After returning to its home station following service in Joint Task Force Katrina, one unit reported that its “staff lacked a general familiarization with civilian disaster response organizations.” The staff officer who trains for and participates in combat operations will experience culture shock when involved in responding to a major domestic catastrophe. He will see a seemingly amorphous array of individuals and organizations from all levels and corners of government, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations, all employed in providing disaster relief, though often not working together in a coordinated manner. The staff officer will quickly learn that lack of knowledge slows the unit’s response and leads to duplication of effort.

A staff officer needs a reference tool that answers his questions regarding the Department of Defense’s place in the overall response to the disaster. Such a guide would introduce the staff officer to the variety of players, their complicated interactions, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan, the emergency support functions, the pitfalls to avoid, and the proven paths to follow in helping deal with the effects of a major domestic disaster.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) intends that this handbook be a quick guide for the staff officer who has little or no experience with responding to a catastrophic event, including a terrorist attack, within the United States.

Lawrence H. Saul
COL, FA
Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters), such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the Global War on Terrorism and should not be necessarily construed as approved Army policy or doctrine.

This information is furnished with the understanding that it is to be used for defense purposes only, that it is to be afforded essentially the same degree of security protection as such information is afforded by the United States, that it is not to be revealed to another country or international organization without the written consent of the Center for Army Lessons Learned.
Opening Scenario

“Time and tide wait for no man,” Mark Twain once said. “That may very well be true,” Dr. Sam Frederickson thought, “but try working a twelve-hour shift here for a while.” Sam was a staff geologist at the National Earthquake Information Center in Colorado who normally found his duties monitoring world-wide earthquake activity interesting, but today he would much rather have been home watching the big game on TV. He was still fiercely devoted to "his team" even though he finished his degree more than a decade ago, and the thought of missing the action was driving him crazy. It was little consolation he had set his VCR to record the game because he knew beyond any doubt he would hear the results somehow before he got home, and the surprise would be spoiled. Just as he was about to bemoan his bad luck for the umpteenth time the monitors along the wall of the command center erupted in a frenzy of activity. Almost as if on auto-pilot, Sam swung into action, running a series of diagnostics to rule out equipment malfunction while simultaneously activating the NEIC alert roster. As he waited for his boss to pick-up, he checked the wall, and just as the voice on the other end of the line said hello, the monitoring equipment pinpointed the epicenter – at which point, Sam dropped the phone in disbelief.

Napoleon is supposed to have said,“An army marches on its stomach” and that was precisely why LTC Joe Smith was in his kitchen, building himself what he proudly referred to as “the mother of all sandwiches.” Joe was the current operations officer for one of the Army’s modular divisions, and he put in long hours every week as the division worked its way through a myriad of transformation challenges. He had been so disappointed at not getting his hands on a ticket to see his beloved alma mater play in its first-ever NCAA tournament his family agreed to leave him alone with the TV remote so he could at least cheer them on from home. The TV was tuned in to a pre-game show, and as he settled into his favorite chair he decided to check CNN during the next commercial break so he could “maintain his global situational awareness”—in reality, he hated TV commercials and thought watching CNN was better than channel-surfing. After a couple of minutes listening to nothing of any real importance to him or his unit, he switched back to the game just in time for the opening tip-off. He was relaxed, his supplies were in easy reach, the big screen picture was crystal clear, and the kids had strict orders not to disturb him.

“You can ask me for anything you like, except for time.” The cell leader was an educated man with a military background, and he found himself thinking once again that Napoleon was right. On the surface it appeared all was on schedule. The “regular” packages his comrades had meticulously built over the past four months were pre-staged around the city. The “special” package, the one made from the rare materials so many of his brothers had died for, was operational and loaded on the delivery vehicle. The weather, as Americans liked to say, was picture perfect. Even the target was ready, with fifteen thousand unsuspecting sports fans crowded into the downtown arena. Today was definitely the day when the plan came together and made for an opportunity he could not miss. His only problem, he needed more time. Against all odds, the truck they were going to use to deliver the “special” package refused to start. The big game was about to begin, and the clock was literally ticking.

Joe was cautiously optimistic – his team was hanging in there against a perennial Final Four, and he was beginning to entertain the notion that maybe, just maybe, this was the year something spectacular happened when the TV went blank. “No!!!” he yelled, loud enough to startle his kids upstairs, “not now, not today you worthless piece of,” when what he saw next stopped him. The TV was showing news helicopter footage of what looked to be severe damage to some city road network, with lots of smoke (from fires or collapsing buildings, he couldn’t tell) making the cameraman and pilot’s tasks difficult. Joe heard a newscaster’s voice in the background say something about a massive earthquake near a U.S. city, roads being cut and the status of water and power being unknown, but it was what Joe saw scrolling across the bottom of the screen that stunned him into silence. Apparently, the epicenter of the quake was located within a few miles.
of the basketball arena where the game was being played, and already emergency services crews and first responders were reporting difficulty negotiating their way through the city to make initial damage estimates. Joe sat back, processing the information, when the phone rang. It was the division G3 Operations Officer. “Joe, this is Colonel Peterson. I want you to head into the office and monitor the earthquake situation.” “Wilco,” Joe replied, hanging up and turning to see his wife standing in the doorway with a worried look on her face. “I’ve got to go in to work for a while, and I don’t know when I’ll be back – the G3 wants to have us ready to react to any short notice tasking that Corps might send our way.” After saying goodbye to the kids, he made his way to the garage and loaded his truck with his alert gear, more out of habit than anything else. For most of the drive his attitude shifted between professional interest in the developing earthquake situation and personal disappointment at missing the most exciting part of the most important game in the history of his small school. “Of all the days, it had to be today” he muttered to himself.

The floor moved, and the walls shook, but the building stayed intact. The cell leader’s first thought was “Someone has beaten us to it!” but realized, after turning on the TV, that it was something different entirely. The news reports were sketchy, but he was able to learn an earthquake had hit the city – what he had to determine now was how this new situation affected his plans. It took more than an hour of watching TV and listening to police scanners to determine that a half dozen of the “regular,” pre-staged packages with remote detonation receivers probably remained operational and, most importantly, the route to the primary target was trafficable. He didn’t foresee any problem getting the truck to the detonation site – it was, after all, an old city emergency services vehicle, and it had never been stopped before on their rehearsal runs. His military training taught him to recognize a tactical opportunity, but it also taught him those opportunities never lasted long. Just as he was about to yell for yet another update on the truck’s status, the team’s mechanic burst into the room. “It runs!” he shouted. “Don’t shut it off,” the leader yelled back, “we are changing our plans. We go now.”

By the time Joe arrived at the division HQs, the field officer of the day had developed an initial assessment based on news reports and information provided from Northern Command’s Emergency Operations Center. Roughly two hours after the earthquake hit, the situation on the ground looked bad but not impossible. City and state emergency services crews were reporting some success in deploying damage assessment crews throughout the area, and despite the TV footage that revealed some roads damaged beyond trafficability and one residential neighborhood fire, there didn’t seem to be any evidence of widespread panic. He gave instructions to his staff to continue monitoring the situation. While they worked up a situation report, Joe sat down to give some thought to how this event might affect the division’s upcoming deployment exercise. He hadn’t been away from the EOC for more than ten minutes when SFC Alesandro, the noncommissioned officer in charge on duty, stepped into Joe’s office. In all the time Joe had known him, SFC “A,” as he was known around the headquarters, had never, not once, appeared upset by any news, or tasking, or unforeseen event — but now, the look on his face was one of pure anger mixed with a little shock. “You’d better come back to the EOC sir,” he abruptly said, “the situation just got worse, a lot worse.”

The cell leader was strangely calm as he maneuvered the truck over damaged streets and around emergency response vehicles that seemed headed in all directions with no sense of purpose. He alone knew the reason for the confusion was that six of the IEDs planted 24 hours earlier by his team had survived the earthquake and had exploded as planned. Never one to give up control willingly, he had elected to use a command-detonated system—based on his personal cell phone—rather than trust a set of timers. He alone was able to trigger the attack because, even after all the time he and his team had spent together over the last four months, in the end, he could only trust himself to see the plan through to its glorious end. He detonated the remote bombs just before he pulled out of the garage at the team safe house. He knew it was a 20 minute drive to the arena, and he counted on most of the traffic moving in the opposite direction in
response to the explosions. What he didn’t count on was the size of the crowd outside the arena—all their rehearsals were based on detonating the final device during the game. He almost panicked, fearing he wouldn’t make it to the designated parking spot, when he realized fate had smiled on him. A huge crowd of unsuspecting targets was milling around the arena, exposing themselves to a danger in a manner he never could have hoped for. His last thought as he reached for the switch was a fervent hope his family would be proud of his sacrifice.

Joe jumped to his feet, more because of the look on SFC A’s face than the words he heard. One of the TVs in the EOC showed an aerial shot, but this time there was a lot more smoke and what looked like a bunch of small fires scattered around the city. Joe was about to say something when he saw everyone was watching another TV, this one showing a news reporter broadcasting from a street corner.

“We are live at City Hall,” the young man was saying, “where we have learned from a city emergency management official police have confirmed six simultaneous explosions have destroyed two electricity sub-stations and damaged several water pumping sites critical to fire fighting efforts. And in what may turn out to be the most significant piece of information yet, just a few moments ago a source inside the city emergency operations center told us first responders reported abnormal levels of radioactivity near a seventh explosion site right next to the downtown arena. When I asked the source to explain exactly what that meant, he replied “We haven’t confirmed it yet, but it looks like someone might have detonated a dirty bomb.”

It only took a few seconds for those words to sink in, and when they did Joe turned to SFC "A" and said “You were right—this changes everything. Get the G3 on the phone now, and have the staff prepare a battle update brief I can give to him and the CG.”

Thirty minutes later Joe had finished briefing the G3, who himself had just returned from a VTC with the Corps staff. “The State was on top of the situation right up until the reports of the dirty bomb started hitting the news,” Col Peterson told Joe, “but after that, it lost the ability to handle the crowds, and the fires, and all the search and rescue tasks that now have to be executed in a contaminated environment. The Governor didn’t waste any time asking the President for help, and NORTHCOM got the call to activate a disaster response joint task force. We’ve been designated the JTF HQs, and I want you to take charge of the advance party. We’re flying you into an airfield about an hour from the city—it was far enough away to have avoided any runway damage. You’ve got room for four wheeled vehicles and no more than 20 soldiers. Get on the ground, locate the folks in charge, and start to coordinate for the main body arrival. Your job is to find out what we are supposed to bring to this fight. And one more thing Joe,” the colonel said, with the merest glint of anger in his eyes, “go armed. We don’t know exactly what the situation is on the ground, so I want you prepared to protect yourselves if necessary. Get moving, you leave in two hours. I’ll be right behind you in the division assault CP.”

“Wilco sir,” LTC Smith replied, and he left the G3’s office to give instructions to his staff. It wasn’t until his advance party was wheels up in a C-130 that he was able to start thinking his way through some of the bigger questions. After an hour he had to admit to himself he didn’t have a clear idea what his unit might be called to do, what capabilities it was expected to bring, and, more importantly, what tasks he might be expected to perform. “I don’t even know what I don’t know” he finally admitted to himself. “Where are all the smart guys with their handbooks when you really need them?”
Introduction

On August 29, 2005, the category three Hurricane Katrina made landfall, and in less than 48 hours the scope of that natural disaster overwhelmed Gulf Coast state and local response capabilities. When the category four Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, 2005, the regional situation deteriorated further. The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in an unprecedented disaster response effort in support of the lead federal agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) exercised its homeland defense responsibilities and established two disaster response Joint Task Forces: Katrina (JTF-K) commanded by 1st Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia; and Rita (JTF-R) commanded by 5th Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The 1st Air Expeditionary Task Force (1AETF), Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida served as the supporting air component to both JTFs, with the 1st Air Force Commander serving as the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC).

The following news item from AUSA News conveys the variety of DOD assistance to Katrina relief operations:

*Joint Task Force Katrina set up Aug. 31 at Camp Shelby, Miss., as the Defense Department’s focal point to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s relief efforts along the Gulf Coast, Air Force Maj. Eric Butterbaugh, a U.S. Northern Command spokesman, confirmed today.*

*Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, 1st U.S. Army commander, will head the task force to coordinate DoD active-duty support for disaster relief efforts in the hurricane’s aftermath, much of it already under way or in the works.*

*Meanwhile, the number of National Guardsmen on duty in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida rose to almost 8,300 Aug. 31.*

*National Guard units and members in 17 more states remained on standby today, ready to provide assistance as required in the wake of extensive damage, rising floodwaters, and power and communications outages throughout the region, Air Force Lt. Col. Ellen Krenke, a DoD spokeswoman, said.*

*The guardsmen remain under their respective governors’ control, which enables them to provide law-enforcement support in the affected regions — something the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty forces from doing within the United States. While under state control, the National Guard is not bound by Posse Comitatus, NORTHCOM officials explained.*

*While establishing Joint Task Force Katrina today, NORTHCOM was already providing or coordinating a full range of support involving active-duty forces and assets.*

*As of the morning of Aug. 31, four MH-53 Sea Stallion and two HH-60 Seahawk helicopters from USS Bataan were flying medical-evacuation and search-and-rescue missions in Louisiana, and Bataan’s hospital was preparing for possible use for medical support. Bataan, based out of Naval Station Ingleside, Texas, is in the waters off the Louisiana coast. High Speed Vessel Swift, also based at Ingleside, sailed to the waters off Louisiana to provide support, as well.*

*Three helicopters from the Army’s 3rd Corps, in Fort Hood, Texas, are in Baton Rouge, La., and two more in Mississippi to help with searches and rescues and damage assessments, NORTHCOM officials reported. In addition, five Air Force helicopters from the 920th Rescue Wing, from Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., and 347th Rescue Wing from Moody Air Force Base,
Ga., are in Mississippi for search-and-rescue missions, officials said. These aircraft are capable of nighttime searches and rescues and also will transport FEMA assessment teams over the area to gather critical information for state and federal emergency managers.

Meanwhile, eight U.S. Transportation Command swift-water rescue teams, each with 14 members, were headed from California to Lafayette, La., today to rescue stranded civilians from flooded areas, NORTHCOM officials reported.

A wide range of other military members and assets were also bound for the Gulf Coast to provide more support, NORTHCOM officials reported.

The Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group was preparing to sail from Norfolk, Va., loaded with disaster response equipment and was expected to reach the Louisiana coast in five days, officials said. The group consists of USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, USS Tortuga and USNS Arctic.

The hospital ship USNS Comfort was preparing to leave Baltimore to bring medical assistance to the Gulf region and was expected to reach the area in seven days, officials said.

Plans were being made bring USS Grapple, a Navy rescue and salvage vessel, to the region to support maritime and underwater survey and salvage operations.

NORTHCOM also established federal operational staging areas at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.; Naval Air Station Meridian, Miss.; Barksdale Air Force Base, La.; Alexandria, La.; and Fort Polk, La., to expedite the movement of relief supplies and emergency personnel to affected areas, officials reported.

In addition, NORTHCOM liaisons are operating in Clanton, Ala.; Baton Rouge, La.; and Jackson, Miss., to coordinate efforts between the command, other DoD elements and FEMA.

Standing Joint Forces Headquarters North will provide an augmentation cell and its command-and-control vehicle to Joint Task Force Katrina, and JTF Civil Support will provide a joint planning augmentation cell, officials said.

Meanwhile, in Colorado Springs, Colo., NORTHCOM’s Joint Operations Center remains on 24-hour duty to expedite any additional requests for help from FEMA representatives, officials said.

The following are thoughts from a brigade commander whose brigade participated in Joint Task Force Katrina:

As early as possible, determine who your counterparts are in the area of operation (AO) and who you will interact with at the local, state, and federal levels. It is essential that you establish close links and have good communications. Share your personal and organizational expertise.

In initial meetings with local leadership, determine and announce what rules apply. Make it clear what you can and cannot do. Provide expectation management. Announce what will be your means of search and rescue and presence patrols.

Immediately establish a presence. Your unit represents safety, security, and stability. Be accessible and available to community leaders and government officials. Use your unit command posts and fixed sites as link-up points for the public. As a result of communications and command and control systems, your headquarters (HQs) can squash harmful rumors and provide the candid news people need.

Be alert for “fratricide” in all projects and efforts. Ensure your unit is not duplicating the work/efforts of other organizations.

Know all organizations, non governmental organizations, private volunteer organizations, and government agencies, that are operating in your AO. Know their chains of command and where their command posts are located. Make maximum use of liaison officers from your HQs to other agencies.

Give the people what they need in terms of humanitarian supplies, news, stability, and security. The disrupted and distressed public will see you as a force for stability.

Saturate your AO with patrols. Make your presence known. Push psychological operations, civil affairs, and military police units out into the sector.

Understand Title 10, Title 32 and Posse Comitatus rules. Know the rules of engagement.
Chapter 1

The Language of Disasters and Incidents

Disasters, Hazards, and Incidents

Before dawn on the 17th of January 1994, an earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale struck the greater Los Angeles area. The Northridge Earthquake left more than 70 persons dead and injured thousands more. It collapsed buildings, caused outages in water and power systems, ruptured oil and water pipelines, disrupted communications, and started a number of fires. Until 2005 this earthquake was the costliest natural disaster in American history.

Legal practitioners may refer to the Northridge Earthquake as “an act of God” because it was outside human control, but emergency responders apply their own language to events like this. Defining these terms and seeing their relationship is key to understanding the language of disaster response. Figure 1-1 depicts the relationship among various terms used to describe events addressed by the Stafford Act and the National Response Plan (NRP).

![Diagram of disaster terminology](image)

**Figure 1-1**

Each of these terms comes from two sources, one dating from before 9/11 and the other after 9/11. The older terms in the Stafford Act (major disaster, natural disaster, and domestic disaster) are more familiar to the layman, while the newer ones in the NRP (incident, catastrophic incident, and incident of national significance) are elements of the more specialized vocabulary of emergency responders. Both older and newer terms are used, and the staff officer should understand how to use all of them.
## The Two Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Act (as amended)</th>
<th>National Response Plan (NRP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short Name</td>
<td>Stafford Act or 42 USC §§ 5121-5206</td>
<td>NRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1988, effective May 1989</td>
<td>Dec 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creator</td>
<td>U.S. Congress</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (DHS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>“To provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from … disasters.”</td>
<td>“To establish a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to domestic across a spectrum of activities, including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (DHS)</td>
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Disasters and Hazards

Where the Stafford Act uses the term “disasters”; the NRP uses “hazards.” A disaster differs from a hazard in the sense that it has already occurred and caused significant damage, while a hazard, as defined by the NRP, is simply “something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome.” The Northridge Earthquake was a disaster, while earthquakes in general are hazards. All disasters or hazards fall into two general categories (natural or manmade) and most fall into one of a number of sub-categories.

### TYPES OF DISASTERS OR HAZARDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Events</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Avalanche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Landslide, rock slide, mud slide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subsidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Volcanic eruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hydro-Meteorological Events</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hurricane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Severe storm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tornado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tropical storm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Typhoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tsunami or tidal wave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Winter, snow or ice storm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Events</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wildfires (lightning-caused)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Stafford Act Declarations

The Stafford Act commits federal resources to responding to damaging, life-threatening disasters when state and local efforts cannot handle them. The federal government reacts to formal state requests for assistance in three principal ways, the first two requiring a Presidential declaration:

1) Major disaster declaration: In response to a request from the governor of a state, the President makes this declaration, thus opening the way to a large federal commitment of resources, including the potential deployment of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and resources. The frequency of major disasters and the costs to the federal government are on the rise because of:

- Increasing population density
- Increasing settlement in high-risk areas
- Increasing technological risks (for example, hazardous substances)

The result of these changing circumstances is one disaster causes additional disasters. For example, an earthquake may rupture gas lines, causing fires and chemical spills.

Facts about major disaster declarations, FY00-05:

- Average of about 50 per year (compare this to 30 per year, FY82-87)
• Varied impact on states:
  ° Only Rhode Island and Connecticut had no declarations
  ° Only Florida averaged more than two per year

• Types and frequency of disasters:
  ° At least one in two included severe storms and/or flooding
  ° One in five included tornadoes
  ° One in ten were hurricanes
  ° One in fifty were earthquakes
  ° Less than one in one-hundred were terrorist attacks

2) Emergency declaration: On the request of a governor, the Presidential declaration authorizes a lesser federal commitment, limited to $5 million.

Facts about emergency declarations, FY00-05:

• Average of 19 per year
• Number varies widely from year to year (FY99, 5; FY05, 67)
• Snow or winter storms were the most common type before FY05
• Note four unusual types of emergency:
  ° Virus threat (West Nile virus)
  ° Loss of the space shuttle Columbia
  ° Power outage
  ° Hurricane evacuation (first used in FY05, 40+ emergencies)

3) Fire management assistance declaration: Authorizes the use of federal funds to mitigate, manage, and control fires burning on publicly or privately owned forests or grasslands. On the request of a governor, the regional Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) director makes the declaration, not the President.

Facts about fire management assistance, FY00-05

• Average of 50 per year
• Funding provided through the President’s Disaster Relief Fund
• Funding pays 75 percent of the state’s firefighting costs
• Not mentioned in the NRP
FEMA posts basic information about each of the individual declarations of major disasters, emergencies, and fires on its Website at the following URL: http://www.fema.gov/library/drcys.shtm. Figure 1-2 shows the relationship between the severity of an event and the level of response to the event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declarations</th>
<th>Number FY00-05</th>
<th>Last Declaration in FY05</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Disasters</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>FEMA-1607-DR, Louisiana – Hurricane Rita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergencies</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>FEMA-3263-EM, Delaware – Hurricane Katrina Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>California, Topanga Fire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Facts about Declarations:**

- With a few exceptions, states must always take the initiative in requesting a declaration.
- Each affected state has a separate declaration, even when they are impacted by the same disaster, emergency, or fire.
• FEMA assigns a sequential number to each major disaster (DR) or emergency (EM).

• A small portion of declared emergencies and fires escalate, requiring a subsequent major disaster declaration (for example, in the case of Hurricane Katrina).

From the Stafford Act to the NRP

The Stafford Act dates from a time when there was little expectation of a terrorist attack. Since 1988 only four terrorist attacks have merited major disaster declarations, but the four were of such magnitude and impact they re-shaped the national approach to all disasters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Disaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1993</td>
<td>FEMA-984-DR, New York</td>
<td>World Trade Center Explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1995</td>
<td>FEMA-1048-DR, Oklahoma</td>
<td>Explosion at Federal Courthouse, Oklahoma City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>FEMA-1391-DR, New York</td>
<td>Terrorist Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2001</td>
<td>FEMA-1392-DR, Virginia</td>
<td>Terrorist Attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the World Trade Center explosion and the Oklahoma City Federal Courthouse bombing in the 1990s, new terminology not found in the Stafford Act began to emerge relating to the tools at the disposal of terrorists.

Figure 1-3

In the new terminology, terrorists employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cause death, destruction, and fear. Figure 1-3 shows the types of weapons that are considered weapons of mass destruction. Destruction encompasses the entire range from physical wreckage and loss of
life to damage to the society, economy, national security, and national well-being. The DOD has
used a general definition of WMD: “Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction
and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.” The DOD also
uses the term “chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosives” (CBRNE or
CBRN-E) to encompass the full range of WMD. The NRP uses a precise definition of WMD that
is spelled out in U.S. laws.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1) Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant
    charge of more than four ounces, or missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of
    more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or similar device |
| 2) Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
    during the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their
    precursors |
| 3) Any weapon involving a disease organism |
| 4) Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous
    to human life. |

Source: Title 18, U.S. C. para. 2332a

Incidents in the NRP

The NRP employs a new term, incident, intended to be broader and more inclusive than the
terms disaster and emergency. An incident is “an occurrence or event, natural or human-caused,
that requires an emergency response to protect life or property.” Figure 4-1 shows the
relationship between various types of incidents discussed in the NRP.

Facts about incidents:

- Number tens of thousands each year.
- Most are handled solely by local first responders.
- A small portion are of sufficient magnitude to require federal assistance including
events of great magnitude:
  - Catastrophic incidents
  - Incidents of national significance

Catastrophic incidents are comparable to Presidentially-declared major disasters. These terms
both suggest natural and manmade events that do significant harm and which overwhelm the
response capabilities of local and state governments. The definition of catastrophic incident
differs from that of major disaster only in that it fits more neatly within the framework of the
Global War on Terrorism.
“Any natural catastrophe or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under [the Stafford Act] to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.”

“Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.”

Facts about catastrophic incidents:

The NRP includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA). Only the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee can implement this annex.

Incident of national significance is a term that is intended to cover the full range of federal responses to incidents. It is “an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by and appropriate combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities.” Incidents of national significance include all Presidentially-declared emergencies or major disasters, all catastrophic incidents, and all national security special events (potential targets for terrorists, such as the Presidential Inauguration). The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate as such an incident of national significance.

Facts about incidents of national significance:

- All major disasters declared by the President.
- All emergencies declared by the President.
- All catastrophic incidents.
- All national security special events (potential targets for terrorists, such as the Presidential Inauguration).
- May be designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee.
Figure 1-4
Disaster Response and Incident Management

Responses to terrorist WMD attacks differ from responses to natural disasters. First responders need to deal with the effects of WMD, which may be different from effects of natural disasters. At the same time, the responders may have to deal with further terrorist attack and with bringing the terrorists to justice. Consequence management and crisis management emerged to describe the manner in which to handle the two needed responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consequence Management</th>
<th>Crisis Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>CM</td>
<td>CrM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Mitigating the damage/effects</td>
<td>Avoiding the crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Emergency management</td>
<td>Law enforcement function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scope (NRP)**

“Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.”

“Measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.”

**Scope (JP 1-02)**

“Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents.”

Same as the above

The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP.

The DOD definition of consequence management is problematic, given that it encompasses both natural and manmade disasters, not just terrorist actions. At the same time, the NRP uses the terms “consequences” and “effects” interchangeably when considering the outcomes for both natural disasters and manmade disasters, including those caused by terrorists. If the staff officer encounters the term consequence management, he should ask for a definition.
Incident Management

The NRP replaces consequence management and crisis management as separate functions with a single term, incident management. Incident management aims to remove the boundaries between consequence management and crisis management. The goal of incident management is to orchestrate “the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major natural disasters, and other major emergencies.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of Incident Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Incident</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This handbook focuses on the response phase when the DOD is most actively engaged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disaster Response

This handbook will use the term "disaster response" when discussing DOD participation in incident management for a number of reasons:

- Major disaster, which encompasses both natural and manmade catastrophes, including those caused by terrorists using WMD, offers the clearest definition for those instances in which states or other federal agencies will need the help of the DOD.

- So long as the Stafford Act remains the principal source of federal disaster response funding, the alternative terms (incident, catastrophic incident, incident of national significance) are of lesser importance. The NRP has not replaced the term major disaster.

- Leaving aside the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the DOD is primarily involved in the response phase of incident management, not in prevention, preparedness, or recovery.

- Incident management has superseded the terms consequence management and crisis management, which have had a tendency to muddy the waters of clarity through varied usage in the past. Regardless of the term, the DOD does not manage the response; it only executes assigned missions.

- Disaster response or disaster relief continue to be the layman’s language, while the term incident management has a narrow usage.

The United States, the Homeland

The Northridge Earthquake was a domestic disaster, meaning that it took place within the United States. When the Stafford Act and the NRP use the term “United States,” they mean more than just the 50 states. The United States, which we can also call the Homeland, consists of the following together with its coastal zone and air space:
• The 50 States and the District of Columbia

• Non-state possessions (regarded as states)
  ° Insular areas in the Caribbean
    * Puerto Rico
    * Virgin Islands
  ° Insular areas in the Pacific Ocean
    * American Samoa
    * Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)
    * Guam

• Freely associated states (not mentioned in the Stafford Act)
  ° Insular areas in the Pacific Ocean
    * Federated States of Micronesia
    * Republic of the Marshall Islands

In terms of the NRP and disaster response, the District of Columbia, the non-state possessions, and the freely associated states, are all “states,” with the same rights and responsibilities accorded to each of the fifty states. The state in this broad sense is the basic geographic unit in disaster response. The state’s chief executive, usually in the person of the governor, is the one who must make the case for and request a federal response in case of a disaster.

Within each state, local chief executive officers (for example, mayors and county commissioners) and tribal chief executive officers must request state and, if necessary, federal disaster assistance through the governor. The local and tribal officers rely on their own law enforcement, firefighting, and other resources to make the first response to an incident. These first responders always take the initial action, whether the incident is a routine, small-scale emergency or a major disaster that will eventually require the presence of the DOD.
Chapter 2
National Incident Management System (NIMS)

Introduction

In response to attacks on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) in February 2003. HSPD-5 called for a National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS provides the doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes needed for effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels. NIMS can be organized along functional lines or jurisdictional lines. When organized functionally, responses are directed by subject matter experts. When organized jurisdictionally, NIMS is organized along local (municipality and county), state, regional, and federal jurisdictions. NIMS assumes that incidents are handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the establishment of NIMS in March 2004.

The NIMS incident management structure has three components: the Incident Command System (ICS), interagency coordination systems, and public information system.

NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. NIMS defines "command" as "the act of directing, ordering, or controlling by virtue of statutory, regulatory, or delegated authority." NIMS defines "coordinate" as "to advance systematically an analysis and exchange of information among principals who have a need to know certain information to carry out specific incident management responsibilities. Command authority is vested in the incident commander, whether a single incident commander or an area commander. Coordination authority is vested in coordinating officers, whether the state coordinating officer, the federal coordinating officer, or the defense coordinating officer. Each coordinating officer has the authority to make coordinating decisions within his or her jurisdiction whether federal, state, or local.

Furthermore, NIMS recognizes that each jurisdiction has authority within its boundaries and that each agency or functional expert, such as firefighters, law enforcement, medical personnel, or environmental protection personnel, has authority within its functional arena. Figure 2-1, taken from the National Response Plan (NRP), provides an overview of initial federal involvement under the Stafford Act. Figure 2-2 depicts the basic framework of NIMS.
Section I: Executive Authorities

**President.** The President is the chief executive authority regarding incidents. Under the authority of the Stafford Act, he declares incidents to be disasters or emergencies. Under the authority of the National Response Plan (NRP), he declares incidents to be of national significance. Furthermore, he can delegate authority to others to act as executive agents in matters of incident response.

**Secretary of Homeland Defense.** The President directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to take direct responsibility for domestic emergencies.

**Secretary of Defense.** The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) authorizes military support to civil authorities (MSCA), discussed in Chapter 3, for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. In accordance with HSPD-5, the SECDEF retains command of military forces under MSCA. Only the SECDEF can authorize the deployment of forces for military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) missions. SECDEF will decide whether or not units will be armed when performing military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) missions. In addition, SECDEF is the approval authority for any requests from lead federal agencies (LFAs) for potentially lethal support (i.e., lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, or a service member).
Principal Federal Officer (PFO). The PFO is the federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under HSPD-5 for incidents of national significance. The PFO is usually, but not always, the federal coordinating officer, discussed below.

LFA. LFA is a term used by DOD, not DHS. The LFA is the federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal response to an emergency. Designation and responsibilities of an LFA vary according to the type of emergency and the agency’s statutory authority.

- DHS. For non-terrorist acts, the DHS is the LFA. DHS has authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be its executive agent for domestic incident management. FEMA is discussed below.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). If the incident is deemed a terrorist act, then the FBI is the LFA.

- Incident specific LFA. When an incident-specific incident occurs, another deferral agency might be the LFA. For example, for an oil spill, the Environmental Protection Agency would be the LFA, or for a maritime security incident, the U.S. Coast Guard would be the LFA.

Governor. The state governor has the final commitment authority over state capabilities in any disaster response effort short of a federal response. Governors have the unique authority to issue a state emergency declaration, mobilize the state National Guard, and redirect state resources to emergency response.

A governor can request federal assistance from the President of the United States (POTUS) when state capabilities prove insufficient. This request brings the resources of the federal government to bear on the disaster and can involve DOD. Ultimately, all DOD support to disaster response is temporary with the end state being transfer of all emergency functions back to civilian authorities.

Lead State Agency. Just as a lead agency is designated at the federal level, so too a lead agency is designated at the state level. Lead state agencies might include:

- State emergency management agency. Typically, states have established state emergency management agencies as executive agents to manage incident response.

- State law enforcement agencies. These agencies can include investigative bureau personnel and state patrol officers (which in some states are distinctly different from state police officers.)

- The National Guard. The National Guard could be the first military unit called when first responders exhaust organic capabilities, and the incident response is elevated to the state level. In this capacity the National Guard begins in a state active duty (SAD) status under the governor’s command. The National Guard provides support to the local incident commander but does not take charge of the response operation. Additionally, under provisions of regional Emergency Management Assistance a key element of National Guard involvement in disaster response is the acknowledgment that a National Guard Soldier operating in either a SAD or Title 32 status can exercise the same law enforcement authority as a State Police officer. The law enforcement environment can be complicated by the existence of multiple versions of rules for the
use of force (RUF) (the more widely recognized term “rules of engagement” is not used during disaster response missions). Appendix 9 provides a more detailed discussion of disaster response law enforcement considerations, legal considerations, and a sample RUF card.

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs) are legal agreements between two or more states designed to expedite interstate utilization of emergency response assets. EMACs enable National Guard personnel from other states to be deployed across state lines in a SAD status to assist in regional disaster response efforts.

Section II: The Incident Command System (ICS)

The ICS defines the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and structure of incident management and emergency response organizations engaged throughout an incident’s the life cycle. Direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management activities rests with the incident commander.

The key feature of NIMS is the ICS. The ICS organization is unique but easy to understand. The ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a common organization structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents.

ICS organization has no correlation to the administrative structure of any single local, state, or federal agency or jurisdiction. This type of organization is deliberate to avoid the confusion over different position titles and organizational structures that has been a significant stumbling block to effective incident management. For example, someone who serves as a chief every day may not hold that title when deployed under an ICS structure.

Concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct legal and cultural meanings for military forces and operations. For military forces, command runs from the President to the SECDEF to the commander of the combatant command to the commander of the forces. The “unified command” concept utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command. NIMS acknowledges that incident command is exercised through chain of command, defined as an orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization. Incident command may be transferred from one commander to a succeeding one. Transfers of incident command must include a transfer of command briefing (which may be oral, written, or both). A transfer of command occurs when a more qualified person assumes command; the incident situation changes over time, resulting in a legal requirement to change command (e.g., multijurisdictional or interagency involvement; there is normal turnover of personnel on extended incidents; or the incident response is concluded and responsibility is transferred to the home agency.

Incident command is discussed below in terms of single incident command, area command, and unified command.

Single Incident Command

Incident commander

The incident commander has overall responsibility for managing the incident by objectives, planning strategies, and implementing tactics. The incident commander must be fully briefed and should have a written delegation of authority that authorizes him to make decisions. Initially,
assigning tactical resources and overseeing operations will be under the direct supervision of the incident commander.

In addition to having overall responsibility for managing the entire incident, the incident commander is specifically responsible for ensuring incident safety, for providing information services to internal and external stakeholders, and for establishing and maintaining liaison with other agencies participating in the incident. The incident commander may appoint one or more deputies, if applicable, from the same agency or from other agencies or jurisdictions. Deputy incident commanders must be as qualified as the incident commander. Personnel assigned as deputies or section chiefs by the incident commander have the authority of their assigned positions, regardless of the rank they hold within their respective agencies.

As incidents expand or contract, change in jurisdiction or discipline, or become more or less complex, command may change to meet the needs of the incident.

Rank, grade, and seniority are not the factors used to select the incident commander. The incident commander is always a highly qualified individual trained to lead the incident response.

Formal transfer of command at an incident always requires a transfer of command briefing for the incoming incident commander and notification to all personnel that a change in command is taking place.

The incident command post

The incident command post (ICP) is a tactical-level, on-scene incident command and management organization established by the incident commander to direct all incident management operations and execute action plans. It quickly establishes working relationships with emergency management agency staffs at city and county levels to avoid redundant resource commitment and mitigate gaps in first response coverage. The ICP provides a standardized on-scene emergency management organization. The organization of the ICP is specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. There is only one ICP per incident, regardless of how geographically large or multi jurisdictional it becomes.

Although the ICP might be initially established by local incident management personnel, its modular configuration allows it to integrate incident personnel, to incorporate additional agencies, or to adapt to multifunctional jurisdiction. Supporting agencies contribute to ICP operations through liaison officers (LNOs).

The ICP is action-oriented. The ICP’s flexible organization allows the incident commander and his subordinates a reasonable span of control, in addition to providing an integrated communication system, common terminology, and common naming conventions for incident personnel.

Basic staff functions

Every incident or event requires that, at a minimum, the following five management functions must be performed: incident command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. Regardless of the size of the incident, these five management functions still will apply.
• Command: Has authority to make decisions; sets the incident objectives, strategies, and priorities; and has overall responsibility at the incident or event. Command is exercised by the incident commander.

• Operations: Conducts tactical operations to carry out the plan. Develops the tactical objectives and organization, and directs all tactical resources.

• Planning: Prepares and documents the incident action plan (IAP) to accomplish the objectives, collects and evaluates information, maintains resource status, and maintains documentation for incident records.

• Logistics: Provides support, resources, and all other services needed to meet the operational objectives.

• Finance/Administration: Monitors costs related to the incident. Provides accounting, procurement, time recording, and cost analyses.

For small incidents, the incident commander may perform all five management functions. In fact, the incident commander is the only position that is always staffed in ICS applications.

Basic staff organization

Large incidents or events may require that these functions be delegated to others who organize separate sections. As incidents grow, the incident commander may delegate authority for performance of certain activities to the command staff and the general staff. The incident commander will add positions only as needed.

• Command staff: Depending upon the size and type of incident or event, it may be necessary for the incident commander to designate personnel to provide information, safety, and liaison services for the entire organization. In fact, the command bears a close resemblance to an Army commander’s personal staff. In ICS, these personnel make up the command staff and consist of the public information officer, who serves as the conduit for information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media or other organizations seeking information directly from the incident or event; the safety officer, who monitors safety conditions and develops measures for assuring the safety of all assigned personnel; the LNO, who serves as the primary contact for supporting agencies assisting at an incident. The command staff reports directly to the incident commander.

• General staff: As the magnitude of a domestic incident grows or as the response matures, the incident commander may expand his staff in order to delegate authority for the performance of the other management functions. Personnel who perform these additional management functions are designated as the general staff. The general staff is made up of four sections: operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. The general staff reports directly to the incident commander.
Section chiefs and deputies

The person in charge of each staff section is designated as a chief. Section chiefs have the ability to expand their section to meet the needs of the situation. Each of the section chiefs may have a deputy or more than one, if necessary. The deputy may assume responsibility for a specific portion of the primary position, work as relief, or be assigned other tasks. The deputy should always be as proficient as the person for whom he works. In large incidents, especially where multiple disciplines or jurisdictions are involved, the use of deputies from other organizations can greatly increase interagency coordination.

Operations section

Until operations is established as a separate section, the incident commander has direct control of tactical resources. The incident commander will determine the need for a separate operations section at an incident or event. When the incident commander activates an operations section, he assigns an individual as the operations section chief and delegates authority to him.

The operations section chief will develop and manage the operations section to accomplish the incident objectives set by the incident commander. The operations section chief is normally the person with the greatest technical and tactical expertise in dealing with the problem at hand.

The operations function does the tactical fieldwork; consequently, it receives the most incident resources. Often the most hazardous activities are carried out by operations personnel.

The operations section usually develops from the bottom up. The operations section will expand to include needed levels of supervision as more and more resources are deployed. To achieve this expansion and increased span of control, the operations section chief can divide the Operations Section into division, groups, branches, task forces, and strike teams. Figure 2-3 depicts how an operations section might be organized using a division and groups. Figure 2-4 depicts how an operations section might be organized using branches.

- Divisions: Divisions are used to divide an incident geographically. The person in charge of each division is designated as a supervisor. The most common way to identify divisions is by using alphabet characters (a, b, c, etc.); other identifiers may be used as long as division identifiers are known by assigned responders.

- Groups: Groups are used to describe functional areas of operation. The person in charge of each group is designated as a supervisor. The needs of an incident will determine the kind of group that is established. Groups are normally labeled according to the job that they are assigned (e.g., human services group, infrastructure support group, etc.). Groups will work wherever their assigned task is needed and are not limited geographically.

- Divisions and Groups: Divisions and groups can be used together on an incident. Divisions and groups are at an equal level in the organization. One does not supervise the other. When a group is working within a division on a special assignment, division and group supervisors must closely coordinate their activities.
Operations Section: Divisions & Groups

Divisions and Groups:
- Can be used together on an incident.
- Are at an equal level in the organization. One does not supervise the other.

Figure 2-3

- Branches: If the number of divisions or groups exceeds the span of control, it may be necessary to establish another level of organization within the operations section, called branches. The person in charge of each branch is designated as a director. Deputies directors may also be used at the branch level. Branches can be divided into groups or divisions or branches can be a combination of both. Very large incidents may be organized jurisdictionally (geographically) or functionally.
Operations Section: Branches

- Established if the number of Divisions or Groups exceeds the span of control.
- Have functional or geographical responsibility for major parts of incident operations.
- Identified by Roman numerals or functional name.
- Managed by a Branch Director.

Figure 2-4

- Task forces, strike teams, and single resources: Task forces are a combination of mixed resources with common communications operating under the direct supervision of a leader. Task forces can be versatile combinations of resources, and their use is encouraged. The combining of resources into task forces allows for several resource elements to be managed under one individual’s supervision, thus lessening the span of control of the supervisor. Strike teams are a set number of resources of the same kind and type with common communications operating under the direct supervision of a strike team leader. Strike teams are highly effective management units. Knowing that all elements have the same capability and how many will be applied allows for better planning, ordering, utilization, and management. Single resources may be individuals, a piece of equipment and its personnel complement, or a crew or team of individuals with an identified supervisor that can be used at an incident.

Planning section

The incident commander will determine if there is a need for a planning section and designate a planning section chief. If no planning section is established, the incident commander will perform all planning functions. The planning section chief can activate additional staffing as needed.

The major activities of the planning section may include collecting, evaluating, and displaying incident intelligence and information; preparing and documenting IAPs; conducting long-range and/or contingency planning; developing plans for demobilization; maintaining incident documentation; and tracking resources assigned to the incident.
The planning section can be further divided into four units: resources, situation, documentation, demobilization. The Resources Unit conducts all check-in activities and maintains the status of all incident resources and plays a significant role in preparing the IAP. The Situation Unit collects and analyzes information on the current situation, prepares situation displays and situation summaries, and develops maps and projections. The documentation unit provides duplication services, including the IAP and maintains and archives all incident-related documentation. The demobilization unit assists in ensuring that resources are released from the incident in an orderly, safe, and cost-effective manner.

At some point, the operations section and the rest of the ICS organization will contract based on the achievement of tactical objectives. Demobilization planning begins upon activation of the first personnel and continues until the ICS organization ceases operation.

Technical specialists who provide special expertise useful in incident management and response may also be assigned to work in the planning section. Depending on the needs, technical specialists may also be assigned to other sections in the organization.

**Logistics section**

The incident commander will determine if there is a need for a logistics section at the incident, and designate an individual to fill the position of the logistics section chief. If no logistics section is established, the incident commander will perform all logistical functions. The size of the incident, complexity of support needs, and the incident length will determine whether a separate logistics section is established. Additional staffing is the responsibility of the logistics section chief.

The logistics section is responsible for all of the services and support needs, including ordering, obtaining, maintaining, and accounting for essential personnel, equipment, and supplies; providing communication planning and resources; setting up food services; setting up and maintaining incident facilities; providing support transportation; and providing medical services to incident personnel.

The logistics section can also be divided into unit. Not all units may be required and should be established based on need. There following six units are possible:

- Communication unit: Prepares and implements the incident communication plan (ICS-205), distributes and maintains communications equipment, supervises the incident communications center, and establishes adequate communications over the incident.

- Medical unit: Develops the medical plan (ICS-206), provides first aid and light medical treatment for personnel assigned to the incident, and prepares procedures for a major medical emergency.

- Food unit: Supplies the food and potable water for all incident facilities and personnel, and obtains the necessary equipment and supplies to operate food service facilities at bases and camps.

- Supply unit: Determines the type and amount of supplies needed to support the incident. The unit orders, receives, stores, and distributes supplies and services non expendable equipment. All resource orders are placed through the supply unit. The unit maintains inventory and accountability of supplies and equipment.
Facilities unit: Sets up and maintains required facilities to support the incident. Provides managers for the incident base and camps. Also responsible for facility security and facility maintenance services: sanitation, lighting, cleanup.

Ground support unit: Prepares The Transportation Plan. Arranges for, activates, and documents the fueling, maintenance, and repair of ground resources. Arranges for the transportation of personnel, supplies, food, and equipment.

Finance/Administration section

The incident commander will determine if there is a need for a finance/administration section at the incident and designate an individual to fill the position of the finance/administration section chief. If no Finance/administration section is established, the incident commander will perform all finance functions.

The finance/administration section is set up for any incident that requires incident-specific financial management. The finance/administration section is responsible for contract negotiation and monitoring, timekeeping, cost analysis, and compensation for injury or damage to property.

More and more, larger incidents are using a finance/administration section to monitor costs. Smaller incidents may also require certain finance/administration support. For example, the incident commander may establish one or more units of the finance/administration section for such things as procuring special equipment, contracting with a vendor, or making cost estimates for alternative response strategies. The finance/administration section can also be divided into units. Not all units may be required and should be established based on need. There following four units are possible:

- Procurement unit: Responsible for administering all financial matters pertaining to vendor contracts, leases, and fiscal agreements.
- Time unit: Responsible for incident personnel time recording.
- Cost unit: Collects all cost data, performs cost effectiveness analyses, provides cost estimates, and makes cost savings recommendations.
- Compensation/Claims unit: Responsible for the overall management and direction of all administrative matters pertaining to compensation for injury and claims related activities kept for the incident.

Area Command

Area command is an echelon of command management organization between the ICP and the governmental agency executives. Area command does not replace an individual incident commander’s authority and responsibility, but does provide an intermediate dedicated level of command between incident commanders and agency administrators.

The area command’s purpose is to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are each being handled by an ICS organization or to oversee the management of a very large incident that has multiple incident management teams assigned to it.

Area command is used when there are a number of incidents generally in the same area and often of the same kind. For example, an area command might be established when there are hazardous material (HAZMAT) spills at two or more locations in proximity to one another. It is usually these kinds of incidents that may be vying for the same resources. When incidents are of
different kinds and/or do not have similar resource demands, they would usually be handled as separate incidents or would be coordinated through an emergency operations center (EOC). If the incidents under the authority of the area command are multi jurisdictional, a unified area command should be established. This allows each jurisdiction to have representation in the area command. Unified commands are discussed below.

Area command is established by the agency executive. When area command is activated, an area commander will be designated and given appropriate delegated authority. The authority given to the area commander should be written as a Delegation of Authority statement. This will eliminate confusion and provide the area commander with authority to oversee the management of the incidents.

The most common situations in which area command has been used are for wild land fires. Area command was also used in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

If the incidents under the area command are in adjacent jurisdictions, then a unified area command should be established. The following could apply to either an area command or a unified area command.

• Provide agency or jurisdictional authority for assigned incidents.

• Ensure a clear understanding of agency expectations, intentions, and constraints related to the incident among incident commanders.

• Establish critical resource use priorities between various incidents based on incident needs and agency policy and direction.

• Ensure appropriate incident management team personnel assignments and organizations for the kind and complexity of the incidents involved.

• Maintain contact with officials in charge, assisting and cooperating agencies, and other interested groups.

• Coordinate the demobilization or realignment or resources between assigned incidents.

**Unified Command**

A unified command is used for incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with interagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with interagency involvement. Unified command allows agencies to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility, or accountability. Agencies work together through their designated incident commanders, called an agency incident commander, at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single IAP. In the final analysis, however, under a unified command, incident commanders representing agencies or jurisdictions share responsibility for the incident.

A unified command structure is an important element in multijurisdictional or interagency domestic incident management. In a unified command, there is a single incident commander; however, the incident commander is assisted by agency incident commanders. An agency incident commander is an agency’s senior representative to the ICP. The agency represents a function, a subject matter expert. As such, each agency incident commander exercises authority over his agency personnel.
A unified command establishes a single command structure and provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively. Such a command arrangement enables all responsible agencies to manage an incident together by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. It allows incident commanders to make joint decisions by. It maintains unity of command and ensures each employee reports to only one supervisor.

Furthermore, the unified command overcomes much of the inefficiency and duplication of effort that can occur when agencies from different functional and geographic jurisdictions or agencies at different levels of government operate without a common system or organizational framework. It permits all agencies with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident and those able to provide specific resource support to contribute to the process of determining overall incident strategies, selecting objectives, and ensuring that joint tactical planning occurs.

Section III: Interagency Coordination Systems

Interagency coordination systems represent the second of the three NIMS components. As stated above, NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. Command authority is vested in the incident commander, whether a single incident commander or an area commander, and is exercised through the ICS. Coordination authority is vested in coordinating officers, whether the federal coordinating officer (FCO), the state coordinating officer (SCO) or the defense coordinating officer (DCO). Each coordinating officer has the authority to make coordinating decisions within his or her jurisdiction, whether federal, state, or local. Sometimes coordinating officers are dual-hatted with command authority. For example, at the federal level, the federal coordinating officer might also be the principal federal officer empowered to act in behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

When incidents cross functional or jurisdictional boundaries, a interagency coordinating entity may be used to facilitate incident management and policy coordination. Interagency coordinating entities are combinations of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications integrated into a common system with responsibility for coordinating and supporting domestic incident management. Interagency coordinating entities typically consist of principals or their designated representatives from organization and agencies with direct incident management responsibility or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities.

The primary functions of interagency coordination systems are to support incident management policies and priorities; facilitate logistics support and resource tracking; inform resource allocation decision using incident management priorities; coordinate incident related information; and coordinate interagency and intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies. As stated above, direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management activities rests with the incident commander. Command authority does not reside in coordinating officers or coordinating entities although coordinating officers may be designated with command authority.

Interagency coordination systems consist of coordinating officers, emergency operations center, and coordinating entities.

Coordinating Officers

Typically, for any given incident, each political level of jurisdiction—state, federal, and defense—has a single coordinating officer. Each coordinating officer has a staff that assists him in his coordination responsibilities.
• FCO: FEMA established the National FCO Program in 1999. Its purpose is to train a cadre of senior incident management personnel to be permanent full-time FCOs for major disaster operations. FCOs are assigned to both FEMA headquarters and regional offices. The FCO Program Director is located in the FEMA Headquarters Response and Recovery Directorate.

The FCO is the federal officer appointed to manage federal response support activities related to Stafford Act disaster and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and private sector. The FCO works directly with the SCO. During an incident, he is located at the joint field office.

Sometimes coordinating officers are dual-hatted with command authority. For example, at the federal level, the FCO might also be the PFO empowered to act in behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

• SCO: SCO is appointed by a governor to coordinate state response and recovery operations with the federal government. The SCO coordinates directly with the FCO and the DCO discussed below.

• DCO: DCOs are active component officers in the grade of O-6 (or their Civil Service equivalents) who represent DOD at the Joint Field Office (JFO). The DCO is the single DOD point of contact at the JFO. DCOs are assigned one per FEMA regional office and are assisted by a staff of five called the Defense Coordinating Element.

• LNO. The LNO is the point of contact for representatives of other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and/or private entities. Representatives from assisting or cooperating agencies and organizations coordinate through the LNO. LNOs must have the authority to speak for their parent agencies or organizations on all matters.

Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)

Normally, EOCs coordinate information and resources to support incident management activities. EOCs can be organized by function, such as fire, law enforcement, medical, or public works; by jurisdiction, such as municipal, state, regional, or national; or by a combination of both.

EOCs might be permanent organizations and facilities, or they might be established to meet temporary, short-term needs. When in a nonemergency configuration with minimal staffing, EOCs should still be able to perform the five emergency staff functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. When activated for an incident, EOCs should also be able to perform the functions of coordination; communications; resources dispatch and tracking; and information collection, analysis, and dissemination. When fully-activated, EOCs are typically in support of a specific ICP.

EOCs are coordinating entities, not ICPs even though ICPs might perform EOC-like functions in small incidents or during the initial phase of a response to large, complex incidents.
Coordinating Entities
When incidents cross disciplinary or jurisdictional boundaries or involve complex incident management scenarios, a coordinating entity, such as an emergency management agency, may be used to facilitate incident management and policy coordination.

As stated above, coordinating entities typically consist of agency principals or their designees who have direct incident management responsibility or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities. These entities are sometimes referred to as crisis action teams, policy committees, incident management groups, executive teams, or other similar terms. For example, the wild land fire community has such an entity, the Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC) Group. In some situations, EOCs may serve a dual function as a coordination entity.

Regardless of the term or organizational structure used, these entities typically provide strategic coordination during domestic incidents. Specifically, their principal functions and responsibilities include the following:

- Ensuring that each agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information.
- Establishing priorities between incidents and/or area commands in concert with the incident command or unified commands involved.
- Acquiring and allocating resources required by incident management personnel in concert with the priorities established by the incident command or unified command.
- Anticipating and identifying future resource requirements.
- Coordinating and resolving policy issues arising from the incident(s).
- Providing strategic coordination as required.

The most common coordinating entities are state emergency management agencies and FEMA.

- Office of emergency services (OES). All states have a specific agency that coordinates emergency preparedness planning, conducts emergency preparedness training and exercises, and serves as the governor's coordinating agency in an emergency. The titles of these offices vary from state to state, for example, Division of Emergency Government, Emergency Management Agency, Department of Public Safety, or Office of Emergency Preparedness. This handbook refers to this office using the generic term office of emergency services.

  Generally, the OES is either organized as a stand-alone office under the governor or aligned under TAG or the state police. It operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and coordinates with federal officials for support if required.

- FEMA. FEMA was formed in 1979 as an independent agency by executive order of the President. In March 2003, FEMA became part of DHS and is the DHS’s executive agent for emergency management. As such, FEMA is responsible for responding to, planning for, recovering from, and mitigating against disasters.
FEMA is organized into ten regions. The region becomes the focal point for organizing and coordinating state and federal emergency management.

Figure 2-5: Map of FEMA regions

Joint field office (JFO). The JFO is a temporary interagency coordination center established locally in the field. It provides a central location for coordination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private-sector organizations with primary responsibility for threat response and incident support. The JFO enables the effective and efficient coordination of federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The JFO combines the traditional functions of the joint operations center, the FEMA disaster field officer, and the joint information center within a single federal facility. The JFO fully replaces the former DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)/FEMA Disaster Field Office (DFO).

The JFO uses an ICS structure as discussed in Chapter 3 to implement the five functions of command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. The JFO may also incorporate a sixth element focused on intelligence and information. This element may be included as a position in the coordination staff, a unit within the planning section, a branch within the operations section, or as a separate general staff section. The JFO differs from the ICP in that the JFO does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting broader support operations that may extend beyond the incident site. The following personnel staff the JFO:

- Emergency response team (ERT): Principal interagency group that staffs the JFO. Size and composition of the ERT is scalable depending on the scope and magnitude of the event.
- Emergency response team-advanced (ERT-A): Deploys during the early stages of an incident to work directly with the state to obtain information on the
impact of the event and to identify specific state requests for federal incident management assistance. Composed of program and support staff and representatives from selected ESF primary agencies. Coordinates for location of the JFO.

° Emergency response team-national (ERT-N): Deploys for large-scale, high-impact events, or as required. Includes staff from DHS, EPR, FEMA, and other federal agencies as required. Three ERT-N teams available/on-call status on a one month rotating basis; a fourth standing team on call year-round exclusively to manage incidents in the National Capital region.

° Federal incident response support team (FIRST): A forward component of an ERT-A. Designed to be a quick and readily deployable resource to support the federal response to incidents of national significance. Provides on-scene support to the local incident command or area command. Deploys within two hours of notification; required to be on-scene within twelve hours of notification.

° Urban search and rescue teams: Specially-trained personnel equipped to conduct operational activities that include locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.

° Initial response resources (IRR): Capable of immediately providing incident victims the most urgently needed life-saving and life-sustaining resources. Resourced to support up to 30,000 victims for 72 hours. Provides an immediate federal presence and supplements state capabilities with concurrence of state leadership.
Figure 2-6: A sample JFO organization for natural disaster
Figure 2-7: A sample JFO organization for terrorist incidents

Section III: Public Information Systems

Public Information Systems

Systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate information to the public are critical during crisis or emergency situations. This section describes the principles, system components, and procedures needed to support effective emergency public information operations.

Public information officer (PIO). Under the ICS, the PIO is a key staff member supporting the incident command structure. The PIO represents and advises the incident command on all public information matters relating to the management of the incident. The PIO handles media and public inquiries; emergency public information and warnings; rumor monitoring and response; media monitoring; and other functions required to coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and timely information related to the incident, particularly regarding information on public health and safety and protection. The PIO is also responsible for coordinating public information at or near the incident site and serving as the on-scene link to
the Joint Information System (JIS). The JIS In a large-scale operation, the on-scene PIO serves as a field PIO with links to the Joint Information Center (JIC).

**JIS.** The JIS integrates incident information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, timely information during crisis or incident operations. The mission of the JIS is to provide a structure and system for developing and delivering coordinated interagency messages' developing, recommending, and executing public information plans and strategies on behalf of the Incident Commander; advising the incident Commander concerning public affairs issues that could affect a response effort; and controlling rumors and inaccurate information that could undermine public confidence in the emergency response effort. The JIS provides the mechanism for integrating public information activities among JICs discussed below, across jurisdictions, and with private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. It includes the plans, protocols, and structures used to provide information to the public during incident operations and encompasses all public information operations related to an incident, including all federal, state, local, tribal and private organization PIOs, staff, and JICs established to support an incident.

**JIC.** The JIC is a facility established to coordinate all incident related public information activities. It is typically collocated with the federal, regional, state, or local EOCs and is the central point where public affairs professionals from organizations involved in incident management activities can collocate to perform critical emergency information, crisis communications, and public affairs functions. A single JIC location is preferable, but the system should be flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate multiple JIC locations when the circumstances of an incident require. Multiple JICs may be needed for a complex incident spanning a wide geographic area or multiple jurisdictions.

The JIC provides a location for organizations participating in the management of an incident to work together to ensure that timely, accurate, easy-to-understand, and consistent information is disseminated to the public. The JIC comprises representatives from each organization involved in the management of an incident. In large or complex incidents, particularly those involving complex medical and public health information requirements, JICs may be established at various levels of government. All JICs must communicate and coordinate with each other on an ongoing basis. Public awareness functions must also be coordinated with the information- and operational-security matters that are the responsibility of the information and intelligence function of the ICS, particularly when public awareness activities may affect information or operations security.

Incident commanders and interagency coordinating entities are responsible for establishing and overseeing JICs including processes for coordinating and clearing public communications. In unified commands, the departments, agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions that contribute to joint public information management do not lose their individual identities or responsibility for their own programs or policies. Rather, each entity contributes to the overall unified message.
Chapter 3
The Department of Defense (DOD) Role in Incident Response

The use of DOD resources in disaster response efforts is always the last resort because the commitment of military resources detracts from national defense and the Constitution and federal legislation limit operations of federal armed forces on domestic soil.

Even so, federal incident management response to a state’s request for assistance can include participation of DOD resources. DOD participation in incident management is called military support to civil authorities (MSCA). In civilian circles, DOD support is called defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). Both mean the same thing. Ultimately, all DOD support to disaster response is temporary with the end state being transfer of all emergency functions back to civilian authorities.

In addition to the legislation cited in Chapter 1, DOD directives also govern the use of DOD assets in supporting civil authorities. DOD assistance should be requested by a lead federal agency (LFA) only when other local, state, and federal capabilities have been exhausted or when a military-unique capability is required.

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)

Employment of military forces in support of civil authorities within the United States, its territories, and its possessions typically falls under the broad mission of MACA. MACA missions consist of three mission subsets: military support to civil authorities (MSCA); military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA), and military assistance for civil disturbances (MACDIS).

- MSCA: MSCA is the most widely recognized form of DOD civil support because it usually consists of support for natural or manmade disasters that often invoke Presidential or state emergency/disaster declarations and support for special events, such as the Olympic Games or the Pan American Games.

- MSCLEA: MSCLEA is a sensitive topic and restrictions apply to its use. Military forces performing in this role may work under several LFAs, including Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and, depending on the circumstances, may be armed. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) will decide whether or not units will be armed. Military support to civilian LFAs may include, but is not limited to, national special security events; counterterrorism operations; counterdrug operations; maritime security; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and general support (training support to law enforcement agencies/loan of equipment/personnel and expert advice).

- MACDIS: The President is authorized by the Constitution and statutory laws to employ the armed forces of the United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and riots, and provide federal supplemental assistance to the states to maintain law and order. Responsibility for the management of federal response for civil disturbances rests with the Attorney General. However, any DOD forces employed in MACDIS operations shall remain under military command and control at all times.
Figure 3-1: Military support to civil authorities is one of three types of DOD assistance available to civil authorities.

Executive Authorities

- SECDEF: As discussed in Chapter 2, the SECDEF authorizes MSCA for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. In accordance with HSPD-5 the SECDEF retains command of military forces under MSCA. Only the SECDEF can authorize the deployment of forces for MACA missions. SECDEF will decide whether or not units will be armed when performing MSCLEA missions. In addition, SECDEF is the approval authority for any requests from LFAs for potentially lethal support (i.e., lethal to the public, a member of law enforcement, or a service member).

- Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). The JDOMS is the action agent for the SECDEF. He and his staff are responsible for issuing operational MSCA orders to the supporting combatant commander.
DOD Coordinating Officers (DCOs) and Entities

- DCOs are military officers in the grade of O-6 (or their Civil Service equivalents) who represent DOD at the joint field office (JFO) discussed in Chapter 2. The DCO is the single DOD point of contact at the JFO. The DCO will be operational control (OPCON) to the designated supported combatant commander or designated joint task force (JTF) commander.

The DCO assists in planning and coordinating the delivering all DOD disaster response assets and resources provided to a state through the federal coordinating officer (FCO). Requests for MSCA originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO to the SECDEF for approval, and then on to the JDOMs for transmission to one of the unified combatant commands. DCOs are designated by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region and are assigned one per state disaster. All DCOs and their associated defense coordinating elements (DCEs) undergo periodic, externally evaluated readiness exercises to ensure they are trained and ready to perform MSCA missions.
Defense coordinating element (DCE). The DCE is the DCO’s staff. It consists of staff and military liaison officers responsible for facilitating DOD coordination and support. The DCE processes requirements for military support; forwards mission assignments through DOD channel; tracks expenditures; assists with reception, staging, on-ward movement, and integration (RSOI) of DOD resources; and assigns military liaisons to activated emergency support functions (ESFs).

Emergency preparedness liaison officer (EPLO). EPLOs are reserve component officers in the pay grade of O6 (Army, Air Force, and Marine colonels and Navy captains) who represent their respective service component at the state EOCs and the state coordinating officer (SCO).
JFO. They serve as the military liaison at the FEMA region level. They identify potential DOD support requirements and function as service representatives and advisors to the DCO as part of the DCE staff.

Joint entities

- Unified combatant commands. Joint Pub 3-26, Homeland Security states, “The combatant commanders responsible for homeland defense and civil support incorporate plans for civil support by task organizing their commands to accomplish civil support missions as well as other assigned missions.”
  - U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, is responsible for providing resources for domestic disaster relief to the 48 contiguous United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
  - U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), headquartered at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii, is responsible for providing resources for Hawaii, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and the Freely Associated States of Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.

- Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). JTF-CS is a standing military headquarters without assigned forces, located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, that studies city and state emergency plans to evaluate the potential needs of these cities in order to support a LFA managing the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack. JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD’s support to FEMA for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events in the continental United States (CONUS) and draws on DOD capabilities including detection, decontamination, medical, and logistical assets. Once the SECDEF authorizes MSCA, JTF-CS deploys to the incident site to serve as the command and control headquarters for responding DOD units.

- Joint task force (JTF): A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SECDEF, and consists of a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.

Army entities

Numbered armies. The U.S. Army is organized into six numbered armies. Two of these, 1st U.S. Army and 5th U.S. Army, have domestic disaster response command and control responsibilities.

- 1st U.S. Army, headquartered at Forest Park, Georgia, is responsible for command and control of military support to domestic disaster response efforts east of the Mississippi River.
- 5th U.S. Army, headquartered at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, is responsible for command and control of military support to domestic disaster response efforts west of the Mississippi River. By 2007, 5th U.S. Army is to assume responsibility for command and control of MSCA efforts throughout the entire continental United States. The JTF headquarters for JTF Katrina was organized from 1st U.S. Army headquarters.
Federal-to-federal support

DOD response can be in the form of federal-to-federal support assistance or direct assistance. Federal-to-federal support refers to the circumstance in which a federal department or agency requests federal resource support under the National Response Plan (NRP) that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or other mechanisms (e.g., executive orders, memorandums of understanding, memorandums of agreement, etc.).

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

The USACE is an Army major command assigned mission responsibilities in major construction and other engineering support to the Army and the Air Force, in nationwide water resource management, in engineering research and development, and in real estate services for the Army and DOD. USACE employs approximately 34,600 civilian and has approximately 650 military members assigned. The Corps is organized geographically into 8 divisions in the United States and 41 subordinate districts throughout the United States, Asia, and Europe. Divisions and districts are defined by watershed boundaries, not by states. In addition, a 9th provisional division with four districts was activated January 25, 2004, to oversee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

USACE’s mission is to provide quality, responsive engineering services to the nation including:

- Planning, designing, building and operating water resources and other civil works projects (navigation, flood control, environmental protection, disaster response, etc.)
- Designing and managing the construction of military facilities for the Army and Air Force. (military construction)
- Providing design and construction management support for other defense and federal agencies. (interagency and international services)

In addition to the long-standing programs noted above, beginning in the 1990s, USACE has been called upon with increasing frequency to take part in contingency operations at home and abroad. These contingency operations include natural and manmade disasters, as well as military/foreign policy operations in support of the U.S. national interest. Such operations became more common during the 1990s, with the frequency, the duration, and the scope of these contingency efforts increasing greatly since the events of September 11, 2001.

USACE and domestic incident response

USACE conducts its emergency response activities under two basic authorities: the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act (P.L. 84-99, as amended) and the Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended). Under the Stafford Act, the Corps supports FEMA in carrying out the NRP, which calls on 26 federal departments and agencies to provide coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. Under this plan, the Army has the lead responsibility for public works and engineering missions (emergency services function #3, public works. and engineering).

Primary activities

- Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (P.L. 84-99, as amended). Readiness teams in Corps districts nationwide are trained, equipped, and prepared to participate in flood control activities. Activities include:
Disaster preparedness

- Participate in state and local emergency seminars and exercises.
- Inspect flood control works constructed or repaired by the Corps, and maintenance recommendations.
- Upon request, inspect non-federal dams and flood control projects.

Flood fighting

- Assist in search and rescue operations.
- Technical assistance and advice.
- Emergency repairs to levees and other flood control projects.
- Furnishing materials such as sandbags, polyethylene sheeting, lumber, pumps, or rocks when the Corps is actively participating in a flood fight.

Post-Flood Response

- Clear drainage channels, bridge openings, or structures blocked by event-generated debris.
- Clear blockages to critical water supply intakes and sewer outfalls.
- Debris removal necessary to reopen vital transportation routes.
- Temporary restoration of critical public services or facilities.
- Identify hazard mitigation opportunities.

Rehabilitation

- Repair or restoration of a flood control structure.
- Repair or restoration of hurricane or shore protection structures damaged or destroyed by wind, wave, or water action not of an ordinary nature.

Public Works and Engineering, National Response Plan (NRP), (ESF #3). The Corps is committed to ensuring that its emergency management teams are well-prepared, well-equipped, and ready to respond instantly. When disaster strikes, response teams can be onsite within hours to provide immediate relief and support. Under the NRP, the Corps is designated as the lead agency for public works and engineering. DOD can authorize the Corps to provide the following assistance on a temporary basis:

- Emergency services including supplying potable water, removing debris, conducting urban search and rescue, and providing emergency electrical power and ice.
Technical advice and evaluations including structural analysis.

* Construction management and inspection.

* Emergency contracting.

* Emergency repair of public infrastructure and facilities such as water supply sources.

* Real estate support

Planning and response teams (PRTs)

The Corps maintains 44 PRTs stationed around the country to facilitate a rapid response to disasters. Teams include:

- 7 ice teams
- 7 water teams
- 8 emergency power teams
- 7 debris removal teams
- 5 temporary housing teams
- 1 emergency access team
- 5 temporary roofing teams
- 4 structural safety assessment teams

Deployable Tactical Operations System (DTOS)

In addition, the Corps also manages a DTOS, which includes a national fleet of rapid response vehicles that are designed to deploy within 18 hours as field offices for the PRTs. The DTOS includes:

- 3 deployable tactical operations centers
- 6 rapid response vehicles
- 2 containerized tactical operations centers (CTOCs) comprised of laptop computers, global positioning equipment, two high-frequency radios, a satellite telephone, and digital camera.

Requests for Military Support

Initial requests for military support are made to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat. If approved by the SECDEF, DOD designates a supported combatant commander for the response, either USNORTHCOM or USPACOM. The supported combatant commander determines the appropriate level of command and control for each response and usually directs a senior military officer to deploy to the incident site. Under most circumstances, the senior
The military officer at the incident site is the DCO. The DCO serves as DOD’s single point of contact in the JFO.

Requests for MSCA originating at the JFO will be coordinated and processed through the DCO with the exception of requests for USACE support, National Guard forces operating in state active duty (SAD) or Title 32 status (i.e., not in federal service), or, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the FBI. These exceptions are detailed later in this section. Specific responsibilities of the DCO are subject to modification by the supported combatant commander based on the situation. In general, the DCO will:

- Collocate with the PFO/FCO/FRC/SFLEO in the JFO
- Coordinate and process applicable requests for assistance from the PFO/FCO/FRC/SFLEO or designated representative
- Orchestrate the accomplishment of approved mission assignments utilizing available resources
- Assign military liaison officers as appropriate to ESF agencies at the JFO to provide technical assistance or facilitate timely coordination
- Refer problematic or contentious issues through the appropriate military chain of command to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

Based on the magnitude, type of disaster, and anticipated level of resource involvement, the supported combatant commander may utilize a joint task force (JTF) to consolidate and manage supporting military activities. A JTF commander exercises OPCON of all allocated DOD resources (excluding USACE resources; National Guard forces operating in SAD or Title 32 status; and, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the FBI). In the event that a JTF is utilized, the DCO may continue to perform all duties set forth above.

As stated earlier, most requests for MSCA originating at the JFO will be coordinated and processed through the DCO; however, requests for DOD/USACE support; National Guard forces operating in SAD or Title 32 status; and, in some cases, DOD forces in support of the FBI are processed differently, as discussed below.

USACE is a public engineering organization within DOD providing engineering support and services to DOD activities around the globe, as well as to the nation’s civil works flood protection and navigation infrastructure. USACE provides support as a primary agency and coordinating agency for ESF #3 and as a support agency to other ESFs as specified in the annexes. USACE performs emergency support activities under separate authorities, to include Public Law 84-99.

Army and Air National Guard forces employed under SAD or Title 32 status are providing support to the governor of their state and are not part of federal military response efforts.

Support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Support for law enforcement and domestic counterterrorism activities is provided in limited circumstances consistent with applicable laws and, in some circumstances, independent of the DCO.
“Immediate Response” Situations

Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive and pre-approval by the SECDEF, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385). All such necessary action is referred to as “Immediate Response.”

In addition to direct support for incident response, DOD possesses specialized capabilities employed in support of federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies, to include their first responder communities. Included among these specialized capabilities are test and evaluation facilities and capabilities; education and exercise expertise; explosive detection; technical escort; medical services; the transfer of applicable technologies, including those developed through DOD science and technology programs; and the expertise of DOD personnel. The DOD Homeland Defense Coordination Office established at DHS headquarters facilitates interdepartmental cooperation and transfer of these capabilities to the emergency responder community.
Chapter 4

Emergency Support Tasks

To facilitate the type of assistance that the federal government can offer states, emergency support functions (ESFs) have been developed. ESFs are groupings of government and certain private-sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services likely to be needed to save lives; protect property and the environment; restore essential services and critical infrastructure; and help victims and communities return to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents. ESFs serve as the primary operational-level mechanism to provide assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is most likely to be involved in supporting ESFs 1, 3, 8, 9, and 11. A complete discussion of ESF can be found in the National Response Plan (NRP). Figure 4-1 shows how ESFs are typically assigned to sections of the Operations division.
ESF #1 Transportation

- **Scope:**
  - Federal and civil transportation support
  - Transportation safety
  - Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure
  - Movement restrictions
  - Damage and impact assessment

- **Purpose:** Transportation assists federal agencies, State and local governmental entities, and voluntary organizations requiring transportation capacity to perform response missions following a major disaster or emergency. ESF #1 also serves as a coordination point between response operations and restoration of the transportation infrastructure.

- **Lead federal agency (LFA):** Department of Transportation (DOT)

- **Support federal agencies:**
  - Department of Agriculture (DOA)
  - Department of Commerce (DOC)
  - DOD
  - Department of Energy (DOE)
  - Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
  - Department of the Interior (DOI)
  - Department of Justice (DOJ)
  - Department of State (DOS)
  - General Services Administration (GSA)
  - U.S. Postal Service (USPS)

- **DOD responsibilities:** Processing and overall coordination of requests for federal and civil transportation support received from organizations eligible under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), including requests for military transportation.

ESF #2 Communications

- **Scope:**
  - Coordination with telecommunications industry
• **Purpose:** Communications ensures the provision of federal telecommunications support to federal, state, and local response efforts following a presidentially declared major disaster, emergency, or extraordinary situation under the FRP. This ESF supplements the provisions of the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies, hereafter referred to as the National Telecommunications Support Plan (NTSP).

• **LFAs:** DHS/Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/National Communications System

• **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DHS
  - DOI
  - Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
  - GSA

• **DOD responsibilities:** Provide assistance in civil emergencies in accordance with national policies, consistent with defense priorities as set forth in DOD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has designated the Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for DOD support to civil emergencies.

**ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering**

• **Scope:**
  - Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
  - Infrastructure restoration
  - Engineering services
  - Construction management
  - Critical infrastructure liaison
• **Purpose:** Public works and engineering provides technical advice and evaluation; engineering services; contracting for construction management and inspection; contracting for the emergency repair of water and wastewater treatment facilities; potable water and ice, emergency power, and real estate support to assist the state(s) in meeting goals related to lifesaving and life-sustaining actions; damage mitigation; and recovery activities following a major disaster or emergency

• **LFAs:** DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), DHS, Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

• **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DOE
  - Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
  - DHS
  - DOI
  - Department of Labor (DOL)
  - DOT
  - Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA)
  - Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
  - GSA
  - Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
  - Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
  - American Red Cross (ARC)

• **DOD responsibilities:** The Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the responsible national-level DOD office for military support to civilian authorities. DOD has responsibility for ESF #3 and has designated the USACE as its operating agent for ESF #3 planning, preparedness, response, and recovery. DOD/DOMS will provide a defense coordinating officer (DCO) to serve as the single point of contact (POC) to the federal coordinating officer (FCO) and ESF representatives for all requests for military assistance other than that provided by ESF #3. USACE will support the DCO and deployed joint forces as requested.
ESF #4 Firefighting

- **Scope:** Firefighting activities on federal lands and resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations

- **Purpose:** Firefighting detects and suppresses wild land, rural, and urban fires resulting from, or occurring coincidentally with, a major disaster or emergency requiring federal response assistance

- **LFA:** DOA, Forest Service

- **Supporting federal agencies:** DOC, DOD, DHS, DOI, EPA

- **DOD responsibilities:** Assume full responsibility for firefighting activities on U.S. military installations. Support firefighting operations on nonmilitary lands with personnel, equipment, and supplies under the terms of the existing interagency agreement, including the arrangement of liaisons as required. Provide contracting services through the USACE to urban and rural firefighting forces to obtain heavy equipment and/or demolition services as needed to suppress disaster-related fires.

ESF #5 Emergency Management

- **Scope:**
  
  - Coordination of incident management efforts
  
  - Issuance of mission assignments
  
  - Resource and human capital
  
  - Incident action planning
  
  - Financial management

- **Purpose:** Collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates information about a potential or actual disaster or emergency to facilitate the overall activities of the federal government in providing assistance to one or more affected states. Fulfilling this mission supports planning and decision making at both the field/regional operations and headquarters (HQ) levels.

- **LFAs:** DHS/EPR/FEMA

- **Supporting federal agencies:**
  
  - DOA
  
  - DOC
  
  - DOD
  
  - Department of Education
  
  - DOE
ESF #6 Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services

• **Scope:**
  - Mass care
  - Disaster housing
  - Human services
• **Purpose:** Mass care coordinates federal assistance in support of state and local efforts to meet the mass care needs of victims of a disaster. This federal assistance will support the delivery of mass care services of shelter, food, and emergency first aid to disaster victims; the establishment of systems to provide bulk distribution of emergency relief supplies to disaster victims; and the collection of information to operate a disaster welfare information (DWI) system to report victim status and assist in family reunification.

• **LFAs:** DHS, EPR, FEMA, ARC

• **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOA
  - DOD
  - DHHS
  - DHS
  - HUD
  - DOI
  - DOJ
  - DOL
  - DOT
  - Department of Treasury
  - DVA
  - GSA
  - OPM
  - SBA
  - Social Security Administration (SSA)
  - USPS
  - Corporation for National and Community Service
  - National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

• **DOD responsibilities:**
  - Director of Military Support provides available resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) in the absence of other national disaster system resource capabilities (including contracting).
USACE:

* Provide potable water and ice for mass care use and bulk distribution to disaster victims.

* Provide assistance in inspecting mass care shelter sites after the disaster to ensure suitability of facilities to safely shelter disaster victims.

* Provide assistance in constructing temporary shelter facilities, if necessary, in the disaster area.

ESF #7 Resource Support

- **Scope**: Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.)

- **Purpose**: Resource support provides operational assistance in a potential or actual presidentially declared major disaster or emergency.

- **LFAs**: GSA

- **Supporting federal agencies**:
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DOE
  - DHS
  - DOL
  - DOT
  - DVA
  - NASA
  - National Communications System (NCS)
  - OPM

- **DOD responsibilities**: Provide resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) in the absence of other national disaster system resource capabilities (including contracting) when provision does not conflict with the DOD’s primary mission or its ability to respond to operational contingencies.
ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services

- **Scope:**
  - Public health
  - Medical
  - Mental health services
  - Mortuary services

- **Purpose:** Health and medical services provides coordinated federal assistance to supplement State and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency, or during a developing potential medical situation. Assistance provided under ESF #8 is directed by the DHHS through its executive agent, the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (ASPHEP). Resources will be furnished when state and local resources are overwhelmed and public health and/or medical assistance is requested from the federal government.

- **LFA:** DHHS

- **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOA
  - DOD
  - DOE
  - DHS
  - DOI
  - DOJ
  - DOL
  - DOS
  - DOT
  - DVA
  - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
  - EPA
  - GSA
DOD responsibilities:

- Alert Global Patient Requirements Movement Center (GPMRC) to provide DOD National Disaster Medical System federal coordinating centers (FCCs) (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and Veterans Affairs (VA) National Disaster Management System (NDMS) FCC reporting/regulating instruction to support disaster relief efforts.

- Alert DOD NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS area operations/patient reception plans; initiate bed reporting based on GPMRC instructions.

- In coordination with NDMS Operation Support Center (NDMSOSC), evacuate and manage patients as required from the disaster area to NDMS patient reception areas.

- In coordination with DOT and other transportation support agencies, transport medical personnel, equipment, and supplies into the disaster area.

- Provide logistical support to health/medical response operations.

- Provide active duty medical units for casualty clearing/staging and other missions as needed, including aeromedical evacuation; mobilize and deploy Reserve and National Guard

ESF #9 Urban Search and Rescue

- **Scope:** Life-saving assistance and urban search and rescue

- **Purpose:** Urban search and rescue rapidly deploys components of the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System to provide specialized lifesaving assistance to state and local authorities in the event of a major disaster or emergency. US&R operational activities include locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.

- **LFA:** DHS, EPR, FEMA

- **Supporting federal agencies:**
  
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DHHS
  - DHS
  - DOJ
° DOL
° DOT
° USAID
° NASA

• **DOD responsibilities:**

  ° Primary source for:

    * Fixed-wing transportation of US&R task forces and incident support teams (ISTs) from base locations to mobilization centers or base support installations (BSIs). Target time frame for airlift missions is six hours from the time of task force activation;

    * Rotary-wing transportation of US&R task forces and ISTs to and from isolated, surface-inaccessible, or other limited-access locations

    * Through the USACE, provide trained structures specialists and System to Locate Survivors (STOLS) teams to supplement resources of US&R task forces and ISTs

    * Through the USACE, provide predisaster training for US&R task force and IST structures specialists.

  ° Secondary source for:

    * Ground transportation of US&R task forces and ISTs within the affected area

    * Mobile feeding units for US&R task forces and IST personnel

    * Portable shelter for use by US&R task force and IST personnel for eating, sleeping, and working.

**ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response**

• **Scope:** Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response and environmental safety and short-and long-term cleanup.

• **Purpose:** Hazardous materials response provides federal support to state and local governments in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or release of hazardous materials following a major disaster or emergency. As an element of the FRP, ESF #10 may be activated under one of the following conditions:

  ° In response to a disaster for which the President (through DHS) determines that federal assistance is required to supplement the response efforts of the affected state and local governments, under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
In anticipation of a major disaster or emergency that is expected to result in a declaration under the Stafford Act.

A Presidential declaration does not automatically activate ESF #10. DHS will determine, in consultation with affected states, the EPA, and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), if appropriate, if such activation is required to supplement the efforts of state and local governments. (The USCG will be consulted in a disaster or emergency where the predominant damage is within its jurisdiction. As primary agency for the ESF, EPA also will be consulted in such cases.)

Within the context of this ESF, the term “hazardous materials” is defined broadly to include oil; hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), as amended; pollutants and contaminants defined under Section 101(33) of CERCLA; and certain chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Federal response to releases of “hazardous materials” is carried out under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 300).

EPA will serve as the National Chair and lead agency for each activation of ESF #10, with close coordination with the USCG in geographic locations under USCG jurisdiction. The USCG will be the ESF #10 Regional Incident Chair for a disaster or emergency affecting only the areas under USCG jurisdiction. (Precise jurisdictional boundaries have been determined by EPA/USCG agreements and are described in the NCP as well as in greater detail in the Regional Oil and Hazardous Pollution Contingency Plans [RCPs]). The USCG will receive mission assignments directly from DHS for such responses. (To provide a smooth interface with the response structure established under the NCP, regional incident-specific lead for ESF #10 may be transferred from one regional chair to the other if circumstances dictate.) In the event that an incident involves both EPA and USCG jurisdictions, EPA will assume the ESF #10 Incident Chair role, with the USCG serving as Vice Chair. Each agency will have the option of transferring the lead agency or specific tasks role to the other; however, the Incident Chair will retain responsibility for effectively addressing the ESF #10 tasks, both NCP and non-NCP.

- **LFAs**: EPA, DHS, USCG

- **Supporting federal agencies**:
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DOE
  - DHHS
  - DHS
  - DOI
DOD responsibilities:

° Direct response actions for releases of hazardous substances from its vessels, facilities, and vehicles.

° Provide personnel and equipment to other federal organizations and state and local governments (such as Supervisor of Salvage and Diving [SUPSALV]), as requested, if consistent with DOD operational requirements.

ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources

• Scope:

° Nutrition assistance

° Animal and plant disease/pest response

° Food safety and security

° Natural and cultural resources

° Historic properties protection and restoration

• Purpose: Identifies, secures, and arranges for the transportation of food assistance to affected areas following a major disaster or emergency or other event requiring federal response.

• LFA: DOA, DOI

• Supporting federal agencies:

° DOA

° DOC

° DOD

° DOE

° DHHS
DOD responsibilities:
° Assess the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities capable of storing dry, chilled, and frozen food.
° Assess the availability of DOD transportation equipment, material handling equipment, and personnel for support. This responsibility will be confined to the posts, camps, and stations within or adjacent to the disaster area.
° Arrange for the delivery and distribution of resources to areas designated by the ESF.

ESF #12 Energy

Scope:
° Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration
° Energy industry utilities coordination
° Energy forecast.

Purpose: Energy helps restore the nation’s energy systems following a major disaster, emergency, or other significant event requiring federal response assistance. In addition, the DOE members of ESF #12 provide direct coordination with all other department response elements.

LFA: DOE

Supporting federal agencies:
° DOA
° DOC
DOD responsibilities: Director of Military Support report damage assessment and recommend priorities to ESF #12 for restoring energy service to critical defense facilities. USACE coordinate emergency power team tasking with power-system restoration activities to assist in setting priorities and ensure time and resources are not wasted in providing support to a facility that is about to have its power restored.

ESF #13 Public Safety and Security

- **Scope:**
  - Facility and resource security
  - Security planning and technical and resource assistance
  - Public safety/security support
  - Support to access, traffic
  - Crowd control.

- **Purpose:** Public safety and security integrates federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities associated with potential or actual incidents of national significance.

- **LFAs:** DHS and DOJ

- **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOA
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DOE
DHS responsibilities: Provides physical and electronic security systems assistance and expertise.

ESF #14 Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation

- **Scope:**
  - Social and economic community impact assessment
  - Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the private sector
  - Mitigation analysis and program implementation.

- **Purpose:** Long-term community recovery and mitigation provides a framework for federal government support to state, regional, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector designed to enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of an Incident of National Significance. This support consists of available programs and resources of federal departments and agencies to enable community recovery, especially long-term community recovery, and to reduce or eliminate risk from future incidents, where feasible.

- **LFA:** DOA, DOC, DHS, HUD, Department of the Treasury, SBA.

- **Supporting federal agencies:**
  - DOC
  - DOD
  - DOE
  - DHHS
  - DHS
DOD responsibilities: Provides technical assistance in community planning and civil engineering, and natural hazard risk assessment expertise. Supports the development of national strategies and plans related to housing and permanent housing, debris management, and the restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.

ESF #15 External Affairs

- **Scope**: Emergency public information and protective action guidance, media and community relations, congressional and international affairs, tribal, and insular affairs.

- **Purpose**: External affairs ensures that sufficient federal assets are deployed to the field during a potential or actual incident of national significance to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace. ESF #15 provides the resource support and mechanisms to implement the NRP and Incident Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures (NRP-ICEPP) described in the NRP Public Affairs Support Annex.

- **LFAs**: DHS, EPR, FEMA

- **Supporting federal agencies**: All

- **DOD responsibilities**: Depending on the nature and scope of the incident, all federal departments and agencies support the NRP and are responsible for providing appropriate support for ESF #15 as required.
Appendix A

Unit Planning Considerations

This appendix is provided as a checklist to assist planners in military assistance to civil authorities (MSCA) planning.

S1 (Personnel)

- Deployment orders
- Personnel accountability
- Preparation for overseas movement (POM): Medical records, shot records, insurance documents, powers of attorney, wills, etc.
- Funding. See below
- Mail
- Pay/Finance
- Medical. See Appendix B
- Dental
- Mortuary affairs
- Automation

S2 (Intelligence)

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
- Maps
- Operations security (OPSEC). See Appendix J
- Physical security
- Arms room

S3 (Operations)

- Define the command relationships. Whom do I report to upon arrival? Who do I work for?
- Define the support relationships. Who do I support?
- Military decision-making process (MDMP). Specified tasks; implied tasks; limitations; constraints; intent; purpose, methods, end state; course of action (COA). Be imaginative in applying MDMP doctrine to MSCA mission
- Advance party. Include signal officer and internal logistics planner
• Battle rhythm
• Briefings/reports
• Chain of command/command organization of supported incident command
• Points of contact for subject matter experts
• Packing lists
• Transportation (tactical)/convoy operations.
• Mission-related training/mission rehearsal exercise (MRX)
• Weapons qualification
• After action reviews (AAR). See Appendix M
• Risk management. See Appendix N
• Liaison officers (LNOs)
• Airspace command and control (A2C2). See Appendix K
• Internet/networking

S4 (Logistics) (Internal to the Supporting Unit)

• Life support: Billeting, mess, rations, water, bath and laundry.


• Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)
• Maintenance and recovery
• Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
• Ammunition storage

Communications and Communications Security (COMSEC)

• Coordinate with military (Air National Guard, Army national guard, coast guard, air force, navy, marines), local, state, regional, and Federal agencies

• Initial communications capabilities should be self-sufficient and interoperable with both first responders and local authorities. Consider wireless capability initially. When primary signal element arrives, phase out wireless network. Replace wireless cards with local area network (LAN) cards or else all computers will not work.
• Plan for all means of communications: telephone (cellular or land line), radio (in all band widths), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNET), Secure Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNET), video, video-teleconferencing (VTC);

• Do not send equipment without operators.

• Do send qualified signal leaders to ensure operators and equipment are being used properly and profitably.

• Be prepared to provide communications equipment (cell phones, radios, base sets, etc.) to first responders. Plan for a lowest common denominator communications to locals (i.e., hand-held radio, computer, etc.)

• Plan for extended logistical support for equipment and personnel as well as unexpected requirements including generator support; maintenance of equipment; fuel requirements of vehicles, systems, and generators; and support for others’ equipment (i.e. charging cell phones from your power source, charging satellite phones).

• Know the power requirements for your equipment. Do you need to bring your own power generation?

• Communications (voice, data, video) with various emergency operations centers (EOCs) including military (Air National Guard, Army National Guard, Coast Guard, Air force, Navy, Marines), local, state, regional, or federal

• Communications structure must be able can grow to meet future needs. What can be established initially and expanded to handle a greater demand. Small deployable packages ahead of larger deployable command posts (DCPs) for immediate feedback of requirements.

• Establish reachback capability

• Conduct a synchronization meeting between Army National Guard and Air National Guard J6s at least 24 hours prior to event.

• Realize that geography affects signal performance. A communication system that worked well at one location might not work in another.

Legal/Rules on Use of Force (RUF). See Appendix I

Funding

In most cases the support provided is on reimbursable basis. The defense coordinating officer (DCO) receives and validates a mission assignment (FEMA form 90-129). This form has a mission assignment number which should be listed on the tasking or execution orders. The mission assignment number is listed on request for reimbursement.

The mission is executed using the supporting unit’s operational funds. In order for the military to receive reimbursement the supporting unit must document the support provided in a memorandum to their higher headquarters.
Keep an accurate record of the mission. Items to note include:

- Record of missions performed
- Rosters of personnel involved
- Travel and per diem (military and civil service)
- Temporary personnel wages, travel, and per diem
- Lodging cost
- Transportation cost (car and bus rentals, chartered aircraft, fuel)
- Contracting cost
- Equipment provided or operated (estimated hourly cost for operation)
- Material provided from regular stock. (all classes of supply)
- Laundry expenses
- Official or morale phone calls

Keep receipts and other supporting documents. Supporting documents include:

- Unit orders
- Temporary duty (TDY) orders
- TDY payment vouchers
- Vehicle dispatch logs
- Fuel card receipts
- Hand receipts
- Request for supplies
- Government credit card receipts
- Copy of contracts

**Demobilization**

The Department of Defense (DOD) responds to disasters in order to perform emergency missions that the overwhelmed state and local governments temporarily cannot handle. As the emergency passes, state and local governments will once again be able to perform these response and recovery missions, and incident commanders begin demobilizing their commands. Recognize when the unit’s work is done. The final decision to conclude the DOD’s activities and presence in the area of operations is made by the federal coordinating officer (FCO) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).
Dangers of staying too long

- State and local governments will frequently expect DOD assistance much longer than it is actually needed.

- State and local governments may become too dependent on DOD assistance, thus impeding long-term recovery.

- If local businesses and contractors can perform the missions and tasks assigned to the DOD, the continued employment of the DOD may be unnecessary or illegal and may rouse resentment of local citizens who may feel deprived of employment opportunities.

- The primary role of the DOD is to train, prepare for, and execute combat operations. Even a short absence from this focus on combat operations may degrade a unit’s preparedness.

End state and exit strategy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)

- Be attentive to measures of performance, the conditions that the DOD must meet to declare mission success and the end state.

- Make clear to state and local governments that the DOD presence will be limited.

- Agree with state and local governments on acceptable end state, usually recognized as when state and local governments can re-establish normal operations.

- Consider using commercial vendors or contractors.

- The DOD must coordinate with Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and obtain the approval of the FCO before terminating disaster response operations.
Appendix B

Casualty Considerations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

The delivery of public health and medical support falls under emergency support function (ESF) #8 of the National Response Plan (NRP). The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) serves as the primary agency for these functions; nevertheless, this ESF is one in which the military is likely to be involved. When required, the Joint Regional Medical Planner Office (JRMPO) of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the defense coordinating officer (DCO) coordinate these services. The joint task force’s (JTF) medical planning staff must be in close contact with these offices as they develop their operational plans. However, there are several acute situations that the JTF will likely encounter before it has the opportunity to coordinate with these offices. These include mass casualty operations, contaminated casualties, and mental health casualties. Also, JTF planners should be aware of National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) organization responsible for supporting and coordinating the federal medical response to disasters.

Mass Casualty (MASCAL) Operations

Disaster situations, whether the result of natural or man-made incidents, can quickly produce a large number of casualties across a widespread geographic area. This may, in turn, overwhelm the existing health care system and produce either a local or area-wide MASCAL situation. MASCALs are inherently difficult to control, especially across large areas, and contain several major obstacles to the delivery of health care which the JTF must plan for and overcome. These obstacles include:

- **Inappropriate care distribution.** Often the first casualties to present for care are the least injured, who then consume all available resources, leaving the most injured without access to life-saving care. To ensure that medical resources are appropriately allocated across the affected area, care delivery must be prioritized at both the local level and area-wide.

- **Unequal distribution of casualties.** Casualties tend to concentrate locally and then present to the nearest health facility. This may overwhelm local facilities, while other facilities in the area are underused. A variation of this pattern is when casualties take themselves to the “preferred” or “better” hospitals, while avoiding all other, closer facilities.

- **Non-Emergency Medical System (EMS) responders.** EMS is the usual route of entry into the health care system for casualties. In MASCALs, casualties access the system through non-EMS entry points (for example: private means, police transport, and search and rescue [SAR]). This results in multiple, uncontrolled demands for health care and concentrates the demands at non-typical locations (i.e., at the SAR delivery point, as opposed to the hospital). Also, non-local responders arrive to help but are not familiar with the local health system, adding to the overall confusion.

- **Lack of inter-organizational planning.** During major disasters, multiple organizations are involved from both within and outside the local area. These may include local, state, and military personnel; public health organizations, non-governmental organizations, and charitable organizations; and private citizens, to name a few. The actions of these groups tend to be uncoordinated, with little to no inter-organizational communication.
• **Lack of proper needs-assessment.** The acute demand for care often results in a rapid deployment of resources to the most critical and closest casualties, without an overall assessment of need. This “ready, fire, aim” approach leads to a “wrong help, at the wrong time, to the wrong people” situation. Some areas will receive an over-abundance of aid, while others may be completely neglected.

**Techniques and procedures to overcome obstacles to care**

• Coordinate all missions through the JRMPO, and coordinate with DHHS and all other medical assets in the area.

• Centralize command and control of all military health assets that enter the area.

• Institute a systematic plan for allocation of medical care at ground zero and across the area.

• Ensure coordinated and controlled delivery of casualties located by SAR into the established triage system.

• Coordinate with law enforcement to maintain crowd and traffic control.

• Communicate with local hospitals to determine capacities and capabilities, in order to properly direct casualty flow from ground zero to higher levels of care.

**Triage**

The key to managing MASCAL situations is triage. Triage is the process of sorting casualties based on the severity of injury and assigning priorities of care and evacuation in a situation with limited resources. The goal is to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of casualties. Medical providers, at all levels of care, must institute a uniformed system to classify casualties and assign treatment priorities.
Triage categories. Triage categories were originally developed for MASCAL management in combat environments. Most military medical personnel are familiar with this system. The same principles apply to the civilian disaster setting, with the major differences being primarily terminology and priority assignment. Table A1-1 depicts triage categories used in combat and natural disasters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triage Category: Combat Setting</th>
<th>Triage Category: Civilian Setting</th>
<th>Category Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>This group includes those who require lifesaving surgery. The surgical procedures in this category should not be time consuming and should concern only those patients with high chances of survival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>Urgent</td>
<td>This group includes casualties who are badly in need of time-consuming surgery, but whose general condition permits delay in surgical treatment without unduly endangering life. Sustaining treatment will be required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>These casualties have relatively minor injuries and can effectively care for themselves or helped by non-medical personnel. Care can be delayed for hours to days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectant</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Casualties in this category have wounds that are so extensive that even if they were the sole casualty and had the benefit of optimal medical resource application, their survival would be unlikely.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2-1. Triage categories, combat vs. civilian casualties

Assigning triage categories. Medical personnel must rapidly assess casualties and assign triage categories. A systematic process should be in place to ensure proper identification occurs. A simple algorithm is suggested in Figure A1-1 to assist with this process.
Figure AB-1: Assigning triage categories

**Treatment priorities.** When assigning treatment priorities, the first to receive care are those in most critical need (where there is an expectation that an intervention will prevent loss of life, limb, and/or eyesight) with minimal expenditure of time, personnel, and/or other resources.

In the combat setting, triage principles dictate treating casualties in the “expectant” category after all other wounded; thus “expectant” casualties have a high likelihood of dying. Civilian medical personnel, especially in the United States, view this as an unreasonable approach. It is unlikely that resources would be so constrained such that the seriously wounded should have care delayed for any significant amount of time. It is unreasonable to expect rescuers to “condemn” expectant casualties when not in a tactical combat environment.

Table A2-2 outlines treatment priorities for the different triage categories in the combat and civilian settings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
<th>COMBAT CASUALTIES</th>
<th>CIVILIAN CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>IMMEDIATE</td>
<td>CRITICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>DELAYED</td>
<td>CATASTROPHIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>MINIMAL</td>
<td>URGENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>EXPECTANT</td>
<td>MINOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table AB-2. Treatment priorities in a combat vs. civilian MASCAL setting
Management and treatment

Every medical unit or facility that responds to a disaster situation requires a MASCAL plan appropriate to their unique operational needs and situation. However, there are several characteristics that are consistent for all MASCAL operations:

- **Triage area.** All casualties should flow through a single triage area. This area should be close to the receiving area (landing zone [LZ], ground routes, decontamination site), have one-way flow, and have clearly marked routes to the treatment areas.

- **Triage officer (TO).** Ideally the TO is a surgeon, but must be a person with clinical experience in evaluating casualties. The TO performs a rapid evaluation of every casualty, assigns them an appropriate category, and directs them to the proper treatment area. The TO is assisted by personnel dedicated to identifying, tagging, and recording triage assignments and disposition.

- **Immediate treatment area.** This area is set up close to and with direct access to the triage area and is composed of the staff and supplies necessary to administer immediate, life-saving aid.

- **Non-immediate treatment area.** All minor and delayed injuries are directed here. This area is staffed and supplied to treat all non-immediate injuries and to hold casualties awaiting evacuation to a higher level of care (i.e., a hospital).

- **Morgue.** This area must be set aside, climate controlled (if possible), and secured from view and interference.

Techniques and procedures for MASCAL and triage

- Ensure traffic flow is well marked so all casualties enter the triage area at one location.

- No significant treatment should occur in the triage area. Casualties are sent to the appropriate treatment area for interventions.

- An administrative recorder should walk with the TO to properly document all casualties in a log and use an indelible marker on the casualty’s forehead to mark his triage category.

- Post an administrative person at the entry of the treatment areas to document and regulate casualty flow.

- Dedicate someone to re-triage casualties as they enter each treatment area.

- Have as many non-medical augmentees as possible available to assist with casualty transport (i.e., litter bearers).

- Shift resources from the triage and emergent area to the non-emergent areas as the casualty flow lessens.

- Ensure proper rest cycles for personnel, especially if operations continue beyond 24 hours.
Be prepared to divert casualties to another facility as resources are exhausted or overwhelmed.

For further, more detailed information on triage and MASCAL, see:


**Contaminated Casualties**

During disaster events, casualties may become contaminated by either a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield-explosive (CBRNE) attack or from exposure to hazardous industrial waste (e.g., sewage, oil spills). In these instances, casualties must be decontaminated before entering any treatment facility; otherwise the treatment facility itself will become contaminated. First responders will decontaminate and treat the majority of these casualties in the initial hours after the event. However, if recovery operations continue in a contaminated area, there will be an ongoing need to decontaminate and treat casualties. The joint task force’s (JTF) medical assets will become involved in these situations.

Radiological (i.e., a dirty bomb) and biological weapons generally only impact the individual casualty, and this type of contamination is unlikely to spread to others. Biological and radiological contamination is usually eliminated with soap and water, and is of little tactical significance to casualty care. Likewise, industrial toxins and wastes are also easily cleaned by simple washing procedures. These types of contamination can be handled by routing casualties through washing and monitoring stations prior to them entering a treatment facility. Chemical casualties, with their potential to contaminate other personnel and facilities, require detailed decontamination plans.

Casualty decontamination is labor-intensive and requires augmentation personnel and additional, or specialized, equipment. It slows the process of casualty evaluation and treatment and is physically demanding of medical and rescue personnel. These negative impacts can be minimized with proactive planning.

**Responders**

Due to the abrupt, immediate nature of a CBRNE event, the initial responders will be local hazardous material (HAZMAT) units and state National Guard units. The National Guard has established weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams (WMD-CST), and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield-explosive enhanced response force packages (CERFP). The WMD-CST mission is to support local and state authorities at domestic CBRNE events, identify agents and assess consequences, and advise local authorities on response measures and requests for military assistance. The primary missions of the CERFPs are casualty decontamination and triage and SAR in contaminated environments. In all likelihood these units will be in place and operational by the time federal military units arrive on the scene of a CBRNE attack. Therefore, these units act as an “advance party” for other military units.

The specific technical aspects of casualty decontamination exceed the scope of this handbook, but the following general concepts apply to all operations:

- **Establishing the decontamination site.** The casualty decontamination site should be as near to the medical facilities as safety allows, but not so near that it risks
contaminating the treatment facility. When establishing the decontamination site, planners must consider:

- **Wind direction and speed.** While the patient decontamination site will be established in a “clean” location, the arrival of casualties and the initiation of decontamination procedures will create chemical vapor and liquid hazards. Wind direction and speed must be constantly monitored to ensure that all clean areas (i.e., clean treatment areas, the rest of the medical unit, other units or personnel in the area, etc.) are not contaminated. If the wind direction shifts more than 30 degrees, the decontamination site may need to be moved.

- **Access and movement control.** Access to the site must be controlled; otherwise there is the possibility that “dirty” casualties and equipment will contaminate the “clean” areas. There should be one entry point and controlled and limited areas of intersection between the clean and dirty zones. All personnel and equipment must remain in a “dirty” zone until decontaminated.

- **Personnel and equipment.** Once personnel and equipment become contaminated, they remain “dirty” until decontaminated. Personnel can and should continue to treat patients and use equipment in the contaminated area for as long as possible. However, operating in this environment is physically demanding and will require additional personnel and the institution of strict work-rest cycles.

### Key Elements of Casualty Decontamination

The management of contaminated casualties is complicated in that they must be evaluated and, possibly treated and evacuated, while still contaminated.

- **Dirty triage.** Casualties must be triaged upon arrival to the treatment facility while still contaminated. The determination made at this point is, not only the immediacy of treatment based on injury, but whether the casualty needs to be treated before or after decontamination.

- **Dirty treatment.** There may be casualties who require immediate treatment before decontamination. At the decontamination site, there must be a treatment area, with supplies and personnel, established within the “dirty” area.

- **Dirty evacuation.** Casualties may need to be evacuated while still contaminated. This may be because the patient is minimally injured and does not need decontamination or treatment at the local treatment facility. This could also be because the patient has been stabilized while contaminated, needs further treatment, and it is a better use of resources to evacuate to another facility for decontamination and further treatment. In these cases, there must dedicated evacuation lanes and equipment that will remain contaminated until the end of operations.

### Techniques and procedures for contaminated casualty care:

- All deploying medical units must prepare to operate in a contaminated environment.

- Establish contact with any WMD-CST and CERFPs present prior to entering the area. This will allow for a smooth handoff of responsibilities and ongoing support.

- Clearly designate clean versus contaminated areas in the area of operations.
• Develop clean and dirty triage and treatment sites and evacuation lanes.

• Only casualties requiring treatment at the medical facility should be decontaminated at the facility. All others should be evacuated to other decontamination facilities.

• Plan to increase the number of personnel at the treatment site due to increased personnel demands in the “dirty” areas.

• Pre-position traffic control points and guards to maintain access control to the treatment site.

• Carefully monitor wind direction (i.e., stakes with streamers), and have plans in place to shift the decontamination and treatment sites, if needed.

For further information on the specific details of casualty decontamination, see:


Mental Health Casualties

Disaster incidents produce strong and unpleasant emotional and physical responses in both victims and rescuers. Leaders must proactively institute preventative measures, and apply appropriate psychological first aid when indicated. The symptoms of psychological stress that rescuers and victims may experience include: confusion; fear and anxiety; hopelessness, helplessness, or sleeplessness; anger; grief, guilt, or shock; aggressiveness or mistrustfulness; loss of confidence; physical pain; or over-dedication to one’s task.

One particularly stressful activity is the handling of human remains. Working around human remains may produce feelings of horror, disgust, anger, or guilt, to name a few. Many feel very strong emotions when confronted with the remains of children or when the victims remind them of loved ones.

The goal of psychological first aid is to mollify the range of emotions and physical responses experienced by personnel exposed to a disaster. The main tenets of care are to create and sustain an environment of safety, calm, connectedness to others; self-efficacy; and hope.

Techniques and procedures for psychological first aid:

• Provide basic needs for food, shelter, and health care.

• Listen to peoples’ stories.

• Keep families together.

• Provide frequent, clear, updated information to victims concerning the disaster itself, the status of relief efforts, and where and how to acquire assistance.

• Help maintain connection with friends and family. Provide responders with regular communication with family members back home.

• Be aware of the stress levels of those around you.
• Provide responders with a rest area for sleep, hygiene, and food that is separate from the public and media.

• Insist on proper sleep, nutrition, and exercise among responders.

• Do NOT force people to share stories.

• Do NOT give simple, generalized reassurances (e.g., “everything will be ok.”).

• Do NOT tell people how they should feel, or “why” things happened to them.

• Do NOT make promises you cannot keep.

• Do NOT criticize current relief efforts in front of those needing help.

Techniques and procedures for psychological first aid during the handling of human remains:

• Remember the greater purpose of your work.

• Wear protective clothing, take frequent breaks, and maintain hygiene, hydration, and rest when not working.

• Talk with others around you and listen as well.

• Humor relieves stress as long as it is not too personal or inappropriate.

• Limit exposure to bodies as much as possible.

• Breath through your mouth to avoid smells.

• Do not focus on individual victims.

• Get teams together for mutual support and encouragement.

• Provide opportunities for voluntary, formal debriefings.

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)

The NDMS is a federally coordinated system that augments the nation’s medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to establish a single integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in dealing with the medical effects of major peacetime disasters. The NDMS may be activated for:

• Natural disasters

• Technological disasters

• Major transportation accidents

• Acts of terrorism including WMD events
Its mission is to design, develop, and maintain a national capability to deliver medical care to the victims and responders of a domestic disaster. NDMS provides medical care at a disaster site, in transit from the impacted area, and at participating definitive care facilities.

**Figure AB-2**

NDMS Section Map
Regional offices for NDMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>99 High Street, 5th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02110</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>800 North Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26 Federal Plaza, 13th Floor New York, New York 10278</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2323 Grand Boulevard, Suite 900 Kansas City, MO 64108-2670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>One Independence Mall, 6th Floor 615 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106-4404</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Denver Federal Center Building 710, Room 239 P.O. Box 25267 Denver, CO 80225-0267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50 United Nations Plaza, Room 329 San Francisco, California 94102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>536 S. Clark St. 6th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60605</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>130 228th Street, SW Bothell, Washington 98021-9796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the NDMS are several unique medical teams:

- Federal Coordination Centers (FCC)
- Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT)
- Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)
- Veterinarian Medical Assistance Team (VMAT)
- National Pharmacy Response Team (NPRT)
- National Nurse Response Team (NNRT)
FCC

FCCs recruit hospitals; maintain local hospital participation in the NDMS; and, during system activation, coordinate the reception and distribution of patients being evacuated from the disaster area.

In most cases, patients are evacuated out of the disaster area by the Department of Defense (DOD) Aeromedical Evacuation System (AES), which is operated by the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC), of the U.S. Transportation Command. In the event of a disaster, the GPMRC is tasked to deploy the Immediate Response Assessment Team (IRAT). The IRAT determines the need for patient evacuation. If there is a need, a mission tasking order is issued to DOD, and FCCs are activated. GPMRC then issues instructions to the FCCs for the reporting of available beds. Simultaneously, patient information is gathered at the disaster site and forwarded to GPMRC through the IRAT. GPMRC determines to which FCCs the patients will be moved based on the victims’ needs, beds available, and transportation availability. GPMRC coordinates with the IRAT and other deployed DOD transportation elements at the disaster site to ensure smooth air operations.

DMORT

The NDMS provides victim identification and mortuary services. These responsibilities include:

- Temporary morgue facilities
- Victim identification
- Forensic dental pathology
- Forensic anthropology methods
- Processing
- Preparation
- Disposition of remains

DMORTs are responsible for this mission. DMORTs are composed of private citizens, each with a particular field of expertise related to mortuary affairs (e.g., funeral directors, medical examiners, forensic scientists, etc.). During an emergency response, DMORTs work under the guidance of local authorities by providing technical assistance and personnel to recover, identify, and process deceased victims.

In support of the DMORT program, FEMA maintains two Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs). Both DPMUs are staged at FEMA Logistics Centers, one in Rockville, MD and the other in San Jose, CA. The DPMU is a depository of equipment and supplies for deployment to a disaster site. It contains a complete morgue with designated workstations for each processing element and prepackaged equipment and supplies.

Specific contact information for specific region team leaders can be obtained at the following Website: http://oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/dmort.html
DMAT

A DMAT is a group of professional and para-professional medical personnel (supported by logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster or other event. Each team has a sponsoring organization, such as a major medical center, which assembles and coordinates the team. DMATs are designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local medical care until other federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or the situation is resolved.

DMATs are principally a community resource available to support local, regional, and state requirements. However, as a national resource they can be federalized to provide interstate aid.

DMATs deploy to disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain themselves for up to 72 hours of operations. In mass casualty incidents, their responsibilities include triaging patients, providing medical care at the disaster site, and preparing patients for evacuation. In other types of situations, DMATs provide primary medical care and serve to augment overloaded local health care staffs. In the circumstance where disaster victims are evacuated to a different locale to receive definitive medical care, DMATs may be activated to support patient reception and disposition to hospitals.

To supplement the standard DMATs, there are highly specialized DMATs that deal with specific medical conditions such as crush injuries, burns, and mental health emergencies.

VMAT

The NDMS is directed to provide assistance in assessing the extent of disruption and need for veterinary services following major disasters or emergencies. These responsibilities include:

- Assessing the medical needs of animals
- Medical treatment and stabilization of animals
- Animal disease surveillance
- Zoonotic disease surveillance and public health assessments
- Technical assistance to assure food and water quality
- Hazard mitigation
- Animal decontamination
- Biological and chemical terrorism surveillance

In order to accomplish this mission, veterinary medical assistance teams (VMATs) were developed and are composed of clinical veterinarians, veterinary pathologists, animal health technicians (veterinary technicians), microbiologist/virologists, epidemiologists, toxicologists, and various scientific and support personnel. During an emergency response, VMATs work under the guidance of local authorities by providing technical assistance and veterinary services.
NPRT

NPRTs represent hundreds of pharmacy, pharmacy technicians, and pharmacy students located in each of the ten DHS regions who can be activated to assist in the chemoprophylaxis or the vaccination of hundreds of thousands or even millions of Americans.

NNRT

The National Nurse Response Team is a specialty DMAT that will be used in any scenario requiring hundreds of nurses to assist in chemoprophylaxis, a mass vaccination program, or a scenario that overwhelms the nation’s supply of nurses in responding to a weapon of mass destruction event.
Appendix C

Extract from National Response Plan: Biological Incident Annex

Coordinating Agency:
Department of Health and Human Services

Cooperating Agencies:
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Postal Service
American Red Cross

Introduction

Purpose

The purpose of the Biological Incident Annex is to outline the actions, roles, and responsibilities associated with response to a disease outbreak of known or unknown origin requiring Federal assistance. Actions described in this annex take place with or without a Presidential Stafford Act declaration or a public health emergency declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). This annex applies only to potential or actual Incidents of National Significance. This annex outlines biological incident response actions including threat assessment notification procedures, laboratory testing, joint investigative/response procedures, and activities related to recovery.

Scope

The broad objectives of the Federal Government’s response to a biological terrorism event, pandemic influenza, emerging infectious disease, or novel pathogen outbreak are to:

- Detect the event through disease surveillance and environmental monitoring;
- Identify and protect the population(s) at risk;
• Determine the source of the outbreak;
• Quickly frame the public health and law enforcement implications;
• Control and contain any possible epidemic (including providing guidance to State and local public health authorities);
• Augment and surge public health and medical services;
• Track and defeat any potential resurgence or additional outbreaks; and
• Assess the extent of residual biological contamination and decontaminate as necessary.

The unique attributes of this response require separate planning considerations that are tailored to specific health concerns and effects of the disease (e.g., terrorism versus natural outbreaks; communicable versus noncommunicable, etc.).

Specific operational guidelines, developed by respective organizations to address the unique aspects of a particular disease or planning consideration, will supplement this annex and are intended as guidance to assist Federal, State, local, and tribal public health and medical planners.

Special Considerations

Detection of a bioterrorism act against the civilian population may occur in several different ways and involve several different modalities:

• An attack may be surreptitious, in which case the first evidence of dissemination of an agent may be the presentation of disease in humans or animals. This could manifest either in clinical case reports to domestic or international public health authorities or in unusual patterns of symptoms or encounters within domestic or international health surveillance systems.

• A terrorist-induced infectious disease outbreak initially may be indistinguishable from a naturally occurring outbreak; moreover, depending upon the particular agent and associated symptoms, several days could pass before public health and medical authorities even suspect that terrorism may be the cause. In such a case, criminal intent may not be apparent until some time after illnesses are recognized.

• Environmental surveillance systems, such as the BioWatch system, may detect the presence of a biological agent in the environment and trigger directed environmental sampling and intensified clinical surveillance to rule out or confirm an incident. If a case is confirmed, then these systems may allow for mobilization of a public health, medical, and law enforcement response in advance of the appearance of the first clinical cases or quick response after the first clinical cases are identified.

• The U.S. Postal Service may detect certain biological agents within the U.S. postal system. Detection of a biological agent in the mail stream triggers specific response protocols outlined in agency-specific standard operating procedures.
Policies

- This annex supports policies and procedures outlined in the ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services Annex, the ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex, and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

- HHS serves as the Federal Government’s primary agency for the public health and medical preparation and planning for and response to a biological terrorism attack or naturally occurring outbreak that results from either a known or novel pathogen, including an emerging infectious disease.

- State, local, and tribal governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to disease outbreaks and implementing measures to minimize the health, social, and economic consequences of such an outbreak.

- If any agency becomes aware of an overt threat involving biological agents or indications that instances of disease may not be the result of natural causes, the Department of Justice must be notified through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU). The FBI, in turn, immediately notifies the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is used to test samples for the presence of biological threat agents. Decisions on where to perform additional tests on samples are made by the FBI, in coordination with HHS. (See the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex for additional information on the FBI’s roles and responsibilities.)

- Once notified of a credible threat or natural disease outbreak, HHS convenes a meeting of ESF #8 partners to assess the situation and determine appropriate public health and medical actions. DHS coordinates overall nonmedical support and response actions across all Federal departments and agencies. HHS coordinates overall public health and medical emergency response efforts across all Federal departments and agencies.

- Consistent with ESF #8, DHS closely coordinates the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) medical response with HHS. The FBI coordinates the investigation of criminal activities if such activities are suspected.

- HHS provides guidance to State and local authorities and collaborates closely with the FBI in the proper handling of any materials that may have evidentiary implications (e.g., LRN samples, etc.) associated with disease outbreaks suspected of being terrorist or criminal in nature.

- Other Federal departments and agencies may be called upon to support HHS during the various stages of a disease outbreak response in the preparation, planning, and/or response processes.

- If there is potential for environmental contamination, HHS collaborates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in developing sampling strategies and sharing results.

- Given the dynamic nature of a disease outbreak, HHS, in collaboration with other departments and agencies, determines the thresholds for a comprehensive Federal Government public health and medical response. These thresholds are based on specific event information rather than predetermined risk levels.
• Any Federal public announcement, statement, or press release related to a threat or actual bioterrorism event must be coordinated with the DHS Public Affairs Office.

Planning Assumptions

• In a large disease outbreak, Federal, State, local, and tribal officials require a highly coordinated response to public health and medical emergencies. The outbreak also may affect other countries and therefore involve extensive coordination with the Department of State (DOS).

• Disease transmission can occur via an environmental contact such as atmospheric dispersion, person-to-person contact, animal-to-person contact, insect vector-to-person contact, or by way of contaminated food or water.

• A biological incident may be distributed across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, requiring a nontraditional incident management approach. This approach could require the simultaneous management of multiple “incident sites” from national and regional headquarters locations in coordination with multiple State and local jurisdictions.

• A response to noncontagious public health emergencies may require different planning assumptions or factors.

• The introduction of biological agents, both natural and deliberate, are often first detected through clinical or hospital presentation. However, there are other methods of detection, including environmental surveillance technologies such as BioWatch and syndromic surveillance.

• No single entity possesses the authority, expertise, and resources to act unilaterally on the many complex issues that may arise in response to a disease outbreak and loss of containment affecting a multijurisdictional area. The national response requires close coordination between numerous agencies at all levels of government and with the private sector.

• The Federal Government supports affected State, local, and tribal health jurisdictions as requested or required. The response by HHS and other Federal agencies is flexible and adapts as necessary as the outbreak evolves.

• The LRN provides for rapid public health assessment of the potential for human illness associated with exposure and the scope of this kind of risk. The LRN also addresses the need for law enforcement notification necessary to initiate threat assessment for criminal intent, and chain of custody procedures. Early HHS, FBI, and DHS coordination enhances the likelihood of successful preventative and investigative activities necessary to neutralize threats and attribute the source of the outbreak.

• Response to disease outbreaks suspected of being deliberate in origin requires consideration of special law enforcement and homeland security requirements.

• Test results from non-LRN facilities are considered a “first pass” or “screening” test (with the exception of the Legislative Branch, which has a separate lab system that is equivalent to LRN facilities).

• Any agency or organization that identifies an unusual or suspicious test result should contact the FBI to ensure coordination of appropriate testing at an HHS-certified LRN laboratory.
• HHS has identified specific Department of Defense laboratories that meet the standards and requirements for LRN membership.

• All threat and public health assessments are provided to the HSOC.

Concept of Operations

Biological Agent Response

The key elements of an effective biological response include (in nonsequential order):

• Rapid detection of the outbreak;
• Swift agent identification and confirmation;
• Identification of the population at risk;
• Determination of how the agent is transmitted, including an assessment of the efficiency of transmission;
• Determination of susceptibility of the pathogen to treatment;
• Definition of the public health, medical, and mental health implications;
• Control and containment of the epidemic;
• Decontamination of individuals, if necessary;
• Identification of the law enforcement implications/assessment of the threat;
• Augmentation and surging of local health and medical resources;
• Protection of the population through appropriate public health and medical actions;
• Dissemination of information to enlist public support;
• Assessment of environmental contamination and cleanup/decontamination of bioagents that persist in the environment; and
• Tracking and preventing secondary or additional disease outbreak.

Primary Federal functions include supporting State, local, and tribal public health and medical capacities according to the policies and procedures detailed in the NRP Base Plan and the ESF #8 Annex.

Suspicious Substances

Since there is no definitive/reliable field test for biological agents, all potential bioterrorism samples are transported to an LRN laboratory, where expert analysis is conducted using established HHS/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) protocols/reagents. A major component of this process is to establish and maintain the law enforcement chain of custody and arrange for transport.
The following actions occur if a positive result is obtained by an LRN on an environmental sample submitted by the FBI or other designated law enforcement personnel:

- The LRN immediately notifies the local FBI of the positive test result;
- The FBI Field Office makes local notifications and contacts the FBI Headquarters WMDOU;
- FBI Headquarters convenes an initial conference call with the local FBI and HHS to review the results, assess the preliminary information and test results, and arrange for additional testing;
- FBI Headquarters immediately notifies DHS of the situation;
- Original samples may be sent to HHS/CDC for confirmation of LRN analyses;
- HHS provides guidance on protective measures such as prophylactic treatment and continued facility operation; and
- HHS and cooperating agencies support the determination of the contaminated area, decisions on whether to shelter in place or evacuate, and decontamination of people, facilities, and outdoor areas.

**Outbreak Detection**

**Determination of a Disease Outbreak**

The initial indication of a major disease outbreak, intentional or naturally occurring, may be the recognition by public health and medical authorities that a significantly increased number of people are becoming ill and presenting to local healthcare providers. Therefore, the most critical decision making support requires surveillance information, identification of the causative biological agent, a determination of whether the observations are related to a naturally occurring outbreak, and the identification of the population(s) at risk.

**Laboratory Confirmation**

During the evaluation of a suspected disease outbreak, laboratory samples are distributed to appropriate laboratories. During a suspected terrorist incident, sample information is provided to the FBI for investigative use and to public health and emergency response authorities for epidemiological use and agent characterization to facilitate and ensure timely public health and medical interventions. If the incident begins as an epidemic of unknown origin detected through Federal, State, local, or tribal health surveillance systems or networks, laboratory analysis is initiated through the routine public health laboratory network.

**Identification (Analysis and Confirmation)**

The samples collected and the analyses conducted must be sufficient to characterize the cause of the outbreak. LRN laboratories fulfill the Federal responsibility for rapid analysis of biological agents. In a suspected terrorism incident, sample collection activities and testing are coordinated with FBI and LRN member(s).
Notification

Any disease outbreak suspected or identified by an agency within HHS or through another Federal public health partner is brought to the immediate attention of the HHS Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness as detailed in the ESF #8 Annex or internal HHS policy documents, in addition to the notification requirements contained in the NRP Base Plan.

Following these initial notifications, the procedures detailed in the ESF #8 Annex are followed. Instances of disease that raise the “index of suspicion” of terrorist or criminal involvement, as determined by HHS, are reported to FBI Headquarters. In these instances, FBI Headquarters, in conjunction with HHS, examines available law enforcement and intelligence information, as well as the technical characteristics and epidemiology of the disease, to determine if there is a possibility of criminal intent. If the FBI, in conjunction with HHS, determines that the information represents a potential credible terrorist threat, the FBI communicates the situation immediately to the HSOC, which notifies the White House, as appropriate. If warranted, the FBI, HHS, and State, local, and tribal health officials conduct a joint law enforcement and epidemiological investigation to determine the cause of the disease outbreak, the extent of the threat to public health and public safety, and the individual(s) responsible.

Activation

Once notified of a threat or disease outbreak that requires or potentially requires significant Federal public health and/or medical assistance, HHS convenes a meeting of the ESF #8 organizations and HHS Operating Divisions (e.g., CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, etc.) to assess the situation and determine the appropriate public health and medical actions. DHS coordinates all nonmedical support, discussions, and response actions.

The immediate task following any notification is to identify the population affected and at risk and the geographic scope of the incident. The initial public health and medical response includes some or all of the following actions:

- Targeted epidemiological investigation (e.g., contact tracing);
- Intensified surveillance within healthcare settings for patients with certain clinical signs and symptoms;
- Intensified collection and review of potentially related information (e.g., contacts with nurse call lines, laboratory test orders, school absences, and over-the-counter pharmacy sales); and
- Organization of Federal public health and medical response assets (in conjunction with State, local, and tribal officials) to include personnel, medical supplies, and materiel (e.g., the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)).

Actions

**Controlling the Epidemic**

The following steps are required to contain and control an epidemic affecting large populations:

- HHS assists State, local, and tribal public health and medical authorities with epidemic surveillance and coordination.
• HHS assesses the need for increased surveillance in States or localities not initially involved in the outbreak and notifies the appropriate State and local public health officials with surveillance recommendations should increased surveillance in these localities be needed.

• DHS coordinates with HHS and State, local, and tribal officials on the messages released to the public to ensure that communications are consistent and accurate. Messages should address anxieties, alleviate any unwarranted concerns or distress, and enlist cooperation with necessary control measures. Public health and medical messages to the public should be communicated by a recognized health authority (e.g., the Surgeon General). (See the Public Affairs Support Annex.)

• If the outbreak first arises within the United States, HHS, in coordination with DOS, immediately notifies and coordinates with appropriate international health agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and Pan American Health Organization as necessary. Given the nature of many disease outbreaks, this notification and coordination may have occurred earlier in the process according to internal operating procedures. HHS advises the HSOC when notifications are made to international health agencies.

• The public health system, starting at the local level, is required to initiate appropriate protective and responsive measures for the affected population, including first responders and other workers engaged in incident-related activities. These measures include mass vaccination or prophylaxis for populations at risk and populations not already exposed, but who are at risk of exposure from secondary transmission or the environment. An overarching goal is to develop, as early as possible in the management of a biological incident, a dynamic, prioritized list of treatment recommendations based on epidemiologic risk assessment and the biology of the disease/microorganism in question, linked to the deployment of the SNS and communicated to the general public.

• HHS evaluates the incident with its partner organizations and makes recommendations to the appropriate public health and medical authorities regarding the need for quarantine, shelter-in-place, or isolation to prevent the spread of disease. HHS coordinates closely with DHS regarding recommendations for medical needs that are met by NDMS and the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps.

• The Governor of an affected State implements isolation and/or social-distancing requirements using State/local legal authorities. In order to prevent the interstate spread of disease, HHS may take appropriate Federal actions using the authorities granted by U.S.C. title 42, 42 CFR parts 70 and 71, and 21 CFR 1240. State, local, and tribal assistance with the implementation and enforcement of isolation and/or quarantine actions is utilized if Federal authorities are invoked.

• Where the source of the epidemic has been identified as originating outside the United States, whether the result of terrorism or a natural outbreak, HHS works in a coordinated effort with DHS/Border and Transportation Security/Customs and Border Protection (DHS/BTS/CBP) to identify and isolate persons, cargo, mail, or conveyances entering the United States that may be contaminated. HHS provides information and training, as appropriate, to DHS/BTS/CBP personnel on identifying the biological hazard and employing “first responder” isolation protocols.

• The scope of the outbreak may require mass isolation or quarantine of affected or potentially affected persons. Depending on the type of event, food, animals, and other
agricultural products may need to be quarantined to prevent further spread of disease. In this instance HHS and, as appropriate, the Department of Agriculture work with State, local, and tribal health and legal authorities to recommend the most feasible, effective, and legally enforceable methods of isolation and quarantine.

**Decontamination**

For certain types of biological incidents (e.g., anthrax), it may be necessary to assess the extent of contamination and decontaminate victims, responders, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure (e.g., subways, water utilities), and large outdoor areas. Such decontamination and related activities take place consistent with the roles and responsibilities, resources and capabilities, and procedures contained in the ESF #8 and ESF #10 Annexes, the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex, and the Catastrophic Incident Annex. (Note: Currently no decontamination chemicals are registered (under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) for use on biological agents, and responders must request an emergency exemption from the EPA before chemicals can be used for biological decontamination.)

**Special Issues**

**International Notification**

A biological incident may involve internationally prescribed reportable diseases. In addition to case reporting, epidemics of disease with global public health significance must also be reported to international public health authorities.

Once a positive determination is made of an epidemic involving a contagious biological agent, HHS notifies DOS and DHS. HHS, in coordination with DOS, notifies the WHO and other international health agencies as appropriate.

**Allocation and Rationing**

If critical resources for protecting human life are insufficient to meet all domestic needs, the Secretary of HHS makes recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding the allocation of scarce Federal public health and medical resources.

**Responsibilities**

The procedures in this annex are built on the core coordinating structures of the NRP. The specific responsibilities of each department and agency are described in the respective ESFs and Incident Annexes.
Appendix D

Extract from National Response Plan: Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex

Coordinating Agencies:
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Environmental Protection Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Cooperating Agencies:
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
American Red Cross

Introduction

Purpose

The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex provides an organized and integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials (Incidents of National Significance), and accidents or incidents involving such material that may or may not rise to the level of an Incident of National Significance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for overall coordination of all actual and potential Incidents of National Significance, including terrorist incidents involving nuclear materials.

This annex describes how the coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies support DHS’s overall coordination of the response to a nuclear/radiological Incident of National Significance. In addition, this annex describes how the coordinating agencies lead the response to incidents of lesser severity.  

The actions described in this annex may be implemented: (1) concurrently with, and as an integral part of, the National Response Plan (NRP) for all nuclear/radiological incidents or accidents considered to be Incidents of National Significance; or (2) independently for all other

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
nuclear/ radiological accidents or incidents considered to be below the threshold of an Incident of National Significance and, therefore, not requiring overall Federal coordination by DHS.

1 Nuclear/radiological incidents of “lesser severity” are considered below the threshold of an Incident of National Significance, as determined by DHS, and vary from lost radiography sources or discovery of orphan radiological sources to incidents/emergencies at nuclear power plants below the classification of General Emergency, as defined by the cognizant regulatory agency (e.g., Department of Energy (DOE) or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)).

Scope

This annex applies to nuclear/radiological incidents, including sabotage and terrorist incidents, involving the release or potential release of radioactive material that poses an actual or perceived hazard to public health, safety, national security, and/or the environment. This includes terrorist use of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or improvised nuclear devices (INDs) as well as reactor plant accidents (commercial or weapons production facilities), lost radioactive material sources, transportation accidents involving nuclear/ radioactive material, and foreign accidents involving nuclear or radioactive material.

The level of Federal response to a specific incident is based on numerous factors, including the ability of State, local, and tribal officials to respond; the type and/or amount of radioactive material involved; the extent of the impact or potential impact on the public and environment; and the size of the affected area.

In situations where threat analysis includes indications that a terrorist incident involving radiological materials could occur, actions are coordinated in accordance with the pre-incident prevention protocols set forth in the NRP Base Plan.

This annex:

- Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal response to any nuclear/radiological incident, including a terrorist incident, that has actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences within the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters, and that requires a response by the Federal Government. This includes both Incidents of National Significance and incidents of lesser severity;
- Acknowledges the unique nature of a variety of nuclear/radiological incidents and the responsibilities of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to respond to them;
- Describes Federal policies and planning considerations on which this annex and Federal agency-specific nuclear/radiological response plans are based;
- Specifies the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies for preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from nuclear/radiological incidents;
- Includes guidelines for notification, coordination, and leadership of Federal activities, and coordination of public information, congressional relations, and international activities; and
- Provides protocols for coordinating Federal Government capabilities to respond to radiological incidents. These capabilities include, but are not limited to:
The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), which is responsible for production, coordination, and dissemination of consequence predictions for an airborne hazardous material release;

The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), established at or near the scene of an incident to coordinate radiological assessment and monitoring; and

The Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health (known as “the Advisory Team”), which provides expert recommendations on protective action guidance.

More information on these capabilities is included in subsequent sections of this annex.

Policies

DHS coordinates the overall Federal Government response to radiological Incidents of National Significance in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 and the NRP. In the NRP Base Plan, Figure 4, Structure for NRP Coordination: Terrorist Incident, illustrates the organizational framework that DHS utilizes to respond to terrorist incidents. In the NRP Base Plan, Figure 5, Structure for NRP Coordination: Federal-to-Federal Support, illustrates the organizational framework that DHS utilizes to respond to nonterrorist Incidents of National Significance.

- The NRP supersedes the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated May 1, 1996.

- The concept of operations described in this annex recognizes and addresses the unique challenges associated with and the need for specialized technical expertise/actions when responding to RDD/IND incidents with potentially catastrophic consequences.

- DHS, as the overall incident manager for Incidents of National Significance, is supported by coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies. Coordinating agencies have specific nuclear/radiological technical expertise and assets for responding to the unique characteristics of these types of incidents. Coordinating agencies facilitate the nuclear/radiological aspects of the response in support of DHS. For any given incident, the coordinating agency is the Federal agency that owns, has custody of, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise designated responsibility for the nuclear/radioactive material, facility, or activity involved in the incident. The coordinating agency is represented in the Joint Field Office (JFO) Coordination Group, the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). The coordinating agency is also represented in other response centers and entities, as appropriate for the specific incident.

- Coordinating agencies are also responsible for leading the Federal response to nuclear/radiological incidents of lesser severity (those incidents that do not reach the level of an Incident of National Significance).

- Coordinating agencies may use the structure of the NRP to carry out their response duties, or any other structure consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) capable of providing the required support to the affected State, local, or tribal government.
Cooperating agencies include other Federal agencies that provide technical and resource support to DHS and the coordinating agencies. These agencies are represented in the IIMG, the HSOC, and other response centers and entities, as appropriate for the specific incident. They may or may not be represented in the JFO Coordination Group.

DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA) is responsible for maintaining and updating this annex. DHS/EPR/FEMA accomplishes this responsibility through the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC).

The Attorney General, generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and for coordinating activities of other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, investigate, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States, including incidents involving nuclear/radioactive materials, in accordance with the following:

- The Atomic Energy Act directs the FBI to investigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the act. Additionally, the FBI legally is responsible for locating any illegally diverted nuclear weapon, device, or material and for restoring nuclear facilities to their rightful custodians. In view of its unique responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act (amended by the Energy Reorganization Act), the FBI has concluded formal agreements with the coordinating agencies that provide for interface, coordination, and technical support for the FBI’s law enforcement and criminal investigative efforts.

- Generally, for nuclear facilities and materials in transit, the designated coordinating agency and cooperating agencies perform the functions delineated in this annex and provide technical support and assistance to the FBI in the performance of its law enforcement and criminal investigative mission. Those agencies supporting the FBI additionally coordinate and manage the technical portion of the response and activate/request assistance under this annex for measures to protect the public health and safety. In all cases, the FBI manages and directs the law enforcement and intelligence aspects of the response, while coordinating its activities with appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal governments within the framework of this annex, and/or as provided for in established interagency agreements or plans. Further details regarding the FBI response are outlined in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

- All Federal nuclear/radiological assistance capabilities outlined in this annex are available to support the Federal response to a terrorist threat, whether or not the threat develops into an actual incident.

When the concept of operations in this annex is implemented, existing interagency plans that address nuclear/radiological incident management are incorporated as supporting plans and/or operational supplements (e.g., the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)).

This annex does not create any new authorities nor change any existing ones.

Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of Federal departments and agencies to carry out their specific authorities and perform their responsibilities under law.
Some Federal agencies are authorized to respond directly to certain incidents affecting public health and safety. In these cases, procedures outlined in this annex may be used to coordinate the delivery of Federal resources to State, local, and tribal governments, and to coordinate assistance among Federal agencies for incidents that can be managed without the need for DHS coordination (i.e., incidents below the threshold of an Incident of National Significance).

The owner/operator of a nuclear/radiological facility primarily is responsible for mitigating the consequences of an incident, providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to State, local, and/or tribal government officials, and minimizing the radiological hazard to the public. The owner/operator has primary responsibility for actions within the facility boundary and may also have responsibilities for response and recovery activities outside the facility boundary under applicable legal obligations (e.g., contractual; licensee; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)).

State, local, and tribal governments primarily are responsible for determining and implementing measures to protect life, property, and the environment in those areas outside the facility boundary or incident location. This does not, however, relieve nuclear/radiological facility or material owners/operators from any applicable legal obligations.

State, local, and tribal governments and owners/operators of nuclear/radiological facilities or activities may request assistance directly from DHS, other Federal agencies, and/or State governments with which they have preexisting arrangements or relationships.

Response to nuclear/radiological incidents affecting land owned by the Federal Government is coordinated with the agency responsible for managing that land to ensure that incident management activities are consistent with Federal statutes governing use and occupancy. In the case of tribal lands, tribal governments have a special relationship with the U.S. Government, and Federal, State, and local governments may have limited or no authority on specific tribal reservations. Further guidance is provided in the Tribal Relations Support Annex.

Participating Federal agencies may take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits of their own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and gather information concerning the emergency to avoid delay.

Departments and agencies are not reimbursed for activities conducted under their own authorities unless other agreements or reimbursement mechanisms exist (e.g., Stafford Act, Federal-to-Federal assistance).

Federal coordination centers and agency teams provide their own logistical support consistent with agreed upon interagency execution plans. State, local, and tribal governments are encouraged to coordinate their efforts with the Federal effort, but maintain their own logistical support, consistent with applicable authorities and requirements.

For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified components, the agency with custody of the material (the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)) may establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA). NDAs and NSAs are established to safeguard
classified information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material, and place non-Federal lands under Federal control for the duration of the incident. In the event radioactive contamination occurs, Federal officials coordinate with State and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions are taken outside the NDA or NSA.

Planning Assumptions

- Radiological incidents may not be immediately recognized as such until the radioactive material is detected or the effects of radiation exposure are manifested in the population.

- An act of radiological terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States, will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many local, State, and/or tribal governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing Federal response capabilities.

- A radiological incident may include chemical or biological contaminants, which may require concurrent implementation of the NCP or other Federal plans and procedures.

- An incident involving the potential release of radioactivity may require implementation of protective measures.

- An expeditious Federal response is required to mitigate the consequences of the nuclear/radiological incident. Radiological Incidents of National Significance that result in significant impacts likely will trigger implementation of the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex and Catastrophic Incident Supplement.

- The Federal Government response to radiological terrorist threats/incidents also includes the following assumptions:
  
  ° If appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated by radioactive material, response actions in a contaminated area may be delayed until the material has dissipated to a safe level for emergency response personnel or until appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive, whichever is sooner;
  
  ° The response to a radiological threat or actual incident requires an integrated Federal Government response;
  
  ° In the case of a radiological terrorist attack, the effect may be temporarily and geographically dispersed, requiring response operations to be conducted over a multijurisdictional, multistate region; and
  
  ° A radiological terrorist incident may affect a single location, or multiple locations, each of which may require an incident response and a crime scene investigation simultaneously.

Concept of Operations

General

This concept of operations is applicable to potential and actual radiological Incidents of National Significance requiring DHS coordination and other radiological incidents of lesser severity,
utilizing the protocols delineated in this annex. For other radiological incidents of lesser severity, other Federal response plans (i.e., the NCP and/or agency-specific radiological incident response plans) may also be utilized, as appropriate.

Hazard-Specific Planning and Preparedness

Headquarters

- The Federal Radiological Policy Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) provides a national-level forum for the development and coordination of radiological prevention and preparedness policies and procedures. It also provides policy guidance for Federal radiological incident management activities in support of State, local and tribal government radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. The FRPCC is an interagency body consisting of the coordinating and cooperating agencies discussed in this annex, chaired by DHS/EPR/FEMA. The FRPCC establishes subcommittees, as necessary.

- The FRPCC also coordinates research-study efforts of its member agencies related to State, local and tribal government radiological emergency preparedness to ensure minimum duplication and maximum benefits to State and local governments. The FRPCC coordinates planning and validating requirements of each agency, reviewing integration requirements and incorporating agency-specific plans, procedures, and equipment into the response system.

Regional: Regional Assistance Committees (RACs) in the DHS/EPR/FEMA regions serve as the primary coordinating structure at the Federal regional level. RAC membership mirrors that of the FRPCC, and RACs are chaired by a DHS/EPR/FEMA regional representative. Additionally, State emergency management agencies send representatives to RAC meetings and participate in regional exercise and training activities. The RACs provide a forum for information-sharing, consultation, and coordination of Federal regional awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The RACs also assist in providing technical assistance to State and local governments and evaluating radiological plans and exercises.

Coordinating Agencies and Cooperating Agencies

During a response to an Incident of National Significance, coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies provide technical expertise, specialized equipment, and personnel in support of DHS, which is responsible for overall coordination of incident management activities. Coordinating agencies have primary responsibilities for Federal activities related to the nuclear/radiological aspects of the incident.

The coordinating agency is that Federal agency which owns, has custody of, authorizes, regulates, or is otherwise deemed responsible for the radiological facility or activity involved in the incident. The following paragraphs identify the coordinating agency for a variety of radiological incidents. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the coordinating agency for incidents involving nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC; DOE is the coordinating agency for incidents involving the transportation of radioactive materials shipped by or for DOE. Table 1 identifies the coordinating agency for a variety of radiological incidents.

Radiological Terrorism Incidents:

- The coordinating agency provides technical support to DHS, which has overall responsibility for domestic incident management, and to the FBI, which has the lead
The FBI also is responsible for coordinating activities of other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, investigate, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States, including incidents involving nuclear/radioactive materials (e.g. RDD/IND incidents).

**TABLE 1. Coordinating agencies**

Note: DHS is responsible for the overall coordination of incident management activities for all nuclear or radiological Incidents of National Significance, including those involving terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Coordinating Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| a. Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g., RDD/IND or radiological exposure device): | (1) DOD or DOE  
(2) NRC  
(3) DOE |
| (1) Material or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE | |
| (2) Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State | |
| (3) All others | |
| b. Nuclear facilities: | (1) DOD or DOE  
(2) NRC  
(3) EPA |
| (1) Owned or operated by DOD or DOE | |
| (2) Licensed by NRC or Agreement State | |
| (3) Not licensed, owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to respond | |
| c. Transportation of radioactive materials: | (1) DOD or DOE  
(2) NRC  
(3) DHS/USCG  
(4) EPA |
<p>| (1) Materials shipped by or for DOD or DOE | |
| (2) Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials | |
| (3) Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or Agreement State (see USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of “certain areas”) | |
| (4) All others | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Coordinating Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>d. Space vehicles containing radioactive materials:</td>
<td>(1) NASA or DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Managed by NASA or DOD</td>
<td>(2) DHS/USCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Not managed by DOD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone</td>
<td>(3) EPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) All others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Foreign, unknown or unlicensed material:</td>
<td>(1) DHS/USCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in</td>
<td>(2) EPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certain areas of the coastal zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) All others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)</td>
<td>DOD or DOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above DHS designates</td>
<td>DHS designates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- For radiological terrorism incidents involving materials or facilities owned or operated by DOD or DOE, DOD or DOE is the coordinating agency, as appropriate.
- For radiological terrorism incidents involving materials or facilities licensed by the NRC or Agreement States, the NRC is the coordinating agency.
- For all other radiological terrorist incidents, DOE is the coordinating agency. The coordinating agency role transitions from DOE to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for environmental cleanup and site restoration at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with State, local, and tribal governments, the cooperating agencies, and the JFO Coordination Group.

**Nuclear Facilities:**

- The NRC is the coordinating agency for incidents that occur at fixed facilities or activities licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State. These include, but are not limited to, commercial nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities, DOE-owned gaseous diffusion facilities operating under NRC regulatory oversight, independent spent fuel storage installations, radiopharmaceutical manufacturers, and research reactors.
- DOD or DOE is the coordinating agency for incidents that occur at facilities or vessels under their jurisdiction, custody, or control. These incidents may involve reactor
operations, nuclear material, weapons production, radioactive material from nuclear
weapons or munitions, or other radiological activities.

- EPA is the coordinating agency for incidents that occur at facilities not licensed,
owned, or operated by a Federal agency or an Agreement State, or currently or
formerly licensed facilities for which the owner/operator is not financially viable or is
otherwise unable to respond.

Transportation of Radioactive Materials:

- Either DOD or DOE is the coordinating agency for transportation incidents involving
DOD or DOE materials, depending on which of these agencies has custody of the
material at the time of the incident.
- The NRC is the coordinating agency for transportation incidents that involve
radiological material licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State.
- DHS/U.S. Coast Guard (DHS/USCG) is the coordinating agency for the shipment of
materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not licensed or owned by a
Federal agency or Agreement State.
- EPA is the coordinating agency for shipment of materials in other areas of the coastal
zone and in the inland zone that are not licensed or owned by a Federal agency or an
Agreement State.

Space Vehicles Containing Radioactive Materials:

- NASA is the coordinating agency for missions involving NASA space vehicles or joint
space vehicles with significant NASA involvement. DOD is the coordinating agency
for missions involving DOD space vehicles or joint space vehicles with significant
DOD involvement. A joint venture is an activity in which the U.S. Government has
provided extensive design/financial input; has provided and maintains ownership of
instruments, spacecraft, or the launch vehicle; or is intimately involved in mission
operations. A joint venture is not created by simply selling or supplying material to a
foreign country for use in its spacecraft.
- DHS/USCG is the coordinating agency for space vehicles not managed by DOD or
NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal zone.
- EPA is the coordinating agency for all other space vehicle incidents involving
radioactive material.

Foreign, Unknown, or Unlicensed Material: EPA or DHS/USCG is the coordinating agency
depending on the location of the incident. DHS/USCG is the coordinating agency for incidents
involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material in certain areas of the coastal zone.
EPA is the coordinating agency for all other incidents involving foreign, unknown, or unlicensed
radiological sources that have actual, potential, or perceived radiological consequences in the
United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters. The foreign or unlicensed source
may be a reactor, a spacecraft containing radioactive material, imported radioactively
contaminated material, or a shipment of foreign-owned radioactive material. Unknown sources
of radioactive material, also termed “orphan sources,” are those materials whose origin and/or
radiological nature are not yet established. These types of sources include contaminated scrap
metal or abandoned radioactive material.
Other Types of Incidents: For other types of incidents not covered above, DHS, in consultation with the other coordinating agencies, designates a coordinating agency. If DHS determines that it is an Incident of National Significance, DHS is responsible for overall coordination and the designated coordinating agency assumes responsibilities as the coordinating agency.

Notification Procedures

- The owner/operator of a nuclear/radiological facility or owner/transporter of nuclear/radiological material is generally the first to become aware of an incident and notifies State, local and tribal authorities and the coordinating agency.

- Federal, State, local, and tribal governments that become aware of a radiological incident from any source other than the coordinating agency notify the HSOC and the coordinating agency.

- The coordinating agency provides notification of a radiological incident to the HSOC and other coordinating agencies, as appropriate.

- Releases of hazardous materials that are regulated under the NCP (40 CFR part 302) are reported to the National Response Center.

Incident Actions

Headquarters: Incidents of National Significance

- Coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies report information and intelligence relative to situational awareness and incident management to the HSOC. Agencies with radiological response functions provide representatives to the HSOC, as requested.

- The coordinating agency and cooperating agencies, as appropriate, provide representation to the IIMG.

- Coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies provide representation to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), as appropriate.

Other Radiological Incidents

- For radiological incidents that are below the threshold of an Incident of National Significance but require Federal participation in the response, the coordinating agency coordinates the Federal response utilizing the procedures in this annex, agency-specific plans, and/or the NCP, as appropriate. The coordinating agency provides intelligence and information relative to the incident to the HSOC.

- The NRCC may be utilized to provide interagency coordination and Federal resource tracking, if needed.

Regional: Incidents of National Significance

- The coordinating agency provides representation to the JFO to serve as a Senior Federal Official within the JFO Coordination Group. Cooperating agencies may also be represented, as needed.
The coordinating agency is part of the Unified Command, as defined by the NIMS, and coordinates Federal radiological response activities at appropriate field facilities.²

² Appropriate field facilities may include a JFO, Incident Command Post, Emergency Operations Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Emergency Control Center, etc.

**Other Radiological Incidents:** The coordinating Response Functions: Primary radiological agency coordinates Federal response operations at a response functions are addressed in this section. An designated field facility. Cooperating agencies may overview of specific DHS and coordinating agency also be represented, as needed. response functions is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: DHS and coordinating agency response functions overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Function</th>
<th>Incidents of National Significance</th>
<th>Other Radiological Incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Coordinate actions of Federal agencies related to the overall response.</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Coordinate Federal activities related to response and recovery of the radiological aspects of an incident.</td>
<td>DHS and coordinating agency</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Coordinate incident security.</td>
<td>DHS and coordinating agency</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ensure coordination of technical data (collection, analysis, storage, and dissemination).</td>
<td>DHS and coordinating agency</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Ensure Federal protective action recommendations are developed and provide advice and assistance to State, local, and tribal governments.</td>
<td>DHS and coordinating agency</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response Function</td>
<td>Incidents of National Significance</td>
<td>Other Radiological Incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Coordinate release of Federal information to the public.</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Coordinate release of Federal information to Congress.</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Keep the White House informed on all aspects of an incident.</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Ensure coordination of demobilization of Federal assets.</td>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Coordinating agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Response Coordination

### Federal Agency Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents of National Significance</th>
<th>DHS is responsible for the overall coordination of Incidents of National Significance using elements described in the NRP Base Plan concept of operations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Other Radiological Incidents**  | • The agency with primary responsibility for coordinating the Federal response to a radiological incident serves as the coordinating agency.  
                                          
                                          • The coordinating agency coordinates the actions of Federal agencies related to the incident utilizing this annex, agency-specific plans, and/or the NCP, as appropriate.  
                                          
                                          • Cooperating agencies provide technical and resource support, as requested by the coordinating agency.  
                                          
                                          • The coordinating agency may establish a field facility; assist State, local, and tribal response organizations; monitor and support owner/operator activities (when there is an owner or operator); provide technical support to the owner/operator, if requested; and serve as the principal Federal source of information about incident conditions. |

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**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED**

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Coordinating Radiological Aspects of an Incident

| Incidents of National Significance | • DHS and the coordinating agency coordinate Federal activities related to responding to and recovering from the radiological aspects of an incident. They are assisted by cooperating agencies, as requested.  
| | • The coordinating agency provides a hazard assessment of conditions that might have significant impact and ensures that measures are taken to mitigate the potential consequences.  
| Other Radiological Incidents | The coordinating agency coordinates Federal activities related to response and recovery of the radiological aspects of an incident, assisted by cooperating agencies, as requested. |
# Incident Security Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents of National Significance</th>
<th>DHS and the coordinating agency are responsible for coordinating security activities related to Federal response operations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Radiological Incidents</td>
<td>The coordinating agency coordinates security activities related to Federal response operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents | • DOD, DOE, or NASA, as the appropriate coordinating agency, may establish NDAs or NSAs to safeguard classified information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material, and place non-Federal lands under Federal control for the duration of the incident. DOD, DOE, or NASA, as appropriate, coordinates security in and around these locations, as necessary.  
  • For incidents at other Federal or private facilities, the owner/operator provides security within the facility boundaries. If a release of radioactive material occurs beyond the facility boundaries, State, local, or tribal governments provide security for the release area.  
  • State, local, and tribal governments provide security for radiological incidents occurring on public lands (e.g., a transportation incident).  
  • If needed, ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security may be activated to provide supplemental security resources and capabilities |
### Technical Data Management

| Incidents of National Significance | • DHS and the coordinating agency approve the release of all data to State, local, and tribal governments.  
| • For incidents involving terrorism, the coordinating agency consults with other members of the JFO Coordination Group as issues arise regarding the sharing of sensitive information that may be needed, on a need-to-know basis, for responder and public safety.  
| • DHS and the coordinating agency, in consultation with the JFO Coordination Group and State, local, and tribal governments, determine if the severity of an incident warrants a request for Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) assets.  
| • The IMAAC is responsible for production, coordination, and dissemination of consequence predictions for an airborne hazardous material release. The IMAAC generates the single Federal prediction of atmospheric dispersions and their consequences utilizing the best available resources from the Federal Government. |
| Other Radiological Incidents | The coordinating agency authorizes the release of all data to State, local, and tribal governments. |
| **Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents** | • The coordinating agency oversees the collection, analysis, storage, and dissemination of all technical data through the entire process.  
• The coordinating agency is responsible for ensuring the sharing of all technical data, including outputs from the FRMAC, the Advisory Team, and the IMAAC, with all appropriate response organizations.  
• Federal monitoring and assessment activities are coordinated with State, local, and tribal governments. Federal agency plans and procedures for implementing this activity are designed to be compatible with the radiological emergency planning requirements for State and local governments, specific facilities, and existing memorandums of understanding and interagency agreements. |

**Technical Data Management (continued)**
Prior to the on-scene arrival of the coordinating agency, Federal first responders may provide radiological monitoring and assessment data to State, local, and tribal governments as requested in support of protective action decision making. Federal first responders also begin collecting data for transmission to the coordinating agency. If a FRMAC is established, the coordinating agency provides a mechanism for transmitting data to and from the FRMAC. Prior to the initiation of FRMAC operations, Federal first responders coordinate radiological monitoring and assessment data with the DOE Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) or the Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT). (Note: A CMHT provides a reach-back capability to support the CMRT. The CMRT functions as an advance element of the FRMAC to establish contact with on-scene responders to coordinate Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities.)

DOE and other participating Federal agencies learn of an emergency when they are alerted to a possible problem or receive a request for radiological assistance. DOE maintains national and regional coordination offices as points of access to Federal radiological emergency assistance. Requests for Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) teams are generally directed to the appropriate DOE Regional Coordinating Office. All other requests for Federal radiological monitoring and assessment go directly to DOE’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Washington, DC. When other agencies receive requests for Federal radiological monitoring and assessment assistance, they notify the DOE EOC.
Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents (Continued)

- DOE may respond to a State or coordinating agency request for assistance by dispatching a RAP team. If the situation requires more assistance than a RAP team can provide, DOE alerts or activates additional resources. These resources can include the establishment of a FRMAC as the coordination center for Federal radiological assessment activities. DOE may respond with additional resources including the Aerial Measurement System (AMS) to provide wide-area radiation monitoring, Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) medical advisory teams, National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) support, or if the accident involves a U.S. nuclear weapon, the Accident Response Group (ARG). Federal and State agencies are encouraged to collocate their radiological assessment activities. Some participating Federal agencies have radiological planning and emergency responsibilities as part of their statutory authority, as well as established working relationships with State counterpart agencies. The monitoring and assessment activity, coordinated by DOE, does not alter these responsibilities but complements them by providing for coordination of the initial Federal radiological monitoring and assessment response activity.

- Responsibility for coordinating radiological monitoring and assessment activities may transition to EPA at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with State, local, and tribal governments, the coordinating agency, and the JFO Coordination Group.

Technical Data Management (continued)
## Protective Action Recommendations

| Incidents of National Significance | DHS and the coordinating agency oversee the development of Federal Protective Action Recommendations and provide advice and assistance to State, tribal, and local governments. Federal Protective Action Recommendations are developed by the Advisory Team, in conjunction with the coordinating agency. Federal Protective Action Recommendations may include advice and assistance on measures to avoid or reduce exposure of the public to radiation from a release of radioactive material. This includes advice on emergency actions such as sheltering, evacuation, and prophylactic use of potassium iodide. It also includes advice on long-term measures, such as restriction of food, temporary relocation, or permanent resettlement, to avoid or minimize exposure to residual radiation or exposure through the ingestion pathway. |
| Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents | State, local, and tribal governments are responsible for implementing protective actions as they deem appropriate. |
| Other Radiological Incidents | The coordinating agency, in consultation with the Advisory Team, develops and provides Protective Action Recommendations. |
Public Information Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents</th>
<th>DHS, in consultation with other agencies and the JFO Coordination Group oversees and manages the establishment of a Joint Information Center (JIC), if required.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Radiological Incidents</td>
<td>The coordinating agency may establish a JIC depending on the needs of the incident response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents | • Owners/operators and Federal, State, local, tribal, and other relevant information sources coordinate public information to the extent practical with the JIC. Communication with the public is accomplished in accordance with procedures outlined in the ESF #15 – External Affairs Annex and the Public Affairs Support Annex.  
  
• It may be necessary to release Federal information regarding public health and safety. In this instance, Federal agencies coordinate with the coordinating agency and State, local, and tribal governments in advance, or as soon as possible after the information is released. |
CATASTROPHIC DISASTER RESPONSE STAFF OFFICER'S HANDBOOK

Congressional Coordination
Incidents of National Significance

DHS coordinates Federal responses to
congressional requests for information. Points
of contact for this function are the
congressional liaison officers. All Federal
agency congressional liaison officers and
congressional staffs seeking site-specific
information about an incident should contact
the DHS Office of Legislative Affairs and the
coordinating agency. While Congress may
request information directly from any Federal
agency, any agency responding to such
requests shall inform DHS and the
coordinating agency.

Other Radiological Incidents

The coordinating agency is responsible for
congressional coordination, consulting with
DHS as required.

White House Coordination
Incidents of National Significance

DHS submits reports to the President and
keeps the White House informed of all aspects
of the incident. While the White House may
request information directly from any Federal
agency, any agency responding to such
requests must promptly inform DHS and the
coordinating agency.

Other Radiological Incidents

The coordinating agency is responsible for any
necessary White House coordination,
consulting with DHS as requested. Note that
these actions can take place during the
transition from response to recovery.

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### Deactivation/Demobilization Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incidents of National Significance</th>
<th>DHS and the coordinating agency, in consultation with the JFO Coordination Group and State, local, and tribal governments, develop plans to demobilize the Federal presence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Radiological Incidents</td>
<td>The coordinating agency discontinues incident operations when a centralized Federal coordination presence is no longer required, or when its statutory responsibilities are fulfilled. Prior to discontinuing operations, the coordinating agency coordinates this decision with each Federal agency and State, local, and tribal governments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Coordination

| Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents | - In the event of an actual or potential environmental impact upon the United States or its possessions, territories, or territorial waters from a radiological emergency originating on foreign soil or, conversely, a domestic incident with an actual or potential foreign impact, DHS and the coordinating agency immediately inform the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for official interactions with foreign governments. In either case (foreign incident with domestic impact, or vice versa), the coordinating agency consults with DHS, and DHS makes a determination on whether it is an Incident of National Significance. DHS and the coordinating agency keep DOS informed of all Federal incident management activities.

- DOS coordinates notification and information-gathering activities with foreign governments, except in cases where existing bilateral agreements permit direct communication. Where the coordinating agency has existing bilateral agreements that permit direct exchange of information, the coordinating agency keeps DOS informed of consultations with their foreign counterparts. DHS and the coordinating agency ensure that any offers of assistance to, or requests from, foreign governments are coordinated with DOS.

- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is the point of interaction with the hydrometeorological services of other countries. International response activities are accomplished in accordance with the International Coordination Support Annex. |
### Victim Decontamination/Population Monitoring

| Incidents of National Significance and Other Radiological Incidents | • External monitoring and decontamination of possibly affected victims are accomplished locally and are the responsibility of State, local, and tribal governments. Federal resources are provided at the request of, and in support of, the affected State(s). HHS, through ESF #8 and in consultation with the coordinating agency, coordinates Federal support for external monitoring of people and decontamination.  
• HHS assists and supports State, local, and tribal governments in performing monitoring for internal contamination and administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination, as deemed necessary by State health officials.  
• HHS assists local and State health departments in establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals, perform dose reconstruction, and conduct long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects. |

### Other Federal Resource Support

For Stafford Act or Federal-to-Federal support incidents, DHS/EPR/FEMA coordinates the provision of Federal resources and assistance to affected State, local, and tribal governments as part of the JFO Operations Section or other appropriate location established by DHS/EPR/FEMA.

### Recovery

- For an Incident of National Significance, DHS coordinates overall Federal recovery activities, while the coordinating agency maintains responsibility for managing the Federal technical radiological cleanup activities in accordance with NRP mechanisms.

- For all radiological incidents, the coordinating agency coordinates environmental remediation/cleanup in concert with cognizant State, local, and tribal governments, and owners/operators, as applicable. While retaining overall technical lead, a coordinating agency may require support from a cooperating agency that has significant cleanup/recovery experience and capabilities (e.g., EPA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)) for a long-term cleanup. The initial coordinating agency may request that the coordinating agency role be transitioned to a cooperating agency to manage long-term cleanup efforts.

- State, local, and tribal governments primarily are responsible for planning the recovery of the affected area (the term “recovery,” as used here, encompasses any action
dedicated to the continued protection of the public and resumption of normal activities in the affected area). Recovery planning is initiated at the request of the State, local, or tribal governments, and generally does not take place until the initiating conditions of the incident have stabilized and immediate actions to protect public health, safety, and property are accomplished. Upon request, the Federal government assists State, local, and tribal governments develop and execute recovery plans.

- Private owners/operators have primary responsibility for recovery planning activities and eventual cleanup within their facility boundaries and may have responsibilities for recovery activities outside their facility under applicable legal obligations (e.g., contractual, licensee, CERCLA).

- The DOE FRMAC Director works closely with the Senior EPA representative to facilitate a smooth transition of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination responsibility to EPA at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with DHS, the JFO Coordination Group, and State, local, and tribal governments. The following conditions are intended to be met prior to transfer:
  
  ° The immediate emergency condition is stabilized;
  
  ° Offsite releases of radioactive material have ceased, and there is little or no potential for further unintentional offsite releases;
  
  ° The offsite radiological conditions are characterized and the immediate consequences are assessed;
  
  ° An initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed in conjunction with the affected State, local, and tribal governments and appropriate Federal agencies; and
  
  ° EPA has received adequate assurances from the other Federal agencies that they are committing the required resources, personnel, and funds for the duration of the Federal response.

- Radiological monitoring and assessment activities are normally terminated when DHS, in consultation with the coordinating agency, other participating agencies, and State, local, and tribal governments, determines that:
  
  ° There is no longer a threat to public health and safety or the environment;
  
  ° State, local, and tribal resources are adequate for the situation; and
  
  ° There is mutual agreement among the agencies involved to terminate monitoring and assessment.

Federal Assets Available Upon Request by the Coordinating Agency or DHS

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

DOE is responsible for developing and maintaining FRMAC policies and procedures, determining FRMAC composition, and maintaining FRMAC operational readiness. The FRMAC is established at or near the incident location in coordination with DHS, the coordinating agency, other Federal agencies, and State, local, and tribal authorities. A FRMAC normally includes representation from DOE, EPA, the Department of Commerce, the National
Communications System (DHS/IAIP/NCS), USACE, and other Federal agencies as needed. Regardless of who is designated as the coordinating agency, DOE, through the FRMAC or DOE CMHT and CMRT, coordinates radiological monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of the response. When the FRMAC is transferred to the EPA, they assume responsibility for coordination of radiological monitoring and assessment activities.

Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health

- The Advisory Team includes representatives from DHS, EPA, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other Federal agencies. The Advisory Team develops coordinated advice and recommendations for DHS, the JFO Coordination Group, the coordinating agency, and State, local, and tribal governments concerning environmental, food health, and animal health matters.

- The Advisory Team selects a chair for the Team.

- The Advisory Team provides recommendations in matters related to the following:
  - Environmental assessments (field monitoring) required for developing recommendations with advice from State, local, and tribal governments and/or the FRMAC senior Monitoring Manager;
  - Protective Action Guides and their application to the emergency;
  - Protective Action Recommendations using data and assessment from the FRMAC;
  - Protective actions to prevent or minimize contamination of milk, food, and water, and to prevent or minimize exposure through ingestion;
  - Recommendations regarding the disposition of contaminated livestock, poultry, and contaminated foods, especially perishable commodities (e.g., meat in processing plants);
  - Recommendations for minimizing losses of agricultural resources from radiation effects;
  - Availability of food, animal feed, and water supply inspection programs to assure wholesomeness;
  - Relocation, reentry, and other radiation protection measures prior to recovery;
  - Recommendations for recovery, return, and cleanup issues;
  - Health and safety advice or information for the public and for workers;
  - Estimated effects of radioactive releases on human health and the environment; and
  - Other matters, as requested by the coordinating agency.
DOE Radiological Assistance Program, Emergency Management Teams, and Nuclear Incident Response Team Assets

- RAP teams are located at DOE operations offices, national laboratories, and some area offices. They can be dispatched to a radiological incident by the DOE regional coordinating offices responding to a radiological incident.

Additional DOE planning and response teams and capabilities are located at various DOE facilities throughout the country and can be dispatched, as needed, to a radiological incident.

Responsibilities

<p>| American Red Cross | (See the ESF #6 – Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services Annex for additional information.) Assesses the mass care consequences of a radiological incident, and in conjunction with State, local, and tribal (including private-sector) mass care organizations, develop and implement a sustainable short-term and long-term strategy for effectively addressing the consequences of the incident. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Agriculture</th>
<th>(See the ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex for additional information.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inspects meat and meat products, poultry and poultry products, and egg products identified for interstate and foreign commerce to ensure that they are safe for human consumption.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assists, in conjunction with HHS, in monitoring the production, processing, storage, and distribution of food through the wholesale level to eliminate contaminated product or to reduce the contamination in the product to a safe level.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Collects agricultural samples within the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (through the FRMAC). Assists in the evaluation and assessment of data to determine the impact of the incident on agriculture.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assesses damage to crops, soil, livestock, poultry, and processing facilities and incorporates findings in a damage assessment report.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Provides emergency communications assistance to the agricultural community through the State Research, Education, and Extension Services electronic mail, or other USDA telecommunications systems.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Supports/advises on decontamination and screening of pets and farm animals that may be exposed to radioactive material.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Assists in animal carcass disposal.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Department of Commerce | • Provides operational weather observations and prepares forecasts tailored to support emergency incident management activities.  
• Provides plume dispersion assessment and forecasts to the IMAAC and/or coordinating agency, in accordance with established procedures.  
• Archives, as a special collection, the meteorological data from national observing and numerical weather analysis and prediction systems applicable to the monitoring and assessment of the response.  
• Ensures that marine fishery products available to the public are not contaminated.  
• Provides assistance and reference material for calibrating radiological instruments.  
• Provides radiation shielding materials.  
• In the event of materials potentially crossing international boundaries, serves as the agent for informing international hydrometeorological services and associated agencies through the mechanisms afforded by the World Meteorological Organization.  
• Provides radioanalytical measurement support and instrumentation. |
|---|---|
| Department of Defense | • Serves as a coordinating agency, as identified in Table 1, coordinating Federal actions for radiological incidents involving DOD facilities, including U.S. nuclear-powered ships, or material otherwise under their jurisdiction (e.g., transportation of material shipped by or for DOD).

• Provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in response to requests for assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception for support provided under Immediate Response Authority, the obligation of DOD resources to support requests for assistance is subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Details regarding DSCA are provided in the NRP Base Plan.

• Provides Immediate Response Authority under imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to as “Immediate Response.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</th>
<th>(See the ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering Annex for additional information.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Directs response/recovery actions as they relate to ESF #3 functions, including contaminated debris management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• For RDD/IND incidents, provides response and cleanup support as a cooperating agency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Integrates and coordinates with other agencies, as requested, to perform any or all of the following:</td>
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<td>° Radiological survey functions;</td>
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<td>° Gross decontamination;</td>
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<td>° Site characterization;</td>
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<td>° Contaminated water management; and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>° Site remediation.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Department of Energy | • Serves as a coordinating agency, as identified in Table 1, coordinating Federal actions for radiological incidents involving DOE facilities or material otherwise under their jurisdiction (e.g., transportation of material shipped by or for DOE).

• Coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities as lead technical organization in FRMAC (emergency phase), regardless of who is designated the coordinating agency.

• Maintains technical liaison with State and local agencies with monitoring and assessment responsibilities.

• Maintains a common set of all offsite radiological monitoring data in an accountable, secure, and retrievable form and ensures the technical integrity of FRMAC data.

• Provides monitoring data and interpretations, including exposure rate contours, dose projections, and any other requested radiological assessments, to the coordinating agency and to the States. |
Department of Energy (Continued)

- Provides, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, the personnel and equipment to perform radiological monitoring and assessment activities, and provides on-scene analytical capability supporting assessments.

- Requests supplemental assistance and technical support from other Federal agencies as needed.

- Arranges consultation and support services through appropriate Federal agencies to all other entities (e.g., private contractors) with radiological monitoring functions and capabilities and technical and medical expertise for handling radiological contamination and population monitoring.

- Works closely with the Senior EPA representative to facilitate a smooth transition of the Federal radiological monitoring and assessment coordination responsibility to EPA at a mutually agreeable time and after consultation with the States and coordinating agency.

- Provides, in cooperation with other Federal and State agencies, personnel and equipment, including portal monitors, to support initial external screening and provides advice and assistance to State and local personnel conducting screening/decontamination of persons leaving a contaminated zone.
| Department of Energy (Continued) | • Provides plume trajectories and deposition projections for emergency response planning assessments including source term estimates where limited or no information is available, including INDs and RDDs, to the IMAAC and/or coordinating agency, in accordance with established procedures.  
| | • Upgrades, maintains, coordinates, and publishes documentation needed for the administration, implementation, operation, and standardization of the FRMAC.  
| | • Maintains and improves the ability to provide wide-area radiation monitoring now resident in the AMS.  
| | • Maintains and improves the ability to provide medical assistance, advisory teams, and training related to nuclear/radiological accidents and incidents now resident in the REAC/TS.  
| | • Maintains and improves the ability to provide near-real time assessments of the consequences of accidental or potential radiation releases by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes, and to correct modeled results through integration of actual radiation measurements obtained from both airborne and ground sources, resident in the NARAC. The NARAC also maintains and improves their ability to model the direct results (blast, thermal, radiation, EMP) of a nuclear detonation. |
Maintains and improves the first-response ability to assess an emergency situation and to advise decision makers on what further steps can be taken to evaluate and minimize the hazards of a radiological emergency resident in the RAP.

Maintains and improves the ability to respond to an emergency involving U.S. nuclear weapons resident in the ARG.

Maintains and improves the ability of the Consequence Management Planning Team, CMHT, and CMRTs to provide initial planning, coordination, and data collection and assessment prior to or in lieu of establishment of a FRMAC.

Maintains and improves the ability of the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team to provide advice and limited technical assistance, including search, diagnostics, and effects prediction, as part of a Domestic Emergency Support Team.

Maintains and improves the ability of the Search Response Teams to provide covert search capability using local support for initial nuclear search activities.
| Department of Energy (Continued) | • Maintains and improves the ability of the Joint Technical Operations Team to provide technical operations advisory support and advanced technical assistance to the Federal primary or coordinating agency, provide extended technical support to other deployed operations through an emergency response home team; perform nuclear safety reviews to determine safe-to-ship status before moving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to an appropriate disposal location; and accept custody of nuclear or radiological WMD on behalf of DOE and provide for the final disposition of these devices.

• Maintains and improves the ability of Radiological Triage to determine through remote analysis of nuclear spectra collected on-scene if a radioactive object contains special nuclear materials.

• Assigns a Senior Energy Official (SEO) for any response involving the deployment of the DOE/NNSA emergency response assets. The SEO is responsible for the coordination and employment of these assets at the scene of a radiological event, and the deployed assets will work in support of and under the direction of the SEO. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Health and Human Services</th>
<th>(See the ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services Annex for additional information.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• In conjunction with USDA, inspects production, processing, storage, and distribution facilities for human food and animal feeds that may be used in interstate commerce to ensure protection of the public health.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Collects samples of agricultural products to monitor and assess the extent of contamination as a basis for recommending or implementing protective actions (through the FRMAC).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides advice on proper medical treatment of the general population and response workers exposed to or contaminated by radioactive materials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides available medical countermeasures through deployment of the Strategic National Stockpile.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides assessment and treatment teams for those exposed to or contaminated by radiation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides advice and guidance in assessing the impact of the effects of radiological incidents on the health of persons in the affected area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Manages long-term public monitoring and supports follow-on personal data collection, collecting and processing of blood samples and bodily fluids/matter samples, and advice concerning medical assessment and triage of victims. Tracks victim treatment and long-term health effects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency | • Serves as the annex coordinator for this annex.  
• In consultation with the coordinating agency, coordinates the provision of Federal resources and assistance to affected State, local, and tribal governments under the Stafford Act or Federal-to-Federal support provisions of the NRP.  
• Monitors the status of the Federal response to requests for assistance from the affected State(s) and provides this information to the State(s).  
• Keeps the coordinating agency informed of requests for assistance from the State(s) and the status of the Federal response.  
• Identifies and informs Federal agencies of actual or apparent omissions, redundancies, or conflicts in response activity.  
• Establishes and maintains a source of integrated, coordinated information about the status of all nonradiological resource support activities.  
• Provides other support to Federal agencies responding to the emergency. |
| --- | --- |
| Department of Homeland Security/National Communications System | (See the ESF #2 – Communications Annex for additional information.)  
Acting through its operational element, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), the NCS ensures the provision of adequate telecommunications support to Federal radiological incident response operations. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Homeland Security/Science and Technology</th>
<th>Provides coordination of Federal science and technology resources as described in the Science and Technology Support Annex. This includes organization of Federal S&amp;T support as well as assessment and consultation in the form of Scientific and Technical Advisory and Response Teams (STARTs) and the IMAAC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Department of Homeland Security/Customs and Border Protection (DHS/CBP) | • For incidents at the border, maintains radiation detection equipment and nonintrusive inspection technology at ports of entry/Border Patrol checkpoints and to detect the presence of radiological substances transported by persons, cargo, mail, or conveyance arriving from foreign countries.  
• Through its National Targeting Center, provides extensive analytical and targeting capabilities to identify and interdict terrorists and WMD.  
• The CBP Weapons of Mass Destruction Teleforensic Center provides 24/7 support to DHS/CBP and other Federal law enforcement personnel in the identification of suspect hazardous material.  
• The CBP Laboratory and Scientific Services staffs WMD Response Teams in strategic locations nationwide.  
• Through the Container Security Initiative, DHS/CBP personnel are stationed at major foreign seaports in order to detect and prevent the transport of WMD on container vessels destined to the U.S.  
• Has extensive authority and expertise regarding the entry, inspection, and admissibility of persons, cargo, mail, and conveyances arriving from foreign countries. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>• Serves as coordinating agency for incidents that occur in certain areas of the coastal zone, as identified in Table 1.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>• “Certain areas of the coastal zone,” for the purposes of this document, means the following areas of the coastal zone as defined by the NCP:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o <strong>Vessels, as defined in 33 CFR 160;</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o <strong>Areas seaward of the shoreline to the outer edge of the Economic Exclusion Zone; and</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o <strong>Within the boundaries of the following waterfront facilities subject to the jurisdiction of DHS/USCG; those regulated by 33 CFR 126 (Dangerous cargo handling), 127 (LPG/LNG), 128 (Passenger terminals), 140 (Outer Continental Shelf Activities), 1541-56 (Waterfront portions of Oil &amp; Hazmat bulk transfer facilities – delineated as per the NCP), 105 (Maritime security - facilities).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard (Continued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EPA is the coordinating agency for responses in areas of the coastal zone other than those defined above as certain areas of the coastal zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For incidents that have cross-boundary impacts, works with the other affected agency to determine how best to cooperatively respond consistent with the NCP model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Serves as the coordinating agency for these incidents only during the prevention and emergency response phase, and transfers responsibility for later response phases to the appropriate agency, consistent with the NCP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Because of its unique maritime jurisdiction and capabilities, is prepared to provide appropriate security, command and control, transportation, and support to other agencies that need to operate in the maritime domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of the Interior (DOI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advises and assists in evaluating processes affecting radioisotopes in soils, including personnel, equipment, and laboratory support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advises and assists in the development of geographic information systems databases to be used in the analysis and assessment of contaminated areas, including personnel and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advises and assists in assessing and dealing with impacts to natural resources, including fish and wildlife, subsistence uses, public lands, Indian tribal lands, land reclamation, mining, minerals, and water resources. Further guidance is provided in the Tribal Relations Support Annex and the ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides liaison between federally recognized tribal governments and Federal, State, and local agencies for coordination of response activities. Additionally, DOI advises and assists DHS on economic, social, and political matters in the U.S. insular areas should a radiological incident occur in these areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinates all law enforcement and criminal investigative response to acts of terrorism, to include intelligence gathering, hostage negotiations, and tactical operations. Further details regarding the FBI response are outlined in the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Department of State | • Coordinates foreign information-gathering activities and all contacts with foreign governments, except in cases where existing bilateral agreements permit direct agency-to-agency cooperation.  
• Conveys the U.S. Government response to foreign offers of assistance. |
| Department of Transportation | (See the ESF #1 – Transportation Annex for further information.) Provides technical advice and assistance on the transportation of radiological materials and the impact of the incident on the transportation infrastructure. |
| Department of Veterans Affairs | • Provides medical assistance using the Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team.  
• Provides temporary housing. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Environmental Protection Agency</strong></th>
<th>(See the Hazardous Materials Incident Annex for additional information.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Serves as a coordinating agency, as identified in Table 1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provides resources, including personnel, equipment, and laboratory support (including mobile laboratories) to assist DOE in monitoring radioactivity levels in the environment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assumes coordination of Federal radiological monitoring and assessment responsibilities after the transition from DOE.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assists in the development and implementation of a long-term monitoring plan and long-term recovery plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provides nationwide environmental monitoring data from the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring Systems for assessing the national impact of the incident.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develops Protective Action Guides in coordination with the FRPCC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recommends protective actions and other radiation protection measures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Environmental Protection Agency (Continued) | • Recommends acceptable emergency levels of radioactivity and radiation in the environment.  
• Prepares health and safety advice and information for the public.  
• Estimates effects of radioactive releases on human health and the environment.  
• Provides response and recovery actions to prevent, minimize, or mitigate a threat to public health, safety, or the environment caused by actual or potential releases of radioactive substances, including actions to detect, identify, contain, clean up, and dispose of such substances.  
• Assists and supports the NIRT, when activated.  
• Provides, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, the law enforcement personnel and equipment to conduct law enforcement operations and investigations for nuclear/radiological incidents involving criminal activity that are not terrorism related. |
| General Services Administration | (See the ESF #7 – Resource Support Annex for additional information.) |
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration | Serves as a coordinating agency, as identified in Table 1. |
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission | • Serves as a coordinating agency, as identified in Table 1.  
• Provides technical assistance to include source term estimation, plume dispersion, and dose assessment calculations.  
• Provides assistance and recommendations concerning protective action measures as coordinating agency.  
• Provides assistance in Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities.  
• For an incident at a facility licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State, or involving Atomic Energy Act licensed material:  
  • The licensee takes action to mitigate the consequences of the incident and provides appropriate protective action recommendations to State, local, and tribal officials;  
  • The NRC: |
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Continued)

- Performs an independent assessment of the incident and potential offsite consequences and, as appropriate, provides recommendations concerning any protective measures;

- Performs oversight of the licensee, to include monitoring, evaluation of protective action recommendations, advice, assistance, and, as appropriate, direction; and

- Dispatches, if appropriate, an NRC site team of technical experts to the licensee’s facility.

- Under certain situations involving the protection of public health/safety or national security, the NRC may take possession of special nuclear materials and/or operate certain facilities regulated by the NRC.
Appendix E

Extract from National Response Plan: Catastrophic Incident Annex

Coordinating Agency: Department of Homeland Security

Cooperating Agencies: All Federal departments and agencies (and other organizations) with assigned primary or supporting Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibilities

Introduction

Purpose

The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP-CIA) establishes the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident.

A more detailed and operationally specific NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated “For Official Use Only” will be approved and published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes.

Scope

- A catastrophic incident, as defined by the NRP, is any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated Federal/national assistance.

- Recognizing that Federal and/or national resources are required to augment overwhelmed State, local, and tribal response efforts, the NRPCIA establishes protocols to preidentify and rapidly deploy key essential resources (e.g., medical teams, urban search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, medical and equipment caches, etc.) that are expected to be urgently needed/required to save lives and contain incidents.

- Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources—organized into incident-specific “packages”—deploy in accordance with the NRP-CIS and in coordination with the affected State and incident command structure.
Policies

- The NRP-CIA strategy is consistent with NRP and National Incident Management System protocols and Incident Command System conventions.
- Only the Secretary of Homeland Security or designee may initiate implementation of the NRP-CIA.
- All deploying Federal resources remain under the control of their respective Federal department or agency during mobilization and deployment.
- Federal resources arriving at a Federal mobilization center or staging area remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated into the incident response effort.
- Federal assets unilaterally deployed in accordance with the NRP-CIS do not require a State cost-share. However, in accordance with the Stafford Act, State requests for use of deployed Federal assets may require cost-sharing.
- Unless it can be credibly established that a mobilizing Federal resource identified in the NRP-CIS is not needed at the catastrophic incident venue, that resource deploys.
- The occurrence or threat of multiple catastrophic incidents may significantly reduce the size, speed, and depth of the Federal response. If deemed necessary or prudent, the Federal Government may reduce the availability or allocation of finite resources when multiple venues are competing for the same resources, or hold certain resources in reserve in case of additional incidents.

Situation

- **Incident Condition**: Normal procedures for certain ESFs may be expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident. All ESFs must explore economies of scale to maximize utilization and efficiency of scarce resources. In the case of catastrophic incident, it is expected that the Federal Government or other national entities provide expedited assistance in one or more of the following areas:

- **Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services (ESF #6)**: The ability to provide temporary shelter, food, emergency first aid, clothing, and other essential life support to people may be complicated by contaminated resources or facilities.

- **Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9)**: Resources and personnel to perform operational activities (e.g., locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures) are limited. If search and rescue operations are required in areas of contamination, the limited availability of properly equipped resources supports or underscores the need for prompt Federal response.

- **Decontamination (ESFs #8 and #10)**: Incidents involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may require decontamination of casualties, evacuees, animals, equipment, buildings, critical infrastructure, and other areas. Given the potentially large numbers of casualties and evacuees, resulting decontamination requirements may quickly outstrip local and State capabilities.
• **Public Health and Medical Support (ESF #8):** There is a significant need for public health and medical support, including mental health services. Medical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points and shelters, and at other locations to support field operations. In addition, any contamination requirement increases the requirement for technical assistance.

• **Medical Equipment and Supplies (ESF #8):** Shortages of available supplies of preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals and qualified medical personnel to administer available prophylaxis are likely. Timely distribution of prophylaxis may forestall additional illnesses, and reduce the impact of disease among those already exposed.

• **Casualty and Fatality Management and Transportation (ESF #8):** Federal resources may be required to manage the transportation and storage of deceased, injured, and exposed victims if their numbers are extremely high. In addition, the immense numbers of casualties are likely to overwhelm the bed capacities of local and State medical facilities.

• **Public Information (ESF #15):** When State and local public communications channels are overwhelmed during a catastrophic incident, the Federal Government must immediately provide resources to assist in delivering clear and coherent public information guidance and consistent messages to the affected areas.

**Planning Assumptions**

• A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of casualties and/or displaced persons, possibly in the tens of thousands.

• The Secretary of Homeland Security designates the event an Incident of National Significance and directs implementation of the NRP-CIA.

• A catastrophic mass casualty/mass evacuation incident triggers a Presidential disaster declaration, immediately or otherwise.

• The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident may include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive attacks, disease epidemics, and major natural or manmade hazards.

• Multiple incidents may occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous and/or noncontiguous areas. Some incidents, such as a biological WMD attack, may be dispersed over a large geographic area, and lack a defined incident site.

• A catastrophic incident may occur with little or no warning. Some incidents, such as rapid disease outbreaks, may be well underway before detection.

• The incident may cause significant disruption of the area’s critical infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, and public health and medical systems.

• The response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction (to include mutual aid from surrounding jurisdictions and response support from the State) may be insufficient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency personnel who normally respond to incidents may be among those affected and unable to perform their duties.
A detailed and credible common operating picture may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours (or longer) after the incident. As a result, response activities must begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment.

Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols.

Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. More people initially are likely to flee and seek shelter for attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents than for natural events. The health-related implications of an incident aggravate attempts to implement a coordinated evacuation management strategy.

Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require prolonged temporary housing.

A catastrophic incident may produce environmental impacts (e.g., persistent chemical, biological, or radiological contamination) that severely challenge the ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a timely recovery.

A catastrophic incident has unique dimensions/characteristics requiring that response plans/strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging needs and requirements.

A catastrophic incident may have significant international dimensions. These include potential impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and other areas.

If the incident is the result of terrorism, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level likely may be raised regionally, and perhaps nationally. Elevation of the HSAS level carries additional local, State, and Federal security enhancements that may affect the availability of certain response resources.

Concept of Operations

Local and State Response: Local and State response operations and responsibilities are covered in the NRP and the NRP-CIS. This annex addresses the proactive Federal response to be taken in anticipation of or following a catastrophic incident to rapidly provide critical resources to assist and augment State, local, and tribal response efforts.

Federal Response

In accordance with NRP provisions for proactive Federal response to catastrophic incidents, the NRP-CIA employs an expedited approach to the provision of Federal resources to save lives and contain the incident.

Guiding principles for a proactive Federal catastrophic incident response include the following:

- The primary mission is to save lives, protect property and critical infrastructure, contain the event, and protect the national security;
Standard procedures outlined in the NRP regarding requests for assistance may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended in the immediate aftermath of an incident of catastrophic magnitude, pursuant to existing law;

Preidentified Federal response resources are mobilized and deployed, and, if required, begin emergency operations to commence life-safety activities; and

Notification and full coordination with States occur, but the coordination process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.

Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g., involving mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of Homeland Security immediately designates the event an Incident of National Significance and begins, potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA. Upon notification from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) that the NRP-CIA has been implemented, Federal departments and agencies:

Take immediate actions to activate, mobilize, and deploy incident-specific resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;

Take immediate actions to protect life, property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within the affected area;

Immediately commence those hazard-specific activities established under the appropriate and applicable NRP Incident Annex(es), including the NRP-CIA; and

Immediately commence functional activities and responsibilities established under the NRP ESF Annexes.

NRP-CIA actions that the Federal Government takes in response to a catastrophic incident include:

All Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross initiate actions to mobilize and deploy resources as planned for in the NRP-CIS;

All Federal departments, agencies, and organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross) assigned primary or supporting ESF responsibilities immediately begin implementation of those responsibilities, as appropriate or when directed by the President;

Incident-specific resources and capabilities (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, equipment, transportable shelters, preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches, etc.) are activated and prepare for deployment to a Federal mobilization center or staging area near the incident site. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response strategies (as detailed in the NRP-CIS) that include the preidentification of incident-specific critical resource requirements and corresponding deployment/employment strategies accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled resources and capabilities;
Regional Federal facilities (e.g., hospitals) are activated and prepared to receive and treat casualties from the incident area. Federal facilities are directed to reprioritize services (in some cases reducing or postponing certain customary services) until life-saving activities are concluded. The development of site-specific catastrophic incident response plans that include the preidentification of projected casualty and mass care support requirements and potentially available facilities expands the response architecture and accelerates the availability of such resources;

- Supplementary support agreements with the private sector are activated; and

- Given the projected high demand for Federal augmentation support, as well as the potential national security implications of a catastrophic incident, Federal departments and agencies may be asked to redirect efforts from their day-to-day responsibilities to support the response effort.

Responsibilities

This section summarizes Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA. For a complete listing of Federal department and agency responsibilities under the NRP-CIA, refer to the NRP-CIS, which is designated For Official Use Only and maintained as a separate document. For additional Federal department and agency responsibilities, refer to the individual ESF Annexes and hazard-specific Incident Annexes in the NRP.

Coordinating Agency: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

- Establish that a catastrophic incident has occurred and implement the NRP-CIA.

- Notify all Federal departments and agencies to implement the NRP-CIA and the NRP-CIS.

- Upon implementation of the NRP-CIA:
  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) DHS-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
  - Identify, prepare, and operationalize facilities critical to supporting the movement and reception of deploying Federal resources;
  - Activate national-level facilities and capabilities in accordance with the NRP-CIS and standard NRP protocols;
  - Establish and maintain communications with incident command authorities to ensure a common and current operating picture regarding critical resource requirements. As specific resource requirements are identified, advise the Department of Transportation to reprioritize and adjust accordingly the schedule of execution for resource flow in the NRP-CIS; and
  - Make every attempt to establish contact with the impacted State(s) to coordinate the employment of Federal resources in support of the State.
Cooperating Agencies

- When notified by the HSOC that the Secretary of Homeland Security has implemented the NRP-CIA, Federal departments and agencies (and the American Red Cross):
  - Activate and deploy (or prepare to deploy) agency- or ESF-managed teams, equipment caches, and other resources in accordance with the NRP-CIS;
  - Commence ESF responsibilities as appropriate;
  - Commence assessments of the probable consequences of the incident and projected resource requirements; and
  - Commence development of shorter and longer term response and recovery strategies.

- The NRP-CIS provides a list of the specific actions that are initiated upon activation of the NRP-CIA. The following Federal departments and agencies and other organizations are assigned specific responsibilities as cooperating agencies:
  - Department of Agriculture
  - Department of Defense
  - Department of Energy
  - Department of Health and Human Services
  - Department of Homeland Security
  - Department of Transportation
  - Department of Veterans Affairs
  - Environmental Protection Agency
  - American Red Cross

- Departments and agencies assigned primary responsibility for one or more functional response areas under the NRP-CIS appendices are identified below.
  - **Mass Care**: American Red Cross
  - **Search and Rescue**: Department of Homeland Security
  - **Decontamination**: Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Health and Human Services
  - **Public Health and Medical Support**: Department of Health and Human Services
  - **Medical Equipment and Supplies**: Department of Health and Human Services
° **Patient Movement**: Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Defense

° **Mass Fatality**: Department of Health and Human Services

° **Housing**: Department of Homeland Security

° **Public and Incident Communications**: Department of Homeland Security

° **Transportation**: Department of Transportation

° **Private-Sector Support**: Department of Homeland Security

° **Logistics**: Department of Homeland Security
Appendix F

Extract from National Response Plan: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Coordinating Agency: Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation

Cooperating Agencies:
- Department of Defense
- Department of Energy
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of State Environmental Protection Agency

Introduction

Purpose

The purpose of this annex is to facilitate an effective Federal law enforcement and investigative response to all threats or acts of terrorism within the United States, regardless of whether they are deemed credible and/or whether they escalate to an Incident of National Significance. To accomplish this, the annex establishes a structure for a systematic, coordinated, unified, timely, and effective national law enforcement and investigative response to threats or acts of terrorism within the United States.

Scope

This annex is a strategic document that:

- Provides planning guidance and outlines operational concepts for the Federal law enforcement and investigative response to a threatened or actual terrorist incident within the United States; and

- Acknowledges and outlines the unique nature of each threat or incident, the capabilities and responsibilities of the local jurisdictions, and the law enforcement and investigative activities necessary to prevent or mitigate a specific threat or incident.

Policies

The United States regards terrorism as a potential threat to national security, as well as a violent criminal act, and applies all appropriate means to combat this danger. In doing so, the United States vigorously pursues efforts to deter and preempt these crimes and to apprehend and prosecute directly, or assist other governments in prosecuting, individuals who perpetrate or plan terrorist attacks.

To ensure the policies established in applicable Presidential directives are implemented in a coordinated manner, this annex provides overall guidance to Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies concerning the Federal Government’s law enforcement and investigative response to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents that occur in the United States, particularly those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE) material.
Federal Agencies

The law enforcement and investigative response to a terrorist threat or incident within the United States is a highly coordinated, interagency State, local, tribal, and Federal responsibility. In support of this mission, the following Federal agencies have primary responsibility for certain aspects of the overall law enforcement and investigative response:

- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

According to HSPD-5, “The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General-approved procedures pursuant to that Executive order. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States shall be dedicated, consistent with U.S. law and with activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our national security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments.”

Although not formally designated under this annex, other Federal departments and agencies may have authorities, resources, capabilities, or expertise required to support terrorism-related law enforcement and investigation operations. Agencies may be requested to participate in Federal planning and response operations, and may be requested to designate liaison officers and provide other support as required.

Deployment/Employment Priorities

In addition to the priorities identified in the National Response Plan (NRP) Base Plan, the law enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents is based on the following priorities:

- Preserving life or minimizing risk to health; which constitutes the first priority of operations.
- Preventing a threatened act from being carried out or an existing terrorist act from being expanded or aggravated.
• Locating, accessing, rendering safe, controlling, containing, recovering, or disposing of a WMD that has not yet functioned, and disposing of CBRNE material in coordination with appropriate departments and agencies (e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA).

• Apprehending and successfully prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist threats or incidents.

Planning Assumptions and Considerations

• In addition to the planning assumptions and considerations identified in the NRP Base Plan, the law enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents, particularly those involving WMD and CBRNE material, are based on the following assumptions and considerations:

  • A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning, may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may result in mass casualties.

  • The suspected or actual involvement of terrorists adds a complicating dimension to incident management.

  • The response to a threat or actual incident involves FBI law enforcement and investigative activity as an integrated element.

  • In the case of a threat, there may be no incident site, and no external consequences, and, therefore, there may be no need for establishment of traditional Incident Command System (ICS) elements such as an Incident Command Post (ICP) or a Joint Field Office (JFO).

  • An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials, will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of many local, State, and/or tribal governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing Federal response capabilities.

  • In the case of a biological attack, the effect may be temporally and geographically dispersed, with no determined or defined “incident site.” Response operations may be conducted over a multijurisdictional, multistate region.

  • A biological attack employing a contagious agent may require quarantine by Federal, State, local, and tribal health officials to contain the disease outbreak.

  • If appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities are not available and the area is contaminated with CBRNE or other hazardous materials, it is possible that response actions into a contaminated area may be delayed until the material has dissipated to a level that is safe for emergency response personnel to operate or until appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive, whichever is sooner.

Situation

The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of law enforcement, criminal investigation, protective activities, emergency management functions, and technical expertise.
across all levels of government. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, each of which may be an incident scene, a hazardous scene, and/or a crime scene simultaneously.

Concept of Operations

Command and control

The FBI is the lead agency for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and intelligence collection activities within the United States. Investigative and intelligence activities are managed by the FBI from an FBI command post or Joint Operations Center (JOC). The command post or JOC coordinates the necessary Federal law enforcement assets required to respond to and resolve the threat or incident with State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.

The FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the local Field Office establishes a command post to manage the threat based upon a graduated and flexible response. This command post structure generally consists of three functional groups: Command, Operations, and Operations Support, and is designed to accommodate participation of other agencies, as appropriate (see Figure 1).

When the threat or incident exceeds the capabilities and resources of the local FBI Field Office, the SAC can request additional assistance from regional and national assets to augment existing capabilities. In a terrorist threat or incident that may involve a WMD or CBRNE material, the traditional FBI command post will transition to a JOC, which may temporarily incorporate a fourth functional entity, the Consequence Management Group (see Figure 2), in the absence of an activated JFO.

When, in the determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the incident becomes an Incident of National Significance and a JFO is established, the JOC becomes a section of the JFO and the FBI SAC becomes the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO) in the JFO Coordination Group. In this situation, the JOC Consequence Management Group is incorporated into the appropriate components of the JFO (see NRP Base Plan, Figure 4 and Figure 7).
The JOC structure may also be used to coordinate law enforcement, investigative, and intelligence activities for the numerous threats or incidents that occur each year that do not escalate to Incidents of National Significance.

**Joint Operations Center**

- The JOC is an interagency command and control center for managing interagency preparation for, and the law enforcement and investigative response to, a credible terrorist threat or incident. Similar to the Area Command concept within the ICS, the JOC also may be established to coordinate and organize multiple agencies and jurisdictions during critical incidents or special events. Following the basic principles established in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the JOC is modular and scalable and may be tailored to meet the specific operational requirements needed to manage the threat, incident, or special event.

- A JOC may be established and staffed in a pre-incident, pre-emptive role in support of a significant special event. This “watch mode” allows for rapid expansion to full operations if a critical incident occurs during the special event. The JOC is a strategic management tool that effectively coordinates law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational activities at multiple sites from a single location. The JOC may be the only management structure related to a threat, critical incident, or special event.
event, or it may integrate into other management structures in accordance with the NRP.

- Law enforcement public safety functions, such as proactive patrol and traffic control, historically are managed through the Operations Section of the ICS. Criminal investigation and the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence are sensitive law enforcement operations that require a secure environment and well-defined organizational management structure. The JOC is designed to coordinate this specialized law enforcement investigative and intelligence activity. It provides mechanisms for controlling access to and dissemination of sensitive or classified information. Management of crisis information and intelligence is recognized under the NIMS as a sixth functional area within ICS. The structure of the JOC supports this functional area and enhances the overall management of critical incidents and special events.

- The NIMS provides the framework within which the ICS and JOC structures operate for a unified approach to domestic incident management.

- The JOC is composed of four main groups: the Command Group, the Operations Group, the Operations Support Group, and the Consequence Management Group.

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**Figure AF-2: Joint Operations Center**

* While the Operations Group and Operations Support Group remain components of the JOC when it is incorporated into the JFO, the JIC and Consequence Management Group will be merged into the appropriate JFO staff components, if established.
Command Group

- The Command Group of the JOC provides recommendations and advice to the FBI SAC regarding the development and implementation of strategic decisions to resolve the situation. It is responsible for approving the deployment and employment of law enforcement investigative and intelligence resources. The Command Group maintains its advisory role to the FBI SAC when the JOC becomes a section of the JFO for an Incident of National Significance. When a JFO is established in this situation, the FBI SAC becomes the SFLEO in the JFO Coordination Group. The Assistant SAC or an alternate senior FBI official leads the JOC Command Group once the SAC has transitioned to the JFO.

- The FBI representatives in the Command Group include the SAC, the Assistant SAC, and an executive-officer position known as the Crisis Management Coordinator (CMC). The SAC of the FBI Field Office in which the incident occurs is responsible for developing the overall strategy for managing Federal investigative law enforcement activities at the critical incident or special event and coordinating the implementation of that strategy with other agency decision makers and FBI Headquarters. The FBI SAC also is responsible for coordinating Federal law enforcement activities with other Federal incident management personnel during domestic critical incidents and special events. The CMC ensures that the strategy of the SAC is communicated to everyone in the JOC and that the JOC is staffed and equipped to effectively implement the strategy of the SAC. The CMC also ensures that information flows efficiently within the JOC and between the JOC and other command and control centers.

- The JOC Command Group includes senior officials with decision making authority from local, State, and Federal agencies, as appropriate, based upon the circumstances of the threat or incident. Consistent with the Unified Command concept, law enforcement investigative and intelligence strategies, tactics, and priorities are determined jointly within the JOC Command Group. Federal law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational decisions are made cooperatively to the extent possible, but the authority to make these decisions rests ultimately with the FBI SAC.

- Three specialized teams provide guidance and expertise directly to the Command Group. These teams are the Strategic Legal Team, the Joint Information Center Team, and the Domestic Emergency Support Team.

  - The Strategic Legal Team is composed of legal counsel from the FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the District or State’s Attorney’s Office. This team provides legal guidance to the Command Group concerning the strategies under consideration for resolution of the crisis.

  - The Joint Information Center (JIC) Team is integrated into the JFO when established. It is composed of the public affairs (media) officers from the participating local, State, and Federal public safety agencies. It manages information released to the public through a coordinated, unified approach. A separate media unit within the JOC Operations Support Group provides FBI-specific guidance and expertise to the FBI SAC and coordinates with the JIC to ensure the media strategy is consistent with the overall investigative strategy.

  - The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a specialized interagency team composed of subject-matter experts from the FBI, the DHS/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA), DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. It provides guidance to the FBI SAC concerning WMD threats and actual incidents.

**Operations Group**

- The Operations Group handles all investigative, intelligence, and operational functions related to the threat, critical incident, or special event.

- Each unit within the Operations Group provides expertise in a specific functional area that is important in the overall resolution of the incident.

- The units within the Operations Group are scalable and modular, and may be tailored to the specific threat, critical incident, or special event.

- The Operations Group normally consists of the Information Intake unit (formerly referred to as the Control unit), the Intelligence unit, the Investigations unit, and Field Operations units.

**Information Intake (or Control)**

- Information Intake is the central point for receiving all information that comes into the JOC. The purpose of Information Intake is to ensure that telephone calls, e-mail messages, fax reports, and other incoming information are assessed for relevance to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The information is checked to determine if it has been previously reported. It is prioritized and entered into the information management system. Through this filtering mechanism the Information Intake unit ensures that only current and relevant information is disseminated to the JOC.

- The Information Intake Coordinator is responsible for providing guidance and direction to all personnel within the Information Intake unit and coordinating the activities of the unit with all other units within the JOC. Personnel within the Information Intake unit are responsible for receiving incoming information, processing new information, routing followup information appropriately, and implementing procedures for tracking evidentiary material that is introduced into the command post.

**Intelligence**

- The Intelligence unit manages the collection, analysis, archiving, and dissemination of relevant and valid investigative and strategic intelligence. It fuses historical intelligence from a variety of sources with new intelligence specific to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Intelligence unit also disseminates intelligence products and situation reports to all JOC units, FBI Headquarters Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), and the JFO Coordination Group. This information is shared with the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and, as appropriate, other government agencies, consistent with operational security considerations.

- The Intelligence unit usually is divided into teams based on functional responsibility. Teams manage intelligence related to the crisis site or target, build intelligence portfolios and databases on significant elements related to the investigation (subjects, vehicles, and organizations), analyze and identify trends in activities related to the investigation (predictive and strategic intelligence), conduct liaison with outside members of the Intelligence Community, and prepare periodic briefings and reports.
concerning the status of the crisis or investigation. The Intelligence unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all intelligence related to the threat, crisis, or special event to enable the SAC to further develop and refine strategic objectives.

Investigations

- The Investigations unit provides oversight and direction to all investigative activity related to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Investigations unit implements the strategy of the SAC by directing the collection and management of investigative information. It is composed of investigative personnel from the agencies with specific jurisdiction or authority for investigating crimes related to the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Investigations Unit Coordinator is usually an FBI Supervisor who has responsibility for investigating the most significant substantive law violation.

- Teams within the Investigations unit review all incoming information to determine investigative value. The Investigations unit assigns, tracks, and reviews all investigative leads and documents the investigation in the appropriate case file(s). The case agents or primary investigators within the Investigations unit manage all evidence and information, and prepare it for court presentation, if appropriate. The case agents or primary investigators are assisted by analytical personnel to ensure that all investigative information is pursued to its logical conclusion. A Records Check Team within the Investigations unit reviews case files and databases to ensure that all items of investigative value are identified and evaluated. The Investigations unit is responsible for collecting and reviewing all reports of investigative activity to enable the SAC to further develop and refine strategic objectives.

Field Operations

- The Field Operations units are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel staffing these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized skill areas. Field Operations unit coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activity of the specialized units is consistent with and in support of the strategy of the SAC.

- Field Operations units may include representatives of tactical, negotiations, WMD/CBRNE, evidence response, surveillance, technical, or any other specialized unit deployed to the crisis site(s) or staged in readiness. The mission of these units is to provide the SAC with current information and specialized assistance in dealing with the threat, critical incident, or special event. Information is communicated between the JOC and the crisis site(s) through the Field Operations unit representatives in the JOC. This ensures that decision makers both in the JOC and in the forward areas maintain full situational awareness. The Field Operations units coordinate their activities within the JOC to ensure each is aware of the impact of their activities on the other field units.

- Local, State, and Federal law enforcement specialty units assigned to assist with field operations during the threat, incident, or special event coordinate their activities with the appropriate FBI Field Operations units through the JOC. Federal Government mission-specific units are designated to help the FBI maintain their respective chains of command and coordinate their activities through representation in the JOC. The JOC manages the activities of the specialized units at a strategic level. Activities at the individual or “tactical” level are managed at the crisis site(s) through forward command structures such as the Tactical Operations Center, Negotiations Operations Center, and Evidence Response Team Operations Center.
Operations Support Group

- The Operations Support Group units designated within the JOC are based upon the specific needs of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel who staff these units are subject-matter experts in a number of specialized areas. Operations Support Group unit coordinators are responsible for ensuring the activity of their units is consistent with and in support of the strategy of the SAC.

- Operations Support Group units can include administrative, logistics, legal, media, liaison, communications, and information management. The mission of these units is to support the investigative, intelligence, and operational functions of the JOC.

- The Administrative and Logistics units have responsibilities that are similar to the Finance and Logistics Sections in ICS. However, they are tasked with managing only the activities related to the law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and operational functions; they do not manage the administrative and logistics functions associated with the overall incident.

- The Legal and Media units support the investigative and intelligence operations of the JOC through the preparation of specific legal processes and management of media affairs. These units focus on specific objectives related to the investigation such as search warrants and press releases, and not the strategic overall objectives handled by the Strategic Legal Team and JIC that are attached to the Command Group.

- The Liaison unit is composed of representatives from outside agencies who assist the FBI with resolution of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The Liaison unit may include agencies without clear authority or jurisdiction over the threat, critical incident, or special event if they have a potential investigative interest. For example, law enforcement agencies that border affected jurisdictions may be represented in the JOC to maintain situational awareness of potential threats. Additional Liaison unit representatives may include fire department personnel, utility company workers, or engineering specialists.

- The Communications unit handles radio and telephone communications to support JOC operations. The Communications unit establishes communications networks within the JOC. It also establishes networks to facilitate timely and reliable information-sharing between the JOC and other command and control centers.

- The Information Technology unit is responsible for the JOC computer system operation within each unit and between units. Information technology specialists and facilitators assigned to this unit are responsible for ensuring the uninterrupted operation of the information management system used during JOC operations.

Consequence Management Group

- The JOC Consequence Management Group consists of representatives of agencies that provide consequence-focused expertise in support of law enforcement activities. The JOC does not manage consequence functions; rather, it ensures that law enforcement activities with emergency management implications are communicated and coordinated to appropriate personnel in a complete and timely manner.

- A DHS representative coordinates the actions of the JOC Consequence Management Group, and expedites activation of a Federal incident management response should it become necessary. FBI and DHS representatives screen threat/incident intelligence for
the Consequence Management Group. Representatives of the JOC Consequence Management Group monitor the law enforcement criminal investigation and may provide advice regarding decisions that impact the general public or critical infrastructure. This integration provides continuity should a Federal incident management response become necessary.

- Agencies comprising the Consequence Management Group may also have personnel assigned to other units within the JOC structure. Depending on the nature of the incident and required assets, additional teams assigned to support the FBI may be included under Other Specialized Units.

- Should the threat of a terrorist incident become imminent, the JOC Consequence Management Group may forward recommendations to the RRCC Director to initiate limited pre-deployment of assets under the Stafford Act.

- Requests for DOD assistance for law enforcement and criminal investigation during the incident come from the Attorney General to the Secretary of Defense through the DOD Executive Secretary. Once the Secretary approves the request, the order is transmitted either directly to the unit involved or through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI SAC informs the Principal Federal Official (PFO), if one has been designated, when requesting this additional assistance.

- The Consequence Management Group is established when a JOC is necessary but a JFO has not yet been activated, or the event has not reached the level of being considered an Incident of National Significance.

- Representatives in this group may move to appropriate positions in other sections of the JFO when one is established.

The Response

- Receipt of a terrorist threat may be through any source or medium and may be articulated or developed through intelligence sources. It is the responsibility of all local, State, and Federal agencies and departments to notify the FBI when such a threat is received. As explained below, the FBI evaluates the credibility of the terrorist threat and notifies the HSOC, NCTC, and other departments and agencies, as appropriate.

- Upon receipt of a threat of terrorism within the United States, the FBI conducts a formal threat credibility assessment in support of operations with assistance from select interagency experts. For a WMD or CBRNE threat, this assessment includes three perspectives:

  - Technical Feasibility: An assessment of the capacity of the threatening individual or organization to obtain or produce the material at issue;

  - Operational Practicability: An assessment of the feasibility of delivering or employing the material in the manner threatened; and

  - Behavioral Resolve: A psychological assessment of the likelihood that the subject(s) will carry out the threat, including a review of any written or verbal statement by the subject(s).

- A threat assessment is conducted to determine whether the potential threat is credible, and confirm whether WMD or CBRNE materials are involved in the developing
terrorist incident. Intelligence varies with each threat and impacts the level of the Federal response. If the threat is credible, the situation requires the tailoring of response actions to use Federal resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve the situation. The Federal response focuses on law enforcement/investigative actions taken in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is predominantly concerned with preventing and resolving the threat. In addition, contingency planning focuses on the response to potential consequences and the pre-positioning of tailored resources, as required. The threat increases in significance when the presence of a CBRNE device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or loss, is confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists. In this case, the threat has developed into a WMD or CBRNE terrorist situation requiring an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of Federal resources to augment State, local, and tribal authorities in lessening or averting the potential consequence of terrorist use or employment of WMD or CBRNE material. It should be noted that a threat assessment would also be conducted if an incident occurs without warning. In this case, the assessment is focused on criminal intent, the extent of the threat, and the likelihood of secondary devices or locations.

- The FBI manages a Terrorist Threat Warning System to ensure that vital information regarding terrorism reaches those in the U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement community responsible for countering terrorist threats. This information is coordinated with DHS and the NCTC, and is transmitted via secure teletype. Each message transmitted under this system is an alert, an advisory, or an assessment—an alert if the terrorist threat is credible and specific, an advisory if the threat is credible but general in both timing and target, or an assessment to impart facts and/or threat analysis concerning terrorism.

- Upon determination of a credible threat, FBI Headquarters activates its SIOC to coordinate and manage the national-level support to a terrorism incident. At this level, the SIOC generally mirrors the JOC structure operating in the field. The SIOC is staffed by liaison officers from other Federal agencies who coordinate with and provide assistance to the FBI. The SIOC serves as the focal point for law enforcement operations and maintains direct connectivity with the HSOC. The HSOC is notified immediately by the SIOC once a threat has been determined to be credible. In turn, this notification may result in activation of NRP components in coordination with the FBI.

- The FBI leads the criminal investigation related to the incident, and the SIOC is the focal point for all intelligence related to the investigative law enforcement response to the incident. Consistent with the NRP, affected Federal agencies operate headquarters-level emergency operations centers, as necessary. FBI Headquarters initiates appropriate liaison with other Federal agencies to activate their operations centers and provide liaison officers to the SIOC. In addition, FBI Headquarters initiates communications with the SAC of the responsible Field Office, apprising him/her of possible courses of action and discussing deployment of the DEST. The FBI SAC establishes initial operational priorities based upon the specific circumstances of the threat or incident. This information is then forwarded to FBI Headquarters to coordinate identification and deployment of appropriate resources.

- The JOC is established by the FBI under the operational control of the FBI SAC, and acts as the focal point for the field coordination of criminal investigation, law enforcement, and intelligence activities related to the threat or incident. When a PFO is designated for a terrorism incident, the FBI SAC provides full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support to the PFO, as appropriate and consistent with applicable authorities. The PFO (or an initial PFO designated by the Secretary of Homeland
Security) may elect to use the JOC as an initial operating facility for strategic management and identification of State, local, and tribal requirements and priorities, and coordination of the Federal response. The FBI SAC coordinates with the PFO, including providing incident information to the PFO as requested, coordinating the public communications strategy with the PFO, and approving Federal interagency communications for release to the public through the PFO. It is recognized, however, that in some cases it may be necessary for the FBI SAC to respond directly to media/public inquiries on investigative operations and matters affecting law enforcement operations, particularly during the early stages of the emergency response.

- The local FBI Field Office activates a Crisis Management Team to establish the JOC in the affected area, possibly collocated with an existing emergency operations facility. In locating the JOC, consideration is given to the possibility that the facility may have to accommodate other Federal incident management field activities including the JFO, the JIC, and other supporting teams. Additionally, the JOC is augmented by outside agencies, including representatives from the DEST (if deployed), who provide interagency technical expertise as well as interagency continuity during the transition from an FBI command post structure to the JOC structure.

- Based upon a credible threat assessment and a request by the SAC, the FBI Director and DHS Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security, may request authorization through the National Security Council to deploy the DEST to assist the SAC in mitigating the crisis situation. The DEST is a rapidly deployable, interagency team responsible for providing expert advice and support concerning the Federal Government’s capabilities in resolving the terrorist threat or incident. This includes law enforcement, criminal investigation, and emergency management assistance, technical and scientific advice, and contingency planning guidance tailored to situations involving chemical, biological, or nuclear/radiological weapons.

- Upon arrival at the FBI command post or JOC, the DEST may act as a stand-alone advisory team to the SAC providing recommended courses of action. Although it would be unusual, the DEST may be tasked to deploy before a JOC is established. The DEST may handle some of the specialized interagency functions of the JOC until the JOC is fully staffed. The DEST emergency management component merges into the Consequence Management Group in the JOC structure.

- Prior to an actual WMD or CBRNE incident, law enforcement, intelligence, and investigative activities generally have priority. When an incident results in the use of WMD or CBRNE material, rescue and life-safety activities generally have priority. Activities may overlap and/or run concurrently during the incident management, and are dependent on the threat and/or the strategies for responding to the incident.

- Upon determination that applicable law enforcement/intelligence goals and objectives are met and no further immediate threat exists, the FBI SAC may deactivate the JOC and order a return to routine law enforcement/investigative operations in accordance with pre-event protocols.

- When an incident occurs and an ICP is established on-scene, FBI personnel integrate into the ICP to enhance the ability of the FBI to carry out its mandated mission (see Figure 3). Three specific positions within an ICP are provided. The first FBI Special Agent (SA) or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) member responding receives an initial briefing from the Incident Commander or his/her designee and works closely...
with the Incident Commander as a member of the Unified Command. The FBI representative then informs the local Field Office of the current situation and, if necessary, requests additional assets. When a more senior FBI SA arrives on the scene, he/she assumes the role of the FBI representative in the Unified Command.

- The first arriving SA or JTTF member moves to the Operations Section as the Deputy Chief of Operations. This position is responsible for managing the deployment and coordination of Federal law enforcement and investigative assets in support of the Incident Action Plan. Additionally, an FBI SA assumes the position of Deputy Chief of Planning within the ICP. This position permits the FBI SA to remain updated on the situation and serve as a conduit for requests for additional law enforcement and investigative assets. The Agent also inputs Federal objectives into the developing incident action plan and performs other duties as appropriate. Also, FBI assets form a unit in the Operations Section. Throughout the incident, the actions and activities of the Unified Command at the incident scene and the Command Group of the JOC (and the JFO Coordination Group if established) are continuously and completely coordinated throughout the incident.

**Figure AF-3: On-scene coordination**

Note: Operational control of assets Unified at the scene is retained by the Command designated officials representing the agency (local, State, or Federal) (Police, Fire, EMS, FBI) providing the assets.
Appendix G

Media

General

Media requirements are no longer a sporadic event that is handled only by the public affairs officer (PAO). Mass communications run 24 hours a day and need updated information. Reporters under pressure to fill that time will report anything, including rumors and speculation, in order to relieve the pressure. Commanders and staff need to learn how to “feed the beast” with your story and outlook. You can use the media to not only see the real situation, but also to pass on information that will help the public; i.e. road closures, evacuation routes, nongovernmental organization (NGO) support sites, requests for support, etc. In a crisis, the commander is the person to be out front, not the PAO. The PAO can prepare the commander for the interviews and news conferences, but the commander needs to be the face and voice in front of the cameras and behind the microphone.

- **Access to your operations.** Commanders will have to decide how much to involve the media in the operation. Giving a reporter free run of a tactical operations center (TOC) may seem extreme but may be a viable course of action depending on the situation. Some commanders have opted to travel with reporters so they could get first-hand information and simultaneously see that the message is not changing with the audience. Prepared press releases provided to a pool of journalists with no direct access to a commander will be viewed as an attempt to whitewash facts and put a positive spin on a bad situation, regardless of the validity of the press release.

- **Terminology and media relations.** Words have power, as well as different meanings to different people. Military terminology must be “translated” so that civilians can understand the message presented. For example, the word “intelligence” has specific meanings to the military that will be misconstrued by a suspicious populace concerned with maintaining their civil rights. Collection of intelligence by the military on citizens is illegal. Some military leaders have chosen to substitute the word “information” for “intelligence” to clarify their activities with the media.

- **Importance of the PAO.** The PAO is instrumental to mission accomplishment in disaster relief operations. As such, this position must be manned with a trained leader, staffed with experienced noncommissioned officer (NCOs) and supported with transportation and communications assets.

**Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)**

All commanders will designate a spokesperson to release information pertaining to their command. Some units are authorized public affairs (PA) modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions and those that are not authorized these positions have to appoint a PAO as an additional duty. MTOE PA positions that are not resourced when the deployment warning order is received should be identified and filled through cross-leveling before deploying.

As apart of a joint task force (JTF) performing civil support, the military PA activities are subject to approval of the lead federal agency (LFA).

- PAOs operate in an interagency environment, with emphasis on cooperation, coordination, and unity of effort.
• The LFA has release authority, and unit PAOs must coordinate all PA activities with the LFA and comply with its PA guidance.

Natural disasters are intensely covered by the media.

• Conduct a pre-deployment media briefing to unit members both assigned and attached. The main points of the briefing should include:

  ° Every Soldier is a representative of the US Army.

  ° Operations security (OPSEC). Even though you are on a domestic, disaster relief mission, the unit and its members could still be object of collection actions by an adversary.

  ° State their mission. Give a clear concise statement as to what they are going to do, why they are there.

  ° Talk to the media in a positive manner.

    * You do not have to answer every question, but do not say “no comment.”

    * Express the importance of the missions, your commitment and mission successes.

    * Do not speculate. If you do not know the answer to a question, say so.

    * Stay in your lane. Discuss only those items that pertain to your particular area of expertise.

Commanders should use their PAOs to keep both the Soldiers and their families informed of the units’ missions and accomplishments.

Combat camera teams are good to have, but their main purpose is historical documentation, not public affairs. Commanders and PAOs at all levels should attempt to have personnel trained in the use of the Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS). The DVIDS links media to deployed units; maintains a searchable archive of video, photo, and print products; and provides an additional link for the Soldiers with their families.

If your unit is the senior U.S. Army unit or is designated as the JTF headquarters request a public affairs detachment (PAD to coordinate your PA.

PADs are trained in:

• Producing news items for both print and broadcast.

• Managing and accrediting civilian media.

• Setting up and moderating a press conference.

Tips when being interviewed:

• Talk to the interviewer, not the camera.
• Be relaxed, confident, and professional.

• Be aware than some military terms may have very different meanings to civilians

• Avoid acronyms or profanity.

• Do not argue with the reporter. Be firm and polite and do not get emotional.

• Deal in facts. Avoid speculation and hypothetical questions, discuss areas you have knowledge of, it is all right to say “I do not know.”

• The commander’s packing list should include makeup matching his skin tone. Applying the makeup before an interview will keep him from sweating under hot camera lights and he will come across as more confident on the television.
Appendix H

First Responder Categories and Capabilities

Definition:

Definition of “First Responder” as outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8:

2) Definitions: d) The term ‘first responder’ refers to those individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.

First Responders Awareness Level Guidelines:

Law enforcement

- **Awareness level:** Address training requirements for law enforcement personnel who are likely to witness or discover an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of weapons of mass destruction or who may be sent out to initially investigate the report of such an event. Generally, all actions to be taken by these personnel should be conducted from within the cold zone. If personnel find themselves in the warm or hot zone, they are to move from that zone and encourage others, if ambulatory, to move to a staging area away from the immediate threat. They should attempt to minimize further contamination.

- **Awareness level guidelines for law enforcement officers:**
  - Recognize hazardous materials incidents.
  - Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents or materials.
  - Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.
  - Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.
  - Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous material events.
  - Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information collected at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel.
Fire fighters

- **Awareness level:** Address training requirements for fire fighters who are likely to witness or discover an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or who may be sent out to initially investigate the report of such an event. Generally, all actions to be taken by these personnel should be conducted from within the cold zone. If personnel find themselves in the warm or hot zone, they are to move from that zone and encourage others, if ambulatory, to move to a staging area away from the immediate threat.

  - Recognize hazardous materials incidents.

  - Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of WMD agents or materials.

  - Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.

  - Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

  - Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous material events.

  - Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information collected at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel.

Emergency medical service (EMS) providers

- **Awareness level:** Address training requirements for EMS providers who are likely to respond to or discover an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of weapons of mass destruction or who may be sent out to initially investigate the report of such an event. Generally, all actions to be taken by these personnel should be conducted from within the cold zone. If personnel find themselves in the warm or hot zone, they are to move from that zone and encourage others, if ambulatory, to move to a staging area away from the immediate threat. They should attempt to minimize further contamination. It is assumed that the EMS provider at the awareness level does not have emergency response supplies with him/her when arriving at the potential WMD scene (unless dispatched). The EMS provider that is anticipated to be covered by these guidelines would be trained in first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) using the Red Cross Community First Aid Course or equivalent, up to and including paramedic trained personnel and emergency physicians.

  - Recognize hazardous materials incidents.

  - Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of WMD agents or materials.

  - Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.

  - Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.
• Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous material events.

• Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information collected at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel. Know how to characterize a WMD event and be able to identify available response assets within the affected jurisdiction(s).

Emergency management personnel

• **Awareness level:** Address training requirements for emergency management personnel who are likely to witness or discover an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of weapons of mass destruction or who may be sent out to initially investigate the report of such an event. Generally, all actions to be taken by these personnel should be conducted from within the cold zone. If personnel find themselves in the warm or hot zone, they are to move from that zone and encourage others, if ambulatory, to move to a staging area away from the immediate threat.

  ° Recognize hazardous materials incidents.

  ° Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of WMD agents or materials.

  ° Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.

  ° Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

  ° Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous material events.

  ° Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information collected at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel.

Public works employees

• **Awareness level:** Address training requirements for public works employees who are likely to witness or discover an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of WMD or who may be sent out to initially investigate the report of such an event. This training should target all non-operational employees; line personnel and operations supervisors, including highway maintenance crews; planners, engineers, and lab technicians; and superintendents. This training also is appropriate for agency directors employed by public works facilities associated with a local community, including a public works facility such as wastewater treatment or water operations covered by the emergency response plan. Generally, all actions to be taken by these personnel should be conducted from within the cold zone. If personnel find themselves in the warm or hot zone, they are to move from that zone and encourage others, if ambulatory, to move to a staging area away from the immediate threat.

  ° Recognize hazardous materials incidents.
Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of WMD agents or materials.

Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.

Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

Know and follow agency/organization’s scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous material events.

Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information collected at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel.

First Responders Performance Level Guidelines

Law enforcement

• **Performance level:** This level is divided into two parts with a separate set of training guidelines for each part. The training guidelines for the law enforcement officer at the performance level target officers who will likely be responding to the scene of a hazardous materials event or a potential terrorist criminal use of WMD event. These officers will conduct on-scene operations within the warm zone and/or the hot zone (if properly trained and equipped) that has been set up on the scene of a potential WMD or hazardous materials event to control and close out the incident. It is expected that those officers trained for Performance Level A will work in the warm zone and cold zone and support those officers working in the hot zone. Officers trained for Performance Level B will work in the hot zone, and in the other zones set up on the incident scene as needed.

• **Performance Level A (operations level) guidelines for law enforcement officers:**

  ° Have successfully completed adequate and proper training at the awareness level for events involving hazardous materials and for WMD and other specialized training.

  ° Know the Incident Command System and be able to follow Unified Command System procedures for the integration and implementation of each system. Know how the systems integrate and support the incident. Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementation of the Unified Command System if needed.

  ° Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

  ° Know and follow procedures for working at the scene of a potential WMD event.
• **Performance Level B (technician level) guidelines for law enforcement officers:**

  • Have successfully completed training at the Awareness Level and Performance Level A for events involving hazardous materials, and for WMD and other specialized training.

  • Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

  • Know and follow procedures for performing specialized work at the scene of a potential WMD event.

  • Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the two systems are to work together.

**Fire service**

• **Performance level:** This level is divided into two parts with a separate set of training guidelines for each part. The training guidelines for fire fighters at the performance level target fire fighters who will likely be responding to the scene of a hazardous materials event or a potential terrorist/criminal use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. These fire fighters will conduct on-scene operations within the warm zone and/or the hot zone (if properly trained and equipped) that has been set up on the scene of a potential WMD or hazardous materials event to control and close out the incident. It is expected that fire fighters trained for Performance Level A will work in the warm zone and cold zone and support those fire fighters working in the hot zone. Fire fighters trained for Performance Level B will work in the hot zone, and in the other zones set up on the incident scene as needed.

• **Performance Level A (operations level) guidelines for fire fighters:**

  • Have successfully completed adequate and proper training at the awareness level for events involving hazardous materials and for WMD and other specialized training.

  • Know the Incident Command System and be able to follow Unified Command System procedures for the integration and implementation of each system. Know how the systems integrate and support the incident. Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementation of the Unified Command System if needed.

  • Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

  • Know and follow procedures for working at the scene of a potential WMD event.

• **Performance Level B (technical level) guidelines for fire fighters:**

  • Have successfully completed training at the Awareness Level and Performance Level A for events involving hazardous materials, and for WMD and other specialized training.
Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

Know and follow procedures for performing specialized work at the scene of a potential WMD event.

Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the two systems are to work together.

EMS

- **Performance level**: This level is divided into two parts with a separate set of training guidelines for each part. The training guidelines for EMS providers at the performance level target personnel who will likely be responding to the scene of a hazardous materials event or a potential terrorist/criminal use of WMD event. These EMS responders will conduct on-scene operations within the warm zone and cold zone that have been set up on the scene of a potential WMD or hazardous materials event. They are expected to provide emergency medical assistance and treatment to the victims and support those involved in the control and mitigation of the on-scene hazards and to assist in bringing the incident to a successful conclusion. EMS responders trained for Performance Level A will work in the warm and cold zones and support the other emergency responders in any of the three zones. EMS responders trained for Performance Level B will supervise or serve as team leaders for EMS groups given various assignments by the incident commander or incident management team under the unified command system. Performance Level B EMS responders will work in the warm and cold zones, but they will have some special training in rescuing or assisting in rescuing victims in the hot zone. Hot zone rescue efforts will be coordinated with the fire service and hazardous material (HAZMAT) responders.

- **Performance Level A (operations level) guidelines for EMS responders**:
  - Have successfully completed adequate and proper training at the awareness level for events involving hazardous materials, and for WMD and other specialized training.
  - Know the Incident Command System and be able to follow Unified Command System procedures for the integration and implementation of each system. Know how the systems integrate and support the incident. Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementation of the Unified Command System if needed.
  - Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.
  - Know and follow procedures for working at the scene of a potential WMD event.
Performance Level B (technical level) guidelines for fire fighters:

- Have successfully completed training at the Awareness Level and Performance Level A for events involving hazardous materials, and for WMD and other specialized training.

- Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

- Know and follow procedures for performing specialized work at the scene of a potential WMD event.

- Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the two systems are to work together.

Hazardous materials

Performance level: This performance level will be a single tier of training guidelines for HAZMAT emergency responders. These guidelines at the performance level target those emergency responders who will be responding to the scene of a HAZMAT or potential terrorist/criminal use of WMD event. These HAZMAT responders will conduct on-scene operations within the hot and warm zones that have been established at the scene of a potential WMD or HAZMAT event. These personnel may also work in the cold zone as needed. These HAZMAT responders will likely be involved controlling and mitigating hazards found on the scene and in bringing the incident to a successful conclusion under the direction of an operations officer and the on-scene incident commander.

Performance Level A (operations level) guidelines for HAZMAT responders:

- Have successfully completed adequate and proper training at the awareness level for events involving HAZMAT, and for WMD and other specialized training.

- Know the Incident Command System and be able to follow Unified Command System procedures for the integration and implementation of each system. Know how the systems integrate and support the incident. Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementation of the Unified Command System if needed.

- Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

- Know and follow procedures for working at the scene of a potential WMD event.

Performance Level B (technical level) guidelines for HAZMAT responder:

- Have successfully completed training at the Awareness Level and Performance Level A for events involving HAZMAT and for WMD and other specialized training.
° Know and follow self-protection measures and rescue and evacuation procedures for WMD events.

° Know and follow procedures for performing specialized work at the scene of a potential WMD event.

° Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the two systems are to work together.

Public works

• **Performance level:** This performance level addresses training requirements for all non-operational employees; line personnel and operations supervisors; planners, engineers, and lab technicians; and superintendent / agency directors employed by public works facilities. These personnel will be involved in a community response to a WMD incident, particularly an incident affecting wastewater treatment or water operations, which may represent WMD targets. It is assumed that non-public works personnel will comprise emergency responders. Therefore, training requirements associated with any Federal or State contingency planning and preparedness requirements for responding to such an incident are not considered.

• **Performance Level A (operations level) guidelines for public works personnel:**

  ° General line operations personnel and supervisors. Have successfully completed additional training beyond awareness level to be able to provide skilled support services in the event of a WMD attack targeting a public works facility.

  ° Planners, engineers, and lab technicians. Have successfully completed additional training to effectively respond to a WMD incident either within a public works facility or within the community.

Planning And Management Level Guidelines

Law enforcement

• **Planning and management level:** Address training requirements for law enforcement officials who are expected to be part of the leadership and management team that likely will respond to an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of WMD. At the very least, law enforcement managers will be involved in onsite planning for and managing scene security services. They will help set up the crime scene investigation and evidence gathering that will be coordinated with the command post at the scene. These personnel are expected to manage onsite law enforcement resources and assist the incident commander in bringing the event to a successful conclusion. Generally, all of the actions to be taken by these law enforcement managers should be conducted from within the cold zone. As access is provided to law enforcement officers to conduct their potential crime scene investigation, there may be times for the law enforcement managers to come within the warm zone. It is expected that law enforcement managers will be integrated into the overall command structure that is implemented for the management and supervision of resources and assets being deployed to mitigate and recover from the overall WMD emergency event.
Planning and management level guidelines for law enforcement managers:

- Have successfully completed training in awareness, performance, and management levels for events involving hazardous materials and for WMD.

- Know Incident Command System and the Unified Command System’s procedures and the steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the systems are integrated and implemented to work together and what information the on-scene manager needs from the law enforcement manager. Be familiar with the full range of incident command functions and be able to fulfill any functions related to law enforcement operations.

- Know protocols to secure and retain control of the emergency scene and to allow only authorized persons involved with the emergency incident to gain access to the scene of WMD agents and/or hazardous materials.

- Know and follow self-protection measures and protective measures for personnel on the scene of WMD events and hazardous materials events.

- Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

- Know plans and assets available for the crime scene investigation and control of WMD and HAZMAT events to secure and retain evidence removed from the scene.

Fire service

Planning and management level: Address training requirements for fire department senior officers who are expected to be part of the leadership and management team that likely will respond to an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of WMD. Fire department senior officers will be involved in planning for and managing the emergency on-site scene and will help implement the on-scene command post. These officers are expected to manage fire fighters and other allied emergency responders, who will support the ongoing operations to mitigate and control the hazardous agents and materials, using any available resources to safely and sufficiently conclude the event. Generally, actions to be taken by fire department senior officers should be conducted from the cold zone (sometimes from the warm zone). It is expected that fire service managers will be integrated into the overall command structure that is implemented for the management and supervision of resources and assets being deployed to mitigate and recover from the overall WMD emergency event.

Planning and management level guidelines for fire department senior officers:

- Have successfully completed training in awareness, performance, and management levels for events involving HAZMAT and for WMD.

- Know Incident Command System and the Unified Command System’s procedures and the steps required for implementation of each system. Understand how the systems are integrated and implemented to work together and what information the on-scene manager needs from the fire department manager. Be familiar with the full range of incident command functions, and be able to fulfill any functions related to fire department operations.
Know protocols to secure, mitigate, and remove hazardous agents or materials that may be WMD agents or materials.

Know and follow self-protection and protective measures for emergency responders to WMD and HAZMAT events.

Understand development of the Incident Action Plan and know assets available for controlling WMD and HAZMAT events, in coordination with the on-scene incident commander. In collaboration with the on-scene incident commander, be able to assist in planning and in determining operational goals and objectives to bring the event to a successful conclusion.

Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

Know and follow department protocols for medical monitoring of response personnel involved with or working at WMD and HAZMAT events.

EMS

• **Planning and management level**: Address training requirements for emergency providers who will be part of the leadership and management of the emergency medical team likely to respond to an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of WMD. These emergency medical managers will be involved in planning for and managing on-site emergency medical services (EMS). They also will help set up the command post at the scene. These personnel are expected to manage emergency medical resources used to successfully conclude the event. Generally, all of the actions to be taken by these emergency medical team managers should be conducted from within the cold zone (and at times from within the warm zone). It is expected that the emergency medical team managers will be integrated into the overall command structure set up for management and supervision of resources and assets deployed to control and conclude the overall WMD or HAZMAT emergency event.

• **Planning and management level guidelines for emergency medical providers team managers:**

  ° Have successfully completed training in awareness, performance, and management levels for events involving HAZMAT and for WMD.

  ° Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and requirements for implementing each system. Understand how the systems are implemented and integrated. Know what information the on-scene incident commander will need from the EMS manager.

  ° Know and follow protocols to provide emergency medical treatment to persons involved in a potential or actual WMD event.

  ° Know and follow self-protection and protective measures for victims of WMD events and HAZMAT events. Understand the special hazards to humans from WMD agents and hazardous materials.

  ° Know the plans and assets available for transporting the victims of WMD and hazardous materials events to more advanced medical care at hospitals and
similar facilities. Be familiar with the department emergency plan criteria for
transporting victims to more advanced medical care facilities.

° Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

° Know and follow department protocols for medical monitoring of response
personnel involved or working with WMD and HAZMAT events.

HAZMAT

• Planning and management level: Address training requirements for HAZMAT team
managers who will be part of the leadership and management of the emergency
response team likely to respond to an event involving the terrorist/criminal use of
WMD. These personnel will be involved in planning and managing the onsite scene
involving the hot and warm zones. They will help set up the on-scene command post.
HAZMAT team managers are expected to supervise staff who will attempt to mitigate
and control the hazardous agents and materials. They are expected to use all available
resources to bring the event to a successful conclusion. Generally, all of the actions to
be taken by HAZMAT team managers should be conducted from within the warm
zone or out to the cold zone. It is important that HAZMAT team managers are
integrated into the overall command structure set up for management and supervision
of resources and assets being deployed to control and conclude the WMD emergency
event.

• Planning and management level guidelines for HAZMAT team managers:
  ° Have successfully completed training in awareness, performance, and
management levels for events involving HAZMAT and WMD agents.

° Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System
procedures and requirements for implementing each system. Understand how
the systems are implemented and integrated. Know what information the
on-scene incident commander will need from the HAZMAT team manager. Be
familiar with the full range of incident command functions and be able to fulfill
any function pertaining to HAZMAT team operations.

° Know and follow protocols and procedures to secure, mitigate, and remove
hazardous materials or potential WMD agents.

° Know and follow self-protection and protective measures for emergency
responders to WMD events and hazardous materials events. Be aware of the
special hazards to humans from WMD agents and hazardous materials.

° Know how to develop an incident action plan. Coordinate with the on-scene
incident commander assets available for controlling WMD and hazardous
materials events.

° Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene. Understand
the roles and jurisdiction of federal agencies in a WMD event.

° Know and follow department protocols for medical monitoring of response
personnel involved with or working onsite at WMD and HAZMAT events,
including response team members involved with or working within the hot and warm control zones or personnel involved in onsite decontamination.

Emergency management

• **Planning and management level**: Address training requirements for emergency management personnel who will be part of the leadership and management team expected to respond to an event involving the terrorist criminal use of WMD. These emergency management directors/coordinators/team managers will be involved in preparing plans for mobilizing and coordinating the resources and assets needed for managing emergency operations and for providing onsite technical assistance when needed. These personnel will assist in planning implementation of the incident command structure, staffing of the satellite or headquarters emergency operations center, and establishing the command post or mobile command unit at the scene. These personnel are expected to work in a coordinated manner with the on-scene incident commander or unified command team to manage the emergency management resources required for bringing the event to a successful conclusion. Generally, many of the activities conducted by the emergency management team will be away from the immediate emergency incident scene, but require staying in communication with those at the scene. All of the actions to be taken by these emergency management team managers are expected to be conducted from within the cold zone. It is expected that the emergency management team managers will be part of the overall response, but will not be part of the on scene incident command structure as called for in the emergency response preplan or the emergency operations plan document. However, the emergency manager is responsible for developing, testing, exercising, and revising the preplan or emergency operations plan established for coordinating management and supervision of the resources and assets that will be needed to control and successfully conclude the overall WMD emergency event.

• **Planning and management level guidelines for emergency management agency’s emergency managers:**

  ° Have successfully completed appropriate and qualified training at the awareness and management levels for events involving HAZMAT and for WMD.

  ° Know and follow Incident Command System and Unified Command System procedures and requirements for implementing each system. Understand how the systems are implemented and integrated. Recognize when it is appropriate for the Unified Command System to evolve from the Incident Command System. Know what information the on-scene incident commander will need from the emergency management agency emergency operations center. Be familiar with the full range of coordinating activities and duties of the emergency management agency and all incident command functions. Assist those persons who will be fulfilling functions related to the emergency operations plan.

  ° Know how to develop an Incident Action Plan and identify assets available for controlling WMD and HAZMAT events. Coordinate these activities with the on-scene incident commander. Be familiar with steps to take to assist in planning operational goals and objectives that are to be followed on site in cooperation with the on-scene incident commander.
Know and follow self-protection and protective measures for the public and for emergency responders to WMD events and hazardous materials events.

Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.

Know how to interface with and integrate requisite emergency support services and resources among the emergency operations center (EOC) management and the incident or unified command on-scene incident management team. Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by and with the EOC in support of on-scene emergency response activities.

Public works

**Planning and management level:** Address training requirements for all public works supervisors, planners, engineers, and superintendent/agency directors employed by public works facilities associated with a local jurisdiction involved in planning for emergency response to a WMD incident including one at a public works facility. Public works facilities, such as wastewater treatment or drinking water operations or a nuclear power plant, may represent WMD targets within the local jurisdiction. Properly trained public works managers will improve the overall effectiveness of emergency planning and preparedness for response to an incident within the local jurisdiction. Typically, it is assumed that non-public works personnel will constitute the emergency response organizations or resources. If, however, an incident were to occur at a power plant or other public works plant, the employees of the particular plant likely would be the first responders in protecting their own personnel.

**Planning and management level guidelines for public works managers and supervisors:**

Know and follow self-protection and protective measures for the public and for public works emergency responders in WMD events and HAZMAT events.

Know and follow procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.
Know how to interface and integrate emergency support services and resources that will be needed (or are needed) among the EOC, the on-scene incident management team, and public works facilities and agencies. Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by public works with the EOC to support on-scene emergency response activities. See: [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/EmergencyRespGuidelinesRevB.pdf](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/EmergencyRespGuidelinesRevB.pdf)

**First Responders Resources**

**WMD civil support team (WMD-CST).** The WMD-CST was established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident commander in determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. They are joint units and, as such, can consist of both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel, with some of these units commanded by Air National Guard lieutenant colonels.

The mission of WMD-CST is to support local and state authorities at domestic WMD/nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with requests for additional military support.

The WMD-CMT are able to deploy rapidly, assist local first-responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets. They provide initial advice on what the agent may be and assist first responders in the detection assessment process. They are the first military responders on the ground, so that if additional federal resources are called into the situation they can serve as an advance party that can liaise with the joint task force civil support.

The units provide critical protection to the force, from the pre-deployment phase of an operation at home station through redeployment. They ensure that strategic national interests are protected against any enemy; foreign or domestic, attempting to employ chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, regardless the level of WMD/NBC threat. They are a key element of the DOD’s overall program to provide support to civil authorities in the event of an incident involving WMD in the United States.

They maintain the capability to mitigate the consequences of any WMD/NBC event, whether natural or man-made. They are experts in WMD effects and NBC defense operations.

These National Guard teams provide DOD’s unique expertise and capabilities to assist state governors in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents as part of a state’s emergency response structure. Each team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who are federally resourced, trained, and exercised and employs federally approved CBRN response doctrine.

The WMD-CST is not designed to replace the first responder. The team integrates into the Incident Command System (ICS) in support of the local incident commander, providing a crucial capability between the initial local response and that of follow-on federal and state assets. Municipal fire, HAZMAT, police, and EMS agencies have a proven capability to deal with most emergencies. Larger incidents use mutual aid plans and the ICS to cope with the emergency. However, a WMD attack would present unique obstacles, such as identification of a military agent or spread of contamination, that could quickly overwhelm existing local and state resources. The WMD-CST provides rapid detection and analysis of chemical, biological, and
radiological hazards agents at a WMD incident scene. The team is trained for CBRNE response and can provide advice on event mitigation, medical treatment, follow-on resources, and other response concerns to the incident commander.

- **WMD-CST key characteristics:**
  - Must be certified by Secretary of Defense
  - Unique to the National Guard
  - Main role is support to governor and incident commander
  - Operates only within the US Territory
  - Manned by Title 32 full-time (AGR) Army and Air National Guard personnel
  - Interoperable with civil responders

**CBRNE enhanced response force package (CERFP).** Another asset that the National Guard can bring in the near future is the CERFP. The NG CERFP consists of a core of full-time personnel augmented by traditional National Guard citizen-Soldiers and airmen. The NG CERFP concept combines existing Army and Air Force National Guard medical, engineer, and security forces to leverage current force structure into a capabilities-based force packages with some adjustments in organization and equipment.

The CERFP can perform mass medical decontamination, technical casualty search and extraction, and emergency medical treatment in hostile WMD operating environments.

Functioning as a robust follow-on team capability to the WMD-CST the NGCERFP is composed of five cells: command and control, security, medical, extraction and decontamination, and medical services. Much larger than the WMD-CST, the CERFP can operate for much longer durations. A CERFP typically consists of an enhanced division medical company with a decontamination and treatment capability and an enhanced engineer company. Currently the teams are being formed and not all teams are functional.
A complete WMD-CST listing with contact information follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Unit Designation/ Type of Team/ Certification Date</th>
<th>WMD-CST</th>
<th>FEMA Region</th>
<th>DOD Region/Army</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>46th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 46th WMD-CST P.O. Box 9038 Montgomery, AL 36108 Phone: (334) 954-3400 Fax: (334) 206-2454 Alabama JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (334) 271-7207 Installation: 3101 Tine Ave, Montgomery, AL 36108</td>
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<td>NORTHCOM RTF East</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALASKA</td>
<td>103rd WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 103rd WMD-CST PO Box 5800, Ft Richardson AK 99505-5800 Phone: (907) 384-9401/9402 Fax: (907) 384-9414 Alaska JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: 1-800-478-2337 Installation: Bryant Army Guard Heliport, Fort Richardson/Camp Denali (US Army)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>91st WM-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 91st WMD-CST 5636 E. McDowell Road Phoenix, AZ 85008-3495 Phone: (602) 267-2953 Fax: (602) 267-2679 Arizona JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (602) 267-2428 (DSN 853) Installation: Papago Park Military Reservation</td>
<td>IX</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>61st WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 61st WMD-CST</td>
<td>Camp Robinson, Box 35, North Little Rock, AR72199-9600</td>
<td>(501) 212-4264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>95th WMD-CST HEAVY/CERFP TEAM</td>
<td>Commander 95th WMD-CST</td>
<td>1525 W. Winton Ave, Building 9 Hayward, CA 94545-1310</td>
<td>(510) 780-0683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 9th WMD-CST</td>
<td>11302A Independence Dr. Los Alamitos (JFTB), CA 90720-5155</td>
<td>(562) 413-1516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>8th WMD-CST HEAVY/CERFP TEAM</td>
<td>Commander 8th WMD-CST</td>
<td>19070 E. Sunlight Way, Mail Stop 36 Buckley AFB, Aurora, CO 80011</td>
<td>(720) 847-6874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CONNECTICUT | 14th WMD-CST LIGHT | Commander 14th WMD-CST  
Army Aviation Support Facility #152  
Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096  
Phone: (860) 627-7942  
Fax: (860) 524-4836  
State HQ  
Connecticut JFHQ JOC  
Phone: (860) 524-4824  
Installation: AASF #152, Winsor Locks Connecticut | I | NORTHCOM |
| DELAWARE | 31st WMD-CST LIGHT | Commander, 31st WMD-CST  
103 Artisan Drive  
Smyrna, DE 19977  
Phone: (302) 326-7548  
Fax: Delaware WMD POC:  
Phone: (302) 326-7086  
Installation: Smyrna Readiness Center | III | NORTHCOM |
| DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA | 33rd WMD-CST LIGHT | Commander 33rd WMD-CST  
DCNG-CST,  
2001 East Capitol Street  
Washington, DC 20003  
Phone: (202) 685-9955  
Fax: (202) 685-8747 | III | NORTHCOM |
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<th>State</th>
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<th>Phone</th>
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<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>44th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 44th WMD-CST</td>
<td>Camp Blanding</td>
<td>Route 1, Box 465</td>
<td>Stark, FL 32091-9705</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Camp Blanding Training Site,</td>
<td>Building 5646</td>
<td>Phone: (904) 682-2400</td>
<td>Phone: (904) 823-0431</td>
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<td>Fax: (904) 682-3230</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>IV NorthCOM</td>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>4th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander 4th WMD-CST</td>
<td>956 Atlantic Ave.,</td>
<td>Building 553</td>
<td>Dobbins ARB, GA 30069</td>
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<td>Dobbins Air Reserve Base (USAFR)</td>
<td>Georgia JFHQ JOC</td>
<td>Fax: (678) 569-3704</td>
<td>Installation: Dobbins Air Reserve Base (USAFR)</td>
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<td>3949 Diamond Head Rd</td>
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<td>3551 W. Ellsworth St. Bldg.</td>
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<td>Phone: (208) 422-4282</td>
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<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>Commander, 5th WMD-CST 1301 N. MacArthur Blvd.</td>
<td>Springfield, Il. 62702-2399 309-697-3635 Fax: (309) 697-3868 JFHQ JOC 24-Hr Phone: (217) 761-3654 Installation: Bartonville Armed Forces Reserve Center</td>
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<td>5th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
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<td>Commander, 53rd WMD-CST 2002 S Holt Rd.</td>
<td>Indianapolis IN 46241-3949 Phone: (317) 247-3300x5050 Fax: (317) 247-3545 Indiana JFHQ WMD Contact: (317) 247-3204 Installation: Stout Field, Military Department of Indiana</td>
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<td>53rd WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
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<td>INDIANA</td>
<td>Commander, 71st WMD-CST 7700 NW Beaver Drive</td>
<td>Johnston, IA 50131-1902 Phone: (515) 334-2803/4/5/6/7/8 Fax: (515) 252-4930 Iowa JFHQ JOC 24-Hr Phone: (515) 249-0396 Installation: Des Moines ANG Base/Des Moines Int’l Aprt</td>
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<td>Commander, 73rd WMD-CST 5920 SE Coyote Dr,</td>
<td>Topeka, KS 66619 Phone: (785) 861-4124 Fax: (785) 861-4038 Kansas JFHQ JOC 24-Hr Phone: (785) 296-3176 or 1-800-905-7521 Installation: 190th ARW ANG Forbes Field Topeka KS</td>
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<td>KENTUCKY</td>
<td>41st WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 41st WMD-CST 1101 Grade Ln., BLDG 900 Louisville, KY 40213 Phone: (502) 364-9542 (DSN 741-4xxx) Fax: (502) 364-9562 Kentucky JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: 1-800-255-2587 Installation: Louisville Air Base/ANG Facility (KYANG)</td>
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<td>LOUISIANA</td>
<td>62nd WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 62nd WMD-CST 5445 Point Clair Rd, Bldg 34, Gillis Long CenterCarville, LA 70721 Phone: (225) 319-4779/4781 Fax: (225) 319-4699 Louisiana JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (504) 271-6262 Installation: Gillis Long Center (State of LA)</td>
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<td>MAINE</td>
<td>11th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 11th WMD-CST Colonel Lewis Millet Ready Building, 1 Armory Road Waterville ME 04901 Phone: (207) 877-9623/873-9591 Fax: (207) 872-0864 Maine JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (207) 441-4109 Installation: Colonel Lewis Millet Ready Building</td>
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<td>MARYLAND</td>
<td>32nd WMD-CST LIGHT</td>
<td>Commander, 32nd WMD-CST 610 Reistertown Road Pikesville, MD 21208 Phone: (410) 653-6732 Fax: (410) 653-6732 Maryland JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: TBA Installation: Pikesville Armory</td>
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<td>14 Minuteman Dr. Wellesley MA 02181</td>
<td>(508) 233-7575</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>51st WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 51st WMD-CST</td>
<td>2750 27th Street Augusta, MI 49012</td>
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<td>MN</td>
<td>55th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
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<td>612 Militia Dr. St Paul, MN 55111</td>
<td>(612) 713-2835/36/38</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>47th WMD-CST LIGHT</td>
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<td>609 North Jackson Street Crystal Springs, MS 39059</td>
<td>(601) 313-6193</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1260 Artillery Circle Ft. Leonard Wood, MO 65473 Phone: (573) 329-9024 Fax: (573) 329-9016 Missouri JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (573) 638-9500 Installation: Fort Leonard Wood, MOV</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
<td>83rd WMD-CST Light PO Box 4789 Fort Harrison, MT 59636-4789 Phone: (406) 324-3099 Fax: (406) 324-3676 Montana JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (406) 324-3170 Installation: Fort Harrison, MT</td>
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<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>72nd WMD-CST Light 1600 N 10th Street Lincoln, NE 68508 Phone: (402) 309-7559 Fax: None Nebraska JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (402) 309-7400 Installation:</td>
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<td>Nevada</td>
<td>92nd WMD-CST Light 4511 W. Cheyenne Ave. Suite 700 Las Vegas, NV 89032 Phone: (702) 643-4277 Fax: None Nevada WMD CST POC Phone: (775) 887-7891</td>
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<td>(603) 225-1374</td>
<td>(603) 225-1293</td>
<td>New Hampshire JFHQ JOC</td>
<td>(603) 227-1427</td>
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<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>21st WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 21st WMD-CST 6749 E. 16th St. &amp; Albany Ave, Fort Dix, New Jersey 08640</td>
<td>(609) 562-3036</td>
<td>(609) 562-3152</td>
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<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>64th WMD-CST HEAVY</td>
<td>Commander, 64th WMD-CST PO BOX 44190, Rio Rancho, NM 87174-4190</td>
<td>(505) 771-7802</td>
<td>(505) 771-7857</td>
<td>New Mexico JFHQ JOC</td>
<td>(505) 474-1960</td>
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NORTHCOM
<p>| NORTH DAKOTA | 81st WMD-CST LIGHT | Commander, 81st WMD-CST 4200 E Divide Bismarck ND 58506-5511 Phone: (701) 333-2900 Fax: (701) 333-3314 JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (701) 333-2906 | VII | NORTHCOM |
| OHOIO | 52nd WMD-CST HEAVY | Commander, 52nd WMD-CST 8202 South Access Road, Bldg. #946 Columbus, Ohio 43217-5946 Phone: (614) 336-6597 Fax: (614) 336-6635 Ohio JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: 1-888-889-7070/(614) 336-7070 Installation: Rickenbacker Intl Airport/Army Enclave (US Army) | V | NORTHCOM |
| OKLAHOMA | 63rd WMD-CST HEAVY | Commander, 63rd WMD-CST 3620 24th Ave NW Norman, OK 73069-8232 Phone: (405) 228-5880 Fax: (405) 321-6836 Oklahoma WMD CST JFHQ POC: (405) 228-5208 | VI | NORTHCOM |
| OREGON | 102nd WMD-CST LIGHT | Commander, 102nd WMD-CST 102ndCST, PO Box 14350 Salem, Oregon 97309 Phone: (503) 584-2345 Fax: None Oregon WMD CST JFHQ POC Phone: (503) 584-3603 Installation: Salem Oregon | X | NORTHCOM |</p>
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<td>Bldg 11-59 Fort Indiantown Gap Annville PA 17003</td>
<td>(717) 861-2623</td>
<td>(717) 861-2655</td>
<td>Pennsylvania JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (717) 861-8936 Installation: Fort Indiantown Gap (State of PA)</td>
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<td>PUERTO RICO</td>
<td>22nd WMD-CST LIGHT</td>
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<td>P.O. Box 34477 FT. Buchanan, PR, 00934</td>
<td>(787) 782-4280</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (787) 723-7700/7711 Installation: Fort Buchanan, PR 00934</td>
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<td>570 Read School House Rd Coventry RI, 02816</td>
<td>(401) 392-0821</td>
<td>(401) 392-0822</td>
<td>WMD CST JFHQ POC Phone: (401) 275-4123 Installation: Coventry, Air Guard Station</td>
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<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>Commander, 42nd WMD-CST LIGHT 851 Pine Ridge Drive West Columbia, SC 29172 Phone: (803) 806-3772/4336 Fax: (803) 806-2219 South Carolina JFHQ JOC 24-HR Phone: (803) 806-4200 Installation: Fort Jackson/McGrady Training Center (SCARNG)</td>
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<td>Commander, 82nd WMD-CST LIGHT 2823 W. Main Street, Bldg 509 Rapid City, SD 57702-8186 Phone: (312) 747-8971 Fax: None South Dakota JFHQ POC Phone: (605) 737-6693 Installation: Camp Rapid, Rapid City South Dakota</td>
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<td>Commander, 45th WMD-CST HEAVY VTS, BLDG 551; P.O. BOX 21 Smyrna, TN 37167 Phone: (615) 355-3618 Fax: (615) 355-3740 Tennessee JFHQ WMD CST POC Phone: (615) 313-3071 Installation: Volunteer Training Site, Smyrna, TN</td>
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<td>W905NX LTC Lionel A. Jackson Armory BLDG 1 Bethlehem Street St. Croix, VI 00850-9731</td>
<td>(340) 712-7946</td>
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<td>Phone: (304) 561-6210 Fax: (304) 561-6219 West Virginia JFHQ JOC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>24-HR Phone: (304) 561-6401 Installation: 610 Dame St. St. Albans, WV 25177</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>54th LIGHT</td>
<td>Commander, 54th WMD-CST 1420 Wright St Madison WI 53704</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (608) 245-8430 Fax: (608) 242-3196 Wisconsin JFHQ JOC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24-HR Phone: (608) 242-3537 Installation: State owned Armory</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
End Notes:

1 Cold zone: Represents the outer boundary of an emergency incident and an area of the least potential for contaminant exposure to workers and others. It is generally an area intended to act as a buffer to keep persons not involved in the response away from the incident at a safe distance.

2 Warm zone: Represents an area of less potential for contaminant exposure to workers and is the zone that contains the decontamination area. The decontamination activity is located on the upwind and upgrade side and extends from the hot zone to the cold zone. This area may also be used to support the responders with miscellaneous equipment needs such as changing air bottles and replacing worn or damaged PPE. Exiting from the hot zone will be accomplished by going through the decontamination steps.

3 Hot zone: Represents the area with the greatest degree of threat to individuals working in that area and requires the highest level of personal protection equipment. This area has to be clearly marked with banner tape or a satisfactory substitute to indicate to workers the high potential for exposure and thus the greatest level of personal protection.
Appendix I

Legal Considerations/Law Enforcement

Introduction

Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies has undergone significant growth in recent years, initially due to the U.S. war on drugs. However, this support is undergoing a transition in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 and more recently Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. The need for support to and coordination with state and local law enforcement agencies and the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased in association with a renewed domestic emphasis for Department of Defense (DOD) forces.

Disaster response efforts by military personnel and units within the United States are classified as “domestic support operations” (DSOs). DOD’s role in DSOs is well defined and is limited by law in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment, but do not replace, local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster response. The military frequently supports the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A presidential declaration of an emergency or disaster area usually precedes a DSO. Based on the limited scope of the military’s role, all service personnel should be aware of the legal considerations.

The Army National Guard (ARNG):

- **Federal mission.** The ARNG’s federal mission is to maintain well-trained, well-equipped units available for prompt mobilization during war and provide assistance during national emergencies (such as natural disasters or civil emergencies). The ARNG units (or any Reserve component forces) may be activated in a number of ways as prescribed by public law.

- **State mission.** When ARNG units are not mobilized or under federal control, they report to the governor of their respective state, territory (Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. Each of the 54 National Guard organizations is supervised by the Adjutant General of the state or territory.

- **Law enforcement mission.** ARNG units provide support to the incident commander in accordance with (IAW) state and local emergency response plans to assist in maintaining order, ensuring public safety, and providing assistance to law enforcement officials. Specific tasks and capabilities include:
  
  * **Access control.** The potential for mass panic following a major disaster/emergency incident could overwhelm hospitals without additional personnel to control facility access. Governors could augment law enforcement and hospital security personnel with National Guard troops to maintain efficient access control in the hospitals. Because arriving victims may be contaminated, the personnel assigned this function require both awareness level knowledge and training in performing security operations in personal protective equipment (PPE). The units assigned this responsibility need ready access to PPE which allows for rapid mobilization from a local armory to an incident site.
° **Site security.** Security forces must establish a cordon to prevent anyone from entering a contaminated area. Because this mission will be performed outside the contaminated area (hot zone) and National Guard units regularly perform this type of mission in other disaster situations, the only required training will be law enforcement awareness level training. This training teaches recognition of hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents; protocols used to detect the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents or materials; self-protection measures for WMD events and HAZMAT events; and protecting a potential crime scene.

° **Civil disturbances.** The potential for lawlessness and disorder will exist following any major disaster/emergency incident. Units designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need to have law enforcement awareness level training on disaster incidents.

° **Quarantine.** The National Guard could be called on to assist in quarantine implementation.

° **Evacuation.** National Guard units will be required to assist in any evacuation ordered by the local officials.

NOTE: It is critical that military staff officers and leaders have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the legalities and restrictions outlined in Title 10 and Title 32 that pertain to supporting law enforcement agencies. Refer to the Posse Comitatus Act discussion below for details.

The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)

In common law, posse comitatus (Latin, roughly translated as “to be able to be made into part of a retinue or force”) referred to the authority wielded by the county sheriff to deputize any able-bodied male over the age of fifteen to assist him in keeping the peace or to pursue and arrest a felon. It is the law enforcement equivalent of summoning the militia for military purposes. Congress passed the PCA in 1878 to end military occupation of the defeated southern states during the post-Civil War reconstruction period.

PCA is the primary statute restricting support to civilian law enforcement. It specifically states: Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a Posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both.

Remember that the PCA does not prohibit all military involvement with civilian law enforcement. A considerable amount of military participation with civilian law enforcement authorities is permissible, either as indirect support, or under one of the numerous PCA exceptions.

Permissible direct assistance

· **Military purpose doctrine.** Action taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. These actions include:

  ° Investigations and other actions related to the enforcement to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
● Investigations and other actions related to the commander’s inherent authority to maintain law and order on a military installation or facility.

● Protection of classified military information or equipment.

● Protection of DOD personnel, DOD equipment, and official guests of the DOD.

● Such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a military or foreign affairs purpose.

• **Emergency authority.** These actions are taken under the inherent right of the U.S. government as a sovereign national entity under the U.S. Constitution. Actions taken under this authority are intended to preserve public order and to carry out governmental operations within U.S. territorial limits. This authority will only be used under the guidance of DoD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) which states: Military forces shall not be used in MACDIS unless specifically authorized by the president, except in the following emergency circumstances:

  ○ When the use of military forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or destruction of property or to restore governmental functioning and public order. That “emergency authority” applies only when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances (including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity endangering life) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President.

  ○ When duly constituted state or local authorities are unable to provide adequate protection for federal property or federal government functions, federal action (including the use of military forces) is authorized, as necessary, to protect the federal property or functions.

  **NOTE:** Presidential approval is not a prerequisite to the use of military forces in these two limited circumstances. However, DOD officials and military commanders must use all available means to obtain Presidential authorization through their appropriate chains of command while applying emergency authority.

• **Insurrection statutes.** These statutes permit the President to use the armed forces to enforce the law when:

  ○ There is an insurrection within a state and the state legislature (or governor, if the legislature cannot be convened) requests assistance from the President.

  ○ A rebellion makes it impractical to enforce the federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings.

  ○ An insurrection or domestic violence opposes or obstructs federal law, or so hinders the enforcement of federal or state laws that residents of the state are deprived of their constitutional rights and the states are unable or unwilling to protect these rights.
• **Prohibited direct assistance.** Prohibition on the use of military personnel as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws prohibits the following forms of direct assistance:
  
  ° Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity
  
  ° Search or seizure
  
  ° Arrest, apprehension, and stop and frisk
  
  ° Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals or as undercover agents, informants, investigators or interrogators.

**To whom does the PCA apply?**

The PCA applies to members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as each of their respective Reserve components who are on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training. The PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard except during times of war when they fall under the command and control of the United States Navy (Title 14).

• Army National Guard personnel may be ordered to duty under one of the following three statutory frameworks:
  
  ° **Title 10 (United States Code).** Under Title 10 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded and under federal command and control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily (i.e., mobilization) under appropriate circumstances. **When Army National Guard forces are activated under Title 10, they are subject to the PCA, which prohibits them from law enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or law.**
  
  ° **Title 32 (United States Code).** Under Title 32 status, Army National Guard personnel are federally funded but under the control of the state. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel typically perform training for their federal mission. The federal government reimburses states for Guard units’ activities in response to federally designated disasters, such as hurricane response. **While in a Title 32 status members of the National Guard do not fall under PCA restrictions and may perform applicable law enforcement duties.**
  
  ° **State Active Duty (SAD) status.** Army National Guard personnel performing state missions are state funded and under state control. Under state law, a governor may order National Guard personnel to respond to emergencies, civil disturbances, or perform other duties authorized by state law. While the National Guard performs both federal and state missions, they are organized, trained, and equipped for federal missions, which take priority over state missions. **Army National Guard personnel on SAD status do not fall under PCA restrictions and may perform applicable law enforcement duties.**

• Civilian employees of the DOD are only subject to the prohibitions of the PCA if they are under the direct command and control of a military officer.
To what does the PCA apply?

Title 10, United States Code outlines the restrictions of the PCA as they apply to participation by the military in civilian law enforcement activities. These restrictions are divided into three major categories:

- **Use of information.** Intelligence sharing has taken on crucial importance since 9/11. Under Title 10 the Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum extent possible, take into account the needs of the civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing military training and operations. DoDD 5525.5 (Cooperation with Civilian Law enforcement Officials) implements that guidance with some additional restrictions. Military departments and defense agencies are generally encouraged to provide law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may be relevant to a criminal violation. While the Secretary of Defense shall take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing military training and operations in accordance with Title 10 above, the planning or creating of missions or training for the primary purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement officials is strictly prohibited.

- **Use of military equipment and supplies.** The loan or lease of military equipment is a difficult legal area. Each military service has implemented its own regulations in addition to DoDD 5525.5. Military departments and defense agencies may make equipment, base facilities, or research facilities available to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes as long as they are in compliance with applicable regulations, directives, and guidelines.

- **The use of military personnel.** Military departments and defense agencies may provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials. Such assistance may include training in the operation and maintenance of equipment made available. This does not permit large scale or elaborate training and does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise authorized.

Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials may be provided under the following guidance:

- Assistance shall be limited to situations when the use of non-DOD personnel would be unfeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and would not otherwise compromise national security or military preparedness concerns.

- Such assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct role in a law enforcement operation, except as otherwise authorized by law.

- Except as otherwise authorized by law, the performance of such assistance by DOD personnel shall be at a location where there is not a reasonable likelihood of a law enforcement confrontation.

- Military departments and defense agencies may provide expert advice to federal, state, or local law enforcement officials in accordance with Title 10. This does not permit regular or direct involvement of military personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise authorized.
Use of DOD personnel to operate or maintain or to assist in operating or maintaining equipment shall be limited to situations when the training of non-DOD personnel would be unfeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and would not otherwise compromise national security or military preparedness concerns.

The National Guard operates primarily under three different command and control relationships depending upon its status. These relationships are: (See Table A9-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Guard</th>
<th>Command and Control (C2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Active Duty (SAD - State Funded)</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 32 (USC) - Federally Funded</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10 (USC) - Federally Funded</td>
<td>President of the United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table AI-1: Homeland Security Joint Publication 3-26 (2 August 2005), Chapter 11, pp 12-13, paragraphs 1-2

Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

The RUF apply to domestic operations and are constrained or limited by federal, state, and local laws. There are no preexisting, overall, stand-alone rules for the use of force for domestic disaster relief. Staff officers and military leaders need to understand the legal, policy, and practical limitations for its use.

- **Role of the National Guard Judge Advocates (JAs).** RUF practice is an area in which the legal advice of the JAs is directly related to the safety and well-being of service personnel and civilians. There are variations between the states in the National Guard’s authority to take actions requiring RUF in a law enforcement, law enforcement support, or security operation. Some states by statute give the National Guard all the authority of peace officers. In other states, the National Guard has only those peace officer-type powers enjoyed by the population at large, such as "citizen's" arrest. Depending on the language of the state statutes involved, these grants or limitations on the National Guard’s authority to act as peace officers may apply to National Guard personnel conducting operations in a Title 32 status, SAD status, or both. Regardless, the National Guard JA must participate in the effort to tailor the RUF to the particular mission and policies of the state.

- **RUF guidance.** Commanders and their supporting judge advocate generals (JAGs) must pay particular attention to RUF guidance contained in the execute order (EXORD) or in any subsequent orders or directives. As a baseline, however, the Soldier’s inherent right to self-defense would apply.

- **Inherent right to self-defense.** A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend his unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or the demonstration of hostile
intent. Neither these rules nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules limit this inherent right and obligation.

- **Title 32 activation.** When activated under Title 32 USC, the use of force in state active-duty status will be governed by state law. As a condition on the use of federal property and equipment, NG personnel (in SAD status) will, at a minimum, comply with the following guidelines (unless state law is more restrictive, in which case they will comply with state law). The reference for these guidelines is FM 3-11.22, *Weapons of Mass Destruction, Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Appendix C10-C17.

  - The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with mission accomplishment.

  - The use of deadly force can be justified only by extreme necessity. It is authorized only when all three of the following circumstances are present:

    * Lesser means have been exhausted or are not available.

    * The risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by its use.

    * The purpose of its use is one or more of the following:

      > Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm, including the defense of other persons

      > Prevention of a crime that involves a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm (for example, dispersal of a hazardous substance in an inhabited dwelling or sniping).

      > Prevention of the destruction of property vital to public health and safety.

      > Detention or prevention of the escape of a person who, during the detention or on the act of escaping, presents a clear threat of loss of life or serious bodily harm to another person. Other state and local agencies, and perhaps non-federalized NG, are responsible for law enforcement functions, not federal troops.

- **Title 10 activation.** When activated under Title 10 USC, the use of force in federal active-duty status will be governed by DOD/federal directives.

- **Force options.** When force is necessary, use it according to the priorities of force and limit it to the minimum degree necessary. The application of any or all of the priorities of force or the application of a higher numbered priority without first employing a lower numbered one, depends on (and will be consistent with) the situation encountered. Only as a last resort, will deadly force be used and only as prescribed by the appropriate regulations and guidance. The priorities (in order) of force are:

  - Verbal persuasion.

  - Unarmed defense techniques.
° Chemical aerosol irritant projectors (subject to local restrictions).
° Use of physical force other than weapons fire (such as military dogs, military police (MP), clubs).
° Presentation of deadly force.
° Deadly force.

RUF are developed to assist Soldiers in determining the appropriate level of force that should be applied in a given situation. Commanders' authority to modify the RUF is limited to making them more restrictive.

• **Arming orders.** Arming orders provide a common standard of reference for the carrying weapons and munitions. They are developed based upon known information about the upcoming situation. Arming orders should address the employment of all available weapons, as well as less lethal munitions and riot control agents. Commanders are responsible for developing and enforcing arming orders. Table A9-2 describes examples of arming orders.

### ARMING ORDER MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMING ORDER</th>
<th>RIFLE</th>
<th>PISTOL</th>
<th>MAGAZINE</th>
<th>CHAMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>SLING</td>
<td>IN HOLSTER</td>
<td>AMMO POUCH</td>
<td>EMPTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-2</td>
<td>AT THE READY</td>
<td>IN HOLSTER</td>
<td>AMMO POUCH</td>
<td>EMPTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-3</td>
<td>AT THE READY</td>
<td>IN HOLSTER</td>
<td>IN WEAPON</td>
<td>EMPTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-4</td>
<td>AT THE READY</td>
<td>IN HAND</td>
<td>IN WEAPON</td>
<td>ROUND IN CHAMBER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1-2: OPLAN 05-007 (Santa Fe Southern Relief), Annex E, Rules for the Use of Force, Page E-2. (Note: LOCKED AND LOADED was replaced with ROUND IN CHAMBER for clarity)

• **RUF cards.** It is extremely important that leaders ensure that all Soldiers are trained and have a thorough knowledge of the RUF prior to deploying into the affected area. Figure A9-3 describes a RUF card which can be issued to Soldiers before deploying on a disaster response mission.
Note: This RUF card was developed by the National Guard for the National Guard. Title 10 RUF will differ based on the Posse Comitatus Act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE</th>
<th>RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANG maintains positive control of and final authority over weapons, tactics, degrees of force</td>
<td>The use of non-deadly force is authorized to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use only minimum force required</td>
<td>• Control disturbances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No excessive force permitted</td>
<td>• Prevent crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protect resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Arrest and detain (only on SAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deadly force is any force that can cause death or serious bodily harm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The discharge of any firearm is always considered deadly force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE</td>
<td>RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadly force is justified only:</td>
<td>Only use the minimum force necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In self defense and defense of others</td>
<td>• Verbal command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To prevent serious offenses against persons such as murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault</td>
<td>• Compliance techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have the right to use all reasonable necessary means available to:</td>
<td>• Defensive tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protect yourself</td>
<td>If possible before resorting to deadly force:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protect others</td>
<td>• No warning shots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Watch out for bystanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Do not unholster unless you have a reasonable expectation that deadly force may be necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aimed fire to render target incapable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure AI-3: OPLAN 05-007 (Santa Fe Southern Relief) Annex E, Rules for the Use of Force, Figure E-2-1.

Lessons Learned

The following excerpt is from a unit that supported the 2005 Gulf Coast disaster response efforts.

**Issue**: Legal annex and the rules for the use of force cards
Discussion: In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the unit recognized that they might be deployed. Therefore, the command group and JAs recognized the need to understand the RUF and prepare a legal annex and RUF cards. The Operations (Ops) Law attorney contacted the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) JAs, but no guidance was given. The Ops Law attorney then contacted the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) at 1st Army because it seemed that 1st Army was going to be tasked to coordinate this military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) mission. The OSJA prepared a legal annex and RUF card with timely assistance from the 1st Army OSJA; however, because 1st Cavalry Division (1CD) waited to receive a RUF card from the higher headquarters, their RUF cards were not printed until right before they deployed. JAs trained and distributed RUF cards to other units that were anticipated to be assigned a MACDIS mission.

Recommendation: Units must be prepared and have a standard legal annex and RUF card that comply with the provisions of the standing RUF. This pre-approved annex and card would be immediately accessible so that Soldiers could be trained and would understand the rules even if they had to deploy in 24 hours to support a MACA mission. This annex and card could be supplemented if the mission changed.

Preservation of Evidence

During a response to a domestic emergency/disaster, law enforcement actions to collect and preserve evidence are critical. These actions take place simultaneously with response operations that are necessary to save lives and protect property and are closely coordinated with the law enforcement effort to facilitate the collection of evidence without impacting on-going life-saving operations. While preservation of evidence is highly desirable, actions to recover and/or preserve evidence must not compromise personnel safety.

Conclusion

DOD support to civilian law enforcement agencies is a critical element of domestic disaster response. Prior to supporting civilian law enforcement agencies, military leaders must understand and ensure that their Soldiers understand the legal guidelines and restrictions placed on them. The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the use of the military in federal status and prevents it from executing laws and performing civilian law enforcement functions within the U.S. When National Guard personnel are serving under state status (Title 32 Status), the Posse Comitatus Act does not impose the same restrictions it would to the National Guard personnel serving under federal status (Title 10 Status).

All military personnel participating in a domestic support operation need to understand their status, whether federal or state, so they will better understand any restrictions placed on them for providing assistance to civilian law enforcement.

Units will have rules governing the rules for the use of force (which are the domestic counterpart to rules of engagement) during domestic support operations. Staff officers and leaders must ensure all personnel know and understand these rules to prevent an unwarranted use of force.

Each deploying unit will have a designated legal advisor and all leaders should know to contact their legal advisors for specific guidance on a case-by-case basis.
Appendix J

Operations Security (OPSEC) General

General Peter J. Schoomaker said “In the global war on terrorism, we face an insidious and adaptive adversary capable of gathering open source information on our operations and intentions. Do not provide him assistance through uncontrolled release of information that may compromise our own force protection. We are an Army at war and our Soldiers deserve the best Operations Security we can provide.”

Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security defines OPSEC as: The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.”

Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) defines OPSEC is an analytic process used to deny an adversary, information – generally unclassified – concerning our intentions and capabilities by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with our planning process or operations. OPSEC does not replace other security disciplines; it supplements them.

According to the definition in FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), OPSEC denies the adversary information critical to the success of friendly military operations. It contributes to the security of Army forces and their ability to surprise enemies and adversaries. OPSEC identifies routine activities that may telegraph friendly intentions, operations, capabilities, or military activities. It acts to suppress, conceal, control, or eliminate their indicators. OPSEC includes countersurveillance, signal security (SIGSEC), and information security (INFOSEC).

What is OPSEC?

- Continuous process
- Methodology for denying critical information
- Typically deals with unclassified or open source information.

General:

- OPSEC’s most important characteristic is that it is a process and not a collection of specific rules and instructions that can be applied to every operation.
- In command and control warfare (C2W), the threat to OPSEC is ultimately the adversary commander.

Planning:

- Joint OPSEC planning and execution occur as part of the commander’s or organization’s C2W effort.
- OPSEC should be one of the factors considered during the development and selection of friendly courses of action.
OPSEC, is a key component of antiterrorism and force protection. It helps protect service members, civilian employees, families, facilities, and equipment everywhere by denying information.

OPSEC Responsibilities:

Who is responsible for OPSEC? Army Regulation 530-1, OPSEC, Chapter 2, 2-19, states that it is everyone’s responsibility, not just the commander or security officer or security noncommissioned officer (NCO).

Operations security is serious business and everyone’s responsibility. Failure to properly implement OPSEC procedures can result in serious injury or death to personnel, damage to key equipment and logistics stockpiles, and/or loss of critical technologies. All Department of the Army (DA) personnel (active component, reserve component, DA civilians), and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors will:

• Be aware of and support the Army’s OPSEC program.
• Reinforce the vital importance of OPSEC at all times. OPSEC is a continuous process and an inherent part of military culture and, as such, must be fully integrated into the execution of all Army operations and support activities.
• Know what their organization considers to be sensitive and critical information.
• Protect from disclosure any and all sensitive and critical information to which they have personal access.
• Be aware of the vulnerabilities exposed as a result the disclosure of sensitive and critical information on the Internet. In particular, avoid disclosure of photos, destroyed or damaged equipment, and access to military facilities.
• Actively encourage others (including family members and family readiness groups) to protect sensitive and/or critical information.
• Consult with their immediate supervisor and their OPSEC program manager, prior to publishing or posting information that might contain sensitive and/or critical information in a public forum. This includes, but is not limited to letters, e-mail, Website postings, Web log (Blog) postings, discussion on Internet information forums, discussion on Internet message boards, or other forms of dissemination or documentation. Supervisors will advise personnel to ensure that sensitive and critical information is not disclosed. Each unit’s OPSEC representative will advise supervisors on means to prevent the disclosure of sensitive and critical information.
• Handle any attempt by unauthorized personnel to solicit sensitive information, critical information, or essential elements of friendly information as subversion and espionage directed against U.S. Army (SAEDA) incident in accordance with AR 381-12. Report all facts immediately to the nearest supporting counterintelligence office and inform the chain of command. If counterintelligence offices are not readily available, report such incidents to the organizational security manager and to the unit commander.

The OPSEC Process

The OPSEC process consists of five distinct actions:
Identification of critical information

Analysis of threats

Analysis of vulnerabilities

Assessment of risk

Application of appropriate OPSEC measures.

**Critical information**

In discussing Critical Information be aware of the different perspectives. Identify friendly objectives and strategies, and adversary’s objectives and strategies. Focus on:

- Information the adversary needs to prevent our success
- Information friendly forces must protect to ensure success

**Types of critical information:**

- Capabilities: Make up of task force, team or squads, personnel, and equipment.
- Intention: Operation plans (OPLANs), fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
- Place: Where is the unit traveling from, to, and what is the route?
- Time: What time does the unit leave arrive?
- Strength: What is unit manning?
- Technology: What communications and equipment does the unit possess?
- Tactics: What TTP does the unit use, have they been updated or changed (example improvised explosive device [IED] TTP)?
- Vulnerabilities: What are unit weaknesses (e.g., range and type of communications)?

**Factors to consider:**

- What is the mission or project?
- How long do I need to protect information?
- What does the adversary need to know?

**Analysis of Threats**

THREAT = INTENT + CAPABILITIES
Threat:

- Who are the potential adversaries?
  - Capabilities?
  - Intentions?
  - Knowledge?
- Where can they get the information?
- Potential adversaries:
  - Terrorist threat
    - Targets fit their priorities
    - Demonstrated intent to hurt the U.S.
    - Capable of collecting unprotected information
    - Capable of acting on information
  - Foreign intelligence threat
    - Military, economic, technology targets
    - Demonstrated intent to collect
    - Wide range in capability to collect and to act on information.
  - Domestic threats
    - Criminals
    - Organized crime
    - Domestic militia groups
    - Extremists groups and cults
    - Hackers and crackers
    - Insiders
    - Bloggers (Web loggers)
      - A blog is a personal diary.
      - A daily pulpit.
Intent:

Who has demonstrated their intent to harm the organization?

Capabilities:

- What are the capabilities of those that have demonstrated intent to do the unit harm?

- Collection methods: About 90% of all intelligence is gathered from open source information. The adversary doesn’t have to use legal means to obtain information.
  - Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
  - Internet (Web Pages, Blogs, and Chat Rooms)
  - People
  - Communications
  - Photography
  - Trash
  - Surveillance

Analyze Vulnerabilities

Address three areas to determine friendly vulnerabilities:

- Who are your adversaries?
- What are the capabilities of each?
- What are the intentions of each?

Examples of areas of vulnerabilities:

- Communications
- Public affairs department
- Critiques and after action reports
- Operating procedures
• Personnel
• Computers
• Physical environment

**Remember, the greatest vulnerability is yourself:**
• Blogs
• Web Pages
• Unprotected communications
• Email
• Sharing too much with strangers

**In summary remember this about vulnerabilities:**
• Every operation has vulnerabilities
• All indicators cannot be eliminated
• We are our greatest vulnerabilities

**Assessing Risk**

“Does the possible loss of information about my operation or activity warrant taking steps to reduce or (hopefully) negate the adversary’s potential efforts to thwart my operation or activity?”

RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY x IMPACT
• What is the significance of each threat?
• What is the significance of each vulnerability and indicator?
• What is the impact if the threat acted on the vulnerability or indicator?

The result is the level of risk.
Example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Awareness</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell Phone Use</td>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>MHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blog* Site</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>HI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary:

- Look at all vulnerabilities, indicators, and threats in light of each adversary.
- Impact answers the “so what” question.
- All three components must be present for there to be risk.

Apply Countermeasures

Countermeasures are the solutions that a leader employs to reduce risks to an acceptable level, whether by eliminating indicators or vulnerabilities, disrupting the effective collection of information, or by preventing the adversary from accurately interpreting the data.

Consider the threat analysis for the cell phone:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cell Phone Use</td>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>MHI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By applying a limiting use of cell phones you can reduce the risk to an acceptable level. You can restrict by person, by information available to be discussed, etc.

Remember, the bottom line is always weigh the cost versus the benefit of a countermeasure.

Consider the threat when you:

- Use the phone (Use secure communications).
- Answer stranger’s questions (Refer to public affairs officer (PAO)/designated representative)
• Discuss work in a public place (Stay alert)
• Remember to shred all paper
• Practice good security procedures (Stay alert to your surroundings)

OPSEC for Civil Support During Catastrophes

“The world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned that a threat that gathers on the other side of the earth can strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It’s an important lesson; one we can never forget. Oceans no longer protect America from the dangers of this world. We’re protected by daily vigilance at home. And we will be protected by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad.”

President George W. Bush
September 17, 2002

In responding to civil support catastrophe missions the military personnel will have to be integrated in with other civilian federal, state and local governmental agencies.

The following outline is provided for the OPSEC officer as a planning aid:

• Ensure that your predeployment checklist is available for implementation. This checklist should include, but is not limited to:
  ° What briefings need to be given (OPSEC update, media guide for Soldiers and family members)
    * Family members/support group briefing
    * Soldiers specific OPSEC briefing
  ° Schedule briefings on training schedule
  ° Have a checklist and load plan for what items need to be packed (e.g., lap top computers, pens, pencils, office supplies).
  ° What regulations, software, resources are needed?
  ° Update unit OPSEC operations standing operating procedures (SOP).

• Information that by regulation you will have in place and will need updated:
  ° Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to reflect current incident.
  ° Start up the OPSEC planning process to update plan with current intelligence.
  ° Ensure that OPSEC officer and NCO have been appointed and are aware of their responsibilities and duties and have met the qualification criteria.
• Personnel or teams that need to be appointed or requested
  ° Appoint or request Army PAO
  ° Request a PAO team
  ° Establish a OPSEC workgroup team that is headed by the OPSEC officer.
  ° Ensure that information operations (IO) is addressed to coordinate a united response.

Once you have arrived, you will need to establish communications with lead federal agency (LFA) or joint task force (JTF) command and local area authorities (LAA).

• Coordinate communications
  ° For local law enforcement response
  ° Medical support
  ° Higher headquarters responsibilities
  ° Phone numbers/frequencies for LFA or JTF
  ° Do you give them communication equipment (i.e., radios or do they provide radios/cell phones, etc.)

• Coordinate for reports
  ° What reports are required; provide examples.
  ° When are the reports due?
  ° Who are the reports to go to, and what if any classification level?
  ° Determine if Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) or Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPR) is available.

• Coordinate with the public information officer (PIO) at the joint information center (JIC) and the JTF PAO if applicable:
  ° Receive update on current operational information.
  ° Get the latest media plan for briefing back to command structure.
  ° Coordinate with local/national media through the media coordination center (MCC) at the JTF level or the JIC and PIO at the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS).

• The OPSEC officer will set up a time slot for the OPSEC workgroup. This will be coordinated through the S3/J3. Continual updating of the EEFIs and employing the OPSEC process will ensure a smooth transition and successful operation.
After the recovery phase and stand down, an after action review (AAR) covering all aspects of the operations will be captured with 72 hours. The S3 Operations Section is responsible for capturing documents and situation reports (SITREPS) for inclusion in the AAR.

When unit returns to their base, the AAR will be reviewed and all sections will participate. A completed copy will then be sent to the Center for Army Lessons Learned for inclusion in the CALL database.

**Tools:**

AR 530-1, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*

FM 3-13, *Information Operations (IO)*

FM 3-11.22, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team TTP*, June 2003,

JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (IO)*

JP 3-54, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Security (OPSEC)*

JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*

Local OPSEC Policy Letters

OPSEC Messages

Unit OPSEC SOP

DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005
Appendix K

Airspace Command and Control (AC2)/Airspace Control Plan

AC2 During an Incident of National Significance

Incidents of national significance are those high-impact events that require a coordinated response by federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. An effective way to frame a discussion about AC2 during an incident of national significance is to relate AC2 to the Gulf Coast natural disasters of 2005.

Background: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, August/September 2005

On August 29, 2005, the category three Hurricane Katrina made landfall and in less than 48 hours the scope of that natural disaster overwhelmed Gulf Coast state and local response capabilities. When the category four Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, 2005, the regional situation deteriorated further. The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in an unprecedented disaster response effort in support of the lead federal agency (LFA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) exercised its homeland defense responsibilities and established two disaster response joint task forces (JTFs): Katrina (JTF-K) commanded by 1st Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia, and Rita (JTF-R) commanded by 5th Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

In addition, 1st Air Force, Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida was designated to perform command and control for Air Force assets supporting air operations in and around the Katrina joint operating area. To exercise this responsibility, 1st Air Force established the 1st Air Expeditionary Task Force (1 AETF), Tyndall AFB, Florida, to be the Air Force service component of JTF-Katrina. When 5th Army stood up JTF-Rita, 1st AETF became JTF-Rita’s Air Force service component.

1st AETF was responsible for coordinating and integrating relief operations with local, state, and federal agencies. It established air expeditionary groups (AEGs) at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, Louisiana; Alexandria, Louisiana; Keesler AFB, Mississippi; Jackson, Mississippi; and Maxwell AFB, Alabama. These AEGs supported forward-deployed Airmen on the periphery of the disaster area.

1AF: Provided centralized command for all JTF Katrina and JTF Rita military air assets. As the senior military aviation command and control (C2) agency in the U.S., 1AF is responsible for centralized planning while the airborne C2 platform (Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]) is responsible for decentralized execution (http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/dd/afdd2-1.7/afdd2-1.7.pdf). Through partnership with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other government agencies, 1AF maintains an open line of communication to ensure standing operating procedures are established and followed.

JFACC: The 1AF Commander is JFACC for JTF Katrina and JTF Rita. In this role he acts as the airspace control authority (ACA) and the air defense commander (ADC). The ACA establishes airspace in response to joint force commander (JFC) guidance. During the Gulf Coast disaster the ACA integrated military aviation operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) and coordinated JTF Katrina and JTF Rita airspace requirements. The ACA develops the
airspace control plan (ACP) and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the area of operations (AO) and with civilian agencies. The ACA delegates airspace coordination responsibilities to the air and space operations center (AOOC).

**AOC:** The AOC is organized under a director, with five divisions (strategy; combat plans; combat operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air mobility) and multiple support/specialty teams. Each integrates numerous disciplines in a cross-functional team approach to planning and execution. Each AOC is uniquely tailored to the local environment, resource availability, operational demands, and command relationships of the military and civilian hierarchy. In support of the FAA’s statutory air traffic management responsibilities, military air operations are designed to exert minimal negative impact on the NAS. (Figure A11-1 depicts the basic structure of a notional AOC).

**FAA:** The FAA exercises positive control of all air traffic operating within designated control areas by managing separation of aircraft.

**NAS:** The NAS is an interconnected system of airports, air traffic facilities and equipment, navigational aids, and airways.

**ACP:** The ACP provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the joint operations area (JOA), including airspace control procedures. The ACP is distributed as a separate document or as an annex to the operations plan. The airspace control order (ACO) implementation directive of the ACP is normally disseminated as a separate document. The ACO provides the details of the airspace control measures (ACM).

### Implementation

The ACP outlines airspace procedures for assessment, search, rescue, recovery, and reconstitution operations in the FEMA-declared disaster areas along the Gulf Coast from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, east to Mobile, Alabama.

In general terms, the ACP can be used for other military operations within the scope directed by the JFACC. In the case of the Gulf Coast disaster, it was designed to combine the FAA regional air traffic management capability with the military rescue resources and create a cohesive unit.

The ACP is based on the premise that civilian air traffic control (ATC) facilities and communications would be used as long as possible to provide visual flight rules (VFR) separation. The plan contained general guidance and procedures for airspace control within the Katrina and Rita JOAs.

The ACP is a directive to all military recovery operations aircrews; air, ground, or surface (land and naval) forces; air defense sector; any current and future C2 agencies; and ground, naval, and DOD forces. Strict adherence to the ACP, as well as FAA air traffic procedures will ensure the safe, efficient, and expeditious use of airspace with minimum restrictions placed on civil or military aircraft. Total airspace deconfliction among military versus military and military versus civilian traffic would impose undue constraints on the NAS. The ATO governs JOA airspace usage by means of a pre-planned system of ACMs that can be adjusted according to mission requirements. To assist with coordination, all component services and applicable civil authorities provide liaisons to the JFACC, and all air activities are thoroughly coordinated with FAA representatives. (Figure A11-2 depicts the pre-planned system of ACMs.)
Figure AK-1: Pre-planned system of ACMs.


**Combat Plans and Strategy Divisions:** Combat Plans and Strategy Divisions are two of five elements in an AOC. These divisions apply the JFACC’s vision to the JFC’s campaign plan to build the air campaign plan and the daily air tasking order (ATO). ATOs are the orders that assign air missions to JFACC-controlled aircrews. (Source: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/docs/aoc12af/part03.htm)

**Hurricane Katrina and Rita:** The AOC became a central point of contact for those needing rescue, supplies, and flight information. The Combat Plans Division also acted as a clearinghouse for information on behalf of the FAA, from fielding hundreds of calls to the 1-800-WEATHER-BRIEF number, to ATO development, to directions regarding flights into the JOAs. These calls were then forwarded to appropriate agencies for action.

**General:** AF airspace managers were the military and civilian air traffic controllers responsible for coordinating and integrating all JTF Katrina and JTF Rita mission airspace requirements with the FAA. They applied the positive control elements of the NAS and procedural control capabilities of Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) computers.

One of the most significant challenges to publishing a complete ATO was a result of the immediate and “real time” nature of the situation. Information flowed to Combat Plans and Strategy Divisions as well as to the crisis action team (CAT), and JTF teams. Because assets were coming from all branches of the DOD, other government agencies, and foreign governments, each team had a piece of the puzzle. The picture was not complete until Combat Plans Division instituted a dedicated air asset tracker program, staffed by a planner who gathered, organized, and consolidated all aviation assets information into a single source document and posted it to the Website.
This table identifies some of the aviation assets involved in the 2005 Gulf Coast disaster response effort:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JFACC Controlled</th>
<th>Non-JFACC Controlled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>U.S. Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>AMO (formerly Customs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANG (Title 10)</td>
<td>Local Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Auxiliary</td>
<td>Civilian Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANG (SAD and Title 32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian Forces (Sea Kings, BO-105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Mexico (MI 17s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Singapore (CH 47s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian Forces (AN24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If a non-JFACC controlled asset is transferred to the JFACC, it can then be line-tasked in the ATO. For those assets not directly controlled by the JFACC, applicable mission information appears in the special instructions (SPINS) section of the ATO for visibility and coordination purposes.

The Combat Plans Division also created two Websites to display Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita aviation mission data and JFACC update briefings. These Websites quickly became the fastest means of disseminating JFACC information.
“The Wild Blue Yonder”

Air Force commanders and personnel will normally lead the effort to control airspace for joint force commanders. Airmen must understand how to organize forces and how to present them to the joint force commander to ensure safety and survivability for all users of the airspace, while ensuring mission accomplishment. Military staff officers unfamiliar with AC2 also need a basic understanding of these tenets. The “Quick Users” guide below will help you get oriented once on the ground and provide a quick reference for understanding AC2 in your JOA.

The Staff Officer’s “Quick Users” Guide

1. Find out who the JFACC or J (Joint) FACC is and where he is located.
2. Find out who the centralized command is for all military air-assets.
3. Find out where FAA representatives are located.
4. Find out where the AOC is located. Visit it as soon as you can.
5. Get a copy of the ACP and get Website address/es for updated information.
6. The guidance provided in the ACP is a directive to all military recovery operations aircrews.
7. Find out what assets are JFACC/JFACC controlled (i.e., Air Force, Army, Navy) And non-controlled (i.e., Coast Guard, Marine Corps, foreign support assets).
8. Get telephone numbers and email addresses.
Appendix L

Search and Rescue (SAR)

Introduction

Effective SAR operations are essential in ensuring that the loss of life is mediated. During urban disasters, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumes the lead role in SAR operations. The U.S. Air Force assumes the lead for inland operations, while the U.S. Coast Guard conducts operations for maritime search and rescue.

About Urban Search-and-Rescue (US&R)

US&R involves the location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse is most often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims may also be trapped in transportation accidents, mines, and collapsed trenches.

US&R is considered a “multi-hazard” discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, as in the case of earthquakes.

The National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, established under the authority of the FEMA in 1989, is a framework for structuring local emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces.

What You Didn’t Know About US&R

- For every US&R task force (TF), there are almost 70 positions. To be certified, a US&R task force must each have at the ready more than 130 highly-trained members.

- A is a partnership between local fire departments, law enforcement agencies, federal and local governmental agencies, and private companies.

- A US&R TF is totally self-sufficient for the first 72 to 96 hours of a deployment.

- The equipment cache used to support the TF weighs nearly 60,000 pounds and is worth about $1.4 million. When equipment is combined with TF members, a military C-141 transport or two C130s are required to deploy.

- Training requirements are intensive. In addition to being an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), each TF member must complete hundreds of hours of training. Specialties such as K-9 search, rescue, and rigging carry their own training requirements.

- What the TF can do:

  ° Conduct physical SAR in collapsed buildings

  ° Emergency medical care to trapped victims

  ° SAR dogs
Assessment and control of gas, electric service, and HAZMAT

Evaluation and stabilization of damaged structures

**US&R Participants**

There are many participants in the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System. These participants can be grouped into three main categories.

- **FEMA**: FEMA establishes policy and leads the coordination of the national system.
- **US&R TFs**: There are 28 FEMA US&R TFs spread throughout the continental United States who are trained and equipped by FEMA to handle structural collapse.
- **Incident support teams**: These teams support the US&R TFs in accomplishing their mission through logistical, electronic, and coordination expertise.

**National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC)**

The NSARC is a federal-level committee formed to coordinate civil SAR matters of interagency interest within the United States.

**NSARC member agencies:**

- Department of Defense
- Department of Interior
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Transportation
- Department of Homeland Security
- Federal Communications Commission
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- U.S. Air Force
- National Park Service
- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
- U.S. Coast Guard

**US&R Task Forces**

FEMA can activate and deploy the TF to provide assistance in structural collapse rescue or pre-position them when a major disaster threatens a community. Each TF must have all its personnel and equipment at the embarkation point within six hours of activation. The TF can be dispatched and en route to its destination in a matter of hours.
Each TF is comprised of almost 70 specialists and is divided into six major functional elements: search, rescue, medical, HAZMAT, logistics, and planning. The TF is divided into two 35-member teams, which allows for the rotation and relief of personnel for round-the-clock SAR operations.

TFs also have the flexibility to reconfigure and deploy as one 28-person (Type-III) team to respond to small, primarily weather-driven incidents, where the requirements would be physical, technical, and canine SAR in light, wood-frame construction. Such events typically include hurricanes, tornados, ice storms, and typhoons.

Some of the capabilities of the US&R TFs are:

- Physical SAR operations in damaged/collapsed structures
- Operations in a known or suspected weapons of mass destruction environment
- Emergency medical care for entrapped victims, task force personnel and search canines
- Reconnaissance to assess damage and needs, and provide feedback to other officials
- Assessment/shut-off of utilities to houses and other buildings
- HAZMAT survey/evaluations
- Structural and hazard evaluations of buildings
- Stabilization of damaged structures, including shoring and cribbing operations
### TFs by Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>AZ-TF1</td>
<td>Phoenix, Arizona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>CA-TF1</td>
<td>LA City Fire Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA-TF2</td>
<td>LA County Fire Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA-TF3</td>
<td>Menlo Park Fire Department</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CA-TF4</td>
<td>Oakland Fire Dept.</td>
</tr>
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<td>CA-TF5</td>
<td>Orange Co. Fire Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA-TF6</td>
<td>Riverside Fire Department</td>
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<td>Sacramento Fire Dept.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nebraska</td>
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<td>OH-TF1</td>
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<td>Washington</td>
<td>WA-TF1</td>
<td>Puget Sound Task Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TFs by Location (continued)
Profile of a Rescue

While every SAR assignment is unique, a rescue might go something like this:

- Response always begins at the local level with first responders. If the emergency is great enough, the local emergency manager requests assistance from the state.

- Following the disaster, the local emergency manager requests assistance from the state, the state in turn can request federal assistance, and FEMA deploys the three closest TFs.

- After arriving at the site, structural specialists, who are licensed professional engineers, provide direct input to FEMA TF members about structural integrity of buildings and the risk of secondary collapses.

- The search team ventures around and into the collapsed structure shoring up structures and attempting to locate trapped victims. The team uses electronic listening devices, search cameras, and specially trained search dogs to locate victims.

- Once a victim is located, the search group begins the daunting task of breaking and cutting through thousands of pounds of concrete, metal, and wood to reach the victims. They also stabilize and support the entry and work areas with wood shoring to prevent further collapse.

- Medical teams, composed of trauma physicians, emergency room nurses, and paramedics provide medical care for the victims as well as the rescuers, if necessary. A fully stocked mobile emergency room is part of the TF equipment cache. Medics may be required to enter the unstable interior of the collapsed structure to render immediate aid.

- Throughout the effort HAZMAT specialists evaluate the disaster site, and decontaminate rescue and medical members who may be exposed to hazardous chemicals or decaying bodies.

- Heavy rigging specialists direct the use of heavy machinery, such as cranes and bulldozers. These specialists understand the special dangers of working in a collapsed structure and help to ensure the safety of the victims and rescuers inside.

- Technical information and communication specialists ensure that all team members can communicate with each other and the TF leaders, facilitating search efforts and coordinating evacuation in the event of a secondary collapse.

- Logistics specialists handle the more than 16,000 pieces of equipment to support the search and extrication of the victims. The equipment cache includes such essentials as concrete cutting saws; search cameras; medical supplies; and tents, cots, food, and water to keep the TF self-sufficient for 72 or 96 hours.

Search Assessment Marking

- A specialized marking system is used to conspicuously denote information relating the victim location determinations in the areas searched.

- The Search Assessment Marking System is designed to be used in conjunction with the Structure and Hazards Evaluation Marking System.
A 2’ x 2’ “X” is made with International Orange color spray paint. This X is constructed in two operations:

| 1400 hr  |
| CA-TF1   |

- **Single slash drawn upon entry to a structure or area indicates search operations are currently in progress. The time and TF identifier are posted as indicated.**

- **Crossing slash drawn upon personnel exit from the structure or area.**

- Distinct markings are made inside the four quadrants of the X to clearly denote the search status and findings at the time of this assessment.

- The marks are made with carpenter chalk, lumber crayon, or duct tape, and black magic marker.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>US&amp;R TF identifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA-TF1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>Time and date that the TF personnel left the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/15/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1400 hr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Personal hazards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RATS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is important that markings are made specific to each area of entry or separate part of the building.

If no victims are found, it is noted with a “0” below.

Situation updates are noted as they are available:

° Previous search markings are crossed out
° New markings are placed below (or next to) their previous markings with the most recent information.

FEMA TF Tools and Equipment

• To ensure rapid response and to avoid burdening the already suffering community more, the TF equipment cache must be a mobile emergency room, construction site, communications center, high-tech engineering firm, and camp rolled into one.

• The equipment cache consists of five types of equipment: medical, rescue, communications, technical support, and logistics.

• Medical supplies include various medicines, intravenous fluids, blankets, suture sets, airways, tracheal tubes, defibrillators, burn treatment supplies, bone saws, and scalpels.

• The search component of the equipment resembles the equipment at a normal construction site. Common building supplies such as concrete saws, jackhammers, drills, lumber, and rope are used to safely and slowly remove victims from the rubble.

• The communications section allows rescuers to stay in contact in case of a find or an evacuation. Generators, lights, radios, cellular phones, laptop computers, and other electronics equipment are used.

• More than 500 items make up the technical support cache, the most high-tech of all the equipment. Snake-like cameras and fiber optic scopes are used to locate victims trapped in rubble. Sensitive listening devices that can detect even the slightest human sound locate victims who are still alive.
The logistics section cares for the needs of the rescuers as they work in 12-hour shifts around the clock. Supplies include sleeping bags, cots, food, and water, as well as cold weather gear.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

In 1956, with the publishing of the first National Search and Rescue Plan, the USCG was designated the single federal agency responsible for maritime SAR and, likewise, the United States Air Force (USAF) was designated the single federal agency responsible for federal-level SAR for the inland regions. In order to meet the need for trained USCG and USAF SAR planners, the Joint Service National Search and Rescue School was established at Governors Island, New York, on 19 April 1966. This action created a facility devoted exclusively to training professionals to conduct SAR.

With $15,000 and a vacant WWII barracks building, six highly experienced USCG and USAF personnel formed the National SAR School. Since the first class over thirty years ago, over 14,000 have joined the ranks of trained SAR professionals. This includes over 1,400 international students from 103 nations.

The school was moved to the USCG Reserve Training Center (RTC) Yorktown (now USCG TRACEN Yorktown), Virginia, in 1988. The curriculum of the school has been changed over the years to include newly developed computer search planning programs and advances in search theory and application. Additionally, many instructional technology changes have been incorporated, which allow the school to maintain its distinction as the premier school of its type in the world.

SAR is one of the USCG's oldest missions. Minimizing the loss of life, injury, property damage, or loss by rendering aid to persons in distress and property in the maritime environment has always been a USCG priority. USCG SAR response involves multi-mission stations, cutters, aircraft, and boats linked by communications networks. The National SAR Plan divides the U.S. area of SAR responsibility into internationally recognized inland and maritime SAR regions. The USCG is the maritime SAR coordinator. To meet this responsibility, the USCG maintains SAR facilities on the East, West, and Gulf coasts and in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico, as well as on the Great Lakes and inland U.S. waterways. The USCG is recognized worldwide as a leader in the field of SAR.

Maritime Search and Rescue Background: Program Objectives and Goals

SAR background statistics/information:

- 95% of all USCG SAR occurs less than 20 nautical miles offshore.
- Approximately 90% of cases involve assist/rescue only.
- 8% of cases involve minor searches (less than 24 hours).
- 2% of cases involve major searches (greater than 24 hours).
- Those 10% of cases involving searches (minor and major) cost more than $50 million annually.
It is advantageous to reduce the time spent searching in order to:

- Save more lives
- Save USCG resources
- Place fewer USCG personnel at risk

The school provides search planners with the skills and practice they need to become SAR detectives and information distillers. They must aggressively pursue leads and obtain all information available to successfully prosecute cases.

SAR program objectives are:

- Minimize loss of life, personnel injury, property loss, and damage to the maritime environment.
- Minimize search duration and crew risk during SAR missions.
- Maintain a world leadership position in maritime SAR.

SAR program goals are (after USCG notification):

Save at least 93% of those people at risk of death on the waters over which the USCG has SAR responsibility.

Prevent the loss of at least 85% of the property at risk on the waters over which the USCG has SAR responsibility.

USAF

Air Force rescue coordination center (AFRCC)

As the United States’ inland SAR coordinator, the AFRCC serves as the single agency responsible for coordinating on-land federal SAR activities in the 48 contiguous United States, Mexico, and Canada.

The AFRCC operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The center, located at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, directly ties in to the FAA’s alerting system and the U.S. Mission Control Center. In addition to the SAR satellite-aided tracking information, the AFRCC computer system contains resource files that list federal and state organizations that can conduct or assist in SAR efforts throughout North America.

When a distress call is received, the center investigates the request; coordinates with federal, state, and local officials; and determines the type and scope of response necessary. Once verified as an actual distress situation, AFRCC requests support from the appropriate federal SAR force. This may include Civil Air Patrol (CAP), USCG or other DOD assets, as needed. State agencies can be contacted for state, local, or civil SAR resource assistance within their jurisdiction. The AFRCC chooses the rescue force based on availability and capability of forces, geographic location, terrain, weather conditions, and urgency of the situation.

During ongoing SAR missions, the center serves as the communications hub and provides coordination and assistance to on-scene commanders or mission coordinators in order to recover the mission’s objective in the safest and most effective manner possible. AFRCC uses
state-of-the-art technology including a network of satellites for monitoring emergency locator transmitter signals. Systems such as these help reduce the critical time required to locate and recover people in distress.

The AFRCC also formulates and manages SAR plans, agreements, and policies throughout the continental United States. Additionally, it presents a mobile Search Management Course to CAP wings throughout the U.S. to produce qualified incident commanders, thus improving national SAR capability.

The AFRCC also assigns instructors to the National SAR School at the USCG Reserve Training Center. The instructors teach the Inland Search and Rescue Class throughout the United States and at many worldwide military locations. This joint school is designed for civilian and military personnel from federal, state, local, and volunteer organizations, all of who are responsible for SAR mission planning.

SAR missions include a variety of missions: searches for lost hunters, hikers, or Alzheimer’s patients; sources of emergency locator transmitter signals; and missing aircraft. The center frequently dispatches rescue assets to provide aid and transportation to people needing medical attention in remote or isolated areas, for emergency organ or blood transportation, or for medical evacuations, when civilian resources are not available.

Before 1974, the USAF divided the continental United States into three regions, each with a separate rescue center. In May of that year, the USAF consolidated the three centers into one facility at Scott AFB, Illinois. This consolidation provided better coordination of activities, improved communications, and economy of operations and standardized procedures. In 1993, AFRCC relocated to Langley AFB, Virginia, when Air Combat Command assumed responsibility for USAF peacetime and combat SAR. In October 2003, the center was realigned under the USAF Special Operations Command.

Since the center opened in May 1974, more than 13,500 lives have been saved from its missions.

**Disaster Response versus Civil SAR**

Aspects of disaster response (DR) and civil SAR tend to be confused, because they overlap in certain aspects, such as responsible agencies and resources used and both involve emergency response. The following information is intended to point out some of the basic differences between DR and SAR in a way that may be helpful to any persons or organizations involved in both; however, it does not address how states or localities deal with these missions and their differences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Comparison</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caseload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alerting or requests for assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common basis for federal involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major disaster declaration by the President based on request and justification from a governor; default response responsibility is with local/state authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination of federal response</th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often by local military command or other cognizant federal agency (e.g., National Park Service or USCG) before a disaster declaration, and by FEMA after such declaration</td>
<td>By the responsible RCC, using own or arranged local, national, or international resources or by delegation based on plans or agreements</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary legal authorities</th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stafford Act, Presidential Directives, the National Response Plan (NRP), and authorizing legislation relevant to various federal agencies (there are many) to provide or support federal response</td>
<td>International treaties, such as the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the NRP, and agency-specific legislation authorizing conduct or support of SAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supplemental authorities other than agency directives</th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Search and Rescue Plan (NSP); available at “www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsparc/nsp.pdf”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing guidance for the NRP and NSP</th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainly the National Incident Management System (NIMS)</td>
<td>Mainly the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual) and the National Search and Rescue Supplement to the IAMSAR Manual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminology</th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainly per NRP and NIMS</td>
<td>Mainly per IAMSAR Manual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary policy/oversight authorities</td>
<td>Disaster Response</td>
<td>Civil SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security/FEMA, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, and the National Search and Rescue Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Typical operational coordination

NIMS

Mainly international SAR procedures at the federal level, with NIMS/incident command system used mainly within (or when coordinating with) state and local levels; RCC Langley also uses incident command

Compatibility of concurrent DR and SAR

DR is carried out per the NRP and civil SAR (including MROs), if any, typically per the NSP and international SAR procedures; SAR coordination is separate from but “plugs into” the NIMS command structure

Compatibility of SAR procedures with NIMS typically achieved by assigning a SAR representative to support the incident commander in the operations section of the incident command post (ICP)

Typical command structure

Incident commander/command post or unified command

SAR mission coordinator (SMC, usually in an RCC) and on scene coordinator (OSC)

Factors affecting involvement of states

- State has primary responsibility for its DR
- State sovereignty, laws, plans, and agreements
- State capabilities
- Responsibilities assigned to state agencies
- Inter-state organizations for governors, emergency managers, etc.
- Mutual-aid arrangements among states

- RCC Langley (AFRCC) agreements with each state
- Various other agreements, where appropriate
- RCC plans
- NSP provides for states to assume aeronautical and maritime SAR responsibilities that default to the federal government
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disaster Response</th>
<th>Civil SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors involving other</td>
<td>- Need</td>
<td>- Operational expediency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>- Arrangements via diplomatic channels</td>
<td>- Coordination among international RCCs rather than via diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination/guidance of International Search and Rescue Advisory Group</td>
<td>channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary civilian agencies</td>
<td>Many federal agencies signatory to the NRP under lead of FEMA; OFDA for international response</td>
<td>The USCG operates 10 RCCs and arranges SAR services for waters around the U.S. including half of the North Atlantic and three-fourths of the North Pacific; the National Park Service handles SAR in national parks; primary supporting agencies are the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD role</td>
<td>Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) usually, but not limited to, actions under the Stafford Act</td>
<td>Per the NSP (not DSCA): primary responsibility for RCC functions in continental United States (RCC Langley) and Alaska (RCC Elmendorf); secondary support of civil SAR in rest of the world; local military commands have authority for immediate response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue units</td>
<td>Mainly federal US&amp;R Task Forces deployed under the NRP to support local efforts in U.S. or deployed internationally per OFDA</td>
<td>Mainly aircraft and boats with SAR-trained crews and specialized SAR equipment, along with ships at sea and all other available resources; for land SAR, mostly state and local resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Disaster Response</td>
<td>Civil SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainly various types of funding available under Stafford Act</td>
<td>Agency appropriated SAR funding or out-of-hide; no charge to survivors; each entity funds own services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix M

AAR Considerations

The National Response Plan (NRP), (December 2004) requires the federal coordinating officer (FCO) to submit an after action report (AAR) when a centralized federal coordination presence is no longer required.

Army Regulation (AR) 11-33 established the After Action Review System. Major command (MACOM) reports will include input from subordinate units down to battalion level. A recommendation for brigade and battalion reports is to include input from all attached elements. The Army's Training Circular (TC) 25-20 provides thorough guidance on preparing an AAR.

The U.S. Army conducts AARs for both training exercises and operations and provides a standardized format to identify:

- Unit identified problems with the commanders’ solution.
- Better ways of doing business (no changes required to current doctrine, training, organization, material and leadership).
- Commanders identified problems that require Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA)/Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) action to solve.

MACOM reports will include input from subordinate units down to battalion level. A recommendation for brigade and battalion reports is to include input from all attached elements.

The format below is compatible with the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) but was modified from the JAARS format by the Army in order to eliminate redundant work for AAR issues with joint implications. It will serve as the commanders’ input to JAARS.

Part I: Executive Summary (completed by commander)

—Mission/objectives
—General description
—Dates, locations, and major participants
—Significant issues
—Limitations

Part II: Lessons Learned

—Observation
—Discussion
—Lessons learned
—Recommended action
—Comments
Part III: Optional

—Chronology of events

—Operations plan (OPLAN) and/or operation orders (OPORDs)

—Standing operating procedures

The AAR format is often modified. The following are divisional formats used for recent operations:

Example A.

1. Purpose.

2. General.

3. Planning.
   • Issue
   • Discussion
   • Recommendation

4. Preparation.
   • Issue
   • Discussion
   • Recommendation

5. Execution.
   • Issue
   • Discussion
   • Recommendation

Example B.

Each brigade, battalion, task force, and staff section AAR was formatted as:

SUSTAIN
   • Issue
   • Discussion
   • Recommendation
The NRP requires the FCO to submit an AAR when a centralized federal coordination presence is no longer required. A format is neither shown nor discussed.

Prior to July 2003 FEMA used a written AAR format with areas, Issue #, Issue Topic, Statement, Issue Description, Issue Recommendation. This is very much like the Army’s AAR format: Issue, Discussion, Recommendation.

FEMA news release, dated July 23, 2003, Release Number: HQ-03-RAMP, introduced the Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP). RAMP does away with AARs and is designed to identify and capture those procedures that worked well and those that did not more quickly and effectively to ensure they are addressed and resolved by the appropriate functional program areas.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA both have written AARs based on the information gleaned from the RAMP Hotwash. The formats used were very similar to the Army’s format shown above.
Appendix N

Risk Management and Safety Considerations in Disaster Response Operations

Introduction

This Appendix highlights operations and conditions that are applicable to disaster response efforts and provides leaders with appropriate controls and prevention measures. The information provided is based on past experience in disaster response operations and also includes lessons learned in everyday operations. While some of the controls and prevention measures might seem obvious, past accident and injury experience indicates they were not so obvious to some.

Leaders must be diligent in enforcing standards and applying the principles of composite risk management (CRM) to all operations.

During disaster response efforts, DOD personnel are given missions that involve life-and-death situations. Personnel have been known to willingly assume unusual risks in such circumstances, perhaps because they think the risks are justified in the interest of saving lives. Unfortunately, however, such thinking can lead personnel to take unnecessary and inappropriate risks that will affect not only themselves, but also those they are trying to save.

Disaster response efforts are hazardous by their very nature, and resources often are stretched to the breaking point. There is never a good time for an accident, but this is especially true in disaster situations. Responding to an accident can halt response efforts and drain the resources intended for disaster assistance.

We would like to thank the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center for their use of the Leader’s Risk Management Guide for Disaster Response Operations, September 2005. The complete document can be located at: https://crc.army.mil/Guidance/detail.asp?idata=201&icat=456&ichannel=15&nchannel=Guidance

Section 1: CRM

CRM is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits. Loss statistics show that incidents occur when personnel are unaware of hazards and countermeasures (controls), or when established countermeasures and procedures are ignored. This section provides leaders guidance on integrating the CRM process into all operations.

Principles

There are four principles to the CRM process:

- Integrating CRM into mission planning, preparation, and execution.
  
  CRM is a continual process that must be incorporated into both formal and informal planning activities.

- Making risk decisions at the appropriate level.
  
  Make risk decisions at a level consistent with the commander’s guidance. The leader responsible for the mission should make the risk decisions.
Accepting no unnecessary risk.

- Everyone, including individuals who have the authority to accept risk, has the responsibility to protect Soldiers, civilians, and equipment from unnecessary risk.
- An unnecessary risk is one that, if eliminated or mitigated, still allows mission accomplishment and maintains unit readiness.

Accept risk if benefits outweigh the costs.

- Leaders and individual Soldiers must take necessary risk to accomplish the mission.
- Leaders must understand that taking risk requires a decision-making process that balances mission benefits with costs.

Process

There are five steps to the CRM process:

- **Identify the hazards.** Hazards are the potential sources of danger that could be encountered while performing a task or mission on or off duty.

- **Assess hazards.** Identified hazards must be assessed to determine their cumulative effect on the mission or objective. Each of the hazards is analyzed to determine the probability of its causing a problem and the severity of the consequences should such a problem occur. (See Figure A14-1.)

![Risk Assessment Matrix](image)

**Figure AN-1: Risk Assessment Matrix**

- **Develop controls and make decisions.** Once hazards have been assessed, controls must be developed to mitigate the risk.

- **Implement controls.** The controls established as a result of the first three steps are implemented in step four, including leader action to reduce or eliminate hazards. Controls may be as substantial as writing a standing operating procedure (SOP) or as simple as conducting a short safety briefing.
• **Supervise and evaluate.** Leaders’ supervisory tasks include following up during and after the operation to ensure all actions went according to plan; re-evaluating the plan or making adjustments as required to accommodate unforeseen issues; and incorporating lessons learned for future use.

**Section 2: Human Factors**

During disaster response efforts, the interaction of our personnel and the environment can produce hazardous conditions. You as a leader can reduce or eliminate these hazards as discussed in this chapter.

**Supervision**

Safety statistics have shown that 80 percent of all accidents are caused by human error. Leaders can reduce human error by establishing sound standards and through consistent enforcement. Failure to enforce a standard establishes a new, less stringent standard that might result in an accident.

**Buddy System**

Establish a buddy system and provide guidance on the issues that can be addressed by the system. Leaders also need a buddy, because they frequently try to “tough out” injuries to stay in the action.

**Communication**

Maintain positive communication with your personnel. Make sure your Soldiers have communication equipment, such as radios and cellular telephones. Ensure that you set up and enforce a check in and report on their status at regular intervals. Ensure that all personnel know how to contact medical assistance, rescue assets, and fire and law enforcement personnel.

**Environmental Concerns**

**Hot weather**

**NOTE:** Use only approved water sources (bottled water or provided potable water); the local water sources maybe contaminated.

• Enforce hydration and monitor water use and mission risk.

• Provide cool water whenever possible.

• Enforce work and rest cycles.

• Educate personnel on the signs of heat injury and ensure they watch for those symptoms.

• Know each individual’s physical condition and assign appropriate work.

• Establish and ensure use of the buddy system.
Heat injuries:

- Heat cramps are caused primarily by an excessive loss of salt from the body. Symptoms include muscle cramps in the abdomen, legs, or arms. Move the victim to a shady area, loosen his clothing, and dissolve ¼-teaspoon table salt in 1 quart of water. The victim must slowly drink at least 1 quart of this salt solution and seek medical treatment.

- Heat exhaustion is caused by excessive salt depletion and dehydration. Symptoms include profuse sweating, headache, a tingling sensation in the extremities, weakness, loss of appetite, dizziness, nausea, cramps, chills, and rapid breathing. Move the victim to a shady area, loosen or remove his clothing, elevate his legs, pour water on him, have him drink water, and fan him as much as possible. Promptly seek medical treatment.

- Heat stroke is a medical emergency and immediate action is required. Symptoms generally are patterned after heat exhaustion, but the victim’s skin will be hot and dry, and he might suddenly lose consciousness and have seizures. Move any suspected heatstroke victim to a shady area; immerse him in water if possible, or douse him with water (ice water is preferable); fan him as much as possible; and elevate his feet. Seek immediate medical attention and ensure the cooling process is continued during transport to the medical facility.

- The pain and discomfort associated with the effects of sunburn can be debilitating in the short term, as well as contributing to skin cancers resulting from exposure over the course of time. The most effective means of sunburn prevention is to limit the length of exposure, particularly during the midmorning and midafternoon when the amount of ultraviolet radiation is greatest. Effective means of protection are to wear clothing and hats to cover exposed skin, as well as applying commercial skin preparations made specifically to block ultraviolet rays. In addition, the eyes also need protection from exposure to sunlight and glare. Wear appropriate sunglasses designed to block ultraviolet rays.

Cold Weather

- Wear the right clothing
- Dress in layers and wear warm, waterproof/resistant clothing.
- Wear appropriate eye protection, such as sunglasses/goggles

Cold injuries

- Dehydration is the depletion of body fluids. In cold weather people are less apt to feel thirsty and/or have less desire to drink fluids; it is imperative to enforce hydration and monitor water use and mission risk. Symptoms are dizziness, weakness, and blurred vision. Replace lost water by sipping, not gulping, water

- Chilblain is repeated exposure of bare skin for prolonged periods to temperatures from 20 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit (F). (Note the range is for those
not acclimated to cold weather). Symptoms are swollen, red skin or darkening of the skin in dark-skinned Soldiers and tender, hot skin, usually accompanied by itching. First aid is to warm affected area with direct body heat, do not rub affected areas. Do not wet the area or rub with snow or ice nor expose affected area to open fire or other intense heat source.

- Immersion foot (trench foot) is prolonged exposure of feet to wet conditions at temperatures between 32 and 60 degrees F., caused by inactivity, and damp socks and boots. Symptoms include cold numb feet progressing to hot feet with shooting pains, swelling, redness, and bleeding. Seek medical attention immediately; rewarm feet by exposing to warm, not hot, air. Do not massage, rub, moisten, or expose feet to extreme heat. Evacuate victim to a medical faculty.

- Frostbite is the freezing of tissue, normally due to exposure below 32 degrees F and is caused by exposing bare skin to metal, extremely cool fuel and petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), and wind chill. Tight clothing and boots increase the risk. Parts most often affected include fingers, toes, ears, and other facial parts. Symptoms include yellowish, waxy looking skin (grayish in dark-skinned Soldiers) and tissue that feels wooden to the touch. First aid is to warm affected area with direct body heat; do not thaw frozen areas if treatment will be delayed; do not massage or rub affected areas; do not wet the area or rub it with snow or ice; do not expose skin to any intense heat source.

- Hypothermia is abnormally low body temperature due to prolonged exposure to cold and loss of body heat and may occur at temperatures well above freezing, especially when a person is immersed in water. Symptoms include lack of shivering, drowsiness, metal slowness, and lack of coordination. Hypothermia can lead to unconsciousness and death. First aid is to get the Soldier to a medical facility as soon as possible. This is the most serious cold weather medical emergency and can lead to death. Never assume someone is dead, as victims with temperatures as low as 82 degrees F have been revived. In extreme cold, the pulse and breathing can be so low as to be nearly undetectable. Strip off wet clothing and wrap in blanket or sleeping bag, and place another person in the sleeping bag as an additional heat source.

- Carbon monoxide poisoning is caused when oxygen is replaced with carbon monoxide in the blood stream and is commonly caused by burning fuels without proper ventilation. Symptoms include headache, confusion, dizziness, excessive yawning, and unconsciousness. First aid is to move to fresh air; perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), if needed; administer oxygen, if available; and evacuate.

Fatigue

Fatigue causes accidents. Personnel become militarily ineffective after 48 to 72 hours without sleep. The best control measure against fatigue is sleep. Water consumption, diet, physical conditioning, personal hygiene, and meaningful work all impact fatigue, as well, so ensure the impact is positive.
Observe personnel for signs of the following symptoms of fatigue, and be mindful that these symptoms can manifest themselves in increased errors and carelessness and difficulty in following instructions:

- Headache
- Poor personal hygiene
- Impatience and irritability
- Loss of appetite
- Inability to focus on the task at hand
- Outright physical exhaustion and lack of motivation

**Sleep Plans**

Facts about sleep deprivation:

- You cannot train to overcome sleep loss.
- Tasks that are uninteresting and take a long time are extremely conducive to sleep.
- Performance of mental tasks requiring calculations, creativity, and ability to plan ahead declines by 25 percent for every 24-hour period of semi-continuous work without sleep.
- Leaders’ abilities are degraded by sleep loss, impacting quick and effective responses to changing conditions.
- Tasks that have been learned well and practiced repeatedly are more resistant to sleep loss effects. Select the best-trained personnel to perform critical tasks.
- The ability to learn new information is compromised by sleep loss.
- Leadership ability cannot overcome sleep loss.
- Sleep loss over time (greater than 2 days) has a cumulative effect.

**Guidelines for sleep plans**

- Six to eight hours of sleep per night will maintain mental task performance indefinitely.
- Provide designated sleep areas where there are minimal interruptions and disturbances, as well as an area that maximizes a darkened condition and minimizes noise.
- Three to four hours of sleep per night will maintain mental task performance for five to six days.
° Less than 4 hours of sleep per night over a 3- to 6-day period will impair military effectiveness.

° The best sleep periods, given a limited choice, are 0300 to 0600 and 1600 to 1900.

° Provide for a minimum of four to five hours of quality, uninterrupted sleep.

° Remember, however, that after six to seven days accumulated sleep loss will equal 48 hours without sleep.

° After 24 to 36 hours without sleep, decisions, calculations, etc., should be cross-checked by a second person. Use a mix of rested and unrested personnel as a check and balance.

° Allow for naps as often as possible. Four one-hour naps in a 24-hour period are as beneficial as four hours of sleep. However, accumulated sleep loss is more severe with fragmented sleep.

° Sleep plans should include provisions to recover from sleep loss.

° Twelve hours of sleep and rest with at least eight to ten hours of sleep are required after 36 to 48 hours of acute sleep loss.

° Twenty-four hours of sleep and rest with at least 15 hours of sleep are required after 36 to 48 hours of sleep loss under high workload conditions of 12 to 16 hours per day. This is particularly important for commanders and staff with high mental task workloads.

° Two to three days of sleep and rest are required after 72 to 96 hours of sleep loss. The sleep and rest period means eight to ten hours of sleep per day and light duty.

° Supervisors must be diligent in checking personnel to ensure they get adequate rest.

Personal Injuries

° **Eyes.** Precautions should be taken to protect the eyes by wearing protective lenses, goggles, or face shields when the job calls for it.

° **Ears.** Leaders must enforce the use of hearing protection when personnel are operating heavy equipment, generators, or chain saws.

° **Head.** Helmets or hard hats should be worn in construction areas in accordance with unit requirements.

° **Hands.** Rings are a common source of personal injury. Personnel frequently catch rings on the tailgate of vehicles while dismounting, causing severe hand injuries or amputations. Leaders should ensure that their Soldiers remove rings or other jewelry that may become hooked or snagged. In addition, leaders should provide work gloves for personnel as the job requires, to prevent cuts, splinters, blisters, and exposure to hazardous materials.
• **Back.** In most cases, back injuries occur when individuals overextend themselves. Leaders must remind personnel to get help when lifting heavy objects and to lift with their legs, not their backs.

• **Feet.** Leaders must enforce wear of protective boots in areas that require toe protection such as maintenance, engineer, warehousing, and materiel handling facilities. Also ensure personnel change their socks regularly to prevent trench foot and fungal infections.

### Health and Hygiene

• **Hand washing**
  
  ° Provide appropriate hand washing facilities at all food service areas, latrines, and disposal areas. Hand washing is the single-most important measure in preventing food-borne illness and must be enforced at all times.

  ° Hand cleansers and liquid hand gel can be provided and issued to individuals.

• **Water**
  
  ° Ensure water is treated; serious diseases can be transmitted by untreated water.

  ° Treat all water as if it is contaminated. Do not go in the water unless it is necessary or has been approved by the chain of command.

  ° Water in trailers should maintain a chlorine level of 5 parts per million (ppm).

  ° Use water in trailers primarily for showering and cooking, because the chlorine taste will discourage Soldiers from drinking it. Bottled water should be the primary source of drinking water.

  ° All personnel should be immunized appropriately.

• **Laundry and bath**
  
  ° Laundry operations require that equipment be operated at specific temperatures. To prevent fires, ensure temperatures listed in the appropriate operator’s manual are not exceeded.

  ° Ensure laundry units operating inside tents have adequate ventilation.

  ° Ensure high-voltage laundry units are grounded and that circuits are not bypassed.

  ° Ensure operators are using fuels prescribed in the appropriate operator’s manual to prevent overheating and fire hazards.

• **Food**
  
  ° Keep perishable foods below 45 ºF or above 140 ºF before serving.

  ° Dispose of perishable foods kept in insulated containers for more than 4 hours.
If using meals, ready to eat (MRE), ensure personnel stay well hydrated to avoid constipation.

Bacterial diarrhea, viral diarrhea, chemicals, pesticides, and heavy metal poisoning are hazards associated with eating food from unapproved sources.

Do not consume food procured from or prepared by local personnel in the immediate hazard area.

• Latrines and Waste Disposal

  ° Designate a field sanitation team (FST) before deployment.

  ° Ensure FSTs deploy with appropriate equipment and references.

  ° Ensure portable latrines are available, cleaned regularly, and located in low-lying areas.

  ° Ensure methods are available to establish adequate waste disposal procedures.

  ° Do not burn trash or waste without approval from appropriate military personnel.

  ° To minimize rodent and stray animal activity, designate locations and storage facilities for trash away from living and work areas.

Animals

• Snakes. Tell personnel to leave snakes alone. There are poisonous snakes in many parts of the United States, but bites from nonpoisonous snakes can also be harmful if they are not cared for properly and become infected. Anyone bitten should immobilize the affected area and seek medical help immediately. When ice is available, apply it to the bite to slow the spread of venom. Tourniquets and attempts to suck venom out of the wound can cause more harm than good.

• Wild animals. Wild animals such as bats, raccoons, and skunks, as well as feral dogs and cats, might be injured, hungry, or have rabies or other diseases.

• Domestic animals. Domestic pets might be more aggressive or dangerous than usual. Ensure personnel do not taunt, play with, or handle any animals.

Insects

• Bites from spiders, mosquitoes, and other insects can cause illness and lead to infected wounds. Ensure personnel shake out their clothing before getting dressed and check their boots before putting them on.

• Where possible, boots should be placed off the ground or inside a waterproof bag or other container. Ensure personnel wear the appropriate seasonal uniform with the sleeves down and apply repellent in accordance with the DOD Insect Repellent System. If possible, use insect repellents that contain DEET.
Respiratory Issues

Personnel might be exposed to asbestos, carbon monoxide, nuisance dust, or other caustic fumes. Ensure personnel have the appropriate masks available when entering buildings. If required, ensure all personnel have been fitted for the appropriate gas, mist, fume, and dust protective masks.

To minimize the spread of upper respiratory infections, have personnel sleep in alternating head-to-toe arrangements. Also establish work/rest cycles to prevent personnel from sleeping en masse. When possible, avoid establishing sleeping quarters in areas contaminated with mold and mildew. Enforce hand washing and cover the mouth when coughing or sneezing.

Some species of brush such as oleander are poisonous. Caution personnel not to inhale smoke when burning brush or other materials. Such smoke can cause respiratory problems including sickness and, in extreme cases, death.

Stress Management

Everyone involved in rescue and recovery operations, including the rescue workers and victims, are dealing with increased stress and anxiety. There is a tragic loss of life and material possessions that will affect each person involved. Personnel must seek care from a stress management team or the Red Cross when they feel overwhelmed or unable to cope with the rescue operations.

Minimum Personal Precautions

Everyone involved in rescue and cleanup operations must be aware of the risk from blood-borne pathogens. There currently is and will continue to be disease contamination at all rescue sites. Ensure personnel have current Hepatitis A and tetanus immunizations at a minimum. Precautions must be followed, and the equipment below must be provided:

- Latex or rubber gloves
- Over-garments for clothing protection
- Face masks for respiratory protection
- Goggles for eye protection from splashes or spills
- Bleach and chlorine for cleanup and decontamination of biohazards
- Biohazard bags

A collection site for contaminated items must be established. In addition, sites must be designated for showering and clothing changes before personnel leave for non-contaminated areas.

Section 3: Ground Operations

This section will address the largest area of operations. Leaders should use caution when planning out operations to reduce hazards.
Some of the areas and equipment to be considered include hard hats, advanced combat helmet, gloves, personal protective equipment (PPE), biohazard protection, respirators, water hazard protection, personal flotation devices, goggles or face shields, knee pads, etc.

**General Recovery and Rescue Operations**

- Be aware of the surroundings and not enter damaged structures.
- Be alert for exposed electrical, gas, and other utility lines.
- Wear gloves and other protective clothing.
- Avoid moving or tampering with propane tanks.
- Watch for nails, glass, and other sharp objects.
- Personnel should not attempt to recover human remains unless they are part of a recovery crew. Ensure personnel are briefed in advance on what to do if human remains are discovered.

**Electrical hazards**

Large electrical transformers might contain PCBs or cancer-causing chemicals. Electrical lines also might be energized and present a shock hazard. Ensure personnel:

- Do not attempt to move transformers during cleanup.
- Mark transformers and report their locations to the chain of command.
- Do not touch or operate near downed power lines. Electricity might be restored to downed power lines without notice. Beware of downed lines and anything touching them.
- As power is resupplied, all emergency generators must come off line. Only qualified utility or engineer personnel should conduct the changeover.
- If the downed power line is difficult to see but is in a traffic area, clearly mark the area so no one inadvertently steps on the downed wire.

**Hazardous materials**

There are many sources of hazardous materials. Remind personnel to:

- Avoid areas near damaged propane tanks, oil containers, or other chemical drums.
- Mark and report suspected waste dump sites to the chain of command and avoid such areas.

**Chain saw operations**

- Ensure operators receive training before operation, especially in procedures for cutting down trees to ensure trees fall in a safe direction.
- Enforce the wear of PPE including eye protection, hearing protection, and gloves.
• Check for nails, wire, and other metal objects before cutting.

Severe weather

Ensue that all personnel are familiar with the seasonal severe weather potentials: thunderstorms, ice storms, blizzards, etc.

Vehicle operations

Vehicle operations in this environment will be extremely dangerous. Personnel must drive defensively and be alert to potential hazards.

• Enforce the use of restraint systems by crew and passengers.

• Establish and enforce safe speed limits for various road and environmental conditions.

• Pair experienced drivers with inexperienced ones to provide supervision and hands-on training.

• Use experienced drivers in difficult terrain.

• Remind drivers to slow down in limited visibility, on rough terrain, and during inclement weather.

• Keep vehicle antennas secured to prevent contact with power lines and other objects.

• Take into account the maximum fording depth for each vehicle type, and ensure proper fording equipment and accessories are installed before entering water areas (i.e., exhaust extensions).

Preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS)

• Stress that PMCS is critical, especially under adverse or unusual conditions.

• Ensure operators perform special requirements covered in the “Operating Under Unusual Conditions” section of their respective operator’s manual.

Route reconnaissance

• When possible, conduct a physical reconnaissance of the route to avoid the worst terrain hazards. Mark unavoidable hazards on a strip map and include them in the convoy briefing.

• Reconnoiter the route for bridges or underpasses that might be too low for large vehicles.

• Caution drivers that roads, bridges, and overpasses might not be posted with weight or height restrictions.

• If possible, reconnoiter routes for hazards below the water line before operations begin.
• Check water height before driving through to ensure vehicles will not get swept away. A good rule of thumb is to not drive into running water deeper than the vehicle axle.

Ground guides

• Train drivers in the correct use of ground guides, and train all personnel in how to perform as ground guides.

• Stress the importance of ground guides in congested areas and during periods of limited visibility.

• Remind drivers to use two ground guides while backing or when their view is restricted.

• Equip ground guides with suitable lights during periods of limited visibility or darkness.

• Always use ground guides in assembly areas, displaced persons camps, etc.

• Remind drivers to keep ground guides in view at all times and to stop the vehicle if they lose sight of them.

• Instruct ground guides to never walk backward and to stay out of the path of backing vehicles.

Passenger or cargo transport

• Use fixed seating in truck cargo beds. In cargo beds without fixed seating, ensure passengers remain seated within the truck body and keep their heads, hands, and other body parts inside the vehicle cargo area.

• Ensure all personnel remain seated when being transported in the back of cargo vehicles.

• Enforce the use of troop straps when transporting personnel and ensure tailgates are secure.

Convoys

Conduct convoy briefings before any movement. The following headings should be addressed during the convoy briefing:

• General:

  ° Establish and enforce safe convoy and catch-up speeds that do not exceed the posted limits and are appropriate for expected road and environmental conditions.

  ° Set speeds based on personnel, training, terrain, environment, and equipment.

  ° Establish safe following distance guidelines. Increase following distance in bad weather or darkness.
• Establish procedures to warn approaching vehicles of vehicle stops and breakdowns.

• Mark unavoidable hazards on a strip map and include them in the pre-march briefing.

• Check loads to ensure cargo is secured correctly. Stress even load distribution, especially when traveling over sandy terrain.

• Do not place vehicles transporting troops, ammunition, or POL last in a serial or march unit.

• Ensure all prime movers and trailer brake systems are connected properly and are fully operational.

• Reinforce braking and downhill driving procedures with all operators.

• Ensure routes have proper vehicle clearance. (See the “Route reconnaissance” section of this chapter).

• Material failure:

  • During halts, emphasize tire condition and security of loads.

  • During operation, have drivers pay particular attention to air cleaner indicator and water and transmission gages.

  • Ensure operators know proper cool-down procedures for their vehicles.

  • Ensure vehicle basic issue items, pioneer tools, highway warning devices, and fire extinguishers are present on every vehicle.

  • Ensure disabled vehicles are moved completely off the roadway.

  • Conduct after-operations PMCS on each vehicle; focus on potential damage to the undercarriage and tires from road debris.

• Trail party/recovery vehicle operations:

  • Remind recovery personnel to use a braking vehicle when required by the technical manual (TM) and to always use correct hookup procedures.

  • Ensure all vehicles are equipped for self-recovery as appropriate (tow ropes/cables, rope ladders, and pierced steel planking, or other traction material to place under tires).

  • Do not allow personnel between vehicles during recovery operations.

  • Ensure personnel stay clear of tow ropes, cables, and rope ladders during operation.

  • Caution personnel to keep hands and clothing at least five feet from winches when rewinding cable after recovery operations.
ße safe towing speeds.

° Fabricate ground support devices for outrigger support in soft soil.

**Forklift operations**

- **General:**
  
  ° Require operators to wear safety belts.
  
  ° Enforce the use of ground guides in congested areas.
  
  ° Do not allow riders.
  
  ° Ensure personnel know and stay within forklift load limits.
  
  ° Check to ensure operators chock wheels before unloading.
  
  ° Do not allow personnel to park on a grade.

- **Rollover procedures:**
  
  ° Instruct operators to stay in their seat, grip the wheel, and brace their feet in the event of a rollover.
  
  ° Warn operators not to jump from the vehicle.

**Weapons handling**

- Follow proper weapons handling procedures in accordance with appropriate TMs and graphic training aids.

- Instruct personnel on the rules of engagement with regards to weapons status.

- Ensure personnel clear their weapons at designated weapons clearing points.

- Control ammunition and safeguard it from the civilian population.

- Be aware of environmental factors that might affect weapons systems and take preventive or corrective actions as necessary.

- Do not tolerate horseplay.

**Sleeping locations**

- Establish a designated sleeping area. If the situation permits, mark the perimeter with engineer tape or chem lights.

- Post unit perimeter security personnel equipped with lights for signaling. Ensure they have been briefed thoroughly on their duties and responsibilities.

- Ensure vehicles are not parked where they can roll toward sleeping personnel or on an incline without chocks.
• Do not allow personnel to sleep in or under their vehicles
• Establish dismount points beyond which vehicles may not move without ground guides.
• Require all vehicles to use ground guides, especially during periods of darkness and reduced visibility.

Tents
• Establish fire protection plans and evacuation procedures.
• Ensure operable fire extinguishers are accessible and that operators are assigned and knowledgeable.
• Require that electrical circuits be inspected routinely for possible overload conditions.
• Establish and enforce smoking areas.
• Ensure tents are anchored securely to withstand possible winds.
• To prevent trips and falls, ensure tent ropes and anchors can be seen clearly.

Mess operations
• Sanitation:
  ○ Hand washing is the single-most important measure in preventing food-borne illness and must be enforced at all times.
  ○ Ensure all food waste is disposed of properly.
  ○ Ensure food preparation areas are at least 100 meters from latrines and 50 meters from incinerators.
  ○ Ensure food is protected from contamination.
  ○ Monitor food handlers and other personnel to ensure sanitation standards are maintained.

• Fire/explosion:
  ○ Ensure kitchen fuel storage areas are at least 15 meters from working areas and are marked as hazard areas.
  ○ Ensure operable fire extinguishers are accessible (with designated operators) in mess tent areas and at stove-lighting and fuel storage areas.
  ○ Ensure all personnel fueling or operating stoves, immersion heaters, and burners are properly trained and licensed.
  ○ Make operators aware that increased heat will add pressure to fuel tanks and fuel cans and that particular attention should be given to M2 burners.
° Keep mess tent exits clear of obstructions.

**Maintenance operations**

- **Tire checks:**
  
  ° Ensure tires are checked often for cuts and wear.
  
  ° Remind drivers to check for rocks between duals and to check tire pressure often.

- **Tire repair:**
  
  ° Ensure mechanics always use an Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) approved tire cage.
  
  ° Remind mechanics to use proper tools, to keep hands out of tire cages while inflating tires, and to use extension hoses. Require the use of 10-foot inflation gauges with a locking chuck for inflating and deflating split-rim tires.
  
  ° Remind mechanics to use the buddy system when lifting, moving, and installing large tires.

- **Batteries:**
  
  ° Require the use of face shields, goggles, and aprons when servicing batteries.
  
  ° Remind personnel to keep air vents on caps clean to allow gas release and avoid pressure buildup.
  
  ° Ensure personnel check battery levels often. Battery electrolyte water evaporates faster in hot weather.
  
  ° Ensure personnel adjust battery electrolyte levels during the day.
  
  ° When batteries cool, levels will lower slightly and overflow will be avoided.
  
  ° Require the use of slave cables. Only as a last resort should jumper cables be used. Remind personnel to beware of sparks as jumper cables are attached around the battery’s gaseous vapors.
  
  ° Ensure mechanics adjust voltage regulators to the lowest setting possible to avoid overcharging.

- **POL:**
  
  ° Remind personnel to use extreme care when changing hot lubricants, which can burn skin.
  
  ° Take care to prevent contamination of POL.
• Brakes:
  - Remind mechanics to use low air pressure to remove sand and dust from brake drum areas.

• Radiators/coolant:
  - Remind personnel to use caution when removing radiator caps from hot vehicles and to check radiator fluids often to avoid overheating.
  - Personnel should not use their hands to remove caps unless the cap is cool to the touch.
  - Remind personnel to keep radiators and airflow areas clean and free of debris to avoid rupture.
  - Require that radiator caps be tested often, because the caps control radiator pressure.

• Grounding:
  - Instruct personnel to dig or drive grounding rods to a depth of six feet.
  - Remind personnel to keep the soil around grounding rods moist to increase conductivity. Keep rods, straps, and connections free of paint or oils.
  - Ensure portable electric power tools and power generation equipment is grounded properly.

Fuel handling

• Grounding and bonding:
  - Ensure proper grounding and bonding procedures are used at all times.
  - Remind personnel that hot conditions contribute to the generation of static electricity.
  - Remind personnel to ground themselves by touching a large metal object before handling fuel hoses and nozzles.
  - Ensure grounding and bonding equipment is inspected regularly.

• Tank and pump units. Remind personnel to:
  - Lubricate equipment more often and use light oil instead of grease.
  - Keep caps and covers on systems.
  - Keep pump engines clean.
  - Purge tanks, lines, and filter separators at the beginning and end of each day.
  - Re-circulate all fuels to remove water.
º Keep pressure response valves clean (compressed air).

º Watch for corrosion.

º Wear fuel-resistant or rubber gloves and protective clothing to keep fuel off the skin. (Human skin is highly susceptible to drying, cracking, and peeling if it comes in contact with fuel. Personnel should immediately change out of clothing that has been contaminated with fuel through spills or other means.)

• Fuel system supply point: Remind personnel to:
  º Not fill collapsible bags to full capacity to allow for expansion.
  º Leave hose line valves slightly open to allow for fuel expansion in the tank.
  º Keep pump engines clean and lubricate the pumps more often.
  º Use dust caps and plugs.

• Refueling operations: Ensure proper bonding and grounding procedures are used and remind personnel to:
  º Not fill vehicles to full capacity to allow for expansion.
  º Keep tank truck hatches open during refueling to allow vapors to escape.
  º Stay on the windward side to prevent being overcome by fuel vapors.
  º Close hatches immediately after refueling.
  º Use bottom load procedures when possible. (If top loading is used, use extreme caution and start the refueling procedure at a slow rate until the level of fuel has covered the hose. Thereafter, increase the flow rate slowly.)

Communications

• Antennas:
  º Remind personnel that, when erecting RC-292/OE254 antennas, they must stay twice the distance from power lines as the length of the antenna.
  º Stress that personnel have been killed by falling antenna head sections.
  º Require that personnel wear eye protection, head protection, and gloves when erecting antennas.
  º Allow no substitutes for antenna mast sections; camouflage poles have been a fatal alternative.
  º If, for any reason, an assembled antenna head must be left on the ground, ensure it is guarded, to prevent others from walking into it. Tip protectors are a must.
• Power lines:
  ° Identify power lines in operational areas to all personnel.
  ° Tie down antennas when in areas with power lines. Antenna tips should be no lower than seven feet to preclude eye injuries. Use tip protectors at all times.
  ° Warn personnel to never throw communication (commo) wire over power lines.

• Electrical storms:
  ° If possible, do not operate radios, telephones, or switchboards during storms.
  ° Disconnect electrical equipment from power sources and antennas if the situation permits.
  ° If equipment must be used, converse as little as possible, and return calls after the storm.
  ° Ensure all electrical equipment is grounded.

Material handling
• Lift and carry procedures
  ° Never carry a load heavier than can be managed with ease. When in doubt, get assistance
  ° Bend from the hips and knees, not just the waist.
  ° Carry heavy objects close to the body.

• Mounting and dismounting equipment
  * Remind personnel to maintain three points of contact while mounting or dismounting vehicles and negotiating structures.
  * Ensure areas are clear of obstructions and hazards and remind personnel to use care when vision is obstructed by objects being carried.
  * Caution personnel not to jump or step from cargo vehicles while carrying loads. Tell them to use a ramp or get help.
  * Remind personnel to use extreme care when carrying loads in loose sand or over rough surfaces.

Rail Operations
• General
  ° Assign only qualified drivers to load vehicles. Drivers must be licensed on the vehicles they are loading on the rail car.
• Require antennas to be removed or tied down and ensure internal equipment is secured.

  • Ground guides

    ° Have ground guides escort all vehicles on and off rail cars.

    ° Instruct ground guides to never walk backward and never be on the same rail car as a moving vehicle.

  • Load teams

    ° Provide gloves and correct tools for the job.

    ° Provide instruction in proper use of tools and inspect tools, blocking, lashing, spanners, and tow bars for serviceability before use.

    ° Prohibit sleeping on, in, under, or around rail cars.

Section IV: Rotary Wing Aviation Operations

Aviation safety perspective

Safety is paramount. In everyday operations, pilots require a certain amount of clear airspace to conduct approach and departure safely, especially helicopter approaches to confined areas. Pilots also require current information about wind speed and direction to operate safely at any landing site. Pilots do not need less-clear airspace, less-clear ground space, or less-current wind information simply because a disaster has occurred. While a disaster might appear to have turned the world upside down, the laws of physics still apply.

  • Before flight operations:

    ° Operate according to the crawl-walk-run philosophy, especially in unfamiliar environments.

    ° Conduct detailed planning and mission briefings regardless of pilot experience level.

    ° Conduct a CRM assessment of accidental and mission risk with special emphasis on environmental risks (altitude, cold, heat, dust/snow). Tailor risk assessment matrices (worksheets) for the aircraft type and mission to be performed.

    ° Ensure all mission changes are briefed by the appropriate briefing and approving authority. Stress the importance of not conducting unauthorized tasks and tasks not briefed beforehand to all flight crews.

    ° Establish specific crewmember duties during mission briefings.

    ° Identify aircrew coordination requirements to ensure standardized communications between crewmembers, other aircraft, and ground personnel.

    ° For rotary wing operations, establish vertical helicopter instrument recovery procedures for all areas of operation and include in mission briefings. Ensure
crews know instrument recovery airfields. Check the status of all airfields in the disaster area before departure to ensure operability of navigation aids, airfield lighting, and services.

º Tailor pre-accident plans for specific areas of operation.

º Create hazards maps for all areas of operation. Due to reconstruction and response efforts, known hazards might change or new hazards might develop with little notice. Areas known to have been clear or unobstructed might no longer be safe for landing or low-level flight.

º Require aircrew to review hazards maps and update the hazards maps often.

º Take special care when dealing with power transmission lines. Assume that all power lines, especially those downed by the disaster, are live.

º Identify all high intensity radio transmission areas.

º Ensure crewmembers adjust aviation life support equipment and personal protective equipment for over water and rescue operations. Integrate civilian authorities into mission planning whenever possible.

º Work with local airport agencies and the Federal Aeronautics Administration (FAA) regional flight district office to establish an aerial procedures guide for traffic deconfliction, fixed- and rotary-wing routes, aided and unaided traffic, and air traffic control procedures.

º Be aware that many navigation aids might not be operable in disaster-affected areas and remember their status can change quickly and without notice.

º Plan for dealing with power management issues before the flight. Disaster recovery support operations might increase the need for rotary wing aircrews to conduct downwind, formation, and steep approaches and also operate while hovering for long periods out-of-ground effect.

º Consider the possibility that some passengers might not understand oral or written English. If the mission is likely to involve transporting civilian passengers and especially evacuees, consider taking a Soldier on board who is fluent in both Spanish and English. At a minimum, consider providing the flight crew with a bilingual phrase guide for common commands and phrases.

• During flight operations:

º Be aware the disaster area might become congested with military, other governmental agency, and civilian aircraft. Emphasize the importance of scanning for other aircraft and obstacles to all crewmembers. Do not assume civilian aircraft are familiar with military flight techniques or procedures to deconflict airspace.

º Require all crewmembers to assist in obstacle clearance.

º Emphasize foreign object debris awareness when conducting operations in urban and post-natural disaster environments.
° Be prepared for nonstandard internal and external loads. Take all reasonable steps to adjust for these loads.

° Do not allow crews to develop a false sense of urgency simply because they are supporting disaster response or engaged in rescue operations.

° Conduct landing zone/pick-up zone surveys to ensure suitability for aviation operations. For special considerations with regard to aircraft landing site selection, see the “Aircraft site selection criteria” section at the end of this chapter.

° Do not trust any rooftop for landing, even if previously tested. Water damage might change load-handling capability. If you have to land on a rooftop, maintain a power setting that reduces the weight but keeps the aircraft in positive contact with the landing point.

° Consider alternative briefing techniques for passengers such as preprinted passenger briefing cards. Emphasize entry and exit of the aircraft during crew chief briefings. Be aware that you might be dealing with passengers who have never been around military or rotary-wing aircraft of any type. Do not assume these passengers understand military lingo or the basic precautions to protect themselves around Army aircraft.

° If ground rescue agencies are on site, establish communications with the ground element to facilitate air-ground integration.

° Place extra emphasis on preventing fuel contamination, especially fuel obtained from non-governmental agencies.

• After flight operations:

° Conduct all scheduled maintenance in accordance with the applicable maintenance manuals. Do not defer maintenance due to operations unless the commander or his lawful representative authorizes such.

° Thoroughly inspect all aircraft after conducting operations in unimproved areas or after conducting rescue operations.

° Update unit hazard maps after every flight, and share the information with higher headquarters and civilian agencies.

° Coordination with the FAA, specifically Flight Service, is essential. End the mission with a call to 1-800-WX-BRIEF (1-800-992-7433) informing them of any new hazards in the area of operations.

A pilot needs three things for safe operations at any helicopter landing site:

• Adequate clear airspace for approach and departure with at least one, but preferably two, departure paths

• Adequate clear space for expected ground maneuvers

• Adequate current information about wind speed and direction (a wind sock is the ideal source for such information)
Additions to these basic requirements usually depend on the facility’s purpose, resources available for development, and how often they will be used. In a disaster situation with numerous helicopters participating in response efforts, it is highly desirable to have multiple approach and departure paths into the landing zone along with multiple parking areas. These measures provide an increased safety margin and operational flexibility and also reduce operational delay. Specifically, commanders should consider the following factors when selecting aircraft sites:

- **Location.** Remember the ultimate purpose of the facility when selecting the location of a temporary or permanent emergency-use landing zone. Landing zones near the disaster site and the emergency room entrance at receiving hospitals are most desirable but not at the expense of safety, communications, and operations. The landing area should be placed far enough away from activity centers so rotor wash will not blow dust or supplies around and noise will not interfere with communications.

- **Approach and departure paths.** Like all aircraft, helicopters require clear airspace for safe operations during approach and departure. When selecting landing sites, it is critical to choose locations that provide at least the minimum airspace recommended by the FAA. Some of the most common helicopter accidents at landing sites are collisions with off-facility obstacles. Such accidents might involve collision with a tower, trees, or wires. These accidents can destroy aircraft and injure occupants. Selection of sites with additional airspace is encouraged because they provide an additional safety margin. Obstacles such as buildings, antennas, or wires must not penetrate either the approach/departure surfaces or the transitional surfaces. Aircraft operate best when taking off or landing into the wind. Thus, while one approach and departure path might be acceptable at some locations, two or more paths are recommended as a way to provide greater safety and operational flexibility during varying wind conditions. Approach and departure paths should not pass over command posts, treatment areas, or operationally congested ground areas where rotor wash and noise might interfere with communications and operations.

- **Minimum recommended size final approach and takeoff areas (FATOs).** The minimum recommended FATO size is determined by the largest aircraft expected to use the facility. Keep in mind the largest helicopter might be a military aircraft such as the CH-47. Choosing and designing landing sites that exceed the minimum requirements can increase the safety margin.

- **Minimum recommended size safety area.** The size of the safety area around the FATO is determined by the largest aircraft expected to use the facility, military or civilian. The safety area provides clearance between the FATO’s edge and buildings, trees, fences, telephone poles, wires, hillsides, or anything else that could be struck by main or tail rotors. Increasing the minimum tip clearance between helicopter rotors and objects that might be hit can increase the safety margin. This is a particular concern for objects that are hard to see (such as wires) or whose color allows them to blend into the background when visibility is poor. For nighttime operation at a temporary or unimproved landing site, a minimum tip clearance of 40 feet is recommended.

- **Wind indicator.** A means of informing the pilot of wind velocity and direction is essential at a landing zone. The recommended means is a wind sock. At facilities that are used only during disasters, choose a wind sock that can be installed quickly on a temporary basis. Placement is critical, particularly if the landing site is located near a building. Place the wind sock so it does not interfere with flight operations but still gives a true indication of wind speed and direction. In areas with swirling or varying
winds, such as near buildings or in mountainous areas, two or more carefully placed wind socks might be required for an accurate indication. A lighted wind sock should be used for night operations. Care should be taken to ensure this lighting is installed in a way that does not degrade night vision.

- **Surface slope (in degrees).** The landing surface should be flat with no bumps or depressions and level (or as near level as possible). In no case should the slope exceed ten degrees from the horizontal.

- **Surface composition.** Landing surfaces should be capable of supporting 1.5 times the heaviest helicopter’s maximum takeoff weight and be skid-resistant. All helicopter landing areas should be free of dust, loose dirt, other forms of loose debris and objects, and gravel smaller than 1.5 inches in diameter. Rotor wash can pick up and throw small gravel at significant speeds. Turf landing zones are suitable, but vegetation should be no higher than 12 to 18 inches. Wheeled helicopters are especially sensitive to soft landing surfaces. To control dust in dirt areas, wet down the landing area with a hose before landing operations begin.

- **Obstructions and obstacles.** Tie-downs and other equipment within the FATO lights should be flush with the surface. Obstacles such as signs, poles, light fixtures, or fire extinguishers should be kept well clear of helicopter maneuvering areas. This is particularly relevant for objects that are difficult to see from the air such as power or telephone lines, guy wires, and poles that blend into the background. Obstructions should be briefed to pilots and, for night operations, should be lighted in a way that will not interfere with the aircrew’s night vision. Ball markers can be effective in marking obstacles such as power lines and guy wires.

- **Lighting.** Lighting systems are necessary to support night operations. However, the installation of permanent lighting systems usually is practical only at permanent landing sites. Portable lighting systems are available commercially and can be used at temporary facilities. Flares, vehicle lights, and other light sources are acceptable field expedients if trained personnel deploy them under very carefully controlled circumstances. Special care must be taken in the placement and orientation of lighting to avoid the temporary destruction of crews’ night vision.

- **Security.** Fences and hedges can effectively restrict inadvertent or unauthorized access to permanent heliports and helipads, but they must not present a hazard to flight operations. It is absolutely essential to have specially trained personnel responsible for security at temporary landing zones. Confusion and excitement can create dangerous situations for persons on the ground and the aircraft using the facility. For on-the-scene landing areas, a vehicle barrier or very secure rope can help keep the flow of response activity away from the operational area.

- **Triage areas.** The primary concern in establishing a temporary landing zone should be aeronautical safety and efficiency of operations. In disaster situations, high priority always is placed on saving lives and relieving the suffering of casualties. Emergency landing zones should be situated close to triage areas to facilitate and expedite patient transport. However, these landing areas should not interfere with triage or medical efforts, further endanger the victims, or add to patient discomfort (noise, rotor wash, and flying debris).

- **Logistical support.** Long-term operations require support with fuel, maintenance, flight crew food, fluids, rest, etc. Planning must reflect these needs and provide a means of
obtaining the necessary resources. These logistical support requirements are built into the incident command system.

Section V: Accident Reporting

As part of the force protection effort, accidents meeting the following minimum criteria will be reported within 24 hours to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Safety Office:

- Injury to any military personnel that results in a lost workday
- Estimated damage of $2,000 or more to any military property or equipment
- Injury to any civilian resulting from military operations that requires either hospitalization of 24 hours or more or a lost workday(s)
- Estimated damage to civilian property of $2,000 or more resulting from military operations

The JTF Safety Office will be set up and will be accessible on a 24-hour basis. The phone number will be published to all units within the JTF.

The JTF Safety Office will:

- Coordinate requirements for Class A and B accident investigations according to DOD criteria (Class A=fatality, permanent total disability, or property or equipment damage estimated to exceed $1 million; Class B=permanent partial disability, three or more personnel hospitalized in one event, or property or equipment damage estimated to exceed $200,000)
- Forward required accident information to the appropriate service safety center.

At a minimum the following information is to be provided for each accident reported:

- Name of the person reporting the accident
- Point of contact telephone number
- Unit involved in the accident
- Location of the accident
- Date and time of the accident
- Name and rank of personnel involved
- Extent of injuries
- Type of property or equipment damage
- Estimated cost of damage
- Estimated environmental cost
- Description of circumstances and events
Annex O

Web Sites

For information about the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm

For training on NIMS:

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training.shtm

For information about the National Response Plan (NRP):

http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml

For Training on the NRP:

http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/IS/is800.asp

For information about the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):

http://www.fema.gov/

For training offered by FEMA:

http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/
To help you access information quickly and efficiently, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL Web site. The CALL Web site is restricted to U.S. Government and allied personnel.

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the following links on the CALL home page: “Request for Information or a CALL Product” or “Give Us Your Feedback.”

If your unit has identified lessons learned or TTP or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR Email address: call.rfimanager conus.army.mil

Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your request at: <http://call.army.mil>. Use the “Request for Information or a CALL Product” link. Please fill in all the information, including your unit name and official military address. Please include building number and street for military posts.
Access and download information from CALL's Web site. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL Archives. The CALL home page address is:

<http://call.army.mil>

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends
- Special Editions
- News From the Front
- Training Techniques
- Handbooks
- Initial Impressions Reports

You may request these publications by using the “Request for Information or a CALL Product” link on the CALL home page.

The CAC home page address is:

<http://www.leavenworth.army.mil>

**Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)**

BCKS supports the online generation, application, management, and exploitation of Army knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in order to share expertise and experience, facilitate leader development and intuitive decision making, and support the development of organizations and teams. Find BCKS at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/bcks/index.asp>.

**Center for Army Leadership (CAL)**


**Combat Studies Institute (CSI)**

CSI is a military history “think tank” that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp>.
Combined Arms Center-Training: The Road to Deployment

This site provides brigade combat teams, divisions, and support brigades the latest road to deployment information. This site also includes U.S. Forces Command’s latest training guidance and most current Battle Command Training Program COIN seminars. Find The Road to Deployment at <http://rtd.leavenworth.army.smil.mil>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/recent.htm> or <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx> (requires AKO password and ID).

United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOp)

USAIOp is responsible for developing and documenting all IO requirements for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; managing the eight personnel lifecycles for officers in the IO functional area; and coordinating and teaching the qualification course for information operations officers. Find USAIOp at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/usaiop.asp>.

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