The world is at a turning point in history. The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II (WWII), and we have entered a new era of crisis.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an unprecedented situation. A permanent member of the United Nations Security Council has shown disregard for international law by launching an aggression against a sovereign country and repeating rhetoric and actions that can be interpreted as threats of nuclear weapons use. Additionally, China is rapidly enhancing its military capability qualitatively and quantitatively, including nuclear and missile forces, while continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Furthermore, North Korea is rapidly advancing its nuclear and missile development, repeatedly launching missiles.

Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that diplomatic efforts are the foremost priority of Japan, which has experienced WWII and has since been pursuing the path of a peace-loving nation. Japan remains unwavering in its commitment to respecting the rule of law and settling any disputes not through the use of forcible measures but peacefully and diplomatically. At the same time, in order to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is essential to make efforts to “defend our country by ourselves” and increase deterrence. In other words, we need to make the opponent think that “attacking Japan will not achieve its goals.”

Japan’s intentions and tangible measures for achieving them are articulated in our new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program that were adopted by the Cabinet last December. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will follow
through on them, including reinforcement of our defense production and technology bases. In doing so, we will focus on two priorities: first, to maximize effective use of our current equipment by improving operational rates, securing sufficient munitions, and accelerating investments in improving the resiliency of major defense facilities; and second, to strengthen the core areas of our future defense capabilities, including stand-off defense capabilities that can be utilized as counterstrike capabilities and unmanned assets.

However, no matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) procure, our defense capability cannot be demonstrated without personnel to operate them. The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. We will speed up our efforts to improve their lives, work environments and treatment.

In recent years, diplomatic efforts have also gained importance for defense. Since my appointment as Minister of Defense, I have held discussions on numerous occasions with defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Austin of the United States, Japan’s only ally, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles of Australia, working to deepen our cooperation and collaboration. Building upon these discussions, we will continue to pursue various cooperation, including the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

Even if my counterparts and I were to have different views, it is important to make persistent efforts to maintain and increase our communication through dialogue, aiming to build trust and avoid unforeseen circumstances. As such, I will continue to make these endeavors.

From this perspective, Defense of Japan 2023 outlines the security environment surrounding Japan and the activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF. The beginning focuses on the changes before 2013 (when the previous National Security Strategy was formulated) and the changes through 2022 (when the current National Security Strategy was formulated), which includes a special feature titled, “An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change.” Additionally, the National Defense Strategy is explained concisely and clearly with photos and diagrams to deepen readers’ understanding.

It is important above all that initiatives for defense of Japan have the understanding and cooperation of the people and are highly transparent to the international community. In this regard, this white paper has played a critical role. We sincerely hope that Defense of Japan 2023 will be read by as many people as possible and help increase their understanding of the activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF.
Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Over the past decade, countries and others neighboring Japan have been significantly strengthening their military capabilities as well as rapidly expanding and intensifying missile launches and demonstrations of their military force.

### Military developments in countries and others neighboring Japan since 2013

#### North Korea
North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

#### China
China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge.

Since 2013, China has been flying military aircraft over the Sea of Japan, expanding and intensifying the scope of its activities.

- First confirmation of passage by Chinese military aircraft (Y-8 early warning aircraft and Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft) over the Sea of Japan (January 2016)
- First confirmation of bombers (H-6) (August 2016)
- First confirmation of a formation including fighters (December 2017)

Since 2016, China has been flying military aircraft over the Sea of Japan, expanding and intensifying the scope of its activities.

- First confirmation of Chinese military aircraft (Y-8 early warning aircraft and Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft) over the Sea of Japan (January 2016)
- First confirmation of bombers (H-6) (August 2016)
- First confirmation of a formation including fighters (December 2017)

Promotion of unilateral changes to the status quo by force and the creation of faits accomplis in the South China Sea

- Since 2014, China has engaged in large-scale and rapid land reclamation and infrastructure development on seven features of the Spratly Islands
- China has had de facto control over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012

Continuous activities of Chinese warships and others around the Senkaku Islands

- Entry into Japan’s contiguous zone by Chinese navy surface ships (June 2016, January and June 2018, July 2022)
- Frequent cases in recent years of China Coast Guard vessels attempting to approach Japanese fishing vessels in Japan’s territorial waters (8 cases in 2020 – 12 cases in 2018) and official visit to the Senkaku Islands (2022)

Activities by Chinese aircraft carriers in the Pacific Ocean

- First confirmation of entry into the Pacific Ocean by “ Liaoning” (first aircraft carrier) (2016)
- Flights by carrier-based fighters (including presumed ones) carried by “ Liaoning” over the Pacific Ocean (April 2018, April 2020, April and December 2021, May and December 2022)
- “ Liaoning” had the highest number of shipboard takeoffs and landings (more than 300) during its operational period (2022)
- First confirmation of entry into the Pacific Ocean by “ Shandong” (second aircraft carrier), More than 600 shipboard takeoffs and landings were confirmed.

### Russia
Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.

Movements of China and Russia to strengthen their military ties

- Joint flights by bombers (July 2019, December 2020, November 2021, May and November 2022)
- Joint navigation by warships near or around Japan (October 2021, September 2022)

Active advancements to the Pacific Ocean by China

Cumulative number of scrambles (decade-based comparison)

**Total:** Approx. 3.1 times
- China: Approx. 7.2 times
- Russia: Approx. 1.8 times

**2003–2012**
- China: 2,988
- Russia: 915
- Japan: 514

**2013–2022 (F)**
- China: 10,198
- Russia: 5,869
- Japan: 354

Intensified activities by China around Taiwan

- Although China is maintaining its policy for peaceful reunification with Taiwan, it has not ruled out the possibility of use of force.
- Five Chinese ballistic missiles landed in Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)
- Significant increase in number of Chinese aircraft entering Taiwan’s airspace (2022)

Continuous activities of Chinese military aircraft confirmed around Taiwan

**380 in 2020 – 972 in 2021 – 1,733 in 2022**
Japan formulated its new National Security Strategy (2022 NSS) in December 2022. Special Feature 1 focuses on changes in areas such as the security environment, build-up of defense capabilities, and cooperation and collaboration with our ally and like-minded countries and others from pre-2013 (when the previous NSS was formulated) to 2022 (when the current NSS was formulated).

Supported by the increase in its defense budget at a high level, China is extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its nuclear and missile forces.

### Activities around the Senkaku Islands

China has relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force around the Senkaku Islands for many years.

#### Number of nuclear warheads in stock*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Approx. 1.5 times</th>
<th>Approx. 1.4 times</th>
<th>Approx. 1.3 times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to SIPRI Yearbook 2022.

Russia is promoting the modernization of various types of equipment, including its nuclear capabilities, and reinforcing its armaments by deploying new types of equipment in Japan’s Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands. In addition, Russia is moving to deepen its coordination with China by increasing joint activities.

Over the past 10 years, Russia has strengthened its missile capabilities with the deployment of new equipment in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories.

**Building on the status quo by force around the Senkaku Islands**

*Supported by the increase in its defense budget at a high level, China is extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its nuclear and missile forces.*
Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities: Buildup of Defense Capabilities, etc. Promoted Since 2013

Japan’s defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantor of national security and demonstrate Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself. Defense capabilities cannot be replaced by any other means. The SDF play a central role as the “last stronghold.” Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of defense capabilities since the end of World War II.

2013

December 2013
• Establishment of the National Security Council
• Passage and promulgation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets
• Formulation of the NSS, 2013 NDPG, and 2014 Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)

July 2014
• Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People (Cabinet decision)

December 2014
• Entry into force of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets

May 2015
• Cabinet decisions to expedite procedures for promulgating security operations, maritime security operations, etc. (*“Responses to foreign naval vessels navigating through the territorial waters or the inland waters of Japan that do not constitute innocent passage under international law,” *“Government responses to incidents such as unlawful landings on remote islands, etc., by armed groups,” and “Responses to acts of infringement when SDF ships, etc., detect foreign ships committing said acts against Japanese private ships on the high seas”)

September 2015
• Passage and promulgation of the Legislation for Peace and Security

Changes in Defense-Related Expenditures by Item (Fiscal Year) *On a contract basis with the exception of annual budget expenditures (initial)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget expenditures (initial) (Trillion yen)</td>
<td>Approx. 1.1 times</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Including SACO</td>
<td>6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Excluding SACO</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses for sustainment and maintenance (100 million)</td>
<td>Approx. 1.5 times</td>
<td>7,862</td>
<td>11,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildup expenditures for ammunition (100 million)</td>
<td>Approx. 1.7 times</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>2,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D (100 million)</td>
<td>Approx. 2.2 times</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>2,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for FY2022 include the FY2021 supplementary budget.

Strengthening of the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region

Deployment of units to the southwestern region, which has become a void in terms of SDF deployment
• Establishment of the GSDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit (2016)
• Establishment of GSDF Area Security Force units (2019: Amami Oshima Island, Miyakojima Island; 2023: Ishigakijima Island)
• Acquisition of GSDF Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles (from 2012) and GSDF Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missiles (from 2014)
• Deployment of GSDF surface-to-ship missile units and surface-to-air missile units (2019: Amami Oshima Island; 2020: Miyakojima Island; 2023: Ishigakijima Island)
• Deployment of ASDF mobile air surveillance radars (2022: Yonaguni Island)

Development of a full-scale amphibious operations capability
• Refurbishment of an MSDF landing ship
• Enhancement of the functions of the MSDF Minesweeper Squadron (from 2016)
• Establishment of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (2018: Ainoura)

Reinforcement to ensure air superiority
• Establishment of the early warning aircraft unit (2014: Naha)
• Reinforcement of the Fighter Aircraft Units and establishment of the 9th Air Wing (1 squadron) (2016: Naha)
• Establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force (2017: Naha)

*The numbers related to equipment held and units in this document are a comparison of the numbers in FY2013 and those in FY2022. For example, “Acquisition of GSDF V-22 Ospreys (8→13 aircraft)” indicates that Japan had zero such aircraft at the end of FY2013 and 13 at the end of FY2022.
Squaringly facing the reality of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan decided to build truly effective defense capabilities under the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the 2018 NDPG, and has strengthened our defense capabilities as well as resolutely defended the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace. However, Japan’s neighboring countries and others are increasing their military activities while strengthening their military capabilities. With regard to future defense capabilities, Japan must clearly demonstrate its intention to never tolerate any unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts at any point in time.

2018

December 2018
- Formulation of the 2018 NDPG and 2019 MTDP
- Formulation of the 2018 NDPG and 2019 MTDP

2022

December 2022
- Formulation of the NSS, the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP)

Strengthening of Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
- Deployment of the PAC-3 MSE surface-to-air guided missiles (2020–2022)
- Increase in the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers (6 → 8 ships) (completed by 2020)

Buildup of Stand-off Defense Capabilities
- Buildup of stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM) to respond to opposing forces from a safe distance without being attacked (outside of the threat zone) (JSM: since 2018, JASSM: since 2023)
- Research and development on Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, upgraded hyper velocity gliding projectiles and hypersonic missiles. etc. (from 2018)

Strengthening of Command and Control Capabilities; Utilization of the Space Domain
- Strengthening the capabilities of various communication systems

Utilization of Unmanned Assets
- Acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (Global Hawk) (0 → 2 aircraft) (from 2015)
- Establishment of the Reconnaissance Group (2022: Misawa)

Strengthening of Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains
- Acquisition of F-35A/B fighters (0 → 33 aircraft) and P-1 patrol aircraft (5 → 34 aircraft)
- Increase in the number of submarines (16 → 22 submarines) (completed in 2022)
- Refurbishment of Izumo-class destroyers as well as takeoff and landing testing of F-35B fighters (2021)
- Acquisition of a new type of frigates (FFM) (0 → 4 vessels)

Strengthening of the Joint Operational Architecture
- Establishment (in Asaka) of a new command center (Ground Component Command) to conduct integrated operations of the various regional units for nationwide operation of the GSDF (2018)
- Strengthening of the Joint Staff’s posture in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum (from 2020)

Strengthening of Capabilities in the Domains of Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum (From 2020)
- Establishment of the ASDF Space Operations Squadron (2020: Fuchu), as well as the ASDF Space Operations Group (2022: Fuchu) with expanded units
- Establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (2020)
- Acquisition of the GSDF Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS) (from 2017)
- Development of the ASDF stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (since 2020)
Ties with Japan’s Ally, Like-Minded Countries, and Others: Deepening of Cooperation and Collaboration

2013

The Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever, and its deterrence and response capabilities have been enhanced. Protection of U.S. Forces weapons, etc., has also become possible.

2015

Establishment of the new Guidelines

Passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security

Entry into effect of the new Japan-U.S. ACSA

SM-3 Block IIA, Reached the stage of joint production and deployment

2017

Japan has promoted mutual understanding and confidence building with partner countries and strengthened bilateral and multilateral defense relations.

Cooperation and Exchanges Among People and Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“2+2” Meetings and Defense Ministerial Meetings</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“2+2”</td>
<td>3 times</td>
<td>5 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>20 times</td>
<td>37 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries with a “2+2” framework</td>
<td>4 countries</td>
<td>9 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Defense ministerial meetings are meetings with defense ministers of other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation in Multilateral Exercises</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td>19 times</td>
<td>43 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.
No country can now protect its own security alone. While deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is the cornerstone for Japan’s security, Japan has also been strengthening cooperation with various countries.

**2019**

The Japan-U.S. “2+2”

Confirmation that a cyber attack can constitute an armed attack under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

---

**2020**

60th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Expression of determination to continue to strengthen the Alliance

---

**2023**

The Japan-U.S. “2+2”

Confirmation that an attack in space could lead to invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

---

**Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Times</th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 times</td>
<td>108 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.

**Capacity Building**

Capacity-building involves utilizing Japan’s capabilities to help other countries build their own capabilities. Japan has been combining more practical and diverse means to further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and exchanges.

**Steady deepening and expanding**

**Cumulative numbers of recipient countries and projects for capacity-building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of recipient countries</td>
<td>5 countries</td>
<td>16 countries, 1 organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>9 projects</td>
<td>51 projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**

Japan has been promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries in order to contribute to the promotion of our national security, peace, and international cooperation, as well as contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technology and industrial bases.

**Steady deepening and expanding**

**Number of countries with which Japan has concluded agreements on the transfer of defense equipment and technology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries with agreements</td>
<td>2 countries</td>
<td>13 countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Improvement of interoperability and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities**

**Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY2013</th>
<th>FY2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 times</td>
<td>108 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.
Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare, in order to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of the Japanese nationals.

Thinking strategically, Japan’s deterrence will be enhanced by fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities as well as reinforcing the defense architecture for national defense as a coherent whole.

Based on this recognition, the government of Japan finalized the NDS to comprehensively present Japan’s defense objectives, approaches and means to accomplish those objectives, and the means to achieve them. The NDS replaces the NDPG, which was formulated six times since 1976. The NDS represents a major turning point for postwar defense policy and provides the direction and content for strengthening defense capabilities over the mid-term to long term. The Government will make every effort to deepen the public’s understanding of the significance of this major turning point.

### Defense Challenges

The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russia’s aggression.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threats may materialize.

To protect one’s country from such states, it is necessary to possess deterrence capability that makes others realize the difficulty of making unilateral changes to the status quo by force, as well as to develop defense capability that are focused on opponent capabilities.

In addition, whether Japan will be able to respond to these emerging new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities. Japan’s future security and defense policy will directly affect the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

#### Emerging new ways of warfare

**Large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles**
- It is necessary to intercept incoming missiles and prevent them from landing in Japan
- It is necessary to constrain missile launches by opponents and make it difficult for them to conduct missile attacks
- Even if missiles hit facilities, runways, etc., it is necessary to conduct persistent response by minimizing damage and quickly restoring the affected facilities, runways, etc.

**Asymmetric attacks via the domains of space, cyber, or electromagnetic spectrum, unmanned vehicles, etc.**
- Strengthening of detection, protection, and other response capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum is an urgent issue
- It is necessary to introduce a variety of unmanned equipment that can operate on land, sea, and in the air, and develop capabilities to respond to unmanned vehicles of opponents

**Hybrid warfare including information warfare**
- Detect suspicious signs promptly and share that information in as real-time as possible
- Be able to deploy SDF units ahead of opponents to where they are expected to attack, and also to have the transportation capabilities to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from dangerous areas
- Win information warfare including the dissemination of disinformation, etc., and prevent confusion and such
Special Feature 2 covers the NDS, which was formulated in December 2022. It particularly focuses on the part regarding strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense, and concisely explains the content on the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities to defend Japan.

Japan’s Three Defense Objectives

1. **Shape a security environment** that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

2. **Deter and respond to** unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through cooperation and collaboration with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, and others, and bring the situation under control swiftly.

3. **Should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur,** take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression and, while receiving support from our ally and others, disrupt and defeat the invasion.

Three Approaches to Realize the Defense Objectives

1. **Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense**
   - "Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities"
   - "Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country"

2. **Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**
   - "Demonstrating the joint resolve and capabilities of Japan and the United States"

3. **Reinforcement of collaboration with like-minded countries and others**
   - "Reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible"
Seven Fields of the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities by emphasizing seven pillars as the necessary functions and capabilities for national defense. In particular, the top priorities for the next five years are to improve equipment operational rates, secure sufficient ammunition and fuel, and expedite investment in key defense facilities in order to effectively maximize the use of current equipment, as well as to reinforce future core capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities.

**Cross-domain operation capabilities**

Enhancement of capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum as well as ground, maritime, and air capabilities needed for combat fusing all capabilities

**Unmanned defense capabilities**

Enhancement of intelligence gathering and combat support capabilities through unmanned assets

**Stand-off defense capabilities**

Strengthening of capabilities to respond to opposing forces from a safe distance without being attacked

**Integrated air and missile defense capabilities**

Strengthening of capabilities to respond to increasingly diverse and complicated airborne threats, including missiles

**Command and control and intelligence-related functions**

Reinforcement of command and control and intelligence-related functions for quick and accurate decision-making

**Mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection**

Reinforcement of maritime and air transportation capabilities for rapid maneuvering and deployment of necessary units. These capabilities are used to protect the people of Japan.

**Sustainability and resiliency**

Buildup of sufficient ammunition, guided missiles, and fuel at an early stage. Japan will also secure funds for the acquisition and repair of equipment as well as for improving the resiliency of facilities.

**“Counterstrike capabilities” Key to deterring invasion against Japan**

The capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network. This discourages the opponent from attacking and deters armed attack itself.
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases

The rapid progress of science and technology has fundamentally changed the nature of security, and various foreign countries are now working to surround themselves with such technology. In order to ensure stable procurement of equipment, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the defense production and technology bases in Japan as a virtually integral part of its defense capabilities.

Reinforcing Defense Production Base

- Building a strong and sustainable defense industry
- Responding to various risks
- Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

- Research and development that will lead to fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities at an early stage
- Active use of cutting-edge civilian technologies

Reinforcing Human Resource Base and Transformation of Medical Functions

It is the SDF personnel who demonstrate the defense capabilities. No matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/SDF procures, it will not be able to demonstrate its defense capabilities without human resources to handle that equipment. The MOD/SDF will promote efforts to strengthen our defense capabilities in terms of human resources. We will also strengthen our readiness to protect the lives of SDF personnel who fight.

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

- Reinforcement of recruitment measures
- Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others
- Improvement of living and work environments and treatment
- Human resource development
- Improving reemployment
- The award of honors for more SDF personnel

Transforming Medical Functions

- Establishment of a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation of patients between the frontline and medical evacuation destinations
- Strengthening of education and research on medical treatment for war injuries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Previous plan (FY2019–FY2023)</th>
<th>Current plan (FY2023–FY2027)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand-off defense capabilities</td>
<td>0.2 trillion yen</td>
<td>5 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated air and missile defense capabilities</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>3 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned defense capabilities</td>
<td>0.1 trillion yen</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-domain operation capabilities</td>
<td>3 trillion yen</td>
<td>8 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control and intelligence-related functions</td>
<td>0.3 trillion yen</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection</td>
<td>0.3 trillion yen</td>
<td>2 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition and guided missiles</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>2 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of equipment, etc.</td>
<td>4 trillion yen</td>
<td>9 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the resiliency of facilities</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing defense production base</td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
<td>0.4 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.4 trillion yen</td>
<td>6.6 trillion yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Planned amount for FY2019–FY2023: 17.2 trillion yen (contract-based amount)

Necessary expenditure over the next 5 years: 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based amount)
Necessity of Securing Expenditure

**Improved missile and radar capabilities of various foreign countries**

- Strengthening of capabilities to counter opposing forces from a safe distance without being attacked

**Increasing diversity and complexity of airborne threats, such as missiles flying at extremely high speeds (hypersonic speeds), at low altitudes, and on irregular trajectories**

- Strengthening of interception and other capabilities to respond to airborne threats

**Deal with new aspects of combat using unmanned equipment**

**Strengthen intelligence gathering capabilities** for missiles and other assets of opponents, through the utilization of satellites

- Reinforce the defense posture to respond to increasingly sophisticated, skillful cyber attacks
- Improve the capabilities of various types of equipment as well as acquire them at an early stage in order to respond to the rapid buildup of military capabilities in neighboring countries and others

**Conduct seamless, continuous intelligence gathering** on the increasingly intensifying military activities in various countries

- Strengthen intelligence functions to win information warfare as seen in the aggression against Ukraine

**Strengthen maritime and air transport capabilities for rapid deployment of units to remote islands and other areas**

- Promote acquisition of transport vessels, etc.

**Resolve the shortage of ammunition and guided missiles in order to prevent an invasion against Japan during a contingency**

**Occurrence of situations where equipment cannot be operated due to parts shortages, etc.**

- Secure sufficient funds for repairs, etc., to eliminate situations where equipment cannot be operated due to parts shortages, etc.

**Of all SDF facilities, approx. 20% have protection performance and approx. 60% have earthquake resistance performance**

- Roughly 10 years later, 100% of facilities will have both protection and earthquake resistance performance

**The defense industry is defense capability itself. Need to respond appropriately to diverse issues such as successive withdrawals of companies, disruption of raw materials supply from overseas, and cyber attacks on companies**

**Amidst the rapid progress of science and technology, if we lag behind in research and development of future equipment it is difficult to recover from a delay**

- Strengthening of investment, etc., in advanced technologies necessary for future ways of warfare

**Secure the necessary budget for training and education of personnel, fuel for equipment, etc.**
International Community is Facing the Greatest Post-War Trial Yet

States that do not share universal values nor political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence, and unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine, represent a serious challenge to the existing international order. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, changes to the power balance have brought about interstate competition across the political, economy, military, and other spheres, and the competition between the United States and China is growing particularly intense. The international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges.

Furthermore, rapid development in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that prove to become “game changers” and that are resulted in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted, and the security sphere is expanding into the economic sphere, encompassing areas such as the competition for control over advanced technologies.

In addition, risks in cyber and other domains are becoming more serious. It is highly likely that information warfare, including the dissemination of disinformation, will be conducted on a regular basis, and that hybrid warfare combining military and non-military methods will be employed in an even more sophisticated manner.

The Security Situation Intensifies in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region in which Japan is situated faces a host of security challenges. In particular, the number of arms including nuclear weapons and missiles is rapidly building up around Japan, and the tendency towards unilateral changes to the status quo by force is further increasing.

Russian Aggression and Defense by Ukraine

Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force Shake the Foundation of the International Order, Including in Asia

The Russian aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international order, including in Asia.

The situation in which a permanent member of the Security Council, which is supposed to take primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, openly engages in military actions challenging international law and the international order, claims innocent lives, and repeatedly uses language and actions that can be interpreted as threats involving nuclear weapons, is unprecedented. While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the number of noncombatant victims in Ukraine may be over 8,000 as of April 2023, the actual number is possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the number is likely still increasing now. If such Russian aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with the wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are acceptable in other regions as well, including Asia. Therefore, the international community, including Japan, should never tolerate Russia’s action.

It is possible that Russian national strength will decline and the military balance between Russia and surrounding countries will change in the medium- and long-term, because of significant casualties of conventional forces in this aggression. Furthermore, through Russia’s deepening cooperation with China and other factors, this may have an impact on global affairs, including the development of the strategic competition between the United States and China and its impact on Asia. Therefore, it is necessary to monitor related trends with keen interest.
New U.S. Strategy Places Emphasis on Alliances and Partnerships

The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy released by the United States in October 2022 characterize China as a “pacing challenge,” Russia as an “acute threat,” and North Korea as a “persistent threat.” In the Nuclear Posture Review released at the same time as the National Defense Strategy, it was noted that, the United States will face two major nuclear powers by the 2030s with China’s emergence as a major nuclear power.

In this context, the United States showed its recognition that mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are a center of gravity for its national defense strategy because it cannot meet these complex and interconnected challenges alone. In particular, it states that it will promote partnerships with allies and efforts to form multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS to counter China’s coercive behavior in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States also continues to demonstrate its commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” through ongoing “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and the passage of U.S. Navy vessels through the Taiwan Strait.

China’s Intensification of Unilateral Change to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

China has been increasing its defense budget at a rapid pace for an extended period of time, and supported by this, it has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its nuclear and missile forces.

For example, it has been pointed out that China may possess 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, and it is proceeding rapidly with the construction of its second indigenous aircraft carrier, which has been noted to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapults systems, as well as the development of a wide variety of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Backed by these tremendous military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. It is increasing military pressure on Taiwan and continues to entrench its military foothold in the South China Sea.

Regarding Taiwan, in particular, China launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents.

China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.
U.S.-China Strategic Competition Escalates; Tension Grows in Taiwan

China regards unification with Taiwan as “a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and is highly wary of the United States’ involvement in issues concerning Taiwan.

In 2022, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi and other members from both parties of Congress visited Taiwan. Following this, the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to reinforce security cooperation with Taiwan was passed, indicating that both the U.S. government and Congress plan to further strengthen support for Taiwan.

Responding to this, China has further intensified military activities around Taiwan.

North Korea Makes Advances in Nuclear and Missile Development

In recent years, North Korea has been repeatedly launching ballistic missiles and other missiles at an unprecedentedly high frequency. It is also concentrating on enhancing its nuclear and missile related technologies and operational capabilities. For example, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories and missiles it calls “hypersonic missiles,” and it is also pursuing the implementation of long-range cruise missiles with the intention of mounting them with tactical nuclear weapons. In October 2022, it launched a ballistic missile that passed over Japan, and it has also repeatedly launched ICBM-class missiles. Such military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and international community.

Russia Adopts the “Strong State” Model and Ramps Up Strategic Coordination with China

Russia has been developing and deploying a variety of new weapons under its “strong state” model. Since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, it has also been making moves to increase troop numbers and expand and reorganize its military units. Russia has actively continued its military operations in the Far East even in the midst of its aggression against Ukraine, and the “Vostok-2022” strategic command post exercise was conducted with more than 50,000 troops and the participation of a total of 14 countries including China and India. Russia has also been making moves to strengthen a strategic tie with China.

The repeated joint bomber flights and joint navigations of vessels by Russia and China are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are of grave concern from the perspective of the security of Japan and the region. We must continue to monitor actions by the Russian military in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, with strong concern.
Science & technology, and the creation of innovation are sources of Japan’s economic and social development. Appropriate use of these technologies is essential not only for security, but also for addressing global-scale issues such as climate change. Countries are making efforts for the research, development, and military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology, next generation information and communication technology, and other advanced, potentially game-changing technologies that could dramatically change the future character of warfare.

In addition, there is concern about information theft of advanced technologies for military use by abusing cyberspace or corporate activities, including acquisitions and investments. Countries are taking measures from the perspective of so-called “economic security,” such as strengthening export controls and screening mechanisms for foreign investments, as well as increasing the independence of technological development and production.

Space-based technologies and information and communication networks have become core infrastructure in people’s everyday lives and for the military. Meanwhile, countries such as China and Russia have been pointed out to be strengthening their capabilities to interfere with other countries’ use of space, and their nations and militaries are being involved in cyber attacks.

Countries are to improve their capabilities in the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum while recognizing these capabilities as methods of warfare that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential.

The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, as competition and confrontation among states have been sharpened, and as the current international security environment becomes complex and severe, there is concern that it is becoming difficult for the international community to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Armed Forces of many countries strive for resiliency in order to continue their activities regardless of climate change, and also work on security crises arising from climate change diligently.
Creating a Defense Architecture That Can Surely Protect the People

We are currently living in an era where the world order is facing grave challenges, and confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined. Moreover, Japan has entered a new era of crisis, facing its most severe and complex security environment since WWII. To respond to this severe security environment, Japan formulated the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS), the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) in December 2022. These are thought to mark a major turning point in Japan's postwar defense policy, enabling the fundamental reinforcement of necessary defense capabilities and creating a defense architecture that can truly protect the people.

The NSS is positioned as Japan’s supreme national security policy document. It outlines the Government’s strategy to respond with a whole-of-government approach in a wide range of areas including economic security, technology, and intelligence, in addition to the traditional areas of diplomacy and defense. In particular, in FY2027, Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives reaches 2% of the GDP in FY2022 (approximately 11 trillion yen), in order to reinforce Japan’s own architecture for national defense.

The NDS outlines Japan’s defense objectives and its approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. In order to defend the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare (massive missile attacks; hybrid warfare, including information warfare; asymmetrical warfare leveraging the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and with unmanned aerial vehicles and other assets; threats using nuclear weapons, etc.). To this end, the NDS establishes a policy for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities.

What we must prioritize first and foremost is developing proactive diplomacy to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals. It is essential to promote multilateral cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone. At the same time, diplomacy needs to be backed by defense capabilities. As its strategic approach, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike capabilities, while developing its diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Moreover, from the perspective of preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities in cooperative efforts in the Indo-Pacific region is increasing.

Recognizing the role of such defense capabilities, Japan will ensure its peace and security by exerting efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economy.

In addition, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective, integrated defense force, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

As for the functions and capabilities required for defense, Japan will first strengthen its (i) stand-off defense capabilities and (ii) integrated air and missile defense capabilities, (iii) cross-domain operation capabilities, and (iv) command and control/intelligence-related functions, in order to ensure asymmetric advantage while gaining superiority across domains. Furthermore, to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush the opponent’s will to invade, Japan will also reinforce its (v) mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection, as well as its (vi) sustainability and resiliency. As when and how unilateral changes to unilateral changes to

Japan’s Three Defense Objectives

- (1) Shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force
- (2) Deter and respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through cooperation and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries and others
- (3) Should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occur, take primary responsibility to deal with the situation, while receiving support from our ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion

Prime Minister Kishida participating in the G7 Summit Meeting (May 2023) [Metadata of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]
Bilateral training with U.S. Air Force strategic bombers and other aircraft (March 2023)
Exercise for amphibious operations, etc. (February 2023)
the status quo by force occur are hard to predict, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities by FY2027, in five years, to the point Japan will be able to take primary responsibility for countering any invasion of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion while receiving support from its ally and others. In addition, further efforts will be made by approximately ten years from now to better ensure these defense objectives are met, and to reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities so that any invasion of Japan can be disrupted and defeated earlier and at places further afield.

In addition, Japan will also reinforce its defense production and technology bases as virtually integral part of a defense capability, as well as the foundation for SDF personnel, who are at the core of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities.

The DBP indicates the level of defense capability Japan should possess, including what needs to be done to reach that level. It describes various measures to realize the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities at a budget of approximately 43 trillion yen for the next five years, which is a completely different level from the past. In particular, Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce areas at the core of its future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities; improve operational rates, secure ammunition, and accelerate investment in fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment; and further reinforce defense production and technology bases and the human resource base.

### Budget for the “First Year” of Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities

Regarding defense-related expenditures for FY2023, the MOD has secured a budget appropriate for the content of the first year of the “buildup program” (budget for the “first year” of fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities), which will build up the initiatives necessary to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities within five years.

The annual budget expenditure includes ¥6,601.1 billion (year-on-year increase of ¥1,421.3 billion (27.4%)) allocated for DBP-related expenditures, an amount that rises to ¥6,821.9 billion when U.S. Force realignment-related expenses are included, with the “substantial increase of the defense budget” having been secured. In addition, future obligation concerning new contracts (new programs) includes ¥7,067.6 billion (2.9 times that of the previous fiscal year) allocated for DBP-related expenditures. Contracts will be fulfilled in the first fiscal year as much as possible so that the necessary equipment can be delivered to each unit for operation as expeditiously as possible. Specifically, budgets for areas that constitute the core of Japan’s future defense capabilities, such as “stand-off defense capabilities” and “unmanned defense capabilities,” have been significantly increased, while investments aimed at improving operational rates, securing ammunition, and enhancing the resiliency of key defense facilities (including the construction of key command centers underground and development of barracks, etc.) have been expedited in order to maximize the use of existing equipment.

In allocating the budget, programs for the buildup of defense capability that have hitherto been managed by being classified under one of the two categories of “procurement expenditures for major equipment, etc.” and “other expenditures” will now be classified under one of the 15 new categories for each staff office and organization. The resulting budget is allocated in order to have accumulated budget items with greater precision, which prevents issues of insufficient funding for expenditures related to ammunition, maintenance, facilities, living and work environments, etc.

---

### Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense

The MOD and the SDF develop policies and execute missions based on the fundamental stance discussed at the National Security Council, which is a part of the Cabinet.

In addition, the MOD/SDF have adopted a joint operations architecture in which GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units are operated in an integrated manner. In order to realize seamless cross-domain operations at all phases from peace time to contingencies with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations, various issues are being discussed with the goal of promptly establishing permanent Joint Headquarters to unite command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services by reviewing the existing organization.

### Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others

The 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security defined new situations to be addressed, such as “Survival-Threatening Situations” and “Situations that Will Have an Important Influence,” enabling seamless response to any situation. The Government of Japan will continue to take all possible measures to respond to such situations.

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so, yet accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threats may materialize. To protect one’s nation from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability that makes others realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult, as well as to develop defense capabilities focusing on opponent capabilities. Regarding future defense capability, Japan needs to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities so that it can respond to new ways of warfare, and thereby discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch aggression against Japan.

Japan will also build an overall national defense architecture by integrating its national power, which includes its diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological capabilities, and systematically combining all policy means.

Creating a Security Environment That Does Not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force Responses to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts

Japan must deter, through cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. In order to influence an opponent’s actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises such as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally, like-minded countries and others. The MOD/SDF is conducting continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) from peacetime as well as analysis in cooperation with relevant government ministries and agencies to detect indications of contingencies at an early stage, and are scrambling fighters and other aircraft.

Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks

In response to an invasion against Japan, including our remote islands, Japan would disrupt and defeat the invading forces from a long distance. We will also acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross-domain operations that organically integrate capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains, as well as in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum to secure asymmetrical superiority, and disrupt and defeat the invading forces. Japan would also continue persistent actions to crush the opponent’s will to invade.

Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan, including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles flying over the high seas and our territorial airspace with its missile defense system. In addition, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent invasion, including missile attacks, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrikes in the opponent’s territory, and thereby deter missile attacks from happening.
Large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructure including nuclear power plants are also serious threats. The MOD/SDF will take effective measures in the event of such attacks in close cooperation with relevant organizations. In addition, when an invasion of Japan is predicted, the MOD/SDF will utilize mobile deployment capabilities to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents.

**Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Responses to Information Warfare**

As military activities around Japan become more active, while striving to gather information quickly and accurately through various means on a regular basis, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing functions such as information gathering and analysis.

In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, a method of warfare that uses the spread of disinformation and strategic information to influence public opinion and decision-making in other countries while creating a security environment favorable to one’s own country, even when a conflict has not yet erupted. In light of this situation, the MOD/SDF, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, will build a system and posture that can reliably handle integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, with a focus on fact-checking and analyzing disinformation and promptly and appropriately disseminating information.

**Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives to Ensure Warfare Sustainability**

In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient warfare sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. To this end, the MOD/SDF will urgently possess adequate ammunition as necessary, build up ammunition storage facilities and fuel tanks, and improve equipment availability. In addition, major command headquarters will be moved underground and structurally reinforced, and other facilities will be relocated.

**Measures for Protection of the Life, Person, and Property of Japanese Nationals**

Besides invasions of Japan, large-scale disasters and infectious disease crises are other serious threats that require the utmost efforts by the nation to respond. In the event of a large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/SDF will cooperate closely with relevant organizations to effectively carry out life-protecting activities, emergency, livelihood support, and other essential services.

**SDF Activities Since the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security**

Since the Legislation for Peace and Security went into effect in 2016, various preparations and trainings related to this legislation have been made. In 2022, the MOD/SDF participated for the first time in a field training exercise based on a scenario with a declaration of a Survival-Threatening Situation by the Government of Japan. In addition, in accordance with the Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the first coordinated asset protection was conducted among Japan, the U.S., and Australia and the SDF provided security for the U.S. and Australian forces.
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as a Cornerstone for Japan’s Security

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Japan has maintained its peace, security, and independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

The NDS calls for further deepening of discussions with the United States on both countries’ respective roles, missions, and capabilities to further reinforce Japan-U.S. joint deterrence capabilities in an integrated manner from the perspective of deterring invasion against Japan. Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations of the Alliance, including in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, and to improve interoperability. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISR); protection of assets and facilities; and logistics support. In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve response capability of the Alliance, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training. In order to ensure that the United States extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence, including those at the ministerial level. To deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, as well as to deter various contingencies from emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint flexible deterrent options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities as a part of routine bilateral efforts by Japan and the United States on a regular basis.

In addition, while the presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrence capability of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.
Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others

Promoting Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others to Realize FOIP

The MOD/SDF is actively promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation and exchanges in order to strengthen ties with as many countries as possible under the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

In recent years, the MOD/SDF have been advancing high-level exchanges, bilateral/multilateral training and exercise, capacity building, and other defense cooperation and exchanges not only with Japan’s ally, but also with a wide variety of countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The MOD/SDF is also expanding the establishment of institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with like-minded countries and others.

Maritime Security

As a maritime nation, it is extremely important for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and safety. For this reason, the MOD/SDF are promoting multilateral cooperation concerning maritime security, such as the monitoring of maritime situations, including ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF have been dispatching two headquarters personnel to MFO, whose mission is to monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, and has decided to dispatch two additional headquarters personnel. Also, four SDF personnel are working for the UNMISS Headquarters in South Sudan. In addition, the MOD/SDF actively contributes to international peace cooperation activities by dispatching personnel to the UN Secretariat and PKO training centers, and by providing various support to the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.

From May to June 2022, the SDF transported humanitarian relief supplies by the aircraft from the UNHCR warehouse in Dubai to the countries surrounding Ukraine.

Additionally, from February to March 2023, the SDF transported disaster relief supplies in response to the earthquakes which occurred in Turkey and Syria, under the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) Law.

The SDF is always prepared to respond to such urgent requests.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The MOD/SDF are working with related ministries and agencies to develop an international posture and training program for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could serve as their means of delivery, conventional weapons, and cargo and sensitive technologies that could be adapted for military use.
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability, etc.

Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases

Science and technology are rapidly advancing, and countries are developing cutting-edge technologies that could become so-called “game changers” which dramatically alter the future character of warfare. In addition, the development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded the character of warfare not only in the ground, maritime, and air domains, but also in the space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains, including the cognitive dimension. In response to these changes, each country is actively engaged in research and development to ensure its technological superiority. On the other hand, Japan’s defense production and technology bases have been exposed to challenging conditions resulting from growing issues such as supply chain risks and a series of withdrawals from the industry. In light of these circumstances, the NDS states that Japan’s defense production and technology bases are essential infrastructure for securing the stable research and development, production, and procurement of equipment in Japan and for incorporating the cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into its defense equipment, making these bases virtually defense capability itself, and that efforts will be made to reinforce these bases.

In addition, in order to acquire the necessary equipment for new ways of warfare, it is imperative for Japan to leverage the technology that it possesses. The development of scientific technologies and innovations based on Japan’s advanced technological capabilities is at the source of its economic and social development and constitutes a key element of its comprehensive national power integral to its national security. In addition, actively utilizing technological capabilities developed by Japan’s public and private sectors in the area of national security without being held back by existing approaches is an essential activity for strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense. It is important to work strategically to ensure technological superiority as a nation by actively leveraging the results of research and development in science and technology in Japan’s public and private sectors for the research and development of defense equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to further promote research and development domestically and develop and strengthen the technology base for the technology areas on which Japan should focus.

Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The transfer of defense equipment overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to create a desirable security environment for Japan. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly promote such transfers.
Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.

Despite a severe recruitment environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, the MOD/SDF is working on recruitment activities and also reinforcing mid-career recruitment to utilize human resources from the private sector in order to ensure stable recruitment of excellent human resources. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and Others, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to utilize personnel with specialized skills etc.

In addition, the MOD/SDF will work to improve the living and work environment of personnel, improve their salary treatment, support their re-employment, promote measures related to award of honors and privileges, and provide family support measures.

Response to Harassment

In September 2022, an investigation of a harassment incident involving a former member of the GSDF who was sexually harassed while on active duty resulted in a substantiated finding. This is an extremely serious incident that was not properly handled despite the fact that the victim reported the incident.

In light of the current situation, including the ever-increasing number of consultations, the Minister of Defense has instructed the implementation of a fact-finding inspection for the entire SDF by Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and the establishment of a committee of experts to conduct a fundamental review of the anti-harassment policy.

Based on the findings of the study by this committee of experts, the MOD/SDF will implement new policies and strive to create a work environment with zero tolerance for harassment of any kind.

Work-life Balance and Women’s Participation

Ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment in which staff are both mentally and physically healthy and are able to maintain high morale and fully demonstrate their abilities.

To this end, the MOD/SDF is adopting working style reforms to correct working long hours and measures such as teleworking to make work hours and locations more flexible.

In addition, the MOD/SDF is working to promote the participation of highly motivated and capable women, such as by lifting restrictions on the assignment of female SDF personnel.
In order to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, the SDF constantly conducts joint exercises and training by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services. The content of these trainings is not limited to conventional domains, but extends into new domains, including that of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. Efforts are being made to improve cross-domain operations in order to better utilize these domains and enhance defense capabilities.

In addition, in order to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, each service of the SDF conducts bilateral trainings with the corresponding U.S. military service and Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises, the contents of which have been deepened year after year.

Furthermore, in order to strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation based on the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the SDF is actively engaged in bilateral training and exercises with ally and like-minded countries and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Moreover, in recent years, the SDF actively promotes bilateral training and exercises not only with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, but also with like-minded countries and others outside the region, with a view to improving interoperability and deepening ties with these countries.

**Medical Organization that Saves the Lives of SDF Personnel**

The NDS states that, from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, the SDF will transform the SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel.

In particular, the MOD/SDF needs to establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, in order to improve the life-saving rate of injured personnel.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management necessary to further enhance the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers.

**Reinforcement of Policy-making Function**

For the SDF to respond to the increasingly severe strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required. To this end, the MOD/SDF is closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. In addition, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing their intellectual base by reviewing and reinforcing research systems, centered on the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).

**Measures Relating to Training and Exercises**

In order to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, the SDF constantly conducts joint exercises and training by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services. The content of these trainings is not limited to conventional domains, but extends into new domains, including that of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. Efforts are being made to improve cross-domain operations in order to better utilize these domains and enhance defense capabilities.

In addition, in order to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, each service of the SDF conducts bilateral trainings with the corresponding U.S. military service and Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises, the contents of which have been deepened year after year.

Furthermore, in order to strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation based on the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the SDF is actively engaged in bilateral training and exercises with ally and like-minded countries and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Moreover, in recent years, the SDF actively promotes bilateral training and exercises not only with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, but also with like-minded countries and others outside the region, with a view to improving interoperability and deepening ties with these countries.
In order to protect Japan’s peace and independence in an increasingly severe security environment, the SDF must become more powerful on its own while improving its ability to cooperate and collaborate with Japan’s ally and like-minded countries and others, rather than be content with its current capabilities. For this reason, the SDF is striving to acquire further deterrence and response capabilities through training and exercises.

Measures Concerning Harmony with Regional Society

The various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person, as well as local governments and other organizations. Based on this idea, the MOD/SDF will continue to promote various measures necessary in order to further deepen the trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.

Responding to Climate Change and Environmental Issues

It is inevitable that the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will have an even greater impact on future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, and defense equipment, as well as the security environment surrounding Japan. The MOD/SDF has long complied with environmental laws and regulations and has made efforts to thoroughly conserve the environment and reduce environmental impact. In August 2022, the MOD/SDF formulated the Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on Climate Change, which outlines strategic measures for the MOD to address climate change. Going forward, the MOD will promote concrete measures to combat the impacts of climate change based on this strategy.

Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Disclosure of Administrative Documents

In order to gain the trust and the cooperation from the Japanese people and other countries, the MOD/SDF strives to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities regarding its operations in various ways.
Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

Minister of Defense

Chief of Staff, JSDF
Ground Staff Office

Joint Staff

Ground Component Command

- 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino)
- 1st Air Defense Artillery Brigade (Kisarazu)
- 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu)
- 1st Air Defense Artillery Brigade (Kisarazu)
- System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya)
- Central Readiness Force Regiment (Minamisuna)
- Special Forces Group (Narashino)
- Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (Izumisano)

Other units and organizations

Northern Army

- 2nd Division (Abashikawas)
- 5th Division (Otsuchi)
- 11th Brigade (Makomanai)
- 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Kita Chitose)
- 3rd Engineer Group (Minami Erima)
- Northern Army Combined Brigade (Hachinohe)
- Northern Army Aviation Group (Kakamigahara)

Other units and organizations

Northeastern Army

- 6th Division (Jennichi)
- 9th Division (Asahikawa)
- Northeastern Army Artillery Unit (Sendai)
- Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai)
- Northeastern Army Aviation Group (Ishikari)

Other units and organizations

Eastern Army

- 1st Division (Nemura)
- 12th Brigade (Sembagahara)
- 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Minato)
- 1st Engineer Brigade (Kagoshima)
- Eastern Army Aviation Group (Toya)

Other units and organizations

3rd Division (Sento)

- 10th Division (Moriyama)
- 13th Brigade (Kitaichi)
- 14th Brigade (Sento)
- 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hosogaya)
- 4th Engineer Group (Okubo)
- Middle Army Combined Brigade (Aki)
- Middle Army Aviation Unit (Matsuyama)

Other units and organizations

Middle Army

- 4th Division (Kusatsu)
- 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto)
- 15th Brigade (Naha)
- Western Army Artillery Unit (Yufunai)
- 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Busuika)
- 5th Engineer Group (Oguri)
- Western Army Combined Brigade (Kunacr)
- Western Army Tank Unit (Kusu)
- Western Army Aviation Group (Takashibana)

Other units

Training evaluation and Development Command (Meguro)

- Ground Material Control Command (Ishigaki)

Other units and organizations

Western Army

- 1st Division (Fukushu)
Location of Principal SDF Units [for illustrative purposes]  [As of March 31, 2022]
DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023