

# Advance unedited version

Distr.: General  
5 September 2025

Original: English

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## Human Rights Council

### Sixtieth session

8 September–3 October 2025

Agenda item 2

**Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner  
for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the  
High Commissioner and the Secretary-General**

## **Sudan: A War of Atrocities**

### **Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan\***

#### *Summary*

This report documents attacks on civilians and objects essential for their survival in Sudan. It concludes that both parties to the conflict violated international human rights and humanitarian law, with most violations amounting to war crimes. The Rapid Support Forces' conduct may also constitute crimes against humanity, including persecution and extermination. The report calls for accountability and sets out a roadmap for justice.

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\* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.

## I. Mandate

1. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan submits this report pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 54/2 and 57/2. It focuses on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population and critical infrastructure and describes atrocities documented during the reporting period. It should be read in conjunction with its previous reports. It will be followed by a Conference Room Paper.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Mission is composed of three independent experts: Mohamed Chande Othman (Tanzania) - chairperson, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (Nigeria) and Mona Rishmawi (Palestine, Jordan and Switzerland). It is supported by a secretariat whose capacity is approximately 40 per cent due to the United Nations liquidity crisis.

## II. Methodology and cooperation

### A. Methodology

3. The standard of proof applied by the Mission is that of “reasonable grounds to believe”. The phrase “the Mission finds” is used when this standard is met.

4. All information gathered by the Mission is subjected to rigorous verification and corroboration, and open-source materials undergo authentication processes. Requests for cooperation by judicial and other entities are processed in line with applicable policies and procedures, and subject to victim or witness informed consent.

5. The Mission travelled to Ethiopia (10 to 14 December 2024), Uganda (1 to 18 December 2024), Chad (1 to 18 April 2025) and Kenya (20-22 February; 26-31 May 2025).

6. The Mission conducted a total of 257 interviews (120 men; 137 women) between October 2024 and July 2025. Of these 199 were conducted in person and 58 remotely. It held over 50 meetings and consultations with victims and survivors, affected communities, civil society, other stakeholders and experts.

7. The Mission verified 43 videos and geolocated 8 attacks. It reviewed information received from 147 individuals and 32 civil society organizations following the issuance of a call for submissions. It also reviewed reports from public sources, including United Nations, regional and international bodies and non-governmental organizations.

8. In February 2025, the Mission observed the ongoing trial before the District Court of Stockholm, Sweden, against two former executives of the company Lundin Oil, accused of complicity in serious human rights violations and war crimes in Sudan.

9. From 28 to 30 May 2025, it organised a consultation on accountability in Nairobi, Kenya, with the support of the Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists.

### B. Cooperation

10. The Mission sent five notes verbales to the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sudan in Geneva. On 27 November 2024 with reference to earlier correspondence, it renewed its request to visit Sudan and to meet with officials. On 19 February 2025, it reiterated this request. On 2 July, it wrote to the civilian Prime Minister, requesting a meeting and a visit to Sudan. On 28 July, it shared questions on allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, also requesting a meeting. On 22 August, it shared a draft of this report for comments. All communications remained unanswered.

<sup>1</sup> The conflict dynamics and the sources used in the report are described in an Annex, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-sudan/index>.

11. The Mission wrote to the Rapid Support Forces on 14 July 2025 requesting a meeting. On 29 July it reiterated its request and shared questions on allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. No response was received.
12. The Mission also sent notes verbales to neighbouring States requesting access to the Sudanese communities. It is grateful to Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda which provided visas.
13. In December 2024, the Mission met with African Union officials in Ethiopia, including members of its Peace and Security Council. It met with the diplomatic corps, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and United Nations.
14. The Mission deepened its collaboration with the African Union Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities and the Joint Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Union.
15. The Mission engaged with representatives of the European Union, the European Parliament and diplomats in Brussels, Belgium, and participated in events related to its mandate in Germany, Kenya, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
16. The Mission established cooperation with judicial and other entities, including the International Criminal Court.

### III. Legal developments

17. The legal framework applicable to Sudan was outlined in Mission reports. The Mission classified the conflict starting in mid-April 2023 as a non-international armed conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces as its main parties. Together with their allies, they are bound by international human rights law, article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and by Additional Protocol II of 1977, to which Sudan is a party, and customary international law. The parties signed the Jeddah Declaration, which, despite repeated calls for its full implementation, remains unimplemented.
18. International humanitarian law imposes obligations on third States. Article 1 common to the Geneva Conventions requires all High Contracting Parties to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law. States must not only ensure respect by their own armed forces, but also by other groups or persons acting on their behalf and the population as a whole. All States must refrain from providing aid or assistance to the commission of violations, and work actively to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law.
19. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council are binding. The arms embargo and sanctions regime related to Darfur under Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) and subsequent resolutions were extended for one year by resolution 2750 (2024). Targeted sanctions were imposed on several Sudanese individuals and companies affiliated to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, including by the Security Council 1591 Sanctions Committee, Canada, European Union, United Kingdom and the United States.
20. Sudan instituted proceedings at the International Court of Justice under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide against the United Arab Emirates. It requested the Court to issue provisional measures ordering the United Arab Emirates to, *inter alia*, refrain from any conduct amounting to complicity in genocide by the Rapid Support Forces. The Court upheld the United Arab Emirates' reservation to the Convention, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.
21. In January and July 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court reiterated it had reasonable grounds to believe that international crimes continue to be committed in Darfur. It announced that steps were being taken to request arrest warrants. In December 2024, closing arguments were delivered in the trial of Mr. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman. All other suspects remain at large, including former President Omar Al Bashir.

22. Accountability efforts are ongoing within several domestic jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, a war crimes dossier concerning the Rapid Support Forces and international complicity was submitted to the relevant authorities. In the United States, legal proceedings were initiated against BNP Paribas, accused of violating sanctions and assisting Sudan's Government in committing international crimes between 1997 and 2011. In Sweden, the landmark trial against two former Lundin Oil executives for complicity in war crimes between 1999 and 2003 is ongoing, highlighting control over resources as a root cause of Sudan's recurring conflicts.

## IV. Main findings

23. As the conflict in Sudan intensifies, parties not only failed to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, but rendered civilians primary targets. The Mission documented widespread violence against individuals and communities, including killings, mass displacement, detention, enforced disappearance, and sexual violence. Civilian infrastructure suffered extensive damage, with medical centres, schools, markets, food production systems, electricity stations, and displacement camps under attack.

### A. Violations against life and personal integrity

24. The Mission finds that both warring parties and allies targeted civilians. Civilians and individuals taking no active part in hostilities were killed and injured through shelling and attacks on displacement camps, checkpoints, roads, and convoys, as well as retaliatory assaults based on perceived allegiances. They also faced torture, arbitrary detention and sexual violence.

#### 1. Attacks on civilians

25. From the beginning of the siege by the Rapid Support Forces of El Fasher in May 2024, El Fasher and surrounding areas were repeatedly shelled by both warring parties. Over 470,000 persons have been displaced from El Fasher city and its surroundings, including from Shagra, Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps.

26. The Abu Shouk displacement camp, north of El Fasher, has become a target of shelling by the Rapid Support Forces since mid-July 2024 and intensified in 2025. Between 20 January and 31 March, multiple artillery strikes killed over 80 persons, injured others, and caused severe damage to property, triggering displacement. On 10 April 2025, the Rapid Support Forces intensified its shelling on Abu Shouk when shelling occurred almost daily, killing dozens of civilians and causing massive damage. Overall, more than 300 people have reportedly been killed in Abu Shouk. Most civilians in the camp were from non-Arab communities.

27. Since May 2024, the Zamzam displacement camp, south of El Fasher, was also regularly shelled by the Rapid Support Forces. The Rapid Support Forces associate certain communities, particularly the Zaghawa, with the joint forces allied to the Sudanese Armed Forces which are present in the area. One witness noted: "They burned everything. They claimed they only wanted to fight soldiers, but they punished the whole community. It felt like they wanted to remove us because of who we are." Shelling intensified by late 2024 and particularly on 11 and 12 February 2025, when the Rapid Support Forces stormed the camp. At least 30 persons were killed and 21 injured. Property was looted.

28. From 11 to 13 April 2025, the Rapid Support Forces and allies launched a large-scale ground offensive on the camp. A large military convoy entered the camp, firing randomly, killing and injuring many. Members or perceived associates of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Joint Forces were summarily executed. Estimates of the number of persons killed range from 300 to 1500, with over 157 wounded, the majority women and children. By the time the Rapid Support Forces took control, parts of the camp were burned, and all facilities were destroyed. Over 400,000 inhabitants, about 81 per cent of the camp's population, were again displaced, with many fleeing towards Tawilah or back to El Fasher.

29. The Rapid Support Forces also attacked civilian convoys. In mid-January 2025, the Rapid Support Forces attacked a convoy of 42 to 60 vehicles close to the Chadian border. They were largely from non-Arab communities fleeing from Tawilah to Tine in Chad. The convoy had been assured safe passage through areas under control of the Rapid Support Forces and was escorted by neutral forces. At a checkpoint at the entrance of Kabkabiya, it was ordered to stop. Members of the Rapid Support Forces and affiliates surrounded the vehicles and opened fire on the convoy. The sudden attack caused panic. Civilians attempted to escape, but at least 30 were killed. Others were captured, detained and subjected to physical assaults until their families paid ransom.

30. On the road or at checkpoints as they were fleeing, many civilians, including children, were killed, beaten, robbed, and subjected to racial slurs by the Rapid Support Forces. The main victim groups of these attacks were the non-Arab communities Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit and Tunjur.

### **Findings**

31. The Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and allies continued coordinated, large-scale attacks on civilians as part of a deliberate policy targeting non-Arab communities. These operations, some involving large scale killings and forced displacement, constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law, intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction based on race or ethnicity, including violence to life and person, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, terrorizing populations and forcing civilian displacement. They also violate international human rights law, particularly the rights to life and non-discrimination.

32. The Mission finds that acts carried out by the Rapid Support Forces, occurring in the context of and directly linked to the non-international armed conflict, amount to war crimes, including violence to life and person, in particular murder, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and forcing displacement of civilians. Given its widespread and systematic character and the existence of an underlying policy, the Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces also committed crimes against humanity, notably murder, torture, forced displacement, persecution on ethnic grounds, and other inhumane acts.

## **2. Reprisals**

33. The Mission finds that civilians were targeted by both parties and their respective allies, because of their real or perceived affiliation with the opposite side.

### **Rapid Support Forces and allies**

34. In early October 2024, after the Joint Forces allied to the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked and captured a base of the Rapid Support Forces in Bir Maza, North Darfur, The Rapid Support Forces and allies attacked Kutum locality, targeting several villages between Kutum town and Anka, perceived as sympathetic to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Towns and villages, including Breidik, Bir Maza, and Anka, were looted and burned. By late November 2024, an estimated 4,630 households had been displaced from Kutum locality. Over 50 individuals were killed, primarily from Zaghawa and Tunjur communities.

35. Following the defection of Commander Abu Aqla Keikel and his Sudan Shield Forces from the Rapid Support Forces to the Sudanese Armed Forces on 20 October 2024, the Rapid Support Forces launched attacks in Keikel's stronghold in East Gezira. Over 30 towns and villages including Tamboul, Rufaa, al Sireha and al-Hilaliya, were targeted. Witnesses reported extra-judicial killings, beatings, widespread looting and rape. The Rapid Support Forces entered Tamboul in vehicles and on motorbikes, shooting at residents with heavy machine guns, entering houses, beating and insulting residents for the perceived celebration of Keikel's defection. By November 2024, the Rapid Support Forces reportedly killed hundreds including 80 in al Sireha alone. Over 130,000 people fled their homes.

### Sudanese Armed Forces and allies

36. After the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies recaptured Gezira in January 2025, reprisals targeted particularly the Kanabi community, that it accused of siding with the Rapid Support Forces. From 9 to 12 January 2025, the Sudan Shield Forces attacked several Kanabi villages, including Tayba and Dar al-Salam al-Hideba. They arrived in armed vehicles, shooting and killing unarmed civilians, burning homes, and looting property and livestock. In Tayba alone, at least 26 individuals, including a child, were killed. Perpetrators used racial slurs against victims such as “abeed” (slaves) and “gharaba” (foreigners). In Dar al-Salam al-Hideba, at least 16 individuals were killed and many houses looted and burned. Some remain missing. Most residents were forced to flee and were prevented from returning to their village.

37. During the retaking of Wad Madani, between 12 and 25 January 2025, videos verified by the Mission show individuals in army fatigues beating a civilian on crutches. Another man was beaten, thrown from a bridge and then shot. Other videos show individuals beaten while accused of supporting the Rapid Support Forces. Some perpetrators appeared in Baraa bin Malik Brigade uniforms. One perpetrator can be heard saying “this is in revenge for all our martyrs”.

38. Verified videos also document violent reprisals by the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies while advancing towards and recapturing Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri. They show men in uniforms of the Sudanese Armed Forces or allied forces beating and killing individuals in civilian clothes, accused of being members of the Rapid Support Forces. One video, dated 8 January 2025, shows individuals in army uniforms in Umbada, south Omdurman, beating a man in civilian clothes while saying “This guy is Rapid Support Forces and Kafir-infidel” before shooting and killing him. Another video, dated 19 February 2025, shows several detained men blindfolded and tied together while soldiers beat them with sticks while chanting slurs for supporting the Rapid Support Forces. On 25 March 2025, also in Umbada, six individuals in army uniforms are seen dragging an injured young man in civilian clothes and then shooting him. A man in civilian clothes decapitated the body with a knife and held the victim's head, while others chanted “Allahu Akbar”. On 27 March 2025, two individuals in army uniforms publicly executed an individual in civilian clothes for suspected collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces on Siteen street, Al Jereif West, Khartoum.

39. The Mission received credible reports that it continues to investigate, of similar targeting by the Sudanese Armed Forces and allies of the Arab Rizeigat community in Sennar based on their perceived allegiance with the Rapid Support Forces.

### Findings

40. The Mission finds that the parties, and their allies, carried out large-scale attacks against civilians in North Darfur, Gezira and/or Khartoum. Civilians were deliberately targeted based on their ethnicity and/or perceived affiliation with the opposing side. The Mission documented killings, some at a large scale, executions, and injuring of civilians. These acts constitute serious international humanitarian law violations intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction based on race or ethnicity, including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, and measures designed to terrorize populations.

41. The Mission recorded collective punishment, reprisals, and conflict-related displacement. The Sudanese Armed Forces, in some cases with civilian involvement, were responsible for desecration of the dead and exposing victims to public curiosity. Executions of civilians or persons hors de combat without judicial guarantees violate international humanitarian law. The Mission finds that these practices also violate international human rights law, including the rights to life, liberty, security of person, freedom from torture, non-discrimination, and guarantees of fair trial and due process.

42. Accordingly, the Mission finds that both parties committed war crimes, including violence to life and person, intentionally directing attacks against civilians, or persons hors de combat, collective punishment or reprisals against civilians, and forced displacement of civilians.

43. It also finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces perpetrated the war crimes of carrying out executions without previous judgement or judicial guarantees and outrages on personal dignity by desecration of the dead. The Rapid Support Forces also committed crimes against humanity, in particular murder, persecution on ethnic grounds, forced displacement, and other inhumane acts.

### **3. Arbitrary detention, torture and inhumane treatment**

44. The Mission finds that both parties detained individuals arbitrarily without charge or legal process, and subjected them to torture, inhumane and degrading treatment, and inhumane conditions.

#### **Rapid Support Forces**

45. The Rapid Support Forces detained civilians in Darfur, Khartoum and other parts of Sudan under its control in military bases, police stations, prisons, and civilian infrastructure that were converted into detention facilities.

46. Most detainees were arrested at their homes or checkpoints. They were held incommunicado without access to legal representation or communication with, or visits by their families. None were charged nor appeared before a court.

47. Guards of the Rapid Support Forces subjected them to severe beatings with whips. One interviewee stated he was beaten, whipped, and drenched with cold water for several hours until he lost consciousness. The beating continued for three days.

48. Detainees were held in crowded facilities without access to adequate food and sanitation or medical care, including in Soba prison in Khartoum and central prison in Zalingei. Those detained in Soba Prison described it as a "slaughterhouse" stating that between June and October 2024, at least 50 detainees died due to torture, malnutrition and lack of medical care. Some were forced to work in construction or prepare meals for the guards.

49. Families of some detainees had to pay ransom to secure their release. One witness, held near Nyala between February and August 2024, stated a guard told him he could 'buy his freedom'. He managed to relate a message to his wife who paid around 500,000 Sudanese pounds (833 USD) for his release. He was threatened with consequences if he disclosed being held by the Rapid Support Forces.

50. Guards of the Rapid Support Forces executed detainees, including seven detainees in a military base of the Rapid Support Forces in North Darfur in May 2024. Verified videos depict armed men wearing Rapid Support Forces uniforms beating a large group of approximately 15 to 25 male detainees with sticks and whips and then shooting them in Salha, Omdurman, on or around 27 April 2025.

#### **Sudanese Armed Forces**

51. Arrests carried by the Sudanese Armed Forces were mainly based on suspicion of collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces. In areas retaken by the Sudanese Armed Forces or at army checkpoints, many who lived under control of the Rapid Support Forces were stopped, beaten and detained for alleged association with the Rapid Support Forces. Former detainees reported their incommunicado detention and the lack of due process and judicial oversight. Only one of them appeared before a judge, which led to his release following more than two months of detention.

52. Individuals recounted horrific details while in detention facilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces. In military intelligence facilities in Sinja, Sennar, in May 2024 detainees were beaten with water pipes while tied. In the White Nile military base, daily beatings with sticks, whips, punches, and kicks also took place.

53. In Serkab prison in Karari, Omdurman, a victim was hit with a hammer upon arrival. He was interrogated about his connections with the Rapid Support Forces while being forced

to sit naked on a metal chair, with weights attached to his genitals, while two masked men administered electric shocks. Another victim, arrested in El Fasher in April 2025, was beaten by six soldiers for denying collaboration with the Rapid Support Forces. He was later held in solitary confinement for 20 days before being released.

54. Witnesses also reported the lack of adequate food, sanitation and medical care in army detention facilities. For instance, in Serkab prison, some prisoners slept standing due to the overcrowded cells.

### Findings

55. The Mission finds that both parties arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians, subjecting them to inhumane conditions and severe physical and mental suffering for purposes of intimidation, coercion, punishment, or discrimination. The Rapid Support Forces carried out executions and caused deaths in detention. These acts constitute serious international humanitarian law violations, including violence to life and person and outrages upon dignity, as well as violations of international human rights law, notably the prohibitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the rights to life, liberty, security, health, and adequate food.

56. The Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces forced detainees into labour, or demanded ransom for their release, amounting to hostage-taking and forced labour practices in violation of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

57. Accordingly, the Mission finds that both parties perpetrated war crimes, including violence to life and person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and outrages upon personal dignity. The Rapid Support Forces also perpetrated the war crimes of murder and hostage-taking. Given its widespread and systematic character, the acts of the Rapid Support Forces may also amount to crimes against humanity, including imprisonment or severe deprivation of liberty, requiring further investigation.

## 4. Sexual and gender-based violence

58. The Mission received an overwhelming volume of information and evidence on sexual violence, including rape, gang rape, forced nudity, abduction, sexual slavery and forced marriage. Members of the Rapid Support Forces were identified as the primary perpetrators, but members of the Sudanese Armed Forces were also implicated. While predominantly directed at women and girls, some victims were men and boys.

### Rapid Support Forces

59. The Rapid Support Forces used sexual violence as a deliberate tactic to humiliate and subjugate women, girls, and entire communities. Such violence is rooted in racism, prejudice and extreme cruelty, and violence has become a defining feature of the conflict. It is enabled by widespread impunity.

60. Sexual violence occurred throughout Sudan's conflict zones including Bahri, El Fasher, Gezira, Khartoum, Kordofan, Kornoi, Nyala, Omdurman and Zamzam. It took place in streets, public squares, homes, abandoned buildings, and forested areas. In some incidents, multiple perpetrators in Rapid Support Forces uniforms raped women and girls. In June 2025, one survivor fleeing from El Fasher was stopped at a checkpoint of the Rapid Support Forces between Shagra and Tawilah. She was taken to an abandoned building, along with several other women and girls aged 15 to 17, where they were all raped. Some raped women were visibly pregnant while others became pregnant as a result.

61. Forced nudity was also documented, particularly in Khartoum and Gezira. Girls were reportedly stripped at checkpoints manned by the Rapid Support Forces under the pretext of being searched. A male victim reported being forced to remain naked for three consecutive days while detained by the Rapid Support Forces in Khartoum.

62. The Rapid Support Forces systematically carried out abductions in areas under their control for sexual exploitation purposes. This violence was especially prevalent between May 2023 and February 2025 in North and South Darfur and Khartoum. In El Fasher, in April



2024, two sisters and three girls were abducted from their house, blindfolded and taken to a Rapid Support Forces camp where they were repeatedly raped over three days. Witnesses reported women and girls being forced into Rapid Support Forces vehicles. Many are reported missing. There are allegations, requiring further investigation, of the Rapid Support Forces trafficking and selling women and girls. One interviewee saw 28 young women with their hands tied being brought by the Rapid Support Forces to the Al-Daman hotel in Nyala in May 2023, allegedly to be sold.

63. Forced marriage is another form of gender-based violence. It has been documented particularly in Khartoum and Gezira between May 2023 and December 2024. Members of the Rapid Support Forces appear to have coerced families, often during home raids, into “marrying” off girls as young as 12. The coercion included killing or injuring family members, or threats of such violence.

64. Sexual violence often has an ethnic dimension. The Rapid Support Forces mostly targeted women and girls belonging to non-Arab communities in North Darfur, including the Zaghawa and Fur, often associating them with the Joint Forces allied to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Racial slurs were used to dehumanize victims. In some cases, perpetrators apparently stated that rape was intended to “improve” the victims’ race. Information was also received about children born out of rape and that many such children have been abandoned or remain undocumented. More investigation is needed in this area.

65. The persistence and recurrence of violent sexual acts across multiple regions and time frames indicate a systemic pattern. Access to medical and psychological services for survivors of sexual violence remains limited mainly due to the collapse of the healthcare system within Sudan and decreased support in displacement. Many women and girls only sought help after fleeing to neighbouring countries.

#### **Sudanese Armed Forces**

66. The Mission received evidence that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces committed sexual violence in White Nile, Blue Nile, Khartoum and Northern State. Documented incidents include rape, sexual harassment, and sexualized torture of women and men, particularly during detention or while fleeing. An example is the case of a man detained for months by the Sudanese Armed Forces in Khartoum in 2024 and subjected to sexualized torture, including electrocution to his genitals, mentioned earlier.

67. The Mission continues to investigate rape and other forms of sexual violence by the Sudanese Armed Forces. These violations appear to be underreported for fear of retaliation and perceived sympathy towards the Sudanese Armed Forces in some areas.

#### **Findings**

68. The Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces continued large-scale rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, often targeting victims based on their combined gender and ethnic identity. These acts, including forced nudity of men in detention, constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law, intersecting with the prohibition of adverse distinction, including violence to life and person (in particular cruel treatment and torture), outrages upon personal dignity, in particular rape and indecent assault, and adverse distinction, as well as collective punishment on intersecting gender and ethnic grounds.

69. Under international human rights law, this conduct violates the rights of victims, including children and family members who witnessed the violence, to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to physical and mental health, including reproductive rights, and to non-discrimination. The Mission confirmed a pattern of deprivation of liberty, including forced marriage of women and children for sexual purposes, where perpetrators appear to exercise ownership over the victims, amounting to sexual slavery.

70. Accordingly, the Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces committed war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, rape and sexual slavery. The Mission finds that this conduct formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians and constitutes crimes against humanity, including torture, enslavement, rape,

sexual slavery and comparable sexual violence, persecution on intersecting ethnic and gender grounds, and other inhumane acts.

## **B. Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure**

71. The Mission has documented a consistent pattern of attacks on civilian infrastructure and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Hospitals, markets, water sources and electricity systems were damaged. These attacks have had a devastating impact on civilians, denying them access to healthcare, food, clean water and shelter. Food insecurity increased due to the inability of farmers to reach their fields, and because seeds were not distributed due to the conflict.

### **1. Attacks on food systems and other critical infrastructure**

#### **Rapid Support Forces**

72. The Rapid Support Forces and their allies systematically targeted civilians and civilian objects, including dwellings, markets, shops and food sources, as well as critical infrastructure, including water and electricity systems, across Sudan. Ground operations were accompanied by widespread looting, including of personal items, livestock, warehouses, generators, solar panels, and water pumps.

73. The Rapid Support Forces repeatedly shelled civilian neighbourhoods in areas under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces in the southern and western parts of El Fasher city, mostly inhabited by non-Arab communities, destroying homes and infrastructure, and killing many civilians in houses, hospitals, markets and streets. In particular, the al-Wahda and al-Thawra neighbourhoods were targeted and destroyed. Shelling intensified towards late 2024 until today, damaging residential areas and houses. The Rapid Support Forces also launched ground attacks on several El Fasher neighbourhoods, as well as nearby villages and towns, including Borush on 25 January 2025, and Shagra on 27 February, killing civilians, and destroying and looting property. Shagra was burned down.

74. The Rapid Support Forces also struck markets. On 23 September 2024, shelling by the Rapid Support Forces struck Sabreen Market in Karari, Omdurman, killing at least 15 civilians. A second attack on 1 February 2025 on the same market killed 54 to 60 civilians and wounded about 158. In North Darfur, particularly in and around El Fasher, repeated shelling of local markets, including the Al Mawashi livestock market on 3–4 July 2024 and 26 September 2024, jointly killing over 40 civilians damaged the livestock market and livelihoods. In the Abu Shouk displacement camp, the Rapid Support Forces repeatedly shelled the market, including in August, November and December 2024, in January, on 5 March, 18 May and 4 June 2025, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging food stalls and supplies.

75. In North Darfur, ground attacks launched by the Rapid Support Forces were documented in 2024 and 2025, including on Zamzam, Abu Zeriga, Um Hejalij, Tabit, and Dar al-Salaam. In October and November 2024, attacks by the Rapid Support Forces on Kutum, Breidik, Bir Maza and Anka led to markets and surrounding homes set ablaze, widespread looting, and villages burned. On 11–12 February 2025, during assaults on Zamzam displacement camp, the Rapid Support Forces and allies burned large parts of the market and looted food, livestock, and vehicles. Individuals bringing food into the camp were also targeted: some were killed, while others were robbed of their goods. These recurring operations destroyed essential trading infrastructure and hampered access to vital goods.

76. The Rapid Support Forces attacked Sudan's electricity infrastructure. Early April 2025, drone strikes launched by the Rapid Support Forces hit the Merowe Dam power station, disrupting supply across northern Sudan. On 14 May, drone strikes destroyed several power stations in Omdurman, causing widespread blackouts. El Fasher's grid has been a frequent target, with repeated strikes causing prolonged interruptions to electricity and internet services.

77. The Rapid Support Forces targeted water infrastructure, particularly around El Fasher. Late May 2024, it briefly seized the Golo water reservoir, El Fasher's primary water source,

and shut down pumps. In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces damaged water facilities and supply lines in Shagra, exacerbating El Fasher's water shortages. Attacks by the Rapid Support Forces on Abu Shouk and Zamzam displacement camps further disrupted access to safe water; by mid-2025, many local water towers and pumps were destroyed or non-functional.

78. Farmland and crops were also violently grazed, destroyed or burned by the Rapid Support Forces and allies. Between 31 March and 15 April 2024, Berka and eight other villages and surrounding agricultural land, west of El Fasher, were subjected to arson and destruction. Crops were also forcibly grazed in Mahajirya, East Darfur in late 2024.

#### **Sudanese Armed Forces**

79. The Sudanese Armed Forces destroyed civilian property and infrastructure, particularly through shelling and airstrikes on areas held by the Rapid Support Forces.

80. The Sudanese Armed Forces frequently conducted attacks on civilian neighbourhoods, particularly in East El Fasher, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging their houses and property. As civilians began to flee, the Rapid Support Forces occupied houses and schools, resulting in the Sudanese Armed Forces shelling entire residential areas, causing extensive casualties and widespread damage to civilian property and infrastructure. One witness described how, in October 2024, his house was hit by an airstrike, killing his siblings.

81. Markets across North Darfur have suffered deadly airstrikes of the Sudanese Armed Forces. On 4 October 2024, airstrikes launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces on El Koma market near El Fasher reportedly killed at least 45 civilians, including 13 children, and injured hundreds. The entire market was engulfed in flames and destroyed. Multiple surrounding structures, including health facilities and water sources, were also damaged. El Koma market was struck again on 1 June 2025, killing dozens of civilians.

82. The Sudanese Armed Forces also struck the market and wells in nearby Mellit multiple times after the Rapid Support Forces took control of it, including on 26 April 2024, when the water wells were hit, thereby killing hundreds of camels, and 2 September, when the Al-Aish market was hit, killing 14 persons, severely disrupting trade activities and food access. On 9 December 2024, a strike on the Kabkabiya market killed over 100 civilians. Verified videos show the market destroyed with damaged buildings, burned shops, smoke, and wounded civilians being pulled from under the rubble by other civilians.

83. On 24 March 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the Tora market, north of El Fasher, during peak hours, setting fire to the market, livestock, cattle and people, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, largely women and children, and many animals, and destroying numerous livestock. The Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly using imprecise barrel bombs. The consequences were catastrophic, as Tora was among the last accessible food sources in the area.

84. The Sudanese Armed Forces also hit markets in other parts of Sudan, including the Fur Market in Al-Hasahisa, Gezira, on 7 October 2024, killing over 100 civilians.

#### **Findings**

85. The Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies engaged in large-scale looting, pillage, and destruction of objects essential to civilian survival, including the burning of camps and towns. These acts deprived civilians of food, water, and housing, violating international humanitarian law and economic, social, and cultural rights.

86. It finds that both parties failed to take sufficient measures to minimize the impact of airstrikes and artillery on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including markets. Indiscriminate attacks risking civilian lives violate international humanitarian law and human rights law as well as international criminal law.

87. The Mission finds that the Rapid Support Forces and their allies perpetrated war crimes, including pillage and intentionally directing attacks against civilians. Combined with the denial of humanitarian relief supplies, they also committed the war crime of intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving the civilian population of objects

indispensable to their survival. These acts may also constitute crimes against humanity, including persecution on ethnic and political grounds, forced displacement, and other inhumane acts and contributing to extermination.

## 2. Attacks on medical facilities

88. The Mission finds that attacks on, or in the vicinity of medical infrastructure by both parties caused the near-total collapse of the healthcare system across Sudan.

89. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and other organisations documented several hundred attacks on health care infrastructure since the beginning of the conflict. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, reported that as of 30 June 2025, less than 25 per cent of the health facilities remained operational in the worst-affected areas. Over half of the reported attacks occurred during the siege of El Fasher. By March 2025, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that over 200 health facilities in El Fasher were no longer operational. The destruction of these essential services has left civilians without access to urgent care. More than 20 million people are in need of health care, amid escalating medical needs due to injury, malnutrition, and disease.

### Rapid Support Forces

90. The Rapid Support Forces carried out large-scale and systematic attacks on medical facilities across Sudan, including Gezira, Khartoum and North Darfur, attacking hospitals, looting medical supplies, and killing medical care professionals, leading to widespread closures, death, and the collapse of healthcare provision.

91. Around El Fasher, in particular, attacks on health infrastructure escalated from May 2024. Al Janoubi Hospital in southern El Fasher, which was one of the last two surgical-capacity facilities, was repeatedly attacked from 25 May until 8 June, killing several individuals.

92. On 8 June 2024, fighters of the Rapid Support Forces entered the hospital, opening fire on staff and patients, looting medical supplies and taking an ambulance. Family members attempting to evacuate patients were shot at. This attack led to the closure of the hospital.

93. Al-Saudi Maternal Teaching Hospital, in western El Fasher, was also repeatedly shelled. From March 2024 onwards, artillery shelling damaged the facility and injured civilians. On 19 May, the maternity ward was struck; on 21 June, the shelling killed a pharmacist and four others; on 27 June, an attack damaged the pharmacy and water tanks. Additional attacks on 29 July killed three and injured 25. On 11 August, another attack killed one person, injured five and damaged the surgical ward. Between October and December 2024, continued strikes caused severe structural damage to the hospital and more casualties. On 24 January 2025, a drone strike launched by the Rapid Support Forces killed over 70 people and destroyed its emergency and surgical wards, rendering the hospital non-operational.

94. Smaller clinics in and around El Fasher were forced to close due to destruction, insecurity, or looting. Patients often required transfer amidst dangerous conditions as the Rapid Support Forces increased control of roads.

95. In northern El Fasher, the Police Hospital was shelled in August 2024, injuring civilians and destroying the facility, which was subsequently abandoned. In Baradik, the local clinic was burned down by the Rapid Support Forces in November 2024.

96. Medical infrastructure in displacement camps was similarly decimated. In Abu Shouk, all medical facilities, including a private clinic, an emergency volunteer unit, and a malnutrition treatment centre, were destroyed in April and June 2024.

97. In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces shelled and raided multiple hospitals in Khartoum, including the Al-Nau Hospital in Omdurman killing at least six civilians. In late November 2024, the Rapid Support Forces attacked Al-Hilaliya in Gezira, looting health facilities, and threatening to kill health workers.

98. Medical personnel were directly targeted. Since the start of the conflict, at least 159 health workers were reportedly attacked, while others were arrested. Most of these cases were attributed to the Rapid Support Forces. For example, one doctor was killed in his home in al

Thawra in El Fasher, and another was abducted to treat wounded fighters. In Kutum, the Rapid Support Forces occupied the hospital and threatened staff, demanding preferential treatment for their wounded fighters. On 24 December 2024 and 10 January 2025, during patient transfers to El Fasher, *Médecins sans frontières* (MSF) ambulance staff were shot at, forcing MSF to suspend operations. On 11 April 2025, fighters of the Rapid Support Forces shot and killed 11 International Relief clinic staff and injured several more in Zamzam.

### **Sudanese Armed Forces**

99. The Sudanese Armed Forces also launched attacks on hospitals or in their vicinity, including in Khartoum and North Darfur, with serious consequences. For example, on 11 May 2024, an airstrike landed roughly 50 meters from the Babiker Nahar Paediatric Hospital in El Fasher killing two children and a caregiver and injuring others. MSF had to suspend operations in what was one of the few children's hospitals in the country. The facility was eventually closed.

100. On 28 May 2024, airstrikes launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces caused fire to Kutum Hospital in North Darfur, destroying the maternity ward and major infrastructure. Several patients and staff were killed or injured, and the hospital was rendered inoperable.

101. On 21 June 2025, the Sudanese Armed Forces bombed the Mujlad Referral Hospital in West Kordofan, killing at least 41 and wounding dozens more. The hospital remains only partially operational.

### **Findings**

102. The Mission finds that the parties violated the protections afforded to medical facilities and personnel. It finds that the Rapid Support Forces made medical units, transports, and the wounded and sick the object of attack and compelled medical staff to perform tasks of prioritise patients on non-medical grounds. These acts constitute prohibited acts under international humanitarian law and human rights law, including the rights to life and to physical and mental health.

103. The Mission finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces failed to take sufficient measures to minimize the impact of airstrikes and artillery on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and medical facilities. Indiscriminate attacks risking civilian lives violate international humanitarian law and human rights law as well as international criminal law.

104. The Mission further finds that the Rapid Support Forces perpetrated war crimes, including violence to life and person and intentionally directing attacks against hospitals and locations where the wounded and sick are collected. Taken together with other findings, these acts may also constitute the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against civilians, forcing civilian displacement, the use of starvation as a method of warfare, as well as crimes against humanity, including persecution on ethnic grounds, forced displacement and contributing to extermination.

### **3. Attacks on humanitarian workers and facilities**

105. Humanitarian workers and facilities were targeted or caught in the crossfire. Between April 2023 and April 2025, more than 84 Sudanese humanitarian workers were reportedly killed.

106. On 15 April 2023, several World Food Programme (WFP) staff members were killed following clashes between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces in Kabkabiya. The Rapid Support Forces also looted WFP vehicles and cash intended for aid. On 19 December 2024, three WFP workers were killed as a result of an aerial bombardment that hit the WFP Field Office Compound in Yabus, Blue Nile State.

107. In May 2024, armed groups attacked a convoy of three vehicles marked with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) emblem in Layba, East Jebel Marra, South Darfur, resulting in the killing of two ICRC drivers and injuring three other staff.

108. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that a team of an international non-governmental organisation was abducted by armed men in June 2025 while visiting Nertiti, in Central Darfur. The were released after a few days.

109. An alarming incident that the Mission continues to investigate concerns a drone attack on a joint WFP and the UNICEF humanitarian convoy in the night of 2 June 2025. The convoy was carrying food supplies for El Fasher, at El Koma in North Darfur. The attack killed five humanitarian workers, injured several others and damaged life-saving humanitarian supplies. According to WFP, the parties were aware of the whereabouts and route of the convoy. The trucks were marked with WFP and UNICEF banners. The convoy had been stopped in El Koma by the Rapid Support Forces, which controlled the area, and was waiting for permission to proceed to El Fasher.

110. United Nations entities and international non-governmental organisations continue to face administrative challenges, which frustrate their operations, including delays in issuing visas and travel authorizations. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that in May 2025 only 110 visas were approved out of the of 355 pending visa requests, while the backlog is increasing.

### **Findings**

111. The Mission finds that attacks on humanitarian facilities, convoys, and workers, along with imposed bureaucratic restrictions, significantly impeded humanitarian operations, resulting in the denial of humanitarian access, particularly as part of prohibited siege tactics of El Fasher and surrounding areas. Despite Security Council resolutions 2724 (2024) and 2736 (2024) obliging parties to allow rapid, safe, and unhindered passage of humanitarian relief, both parties continued actions contrary to their international humanitarian law obligations.

112. The Mission finds that these violations, together with intentionally directing attacks on civilians and the destruction of objects indispensable to their survival, have contributed to famine and starvation in and around El Fasher. It finds that the Rapid Support Forces, through the siege of El Fasher and its surroundings, committed the war crime of intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies. The combined effect of deprivation of access to food and medicine and attack on and obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the Rapid Support Forces may also amount to the crime against humanity of extermination.

## **4. Attacks on places of worship and culture**

113. The Mission received credible allegations of attacks on places of worship by both warring parties and is planning additional investigations on this topic.

114. The Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly bombed the Sheikh El Jeili Mosque in Wad Madani in October 2024, and the Sheikh Elsidiq Mosque in Khartoum North in December 2024. Later that same month, an airstrike launched by the Sudanese Armed Forces damaged the Al Ezba Baptist Church, its nursery and residential buildings in Khartoum North.

115. In June 2025, the Rapid Support Forces reportedly shelled three Christian churches in El Fasher. The Rapid Support Forces reportedly also looted churches and pressured Christians from the Nubian community to convert to Islam.

## **C. The socioeconomic toll**

116. The conflict has triggered one of Sudan's worst humanitarian crises, marked by relentless violence, destruction of infrastructure, collapse of food systems, and deliberate obstruction of aid, leaving civilians in acute peril.

117. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the conflict caused the world's fastest-growing displacement crisis. As of early July 2025, nearly 12.1 million persons have been forcibly displaced, of whom 7.6 million are within Sudan and 4.2 million in other countries.

118. Disruptions to food supply chains and agricultural production, as well as delays and administrative challenges in delivering aid have resulted in widespread hunger and malnutrition, with some areas facing famine conditions. According to the WFP, Sudan is on the brink of becoming the world's most severe hunger emergency in recent history.

Approximately 24.6 million, half of Sudan's population, are experiencing acute food insecurity. In the Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps the situation is particularly dire. The Rapid Support Forces cut all critical food and water supplies in the camps. Witnesses described that in Zamzam, access to food and water deteriorated sharply by March 2025 and that basic items like oil, lentils, sugar and water were scarce and unaffordable, leading to malnourishment, dehydration and death, in particular of children. Furthermore, witness recounted seeing civilians dying in the streets from hunger while moving from one shelter to another.

119. The Mission documented the devastating impact of the siege of the Rapid Support Forces on El Fasher. The Rapid Support Forces severely restricted supply entry and targeted key infrastructure, resulting in widespread food and water shortages. Lack of food and water is a leading cause of death. One witness reported that hunger was so severe she lost 20 kilograms, and her daughter was hospitalized for malnutrition, where a two-year-old child died from starvation.

120. The conflict also left families and communities without economic means. The destruction of infrastructure including roads, factories, and agricultural land has compounded the challenges facing Sudan's labour force. Businesses have shut down, supply chains are broken, and millions have lost access to essential goods and services.

121. Poverty levels have thus worsened significantly, with the proportion of the population living on less than US\$2.15 per day nearly doubling—from 33 per cent in 2022 to 71 per cent in 2024.

122. The conflict also had a devastating impact on children. According to UNICEF, more than six million children (27 per cent under the age of five) are internally displaced or seeking refuge and protection in neighbouring countries. Over 770,000 children are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2025, and over one in three children are already suffering from acute malnutrition, according to WFP.

## **V. Accountability**

123. The Mission reported on accountability measures in detail in its previous reports and will expand it further in the Conference Room Paper.

## **VI. Domestic developments**

124. By June 2025, 120,594 cases were reportedly registered with the National Committee for the Investigation of Crimes and Violations of National and International Humanitarian Law, established by the Sudanese authorities, of which 3,997 were referred to regular courts with 1,093 verdicts issued. While announcing further investigations and emergency courts to deal with the Rapid Support Forces and its perceived collaborators, various officials continued to stress that the small number of cases against the Sudanese Armed Forces, constituting 257 out of the total registered, reflected the isolated nature of violations by the Sudanese Armed Forces, and that they did not constitute international crimes. Information and evidence of violations were denied without initiating credible investigations. Broad immunities from prosecution provided to State forces were upheld and blanket amnesties were offered to members of the Rapid Support Forces willing to report to the Sudanese Armed Forces, without excluding international crimes as required by international law.

125. While promising to end impunity, the Rapid Support Forces deny responsibility for reported violations without indication of any credible investigations having been instituted. It continued to set up investigative mechanisms and courts in areas under its control in the Darfur States. Little is known, however, about the legal basis, the composition or the current functioning of these courts.

126. The Mission finds that Sudan remains unwilling and unable genuinely to conduct thorough, prompt and impartial investigations and prosecutions for international crimes committed in the current conflict. It reiterates its previous finding of selective justice, lack of trust by victims and survivors in the domestic legal institutions given the historical pattern of

use of domestic laws and mechanisms to evade accountability, and the need for thorough legal institutional reforms in the context of a democratic civilian rule.

## **B. Options for victim-centred accountability measures**

127. To effectively break the cycle of impunity, a range of options for delivering justice and ensuring accountability should be considered. Towards this end, the Mission organized a three-day consultation in Nairobi, which offered a safe space for developing recommendations on accountability measures, that the Mission will examine.

128. Discussions considered lessons from past accountability and transitional justice experiences in Sudan, sequencing between justice and peace, and options for future measures. It was agreed that preparations for justice and accountability must begin immediately. The overarching principle of an all-inclusive Sudanese dialogue with a gender sensitive approach should guide the design and implementation of any process.

129. Different justice models were explored, including the modalities of expanding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to all of Sudan and the establishment of an independent judicial mechanism working in tandem with the Court. It was noted that the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement for Darfur includes an approach for transitional justice, including the idea of a hybrid special court. The use of universal jurisdiction was also stressed.

130. It was stressed that professional documentation of violations and related crimes should continue as a tool for justice, including registers for specific violations, missing persons, and damages, as well as training and capacity building. The Mission's mandate of evidence collection and preservation remains crucial.

131. The consultation stressed the transformative role of reparations and distributive justice. Interim reparatory measures should be provided to victims, survivors and communities as priority.

## **VI. Conclusions and recommendations**

132. The Mission finds that both parties to the conflict violated international law, amounting to international crimes. The Rapid Support Forces carried out large-scale and systematic attacks on civilians, constituting violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, including large-scale killings, sexual and gender-based violence, looting, and destruction of essential survival objects. These acts constitute war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages on personal dignity, intentionally directing attacks on civilians, hostage-taking, forced displacement, pillage and the use of starvation as a method of warfare. They also constitute crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence of comparable gravity, and persecution based on intersecting gender, political and ethnic grounds. The deprivation of food, medicine and humanitarian assistance may also amount to extermination.

133. The Mission finds that the Sudanese Armed Forces committed violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, including direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate airstrikes and artillery affecting populated areas and civilian infrastructure, and failed to protect hospitals, medical personnel, and humanitarian operations. These acts amount to war crimes, including violence to life and person, outrages on personal dignity, carrying out executions without previous judgement or judicial guarantee, and attacks on specially protected objects.

134. In light of continuing war of atrocities in Sudan and the need for accountability, the Mission recommends the following roadmap:

### **Conflict Parties – Stop Violence and Protect Civilians**

(a) Stop the fighting immediately and commit to a lasting peace, abide by international law obligations, Human Rights Council and Security Council resolutions and the Jeddah Declaration;



(b) Protect civilians, including by ending shelling of civilians and infrastructure, reprisals, hate speech and ethnic targeting;

(c) Lift sieges, particularly on El Fasher and in Kordofan, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access; establish secure corridors for aid delivery and allow safe civilian evacuation;

(d) Protect displaced communities by halting attacks on camps, preventing killings, ensuring safe shelter, and safe routes for civilians out of active conflict zones;

(e) Safeguard cultural heritage by preventing looting and destruction of historical, religious, public and community sites;

(f) Stop sexual violence, sexual slavery, and forced marriage and end child use in conflict;

(g) End impunity and ensure accountability, including by cooperating with the Mission and the International Criminal Court, and surrendering all wanted persons.

#### **Other States and International Community – Support the People of Sudan Without Fuelling Conflict**

(a) Respect, enforce and expand the Security Council arms embargo and halt all material support to the parties, including via private actors and transit routes;

(b) Back durable peace efforts and stop interference that fuels instability and deepens the illicit war economy;

(c) Support humanitarian needs, including by restoring medical assistance, responding to disease outbreaks, and providing large-scale food support;

(d) Promote compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law through diplomatic, legal, and economic influence and enable independent and impartial investigations by cooperating with the Mission and the International Criminal Court;

(e) Explore avenues for bringing the perpetrators to justice by expanding the International Criminal Court jurisdiction and supporting the establishment of an independent and impartial judicial mechanism for Sudan;

(f) Suspend cooperation with those suspected of international crimes and bring them to justice in national courts through the exercise of universal jurisdiction; issue targeted sanctions against individuals and entities suspected of international crimes;

(g) Fund victim support structures and interim reparatory measures.

#### **Mediators – Drive Inclusive, Sustainable Peace**

(a) Increase engagement to bring the parties to the table and secure a sustainable ceasefire;

(b) Address humanitarian priorities, including famine prevention, health system recovery and safe humanitarian access;

(c) Facilitate inclusive civilian participation in negotiations; ensure women's representation in line with Security Council Resolution 1325;

(d) Align with the Sudanese people's aspirations for justice, stability and prosperity in the design of any peace process and embed justice in peace processes through a comprehensive approach to transitional justice and no amnesty for international crimes.

#### **Civil Society and Local Communities – Sustain Evidence and Build the Future**

(a) Document violations and preserve evidence for accountability processes;

(b) Maintain community resilience and solidarity by supporting victims and survivors;

(c) Continue the commendable efforts toward building an inclusive, democratic, and human rights-oriented Sudan that works for all its people.

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