbound through a village. You are passing an outdoor market. There are visible coalition forces in the area as well as a number of local nationals in the market. You observe a number of young men with weapons, who begin to fire at your convoy. You can clearly identify them, but they are surrounded by a number of civilians who do not appear to be supporting them. What do you do?

**Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:**
- You clearly have hostile acts and PID.
- Under the ROE you can engage the target.
- In this scenario, the risk of collateral damage to both local national and coalition forces might be too great to justify engaging the targets, especially if you have the ability to egress safely.
• Your response should be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude but still defeat the threat.

• Shoot? Maybe.

• Move? Definitely.

• Communicate? Absolutely.

Scenario #7

Assume the facts are the same as the above scenario; however, two of the individuals are armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Does this make a difference in whether you engage?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• The lethality of the enemy threat is significantly higher than when facing small arms fire.

• Take well-aimed shots intended to kill the hostile individuals.

• Although noncombatants should never be intentionally engaged, limited incidental injury to or killing of noncombatants may be acceptable in this situation.

• Use the amount of force necessary to defeat the threat and then cease fire.

Scenario #8

You are the gunner in the rear gun truck of a convoy passing through an urban area. You receive word that a young adult male is throwing softball-size rocks at your convoy from an upcoming overpass. As you approach the overpass, you spot a young man on the overpass with what appears to be a large rock. There are six to eight civilians walking in the same area as the rock-thrower. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

• You clearly have hostile acts and PID.

• Under the ROE you can engage the target if he poses a threat.

• Consider the following:
  ° You have an uparmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). Is there a threat?
  
  ° You have a vehicle with an open top and personnel exposed to the rock-thrower. Is there a threat?
  
  ° Consider the risk of collateral damage. Can the target be engaged while minimizing damage to the surrounding noncombatants?
What is the level of threat? If your armor can protect you from the rocks, is there a threat? Is engagement with lethal force required to defeat the threat?

Scenario #9

Your convoy is on the outskirts of a city and approaching an overpass. A crowd is gathering in the area just beneath the overpass. You see a man running in an alley toward the overpass with an AK-47. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Increase the aggressiveness of your posture.
- Use EOF to negate the potential threat.
- Remember that locals may legally have small arms for the protection of their homes.
- Attempt to identify the individual with the weapon.
- Do not engage unless there are further indications of hostile intent or a hostile act.

Scenario #10

You are in the lead armored vehicle escorting a four-vehicle convoy along a highway. There is a flash behind you, followed by a loud explosion as one of the nontactical vehicles in the convoy disappears in a cloud of dust and smoke. You then see two males 200 meters (m) away from you mount a motorcycle and speed away. You also see an orange sedan back out of a driveway 150 m south of your position and speed away. Three males standing 100 m up the road run into a nearby house. You start taking small arms fire from a different house 150 m west of your position. What do you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You should respond to the hostile fire coming from the house with deadly force.
- You should not engage the motorcycle, car, or people running away from the attack, as there is no evidence to conclude that they possess hostile intent, have committed a hostile act, or are linked to the attack. They may be fleeing for their own safety.
- You may detain people fleeing in order to collect intelligence.

Scenario #11

You are in a convoy on the outskirts of a city when the convoy suffers an IED attack. As you focus your attention on the location of the IED, you notice two individuals in civilian clothes and no weapons jump out of hiding about 80 m away from where the IED exploded and run away from you. You quickly ascertain
that the individuals were within command-detonation range of the IED. Command-detonation is a common method of detonation. What can you do?

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You may engage the individuals with the necessary force, including deadly force, to prevent their escape if you are reasonably certain that they command-detonated the IED.

- Whether you can engage depends on all of the circumstances and whether you are reasonably certain that the fleeing individuals detonated the IED and are attempting to evade capture. If so, these individuals have committed a hostile act against coalition forces, and you may respond in self-defense with necessary and proportional force.

Scenario #12

You are conducting a cordon and search of a neighborhood when you see an individual acting suspiciously. The on-scene commander decides to stop and temporarily detain the individual for tactical questioning. The individual flees from the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- The individual is not demonstrating hostile intent because there is no imminent threat of force against the unit. The unit does, however, have the authority to detain the individual based on the circumstances. The unit may at this point use proportionate force (give chase, tackle the individual, restrain him) to stop the individual.

- Under these circumstances, lethal force would not be authorized under the ROE because it would not be proportionate to the threat the individual poses to the unit. If lethal force is not authorized, then a warning shot would not be authorized.

Scenario #13: Dismounted patrol

You are in a dismounted patrol, and your unit sees an individual digging on the side of a route frequently traveled by the unit. The individual sees the patrol approaching and runs away.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- You have reasonable grounds to detain the individual for questioning. However, although the digging may seem suspicious, the activity of digging a hole by itself is not a demonstration of hostile intent. It is possible that there could be additional facts, such as digging holes in a known red zone where U.S. forces are attacked with IEDs, that would make the patrol believe the man is actually a threat to your unit.

- You should not use deadly force unless you feel the individual poses a threat. You can give chase and physically restrain the man, but you
should not fire warning shots to stop the man or shoot at the individual unless there is a threat action against your unit.

- Every Soldier must be vigilant and attuned to the surrounding environment (situational awareness/situational understanding) when conducting dismounted patrols.

  - Be alert when interacting with the local population.
  - Look for behaviors/indicators that clue you to the possibility of insurgent activity in the patrol area. The following actions could signal possible imminent insurgent activities such as a small arms attack (complex ambush), sniper, or suicide improvised explosive device (IED) attack (either by vehicle or explosive vest):
    - Is there a sudden absence of people in what is normally a congested urban area?
    - What does the graffiti on buildings say (do you have an interpreter with you on patrol)?
    - Do you notice suspicious body language (eye movement and tense posture) when interacting with locals?
    - Is it time for a scheduled Islamic prayer at a local mosque, yet locals are conspicuously absent?
    - Are shops closed during what are normally regularly scheduled business hours?
    - Do you notice video cameramen in the area but no recognizable news media personnel?
    - Are there children using cell phones when they come into contact with your element?
  - When you interact with the local populace, be approachable yet cautious, and always maintain an offensive posture.

**Scenario #14: Mounted patrol**

During a patrol, your unit sees two men digging on the side of a road frequently traveled by U.S. forces. You know there have been multiple attacks with buried IEDs on this stretch of road within the last two weeks, and the S2 has templated this particular area for possible IED attacks in the next 72 hours. You also know that farmers in this area do not dig at this particular time of day. The men see the patrol and flee.

**Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:**

- A determination of hostile intent is based on all the available facts and evidence. The threat may not be immediate or instantaneous. The facts
known to the patrol make it reasonable to believe the individuals should be detained. There is also reason to believe the men pose a hostile threat to the patrol.

- You should use EOF measures, to include warning shots and, if necessary, deadly force. If circumstances allow for it, less than lethal force should be used; however, you may immediately use the full range of EOF measures.

Scenario #15: Mounted or dismounted patrol

During a patrol, you see two adult men digging a hole beside a well-traveled route. You see that one of them has an AK-47 and the other a bundle of wires. Your patrol attempts to stop the men, who flee at the sight of the patrol.

Possible reaction points and EOF considerations:

- Given the facts, there are reasonable grounds to detain the men for tactical questioning. Furthermore, there is evidence that the men are demonstrating a hostile intent. Under the standing (ROE) definition of imminent use of force, the use of force does not necessarily have to be immediate, and based on all the facts, you could reasonably conclude U.S. forces were threatened with force.

- You may use force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the men from escaping. You should, if possible, use EOF measures, to include firing warning shots. If at any time you feel a threat to your patrol’s safety (for example, one of the men turns and points the AK-47 in the patrol's direction), you may immediately engage the men with deadly force.

Section II: Situational Training Exercise (STX) Lane EOF Vignettes

Vignette #1

Lane trained: Forward operations base (FOB) defense

Tasks trained: EOF, react to suicide-vehicle borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED)/suspected SVBIED

Conditions: A U.S. platoon-size unit with assigned equipment is manning an entry control point (ECP) to an FOB. A vehicle approaches the ECP and ignores all warnings to slow down and stop. The unit conducts EOF measures to stop the vehicle. An iteration of this task can be a suspected SVBIED whose driver stops when the unit uses proper EOF.

Desired action: The Soldiers manning the ECP implement the proper EOF measures to secure the ECP and its personnel.

Opposing forces (OPFOR) counter task: Conduct an SVBIED attack. If the SVBIED is stopped by EOF measures, the SVBIED is remote detonated.

Conditions: The OPFOR conduct an SVBIED attack against a U.S. FOB ECP.
**Standard:** The OPFOR approach the ECP and attempt an SVBIED attack in order to damage friendly force facilities and inflict military and civilian casualties.

**Performance steps:**

- **Planning/Preparation:**
  - Reconnoiter your target area and determine the size, composition, and orientation of the threat force there.
  - Find an avenue of approach that provides the greatest speed, cover, and concealment possible to your target.
  - Use different ingress and egress routes to and from the objective when possible.

- **Execution:**
  - The driver times his arrival at the initial identification (ID) checkpoint of the ECP so that the maximum number of Soldiers is present in the area.
  - Move to your target in a calm manner. Do your best to look normal.
  - Bypass physical barriers that your vehicle cannot break through.
  - A large number of civilians (local nationals) seeking employment are congregated near the entrance of the ECP. (Including local civilians into the scenario increases complexity and introduces safeguarding them during a potential EOF incident.)

**Resources:**

18 Spotlights
20 Deployable speed bumps
20 Collapsible spike strips
35 Collapsible sawhorses
1 Grenade simulator
1 IED mock-up (in vehicle)
14 Lasers
30 Arabic signs
18 Orange flags
18 Air horns
36 Orange cones
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>NO-GO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Did unit leadership plan and prepare for EOF procedures before start of shift? *</td>
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<td>2. Did unit leadership inspect necessary equipment prior to shift?</td>
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<td>3. Did unit rehearse EOF procedures? *</td>
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<td>4. Did unit use audible warnings to warn (horn, air horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, siren)?</td>
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<td>5. Did unit use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, signs)?</td>
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<td>6. Did unit show weapons and demonstrate intent to use them?</td>
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<td>7. Did unit attempt nonlethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio signal, signs)?</td>
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<td>8. Did unit fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat)?</td>
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<td>9. Did unit use disabling fire (tires, engine block, windows)?</td>
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<td>10. Did unit use proportional deadly force (if necessary)?</td>
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<td>11. At the conclusion of EOF, did leadership address ways to improve or sustain?</td>
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<td>12. If necessary, did unit skip EOF procedures to ensure the safety of the ECP and apply deadly force (if required)? *</td>
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* Indicates a critical task

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Vignette #2

Lane trained: FOB defense

Tasks trained: EOF, utilize an interpreter

**Condition:** The unit is participating in coordinating stability and support operations.

**Desired action:** Unit leaders provide force protection for interpreter. Unit leaders successfully use an interpreter to communicate with civilians, military, and government representatives to enable friendly forces to continue the mission.

**OPFOR counter task:** Attempt to harm and mislead the U.S force’s interpreter.

**Conditions:** The OPFOR make the friendly forces protect the interpreter and attempt to mislead the friendly forces through the interpreter.

**Standard:** Utilize an interpreter to communicate effectively with civilians.

**Performance steps:**

- **Planning/Preparation:**
  - Determine location to meet with friendly forces.
  - Find an avenue of approach that provides the greatest speed, cover, and concealment possible to your target.

- **Execution:** While communicating with friendly forces, attempt to harm interpreter and give misleading information.

**Resources:**

- 18 Spotlights
- 20 Deployable speed bumps
- 20 Collapsible spike strips
- 35 Collapsible sawhorses
- 1 Grenade simulator
- 1 IED mock-up (in vehicle)
- 14 Lasers
- 30 Arabic signs
- 18 Orange flags
- 18 Air horns
- 36 Orange cones
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Train the interpreter to perform duties in the manner you desire.</td>
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<td>2. Treat interpreters with respect and in a professional manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Ensure interpreters’ safety and security at all times. *</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Remember interpreters are not Soldiers (contractual and ROE limitations).</td>
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<td>5. Verify credentials of all interpreters, check sources, and ensure interpreters are properly trained.</td>
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<td>6. Do not forget interpreters’ physical or emotional needs. Rotate interpreters when necessary (40-50 minute rule).</td>
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<td>7. Do not insult or make disparaging remarks about indigenous people.</td>
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<td>8. Look at the person you are conversing with (not the interpreter). *</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Don’t talk to the translator, but to the person you are addressing; avoid saying “tell him that….” Speak naturally but slowly, distinctly.</td>
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<td>10. Watch your body language, intonation, and tone; convey openness (or at least directness).</td>
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<td>11. Use simple and concise language where possible.</td>
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<td>12. Monitor reaction of conversation partner.</td>
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<td>13. Military language can be difficult for civilians (be careful with terminology and acronyms). *</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Ask questions of the conversation partner to ensure the interpreter correctly interpreted what you said (or even interpreted at all).</td>
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<td>15. Learn early about cultural and social norms.</td>
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</table>
16. Choose an appropriate interpreter (a female or young person will not work in some situations).

17. Ensure interpreter translates exactly what is said and suppresses personal feelings or opinions. When unsure what was said, ask the interpreter to restate to you exactly what he/she just said.

18. Avoid idioms (“pig in a poke”) or cultural allusions (“road runner”). *

* Indicates a critical task

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Vignette #3

Lane trained: FOB defense

Tasks trained: EOF, establish and operate a checkpoint

**Conditions:** The unit is tasked to occupy and operate an ECP. The ECP has been established. Insurgents are operating in groups of 3 to 15 personnel and can conduct small arms, rocket-propelled grenade, IED, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), mortar, or rocket attacks against your unit. The insurgents are likely to use a VBIED against your checkpoint. Sniper attacks are possible. Rooftop observation by hostile forces is a common tactic.

**Desired action:** The Soldiers manning the ECP implement the proper EOF measures to secure the ECP and its personnel.

**OPFOR counter task:** Attempt to enter the FOB through the ECP by vehicle.

**Conditions:** The OPFOR conduct entry operations to enter a U.S. FOB. The OPFOR approach the ECP and attempt to enter the FOB in order to damage friendly force facilities and inflict military and civilian casualties.

**Standard:** The OPFOR attempt entry at the ECP with improper ID.
Performance steps:

- **Planning/Preparation:**
  - Reconnoiter your target area and determine the size, composition, and orientation of the threat force there.
  - Use personnel with and without proper ID.

- **Execution:**
  - Driver arrives at the initial ID checkpoint of the ECP without an ID.
  - Move to your target in a calm manner. Do your best to look normal.

**Resources:**

- 20 Civilians on the battlefield (COBs)
- 2 OPFOR
- 18 Spotlights
- 20 Deployable speed bumps
- 20 Collapsible spike strips
- 35 Collapsible sawhorses
- 1 Grenade simulator
- 1 IED mock-up (in vehicle)
- 14 Lasers
- 30 Arabic signs
- 18 Orange flags
- 18 Air horns
- 36 Orange cones

<table>
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<th>TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES</th>
<th>GO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leaders conduct reconnaissance of checkpoint and coordinate to execute a relief in place with occupying unit.</td>
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<td>a. Assess any additional equipment required.</td>
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<td>b. Determine quality of barriers and protective measures.</td>
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<td>c. Account for number of weapons positions and any observation posts to be manned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Determine if civil police are available to conduct searches and methods are available to search females.</td>
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</table>
2. Leaders brief personnel and task-organize to accomplish assigned tasks.

3. Leaders coordinate for or request additional assets to accomplish improvements to checkpoints.

4. Unit executes relief in place.
   a. Leader or designated representative accepts and acknowledges receipt of:
      - Fixed facilities and assets
      - Ammunition stockpiles
   b. Outgoing unit personnel brief incoming personnel on specific duties.
   c. Incoming unit conducts on-site rehearsal of stop-and-search procedures under scrutiny of outgoing unit.

5. Unit commences checkpoint operations. *
   a. Shifts established.
   b. Shift personnel inspected before assuming duties (similar to guard mount).
   c. Check proper uniform and equipment.
   d. Review ROE and checkpoint standing operating procedures.
6. Unit executes routine operations.
   a. Vehicle approaches, security reports.
   b. Barrier sentry moves into position to stop vehicle.
   c. Barrier sentry allows vehicle to pass forward into checkpoint on signal from checkpoint noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). No more than one vehicle is allowed into checkpoint at one time.
   d. NCOIC/designated sentinel inquires purpose of vehicle and examines papers, identification, registration, trip authorization, and so forth.
   e. NCOIC/designated sentinel is covered by security elements. Another guard is looking into the interior of vehicle for suspicious objects.
   f. NCOIC/designated sentinel allows vehicle to pass.

7. Unit conducts a stop and search: *
   a. Occupants of vehicle (except driver) moved to a personnel search area.
   b. Driver provides papers to NCOIC for examination.
   c. Driver asked to open all doors, trunk and engine covers, and other compartments as needed.
   d. Driver, covered by a guard, remains nearby to observe search of vehicle.
   e. Searcher (armed with pistol) uses mirror and flashlight to check vehicle undercarriage first.
   f. Searcher examines interior of vehicle.
### 8. Search of personnel or vehicle identifies contraband or prohibited items. *

- a. Searcher announces discovery.
- b. NCOIC informs personnel they will be detained for questioning and their prohibited items will be confiscated.
- c. Detained persons move to detainee holding area until military or civil police arrive.
- d. Vehicle is moved out of search area and checkpoint, but is kept in a place where it can be observed.

### 9. Unit reacts to attempt to run through checkpoint. Unit executes EOF procedures in accordance with ROE. *

- a. Sentry normally cautious on approach of single-operator vehicle.
- b. Sentry shouts to halt vehicle. Vehicle fails to stop. Sentry alerts checkpoint personnel of run-through attempt.
- c. Leader orders driver or occupants to dismount and move away from vehicle. If driver is injured and unable to comply, leader keeps personnel in protective positions for at least 15 minutes in event of a delayed-action explosive device.
- d. Leader and medic or combat lifesaver (with security) move to vehicle.
- e. First aid administered. Leader surveys vehicle.
- f. Leader reports action to higher headquarters.
- g. Leader posts new shift. Shift on duty during incident prepares witness statements and waits for investigation team from higher headquarters.
- h. Checkpoint assault element engages in accordance with the ROE.

* Indicates a critical task
Vignette #4

Lane trained: FOB defense

Tasks trained: EOF, vehicle and personnel search

Conditions: The unit is operating an ECP. The unit has been instructed to search vehicles and personnel for weapons and contraband items. The insurgents are likely to use small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, or mortar fires against your checkpoint. Additionally, the insurgents are likely to attack your checkpoint with a VBIED. The unit is prepared for the incremental use of force, including nonlethal means, proportionate to the threat and according to existing ROE.

Desired action: Soldiers manning the ECP implement the proper EOF measures to secure the ECP and its personnel.

OPFOR counter task: Attempt to enter the FOB through the ECP with weapons and explosives.

Conditions: The OPFOR conduct entry operations to enter a U.S. FOB. The OPFOR approach the ECP and attempt to enter the FOB in order to damage friendly facilities and inflict military and civilian casualties.

Standard: The OPFOR approach the ECP and attempt to enter the FOB in order to damage friendly facilities and inflict military and civilian casualties.

Performance steps:

- Planning/Preparation:
  - Reconnoiter your target area and determine the size, composition, and orientation of the threat force there.
  - Use personnel with and without proper IDs.

- Execution:
  - Driver arrives at initial ID checkpoint of ECP without an ID.
  - Driver arrives at initial ID checkpoint of ECP with proper ID.
  - Driver or passenger is carrying a concealed weapon.
## Resources:

- 20 COBs
- 3 OPFOR
- 18 Spotlights
- 20 Deployable speed bumps
- 20 Collapsible spike strips
- 35 Collapsible sawhorses
- 1 Grenade simulator
- 1 IED mock-up (in vehicle)
- 30 Arabic signs
- 18 Orange flags
- 18 Air horns
- 36 Orange cones
- 1 GSA

### TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES</th>
<th>GO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Leader tasks organizes unit to accomplish assigned tasks. Task organization includes: *</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Security elements</td>
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<td>b. Sentries</td>
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<td>c. Search teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Aids to conduct search: mirrors, lights, dogs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Unit executes vehicle search.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Vehicle approaches, security reports.</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Barrier sentry moves into position to stop vehicle.</td>
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<td>c. Barrier sentry allows vehicle to pass forward into checkpoint on signal from ECP NCOIC. No more than one vehicle allowed into the ECP at one time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. NCOIC/designated sentinel inquires purpose of vehicle and examines papers, trip authorization, and identification. NCOIC/designated sentinel is covered by security elements. Another guard is looking into interior of vehicle for suspicious objects or hidden contents.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. NCOIC/designated sentinel allows vehicle to pass.</td>
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</table>
3. Unit conducts a stop and search.
   a. Repeat steps 2a through 2c, above.
   b. NCOIC/designated sentinel directs vehicle into search area.
   c. Search team begins search.
      (1) Occupants of vehicle (except driver) moved to a personnel search area.
      (2) Driver asked to open all doors, trunk and engine covers, and other compartments as needed.
      (3) Driver remains nearby to observe search of vehicle, covered by a guard.
      (4) Searcher uses mirrors and flashlight to check vehicle undercarriage first. Searcher looks for new electrical wiring, unusual configurations, strapped-on or taped packages.
      (5) Searcher examines interior of vehicle.

4. Unit conducts personnel search.
   a. Unit provides security to individual conducting searches.
   b. Searcher conducts same-sex contact search.
   c. Searcher conducts different-sex noncontact search.

5. Search of personnel or vehicle identifies contraband or prohibited items.
   a. Searcher announces discovery.
   b. NCOIC informs personnel they will be detained for questioning and their prohibited items will be confiscated.
   c. Detained persons moved to detainee holding area until arrival of military or civil police.
   d. Vehicle is moved out of search area, but is kept in a place where it can be observed.
   e. NCOIC reports action to higher headquarters.

* Indicates a critical task
Section III: National Training Center (NTC) EOF Integration

How does the NTC integrate EOF civilian casualties into its institutional structure, training, and transformation?

Background: In early 2006, theater commanders began requesting that training centers emphasize EOF procedures. In June 2006 an EOF conference, hosted by the U.S. Army Infantry Center, was held at the NTC. The outcomes of the conference resulted in the development and establishment of standard EOF kits to be used at the NTC.

The Army Center of Excellence with the Tarantula observer/controller (O/C) team became the NTC proponent for building and fielding EOF kits to training units. The NTC adopted a theater EOF model and developed supporting “leaders teach” programs for units during their NTC rotation. Throughout their 14-day rotation, Soldiers participate in complex scenarios developed by the NTC. During the first five to six days of mission essential task (MET) lanes, EOF is built into every lane to allow Soldiers to experience maximum repetitions.

Discussion: The NTC integrates EOF civilian casualties into its institutional structure, training, and transformation through several methods.

As an institution, this integration includes:

- Quarterly visits to units in theater to conduct debriefings and collect current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Collected information is included in officer and noncommissioned officer professional development classes conducted for O/Cs.

- Post rotational after-action reviews (AARs) conducted by all O/Cs to evaluate the development and execution of the rotation scenario.

- Data collection and review of the latest Center for Army Lessons Learned products and products of sister services and coalition partners.

- Exchange programs that assign foreign military liaison officers to the NTC.

- Assigning Soldiers recently returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as O/Cs at the NTC.

- Quarterly EOF councils that update and review current EOF-based scenarios.
Review of rotation surveys of civilians on the battlefield to examine observations that would enhance training scenarios.

Use of authentic role players.

In training, this integration includes:

- The Leader’s Training Program (LTP). Initial introduction to EOF is conducted during the LTP. In the planning process during the unit’s leadership training program, commanders and staffs develop risk mitigation measures to limit potential EOF incidents. Units receive a CD with EOF products such as cards, vignettes, “leaders teach” programs, and kit configurations.

- Situational training exercise (STX) lanes. Units execute several iterations of complex scenarios exposing them to EOF. Units are closely scrutinized on their EOF procedures. At every level O/Cs work closely with the Soldiers and leaders to ensure they fully understand how to conduct proper EOF procedures. Units are given immediate feedback through the AAR process. It is through repetition of these lanes that units start to improve. Additionally, “leader teaches” training is conducted by the O/Cs for the unit leadership.

- During the sustainment replenishment, units continue to be evaluated. If an EOF incident causes an injury or death of a civilian or collateral damage, the unit must conduct an informal AR 15-6, Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers investigation as well as produce a story board for their parent brigade. O/Cs on the ground will gather all data of the incident to share with other O/Cs and units, as well as conduct an on-the-spot AAR to correct any and all deficiencies. At the conclusion of SRO units, every Soldier and leader should understand the following:
  - Convoy and combat patrol procedures
  - Communications (administrative/logistics [A/L] frequency for country)
  - Checkpoint procedures
  - Actions at incident site
  - ROE/EOF procedures
  - Medical evacuation of civilians (helicopter lift for urgent [life, limb, eyesight])
  - Reporting procedures
  - Investigation of all incidents
  - Compensation and claims process
- Public awareness projects
- Convoy discipline and TTP:
  - * Road usage (convoys block road)
  - * Speed (convoys move slow)
  - * Procedures for overtaking/passing convoys

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<th>Subject Area</th>
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<td>ROE/EOF</td>
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<td>No understanding of ROE/EOF training</td>
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<td>Equipment and procedures trained to squad leader level; equipment distributed; covered in company/team OPORD/FRAGO; language cards/ electronic interpreters available</td>
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<td>ROE/EOF conducted to standard *</td>
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<td>Smart card/SOP enforced; effective use of language cards/electronic interpreters to mitigate ROE/EOF incidents; accurate and timely reporting through chain of command when an EOF incident occurs</td>
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<td>Thorough and complete investigation is conducted by the command within 72 hours of an EOF incident being reported</td>
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* Equipment and procedures trained to Soldier level; adequate equipment on hand; covered in patrol operations order (OPORD)/fragmentary order (FRAGO) and rehearsals; standing operating procedures (SOP)/smart card available; special equipment training to operator level; reporting requirements understood to Soldier level
Below are the sets, kits, and outfits that are provided to rotational units:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rapid Equipping Force (REF) Convoy Kit (Sub-components listed below)</th>
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<td>Sirens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handheld translators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green lasers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapon-mounted flashlight (SureFire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handheld spotlight</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTA cards</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>REF Traffic Control Point (TCP) Kit (Sub-components listed below)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Green lasers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic signs (large)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic cones with LED strobe lights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tire spike strip</td>
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<td>Speed bumps</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTA cards</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Handheld traffic signs (stop signs)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deliberate TCP Kit (Sub-components listed below)</strong></td>
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<td>Portable vehicle arresting barrier</td>
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<td>Illuminated search area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aqua-Snake Eye II (liquid container inspection tool)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Light set w/6 x lights with tripods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voice response translator</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Handheld lights and wands</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Item</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handheld metal detector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Search mirrors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Checkpoint signs (1 set of 4 signs)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hasty TCP Kit (Sub-components listed below)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary vehicle search pack</td>
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<tr>
<td>- SLAM mirror w/SureFire flashlight</td>
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<td>- Lumenyte wand w/SureFire flashlight</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lumenyte vest lights w/tactical shield</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 12V DC adaptor cables</td>
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<tr>
<td>- SureFire flashlight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orange safety vest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handheld metal detector</td>
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<td>Vehicle inspection checklist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magnum Spike System MS-16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phraselator Model 2000 w/functional programming module</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voice response translator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle lightweight arresting device net</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Hedge hogs&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sound commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caltrops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lyte flares</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armorer's kit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Packing, marking, integration, and training</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NTC Hasty TCP Kit (Sub-components listed below)</strong></td>
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<td>Vehicle spike strips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic cones</td>
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<tr>
<td>ExSpray explosives detection kit</td>
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</table>
Below are a few examples of storyboards used at the NTC as teaching tools:

![VBIED at Peanut](image)

**Figure 2-1. VBIED at Peanut**

Legend:
- AIF: anti-Iraqi forces
- BDA: battle damage assessment
- CAT KILL: catastrophic kill
- HVT: high-value target
- ID: identify
- KIA: killed in action
- L/U: litter urgent
- MKILL: mobility kill
- MSR: main supply route
- SVBIED: suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
Figure 2-2. EOF during Dismounted Patrol: Medina Wasl

Legend:
BLDG: building  PLT: platoon
DOW: died of wounds  TRP: troop
PL: platoon leader

Observations:
- Shout to "shoot to kill"
- Vehicle and civilian driver were never searched
- Civilian driver was not given aid after being shot
  - His body was taken to the town hall by local citizens
  - He died as a result of his wounds

Lessons Learned:
- Provide aid to those you harm.
- Graduated use of force can prevent needless civilian injury.

Figure 2-3. Five Cs and EOF

TIME LINE:
0829 Patrol begins route clearance
0954 Identifies IED, establishes rear cordon, and flanks dismount
1039 Civilian vehicle passes IED and enters cordon
1110 Clears area and continues mission

OBSERVATIONS:
(*) Dismounted through Tier 1 terrain to interdict potential triggermen
(-) Failed to establish 360-degree cordon around IED site, particularly far side
(*) No attempt to execute EOF by lead Bradley as vehicle approached

LESSON LEARNED:
Prior to interrogation, a tight cordon must be established around an IED to safeguard Soldiers and civilians.
As a part of transformation, the NTC continues to upgrade its equipment, scenarios, and take-home training packages to ensure units continue to receive first-class training and scenario support remains transparent.

Section IV: EOF at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

In recognition of the importance of EOF training and to reinforce the intent to reduce EOF incidents in Iraq, JRTC recently made EOF training a priority objective for rotational training units during their mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at Fort Polk, LA. The JRTC remains committed to continued excellence in replicating the operational environment faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Traffic control point (TCP) and other friction-laden events have been part of every OIF MRE since the first MRE in 2003. With the heightened need for EOF-specific training, the JRTC immediately took steps to ensure Soldiers are properly trained. Because of the density of O/Cs, JRTC is particularly well suited for this critical task.

Figure 2-4. EOF/C-IED at Medina Wasl

Legend:
C-IED: counter improvised explosive device
COB-V: civilians on the battlefield-vehicle
EOD: explosive ordnance disposal
FA: field artillery
FOB: forward operations base

EOF/C-IED at MEDINA WASL

**BDA:**
2 AIF KIA, 1 COB-V Mobility

**TIME LINE:**
0600 ID vehicle moving to emplace IED
0605 Move to interdict/AIF
0615 Search identified 3 x 155-mm rounds
0620 Battalion notified/EOD is requested
0728 EOD arrives on site/dispose of IED
0800 EOD departs; mission complete

**OBSERVATIONS:**
(+) Conducted 5Cs to standard
(+) Cross-talk between scouts and H-H CAB to inform of IED outside of FOB King
(+) Good use of EOF equipment
(-) Initial movement to interdict could have compromised security

**LESSON LEARNED:**
Continuous rehearsals of EOF/C-IED will enhance the effectiveness and understanding of the 5Cs, which will result in a safe environment and mission success.
Use and Adapt the Basics

In approaching the EOF issue, JRTC emphasizes basics and adapting basics to the operational environment, a paradigm linking doctrine to TTP. The Army has always taught the principles needed to win the EOF fight. The JRTC focus is on Soldiers, because the individual Soldier is the one who makes life and death decisions to shoot or not. JRTC leaders and O/Cs fully understand that training Soldiers in EOF is a monumental responsibility, requiring extraordinary guidance and supervision from leaders at every level.

Turning to basics offers a way to approach the complexities of EOF. Consider a defense. Leaders do not put Soldiers into positions without guidance. Leaders define an engagement area, position forces and assign sectors of fire, provide information about adjacent units, and give instruction on what to do upon contact. Leaders define engagement priorities and engagement criteria. These same steps can be applied to TCP and EOF. Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the Army have defined the EOF process; applying it to a given TCP is exactly the same as defining a defense. As the engagement area is defined, leaders must draw the trigger lines from nonlethal to lethal for their Soldiers. Those same leaders must rehearse their Soldiers. This approach frames how the JRTC implements and trains rotational units on EOF issues.

Pre-rotation contacts and training

As part of all pre-rotational training, O/Cs monitor MNC-I and major subordinate commands' Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) Web sites and contact counterparts in theater to ensure JRTC exercises remain relevant. In the case of EOF, this interaction begins with the JRTC commanding general, who makes it a point to highlight the importance of EOF procedures as a key to success in pre-rotation sessions with the brigade combat team (BCT) leadership.

The JRTC uses current unclassified Soldier-level ROE and EOF cards. The O/Cs pass this information on to their rotational counterparts during the O/C linkup in the LTP. The O/Cs further provide unit leaders with references to the MNC-I SIPRNET homepage and the best-practices folder, where additional information on EOF is available. The JRTC has incorporated the current unclassified MNC-I ROE and EOF card in the OIF rotational ROE annex. These products are included in the D-30 predeployment operations and intelligence packages sent to units.

STX lanes and EOF

The predeployment emphasis on EOF continues in the MRE, as the JRTC has made critical changes to STX, live-fire training, and the force-on-force portion of the MRE. During the unit STX lanes for cordon and search, combat convoy, combat patrol, and area security missions, lane O/Cs require units to integrate EOF rehearsals during troop-leading procedures. Lane O/Cs also discuss EOF during the unit AARs. EOF training is also incorporated as part of the engagement training scenario STX lane (the brigade’s company-grade leaders must interact with a local leader following an EOF incident that resulted in civilian casualties).
Live-fire EOF incidents

The JRTC Live Fire Division is also changing how units are presented EOF scenarios. The division O/Cs are currently revamping the company convoy live-fire scenario, requiring the unit to establish a snap TCP. The units are presented with two targets: one vehicle poses no threat, while the other attempts to bypass the checkpoint. In each case Soldiers are required to execute appropriate EOF procedures.

Applying the effects of EOF incidents

During the force-on-force portion of the MRE, Soldiers’ use of EOF procedures during an EOF incident drives the role-player interaction with the unit. Role-player attitudes adjust, and the village trends reflect actions taken by the rotational unit. Operations Group Plans and Exercise Maneuver Control (Plans/EMC) manages this process through a daily synchronization meeting that reviews and adjusts to unit interactions and consequence-management efforts. In support of that effort, the JRTC Center for Army Lessons Learned office developed a standardized EOF report that allows the O/Cs to collect data on EOF events throughout the rotational unit area of operations.

For example, scripted or planned events for a rotational unit FOB, such as a pregnant woman or injured local, present opportunities to train the unit on EOF as O/Cs gather data on the results. O/C divisions also report all planned and hasty TCP locations so that Plans/EMC can direct role-play personnel and vehicle traffic to those locations. These hasty TCPs afford the Operations Group an opportunity to facilitate EOF training. Data from these reports is collected by the Joint Operations Center battle captain and used in the commanding general’s daily situational update. The information is also provided to the unit as part of the BCT AAR.

EOF Incident Report

EOF procedures are sequential actions that begin with nonlethal force measures and continue to lethal force measures in order to defeat a threat and protect the force.

An EOF incident is any direct action that results in weapon discharge where the purpose or intent of the weapon discharge is to warn or defend an individual or unit.

1. O/C call sign.
2. Rank/Name.
3. Date/Time of incident.
4. Who was involved in the incident?
5. What happened?
6. When did the unit report the incident?
7. Where did the incident occur?
8. What caused the incident?
Graphic Soldier aids

The brigade command and control (C2) division has developed and distributed Soldier-friendly EOF-tailored range cards to the BCT. Again, the JRTC emphasizes basics, adapted to the operational environment (see Figures 2-5 and 2-6 below). These EOF range cards are based on the standard range card, DA Form 5517-R. The data found on the card is based on the MNC-I EOF procedure card and is separated into three areas: a notice and evaluation area, a traffic control area, and an engagement zone. The C2-designed EOF card allows a Soldier to accomplish multiple tasks without creating additional requirements or using multiple resources.

Figure 2-5. Standard range card
Asking Soldiers about EOF

Next, O/Cs survey the BCT on EOF and ROE questions. This survey roughly encompasses five percent of the BCT and provides BCT leaders with general observations and feedback on their Soldiers’ comprehension of EOF procedures and the ROE. This information is coupled with rotational EOF incident vignettes and is discussed in the final brigade AAR to help the unit identify training strengths and weaknesses.

Combat camera

To provide Soldiers with a more holistic view of their actions at a TCP, the OPFOR have mounted dashboard cameras to a small number of vehicles used during the force-on-force portion of the rotation. This camera depicts the OPFOR point of view as they attempt to engage the rotational unit. These visuals allow Soldiers to learn positive lessons on how to halt an attack and protect themselves and to prevent future attacks.

Future EOF Kits and Facilities

The JRTC plans further improvements to support EOF-specific training. In the near term, the JRTC Operations Group is in the process of acquiring EOF kits that will allow units to fully capture the MRE training experience. These kits allow the rotational unit to train on equipment it will have in theater.

The kits will include equipment that allows the unit to signal an individual audibly or visually and, if necessary, to slow or stop an approaching threat. The equipment includes:

- Spike strips with rubber inserts
- Traffic cones
• Bull horns

• Various signs printed in Arabic that state “Stop,” “Slow down,” “Prepare to be searched,” “Search area,” and “Stay back 50 meters”

In addition to the EOF kits, the JRTC Operations Group is also in the process of building two TCPs that integrate all the trigger points shown on the EOF card to allow Soldiers to understand what “right” looks like.

**EOF Training is Fundamental to Victory**

Coalition forces must reduce the number of indiscriminate killings. The Operations Group remains focused on cogent training of Soldiers in EOF procedures. The Operations Group is committed to making the necessary changes to training in the LTP, STX, live fire, and force-on-force exercises to ensure Soldiers grasp the importance of EOF procedures. More importantly, the Operations Group is committed to ensuring Soldiers understand their inherent right to self-defense so they are better trained to protect themselves, their fellow Soldiers, and the citizens of the host nation, which creates a positive image of coalition forces.

**Summary**

EOF procedures integrated into training are intended to replicate the operational environment Soldiers face every day. EOF training has the primary goal of improving both leader and Soldier reactions when graduated response is necessary.

Demonstrating appropriate EOF procedures begins with a mindset that balances offensive and defensive operations. The ultimate benefit of EOF training is the prevention of unnecessary loss of life and injuries to Soldiers and noncombatants. The presence of perceived hostile action or demonstrated hostile intent only creates the necessity to act or respond. The guidelines for proportionality mandate that the action or response be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on the totality of circumstances. Lethal force cannot be the default option. Other options, including military nonlethal weapons/capabilities, must be available and used when appropriate.

Commanders report that there is a direct correlation between an increase in EOF incidents and the number of fratricide incidents. Everyone must maintain a heightened sense of situational awareness of the immediate environment, including visibility on elements that are not normally part of the organic task organization (contractors on the battlefield, nongovernmental organizations, interagency personnel, and multinational reconstruction personnel).

EOF incidents involving unwarranted lethal action negatively affect short- and long-term military objectives, adversely affect the ability to foster a strong partnership with the local population, and impede progress in establishing normalcy.
Chapter 3
Actual Operations

This chapter covers escalation of force (EOF) actual operations observations from the Iraqi theater in the war on terrorism.

Section I: EOF Observations, Insights, and Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

EOF incidents are a problem in OIF. On the one hand, units must provide for force protection. On the other hand, there is a perception that coalition forces (CF) engage in indiscriminate killing, which undermines information operations and public affairs campaigns.

Contributing Factors to EOF Incidents

- Incomplete guidance, training, and preparation.
- Inadequate dissemination of information and training.
- Lack of a public awareness campaign to educate the local populace on requirements at entry control points (ECP)/checkpoints and during other operations where CF and local populace interact.

Every leader and Soldier must understand the following:

- Convoy and combat patrol procedures
- All means of available tactical-level communications
- Checkpoint procedures
- Actions at incident site
- Rules of engagement (ROE)/EOF procedures
- Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of civilians (helicopter lift for urgent [life, limb, eyesight])
- EOF reporting procedures
- Investigation of all EOF incidents
- Evidence collection procedures
- Compensation and claims process for EOF incidents
- Public awareness projects
- Convoy discipline and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP):
  - Road usage (convoys block road)
Actual Operations Scenario Examples

Scenario #1

Convoys travel slowly. Provisions for overtaking/passing convoys

Convoy operations: You are the lead vehicle in a 20-vehicle northbound convoy on a busy road. Your convoy has slowed to 10 miles per hour (mph) due to traffic and road conditions. You see a civilian vehicle driving southbound at a high rate of speed in the northbound lanes about 150 meters (m) away. You attempt to wave the vehicle off, but it continues to approach. What do you do?

Solution:

- You must maintain and increase situational awareness. Iraqi drivers often disregard traffic laws. This realization must be factored into your analysis.

- Change lanes, if practical, and observe what the oncoming vehicle does.

- A vehicle passing a convoy is not by itself a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. However, the vehicle is traveling in the wrong direction and has disregarded your attempts to wave it off. What other measures (hand and arm signals, sirens, bullhorns, aimed weapon, laser dazzler) can you use to get the driver’s attention?

- At 50 m, when you are reasonably certain that the driver’s intent is hostile, engage to disable the vehicle and, if necessary, kill the driver.

The following figure represents convoy movement EOF procedures:

![Convoy EOF procedures diagram](image-url)
Scenario #2

Convoy operations: At a traffic control point (TCP), an M2 gunner sees a vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed. The other Soldiers at the checkpoint begin using hand and arm signals, small lasers, and other visible warnings to wave the vehicle off, but the vehicle continues to approach. The gunner uses his large green laser to signal the civilian driver to stay away, but the vehicle continues to approach. What is the next action the checkpoint Soldiers should take?

Solution:

- Gunner points M2 at the vehicle.

- If this has no effect and conditions allow, gunner should fire a burst of .50 caliber (cal) just off to the side of the vehicle.

- If this has no effect, gunner should fire a burst into the engine block to disable the vehicle and, finally, fire at the driver of the vehicle. This is an appropriate use of force to a perceived threat.

- Soldiers must assess the situation to determine whether the occupants need emergency medical assistance; render aid, if necessary; and then report the incident to higher headquarters.

The following figure illustrates a checkpoint/blocking position with EOF procedures:

![Figure 3-2: Checkpoint/blocking position with EOF procedures](image)

NOTE: EOF flow is illustrative and assumes that forces manning the checkpoint feel that the approaching vehicle is continuing to present a threat. If a vehicle demonstrates compliance or is evaluated as non-threatening then the EOF flow would cease.
Scenario #3

Convoy operations: You are a gunner in a 10-vehicle night convoy. You are in an area where there have been several attacks in the last few weeks. You see several flashes to the right, but you do not hear any gunshots. As the events unfold on your right flank, 250 m in front of your convoy is a car traveling on the wrong side with no headlights on coming towards you. What do you do?

Solution:

- Right flank event: You must have positive identification (PID) prior to engaging any target. You cannot engage the flashes of light with fire at this point. The flashes could be anything from nonhostile civilian activity to lateral friendly forces conducting an attack.

- Approaching vehicle event: Tension will be extremely high given the simultaneous scenarios, but the necessary steps of EOF must be applied.
  - Give visual warning using spotlights or lasers.
  - Use audio warning measures such as sirens or loudspeakers, if available.
  - Fire warning shots if conditions permit. Use disabling shots and lethal force only as a last step in the process.

Scenario #4

Convoy operations: You are a gunner in a five-vehicle military convoy heading southbound through a small village. You are passing a congested outdoor market and have slowed considerably when you observe a number of young men approximately 75 m away with AK-47s walking in the general direction of your convoy. You can clearly identify them, but they are surrounded by the large crowd of civilians in the market. The civilians do not seem to show any reaction to the gunmen. What do you do?

Solution:

- The gunmen do not appear to be making any threatening actions, but do appear to be Surrounding a pair of well-dressed older men. The best course of action in this case may be to maintain observation of the group and be prepared to react appropriately to any hostile act.

- If they do demonstrate any potential hostility, initiate audible communication (sirens and bull horns) and use hand and arm signals.

- Continued advance should be met with a show of weapons and demonstrated intent to use them. Quickly assess the response of the armed men and their estimated distance.
Given the large number of civilians in the area, firing shots would not be the best course of action. You are traveling in armored vehicles, so you would be protected from any small arms fire. Report the incident to higher headquarters or to the unit responsible for the area.

Scenario #5

Convoy operations: Your four-vehicle convoy is on the outskirts of Baghdad approaching an overpass. A crowd is gathering in the area just beneath the overpass, which slows your convoy. You see a man on the right flank about 130 m away running in an alley toward the overpass with an AK-47 at his side. What do you do?

Solution:

- Lead vehicle must focus on dispersing the crowd using sirens and hand and arm signals to allow the convoy to continue its mission.
- Number 2 vehicle in the convoy closes distance from lead vehicle and uses laser on the individual with weapon. Gunner also shouts and shows weapon. Remember that Iraqis may legally have small arms for the protection of their homes.
- Attempt to identify the individual with the weapon.
- Do not engage unless there are further indications of hostile intent or a hostile act.
- Possession of the weapon outside of the home is a crime, but not a reason to engage unless coupled with hostile intent, such as pointing the weapon in your direction.

Scenario #6

Convoy operations: You are in a convoy on the outskirts of Baghdad when the convoy suffers an improvised explosive device (IED) attack. As you focus your attention on the location of the IED, you notice a small, white flatbed truck approximately 300 m away breaking away from the queue behind you and coming toward your stopped convoy. What can you do?

Solution:

- At 300 m, begin assessing possible threat.
- At 200 m, use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, signs).
- Show weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
- At 100 m, attempt nonlethal means (laser dazzler, visual/audio signal, signs).
- At 75 m, fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat).
• Use disabling fire (tires, engine block, windows).

• Use deadly force (proportional).

EOF Actual Operations Vignettes

Vignette #1

Outer cordon/cordon and search mission: EOF by a unit in Iraq results in two civilians killed, two civilians injured, and no coalition forces injured or equipment damaged.

Summary: EOF by the unit was on the outer cordon for a cordon and search mission when a civilian vehicle approached and ignored shouts, vehicle horn, and flashed lights. The unit fired one shotgun round as a warning shot. The vehicle ignored the warnings and continued onward. The unit fired 13 to 15 rounds of 7.62-mm into the vehicle.

Vignette #2

Screen mission: EOF by a unit in Iraq results in two civilians killed, two civilians injured, and no coalition forces injured or equipment damaged.

Summary: The unit had an EOF incident while conducting screening for an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit. While posted at an intersection, the patrol observed a vehicle traveling at an unusually slow speed coming toward the cordon from the north. Because of the sustained enemy contact over the preceding 30 minutes and the unusually slow speed of the vehicle, the unit suspected a possible suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED). At 327 m, Marines shouted and used hand and arm signals in an attempt to stop the vehicle. At 260 m, the gunner fired three .50-cal (M2) rounds at the deck in front of the vehicle. At 175 m, the gunner fired ten .50-cal (M2) disabling rounds into the vehicle. The vehicle came to a stop. The driver jumped out of the car and ran to the west out of sight. Within seconds of the engagement, a second vehicle heading from the same direction approached the cordon in the same manner. Again, the unit believed it to be a possible SVBIED and initiated verbal commands as well as hand and arm signals to attempt to stop the vehicle. At 250 m, the vehicle did not stop, and the gunner fired three warning shots of .50-cal (M2) rounds at the deck in front of the vehicle. The vehicle initiated erratic movements, stopping as if to turn around, and then continued south towards the cordon. At 190 m, the gunner fired three .50-cal (M2) disabling rounds into the vehicle. When the second round impacted, the vehicle immediately ignited and was almost instantly consumed by flames from the ensuing fire. The driver exited the vehicle prior to it being completely engulfed by flames, and ran away from the vehicle and out of sight.

Vignette #3

Convoy mission: EOF by a unit in Iraq results in two civilians killed, two civilians injured, and no coalition forces injured or equipment damaged.

Summary: The unit reported an EOF incident while moving south on an auxiliary supply route. The patrol reported a vehicle approaching their patrol from the rear at
a high rate of speed. The patrol used hand and arm signals to wave the vehicle off, but it kept approaching the patrol. The patrol fired a warning shot into the ground, but the vehicle did not slow down or stop. The patrol then fired into the vehicle’s engine compartment, and the vehicle stopped. The patrol reported that the two civilians in the vehicle suffered no life-threatening wounds. The civilians were transported to the hospital by local emergency services.

**Vignette #4**

**Convoy mission:** EOF by a unit in Iraq results in no civilians killed or injured and no coalition forces injured or equipment damaged.

**Summary:** The unit reported an EOF incident while securing an intersection. A local national vehicle was approaching eastbound on the road. The vehicle ignored a spotlight to stop. The unit fired one 5.56-mm round from an M4 when the vehicle was approximately 100 m away. The vehicle continued to approach, and the unit fired another M4 round when the vehicle was approximately 50 m away. The vehicle then stopped, and the convoy continued on its mission without further incident.

**Section II: EOF TTP Employed by a Military Police Battalion in OIF**

Military police (MP) are trained on graduated response measures when dealing with the public during potentially volatile situations. This training includes integration of nonlethal and lethal TTP and equipment. It is imperative that MP and all Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty, understand and correctly apply EOF procedures. EOF procedures enable alternatives to the use of lethal force. Apply the following graduated response measures when responding to a hostile act or to hostile intent.

**Defensive Procedures to Employ During EOF Incidents**

- Use audible communications to warn (horn, air horn, loudspeaker, flash/bang device, siren).
- Use hand and arm signals.
- Use visual aids (lights, laser pointers, flares, colored flags, signs).
- Show weapon and demonstrate intent to use it.
- Attempt nonlethal means (stop strips, physical barrier, vehicle, visual/audio signal, signs).
- Fire warning shots (in vicinity of threat).
- Use disabling fire (tires, engine block, windshield and/or windows).
- Use deadly force as a last resort (proportional to threat).
EOF incident actions:

- Physically restrain, block access, or detain.
- Fire a warning shot into the ground in the direction of the threat.
- Use the lowest caliber weapon assigned (a non-crew-served weapon) and, if possible, the first round should be a tracer.
- Fire into the engine block or windshield to help reduce or eliminate the threat.

Unnecessary Deadly Force Engagements

Contributing factors:

- Predeployment training did not use current in-theater EOF policy and procedures.
- Training scenarios did not replicate the complex and often ambiguous environment in Iraq.
- Training did not include “what if” vignette drills to train best and worst case scenarios.
- Higher headquarters did not provide detailed EOF guidance to lower units.
- Leaders are not enforcing EOF standards.
- Leaders are not talking to Soldiers; Soldiers are not talking to each other.
- Units are not making EOF part of mission analysis before establishing TCP or conducting combat patrols.
- Units are not adjusting their standing operating procedures (SOP) or battle drills to prevent excessive use of force incidents.
- Units are not integrating EOF into precombat inspections/precombat checks, actions on contact, battle drills, and after-action reviews.
- Units are not meeting local Iraqi leaders to make them aware of EOF procedures, which results in a lack of local community understanding of TCP operations.
- Units are not interacting with the Iraqi population.
- Soldiers are not aware of Iraqi significant calendar events that may significantly increase vehicle traffic.
- Soldiers are not aware of local business locations and operating hours in the vicinity of their TCP area of operations and CF combat patrols.
• Soldiers are not exercising positive control or muzzle awareness on weapons systems.

• Units are not consistently reporting EOF incidents in a timely manner.

• Units are not conducting constant reviews of EOF procedures.

**Information required to prevent potential fratricide incidents:**

• Location of adjacent units/TCP.

• CF movement control plan, including CF scheduled movement credits, planned Iraqi movements, and contractor movements.

• Iraqi Army (IA)/Iraqi Police Services (IPS) movements and interagency/nongovernmental movements, if known.

• Aviation reconnaissance plan.

• Quick reaction force (QRF) plan.

• IA/IPS support at TCP and/or their patrol patterns.

• Medical evacuation support (air and ground; military [Iraqi and coalition] and civilian).

• Vehicle recovery plan.

• Detainee transportation assets supporting evacuation plan.

• EOD support.

**EOF TTP**

**Patrols traveling against the flow of traffic**

*(Note: All distances are approximate and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations [METT-TC]-dependent.)*

• Inform all elements in the convoy of the change in the direction of travel.

• Look approximately 100 m ahead and assess a safe point to cross. If available, position an M1117 as the lead vehicle of the convoy to block traffic when crossing over.

• Alert oncoming traffic, and ensure the traffic comes to a complete halt.

  ◦ Ensure all elements in the convoy are aware of the crossing point.

  ◦ Ensure oncoming traffic is at a complete halt and the lane is clear where the convoy will travel.
Slowly cross the median and proceed in the new direction of travel.

- Lead vehicle should have a siren or use of a siren from within the element. Position siren so it is audible.
- Rear vehicles of the convoy are positioned to provide security to allow the convoy to cross.
- Once all vehicles have crossed the median, rear security vehicles are positioned back in the convoy.
- Convoy continues mission at a reduced and safe speed, maintaining the ability to avoid oncoming traffic.
- If the patrol encounters an oncoming local national vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed:
  - Use siren, blow horn, flash lights, and use hand and arm signals.
  - If you fire a warning shot, use proper EOF procedures.
  - Driver must reduce speed and look for a safe location to maneuver vehicle, if possible.
- Night and limited visibility movement TTP may be adjusted, but EOF procedures must be followed.

**Warning shots, if permitted by ROE**

- Warning shots should be used as a last resort immediately prior to the use of deadly force.
- 75 m: Fire warning shots in the vicinity of the vehicle; be alert to the possibility of injuring innocent civilians; take prudent, necessary measures to avoid and/or mitigate collateral damage.
- 50 m: Fire at the engine block of the vehicle to disable it.
- 25 m: Fire aimed shots at the driver to stop the vehicle; fire no more rounds than necessary; stop firing as soon as the situation permits.
- Establish and maintain 360-degree security; scan close in and out, high and low, around vehicle, and around the convoy.
- If situation permits, approach the vehicle and question the occupants.
- Present occupants with a preprinted claim card of instructions, and explain why warning shots were fired.
- Search the vehicle and occupants if you suspect/determine them to be a threat.
• If necessary, separate, restrain, and detain occupants.

• Maintain separate area for occupants during search.

• Do not allow anyone to enter the search area except authorized personnel; if possible/available, allow IPS to search emergency vehicles and personnel who may arrive on site.

• Plan for the transport of detained and wounded individuals or individuals who were killed.

• Secure the vehicle at the scene; if security situation permits, employ biometrics to include digital photographs.

• Take statements from local nationals on the scene and from patrols once they return to the forward operations base (FOB).

**Dismounted troops in contact encountering IEDs**

• Maintain 360-degree security; be prepared for multiple IEDs and follow-on attacks.

• Move away to an established safe distance (300 m).

• Attempt to confirm suspected IEDs.

• Cordon off the area:
  
  o Direct personnel out of the danger area.
  
  o Do not allow anyone to enter the area except EOD.
  
  o Question, search, and detain suspects.
  
  o If security situation permits, employ biometrics to include digital photographs.

• Treat/evacuate casualties and assess battle damage to the extent possible.

• Report situation using a 9-line IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO) format.

• **Before engaging any target, you must have PID**, defined as a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a legitimate military target.

• The convoy commander will determine if the vehicle forward of the IED will proceed to the rally point established during the battle drill or consolidate 300 m in front of the IED and establish a fighting position.
Mounted troops in contact encountering IEDs

- Move out of the kill zone.
  - Drivers who cannot brake quickly enough to avoid coming within 100 m of the kill zone (IED) should speed up and move through the kill zone.
  - Drivers who can stop before entering the kill zone: immediately back up 300 m without breaking contact with the forward element.
- Maintain 360-degree security; scan close in and far out, up high and down low.
- While staying as far back as possible, scan the immediate sector for more IEDs using optics.
  - Move away at an established safe distance.
  - Plan for 300 m safe distance.
- Cordon off the area.
  - Direct people out of the danger area.
  - Do not allow anyone to enter the area except EOD.
  - Question, search, and detain suspects.
  - If security situation permits, take digital photographs.
- Treat/evacuate casualties and assess damage to the extent possible.
- Report situation using a 9-line IED/UXO format.
- Before engaging any target, you must have PID.
- The convoy commander will determine if the vehicle forward of the IED will proceed to the established rally point or consolidate 300 m in front of the IED and establish a fighting position.

Summary

Leadership must continue to ensure increased emphasis on EOF by providing in-depth training down to the user level and nonlethal equipment to convoys. Convoy commanders traveling throughout Iraq and Afghanistan are faced with the difficult decision on when to apply lethal force. Integration and application of EOF-related TTP, along with the use of nonlethal equipment, must be continually and vigilantly reinforced during actual operations. EOF-related TTP should be emphasized during relief in place/transfer of authority from one unit to another in the area of operations.
Reports from the Iraqi theater of operations indicate units that have a good understanding of how to positively influence information operations and actively plan for consequence management (taking into account the safety and protection of civilian life and property, resulting in mitigating EOF-related incidents) can achieve greater long-term force protection for CF and civilians alike, enhancing mission success. Increased engagement with a local population that better understands and supports CF efforts has resulted in increased levels of actionable human intelligence to target insurgents.
Chapter 4
Tools and Equipment

Section I: Nonlethal Munitions and Tools

The use of nonlethal weapons and munitions provide a safer, less-than-lethal alternative to warn and deter individuals during potential escalation of force (EOF) incidents. Units should use nonlethal munitions and tools whenever possible during EOF incidents. Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and Sailors should conduct proper training, familiarization, and certification with each type of nonlethal munitions and tools prior to their use.

40-mm Nonlethal Munitions

Figure 4-1. M1006, 40-mm nonlethal cartridge (sponge grenade)

Sponge grenades have greater than 85 percent accuracy at 30 meters (m) (E-silhouette) and greater than 60 percent accuracy at 50 m (E-silhouette) when fired from an M16A2/M203 or an M4/M203. Engagement range is 10 to 50 m.

Considerations

- Fatal injuries are possible at employment distances of less than 32.8 feet (10 m).
- At distances of 10 m to 50 m, target area should be center mass.
- Training must reinforce that head shots are not acceptable.
- Do not skip fire this round. Round becomes unpredictable upon striking the ground.
- Round is most effective against individually selected targets (point round).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Defense Identification Code for 40-mm Munitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BA06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training requirements for 40-mm nonlethal ammunition

- Pre-training:
  - M203 qualification.
  - Capabilities briefing on all types of 40-mm nonlethal ammunition being used (specifications and lethal limitations).

- Familiarization fire:
  - Engage stationary truck (4’x 8’ panel) at 25 m from standing position (1 round).
  - Engage stationary truck at 50 m from standing position (1 round).
  - Engage stationary truck from a stationary M1114 at 25 to 50 m (1 round).

- EOF exercise:
  - Individual basic load consists of six M1006 rounds.
  - Fire one round at a truck target at 50 m from a stationary M1114.
  - Escalate force to M4/M6 to engage truck target at 25 m from a stationary M1114.

Green light lasers

**Z-Bolt BTG-2/10 (laser pointer):** Output power is less than 5 milliwatt (mW) (Class IIIa laser). Eye safe distance is 10 m.

**B.E. Meyers Mini-Green:** Output power is 125 mW (Class IIIb laser). Eye safe distance is 18 m (unaided viewing)/12m (with magnifying optics).
Figure 4-2a. Green light laser

Figure 4-2b. Green light laser

Figure 4-2c. Green light laser
Green light laser control measures and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)

The following TTP provide general guidance to prevent misuse of the green light laser systems. Maximum exposure times should be calculated for the device at the intended ranges and briefed to operators. Commanders must ensure that Soldiers are aware of the warnings and hazards for each type of laser employed.

Employ laser systems as an EOF tool when:

- Lethal force is not appropriate.
- Lethal force is justified and available for backup, but lesser force may subdue the aggressor.
- Lethal force is justified but could cause collateral effects such as injury to bystanders or damage to property and the environment.
- Otherwise justified by unit standing operating procedures (SOP) and/or rules of engagement (ROE).

Users should never attempt to blind an individual with a laser. Lasers can only be used to gain a suspect individual’s or group’s attention and/or as a visible alert and warning that the individual is a target.

Green light laser control measures:

- The laser is a nonlethal weapon; keep the laser on safe (batteries removed/safe cable disconnected) when not in use, and never intentionally point the laser at anyone except an aggressor.
- Never point the laser in anyone’s face for longer than five seconds.
- Include proper laser use and safety precautions when briefing ROE and EOF procedures during patrol and convoy briefs.
- Units should include information on laser hazards in their safety SOP and provide control measures to mitigate those hazards.
- Ensure laser operators are trained on the proper use and are familiar with the hazards and control measures to mitigate them, as listed in the operator’s manual; ensure Soldiers use proper eye protection during use.
- Preferred method of use is mounted on the individual or crew-served weapon:
  - Primary use is for EOF purposes.
  - Secondary use is for team chiefs/patrol leaders to positively identify enemy targets, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or designated sectors of fire.
Small laser TTP

- Never shine the laser at someone’s face if they are closer than 50 m.

- Never point the laser in anyone’s face for longer than five seconds to get their attention.

- Once you have their attention, place the beam on their chest if still needed.

- Patrons and convoys:
  - Shine the laser at the center of the hood or windshield of the vehicle when the approaching vehicle is head on. Start this procedure at 300 m to get the attention of the vehicle driver and at five-second intervals until the vehicle driver acknowledges your presence by pulling over to the side of the road.
  - When approaching vehicles from the rear, shine the laser at five-second intervals at the back window or in the driver’s side rear view mirror to get the attention of the vehicle driver or until the vehicle driver acknowledges your presence by pulling over to the side of the road.

- Traffic control points (TCPs) and static positions:
  - Lasers can be used effectively in the 50-300 m range in conjunction with audible warnings and physical barriers to slow or stop the subject.
  - At the alert line (300 m), the laser should be pointed at the hood of the vehicle.
  - At the warning line (200 m), the laser should be pointed at the center of the windshield of the vehicle.
  - At the stop line (100 m), point the laser at the individual, avoiding their face if possible.

Section II: EOF Kit Concept of Operations TTP
(Rapid Equipping Force)

Standard EOF Procedure Kit Employment Options

- Shout verbal warning to halt (siren and translator).

- Show your weapon and demonstrate intent to use it (spotlight, weapon-mounted flashlight, and green laser).

- Block access or detain (spike strips and speed bumps).
Fire a warning shot (green laser).

Shoot to kill (weapon-mounted flashlight and green laser).

**Convoy Kit Concept of Operations**

Units moving by vehicle convoy, which can consist of vehicles from coalition forces, local nationals, or third country nationals, employ the convoy kit to facilitate secure movement, increase convoy security, and reduce noncombatant casualties. The items found in the kit could be allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convoy Kit</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirens</td>
<td>2 Lead vehicle, convoy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translators</td>
<td>1 Convoy commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green lasers</td>
<td>4 All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon-mounted flashlights</td>
<td>4 One per vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spotlights</td>
<td>2 Lead vehicle, trail vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTA cards</td>
<td>8 2 per vehicle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of items found in the kit is based on a 4+ vehicle convoy.

The components of an EOF kit can notionally be used in the following manner:

- The lead vehicle uses the siren to clear a path through civilian traffic, while the convoy commander uses a siren to facilitate his own vehicle movement, as necessary.

- Each gunner uses a green laser to warn approaching vehicles that maneuver too closely to the convoy (rendering warning shots as a near last resort).

- The weapon-mounted flashlights provide illumination for aiming weapons at night.

- The spotlight mounted on the vehicle enables illumination of overpasses, one of the most dangerous areas on a convoy route, and provides general illumination to the flanks and rear (outside of the headlight fan). The other spotlight provides general illumination.
TCP Kit Concept of Operations

(Note: The CD included with this handbook visually portrays EOF kits developed and fielded by the Rapid Equipping Force and depicts “a way” to set up and execute snap TCP in urban and open desert terrain environments.)

The TCP kit is designed to allow small unit leaders and Soldiers to rapidly, temporarily, and effectively control the flow of vehicular traffic in a given area during daylight or darkness.

The reasons and operating conditions for establishing a TCP to temporarily control the flow of civilian or military vehicle traffic will vary depending on the situation. For example, a TCP could be employed at a hasty roadside checkpoint for the purpose of spot-checking civilian vehicles for contraband or other illegal activities or during severe weather that causes hazardous driving conditions. A TCP could also be used to assist with traffic control near a road hazard or construction, re-route traffic in the vicinity of a civilian or military vehicle accident, or isolate an area in the event of an IED incident.

A single TCP kit is best employed on a one-lane or two-lane road with a straight section of at least 200 m in length and at a location where vehicles cannot readily bypass the TCP.

While the TCP kit is capable of independent use, its contents can also be used as part of a more substantial traffic control operation.

The figure below outlines a notional traffic control point using a TCP kit.

![TCP Kit Concept of Operations Diagram](image)

**Figure 4-3**
EOF Kit Components

**Figure 4-4a. Speaker/Siren combo**

**Figure 4-4b. Voice Response Translator**

**Figure 4-4c. Mini green laser**

**Figure 4-4d. Handheld green laser**

**Figure 4-4e. Weapon-mounted flashlight**

**Figure 4-4f. Spike strips**
Figure 4-4g. Traffic cones with power flares

Figure 4-4h. Traffic paddles

The EOF convoy kit contains the tools needed in appropriate quantities to outfit a 4+ vehicle convoy. The concept of operations for EOF kits calls for a 3 to 1 ratio of convoy to TCP kits for a 4+ vehicle convoy. Each kit includes the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Convoy Kit</th>
<th>TCP Kit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirens</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser pointers</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green lasers</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic signs</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic cones/Power flares</td>
<td>6 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spike strips</td>
<td>1 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed bumps</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon-mounted flashlights</td>
<td>4 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spotlights</td>
<td>2 ea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTA cards</td>
<td>8 ea</td>
<td>8 ea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic paddles</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 ea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSLIN: FA959P 5895 01C029738 (Convoy Kit)
NSLIN: MB409Y 4940 01C038678 (TCP Kit)

All items in the kit are commercial off the shelf; all items on Government Services Administration schedule for direct purchase from the vendor.
Speaker/Siren combo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Option A) 690000-EOF - Siren</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vehicle mounted, vehicle powered. Siren device has loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject. Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside the vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8567079A-EOF - Mount</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS100-EOF - Speaker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The speaker/siren combo is used to alert civilian and nonmilitary traffic of a patrol and/or convey presence, especially at times of limited visibility. The system is also used to prevent unnecessary EOF measures from being used and to reduce the number of warning shot incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Option B) SK147-EOF - Siren/Speaker System, Vehicle Mounted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vehicle mounted, vehicle powered. Siren device has loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject. Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside the vehicle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The system is designed for easy operation under the stress associated with possible EOF measures.
- Siren functions are accessible with one simple motion without repetitive activation of switches or automatic timed switching that can interfere with desired operation.
- Siren device has loud horn and other siren tones that alert the intended subject.
- Speaker device employs a hand microphone and allows a verbal message to be broadcast from inside a vehicle.
Option A Operation:

General: All controls utilized during normal operation of the Model PA300 are located on the front panel (see Figure 4-5 above).

The optional MNCT-SB plug-in microphone provides high-quality voice reproduction in the public address mode. The microphone push-to-talk switch will override all siren functions, except radio rebroadcast, for instant public address use.

GAIN control: The GAIN control is used to turn the siren on and off. It is also used to control the volume when the siren is used for public address or radio amplification. Clockwise rotation of the knob increases voice volume in the public address or radio amplification mode. The GAIN control does not control the volume of the siren signals. The maximum clockwise setting of the control will be determined, in most cases, by the point at which feedback or “squeal” occurs. This point will depend on the microphone gain, open windows, speaker placement, proximity of reflecting surfaces (building or other vehicles), etc. Adjust the GAIN control to a position just below the point at which feedback occurs or as desired.

Selector switch (SW2): The selector switch is a five-position rotary switch used to select the mode of operation. The following are positions on the selector switch:

- RADIO: In this position incoming radio messages are amplified by the siren and rebroadcast over the outside speaker.
- MANUAL: In this position it is possible to operate the siren by activating the HORN/SIREN switch. The siren can also be activated by means of an auxiliary switch, such as the horn ring button (refer to press-and-hold functions below).
- WAIL: In this position the siren produces a continuous “wailing” sound, up and down in frequency.
- YELP: In this position a continuous, rapid “warbled” tone is generated.
- HI-LO: In this position a two-tone sound will be heard. This distinctive tone may be reserved for any special indication or situation.
HORN/SIREN switch: The HORN/SIREN switch, located on the left side of the front panel, activates the electronic air horn sound (up) or peak-and-hold sound (down) in any siren mode except radio.

TAP II functions: Tap II allows the driver to change the siren sound via the vehicle’s horn ring. This feature is especially effective for clearing traffic.

PRESS AND HOLD functions: Additional alternate sounds can be activated in two other selector switch positions by depressing and holding the horn ring for as long as the alternate sound is desired.

**Option B Operation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>With rotary switch in this position:</th>
<th>Pressing the MANUAL rocker switch does this:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THUNDER</td>
<td>Toggles the output to TWO-TONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YELP</td>
<td>Toggles the output to THUNDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAIL</td>
<td>Toggles the output to YELP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF (hands free)</td>
<td>Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that sweeps down when the button is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN (manual)</td>
<td>Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that sweeps down when the button is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA (public address)</td>
<td>Creates a manual WAIL tone while button is being held that stops immediately when the button is released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR HORN</td>
<td>Pressing the right side of rocker switch provides an air-horn tone while pressed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Voice Response Translator**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VRT-IWT-EOF Translation Device</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hands-free, eyes-free device; allows operator to maintain situational awareness. Translates preprogrammed English commands into Iraqi Arabic. Can be used dismounted with megaphone or in conjunction with the EOF Convoy Kit Vehicle Mounted Siren/Speaker system to broadcast message from vehicle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Handheld green laser**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Option A) BTMK-10-EOF Green Laser, Individual Weapon (with Weapon Mount and Remote Switch)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bright green laser used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on individual weapon. Remote wire allows operator to maintain weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Option B) Green Beam 1000 Green Laser, Individual Weapon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bright green laser used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on individual weapon.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Option A Operation:**

The handheld bright green laser is mounted on an individual weapon. Remote wire allows the operator to maintain weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger.

- The green laser designator is a multifunction laser illuminator/target designator designed for use with handheld and crew-served weapons.
- The green laser is used at operational checkpoints and roadblocks as a disorienting device for stopping vehicles and identifying potential vehicle-borne suicide bomber attackers.
The green laser can be used for less than lethal/active denial purposes to temporarily blind or disorient/confuse groups or individuals and to augment lead and trail vehicle weapons systems on convoys to warn local nationals to maintain a safe distance from the convoy.

The green laser can be used to illuminate potential IEDs found on convoy routes and provides a visual aid so all Soldiers in the convoy will have an understanding of where the potential IED is located.

The green laser can illuminate hostile enemy targets and identify the location of friendly forces.

**Mini-green laser**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>532P-M-EOF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Powerful, long-range green laser with a large beam used to dazzle and visually warn the intended subject. Mounted on crew-served weapon. Remote wire allows operator to maintain weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mini-green lasers are powerful, long-range lasers with a large beam mounted on a crew-served weapon. They are used to dazzle, and remote wire allows the operator to maintain a weapon-ready posture with firing hand on trigger.

- The primary use of the mini-green laser is a warning device for convoy and control point protection.

- The mini-green laser can be used for less than lethal/active denial purposes when utilizing the holographic diffusers to temporarily blind, disorient, or confuse groups or individuals. This laser can also augment lead and trail vehicle weapons systems on convoys to warn local nationals to maintain a safe distance from the convoy.

- The mini-green laser can be used at operational checkpoints and roadblocks as a disorienting device for stopping vehicles and identifying potential suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks.
Major components:

- Housing: The housing contains the electronics and controls for the laser. A built-in battery compartment is also inside the housing, accessible through the battery cap. There are no user serviceable parts inside the housing. **Do not attempt to open the housing.**

- Battery cap: This cap provides access to the battery compartment to replace batteries.

- Safety flip cap: This is a cap on the front of the laser, which covers the laser lens. It protects the lens from being scratched and prevents accidental emission from the laser. The safety flip cap must always be closed when the laser is not in use.

- Interlock plug and receptacle: These components are located on the side of the laser. When the interlock plug is removed from the interlock plug receptacle, the laser is disabled and will not emit optical radiation. The interlock plug must always be removed from the interlock plug receptacle when the laser is not in use.
Controls:

- Power switch: This switch selects the power setting for the laser: OFF, HIGH, SLOW (3 to 5 pulses per second), and FAST (7 to 9 pulses per second). The switch must always be in the OFF position when the laser is not in use.

- Momentary fire switch: This switch is used to activate the laser. The switch is “momentary” and will only activate the laser when pressed. It will not turn on the laser in a “continuous on” mode.

- Armed indicator light-emitting diode (LED): This LED is located to the left of the momentary fire switch. The amber armed indicator LED is lit when the interlock plug is inserted and the power switch is not in the OFF position.

- Emission indicator LED: This LED is located to the right of the momentary fire switch. The green emission indicator LED is lit when the laser is emitting green radiation.

Operation: (Caution: The use of controls, procedures, or adjustments to the unit other than those specified here may result in hazardous radiation exposure.)

- Inserting batteries: (Caution: Prior to inserting batteries, close the safety flip cap and verify that the power switch is in the OFF position.)
  - Unplug the interlock plug from the interlock plug receptacle.
  - Unscrew the battery cap and remove the batteries.
  - Insert new batteries with the positive (+) end in first (only use 3.0 volt CR123 cells), and screw the battery cap back into place.

- Activating laser: The laser is equipped with four activation devices: interlock plug, safety flip cap, power switch, and momentary switch. All four must be enabled before the unit will emit visible radiation. (Note: A remote activation cord is available from B. E. Meyers for remote activation of the laser through the interlock plug. Various lengths up to 30 centimeters are available.)
  - Insert the interlock plug into the interlock plug receptacle. (Note: The interlock plug must always be removed from the interlock plug receptacle when the laser is not in use.)
  - With the laser pointed down range, open the safety flip cap. (Note: The safety flip cap must always be closed when the laser is not in use.)
  - Turn the power switch to HIGH, SLOW, or FAST setting, as desired. (Note: The power switch must always be turned OFF when the laser is not in use.)
Warning and safety:

**WARNING:** **OPTICAL DENSITY SAFETY GLASSES OF 2.3 REQUIRED**

![DANGER]

**LASER RADIATION AVOID DIRECT EXPOSURE TO BEAM**

- 250mW MAX AT 532 nm
- CLASS IIIb IANSI CLASS 3b
- LASER PRODUCT

*Figure 4-9*

**WARNING**

IF USED INCORRECTLY, THIS UNIT CAN DAMAGE THE UNAIDED EYE. FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY.

Weapon-mounted flashlight

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M600A-EOF High Power Flashlight,</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Weapon-mounted, high-powered, durable flashlight with remote on/off switch. Used to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Mount</td>
<td></td>
<td>grab a subject’s attention.</td>
</tr>
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The scout light attaches to Picatiny Rail interface-equipped shoulder-fired weapons via an included dual thumbscrew mount. Switching is controlled with a tailcap-mounted momentary push button. Components are interchangeable, allowing the operator to configure light output and switch configuration to mission-specific applications.
Operation:

- Partially depress tailcap push button or apply pressure to tape switch for momentary light.
- Fully depress tailcap push button to the click-on position for constant light.
- For incandescent light, unscrew the infrared filter and expose the lamp module.

High power spotlight – vehicle mounted

![Figure 4-10](image)

The vehicle-mounted high-power spotlight, 24 volt system is powered by the vehicle and controlled by the gunner. The spotlight mounted on the lead vehicle enables illumination of overpasses, one of the most dangerous areas on a convoy route, as well as provides general illumination to the flanks and rear of convoy.

**Spike strips (Stinger)**

<table>
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<th>Part Number/Tool</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Concept of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90200-EOF Spike Strips</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Used as a barrier in a traffic control point to stop vehicles.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Curbside deployment method:** May be used when traffic is heavy or time is limited. This deployment requires that the Soldier has a position of extra visibility for prompt deployment and retrieval.

- Step 1. Pick up the unit from the case by the rocker arms. Position yourself in a stance that permits a clear view of the approaching vehicle.
- Step 2. When you see the suspect vehicle, hold the unit by the rocker arms at about ankle height above the pavement. Swing the unit and slide it out onto the roadway.
• Step 3. Confirm your escape route. As you take cover, drop the handle and let the cord slide through your hand until it is unwound from the spool, then grasp the handle.

• Step 4. Once the suspect vehicle has run over the unit, remove it from the road with one hard pull on the handle towards you. (Note: The handle glows for easy spotting at night.)

**Pull deployment method:** When time permits, the unit can be pulled across a lane of traffic using the attached cord. This method requires a Soldier to cross lanes of traffic. Therefore, caution should be used at all times!

• Step 1. Place the unit on the roadside with the cord side facing the road.

• Step 2. Hold the cord with one hand, drop the spool, and walk across the road. Allow the cord to slide through your hand as it unwinds from the spool.

• Step 3. Pull the cord taut so that it lies flat on the pavement. Position yourself in a stance to have a clear view of the vehicle, the Stinger, and behind you.

• Step 4. Once traffic is clear and before the suspect vehicle arrives, pull the unit across the road, take cover while pulling the cord until there is no slack, then grasp the handle.

• Step 5. Advise the lead pursuit unit to back off a sufficient distance to allow the Soldier who deployed the unit time to retrieve the system. Once the spike unit is hit, remove it from traffic with one quick, hard pull on the handle.

**Traffic Cones with Power Flares**
### Concept of Operations

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<th>Concept of Operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSP36-EOF-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Traffic cones with power flares underneath to visibly block a lane/direct traffic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF-PF200-R-Y-EOF</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Flares;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF-BAG6-0-EOF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Flare Bag</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Activation and operation:

- To activate, push the button located on the face of the unit. The power flare has nine built-in flash patterns that are selected each time the button is pushed.

- To turn the light off, hold the button down or simply click until the OFF position is reached. If you hold the button down to turn it off, the unit will come back on in the last pattern you used.

- To use, place the units on the road surface or other area to be marked. Avoid placing the units on gravel or sharp objects, as such debris could puncture or crack the unit if it is run over by a heavy vehicle. Wedge a flare unit inside a standard traffic cone to illuminate the cone.
Appendix A

United Kingdom (UK) Operational Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) Rules of Engagement (ROE) Training

LTC Art Weeks, U.S. Army Liaison Officer to the UK OPTAG, and Mr. Ralph D. Nichols, Senior Military Analyst, CALL

Acknowledgements: This article was based upon input from OPTAG trainers.

Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) can gain valuable insight from British historical experience with the Northern Ireland insurgency, the Balkans, OIF/OEF, and their efforts to limit lethal force during stability and support operations. UK servicemembers have been taught to apply lethal force only as a last resort to save a life. OPTAG teaches and reinforces that at all times their soldiers must be aware of their surroundings (what the U.S. Army calls situational awareness/understanding) and avoid collateral damage. If the rules of engagement (ROE) are violated, UK service personnel can be pursued in a military or civilian court for any illegal activity. The UK armed services apply this methodology to all theaters of operations, to include the Balkans, OIF, and OEF. ROE are based on the threat. All use of force is proportional to the threat. Servicemembers receive a ROE briefing and a law of armed conflict (law of land warfare) briefing prior to any patrol, regardless of the mission.

UK soldiers are bound by domestic, military, human rights, and international laws (Geneva and Hague conventions) regardless of the theater of operation. While OPTAG training and the contemporary operational environment (COE) are focused on asymmetric warfare, UK laws view OIF and OEF as stability and support operations. If a UK military unit has to apply a different “posture” based upon the threat, they must receive permission from their government.

Concept of Graduated Response

The UK armed forces developed protective measures as additional warnings to deter potential threats. As a visual, nonviolent warning, berets, and load-bearing equipment with weapons are worn when in an “amber” status. The posture is increased to helmet and ballistic-protected vest based upon the threat. The UK instills graduated response or escalation of force (EOF) procedure battle drills as part of ROE. Graduated response/EOF procedures are not treated as separate entities. UK armed forces apply a prolonged version of the U.S. Army’s “5 S’s” (search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard). OPTAG instructors call this process a ladder of escalation.
The UK approach is to attempt to apply nonlethal force whenever possible to counter the threat and use lethal measures as a last resort (i.e., only take a life to save a life). The following relevant factors are considered when force must be applied:

- Force is necessary.
- Imminent threat to life or threat to life exists in the very near future.
• Force used is proportionate (i.e., the minimum force necessary to counter the threat).

• Risk of collateral damage is minimized.

OPTAG ROE Training

OPTAG provides a unit’s predeployment training in three phases: (1) all ranks briefings for all UK mandatory training requirements, (2) train the trainer (T3) (similar to the U.S. Army Leadership Training Program), and (3) confirmatory training (similar to a U.S. mission readiness exercise). ROE is briefed, trained, and reinforced throughout each phase.

To reduce confusion of applied civil and military laws, only experienced, permanently assigned OPTAG instructors and military lawyers brief ROE. A judge advocate lawyer from the UK Army’s Operational Law Branch briefs the legal aspects of ROE during the all-ranks briefings that reinforce a soldier’s inherent right to self defense. Later in the all-ranks briefings, OPTAG Royal Military Police (RMP) reinforce ROE through the use of UK Card Alpha (U.S. ROE card). The RMP use practical lessons with rehearsed demonstrators to show soldiers the correct applications of the ROE based upon the threat in a specific theater.

During the T3 portion of predeployment training, squad leaders and above receive further in-depth training on best practices applied in theater (OIF/OEF, Balkans, and Northern Ireland). Unit leadership receives further ROE training when they participate in the “Judgmental Trainer,” which is a situational video simulation similar to the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 that places the soldier in an EOF scenario (i.e., shoot or don’t shoot). There are more than 80 scenarios that can last from 30 to 50 seconds. Upon completion of the scenario, the OPTAG instructor dismisses all soldiers from the iteration except one, and, using the Card Alpha and “ladder of escalation” process, conducts an after-action review (AAR) in front of the rest of the class. The purpose of this AAR is to demonstrate to the unit leadership a person’s “perceptual distortion” of the facts and to reinforce the soldier’s actions during the simulation through the use of the ladder of escalation and Card Alpha.

OPTAG also provides in addition to the T3 a Judgmental Trainer Course that allows units to have trained and certified ROE subject matter experts (SMEs) conduct the simulation at home station. Certification of the instructors for the Judgmental Trainer is completed by military lawyers to ensure the instructors understand the nuances and letter of the law concerning ROE.

When a unit returns for confirmatory training, OPTAG instructors observe applications of the ROE as part of tactical scenarios to confirm the unit has properly trained the ladder of escalation and ROE. ROE is a mandatory discussion point of each unit’s AAR.

Summary

The UK ROE and graduated response (EOF) drills were developed and refined based on 30 years of experience in Northern Ireland and adapted based on the threat and particular theater of operation. ROE and EOF are trained as one entity
and are not treated separately. All classroom instruction is administered by experienced cadre and reinforced through demonstrations and simulations.

The ROE/graduated response (EOF) measures applied by the UK armed services are similar to that of U.S. forces and other coalition partners serving in OIF and OEF. In order to win the “hearts and minds” and positively impact information operations and public affairs campaigns, it is vitally important to apply the level of force commensurate with the level of threat. The British historical perspective from the Northern Ireland insurgency and the Balkans, as well as their reflections on recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, offer relevant points for U.S. forces to consider when integrating and applying ROE/EOF procedures in the continuing effort to protect Soldiers while limiting collateral damage to civilians on the battlefield.
Appendix B

Escalation of Force: The Civilian Perspective

Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director,
Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC)

Sameer, a respected Iraqi reconciliation expert, awakens in the dark to his pregnant wife in labor. He hopes she has an easy delivery and wishes for a healthy son. But his first thought is, “Oh God, what will they do if I die at a U.S. checkpoint?”

Civilians don’t know what to do when coming into contact with the U.S. military – true or false? The answer is decidedly “true.” In fact, as hard as it is for Soldiers to predict the next move of an ordinary civilian approaching a hasty checkpoint, it may be just as hard for that civilian to discern the exact intentions of a Soldier pointing a gun at or near him.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, I met families whose homes were destroyed by U.S. operations. Their loved ones were taken in the blink of an eye. I also visited with American Soldiers, who told me stories of the split-second decisions they have to make every day, sometimes ending in tragedy. What struck me was how many Soldiers and civilians wanted the same two things: stability in the country and to stay alive.

If mishandled, escalation of force (EOF) threatens both groups and both goals. It is therefore in the military’s interest to do it right, and that must include an understanding of what ordinary civilians experience when interacting with our troops. An early 2007 poll conducted by the American Broadcasting Channel, British Broadcasting Channel, and USA Today found that when asked the source of violence near their neighborhood, more than forty-four percent of respondents cited “unnecessary violence against citizens by U.S. or coalition forces.”

Whether accurate or not, the numbers paint a picture of perception on the ground among the local population. From Baghdad to Kabul, civilian perception of U.S. intentions is critical. It is just as important for U.S. forces to understand the intentions of civilians and to see them as a necessary part of the military’s working group on the question of force escalation. Civilians have a life or death stake in the answer, the same as our troops do.

In Iraq, I participated in a working group of civilians discussing how to make it safer for them. Nearly every concern centered on how to interface with the U.S. military. “What do they mean when they wave their hands at my car?” “What do they mean when they shout at me?” “What should I do when I see a checkpoint that wasn’t there yesterday – is it really Americans or is it insurgents that want to kidnap me?” Without answers, American Soldiers’ intentions – however noble – may be easily misunderstood.

One suggestion I heard was to announce by loudspeaker an imminent home raid so as to allow women and children to escape. To do so, naturally, would undercut the military’s ability to target insurgents believed to be hiding there, but the civilians’ misunderstanding of the military imperative only proves that both sides have a long way to go to ensure that tragic accidents are minimized.
This EOF handbook does a good job of laying out how to deal with civilians in potentially volatile situations. The following recommendations from the civilian perspective may help ensure the split-second EOF decisions made in theater don’t cost unnecessary loss of life on either side:

• **Someone else’s shoes**: Consider waiting at a busy checkpoint. An American Soldier is waving and has shown his weapon. Is he gesturing to you or to the shady character in the car next to you? Should you proceed? What if the car next to you is a suicide bomber and now you’re forced to stop next to him with your kids in the back seat. Considering the civilian view in a situation like this can help explain a lot of seemingly erratic and hostile behavior.

• **Public relations**: Hearts and minds won’t be won solely by mitigating harm. Civilians have to be told that harm is being mitigated – and they need to see the results of the improvements the military is making. When an Iraqi mother loses her son to a stray bomb, she will never get him back. Improvement of procedures will often reduce the death toll, but to those suffering the losses, it’s important to remember that less death is still more than no death at all.

• **Clear signs**: Are all signs at checkpoints posted in all of the local languages? Are they big enough? In areas of low literacy, like much of Afghanistan, are the signs also clearly illustrated? This is particularly important in preparing the population to deal with hasty checkpoints. U.S. troops using the element of surprise needn’t bear the emotional weight of having killed or maimed innocent lives.

• **Warnings**: In Iraq, there has emerged a pattern of deaths caused by warning shots fired into vehicles at checkpoints. To the passengers in those cars – and their families – that the shot was intended as a warning is understandably of little consolation, if it’s believed at all.

• **Respecting suffering**: A tragic outcome following an EOF incident should always be acknowledged. American humanity means showing compassion for suffering, and thinking strategically means reassuring civilians that Soldiers are trying their best in a difficult situation to avoid harming them.

Ultimately, peace in Iraq and Afghanistan depends on an understanding of when, where, and how force will be used – and that means avoiding one misunderstanding at a time.
Appendix C

References

For further information regarding escalation of force (EOF), consult the following sources:

- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at <http://army.smil.mil> and <http://call.army.mil>
- GTA 90-01-005, Smart Card, *Traffic Control Point Operations*, May 06
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) report, EOF Lessons, Observations, and Training Scenarios from OIF 05-27, 5 April 2007
- *Forces Command (FORSCOM) Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Change 8 (available on the CALL NIPR restricted Web site). Each EOF incident is unique and may require additional resources as the situation evolves due to enemy action. During troop-leading procedures, plan for contingencies (resources) to bolster force protection and mitigate collateral damage while enhancing mission accomplishment. The following resources are recommended:

  ° **Combat resources:**
    * Quick Reaction Force (QRF): Employ QRF, 07-2-1387
    * Close Air Support (CAS), manned and unmanned: CAS Summary Sheet (Dec 05) and Air-Ground Integration, 10th Mountain Division, Task Force 3-17, Kiowa Warrior in Close (KWIC) Card (1 Sep 03)

  ° **Combat support resources:**
    * Indirect Fire Support, Call for Fire, GTA 17-02-015
    * EOF Incident Site Security, Section 2
    * Convoy battle drills:
• Drill 1: React to contact/threat (maintaining movement)
• Drill 2: Convoy forced to stop
• Drill 3: Casualty evacuation and recovery
• Drill 4: Break contact
• Drill 5: Occupy a floating rally point
• Drill 6: Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)/improvised explosive device (IED) and explosive ordnance disposal

° Sustainment support resources:

  * Call for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), 9-line air MEDEVAC request, 081-831-0101
  * Evacuate a casualty, 081-831-1001
  * Evacuate wounded from vehicle, 07-3-03998

IEDs remain a constant threat in a counterinsurgency environment and should be considered in planning for all facets of full-spectrum operations. Soldiers should know their individual and collective tasks regarding IED-defeat techniques. The necessary resources are:

• Individual IED tasks:

  ° React to a possible IED, 052-192-1270
  ° Identify visual indicators of an IED, 052-102-1271
  ° React to an IED attack, 052-192-3261
  ° Prepare for an IED threat prior to movement, 052-192-3262 (updated 16 Nov 06)

• Collective IED tasks:

  ° Prepare for ground-emplaced IED defeat operations prior to movement, 05-1-1006
  ° React to a possible ground-emplaced IED, 05-2-3091
  ° Prepare for a suspected VBIED/person-borne IED attack, 05-2-3092

In addition to the individual and collective tasks relating to IEDs, commanders and staffs must give consideration to the actions of coalition forces during an EOF incident.


• Escalation of Force Training Support Package, USAIC

• Escalation of Force Training Scenarios, Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000

• Army Regulation 19-14, *Use of Force*, Chapter 3

• Field Manual (FM) 3-100.12, *Risk Management Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management*, 15 Feb 01

• FM 5-19, *Composite Risk Management*, 21 Aug 06
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SIPR Email address: call.rfiagent@conus.army.smil.mil

Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.

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**Training Techniques**: Accessed from the CALL products page, this online publication focuses on articles that primarily provide TTP at the brigade and below level of warfare.

**Handbooks**: Handbooks are "how to" manuals on specific subjects such as rehearsals, inactivation, and convoy operations.

**Initial Impressions Reports**: Initial Impressions Reports are developed during and immediately after a real-world operation and disseminated in the shortest time possible for the follow-on units to use in educating personnel and supporting training prior to deployment to a theater. Products that focus on training activities may also be provided to support the follow-on unit.

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