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—— ROC NATIONAL DEFENSE REPORT 2023

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As the dusk in the summer bode farewell to an idle Sunday, the setting sun with a gentle breeze dampened the people’s wish to stay in their air-conditioned rooms. At the time, the beach in Kenting at Hengchun Peninsula, the southern tip of Taiwan, was still dotted with colorful parasols and stirring waves, which were mixed with merry people with smiles on their faces. Then as we zoomed in up north to the streets of Taipei, sparkling neon lights illuminated the bustling night markets, and people basked in delight and joy everywhere in the city to celebrate the upcoming Father’s Day beforehand. These scenes bring us back to Taiwan on 7th August 2022, a long weekend when everything seemed merely normal. Behind the scenes, the ongoing Taiwan Strait Crisis that featured tense confrontations in the air and at the sea, missile lock-ons from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, constant cyber offenses and defenses, and a rock-solid safeguard as shown by the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces, had caught the international spotlights.

Geographically, Taiwan is a linchpin to contain the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) eastward maritime power expansion to the Pacific. Politically, Taiwan is at the frontline of democracy confronting authoritarianism. Historically, Taiwan has been intertwined with bilateral relations of the Taiwan Straits and international communities with connections and options. The recent Russia-Ukraine war has taught us: (1) A totalitarian regime can ignore international rules and kick off invasion for the sake of its own national interests or political assertions; and (2) Even a totalitarian regime may fear wading deeper into a quagmire of war, like Putin’s nightmare. War and peace are the two ends of the spectrum of conflict. We don’t have a fair say to decide war and peace for the drastic difference in comprehensive national power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and the totalitarian essence of the PRC regime. However, we at least have the strength to prevent the inclination towards war, and namely, dissuade the enemy to wage war on considering its potential cost.

It is the duty and purpose of the Armed Forces to “avert war by preparing for it, be capable of fighting a war to stop it” and ensure the normality of people’s lives. Over the past two years, the PRC has been altering the status quo of the Taiwan Strait through grey zone tactics into a so-called “new normal” in the form of military intimidation and intrusions from across the Strait. In response, the Armed Forces have started multiple major initiatives, such as the “military force realignment plant to strengthen all-out defense,” “refining reserve reform,” and “special budget for enhancing naval and air combat power.” We have been following a military strategic thinking of “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence” to extend defense depth outward and construct a whole-of-society defense structure and national resilience. In addition, we have been using an innovative and asymmetric mindset to build up an overall credible combat power to exploit the vulnerability of potential PRC’s military invasion.
“We will not yield an inch of our sovereign lands and will be unwavering in upholding democracy and freedom.” We will tell the world with our readiness and combat preparedness that we will not sit and wait for our fate to be decided. With the rise of the PRC, the geopolitical landscape of the Western Pacific has formed a posture of great power competition. We are at the forefront of the demarcation and geological location of rival political systems and are met with relentless and substantive threats of military invasion from the PRC. Our espousal of the universal value of freedom and democracy gave us a place in the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the free world to assist us in ensuring the normality of our people’s lives and preventing a rerun of the Russian invasion of Ukraine from happening here. However, as an invariable principle of national defense, we shall help ourselves first, and then others may come to our aid. The Armed Forces will continue maintaining force buildup and combat readiness, adapting to the trends of integrated regional deterrence, and optimizing the security for our nation.

The affairs of national defense are highly complicated. It is hoped that this edition of the national defense report would help the people understand current threats to our national security and major national defense affairs, support and participate in efforts national defense. In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere and respectful appreciation to all those men and women in uniform serving at the front line in the air, at sea, on the mountain, in urban and rural areas, and in streaming cyberspace. Because of your loyalty and dedication, our people can keep their lives safe and sound, regardless of how grave the external threat is. Again, all comments are welcome. I hope to see more encouragement, recognition, and support for the Armed Forces from the people and our unity will contribute to a collective effort to secure our nation’s survival and our democratic and free way of life.

Minister

Chiu, Kuo-Cheng

September 2023
Facing fast-changing and complex security situations across the Taiwan Strait and the region, the ROC Armed Forces (hereinafter as the Armed Forces) are determined, with the belief that “our country’s survival is our own responsibility” and Master Sun Tzu’s saying that “do not rely on the enemy’s not coming, but one’s ability to meet it,” to maintaining combat readiness at all times and carrying out rigorous training activities, so as to go all-out to safeguard our sovereignty, our people, and our beloved homeland.

This is the 17th edition of the National Defense Report. It is stipulated by Article 30 of the National Defense Act that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) shall periodically publish a national defense report. Domestically, it is used to elaborate our current security environment and the status and performance of the Armed Forces’ combat readiness and our defense policies’ implementation to the people to allow them to understand our defense activities, recognize the contributions of the Armed Forces, strengthen their confidence in our national defense, support our defense buildup, and achieve a civil-military unity to collectively safeguard our homeland. Externally, it is to show our resolute determination for national defense, the transparency of our military, and our effort to maintain regional peace and stability.

Opened with the Introduction, this report is divided into 5 parts: Regional Posture, National Defense Capabilities, Policy Reform, National Defense Governance, and Heritage of Honor and Glory. It begins with elaborating on the current security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, explaining accordingly our national defense strategic guidelines, development of our combat capabilities, our military force realignment plan, consistent refining reform of our reserve force, and multiple results of our defense undertakings. Moreover, it reveals our efforts to promote all-out defense education and deepen communication with civil society so as to instill a rooted all-out defense concept, exert the power of civil-military unity, consolidate people’s willingness for all-out defense, and construct whole-of-society defense resilience.
The PLA exercises around Taiwan in 2022
The Missile Crisis in 1996
Collective Anxiety and Setback in Geopolitics
The military expenditures of major countries in 2023 are generally higher than 2022 as the following figures and the increase percentages compared to 2022 have shown:

- PRC: RMB $1 trillion 553.7 billion (approx. NT $6.8 trillion), up 7.2%;
- Japan: JPY 6.8 trillion (approx. NT $1.6 trillion), up 26%;
- Republic of Korea: KRW 57.1 trillion (approx. NT $1.29 trillion), up 4.6%;
- The Philippines: US $4.28 billion (approx. NT $135.5 billion), up 8%;
- India: INR 5.94 trillion (approx. NT $2.15 trillion), up 13%;
- Australia: AUD 48.6 billion (approx. NT $1.03 trillion), up 7.4%; and
- R.O.C. (Taiwan): NT $580.3 billion, up 12.5%.
Chapter 1

Strategic Environment

The development of situations in the Indo-Pacific region is being influenced by the strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC. Furthermore, while PRC’s air and maritime intrusions on Taiwan become a normal, the peaceful cross-Strait status is being altered gradually, causing security issues across the Taiwan Strait that draws global attention. In the meantime, the situation in Northeast Asia is deteriorating due to North Korea’s military provocation and nuclear threat. While the U.S. is adopting its Indo-Pacific strategy to expand multilateral cooperation in response to PRC’s military expansion, regional countries are strengthening their military arms, and the security environment and strategic location of Taiwan have become relatively important in the region.

Section 1 Security Posture of the Indo-Pacific

Meanwhile, the U.S. and the PRC are strengthening their respective alliances, and the competition between these two great powers is escalating. PRC’s enhanced military shock and awe against Taiwan and partnership with Russia, as well as its grey zone activities in the waters off the South China Sea, are major factors destabilizing the security situation in the region. The Biden administration of the U.S. continues realizing the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), viewing the PRC as its major competitor and challenge and thereby deepening security cooperation with countries in the region. It scales up cooperation with Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) to jointly respond to North Korea’s recent frequent missile tests and attempts to reactivate nuclear tests that have brought up concerns in Northeast Asia and international geopolitical circles.

I. PRC’s Military Expansion to Tilt Regional Balance

The PRC is expanding military capabilities at scale and conducting military activities frequently in the region, mainly in the form of targeted military exercises and grey zone harassment and intrusions. Moreover, it is actively projecting air and maritime military power beyond the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, key areas in the west of the first island chain, by strengthening its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and increasing the size of its South Sea Fleet and formation of aircraft carriers to perform blue water voyages.

The military cooperation between the PRC and Russia has been closer since the joint strategic cruises in 2019. Several joint air strategic patrols over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, and the West Pacific were conducted in late 2021. Numerous joint maritime and air exercises have also been carried out since the first-ever aircraft landing on each other’s airfield in 2022. During his visit to Russia in March 2023, Xi Jinping, leader of the PRC, signed a joint statement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling for a deeper bilateral strategic partnership and continuing military cooperation on maritime joint exercises, joint air patrols, and anti-terrorism drills and exercises to actively handle potential conflicts with western countries.
Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been constantly getting close to foreign military aircraft and vessels in the South China Sea, attempting to expel foreign powers in the region that has endangered regional security. In March 2023, on the pretext of the Philippines’ permission for the U.S. military to expand its footprints in the country, the PRC sent naval vessels, maritime patrol boats, and maritime paramilitary forces to encircle the waters off Thitu Island and Second Thomas Shoal to heighten tensions in the South China Sea.

II. U.S. Expansion of Cooperation with Allies to Secure the Indo-Pacific

The U.S. Biden administration issued its latest edition of the *Indo-Pacific Strategy* in February 2022, singling out the PRC as an imminent threat to the Indo-Pacific. In November of that year, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) issued the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022 and pointed out that aside from its increases in military investments and expansion of its traditional military power, the PRC is speeding up the production of nuclear warheads and development of space and anti-space capabilities to grow its strategic deterrence and denying foreign powers’ intervention in all cross-Strait situations.

The U.S. has reiterated its security promises to Japan, upgraded its bilateral alliance with ROK to a “global comprehensive strategic alliance,” and implemented substantive moves to establish a comprehensive partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It has strengthened cooperation with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Japan through multilateral mechanisms, such as a trilateral alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the U.S. (AUKUS), Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), Five Eyes (FVEY), U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP), to contain PRC’s expansion in the region.

In addition, the U.S. has joined hands with allies and partners to combine deterrent means in military, intelligence, economic, financial, and technical areas to construct a network to contain the PRC and is tuning up its budget to vigorously develop weapons to ensure its technical superiority and enhance its credible capabilities to deter potential threats in the Indo-Pacific.

III. Japan and Australia Continue Military Buildup to Address PRC’s Threat

Over the past few years, Japan has deepened cooperation with the U.S. military, revised its defense strategy to drastically increase defense budget and speed up its military buildup, playing an important role in security affairs in the Indo-Pacific. After the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, the government of Japan became worried about changes in the security situation in East Asia and decided to greatly improve its military capabilities and increase its defense budget to boost its defensive strength. In December 2022, it authorized the newest edition of the National Security Strategy of Japan, pointing the PRC as its “greatest strategic challenge.” This edition mentioned that Japan will be equipped with counterattack capability and actively defend against military threats from the PRC, Russia, and North Korea.

Australia, a traditional and important ally of the U.S. in the Oceania region, continues to construct its defense and military technical partnership with the UK and the U.S. Under the framework of the AUKUS, it continues to expand cooperation in defense technologies, armament, and cybersecurity within the trilateral alliance to upgrade its own defense capabilities and curb PRC’s attempt to expand military power in the region.

Japan and Australia continue deepening their cooperation with the U.S. and India, and both have strengthened military cooperation with member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the framework of the NATO Strategic Concept 2022. At the same time, the two nations have joined hands with ROK and New Zealand to promote the construction of the FOIP. In October 2022, both countries upgraded their bilateral security agreement by signing the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation to jointly address the PRC’s challenges to the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.
IV. Unsettled Issues on the Korean Peninsula Become a Worry in the Northeast Asia

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula saw little progress because of North Korea’s unwillingness to renounce its possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea completed the construction of Tunnel No. 3 of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility in 2022 and has authorized its military to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes, posing a far greater nuclear threat in the region.

Since the beginning of 2022, North Korea has executed more than 100 test launches of various missiles, surpassing the number in the past, and concurrently sent military aircraft to fly close to the airspace of ROK and triggered response from its counterparts. Late in the year, North Korea even launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to enter ROK’s airspace; the latter was forced to launch fighter and attack helicopter sorties to respond.

In order to counter North Korea’s military provocation, the U.S. Biden administration, joined by Japan and ROK, has imposed economic sanctions on North Korea and requested that the PRC deliver constructive efforts to handle security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Till 2023, North Korea has continued its frequent missile tests to show its discontent with joint military exercises between the U.S. and ROK and to exhibit its deterrence against its neighboring countries, which affects the security stability in Northeast Asia.

V. Rising Security Risks across the Taiwan Strait Draw International Attention

In recent years, the PRC has been stepping up its military threat against Taiwan, such as its frequent use of air and maritime assets and unmanned aerial vehicles to initiate grey zone tactics of harassment and intrusions and the military intimidation of randomly held targeted military exercises in our surrounding airspace and waters. Furthermore, it has been taking advantage of diplomatic occasions to press the international community into accepting its stance on Taiwan, giving rise to greater security risks across the Taiwan Strait.

Regarding PRC’s military intimidation pertaining to the Taiwan Strait issue, the U.S. remains committed by following the Taiwan Relations Act to assisting in boosting our defensive capabilities and would join hands with allies, based on its Indo-Pacific Strategy, to make viable responses. In its National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2023 (NDAA 2023), Taiwan is listed as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), and the Act authorizes the U.S. government to offer us Foreign Military Financing (FMF), establish a Regional Contingency Stockpile for Taiwan, and provide security assistance such as international military education and training to strengthen Taiwan’s defense resilience.

Following the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, the geopolitical risk across the Taiwan Strait has drawn wider international attention. Democratic countries like the UK, Japan, ROK, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as international bodies like the European Union (EU) and the ASEAN, have all publicly expressed concerns about the security across the Taiwan Strait and stressed the importance of maintaining a peaceful and stable Taiwan Strait. In the following August, the NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), and the ASEAN all announced joint statements to express concerns about the rising tension in
the region due to the PRC's frequent military exercises around Taiwan. Then in November, during the convening periods of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), heads of state of the U.S., Japan, Germany, and France reiterated to Xi the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and their objection to the PRC's military intimidation against Taiwan.

At the ASEAN Summit in May 2023, Mr. Ferdinand Marcos Jr., President of the Philippines, expressed that the prospect of tensions escalating over Taiwan was a grave concern to Southeast Asian leaders. By the end of May, the G7 Summit issued a joint communiqué to reaffirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity in the international community and call for a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. Around the same time, the QUAD Leaders' Summit issued a joint statement to express their strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo.

Aside from public statements from some democratic countries, governmental officials from Japan, ROK, Germany, Lithuania, etc. came to visit Taiwan successively to demonstrate their support with concrete actions to promote substantive exchanges, help us break out of isolation, and respond to PRC's threat collectively. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues joint exercises with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, deploys air and naval assets to the Taiwan Strait and waters off the South China Sea to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP). In May 2023, the UK announced its Carrier Strike Group would return to the Indo-Pacific region in 2025, and join up with the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and allies in the region to safeguard peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
Section 2  Defense Undertakings of Indo-Pacific Countries

After the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war, the world has been caught up in a scenario of threats to traditional security, with countries asking for more arms and increasing their defense budgets at scale to enhance autonomous defense capabilities. In the traditional security landscape of the Indo-Pacific, the Taiwan issue has received significant attention. The majority of countries have admitted that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are connected with peace, stability, and prosperity not only in the Indo-Pacific, but also in the international community.

I. The United States

In 2022, the U.S. Biden administration consecutively issued the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Among them, the National Defense Strategy notes that the PRC is the pacing challenge to U.S.’s national security and a free and open international system and points out that the PRC is the only competitor with the intent and growing capability to reshape the international order.

The keynote of U.S.’s policy on the PRC is “a competition, not a conflict.” There are certain pages in the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, issued by the U.S. DoD in 2022, discussing possible scenarios of PRC’s military invasion of Taiwan. Both the U.S. and the PRC have acknowledged the increasing possibility of colliding with each other and expect, through close contact and exchange, opening up communication channels, and establishing a crisis management mechanism, to prevent the competition from spiraling into a military conflict. As the Indo-Pacific Strategy reveals, the U.S. is trying to use non-military means to create the most favorable environment for its allies and partners and seek to manage competition with the PRC responsibly.

In addition, the U.S. is viewing that the growing tumultuous global situation is characterized by the challenges to the international order and transnational strategic competition relacing terrorism as the top issue for its national security. In March 2023, the U.S. DoD announced that its budget of Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is US$ 842 billion and will invest in key items to strengthen the U.S. military’s superiority in integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages sequentially to build a resilient joint force to respond to current fluctuating international situations and transnational competition.

II. Japan

In December 2022, Japan released 3 important security papers, including the latest National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program with contents encompassing its fundamental diplomacy and defense policy. It was the first time in writing to stress that PRC’s ongoing military expansion is the greatest strategic challenge to Japan. These papers emphasize that Japan is facing the gravest and most complex security environment post-World War II with the heightening pressure that Russia and the PRC have been attempting to use military force to change the status quo unilaterally,
and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen defense and deterrent capabilities and team up with allies and like-minded countries to maintain the international order.

These papers note the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and indicate that Taiwan is a vital partner and friend, who shares Japan’s fundamental values. As for strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, these papers suggest that Japan shall maintain a multi-domain defense system to include land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains, and shall adopt a flexible cyber defense strategy in response to heightened threats of cyber warfare and hybrid warfare. Moreover, these papers reveal that Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, and it shall hit its opponent’s missile bases if all means are exhausted to defend against the opponent’s missile strikes.

Japan has earmarked a defense budget of JPY 43 trillion from FY 2023 to FY 2027, and the figure is 1.6 times more than that in 2018. For FY 2023 alone, the Japanese defense budget reached JPY 6.8 trillion (approx. NT$ 1.6 trillion), a 26% increase from FY 2022. It is estimated that by greatly increasing its defense budget, Japan’s defense spending may reach 2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) until FY 2027, roughly equivalent to that of a NATO member state to speed up its military buildup.

III. Republic of Korea

Global anxiety about a potential global nuclear war intensified when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and threatened to use nuclear weapons. Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, took advantage of the chaotic situation to vigorously develop nuclear weapons and conduct missile tests. With the newly enacted nuclear weapon policy, tensions on the Korean Peninsula and even in the waters off Japan have escalated dramatically.

Late in 2022, ROK announced a five-year defense plan, noting that the number of its 500,000 standing troops remains intact and that it would procure additional 20 F-35A stealth fighter aircraft, deploy tactical surface-to-surface missiles, continue introducing mid-size submarines with submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability, deploy more 8,000-tonne class destroyers and long-range surface-to-air missiles, and actively develop UAV technologies and collaborative combat systems with artificial intelligence (AI). It also released the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region to stress that ROK will become a Global Pivotal State and to propose corresponding cooperation plans and perspectives on various issues.

In February 2023, The ROK Ministry of National Defense released the 2022 Defense White Paper, indicating that ROK will enhance security cooperation with the U.S., propose countermeasures to threats of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles from North Korea, promote defense reform 4.0, and improve its command-and-control effectiveness by revamping its defense organizations and systems. The two sides are committed to deepening their cooperation in all domains. They will further strengthen their alliance by improving their substantive military power, i.e., expanding the scale of joint field exercises at regimental level and above, enhancing interoperability, and pushing for the scheme of transferring operational control (OPCON) authority during wartime. Moreover, ROK will evaluate the progress of its
security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan and enhance such cooperation with each other through sharing information, high-level policy negotiations, and trilateral exercises to jointly address the threat from North Korea.

IV. Southeast Asia

In November 2022, the ASEAN Summit was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and all member states agreed in principle to admit East Timor as the 11th ASEAN member. The following ASEAN+8 Defense Ministers’ Meeting issued a joint statement, noting that all members shall strengthen cooperation pragmatically to mitigate current and emerging traditional and non-traditional threats, including COVID-19, terrorism, violent extremism, and natural disasters.

All Southeast Asian countries have been upgrading their defense power in recent years and trying to avoid acquiring military systems from a single country. Thailand and the U.S. signed the Thailand-United States Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership and the Memorandum of Understanding on Promoting Supply Chain Resilience in 2022 to improve their military collaboration. The U.S. promised to assist in Thailand’s military modernization efforts, and the Thai military began to procure military articles from Israel, ROK, the U.S., and Russia in order to lower its military purchases from the PRC. Russia used to be the biggest arms supplier to Vietnam. However, at the end of the same year, the latter invited defense contractors from the U.S., ROK, and Israel to join its Defense Exhibition to reduce its dependence on military sales from Russia.

Both the U.S. and the PRC have recently placed multiple military footholds in Southeast Asia. Ream Port of Cambodia held a groundbreaking ceremony in June 2022 for its upcoming base expansion, giving more space in the Port available for the PRC’s military. When the President of the Philippines met with Mr. Lloyd James Austin III, the U.S. Defense Secretary, in February 2023 in Manila, he agreed to the U.S. military to use 4 additional military installations in the country beside the 5 bases currently in use, and the Philippines’ government formally announced those installations in the following April: Naval Base Camlio Osias, Lal-lo Airport, Camp Melchor Delta Cruz, and Balabac Island.

V. India

Faced with the ever-growing military power of the PRC and historical feuds and endless conflicts with Pakistan, the government of India has to spend multi-billion U.S. dollars annually to sustain its military. In addition, India has a stockpile of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles that requires huge funds to maintain. In June 2022, India issued a new recruitment system to lower personnel expenditures for the Indian military. Then in February 2023, its government proposed the FY 2023 defense budget of INR 5.94 trillion (approx. NT$ 2.15 trillion), a 13% increase, to the parliament in order to realize its military modernization, continue domestic production of its military articles, and address the tensions with the PRC and Pakistan.

Since 2014, Mr. Narendra Damodardas Modi, Prime Minister of India, has been promoting the initiative of Make in India, to motivate investments, encourage innovation, strengthen the development of skills, and establish top-notch manufacturing infrastructures. Foreign
【The Layout of U.S. Bases in the West Pacific】

Source: Malacañan Palace, the Philippines and open information from the U.S. DoD
investments for the initiative reached US$ 83.6 billion in FY 2022, up from US$ 45.15 billion in FY 2014. In order to enhance its autonomous research and development (R&D) and production capabilities, the Indian government has imposed an export ban on several military systems and components. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) of India has kept a detailed inventory of military items that must be purchased from local manufacturer to lower its dependence on foreign military products.

VI. Australia

The government of Australia has recognized that the strategic environment in 2022 was the toughest over the years and it is necessary for it to acquire much needed defense capabilities. Australia has reviewed its current defense strategy and its growing sphere of national interests and concluded that the Australian military shall be capable of executing standoff operations, adjusting prescribed time of precaution against conflicts to deal with threats in a timely fashion.

Considering strained relations with the PRC and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Australia has examined its efforts to strengthen national defense, and noted that the country will not be able to curb the ambition of the PLA to execute operations in areas adjacent to the Southern Pacific and the airspace and territorial waters of Australia. As a result of that, its defense policy obviously led the country to strengthen ties with the AUKUS in order to jointly address the threat from the PRC. Australia plans to introduce various high-tech capabilities, such as networking, artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), hypersonic missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines. In March 2023, heads of state from Australia, the UK, and the U.S. announced a plan to jointly develop Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines.

Australia has disclosed that its defense budget for FY2024 is AUD 52.6 billion (approx. NT$ 1.09 trillion), breaking the benchmark of 2% GDP. It will accept 12 F-35A fighters in the same year and plans to acquire air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground precision munitions to boost the long-range air strike capacity of its fleets. With the newly accepted National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) for its army, the air defense capability of the Australian military will effectively enhanced.
Estimated or expected ranges of missiles that were recently deployed, are being developed, purchased for the first time, or being mass produced by countries.

- **PRC**: DF-26 Missile (4,000 km)
- **U.S.**: Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (2,775 km)
- **North Korea**: Pukguksong-3 missile (1,900 km)
- **Australia**: Surface-to-surface, ship-launched missile (1,500 km)
- **Japan**: Updated Type 12 Missile (1,000 km)
- **ROK**: Hyunmoo-4 missile (800 km)

Note: The U.S. LRHW may have a range greater than 2,775 km, while PRC's DF-26 can reach from 3,000 to 4,000 km.

Sources: Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and international Studies; Reuters reporting (TPG images)

[Missile Competition in the Indo-Pacific]
Section 3  Security Environment and Strategic Location of Taiwan

Taiwan is not only situated at an important geostrategic location but also acts as a trustworthy partner in the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast, the PRC has been vigorously trying to dominate the region in recent years and frequently launching cognitive warfare, grey zone tactics, and military intimidation against us. The security situation across the Taiwan Strait has thus attracted international attention. The Armed Forces continue strengthening force buildup and combat readiness and actively deepening security cooperation in multiple domains with like-minded countries, so as to jointly address PRC’s military challenge in the region and contribute to peace and stability in the region.

I.  Key Geostrategic Location - Taiwan

Taiwan is located at a key node of geostrategic importance on the first island chain of the Indo-Pacific, linking together sea lines of communication (SLOC) between the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The Bashi Channel in its south and the Miyako Strait in its north are major strategic waterways for the PRC to pass through the first island chain. About 50% of all freighters in the world must sail through the Taiwan Strait annually. The Taipei Flight Information Region (FIR) is a hub for travelers in Southeast Asian countries heading to and from Northeast Asia and North America, with 18 international flight routes. Consequently, the situation across the Taiwan Strait is tightly linked with the security of the international lines of communication and global economic development.

With the ever-growing scale and intensity of PRC’s intimidation against Taiwan, the international community is gradually becoming aware that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are necessary factors to maintain international security and global economic development, and security across the Taiwan Strait has thus become a global issue. Democratic countries, like the U.S., continue using multiple means, including deploying military force, making diplomatic statements, imposing policy restrictions, and improving substantive relations with our country to curb PRC’s intent to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

The ROC (Taiwan) has an attitude that is calm and will not act in haste to deal with PRC’s verbal attacks and saber rattling. While the U.S. is actively uniting allies to curb PRC’s threat to the international order and the international community begins to look seriously at the issue across the Taiwan Strait and support our country, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) will continue deepening strategic cooperation with allies and establishing interoperability with one another to keep strengthening our self-defense capabilities.

II.  Key Player to Regional Peace and Stability

Upholding the ideal of preserving peace, the ROC (Taiwan) staunchly supports and abides by all international norms and is a force for good in the world and a reliable partner. In addition, we are handling cross-strait relations with a pragmatic attitude and will not bow to pressure. We are committed to keeping a democratic, diverse, and humane way of life and will not escalate tensions or provoke, with the primary goal of maintaining cross-strait peace and stability.
On issues in the South China Sea, our position is that all concerned countries shall follow international law to maintain the freedom of navigation and passage in the South China Sea and jointly promote peace and stability in the region. While the world is facing a variety of ever-growing security risks, we, as a responsible risk manager, are actively taking part in various international organizations to provide various humanitarian aids. Moreover, we are dedicated to substantively handling major international issues and joining up with democratic countries and communities to curb the expansion of authoritarianism.

The current development of situations in the Taiwan Strait is vital to regional peace and stability, and the Armed Forces are fully committed to strengthening their overall defense capabilities. We are dedicated to sustaining a robust defense power to maintain security in the surrounding areas of the Taiwan Strait and free passage of both air and sea lines, and we work as peacekeepers in the Indo-Pacific to contribute substantially to the security and stability in the region. In the future, we will continue to join hands with like-minded allies, based on the principle of maintaining peace, stability, and mutual benefits, to staunchly defend our free and democratic way of life.
Where is the median line of the Taiwan Strait?

The Taiwan Strait is a natural barrier between Mainland China and Taiwan. When the ROC and the U.S. signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the U.S. Pacific Command demarcated a line for the two sides across the Strait to refrain them from initiating military activities and maintain peace, and this world-renowned median line is not just some randomly drawn line on a map.

Fifty percent of all freighters in the world must pass through the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, peace and stability across the Strait are not only related to both sides of the Strait but are also closely tied to the Indo-Pacific and even the security of global transportation and economic development. In recent years, the PRC has been using military exercises or maritime patrols as excuses to challenge the existence of the median line. It even unilaterally claimed that the “median line of the Strait is non-existent” and is attempting to annex the Taiwan Strait into its territorial waters. It is Armed Forces’ responsibility to safeguard the nation and protect the homeland. We will continue standing staunchly to defend our national sovereignty and ensure the integrity of our territorial waters, lands, and airspace.
Chapter 2
Security Challenges

Since 2022, the Russo-Ukraine war and ongoing Sino-American competition have been straining the international posture and impacting the situation across the Taiwan Strait. On the pretext of the then U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Ms. Nancy Patricia Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and President Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign visit, as well as her meeting with the U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Mr. Kevin Owen McCarthy during transit, the PRC initiated “joint military operations” and exercises around Taiwan to scale up its military intimidation against Taiwan. Since Xi secured his third term as the state leader after the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PRC has become more oppressive and refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. In addition, non-traditional threats, such as mutinational pandemics, extreme climate events, and a depleting supply of energy, are also posing grave challenges to our national defense and security.

Section 1 Status and Development of PRC’s Military Capabilities

Under “active defense” strategic guideline, the PRC continues to improve military capabilities, weapon research & development, and combat readiness. It aims to achieve its comprehensive goals of (1) an integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and speeding up the development of an intelligent army by PLA’s Centennial in 2027, (2) basic completion of modernization on defense and military, and (3) fully transformation of its military into world-class forces by the mid-21 century.

I. PRC’s Military Development

To realize Xi’s thinking to strengthen the military and his guideline for military strategy in a new era, the PLA continues to accelerate defense reform and military modernization, improve joint operations, develop new fighting capabilities, and construct a modern military system with Chinese characteristics. The PLA’s strategic demands and future development goals of the Services are as follows:

1. The PLA Army (PLAA)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “maneuver operations and three-dimensional offense and defense,” the PLA blends innovation and intelligentization into its military training, and focuses on developing capabilities of combined military and local transportation, long-range rocket strike, three-dimensional landing, in depth assault, defense mobilization, and collaboration with unmanned systems, so as to boost its strength and merge with PLA’s joint operational system to become an all-domain and maneuverable force.
2. The PLA Navy (PLAN)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “near seas defense and far seas protection,” the PLAN is enhancing its capabilities of strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuver and joint operations, comprehensive defensive operations, and logistic support. The PLAN is planned to gain basic control over strategic positions on the first island chain by 2035 and continues to seek overseas footholds to enable itself to defeat foreign forces in partial waters west of the second island chain and speed up its transition from a “near seas defense force” into a “force capable of far seas protection.”

3. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “integrating air and space capabilities and coordinating offensive and defensive operations,” the PLAAF is transitioning itself from a “homeland air defense force” into a “force capable of both offense and defense.” The PLAAF is focusing on developing new generation fighters, air defense missiles, and radar systems, optimizing early warning, command and communications networks, and enhancing capabilities in strategic awareness, air strike, air defense and anti-missile, information confrontation, airdropping operations, strategic projection, and comprehensive logistics. While its domestically built multi-role fighters have become main effort and new-generation high-performance aircraft are growing in numbers rapidly, the PLAAF will be able to join up with the PLAN to possess denial capability over the second island chain by 2035.

4. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “possessing nuclear and conventional weapons and having all-domain deterrence,” the PLARF is speeding up missile R&D, renewing missile inventory, strengthening realistic training, and sharpening mid and long-distance precision missile strike capability. Moreover, it is assigning DF series ballistic missile batteries to join live-fire drills and exercises of the other services to further strengthen its joint operational capability and reinforce its ability to conduct operations against Taiwan and foreign forces.

5. The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “integrating existing systems and merging civilian-military (civil-mil) resources,” the PLASSF is integrating PLA units in the domains of aerospace, cyberspace, and electronic confrontation. In addition, it follows the principle of “fostering cohesion of training and operations and using training to optimize operations” to join major exercises in Theater Commands (TC) and the
【Strike Coverage of PLA Missiles】

Source: CSIS
other services, blend itself into PLA’s operational system, exert asymmetric warfare potential, speed up transforming experimental forces under R&D into a fully capable combat force with new capabilities, and ultimately transition itself into a critical contributor to winning an informatization warfare.

6. The PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (PLAJLSF)

As instructed by the strategic demand of “achieving a trinity of joint operations, joint training, and joint logistics” and the principle of “self-servicing for specialized equipment and joint-servicing for general-purpose ones,” the PLAJLSF is responsible for integrating logistic requirements for all general-purpose items, constructing civil-mil combined transportation and logistical capacities, sustaining a unified joint logistic mechanism, and improving management for logistic resources, so as to increase PLA’s joint logistic support efficiency.

II. PRC’s Defense Budget and Weapons R&D

PRC’s defense budget has been keeping a steady growth, and is generally used to construct management systems for hardware modernization, materialize a strong military strategy for talented personnel in a new era, deepen defense and military reform, renovate military installations, raise personnel salaries, strengthen defense technical innovations, and optimize defense technological and industrial arrangements.

1. PRC’s Defense Budget

In FY2023, PRC’s listed 1 trillion 553.7 billion RMB defense budget, roughly 1.28% of its GDP. It increased more than RMB 100 billion, compared with 1 trillion 450.4 billion RMB in FY 2022. PRC’s defense budget ranked 1st in Asia and 2nd in the
world. Its defense budget will be mainly spent on sustaining defense and military modernization, deepening civil-mil integration, optimizing preferential treatment for military personnel, and providing veteran services and personnel salaries. However, certain portions of the budget are hidden in non-military accounts, and therefore, the actual defense budget is higher than the public figure.

2. PRC’s Weaponry R&D

The report of the 20th National Congress of the CCP stresses that the PRC will intensify troop training, enhance combat readiness across the board, establish a strong strategic deterrence, speed up the development of unmanned and intelligent combat capabilities, and coordinate the development of the network information system. Moreover, the PRC continues to commission new artillery pieces, conduct R&D for missiles, and integrate unmanned and manned combat platforms to modernize its hardware and strengthen its long-range strike and A2/AD capabilities.

(1) The PLAA

The PLAA continues to equip new main battle tanks (MBT), armed vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and helicopters. The automation and mechanization capabilities of various PLA equipment are to be improved. The PLA is transitioning into a modernized new ground force capable of "precision, three-dimensional, all-domain, and multi-role operations."

(2) The PLAN

The PLAN continues R&D, outfitting, sea trials, and operational test and evaluation (OT&E) for its third aircraft carrier, Fujian. At the same time, it is developing new carrier-based aircraft compatible with the catapult system onboard, the "YJ-21" hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile, and a naval variant of the "Z-20" helicopter to strengthen its air, maritime, and anti-submarine capabilities. In addition, the PLAN is experimenting with "UAV motherships", ship-borne UAV systems, electromagnetic cannons, and "JL-3" SLBMs to increase its strategic deterrence.

(3) The PLAAF

The PLAAF is increasing the numbers and performance of its fighter jets, bombers, airborne early warning (AEW) platforms, cargo planes, aerial tankers, and UAVs and replacing obsolete ones so as to strengthen its air operational, early warning, and strategic projection capabilities. It is deploying indigenous HQ missile batteries and Russian-made S-300 and S-400 missile batteries at critical locations to form a tightened air defense net, and continuing integrating and optimizing its datalinks to improve the efficiency of its command, control, and communications.

(4) The PLARF

Following Xi’s guideline of "strengthening strategic counterbalance capability and reinforcing mid and long-range precision strike capabilities," the PLARF continues
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R&D for mid and long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles with hypersonic warheads or MIRV warheads to strengthen its long-range precision strike capabilities to deny and deter foreign forces.

(5) The PLASSF

The PLASSF is speeding up R&D for high-propulsion solid-fuel carrier rockets and heavy carrier rockets, upgrading its current inventory of carrier rockets, and expanding its capacity to deploy satellites. It is exploiting its space assets, such as the Beidou Navigation Satellite System, remote sensing and reconnaissance satellites, and "Chinasat" series communications satellites, to provide a favorable environment for local information, communications, and electronic (ICE) operations, strengthen command and control efficiency, and create a transparent picture of the battlefield, to support joint operations with the other services.

(6) The PLAJLSF

As the PLA is pushing for an operational command hierarchy of “the Central Military Commission (CMC)-TCs-Forces (Units),” the PLAJLSF is speeding up the construction of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization infrastructures to support its roles. While all TCs continue strengthening their command and control efficiency towards their respective scenarios of battle, the PLAJLSF is optimizing its formations for logistic support for their newly deployed equipment and helping them to expand the scale of operational forces.

3. PRC’s Arms Export

The PRC is the 4th largest arms exporter in the world from 2018 to 2022, and its major buyers are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Myanmar. Its major export items are tanks, air defense missiles, missile frigates, submarines, fighter planes, AEW platforms, and UAVs. The PRC is vigorously expanding export markets in the Middle East and the Central and South Americas, and it is sponsoring the Changchun Air Show in Jilin Province and the Zhuhai Air Show in Guangdong Province and participating in International Defense Exhibitions held in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to showcase its military and industrial equipment and defense technologies, reap potential arms export opportunities, and deepen its regional influences.

III. PRC’s Military Preparedness

Following Xi’s saying to fulfill the goals for the centenary of the PLA as one of the main objectives for the next 5 years in his report to the 20th National Congress of the CCP and his instructions to strengthen combat readiness across the board during his tour to the joint operations command center of the CMC, all Services of the PLA are focusing on developing innovative military strategic and operational guidance, forging strategic deterrence and joint operational systems, enhancing military arrangements for emerging domains, strengthening joint and combined arms training, and optimizing peacetime and wartime transitioning mechanism, so as to improve their capabilities to hold their powerful opponents in check and fight against Taiwan. The operational training and preparedness statuses of all PLA services are as follows:
1. The PLAA

Aiming at joint operations, the PLAA continues to strengthen its long-distance maneuverability, air-land operations, and joint operational command and control efficiency. It is adopting a whole process concept to combine training and tests on its force-on-force drills at the base level, and is emphasizing the importance of joint training over service branches and TCs. In addition, the PLAA has been hosting "Kuayue (Stride)" and "Huo-li (Firepower)" series exercises and joint landing drills to sharpen its capabilities of "precision, three-dimensional, all-domain, multi-role, and preservation."

2. The PLAN

The PLAN continues accepting new Type 054A frigates, Type 055 and Type 052D guided-missile destroyers, and Type 071 and Type 075 amphibious landing docks. While its fleets are strengthening base training, the PLAN is requesting that such training adopt the principle of "joining with multiple service branches and coordinating with multiple platforms" to conduct air-sea training with its air and naval assets and have to go through live-fire tests. Furthermore, the PLAN has been hosting trans-TC maneuvers and blue water voyage training, to get its grip on strategic positions on the first island chain and build up its capability to fight against foreign forces in partial waters west of the second island chain. The PLAN is normalizing its cruise training to familiarize itself with the operational environment surrounding the Taiwan Strait and speed up the formation of its sea control capability.

3. The PLAAF

The PLAAF continues its conversion to new high-performance fighters, AEW platforms, and aerial tankers, to upgrade its long-range strike capability. It is executing combat air patrols (CAP) and realistic combat training and exercises around the Taiwan Strait to intensify its intimidation against Taiwan and show its will to fight against foreign forces. Moreover, the PLAAF has been participating in international military competitions, such as Exercise Falcon Strike with Thailand, Exercise Shaheen (Eagle) with Pakistan, and joint strategic air patrols, to strengthen its realistic combat experience and security cooperation in the region.

4. The PLARF

The PLARF is using its annual base training and joint firepower strike exercises with the PLAA, the PLAN, and the PLAAF to examine its capabilities of trans-TC mobile deployment and precision strikes. It is developing and testing a new hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) to lower the interception rate of an opponent's air defense missiles and upgrade its penetration and strike power.

5. The PLASSF

The PLASSF has been actively developing space infrastructure and activities at the Tiangong space station. It continues research programs for new generation
communications satellites, the Beidou Navigation System, and wide-band communications technologies, establishing a high-resolution ground observation system, and refining its global positioning navigation, real-time all-domain observation, and command and control datalink, to improve its capabilities of joint operational command and control, surveillance and reconnaissance, air-sea blockade, and precision strike.

6. The PLA JLSF

By stressing the concept of “logistics act ahead, and operations follow in all domains,” the PLA JLSF continues refining its future buildup guidelines based on the existing joint logistic support system, and executing its basic, professional, and combined training and drills based on its training guidelines. It has been participating in force-on-force and live-fire drills and exercises to enhance the results of its realistic combat training. The PLA JLSF is also strengthening its logistical capabilities based on the concept of “joint logistics for joint operations, high logistic efficiency, and multi-domain unity” to ensure its effectiveness to fully support the PLA in wartime.

7. Defense Mobilization

Based on its operational requirements to effectively manage its reserve force and logistic support capacities, the PRC promulgated the Reservist Law in December 2022, and began to set up defense mobilization offices at the central and local levels to implement its defense mobilization system. Related societal and economic resources are to be commandeered to meet supply demands during wartime in the future.

8. Guidance of Joint Operations

Faced with the development of modern warfare, the PLA has been refining its joint operational system since its military reform started in 2015. The PLA Joint Operations Guidelines (Provisional), promulgated in 2020, stipulates the principles and procedures of joint operational command, joint operations, operational support, defense mobilization, and political activities. The PLA is verifying its capabilities through joint operational training and joint exercises around Taiwan to strengthen the command efficiency of its joint operations.

9. Overseas Military Installations

To maintain its overseas national interests and military edge, the PRC seeks to expand its overseas logistical and base facilities. It has established the first military base in Djibouti, Africa, and is actively looking for locations in the Southwestern Pacific and the Indian Ocean to establish more military installations, so as to strengthen PLA’s force projection and long-range combat capability.
Section 2  PRC’s Normalization of Harassment and Threat to Taiwan

Since 2022, the PLA has been conducting more frequent and diversified purposeful operations against Taiwan, and trying to use cognitive tactics that point out, “median line is non-existent across the Taiwan Strait, which is not international waters,” to confuse international community. In June of that year, the PLA announced the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) Guidelines (Provisional) to provide a legal basis for its forces to conduct operations. Moreover, it is ratcheting up the intimidation against Taiwan by normalizing its harassment and incursions at our offshore islands and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and conducting joint operations to irritate our people and frustrate our morale to achieve “unification by force and negotiation by operations.”

I. Patterns of PRC’s Normalized Harassment and Incursions

The PRC continues conducting military and non-military activities to make harassment and incursions against us and using targeted strategic arrangements and planned realistic combat training and exercises to strengthen its preparedness against Taiwan. Furthermore, it is manipulating diversified intimidation strategies and means to raise the power of its verbal attacks and saber rattling, and to build up its overall capacity to launch operations against Taiwan. Its patterns are explained as follows:

1. Realigning Force Deployment of Confronting Airfields

   The PRC has been completing the construction of airfields along the coastline of its East and South TCs and realigning new fighters and UAVs to station there permanently to form a superior air power, put pressure on air defense, and seize air superiority in the event of war across the Taiwan Strait.

2. Targeted Intelligence Gathering

   During major exercises of the Armed Forces and missile tests, the PLA would send reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs, and spy boats to gather intelligence in the vicinity of our airspace and waters, so as to grasp the whole picture of our activities and the electronic perimeters of our major weapon systems.

3. Conducting Training and Exercises of Joint Landing Operations

   From June to September yearly, the East and South TCs will conduct maritime training and amphibious operational training along southeast coast of China to examine their invasion plan against Taiwan. Through defense mobilization, civilian cargo ships would be commandeered to strengthen civil-mil transportation and landing capabilities. Around the same time, Chinese media would broadcast and release news of their progress, to broaden the cognitive warfare against Taiwan.
4. Crossing the Median Line of the Taiwan Strait

On the occasion of friendly high-level foreign officials’ visits to Taiwan or events of significance, the PRC would send aircraft and vessels deliberately to cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait, normalize such moves, and use these intensified and targeted military activities to express its discontent and probe the responses of the Armed Forces.

5. Demarcating No-sail and No-fly Zones

The PRC would set up no-sail and no-fly zones in the vicinity of airspace and waters off Taiwan during its military exercises, including live-firing and joint operational exercises, and it would impose military intimidation against us through its state media and internet propaganda, trying to cause panic among our people.

6. Making Assertive Responses to Foreign Aircraft and Vessels

Following the principle of “trailing every vessel, and checking every plane,” the PRC would marshal its confronting forces along its coastlines to make assertive responses to foreign aircraft and vessels if necessary. It would initiate a simulated attack as a realistic combat drill towards U.S. vessels crossing the first island chain.
7. Conducting Long-distance Flight and Maritime Training

The PLA may use its aircraft, such as H-6s, Y-8s, Y-20Us, and UAVs, to conduct long distance flight training to fly en route through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel to reach the Western Pacific, and thus form a strategic encirclement against us and control the military edge over the region. It may send naval vessels to sail across the first island chain to approach the second. In the meantime, those vessels may join up with an aircraft carrier on a trans-TC training and conduct an air-sea joint and composite drill with assets in the air, posing a threat from the eastern waters off Taiwan. By doing so, the PLA can demonstrate its regional deterrence by holding Taiwan in check from both the western and eastern sides.

8. Initiating Activities Other Than Military Operations

The PRC’s maritime paramilitary force has been using fishing boats as cover. During the fishing closed season, the force may join the PLAN and maritime police to conduct joint training in waters off Taiwan and increase the workload of our coast guard to make necessary responses. Civilian aircraft and UAVs are being used to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, and harassment activities by flying close to our offshore islands and even the Taiwan proper. Moreover, marine survey vessels, hydrographic survey ships, and UUVs, possessed by R&D institutions, are being used to survey hydrology and underwater terrain in our adjacent waters, to improve the PRC’s battle management around Taiwan. Furthermore, under the guise of meteorological R&D, the PRC has been releasing weather balloons around the Taiwan Strait as means of “fake civilian application with a real spy intent,” to conduct reconnaissance against us.

II. Joint Operations and Realistic Combat Training

On the pretext of then U.S. House Speaker Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the PRC set up no-fly and no-sail zones along neighboring areas to Taiwan to conduct joint operations and realistic combat training in early August 2022. During President Tsai’s foreign visit and her meeting with the U.S. House Speaker, Mr. McCarthy, in April 2023, the PLA conducted military exercises around Taiwan from April 8th to 10th of that year to sharpen its joint command and operations efficiency of the TC and launched missile tests with simulated blockades over Taiwan’s outbound communication routes, so as to verify its A2/AD capabilities and execute operations against Taiwan. At the same time, it exerted multiple means in diplomatic, economic, internet, and public opinion domains to cause anxiety among our people and endanger the security of the surrounding areas of Taiwan.

1. Summary of the Exercises

The PLA’s Eastern TC held the reins over all operations and imposed no-fly and no-sail zones in the surrounding areas of Taiwan to form an encirclement posture. During the whole process of the exercises, the northern and southern parts of Taiwan were targeted by the PRC’s cyber and cognitive warfare to pose an overwhelming façade of intimidation.
[Recent PLA’s Aircraft Incursions and Related Major Events]

**Date / Major Events**

- **2023/4/10**: President Tsai Met with Mr. McCarthy, U.S. House Speaker
- **2022/12/25**: U.S. President Biden signed the NDAA 2023 to provide military assistance of dozens of billion U.S. dollars to Taiwan in the next 5 years
- **2022/11/7**: Joint Exercises in the West Pacific by the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia during the period of QUAD
- **2022/8/31**: U.S. President Biden pushed for an FMS package of US$ 11 billion to Taiwan
- **2022/8/7**: Then U.S. House Speaker Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan
- **2022/1/23**: Joint Exercise in waters off Okinawa by JSDF and U.S. military

**Sorties/Day**

Date of Information: from January 2022 to 10th April 2023

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**GJ-2 UAV for Strike Missions**

- **User**: PLA AF
- **Control Radius / Ceiling (CR/C)**: 1,079 nm / 29,528 ft
- **Endurance**: 20 hours

**TB-001 UAV for Reconnaissance/Strike Missions**

- **User**: PLA AF
- **CR/C**: 155-1,660 nm/26,246 ft
- **Endurance**: 35 hours

*Jane’s International Defence Review 2021

**Soaring Dragon UAV for Strategic Reconnaissance**

- **User**: PLA AF
- **CR/C**: 1,080 nm / 39,005 ft
- **Endurance**: 7 hours

**YU-20**

- **User**: PLA AF
- **Range**: 4,263 nm
- **Max. Speed**: 448 nm/hr

**Harrier Hawk UAV**

- **User**: PLA AF
- **CR/C**: 108 nm/24,606 ft
- **Endurance**: 18 hours

**Aircraft Carrier Fujian**

- **User**: PLAN
- **Speed**: 30-31 knots
- **Onboard Aircraft**: approx. 40 carrier-based fighters

[Specification Briefs for PRC’s New UAVs and an Aircraft Carrier]
2. Joint Firepower Strike

The PLA began test-firing ballistic missiles towards our neighboring waters. In parallel, the PLAA launched multiple long-range rockets at different locations to expand the results of the PLA’s joint firepower strike.

3. Joint Operational Readiness Patrols

The PLA assigned CAPs by sending aircraft to fly across the median line of the Taiwan Strait in the form of multiple sorties, aircraft types, headings, and long duration. Then its naval vessels began sailing close to 24 nautical miles off Taiwan to diminish the existence of the median line through their military activities.

4. Joint Blockade, Counter Air, and Sea Control

The PLA marshalled combatant ships, submarines, and shore-based missile batteries to form an encirclement grid over our inbound and outbound air and sea lines of communication to examine its A2/AD capabilities, and assigned anti-submarine aircraft, carrier-based helicopters, and main combatant and auxiliary vessels to conduct joint anti-submarine drills in the southwestern waters off Taiwan.

5. Joint Logistic Support

Meanwhile, the PLA dispatched aerial tankers and fast replenishment vessels to conduct aerial and maritime refueling to extend the endurance of both assets in the air and at sea. Some trains were commandeered specifically to conduct drills to transport personnel and provide first aid to victims, to strengthen PLA’s joint logistic support capabilities in a realistic setting.

6. After Action Review of the Exercises

These two major exercises against Taiwan were centered on the concept of “blockade.” The PLA was trying to “encircle first and then attack.” Aside from joint firepower strikes and cognitive warfare, the PLA had simulated breakdowns of our major installations, such as radar sites and air defense batteries, to seize counter-air, sea control, and electromagnetic dominance, to cause our division of internal opinions and even panic, and to shape a favorable condition for its invasion against Taiwan after a process of trial and error for all its courses of action.

III. Operational Preparation against Taiwan

Based on its operational scenarios against Taiwan over the years, the PLA has been executing a variety of realistic operational training and exercises and is intended to use its cross-island chain long-distance flight and voyage activities to reinforce its potential operations against Taiwan and the capability to deny foreign forces’ involvement. In addition, the PLA is using three-dimensional joint landing exercises to verify its backup courses of action, to extend its preparation for a campaign across the Taiwan Strait. It will monitor situations in the region and the changes in cross-strait relations to propose viable operational
plans, followed by targeted exercises. The evaluation of PLA’s operational capabilities against Taiwan is described as follows:

1. Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities
   
   With its constellation of satellites, the PLA can monitor the dynamic activities in real-time of all foreign aircraft and vessels in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, it has constantly deployed electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and vessels, UAVs, spy boats, and science ships in the surrounding airspace and waters across the Taiwan Strait and exerted multi-domain intelligence gathering means on the ground, at sea, in the air, and in space, to have a firm grip on our military activities and optimize its battlefield management.

2. ICE Capabilities
   
   Currently, the PLA capable of inflicting electronic attacks on us. It can use electronic interference or cutoff measures to pose partial impacts on our communications, command and control assets. With the help of its cyber force to attack global networks, the PLA can damage our national critical infrastructure and impact the operation of our military equipment and systems, to support its operations against Taiwan.

3. Joint Intimidation
   
   The PLA can inflict military and non-military blows against Taiwan simultaneously. It can assign aircraft and vessels to enter airspace and waters adjacent to Taiwan to conduct targeted drills and exercises and scale up their joint exercises. The PLA is using fabricated structures to imitate Taiwan’s important political and military installations to conduct realistic force-on-force exercises and releasing related news in the form of cognitive warfare to amplify propaganda and intimidation effects.

4. Joint Blockade
   
   The PLA can execute blockades on our ports, airports, military facilities, and air and sea lines of communication, to achieve its operational goal of “grounding all aircraft and anchoring all vessels,” and at the same time can cut off inbound and outbound air and maritime routes to lower our sustainability of defensive operations.

5. Joint Firepower Strike
   
   The PLA can assign the PLARF’s possession of various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air-launched land attack missiles that can reach Taiwan proper, join up with assets of the PLAN and the PLAAF, as well as the PLAA’s long-range MLRSs, to attack our political, military, and economic high-value targets (HVT), and destroy our political and military command and control hubs and critical infrastructures under favorable conditions, so as to paralyze operational command and control of the Armed Forces and the functions of our government.
6. Joint Landing Operations

The PLA continues to possess various landing vehicles by commissioning new transport helicopters and amphibious landing vessels and commandeering civilian freighters and cargo ships (through defense mobilization) to construct air and maritime strategic projection capabilities. Furthermore, it is strengthening TC’s joint operational command and control and integration of all capabilities, to speed up upgrading its capacities to conduct “multi-domain, beyond-visual-range, all-terrain,” and “three-dimensional landing” operations.

7. A2/AD

The PLA continues exploring the capabilities of its aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, which are ready to conduct cross-island chain blue water voyages through coordination between the PLAN and the PLAAF. In addition, it has deployed long-range conventional surface-to-surface and anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, to form its capability to fight against foreign forces between the first and second island chains. Furthermore, another aircraft carrier, Fujian, is expected to be commissioned after its completion of sea trials by 2025, fulfilling PLA’s demand for a full A2/AD capability.

8. Strengthening Legal Warfare Moves

The PRC promulgated the Law on National Defense in 2021 to stipulate the purpose of its national defense as safeguarding its national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, the Coast Guard Law and the Maritime Traffic Safety Law to expand its leeway to incite grey zone conflicts, and the MOOTW Guidelines (Provisional) in 2022 to provide legality for PLA’s intervention when incidents arise across the Taiwan Strait. It went further to promulgate the Reservist Law to expand its capacity to train and mobilize its reserve force, and it is trying to completely strengthen its legal moves against Taiwan so as to amplify its operational preparation against us.
Section 3  Hybrid Threats of Grey Zonep

The PRC has never stopped its verbal attacks and saber-rattling against Taiwan. Considering lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the PRC came to realize that, putting military power aside, one must also take more factors, like geostrategic pulls, political and economic changes, and comprehensive national powers, into consideration to handle the issues in Taiwan. Especially, it may take the opportunity of international political heavyweights’ visits to Taiwan or specific events to host a series of military exercises, coupled with hybrid means like cognitive and non-conventional tactics, to cause panic among our people. Ignoring the international concerns and objections from the people in Taiwan, the PRC continues applying hybrid means with grey zone tactics in an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait and escalate regional tensions. It has become a grave challenge to our national defense and has impacted the security situation in the Indo-Pacific and even the whole world.

I. PRC’s Normalization of Grey Zone Harassment and Incursions

Recently, the PRC has become more aggressive in its expansion in the name of establishing a New Normal. In addition, it never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Consequently, it switched to using new means, inciting grey zone conflicts, to manipulate its ambiguous characteristic between war and peace to increase the risks of conflict and constrain the freedom of action of our forces in peacetime. For instance, the PRC may exert more military pressure on Taiwan to create tension unilaterally and alter the security status quo across the Taiwan Strait to avoid the oversight of the International Law in political, economic, military, and societal domains, and take advantage of the ambiguity of a potential war, so as to create a favorable posture to annex Taiwan through its international and internal schemes.

To put the grey zone tactics into practice, the PRC has increased the scale, frequency, and intensity of the drills and exercises against Taiwan to strengthen its operational preparation to invade Taiwan. The activities to normalize its grey zone harassment and incursions include: (1) assigning PLA aircraft and vessels to move across the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and make incursions over our ADIZ, (2) conducting realistic military exercises in the neighboring waters off Taiwan, (3) assigning assets to move close to areas adjacent to 24 nm off Taiwan, (4) dispatching civil aircraft, UAVs, and weather balloons to fly close to our offshore islands and even the Taiwan proper, (5) using marine survey vessels and hydrographic survey ships as a “cover” for the military to improve its battle management around Taiwan, (6) initiating cyberattacks on our governmental agencies, critical infrastructures, important business enterprises, and (7) assigning its maritime paramilitary force to join the PLAN and the Coast Guard to conduct joint training, so as to increase the workload on the part of our naval force.

II. PRC’s Threat of Hybrid Warfare

PRC’s hybrid warfare against Taiwan has been a mix of traditional and non-traditional, and conventional and non-conventional means, and it may go with asymmetrical tactics in political, diplomatic, legal, psychological, propaganda, informational, and even criminal domains with multi-channel, highly informatized, flexible, and highly concealed features. In August 2022, the
PRC unilaterally demarcated areas for its exercises and assigned its joint operational forces to conduct live-fire exercises over areas adjacent to Taiwan and off Mainland China for several days. During the period, the PLA not only launched DF series missiles, but also initiated information attacks against Taiwan by sending 272 fake messages to create an atmosphere of upcoming use of force for unification to diminish the authority of our government and weaken the morale of our military and people.

The PRC has never let up its infiltration and wedge-driving moves in the media and on the internet. Behind its military threat, is exhausting every means to incite discrepancies within Taiwan and create people’s distrust against the government. Its modus operandi (MO) includes (1) hacking and infiltrating the internet, (2) disseminating controversial messages, (3) extravagant propaganda and infiltration by means of a united front, and (4) using the methods of “deliberately distortion, direct falsification, wedge-driving and provocation, and threat and intimidation to modify and distort the essence of issues with Taiwan, aiming at creating a division among our society and driving wedges among our people.

III. PRC’s “Three Warfares” and Cognitive Warfare

In the militarily aspect, the PPC has been flexing its muscles. Politically, it has been using its propaganda organs from its party, political, and military circles to inflict cognitive warfare and “three warfares,” namely opinion, psychological, and legal warfare against Taiwan. Focused on using opinion manipulation, psychological threats, and legal actions as means, the PRC has been trying to seize the initiative to launch military operations. Moreover, it is using all kinds of media and platforms to disseminate fake messages in multi-languages to achieve cognitive purposes by confusing international attention, driving wedges among our people, shattering our combat will, and ultimately creating the image that the adversity of Taiwan’s survival was made in its own right for the international community so as to greatly impact the morale of our military.

Disregarding the security and stability in the region and across the Taiwan Strait, the PRC has been easily tossing off the intent to resort to war to deliberately heighten the tension across the Taiwan Strait and generate a crisis, and a growing number of countries have been feeling anxiety and uneasiness. The political and psychological impact, caused by its MO, on our people, has vindicated that the PRC’s strategy against Taiwan has blended the tactics of cognitive warfare in its “three warfares,” united front, and national security and intelligence tasks, focusing on manipulating the will, value, belief, mindset, and logic of thinking in personal, organizational, military, and national domains. Such a strategy has become more diversified and complex and is trying to paralyze the opponent spiritually and defeat it psychologically.
Section 4  Non-traditional Security Threats in the Region

Non-traditional security threats are characterized as trans-regional, expansive, and hard to handle by a single state. With the development of globalization, non-traditional threats in areas, like emerging infectious diseases, climate change, the internet, energy, and food supply continue to impact our security and becomes an issue that cannot be ignored. It is up to the international community to pursue a collaborative mechanism to effectively prepare and control to ensure the security of the world.

I. Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs)

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has dramatically changed the way of life around the world. When it was gradually under control in 2022, all countries began to lift the lockdown to restore the impacted economic order, but the ongoing mutation of the virus still needs our attention. In addition, monkeypox (mpox), an infectious disease between humans and animals, was declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) in July 2022. Therefore, it is up to governments around the world and civil societies to work together to provide all prevention measures and treatments for EIDs.

II. Climate Change

In recent years, various non-traditional threats caused by climate change, such as major natural disasters and food and water resource shortages, have become issues of global attention. In November 2022, the COP27 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Egypt, inserted the issue of climate damage and compensation into its agenda for the first time and required rich countries to provide a climate adjustment fund. The gesture has revealed that climate justice has become a universal value. The Armed Forces have to contribute manpower and resources on issues of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and related prevention measures and will actively coordinate with the government to respond swiftly.

III. Cyber Security

The focus of cyber security is to protect the system, network, equipment, and data from cyberattacks. With the rapid development of global technologies, there is a rising trend for governments, enterprises, and defense organizations around the world to face more cyberattacks, such as malicious software, phishing, hacking, and deepfakes, and their information security teams are encountering a tremendous challenge that is endangering the security of international supply chains. All governments are required to adopt new countermeasures to avoid a chained hazards caused by a mere loophole in cyber security.

IV. Energy Security

The Russia-Ukraine war exposed the critical weakness of the international energy structure. It revealed the issues with energy security and resilience with emerging problems of steady
energy supply and rising energy prices around the world. Taiwan’s total energy demand depends 98% on imports, which can be easily impacted by risks in the energy market. With potential threats from PRC’s military blockade, we must come up with all contingent measures to respond.

V. Food Security

According to a survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), there were 900 million people facing food insecurity around the world in 2021, and it is estimated that roughly 700 million people will face the threat of hunger by 2023. The Russia-Ukraine war has caused a substantial rise in global food prices, and Asian countries are suffering from collateral damages. Several countries in the region, like Indonesia and Malaysia, imposed an export ban on their staple food crops. Food security is not only a concern for people’s livelihood, but also closely connected with the power of defense. The land of Taiwan is limited and densely populated, and our food production is far from self-sufficient. We need technological upgrades and R&D efforts for agriculture to help address our food concerns.

With non-traditional security threats growing in diversity, it has become a trend for countries around the world to contribute their militaries to HA/DR and anti-pandemic activities. As a modernized military, the Armed Forces not only have to maintain our traditional security, but also must enable themselves to deal with sudden and diversified non-traditional security threats. Therefore, the Armed Forces remain committed to training and operations as required, and will dedicate themselves to HA/DR, disaster prevention, and anti-pandemic tasks to protect the properties and lives of our people.

**Brief Note**

Can you tell the difference between the FIR and the ADIZ?

The FIR means the Flight Information Region, while the ADIZ is short for the Air Defense Identification Zone. The difference between the two is that the FIR is demarcated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as an area of responsibility for operational control and flight information by a given country, while the ADIZ is self-demarcated by a country based on its national security and air defense needs.

To put it simply, the FIR is for civilian use, while the ADIZ is for the military. Each has a different meaning and application.
Non-Negotiable National Sovereignty

- **Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone**
  1. **Boundaries**: In accordance with Article 3 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of Republic of China, the territorial sea shall be the sea area between the baseline and the outer limits measuring outwardly 12 nm baseline. As Article 14 states: contiguous zone is the sea area contiguous to the outer limits of its territorial sea and to a distance of 24 nm measured from the baseline.
  2. **Law Enforcement**: As Article 17 states: if the authorities of national defense, police, customs, or other authorized agencies of R.O.C. consider that a person or an object which is in the territorial sea of the Republic of China or the contiguous zone is engaged in any activity violating laws and regulations of the Republic of China, such authorities may engage in hot pursuit, boarding, inspection, and when necessary, detaining, arresting, or putting in custody such persons or objects.

- **Territorial Air**
  In accordance with Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Aviation), every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

- **Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf**
  1. **Boundaries**: In accordance with Article 2 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China, the exclusive economic zone denotes the sea area contiguous to the outer limits of the territorial sea and to a distance measuring outwardly 200 nm from the baseline of the territorial sea. The EEZ comprises the water body, the seabed and the subsoil. The continental shelf is the submarine area that extends beyond its territorial sea through the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, which includes the seabed and subsoil.
  2. **As Article 5 prescribes, the R.O.C. shall, in its exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf**, enjoy and exercise the following rights:
    (1) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the resources, living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.
    (2) Jurisdiction over the construction, use, modification, or dismantlement of artificial islands, installations, or structures.
    (3) Jurisdiction over marine scientific research, preservation of marine environment, and other rights in accordance with international law.

*In accordance with Chicago Aviation and United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, the territory of a state includes its land territory, territorial sea, and the airspace above them (referred to as territorial air), all of which are under the state’s sovereignty.*
National Defense Capabilities

PART 2

Protecting Around the Clock

00:00

[Image showing a tank and a digital clock reading 00:00]
Protecting Around the Clock
National Defense Capabilities
PART 2
Protecting Around the Clock
Protecting Around the Clock

16:30
National Defense Capabilities

PART 2

Protecting Around the Clock
Investing in National Defense to Deter Threats and Avoid War
As David to Fight against Goliath

Tackling diversified and complex regional situations and severe enemy’s threats. The ROC Armed Forces, following the promulgated national strategy and military strategy and innovative and asymmetric thinking, continue pushing for force buildup, maintaining combat readiness, creating a viable force structure to confront future wars, and procuring necessary hardware for joint operations through discreet and prudent procurement procedures. At the same time, the Armed Forces have been strengthening joint command mechanisms, refining cyber warfare and electronic warfare capacities, maintaining hardware readiness, and sharpening the combat spirit of service members to exhibit their combat edge on the battlefield. In addition, the Armed Forces continue blending the realistic training demand of “battlefields can be everywhere, and training shall proceed accordingly at all times,” into their basic combat and joint operational training to forge well-trained and robust elite forces, enhance overall defense power to prevent war, and ultimately ensure the national security.
Chapter 3
Strategic Guidance

In accordance with the *Constitution of the Republic of China*, the *National Defense Act*, the national defense concept of the President, and the defense policy guidance of the Executive Yuan (EY), together with a thorough contemplation of overall strategic environment trends and patterns of warfare, the Armed Forces have formulated defense and military strategies as the basis to lead our force buildup and combat readiness efforts, strengthen combat capabilities, and ensure the security and stability of our nation.

Section 1  Fundamental Concept of National Defense

To protect our national interests, safeguard the nation, and address the PRC's military threats, our current fundamental concept of national defense is expounded as follows:

I.  Safeguarding National Sovereignty and the Values of Democracy and Freedom

We shall keep a rock-solid defense to maintain our sovereign integrity and system of democracy, freedom, and rule of law, and demonstrate our determination as shown by the saying, “absolutely no concession on our territorial and sovereign integrity; no backing away from democracy and freedom.”

II.  Constructing a Threat-free Environment

The first and foremost defense undertaking is to prevent war and deter any external military threats, and our overall defense power shall be employed to defend our homeland, magnify enemy’s costs and risks entailed by its invasion, respond effectively to its grey zone harassment and incursions, and ultimately protect the lives and properties of the people.

III.  Forging a Shield for National Survival and Development

We shall formulate and carry out the objectives of our defense strategy, actively construct a credible defense power, merge defense technologies with civilian production capacities, and speed up reform of defense affairs to become a rock-solid shield for our society and nation to develop and prosper.

IV.  Maintaining Regional Peace and Stability

As a staunch guardian of peace, the ROC (Taiwan) is committed to maintaining the peaceful status quo of the Taiwan Strait, and is actively cooperating with like-minded countries to shoulder more responsibilities and contribute more efforts to peace and stability in the region.
Section 2  Defense Strategy

To safeguard the people and the nation is the Armed Forces' primary mission. By following the national defense concept of the President and the policy guidance of the EY and contemplating recent cross-strait situations, the military development of the PRC, and lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war, the Armed Forces have been consistently evaluating the threats to our national security, proposing accordingly the guidelines for developing our defense capabilities and executing our defense undertakings, and improving the strength of the forces and their firepower so as to forge a rock-solid defense force to protect our national interests and achieve our national goals. The current strategic goals of our national defense are as follows:

I.  Hardening Security for the Nation

Defense is the cornerstone of our national survival and development, and consequently, the combat power of the Armed Forces has to be comprehensively strengthened to safeguard our nation. Facing the direct and grave military challenge from the PRC, the Armed Forces have to “avert war by preparing for it, be capable of fighting a war to stop it,” and have been actively developing effective defense power in an asymmetric thinking to deter the enemy’s operational intents, nip the war in the bud, protect the peace, and demonstrate the assertion and strength to ensure our national security and interests.

II.  Constructing Defense Professionalism

Quality manpower and a highly efficient organization are critical to sustaining Armed Forces’ combat preparedness and force buildup. Facing the patterns of modern high-tech warfare and the demands for defensive operations, the Armed Forces continue optimizing their organizational effectiveness, pushing for reform of defense affairs, and grooming quality manpower to become a modernized, intelligent, and professional elite force.

III.  Accomplishing a Self-reliant Defense

Our nation is actively endeavoring to accomplish a self-reliant defense. Through cooperation between the government and the private sector, the MND has been using indigenous shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing programs to push for civil-mil technological integration, carry out acquisition and maintenance of hardware, which would motivate related industries to upgrade, and advance the development of our defense technologies to satisfy our needs for national defense and construct our resilient national defense capabilities.
IV. Protecting People's Wellbeing

Facing growing non-traditional security threats, the Armed Forces are fully committed to protecting the homeland and people’s wellbeing by following the principle that “HA/DR stands equal to an operation” and will execute HA/DR as instructed by the government. Taiwan is surrounded by the sea, a natural barrier that can be easily harassed and infringed by grey zone means. To safeguard our sovereignty, the Armed Forces will cooperate with all related agencies to protect our national interests collectively.

V. Expanding Strategic Cooperation

Under the trends of globalization and technological development, transnational exchanges have become more intertwined with national security, international affairs, and regional situations. The Indo-Pacific is a major region of political and economic development, and all regional countries have to work together to cope with potential instabilities caused by the PRC’s military expansion. Since Taiwan is located at a key node of geostrategic importance in the Western Pacific, we continue to strengthen international strategic cooperation with regional countries to demonstrate our absolute determination and power to maintain self-defense and keep peace and stability collectively in the region.
Section 3  Military Strategy

Based on “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence” strategic guidance, the ROC Armed Forces has completed asymmetric capability planning and acquisition by taking into account of future enemy threats, technological advances, pattern of war and operation environment, and weaknesses of likely enemy courses action. It has improved defense operational resilience with decentralized command & control. By integrating all-out defense capacity and taking long-range denial and multi-domain defense approaches, it will impose unacceptable risk and cost on any enemy invasion against Taiwan as means to deter enemy ruthless aggression and safeguard our territory and sovereignty, national security and regional peace and stability.

I. Resolute Defense to Ensure Homeland Security

To ensure that Taiwan is capable of defeating external military threats, the ROC is committed to strengthening defense capabilities and resilience, building complete asymmetric capabilities, improving force protection effectiveness, integrating all-out defense capacity, enhancing operational sustainability, and securing our critical infrastructure to realize strategic persistence. To counter harassments of PRC’s grey zone tactics, the ROC Armed Forces has enhanced joint ISR efforts and adapted standing operational procedures to wide spectrum of conflicts and developed phased responses to counter the enemy’s “new normal” coercion and ensure our national security.

II. Multi-domain Deterrence Combined with Joint Defense in the Region

The multi-domain deterrence is a way to counter evolving enemy threat with asymmetric thinking and better tactics and operational approaches. Using Taiwan Strait and geographical advantages, it will create a layered and in-depth defense. By extending striking scope and building robust joint operational capabilities, the Armed Forces can disrupt enemy operational tempo and increase its risks of multi-facet failure so as to deter its aggressive ambition. Once deterrence failed, the Armed Forces will counter enemy invasion by multi-domain disruption and joint fire strikes in integrated air defense, joint interdiction and joint homeland defense to gradually reduce its fighting capabilities and neutralize its offenses and fail enemy invasion attempt.

Taiwan is a linchpin at the First Island Chain. It plays a key strategic role in integrated deterrence and Indo-Pacific defense formed by the U.S. and its allies. The ROC will improve its operational interoperability and participate in regional joint defense through military exchanges to cooperate with like-mined partners and collectively meet PRC’s threats and challenges.
III. Defense in Depth: Achieving Multi-Domain Deterrence Through Applying the Thinking of Asymmetrical Operations

Based on concept of Taiwan defense operation and lessons learned from the Russo-Ukraine war, the Armed Forces will ensure command, control, surveillance and reconnaissance functions and fighting capabilities with enhanced mobility, dispersion, concealment, redundant and decentralized command during the course of operation. Using “eluding its strength and exploiting its weakness” asymmetric approach, it will monitor obvious indicators of enemy invasion and preemptively strike its mobilizing invasion forces and centers gravity to disrupt its operational tempo and delay its actions. The Armed Forces will also extend its defense space into overall Indo-Pacific strategic deployment. During enemy’s most vulnerable strait-crossing phase, helped by Taiwan Strait geographical advantages, it will further reduce enemy
strength by attack it with “mobile, long-range, precision” sea-tolerant high performance naval vessels, mobile anti-ship missile launchers and unmanned vehicles.

To compensate insufficient defense in-depth, building upon established littoral and coastal defense capabilities, the Armed Forces have actively acquired “mobile, small, portable, and AI-enabled” weapons, UAVs, and counter-UAV systems to rapidly improve deterrent asymmetric and critical capabilities. It will also build layered in-depth counter-offense capability with coastal obstacles and use geography, terrain, features, urban environment, buildings and military critical infrastructure protection measures within tactical defense areas to increase defense lines to fail enemy invasion attempt.

Concurrently, with extended mandatory military service and improved military training, it is expected to strengthen fighting capability of reserve forces. Along with transformation of reserve system to implement various readiness improvement measures, Taiwan will build a “ready to mobilize and ready to fight” reserve force and realize our goals in enhancing defense resilience and strategic persistence, so as to fulfill “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence” military strategic guidance.

To strengthen the mobilization mechanism for all-out defense, effectively employ the comprehensive national power, and construct resilient whole-of-society defense capacity, the “All-out Defense Mobilization Interagency Coordination Conference” will be held periodically to deepen interagency collaborative mechanisms, refine personnel and materiel mobilization procedures and training, and strengthen overall war-time national contingent capacity to support our military strategy.
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<td>Aircraft constant incursions against Taiwan</td>
<td>Type 071 Amphibious Transport Dock x 4</td>
<td>Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock x 2</td>
<td>J-15 carrier-borne fighter</td>
<td>Y-20 Transport</td>
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**PRC’s Policies towards Taiwan and Illustration of Heightening Threats since 1949**
### Vessels trans-TC
- The first passing through the Taiwan Strait by Aircraft Carrier Shangdong in 2019
- The first PRC’s aircraft incursion against the southwestern corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ occurred in 2019, and became normalized since 2020 and onward
- PRC’s aircraft crossing the median line over 49 sorties in 2020

### Aircraft constant incursions against Taiwan
- PRC’s Eastern TC launched ballistic missiles across Taiwan (through outer space) during realistic live-fire joint drills from 2nd to 10th August 2022
- Normalized combat patrols of PRC’s aircraft and vessels in waters around Taiwan
- Conducting combat patrols around Taiwan and Keen Sword exercise from 8th to 10th April 2023

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<th>Multi-dimensional Incursions against Our Airspace and Territorial Waters</th>
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<td>Type 055 Destroyer x 4</td>
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**Notes:**
- **No-fly and No-sail Zone for PLA Exercises in August 2022**
- **Exercise Area of Aircraft Carrier Shangdong in April 2023**

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**PART 2 National Defense Capabilities**
Chapter 4
Development of Capabilities

The force buildup concept of the Armed Forces is based on the saying that "how we fight dictates what we equip, how we organize, what we acquire, and how we train." Envisioning the prospects of hostile threats, technological development, patterns of warfare, and operational scenarios, and considering our defensive operational requirements and available resources, the Armed Forces, with the saying in mind, continue refining the defense organization, weapons acquisition, joint operations, cyber warfare and EW operations, equipment readiness, psychological strength, and realistic combat training so as to develop capabilities comprehensively to accomplish missions.

Section 1 Defense Organization and Force Structure

Since the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense were promulgated on March 1, 2002, our nation has consolidated a democratic defense system of "civilian control over the military" and a "unified commanding and policymaking organ." The head of state is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the seat of the Minister of the MND is taken by a civilian. The MND oversees all matters related to national defense, and in command of the Armed Forces. The planning for the force structure of the Armed Forces now is based on hostile threats and guidance from the military strategy and is focused on establishing a force structure and organization to maximize operational effectiveness to tackle the patterns of future warfare.

I. Defense Organization

1. Defense Organizational Hierarchy and Responsibilities

(1) The President

The President shall assume the supreme command of the army, navy, and air force of the ROC as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He or she exerts executive authority over the National Defense Minister, and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) follows the leadership of the Minister to command the Armed Forces.

(2) The National Security Council

In order to decide major defense policies and guidelines related to national security or in response to urgent defense situations, the President may convene the National Security Council.

(3) The Executive Yuan

The EY is responsible for formulating defense policies, consolidating overall national power, and supervising subordinate agencies to conduct defense relevant affairs.
[Defense Organization and Authorities]
(4) The Ministry of National Defense

The MND is in charge of overall defense affairs, shall perform its policymaking, command, and armament functions. Besides, it shall submit suggestions for defense policies and formulate military strategy accordingly.

2. Defense Organizational Structure

According to the *National Defense Act*, the Defense organization is divided into three systems, namely the “policymaking system,” the “command system,” and the “armaments system” to perform their distinctive and professional functions to achieve synergy for the organization. The policymaking system is responsible for proposing defense strategy and force buildup plans, planning and allocating resources, dealing with legal affairs, evaluating overall combat strength, mobilizing all-out defense, stipulating policies for acquisition, and the rest of the tasks related to defense policymaking. The command system is responsible for proposing requirements for force buildup, proposing defense and military resource allocation, supervising force buildup progress and force training, proposing and executing operational plans, and the rest related to commanding forces. Furthermore, under the command system, a joint operational command center (JOCC) is established and continues being operational both in peacetime and wartime. The armaments (acquisition) system manages armament development, defense technology industry development, weapon systems and equipment acquisition strategy, civil-mil technology exchange, armament exchange and collaboration, integrated logistics policy, as well as providing armament-related policy consultations and reviews.

II. Force Structure

The force structure of the Armed Forces is planned after envisioning the hostile threats and patterns of future warfare and following the aforementioned force buildup concept. The allocation of defense resources, timelines of weapons and equipment acquisition, conscription and recruitment, acquisition and conversion of new weapons and equipment, such as high-performance, short, mid, and long-range UAVs, are all factored in the setup of the force structure. The structure is being rollingly modified to adapt to the actual formations and numbers of the regular, garrisoning, and reserve forces, as well as the composition of the forces and manpower, so as to have joint C2, early surveillance and reconnaissance, long-distance precision strike, and fast mobile response capabilities.

Considering the demands of national security and defense operations and the newly revised one-year conscription service term, the Armed Forces continue reviewing timelines of weapons acquisition and annual results of conscription and recruitment to rollingly adjust the numbers and scale of the forces to ensure the complete strength of the main, garrisoning, and reserve forces.

1. The ROC Army (ROCA)

(1) The Command Headquarters of the ROCA has specialized offices at staff level and oversees numbered-army commands; defense commands; an aviation and special
operations command; an education, training and doctrine development command; a logistic command, and so forth. In addition, the Reserve Command of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) was assigned to the ROCA.

(2) Additional 5 new infantry (backbone) brigades are to be formed by the end of 2023. All backbone manpower from the reserve infantry brigades of the Reserve Command will be realigned gradually to quickly mobilize in the event of war and regain their capabilities. They will form the garrisoning force to deny the enemy’s landing forces, establish our urban warfare resilience, and allow the main forces to inflict devastating counteroffensive blows.

(3) Through its acquisition timelines, the ROCA will acquire “long-range precision firepower strike systems,” and will deploy an additional “multi-rocket launcher battery in the Western Theater of Operations (TOs), to conduct long-range strikes against enemy forces and high value targets (HVTs) and effectively improve the effectiveness of our defensive operations.

2. The ROC Navy (ROCN)

(1) The Command Headquarters of the ROCN has specialized offices at staff level, and oversees a fleet command; a marine corps command; an education, training, and doctrine development command; a maintenance and repair command, and so forth.

(2) To meet its requirements for joint sea control missions, the ROCN continues setting up additional shore-based mobile anti-ship missile batteries and conducting conversions for HPVs. It is refining the minelaying tactics to curb the enemy’s intent to launch an amphibious invasion. Furthermore, the ROCN is planning to acquire light class frigates to strengthen its capabilities for joint sea control and countering the PRC’s grey zone tactics.

3. The ROC Air Force (ROCAF)

(1) The Command Headquarters of the ROCAF has specialized offices at staff level, and has jurisdiction over an air combat command (ACC); an air defense and missile command; an education, training, and doctrine development command; a maintenance and support command, and so forth.

(2) To improve the effectiveness of its overall air defense operations, the ROCAF has been replacing obsolete missiles with new and upgraded missiles to defend against enemy’s air attacks, protect our HVTs, and safeguard our airspace. If necessary, the ROCAF may conduct long-range missions to attack the center of gravity of the enemy’s operations and its critical nodes of operations.

(3) The ROCAF has planned to acquire new F-16V fighters, and will add a new fighter wing to accommodate these new platforms and strengthen the overall air defense capabilities of the Armed Forces.
III. Refining Realignment

Aside from upgrading weapons and equipment, we have comprehensively considered a lot of factors, such as hostile threats, defense resources, manpower, hardware renewal, and all-out defense mobilization in order to strengthen our defense capabilities. As a result, we decided to continue maintaining parity between regular and reserve forces and refining realignment for all units based on the principle of using technology to strengthen manpower and applying firepower before deploying troops.

To work with the newly revised one-year conscription service term and the military force realignment plan, the Armed Forces have specifically prescribed the makeup of the defensive operational force, with the volunteer service members to man the “main” or regular forces, the conscription service members to man the “garrisoning” forces, the reservists to man the “reserve” forces and a reserve system to maintain the manning makeup for the current operational forces. Former garrisoning forces are planned to transformed into regular forces and will be used to supplement the backbone manpower of the reserve forces to become a credible force for defensive operations. In addition, the Armed Forces are supported by a civil defense system with local paramilitary personnel to form a resilient all-out defense system.
Section 2  Planning for Force Buildup

The PRC is progressively enhancing its capabilities to invade Taiwan, such as A2/AD, maritime blockade, and rapid triphibious operations. Facing this situation, the Armed Forces have to absorb the lessons learned from the example of asymmetric warfare as shown in the Russia-Ukraine war, exploit the geographic advantages in the form of an island defense, seek suitable force buildup initiatives, and maintain combat readiness under conditions of limited resources in order to quickly strengthen their credible capabilities and carry out the military strategy of “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence” effectively.

I. Principles of Planning

1. Asymmetrical Warfare

Asymmetrical warfare is designed to attack or exploit enemy weaknesses and disrupt enemy centers of gravity, instead of taking on its strengths. To deter enemy, the Armed Forces must use effective capabilities to target PLA’s weaknesses and offset its advantages. When enemy is not ready its fighting forces or unable to defend certain locations due to technical or numerical constraints, it is the time to take advantage of Taiwan Strait natural barrier and defense resilience to attack enemy centers of gravity, deny its war plans, disrupt its operational tempo, disable its fighting capabilities and maximize asymmetric warfare strengths to stop enemy ambition to rapidly end the war.

2. Decentralized C2

The Armed Forces have evaluated all likely enemy courses of action and taken various corresponding responses against PLA fighting capabilities. In order to unleash overall fighting capabilities, the military forces will focus on improved C2 resilience, decentralized command platform and common operating picture, to enhance integrated joint effectiveness and execute joint missions. After factoring in the Planning Guidelines for Joint Capabilities, goals of asymmetric resilience of defense through “long-range, precision, and mobile, unmanned, and AI-enabled” assets, and the principle of establishing decentralized, survivable, redundant, and cross-domains command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) capabilities, the Armed Forces have performed cost-effectiveness analysis on all assets-to-be-acquired and comprehensively reviewed all acquisition programs and their priorities. These programs are listed and being carried out in the Five-year Force Building Plan. We will realign the structure of the Armed Forces to accommodate these new assets to fulfill our needs for future defensive operations.
II. The Focuses of the Force Build-up

The current focuses of the Armed Forces’ buildup are to initiate and continue acquisition and R&D programs for weapons and equipment that meet our requirements for long-range strike, integrated air defense, joint sea control, joint homeland defense, ICE and cyber warfare, joint command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and upgrading the reserve’s forces’ capabilities. They are summarized as follows:

1. Acquisitions from Self-reliant Defense (Domestic) Sources

(1) ROCA

A. To acquire land-based Skysword II field air defense systems, upgrade field air defense radars, to strengthen countermeasures against the threats of the enemy’s air attack.

B. To acquire armed infantry combat vehicles to improve overall mobile, punching, and protective capabilities.

C. To acquire and upgrade combat hardware and gear for reserve forces to fulfill their mission needs, and ensure the success of homeland defense missions.

D. To establish a command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system for all ground forces, so as to quickly integrate multiple intelligence sources from the services, and construct a digital C2 platform to generate common operational pictures (COP) for forces from TO to platoon levels in order to upgrade the performance of overall joint operations of the Armed Forces.

(2) ROCN

A. To upgrade combat systems onboard naval main combatant vessels, such as the Kang Ding Class frigates, to enhance their maritime capabilities.

B. To acquire new generation submarines and upgrade combat systems for the Chien Lung Class submarines, to enhance their underwater capabilities.

C. To develop small, fast, maneuverable, resilient in terms of seaworthiness, and HPVs, which can carry anti-ship missiles and join up with ROC Coast Guard vessels in the event of war to conduct surprise attacks at sea.

D. To acquire new generation light frigates, to amplify the flexibility to respond and adapt to contingencies, and to enhance capabilities of sea control and counter PRC’s grey zone harassment and incursions.

E. To acquire mobile launchers for Hsiung Feng II and III missiles to weaken the enemy’s maritime capabilities and create a favorable posture for our joint sea control operations.

F. To acquire new auxiliary rescue and salvage (ARS) vessels to enhance the efficiency of our maritime rescue and salvage efforts and ensure the success of these missions.

G. To upgrade littoral radar systems and increase their readiness and coverage so as to monitor the dynamic status of enemy targets effectively.
(3) ROCAF

A. To acquire land-based Skybow III air defense missiles and upgrade Skybow II missiles, so as to strengthen the effectiveness of our air defense operations and maintain the security of our HVTs.

B. To acquire Chien Hsiang anti-radiation UAVs, and Hsiung Sheng and Wan Chien standoff precision munitions to improve our capabilities to weaken and impede the enemy’s operations.

C. To acquire new Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT) to fulfill the needs for lead-in conversions for main and next generation fighters and improve the efficiency and safety of flight training.

(4) Others

A. To acquire various types of UAV to conduct ISR and target acquisition missions and improve our battlefield monitoring and reconnaissance capabilities against hostilities.

B. To acquire anti-UAV systems from domestic civil industries so as to defend against the harassment and incursions from small UAVs and protect the security of our homeland.

C. To develop Integrated Interface of C2 and Mission Planning for UAVs and Integration of Anti-UAV Systems to employ the effectiveness of overall UAV and anti-UAV systems.

D. To combine domestic and international industrial capacities to enhance the existing C4ISR integration efforts and C2 resilience so as to decentralize our C2 structure.

2. Acquisitions from U.S. Foreign Military Sales

(1) ROCA

A. To acquire long-range precision firepower strike systems, namely the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), to improve ROCA’s long-range strike capability.

B. To acquire a defensive land-based mobile minelaying system, namely the Vehicle-Launched Scatterable Anti-tank System (VLSAS), to effectively curb and impede the enemy’s operations, and secure more time for our counteroffensives.

C. To acquire TOW 2B and Javelin highly effective anti-armor missiles to strengthen our anti-boat waves operations and the mobile attack capabilities of our ground forces.

D. To acquire M1A2T main battle tanks (MBT) to strengthen our ground attack and fire support capabilities.

E. To acquire man-portable Stinger missiles (included the requirements from the ROCN) to strengthen our short-range air defense capability and conduct our defensive operations effectively.

F. To acquire new-generation tactical area communications system, the enhance the efficiency of our mobile operational C2 and intelligence communications to support the combat operations.
A. To acquire Harpoon coastal defense cruise missiles to extend our maritime attack capabilities and augment the effectiveness of our joint sea control operations.

B. To acquire Phalanx close-in weapon systems (CIWS) to strengthen our anti-missile capability and enable us to shoot down closing-in targets in the air and at the sea to increase our vessel’s survivability.

C. To acquire long-range heavyweight submarine-launched torpedoes that can be interchangeable with the existing torpedoes to enhance the flexibility of the tactics of our submarines.

A. To acquire MQ-9B UAVs to extend our ISR coverage and strengthen our long-distance surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities.

B. To acquire new F-16V (Block 70) fighters, and retrofit existing F-16A/B fighters to strengthen our overall air power.

C. To acquire precision munitions, such as AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), AGM-84H/L air-to-sea missiles, AGM-88B air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, and AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW), to attack the enemy’s center of operations and critical weaknesses and impede its air and maritime operations.

D. To acquire new MS-110 reconnaissance pods to precisely grasp the picture of the battlefield and improve our joint ISR efficiency.

E. To acquire Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 extended range air defense missiles and the like to strengthen the protection for our HVTs.
Section 3  Acquiring Capabilities

Tackling diversified regional situations and PRC’s military threats, the Armed Forces continue planning carefully for all military investments (acquisitions), based on the guidance of “steadily increasing budget to strengthen capabilities comprehensively” policy with a focus on joint operations. With asymmetrical thinking and the demand of “how we fight” in mind, the Armed Forces have prioritized acquisitions for valuable hardware items that can best demonstrate the resilience of our defensive operations, and will try to maximize the effectiveness of our limited resources to fulfill the requirements for joint operations and accomplish the goal of our force buildup.

I. Scrupulous Process for Weapons Acquisitions

After contemplating (1) an assumed long-term strategic environment and related operational scenarios, (2) an evaluation of future threats, (3) strategic concepts, (4) requirements of military capabilities, and (5) the priority set forth by the Planning Guidelines for Joint Capabilities, the Armed Forces will specify a list of items, which will be incorporated in the Five-year Force Buildup Plan as respective acquisition programs.

All acquisition programs shall be aimed at achieving joint operations and will be managed systematically and reviewed in a single form. To keep the cost down by economic production quantity, the programs shall be activated by professional units in each service. Furthermore, to facilitate personnel training, repair and supply, and logistic operations. The integrated logistic support (ILS) for the items to be acquired shall be incorporated into a life cycle assessment (LCA). Furthermore, facing an ever-changing type of hardware that can be purchased commercially off-the-shelf, the Armed Forces will consider speeding up and sharpening the processes to acquire certain items of urgency either for the mission or combat readiness on the premise of fulfilling a careful review to deal with a complex and diversified environment.

II. Speeding up Acquisitions for Vital Capabilities

At present, the Armed Forces remain committed to prioritizing indigenous R&D and production as the primary source of hardware. However, to address changes in hostile threats in the region and acquire vital capabilities sooner, the Armed Forces may, after a careful review, place orders on those vital items that are available commercially off-the-shelf or through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) channels if they cannot be domestically produced in a short time.

Impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war and COVID-19 pandemis, certain supply chains for military materials began to experience delays in shipments and productions. In order to acquire certain hardware of urgency for operations, the Armed Forces are hoping to establish multiple arms acquisition channels through interagency efforts to expand cooperation with other countries to maximize the results of our defense budget and strengthen our overall capabilities.
Section 4  Integrating Capabilities

To speed up upgrading capabilities, the Armed Forces continue strengthening the command mechanism for joint operations; sharpening joint capability planning and related techniques and tactics; enhancing cyber warfare capacities, maintaining hardware readiness; and improving psychological readiness. By carefully selecting targets of interest, the Armed Forces will center the integrated kill chains to strike at the enemy’s center of operations and critical nodes, create a favorable environment on the battlefield, and employ the combat edge to achieve ultimate success.

I. Joint Operations Command Mechanism

1. To maintain complete command and control over forces, the Armed Forces have fully utilized civilian capacities in related fields and integrated internet data to generate real-time COPs at all levels to sharpen C2 efficiency, the Joint C2ISR system and related countermeasures and ensure the success of the defensive operations.

2. To strengthen the joint C2 efficiency of the services, the Armed Forces have installed interchangeable redundancy in command posts (CP) of the services, and established subordinate operations centers in TOs, offshore defense commands, ROCN’s Fleet Command, and ROCAF’s ACC. Under the command of the JOCC, these operations centers maintain effective control over their subordinate units to complete this hierarchical coordination and collaboration and fully exert the functions of joint operational command.

3. The Armed Forces continue increasing datalink recipients in each service to integrate more C2 systems, weapon platforms, and surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, so as to strengthen the C2 efficiency, and intelligence sharing. To speed up our operational responses, shorten C2 processes, and seize the initiatives in the battlefield, the datalink platforms will provide automated operational evaluations and recommendations for decision-making.

II. Planning for Joint Capabilities

1. To build up their forces and establish a credible deterrence, the Armed Forces have completed the requirements for capabilities that need to be acquired in the near, medium, and long-term, and all the requirements are incorporated in the force buildup plans to fulfill the needs for defensive operations.

2. After reviewing the requirements for overall defensive operations, the Armed Forces have decided to incorporate UAVs into their force buildup plans. In parallel with the acceptance timelines for UAVs, the Armed Forces have begun organizing the recipient units and rearranging relevant military occupational specialties (MOS) for involved personnel. At the preliminary period, the involved personnel will be trained, verified on the basis of having “multiple MOSs as a plus.” Depending on the strategic deployment
of UAV assets in the future, the Armed Forces will readjust its organization and equipment according to maintain integral combat readiness applications, the Armed Forces will rolling realign the UAV forces over time to beef up the overall capabilities of the Armed Forces.

III. Cyber Warfare Capacities

To deal with changes in operational patterns and PRC’s hostile threats, the tactics in cyber warfare and EW have become necessary means to deal with new patterns of battlefields, and their impacts can be felt in the whole process of defensive operations. The Armed Forces continue harnessing the capacity for cyberwarfare and EW operations to support joint operations in the environment of future battlefields.

1. Ensuring Security of Cyberspace and Information

Under the current information security architecture, the Armed Forces have established protection management systems for information security, and strengthened the firewalls to detect and curb cyber intrusions and hacking with information protection and data backup measures at all levels. In addition, the Armed Forces have been following related laws and regulations to work with governmental agencies and a national protection mechanism for information security to integrate related information, and collectively protect the critical information infrastructure of the nation.

2. Strengthening EW and System Resilience

The MND continues executing battlefield validations on the occasion of drills and exercises to sharpen the tactical integration capabilities of the Armed Forces, while at the same time acquiring new EW hardware, reinforcing the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and countermeasures, so as to optimize the effectiveness of the joint operations. To keep a smooth battlefield C2, the MND continues integrating command, control, communications, information, and networking systems; employing cable, wireless and satellite communications means; incorporating civilian resources and capacities, and establishing multiple redundant backup capabilities to strengthen the C2 efficiency and resilience of joint operations.

IV. Maintaining Weaponry Readiness

To maintain the readiness of combat equipment, planned and unplanned maintenances of major pieces of hardware for operations are carried out according to technical manuals (TMs). In peacetime, a cap on readiness is set to fulfill the needs for training and exercises, while complete readiness shall be attained in the event of war to support regular and urgent combat missions.

After reviewing the preparations for emerging units, the Armed Forces have decided to add field and base level maintenance capacities for them. There are many periodic meetings held for related purposes, like exploration of repairing key parts of major weapons, the capacity
integration of maintaining propeller-driven aircraft, the exploration of repairing main circuit boards, and the capacity integration of maintaining missile systems. The Armed Forces have been using these meetings and the "logistic information management system (LIMS) of the Armed Forces" to control hardware readiness, integrate maintenance capacities, accumulate self-reliant maintenance capacities for the services, and explore breakthroughs in maintenance techniques. The focuses in this regard are placed on (1) maintenance inspections by superiors, (2) integration of maintenance capacities, (3) reciprocal assistance among the services, (4) production and maintenance outsourcing, and (5) the progress of ongoing FMSs and commercial sales so as to keep the hardware readiness by which the Armed Forces can sustain their combat training and preparation, strengthen national security, and address PLA’s ever-expanding military activities and threats.

V. Improving Psychological Readiness

To strengthen patriotism and solidify a sense of unity, the MND continues to employ Youth Daily News, Endeavor Monthly, Sweet Home Journal, Voice of Han radio programs, and Juguang Park TV episodes to boost up morale and psychological readiness for all services members and the people concerned. At the same time, periodicals of the services, social media (such as Facebook and Instagram), and video streaming websites are being used to disseminate information about the results of training and exercises of the Armed Forces and their legends with the people to fight against the enemies so as to strengthen the core value of “why we fight for whom we fight.”

1. Psychological Education to Toughen Mental Strength

The MND has been compiling pictorial, textual, and video materials taken from training sessions, anti-pandemic operations, disaster prevention missions, and HA/DR operations of forces at all levels, and using them as propaganda materials to disseminate on the occasion of station unit training, Juguang Park TV sessions, specific mental strength courses, and defense common educational courses, to expand patriotic education for service members. In addition, the MND has been hosting events of all-out defense education to reach out to the people. The sense of honor and confidence of service members shall be boosted through exhibitions, demonstrations of skills, and processes of sharing and interacting with participants. It is expected that service members’ virtue and belief in ‘state, duty, and honor’ shall be further strengthened and their determination to safeguard the nation will be further consolidated through this patriotic education.

2. Countering PRC’s Cognitive Warfare

In recent years, the PRC has been using social media to launch cognitive warfare against us, and try to influence the morale of both our military personnel and the people. The MND has been real-time monitoring domestic and international news, and swiftly clarifying fake messages to nip them in the bud. The MND has compiled two common defense educational materials: Let’s Serve! and Mobilizing Immediate Combat Power, which have been incorporated into basic military training and recall training courses as course materials. At the same time, the concept of cognitive
The Source to Maintain Security and Stability for the ROC

Taiwan enjoys a peaceful and stable environment because every man and woman in uniform understands that security and stability for the ROC is not just a slogan and cannot be achieved by smashing multi-billion dollars on an arms race. The peace and prosperity that the island where 23 million people are living with joy depends on (1) the sacrifices and contributions of so many unsung heroes, (2) the belief that the people have placed in upholding the value of freedom and democracy, and (3) the fighting will, demonstrated by a unity among the people to share wealth and woe on the island. All of these are not only sources to maintain security and stability, but also to generate well-being for Taiwan.
The training of the Armed Forces has been executed by following the plans for defensive operations and training instructions. The curriculum and syllabus are also prescribed in a hierarchical fashion and have taken recent regional wars around the world into consideration. As instructed by the saying, “training as the focus with operations in mind,” the Armed Forces have been conducting the training in the forms of force-on-force, live-fire, on-site, and hands-on in order to fully ingrain the concept that “battle can be fought everywhere and training shall proceed accordingly at all times” in the Armed Forces and strengthen their capabilities to conduct defensive operations.

I. Training for Basic Capabilities

As instructed by the military strategy of “resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence,” the Armed Forces are fully committed to achieving the goal of “to train as we fight, combining training and operations as one.” We have made annual training goals and plans for major drills and exercises, all centered on combat readiness, which will be attained through quality military education and training. Realistic combat training is conducted where the battlefield will be. Simulation hardware is used to keep training costs down. Service members must go through a complete package of training, including basic, station unit, and base training, and drills that are coherent with operational plans, so as to strengthen their joint operational capabilities and demonstrate their rock-solid combat strength to safeguard the nation and protect the homeland.

1. Training for New Conscripts and Recruits

   (1) Training for Regular Conscripts

   A. Regular conscripts have to go through 4 months of military training, which is divided into 2 stages: (1) the first 5 weeks of basic military training (BMT) and (2) the following 11 weeks of assigned unit training. The contents of BMT remain the same. The assigned unit training (AUT) is modified and divided into (1) unit training for regular and reserve forces, and (2) specific training for medium-level MOSs or cadre member training. After BMT, conscripts will be assigned to regular or reserve forces on Taiwan proper or its offshore islands to get orientation around their units, receive AUT, and participate in drills and exercises. They will form the foundation for our reserve mobilization to become instant combat ready once mobilized.

   B. To connect the planned 8 weeks of BMT for conscripts in 2024, more training courses have been added and course hours have been revised since the beginning of 2023, to gradually merge new courses with the current curriculum of 5 weeks. Conscripts will shoot more bullet rounds until they reach the shooting criteria during live-fire shooting drills. By the end of BMT, they will undergo a field tactical march, camping, and combat drills for 3 days and 2 nights as their final test. In addition, the conscripts for military training (as described in Chapter 5) shall attend additional civil defense courses, and they have to shoot more rounds during their rifle live-fire shooting drills to master their military skills.
Eight-week BMT Curriculum for Conscripts of 2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>2023 (5 Weeks)</th>
<th>2024 (5 + 3 Weeks)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal Syllabus</td>
<td>Equipment servicing, basic drills, health and sanitation, military discipline &amp; security, and law &amp; order.</td>
<td>Additional common defense education, such as anti-stress training in virtual battlefields and psychological quality analysis to help conscripts to adapt to real combat scenarios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Fitness and Combat Skills</td>
<td>Basic physical training, grenade throwing drills, 500 m obstacle run, close combat practices.</td>
<td>Additional health management, sports science introduction, gradual intensified physical training to strengthen muscle and endurance to meet the demands in battlefields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms Drills</td>
<td>Mechanical theory of rifle, prone-shooting drills with more live rounds to pass validation.</td>
<td>Additional courses for rifle shooting positions with more live rounds, changing magazines, and troubleshooting to impart shooting skills in real combat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Drills</td>
<td>All practices of combat skills, NBC training, and psychological shock training with additional tactical march and camping.</td>
<td>Additional combat casualty care and survival training, tactical march, and camping drills to impart individual or 5-man squad combat casualty care, first-aid-buddy-aid skills and basic combat capabilities in battlefields.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: New 8-week course is 3-week longer than the BMT in 2023, and it will be centered on real combat to strengthen individual member’s combat skills. Additional common defense education, health management and sports science are provided as all-out defense courses that can be used in executing homeland defense missions.

(2) Training for Volunteer Recruits

A volunteer recruit has to go through 8 weeks of BMT. Starting in 2023, new recruits are going to receive a new BMT with additional courses on reasonable risk-taking, battlefield stress-resistance, combat casualty care, quick and responsive shooting, an introduction to all-out defense handbook, and sports science. Each recruit must complete an improved combat drill, a weapons system drill, a tactical march, and a psychological shock test to be a qualified rifleman. For ROCN recruits, the focus of their training is placed on combat skills, validation of common knowledge and skills, swimming, and shooting.

2. Station Unit Training

The station unit training (SUT) has incorporated training courses on physical fitness,
realistic combat shooting, MOSs, and reactions to handle contingencies on offshore islands. Trainees shall undergo a tough final validation session to construct their military competency to operate weapons and hardware and execute missions to which their station units have been assigned.

(1) Physical Fitness Training

The physical functions of the human body for a service member are his or her most sophisticated and complex weapon system. Consequently, staying healthy also contributes to maintaining combat strength. The Armed Forces have provided diversified physical training (PT) regimens, balanced and nutritious diets, quality sleeping time to help a member switch from being with his or her family to becoming a combatant. Therefore, the Armed Forces have prescribed diversified PT and test topics in 4 categories and 13 items to enhance service member’s adaptability to uncertainties on the battlefields, and these categories are: (1) muscles of the upper limb; (2) abdominal muscle cores; (3) cardiovascular endurance; and (4) flexibility.

A. Training on muscles of the upper limb: push-up, pull-up for men (flexed arm hang for women), and kettle bell upright row.

B. Training on abdominal muscle cores: plank, and crunch.

C. Training on cardiovascular endurance: 3,000-m run, 5-minute skipping, 5-km fitness walk, 800-m swimming or walking, and 20-m progressive cardiovascular endurance run (PACER).

D. Training on flexibility: sit-and-reach and drop back.

(2) MOS Training

According to their assigned MOSs, trainees shall have 2 or 3 MOSs after the completion of 8-week (or more) MOS training, including courses on their assigned weapons and live shooting, in order to meet the actual operational needs of their respective units. ROCN trainees shall take additional training courses on their combat stations to become qualified combatant sailors with MOSs.

(3) Training on Realistic Rifle Shooting

Being capable of shooting light arms is a critical fundamental combat skill for an individual combatant. To enhance realistic training, it is now changed to use standing position, kneeling position, and prone position. In addition, courses on rifle mechanical mechanisms, replacing magazines while shooting, and rifle trouble-shooting are added to the new curriculum. The number of rounds given to a trainee during a shooting drill may be increased depending on the types of forces in order to meet the requirements for battlefield environments and combat operations.

(4) Training on Reactions to Handle Contingencies on Offshore Islands

To strengthen their ability to handle contingencies, trainees who are serving on the frontline at defense commands on our offshore islands shall have briefings before conducting combat drills at their positions to discuss potential situations under hostile threats. The briefings shall be combined with the curriculum of
drills to improve their abilities to discover, adapt, and respond instantly to handle contingencies. In addition, trainees have to design certain scenarios to lure the targets to where they will be shot at by organic arms at the commands as conceived by operational plans, and trainees’ responses can be used to verify the effectiveness of joint firepower coordination and the C2 connection mechanism at their positions.

(5) Training on Immediate Combat Action

To have immediate combat action skills, trainees have to take core training courses, including rifle live shooting, physical combat skills, combat loading, tactical maneuvers, organic MOSs on weapons, and security protection for barracks. Furthermore, the basic training for tank and armed vehicle forces has been strengthened to increase their members’ proficiency with their organic hardware and lay a good foundation for their basic combat preparedness capabilities.

(6) Validation of SUT Results

The SUT is implemented primarily at company-level units, and the results shall be "validated through tests," which are divided into 3 phases: basic physical fitness, combat skills, and MOSs, so as to evaluate the training results and strengthen the military capabilities of trainees.
3. Base Training

(1) Ground Forces
The cycle of base training is changed to once per year, starting in 2024, and will last 9 to 13 weeks, depending on the types of forces. The validation tests are planned to be executed in 3 phases: "(1) general test, (2) combat shooting and validation, and (3) operational plan and combat readiness validation." To incorporate practical field training, all recipient ground forces will be trained in camping, field cooking, and setting up transportation zones. Depending on the mission types, garrisoning forces will have additional civil-defense courses on which they will be validated in the final tests, and the focuses of the test are placed on “disaster report, air defense dispersion, rescue training, and mass evacuation,” to be in line with actual scenarios in the event of war and allow all recipient forces to be combat ready after training completion.

(2) Fleet Forces
All composite training, joint operational planning, command staff activities, and combined operational training of the fleet forces are conducted by combatant detachments, composed of main and support combatant vessels. The Coast Guard may join tactical force-on-force drills according to the progress of the training to validate their joint interdiction capability.

(3) Aviation Forces
To incorporate scenarios of defensive operations, all aviation forces have to undergo validation on dissimilar air combat tactics (DACT) and the mission commander upgrade (MCUG). In addition, the aviation forces will be trained under no air tactical control (ATC) scenarios and in southeastern airspace off our ATC range in order to sharpen their capabilities of counter air and sea, suppression, and close air support (CAS).

4. Simulation Training
To lower dangers and risks, increase the depth of training, and go beyond the limits of training locations, simulation hardware shall be used before proceeding to live-fire or shooting drills at all training phases. While using simulation facilities, all perimeters must be set according to prescribed mission patterns, and all emergency procedures have to be practiced and strengthened in order to lower training costs and risks, help ensure hardware readiness, and enhance training efficiency.

II. Training on Joint Operational Capabilities
According to changes in hostile threat, the Armed Forces are incorporating realistic combat training patterns into all training courses, drills, exercises, and practices of operational plans, and organizing participant forces in operational planned exercises for integrated air defense, joint sea control, and join homeland defense in line with their joint operational plans. The Armed Forces continue hosting air and naval missile launch drills, joint operational training and validation, and Han Kuang (HK) exercises to hone the C2 skills and adaptability of commanding officers at all levels.
1. Joint Operational Training and Validation

The purpose of joint operational training and validation is to strengthen joint operational capabilities for each service and expand the results of base training for service branches. The Armed Forces will arrange the subordinate units in the form of joint services or service branches to conduct training operations, which will be focused on validating the training results of joint C2 mechanisms, joint firepower support coordination, joint ISR, joint air defense, joint EW operations, joint logistic operations, and command and staff operational procedures.

2. Air and Naval Missile Launch Drills

To maximize the training results of the ROCN, the ROCAF, and air defense forces and the effects of weapons, the Armed Forces have been assigning their aerial, shore-based, and naval air defense and anti-surface assets to conduct missile launch drills in a realistic and off-site setting with overall air defense and joint sea control scenarios, form a multi-domain deterrence to curb the enemy’s invasive forces, and validate the training results to strengthen Armed Forces' joint air defense capabilities.


Since 2023, the Armed Forces have incorporated major training and exercise events in their drills and joint operations plans. The drills are conducted by each TO that leads the forces under its jurisdiction from each service and the forces mobilized by all-out defense. All participating forces shall follow the scenarios of PLA's invasion and the progress of our defensive operations, and discern situations announced by an adjudicator team and the activities of aggressor units to execute force-on-force drills. The purpose of the drills is to allow participants to know their missions, environment of operations, and battlefield management in order to strengthen their joint operational C2 and joint operational capabilities to accomplish their defensive operations.

4. HK Exercises

HK exercise is the core of the annual combat readiness training of the Armed Forces. As instructed by the saying, “battle can be fought everywhere, and training shall be proceeded accordingly at all times,” the exercise is held to realize the drill results of joint operations plan, strengthen the joint C2 mechanism, and integrate intelligence gathering efforts, in the form of war games and force-on-force drills. In addition, the exercise is used to actively strengthen the capabilities of regular and reserve forces, and will integrate mobilized units from local governments, police and fire departments, and civil defense forces, as well as civilian resources when all-out defense is activated, into the plans for the exercise to validate overall training results in order to improve the resilience of our comprehensive protection for the nation and demonstrate our determination to safeguard our homeland.

The scenarios of the HK #39 exercise of 2023 are based on all the enemy’s potential invasive moves, and recent examples of PRC’s harassment and incursions on our
military exercises. It is divided into a computer-assisted command post exercise (CPX) and a force-on-force drill, and has integrated annual Wan An, Tong Xin, Zi Qiang, and Min An exercises. To protect our critical infrastructure and safeguard the nation with all-out efforts, the focuses of HK #39 are placed accordingly on optimizing force preservation, strengthening maritime interdiction and escort capabilities, improving the effectiveness of homeland defense operations and resilient logistic support, validating the combat readiness of the forces of each service and their capabilities to execute the operational plans, and verifying available civilian resources once commandeered, HA/DR activities, and personnel dispersion efforts under air raids.

III. Development of Military Doctrines

The Armed Forces have supervised the progress of compiling a collection of 325 revised and new doctrines in 3 categories over the past 2 years after considering the factors of organizational realignment, formation of emerging units, acquisition of new hardware, upgrade of weapon systems, the five-year force buildup plan, and the aforementioned force buildup concept, and reviewing related doctrinal development and plans of their application in order to maintain the consistency between forces training and purposes of operational missions and enhance the operational C2 capabilities for units at all levels.
The Importance of HK exercises

“Han Kuang” exercises are not literally to sweat it out in Mandarin Chinese, but the ones that may sweat buckets completely. (Even though participants were indeed sweating a lot during the exercise.)

HK exercise is the one held to validate the nationwide defensive operations in our country. It used to be the Sino-American Joint Military Exercise between the Armed Forces and U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and was first transformed into a unilaterally held operational exercise nationwide by the Armed Forces, code-named “Han Yang” in August 1979.

The then Chief of the General Staff, General Hau Pei-tsun, decided to expand the scale of Han Yang exercise and alter the content from offensive to defensive for the exercise in 1984. It was then renamed “Han Kuang” exercise, and the one held in that year was the HK #1 exercise, which began constituting following ones in a numerical sequence annually.

HK exercise is divided into two phases: a “computer assisted CDX” (war game) and a “force-on-force drill.” By generating scenarios from our current hostile threats and future situations, we have created a series of potential hostilities to validate the perfection of Armed Forces’ planning activities and the fruition of our forces’ training. It can be seen as an annual final exam for the Armed Forces.
身為三軍統帥
捍衛國家安全
是我無可迴避的
Peace is Kept by All-out Defense
Taiwan is located at a key position on the first island chain in the West Pacific, a choking point to contain PRC’s power expansion in the Pacific. To ensure security across the Taiwan Strait, the MND has been following the instructions from the President to continue maintaining combat readiness, implementing major defense policies, such as revision of conscription terms and reform on reserve mobilization, optimizing realistic combat training, and improving battlefield stress-resistance and reaction capabilities for the Armed Forces. Once male adults are discharged, they will be listed as reservists to augment the strength of the reserve forces. In addition, the MND is dedicated to achieving “the unity of reserve and mobilized forces and the parity between the regular and the reserve forces” to strengthen the resilience of the whole-of-society defense, ensure the survival and development of the nation, and safeguard the people’s wellbeing.
Chapter 5
Revising Conscription Term

Facing a tumultuous situation of stringent regional conflicts and challenges, the MND, joining hands with related governmental agencies, has proposed a revision of the conscription service term up to one-year after more than 2 years of studies on the following external and internal factors: (1) changes of international order; (2) PRC’s growing military power and possible invasive actions; (3) force scale, defense strategy, patterns of operations, organizational structure, realistic training, and weapon and hardware as required by initiating defensive operations for Taiwan and its offshore islands; and (4) negative impact of current 4-month military training for conscripts. Aside from the studies, the proposal was made after a thorough consideration of our comprehensive defense capabilities, urgent needs to maintain national security, and compliance with the Act of Military Service System. It is hoped that through force realignment with this revision and well-designed measures in place, we may construct a resilient all-out defense system.

Section 1  Strengthening All-out Defense

National defense epitomizes our comprehensive national power, and peace depends on a viable national defense to sustain it, while national defense counts on the people to exert their collective strength to present it. To construct a resilient all-out defense system and achieve the strategic goal of force realignment accordingly, the MND has done necessary policy reform on our all-out defense system and the conscription service term, and the reasons are explained as follows:

I. Constructing All-out Defense System

To address hostile threats, our overall national defense is going to be provided by an all-out defense system, which is composed of 4 pillars: (1) main forces, (2) garrisoning forces, (3) reserve forces and reserve system, and (4) civil defense system, with their own respective mission attributes and areas of responsibility (AOR) to collectively safeguard the nation, protect the homeland, and maintain a running and resilient society. With this new and powerful all-out defense system in place, we shall be able to continue strengthening combat readiness and integrating civil-mil resources to create a rock-solid defense power, and these 4 pillars are explained as follows:

I. Main Forces

The main forces are basically composed of volunteer service members organized as professional elite forces responsible for operating high-tech hardware and keeping high combat strength. They are the backbone of the Armed Forces, shouldering major combat missions and being responsible for safeguarding our national sovereignty and territorial integrity as our first line of defense.
2. Garrisoning Forces

According to our current organization for combat operations, the garrison forces are composed of reservists, who will be mobilized to become combat-ready in the event of war. However, in light of the fast progression of modern wars, it is hard for them to swiftly regain their combat status to deal with hostile threats after being called upon. After the revision as mentioned above, conscripts can serve longer to beef up the available combat power, and they will go through the whole package of BMT, SUT, MOS training, base training, and joint training and drills to be qualified combat troops to carry out the missions to secure...
the homeland, support operations, protect military and civilian infrastructures, and collaborate with civil defense forces. In addition, the garrison forces are being upgraded to be equivalent to regular ones and may join up with the main forces to effectively strengthen our overall defense power.

3. Reserve Forces and Reserve System

In peacetime, the reserve forces are run by cadre volunteer service members to perform mobilization preparation, and provide recall training for reservists. At wartime, reservists will be mobilized to protect urban and rural areas, and support main and the garrisoning forces to execute combat and HA/DR missions. The reserve system is composed of reservists, and all service members will be listed in a mobilization database under the system before being discharged or retired. In addition, reservists of volunteer service will join the main forces in the event of war, while those of conscription service will join the garrisoning forces to realize the force buildup and application concept of achieving “the parity between the regular and the reserve forces.”

4. Civil Defense System

The civil defense system is mainly composed of local paramilitary personnel. The system is used to consolidate efforts from central, local governments, and the private sector, and can be swiftly transitioned between peacetime and wartime so as to support military operations and tasks of HA/DR, medical assistance, rapid repair and engineering, providing shelters, and maintaining the rule of law in order to keep society running steadily.

II. Reviewing Conscription Service Term

The Act of Military Service System was announced on 17th June 1933, and promulgated on 1st March 1936 to officially initiate the conscription system of our nation. It was revised in 1943 to pave the way for the military service system as it is today. Then, the Act of Military Service for Volunteer Enlisted Soldiers was promulgated on 8th August 1959 to specify that the military service system depends mainly on conscription with recruitment as its supplement, namely a “dual system of conscription and recruitment.”

To address the trend in high-tech wars, operating requirements for ever-evolving hardware, and application of the human resources of the nation, the Act of Military Service System was again revised on 28th December 2011 to shorten conscripts service terms to 4-month military training. In 2013, male adults began to be drafted as conscripts for military training, while the draft for regular conscripts was suspended in 2018. Then, the military service system began to switch to a “dual system of recruitment and conscription” that centered on recruitment with conscription as its supplement.

Since its implementation, the 4-month conscripts service term has undergone several validations in war games and compute simulations on defensive operations scenarios for Taiwan, and its
offshore islands, and HK exercises. The results have revealed that those conscripts of 4-month military training could only take entry-level MOS training, and acted as observers to the real deal of regular forces. Furthermore, they were unable to go through the whole training package, including SUT, MOS training, base training, joint training and drills, and HK exercises. Their military skills and endurance could not equip them with the most basic combat skills and capabilities as required in future defensive operations, not to mention serving as ones with mid and high-level MOSs to operate various hardware in the event of mobilization.

After hosting several seminars with governmental agencies, consulting with all sectors of society, and reviewing more factors, such as (1) changes in international strategic posture, (2) escalating regional conflicts, (3) actual demands of all-out defense, (4) shifts in our demographic structure, (5) training and real combat experience of militaries in advanced countries, and (6) conscription service terms in democratic countries, the MND has concluded that a one-year conscription service term is more feasible to fulfill the manpower requirement for our future defensive operations.

Then, according to the President’s decision made on 27th December 2022 after hosting a high-level national security meeting, the MND submitted the bill for the one-year conscription service term to the EY for its approval, and it was granted. Afterwards, the MND consulted with the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in accordance with legal procedures on the following 29th December to iron out details, and the bill was sent to the Legislative Yuan (LY) for its acknowledgment. When all legal processes were concluded, the bill was passed and officially announced in the bulletin of the EY that says, starting on 1st January 2024, male adults born in 2005 and thereafter shall serve one year of conscription service as regular conscripts. For those born from 1994 to 2004, they continue to serve 4-month conscription service for military training, and those born before 1993 can serve alternative service.

In the wake of the revision, about 70,000 male adults will be drafted annually from 2024 to 2029, as estimated by the MOI. Among them, those serving one-year conscription service shall increase from 9,000 more to over 53,000 gradually. The additional manpower can beef up the garrison forces, support local paramilitary and civil defense operations, and strengthen our capacities for all-out defense and military mobilization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>One-year alternative service</td>
<td>Four-month military training</td>
<td>One-year conscription</td>
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【 Conscription Terms for Young Adults 】
Section 2  Improving Conscript Training

In line with the revision, drafted one-year conscripts, starting in 2024, will receive 8 weeks of BMT with a new curriculum as that of volunteer service members, and will be assigned to respective forces after BMT to continue their 44 weeks of hands-on training and a series of SUT, MOS training, base training, and joint training and drills. After being discharged, they will join the pool of mobilization to beef up the reserve forces.

I.  BMT

Conscripts will be trained from 8 to 10 hours a day (2 hours at night) and 5 days per week under the new BMT curriculum, which is prescribed by referring to civilian techniques, new scientific knowhow, and the training experiences of advanced countries, like the U.S. The training focuses on equipping them with functions and self-aid skills as a basic individual member, and the courses include topics of shooting, combat skills, psychological quality, HA/DR, sports science, and combat casualty care. By the end of their training, they will undergo validation tests in the form of combat drills and a psychological shock test for them to adapt to the battlefield environment and the pressure herein and enhance their basic military quality and individual combat skills and functions.

II.  Unit Hands-on Training

During 44 weeks of unit hands-on training, the training focuses on conscripts MOSs, operating organic weapons and equipment, shooting skills, and civil defense. In addition, following their training flow in each fiscal year, they may participate in homeland defense drills, defensive operations plan practices, and HK and Min An exercises. They will be equipped according to their service branch and type of unit, and will go through more live-shooting drills with more rounds to enhance their MOS and shooting skills. It is expected that with the revision and a new curriculum, the survivability and combat skills of conscripts will be improved, and their anti-stress and reactive capabilities on the battlefield will be much strengthened by attending realistic training missions.

III.  Preparation of Training Grounds

Concerning the growing demands for training grounds because of the revision and commissioning of emerging forces at different stages, the Armed Forces have rearranged 118 shooting ranges and 135 combat practice grounds in such ways of separate zoning and offering them multi-purposely. Regular forces, new conscripts, and recalled reservists are permitted to use these ranges and grounds during training, depending on the necessary attributes and training courses of their units. Furthermore, 15 field grounds and 5 listed vacant grounds from all TOs and tactical locations that can be used for marching, camping, and shooting drills, have been provided for operational planning drills, combat practices, and recall training to meet the requests for the revision.
【 Planned BMT and Unit Training Curriculum of 2024 for Conscripts 】

**BMT Courses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The 1st Week</th>
<th>The 2nd Week</th>
<th>From the 3rd to 4th Weeks</th>
<th>From the 5th to 7th Weeks</th>
<th>The 8th Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Fundamentals</td>
<td>Individual Skills</td>
<td>Composite Training</td>
<td>Final Evaluation, Reassignment after Complete of Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating personal data</td>
<td>Basic physical fitness</td>
<td>Live-shooting</td>
<td>Anti-pressure training under realistic conditions</td>
<td>Stress inoculation training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal education</td>
<td>Close-in combat skills</td>
<td>Battlefield orientation</td>
<td>NBC training</td>
<td>Field tactical march</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military courtesy</td>
<td>Shooting rehearsals</td>
<td>Combat casualty care</td>
<td>Combat drills</td>
<td>Realistic drills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment maintenance</td>
<td>Grenade throwing</td>
<td>500m obstacle run</td>
<td>5-10 km march</td>
<td>Reassignment after Complete of Training by lot-drawing</td>
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<td>etc...</td>
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**Unit Training Curriculum**

- **SUT 18 Weeks**: Conscripts will receive SUT for their individual military skills at where they are assigned. SUT is implementing consistently and is focused on organic weapon shooting, operations of new weapons, homeland defense operations, protection of HVTs, civil defense operations, HA/DR, physical fitness, and combat skills.
- **MOS Training 7 Weeks**: Depending on their MOSs given from their service branches, conscripts will receive advanced courses on homeland defense operations, squad/platoon combat drills, composite training, and crew-operated weapons (40mm grenade launcher and 50mm machine gun) live-shooting to enhance their skills to combat as teams and operate crew-operated weapons.
- **Base Training 13 Weeks**: Conscripts will practice field march and camping drills, composite combat drills at company and battalion levels, multiple weapons (guns and artilleries) firing drills, virtual offensive/defensive drills in a live-firing setting at (infantry/artillery) validation centers of all service branches to enable them to execute combat readiness operations and participate in joint exercises.
- **Joint Training and Drills 6 Weeks**: Conscripts will participate defensive operational planning drills in their TOs, HK exercises, and Min An exercise (civil defense missions) to familiarize their combat missions and battlegrounds and become capable combatants to fight and conduct civil defense operations.

**Note:**
- Common defense education will be imparted in the evening class hours and its contents includes patriotic education, military ethics, understanding of cognitive warfare, internal security education, military legal education and discipline, and health education, etc.
- Rifle shooting includes multiple positions.
- The periods of each training topic are subject to changes by responsible units due to difference of enlistment dates.

- **After completion of full package of BMT, SUT, MOS training, base training, joint training and drills, and defensive operational planning drills, one-year conscripts shall acquire the skills of individual combat skills to protect homeland through civil defense training.**
- **For conscripts received 4-month military training will take 8-week SUT for entry-level MOS, civil defense, and organic weapon shooting.**
Section 3  Revision Associated Measures

In line with the one-year conscription service term from 2024, we have considered all supportive measures, including the amended salary rate, appropriation of funds for pension, flexible advanced education, getting assigned by skills, selection for reserved officers and non-commission officers (NCO), and relevant logistical preparation, in order to provide a well-rounded arrangement. All these measures have been well-conceived and will be carried out according to their respective schedules to achieve fruitful results for the revision, and their details are explained as follows:

I. Amended Salary Rate for Conscripts

In order to allow male adults to fulfill their obligations to serve in the military and share the financial burdens of their families, the Armed Forces have considered their service term and the impact on their future employment after discharge from military service, and then amended the salary rate with a MOS bonus for conscripts under the new system based on that of volunteer service at each ranking level. For instance, the monthly salary for a private (E-1) is NT$ 20,320, and the amended rate will be helpful to content conscripts. As for those who serve for 4-month military training, the pay remains at NT$ 6,510.

II. Appropriation of Funds for Conscription Service Pension Plans

Because currently the time spent in conscription service can only be counted as time in public service and is not legally counted as time in the private sector, we have stipulated specific regulations by referring to the retirement plans of the labor force to request the government appropriate funds for conscripts’ pension accounts after discharge and define the terms, conditions, and expiration date for those accounts so as to help them connect with the pension accounts of their future employment.

【Salary Comparison of Conscription Members】

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conscripts of 4-month military training</th>
<th>One-year term conscripts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>10,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>10,190</td>
<td>10,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,320</td>
<td>22,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  ■ One-year term conscripts will have a monthly salary of NT$ 10,130 during their BMT. After acquired certificates of riflemen, their salary will be NT$ 20,320 including a MOS bonus.
 ■ Private (E-1) will be promoted to private (E-2) after 6-months of service.
 ■ Profit: Private (E-1 and E-2), corporal (E-3), and second lieutenant (O-1) are eligible.
 ■ Supervisory Differential Pay: deputy squad leader, squad leader, and platoon leader are eligible.
 ■ Hardship Duty Pay: service members serving on offshore islands and mountainous areas.
III. Flexible Advanced Education

To attend to the academic pursuit, military service, and career plan of male adults, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the MOI have stipulated a flexible advanced education guide and regulations on temporary dropping out for military service. On the premise that without altering the graduation criteria of credits and cultivating young professionals, educational institutions (universities and colleges) may specifically adjust course hours and provide electives to allow undergraduates, based on their personal willingness and request to join conscription service by submitting applications to their local household registration offices so as to provide male adults a choice to flexibly continue their advanced education and complete their conscription service.

IV. Getting Assigned by Skills

Following the timeline to fill up the garrisoning forces, one-year conscripts will be prioritized to join the garrisoning units. In addition, male adults may be assigned to specific units because of their professional skills and certificates after a selection process, and consequently, they can dedicate and further sharpen their expertise, with which they can join the private sector more quickly. Male adults without joining the selection may choose to serve in the main forces or draw lots to serve in units close to their households so as to allow them to both serve the country and protect their families. Those serving 4-month military training will be assigned to regular forces to observe and familiarize themselves with practical operations and improve their training results.

V. Selection for Reserved Officers and NCOs

To fill the pool of cadre members at rank-and-file levels, the Armed Forces have decided to host selection exams for reserved officers and NCOs, starting in 2027, with the same criteria as volunteer professional officers and NCOs. Examinees with higher IQ scores, English literacy, proof of acceptance after public service exams, or skill certificates will have extra points. It is hoped that through this selection process, we may bring in more quality cadre members at the rank-and-file level to beef up our combat strength and close the manpower gap of the reserve forces once mobilized.

VI. Logistic Preparation

In line with the number of one-year conscripts, we will renovate current military installations and construct new ones as planned in the Xin An program to meet the accommodation demands in the future. All logistical preparation shall be done a year ahead. On the first day of their BMT, they will receive 14 personal items, like field fatigue and sportswear, in the same quantity as those of volunteer service members. When they report for duty, they will receive firearms, equipment, and combat gear that correspond to the attributes of their units and their MOSs. To familiarize them with real combat scenarios, they may receive camping equipment, like personal or squad-size tents and cooking utensils, during field tactical marches and camping courses to enhance their field training results and lay a good foundation to develop their capabilities.
Section 4 Anticipated Goals

To cope with changes in the international strategic environment and tumultuous regional situations, maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and meet the actual operational requirements of all-out defense, it is hoped that through this military force realignment plan to extend the conscription service term to one-year can allow male adults to have a complete and systemic training to shoulder the responsibility for safeguarding the nation and securing the homeland. By conducting enhanced training initiatives and providing well-rounded supportive measures, the plan can achieve the anticipated goals of beefing up the units, strengthening all-out defense capacity, and ensuring a resilient functioning society. It is also expected to allow conscripts under the new system to connect seamlessly with the career market and have more balanced benefits and privileges.

I. Beefing up the Units

Enhancing training for conscripts is vital to improving the combat power of the Armed Forces because robust training lays a good foundation for developing defense capabilities. During the one-year service, conscripts will go through a complete and systemic package of BMT, SUT, MOS training, base training, and joint training and drills to acquire the necessary skills to execute operations. The training curriculum has taken in new, realistic, and sufficient contents. For “being new,” courses for operating new weapons, coordinating with civil defense units, and protecting critical military and civilian infrastructures have been added to improve conscripts’ combat skills. For “being realistic,” core realistic courses for close combat skills and various rifle-shooting positions have been added. For “being sufficient,” anti-stress training under simulated battlefield conditions has been improved, while more live rounds will be offered to conscripts during live-shooting drills to provide sufficient training for them. By improving these training setups, it is expected that all conscripts will know how to operate their organic weapons and shoot, have the necessary combat skills to fight in future battlegrounds, and ultimately beef up all units of the Armed Forces.

II. Strengthening All-out Defense Capacity

One-year conscripts can accept a complete package of military functions and hands-on experience in units and are beneficial for shortening the mobilization timeframe and training timeline for imminent operations at wartime, and providing fast recovery of combat strength to dive into defensive operations instantly. During their service term, conscripts with better performance shall receive military branch training (MBT) to become cadre members as NCOs or even officers at rank-and-file level units to beef up regular forces and fill up the pool of cadre members and slots for mid and high-level MOSs in the reserve units after discharge so as to meet the capacity demand of the reserve forces, and improve the overall results of reserve mobilization.
III. Ensuring a Resilient Society

The missions for the garrisoning forces, composed of one-year conscripts, are providing support for operations, safeguarding the homeland, protecting critical infrastructure, and coordinating civil defense units. After receiving civil defense training and experiences in HK and Min An exercises, conscripts may coordinate teams from local governments, civil defense units, and police departments to conduct defensive operations collectively. By so doing, conscripts may strengthen their civil defense functions and skills and can join civil defense units after discharge to continue serving the country to protect the properties of the people, the homeland, and their beloved country, as well as strengthen the resilience to keep society running in the event of war.

IV. Connecting Seamlessly with the Career Market

After being drafted, conscripts may enter a selection process, depending on their academic background and certificates, to be assigned to specific units. After being assigned, they may put their expertise, such as those in legal, medical, computer, and finance categories, into practice with the tasks in their units. With professional skills acquired during the service, conscripts may join the career market seamlessly after discharge and play their part in developing the society and the nation.

V. Reaching Balance between Obligation and Privilege

To help conscripts deal with their own and their families’ financial burdens while fulfilling their legal obligations, the Armed Forces have taken the impact of the extended term on their future careers into consideration and decided to amend the salary rate for one-year conscripts to alleviate their financial concerns. The time spent in military service will be seen as part of their career. To protect their rights and privileges after discharge, the government has conceived a way to appropriate funds to their accounts in the pension plan for them to connect with the ones of their future employment so as to protect their rights and privileges after retirement. Furthermore, the MOE has created a flexible advanced education measure for undergraduates to complete military service and earn their credits during their period of study, allowing them to carry out their career plans early.
Chapter 6

Refining Reserve Reform

As instructed by the policy of achieving “the unity of reserve and mobilized forces and the parity between the regular and the reserve forces” and interagency cooperation, the MND has been pushing for reform of reserve and mobilization affairs. Concurrently, in order to strengthen the mechanism of “all-out defense mobilization,” the MND has established the ADMA on 1st January 2022 to coordinate interagency efforts in policy planning and implementation, and collectively promote concrete measures to improve the resilience of defense for the whole-of-society so as to make the best of all-out defense power at wartime to support military operations and keep society running as usual.

Section 1 Strengthening Reserve Forces’ Capacities

Boosting up the reserve forces is the focus of the Armed Forces’ force buildup efforts. The MND continues implementing concrete measures, such as realigning reserve units, expanding cadre manpower, improving recall training, raising recall pay, and equipping them with new weapons and hardware, together with extra defense resources to develop readily available capabilities to strengthen the reserve forces so as to reform the mobilization system for the reserve forces.

I. Realigning Reserve Units

According to the force buildup plan, the Armed Forces are going to set up 5 additional garrison brigades, expand the pool of cadre manpower for the reserve forces, and fill up the vacancies in some garrisoning units so as to substantively boost up the reserve forces and reach “parity between the regular and the reserve forces.” In peacetime, the Armed Forces continue mobilization preparations and expand recall training capacity. Consequently, the Armed Forces can speed up mobilization of the reserve forces at wartime and strengthen their readiness for imminent operations so as to work with the regular and the main forces to construct a rock-solid and sustainable defense system.

1. Types and Missions of Reserve Units

As required by defensive operations, the reserve forces are composed of the garrisoning units, reserve units, combat support units, and service support units and will coordinate all units from each TO, naval, and air force base to become an HVT protection force. In addition, they may join up with police departments and civil defense teams to conduct operations to make the most of all-out defense power to ensure the security of our critical national infrastructure.
2. Expanding Cadre Manpower of Local Reserve Brigades

To help speed up mobilizing local reserve brigades, the Armed Forces have been expanding their cadre manpower from 2022 to 2028 annually. The inflow of cadre members can raise the mobilization capacity of local reserve brigades, which will be able to execute recall training and mobilize reservists independently so as to attain the goal of “being mobilized to execute operations on the spot.”

3. Employing Civilian Instructors

To train local reserve brigades directly at tactical locations set up by their respective wartime scenarios, each brigade is planned to hire 15 civilian (military retiree) instructors in 3 teams with distinctive specialties: (1) command and staff, (2) firearms, and (3) tactics. Each team has 5 instructors who can teach in recall training with their rich teaching skills and practical experiences. With the effect of sharing experience and knowledge between givers and takers, we may improve recall training results and accordingly beef up our reserve forces.

II. Acquisition of Weapons and Equipment

To (1) speed up the strengthening capabilities of the reserve forces, (2) follow the policy of reaching “parity between the regular and the reserve forces,” and (3) consider the demands from overall defensive operations, force deployment, and force training, the Armed Forces continue initiating programs to acquire all necessary weapons and equipment to strengthen the overall combat power of the reserve forces.

1. Acquiring Hardware

Having assessed the available defense budget and self-sufficient manufacturing capacities, the Armed Forces have been transferring certain pieces of weapons and equipment in the inventory after repair or renovation to the reserve forces. Furthermore, the Armed Forces have been allocating a certain number of new weapons and equipment acquired from acquisition programs annually to reserve forces in order for them to attain asset parity with the main forces. By this token, the Armed Forces can integrate logistic resources, consolidate capabilities, and save logistic and human costs by outsourcing civilian contractors in a “government owned and contractor operated (GOCO)” concept so as to adequately support all combat missions.
To provide well-organized storage management for reserve forces' assets, the Armed Forces have been allocating budgets annually to repair or rebuild warehouses to generate more space to accommodate mobilization hardware. At peacetime, these warehouses can be used to store the assets of the reserve forces, while they can be quickly available for reservists to retrieve assets (weapons and equipment) to execute missions at wartime.

III. Providing Realistic Training for Reserve Forces

To effectively improve the strength of the reserve forces, the Armed Forces have conducted a test run of 14-day recall training at certain locations from March to September 2022. By having more training hours, raising training intensity, merging with available drills and exercises, and requesting on-call reservists report for duty at tactical locations to be organized and trained on-the-spot, the Armed Forces may thus be able to provide realistic combat training for the reserve forces.

1. Improving Recall Training

The recall training has increased to 14 days from the original 5 to 7 days. The revised recall training is conducted at tactical locations, and its curriculum topics include MOS refreshers, live-shooting drills, a tactical march, and battalion and company drills. Furthermore, according to missions and features of their respective units, reservists may have to attend beach-wise, operational depth, urban warfare, and HVT protection courses with consistent criteria and a continuous setting so as to effectively help participants regain their combat skills, memorize all contingency procedures in their respective AORs, and ultimately lay a solid foundation to boost up the reserve forces.
2. Training at Tactical Locations

To be able to fight on a future battlefield, the assembly and training ground of 14-day recall training are changed from the original “barracks” to the “battalion tactical location” for reservists to report for duty, organize, and receive training. The training will be combined with the annual Tong Xin exercise to validate the availability of “company tactical locations,” as presumed by the dispersal locations of a reserve battalion at wartime. Starting in the 3rd quarter of 2022, the recall training length has been changed from 5-7 days to 14 days for on-call reservists to allow them to be familiar with the layout of terrain and critical infrastructure in their AOR, help speed up mobilization, strengthen their training for imminent operations, and complete their operational deployment in the event of war so as to achieve the goal of “being mobilized, trained, and combat ready on the spot.”

3. Raising Training Intensity

(1) Recall training is provided to meet the realistic training demand that “battle can be fought everywhere, and training shall proceed accordingly at all times.” During the period of recall, on-call reservists shall report for duty and take a variety of courses at designated and tactical locations in the vicinity of critical infrastructures, air raid shelters, victim shelters, and local first-aid stations (hospitals), depending on the missions their respective units are requested to perform so as to “protect the people’s property, the homeland, and the country.”

(2) By referring to the test run result in 2022, recall training will be extended to 14 days starting in 2023 and will receive more reservists to report at tactical locations to be organized and trained. Locations provided by local governments under material support agreements and locations in the vicinity of critical infrastructure will be used in HVT protection drills. Coupled with more diversified training patterns, it is hoped that 14-day recall training can get reservists combat ready sooner.
### Live-shooting Drill Difference between 5~7 Days and 14 Days Recall Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5~7 Days Recall Training</td>
<td>![17 units, 15 rounds, 21 rounds, 33 rounds]</td>
<td>![17 units, 15 rounds, 48 rounds (+27)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Hours</td>
<td>12 hours</td>
<td>12 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Days Recall Training</td>
<td>![34 units, 35 rounds, 45 rounds, 69 rounds]</td>
<td>![34 units, 35 rounds, 138 rounds (+93)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Hours</td>
<td>28 hours</td>
<td>48 hours (including 4 evening training hours)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legends**
- Mortar
- Pistol Bullet
- Rifle Bullet
- Machine Gun Round

**Notes:**
- 12 hours Training Hours
- 28 hours Training Hours
- 48 hours Training Hours (including 4 evening training hours)
Section 2 Improving Privileges and Protection for Reservists

While at home, reservists are mostly breadwinners, with burdens from both families and workplaces. In order to protect their rights and privileges and alleviate the impact of their absence on their working places during recall, the MND promulgated the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists on 27th May 2022 to address such concerns and help on-call reservists concentrate on their training and missions. Relevant measures are explained as follows:

I. Raising Recall Pay

As the reservists fulfill their civil duty of receiving recall trainings, on 12th January, 2022, the Executive Yuan has approved the MND’s proposal of raising the daily stipends of 14-day recall participants, along with 50% increase of conscripts’ stipends, in order to mitigate their financial burdens. In addition, according to the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists, when those participants go to the military hospital, they can present proof of date within a time span of one year after their latest 14-day recall training, to the registration desk to get free registration. At the same time, they also enjoy discounts while checking into the Hero Houses (military hostels) during the same time span.

II. Giving Recall Awards

To improve the results of refreshing reserve forces’ combat skills, and enhance the combat strength of reserve mobilization, the MND has stipulated the Regulations on Granting Awards for Recalled Reservists and Voluntary Participation in Recalls on 16th January 2023, based on Article 4 of the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists. Qualified reservists can voluntarily join recall training. To further encourage reservists’ participation of recall trainings, those recorded with multiple times of recalls will be awarded a bonus of NT$5,000 starting from his/her attendance of the 5th recall.

III. Soliciting Support from Business Enterprises

According to Articles 7 and 8 of the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists, employees of business enterprises shall be given official paid leaves during the period of recall. However, to alleviate the burden on business enterprises due to the absence of their employees and encourage them to allow employees to answer the call, those enterprises are entitled to deduct 150% of their annual income tax from the same amount paid to the individual during his or her recall. As authorized by Paragraph 2, Article 8 of the Regulations, the MND has collaborated with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to stipulate the Regulations on Incremental Tax Deduction for Employees on Recall Leaves and promulgated them on 30th November 2022 to prescribe terms and conditions for the tax deduction.
### Increased Stipends for On-call Reservists after Conscription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>+450</td>
<td>1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>+400</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlistee</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>+350</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit: NT$  

### Description for the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferential Item</th>
<th>Preferential Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service in Military Hospitals</td>
<td>Reservists can present proof of date within a time span of one year after their latest 14-day recall training to the registration desk to get free registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping and Lodging Discounts</td>
<td>Reservists can present proof of date within a time span of one year after their latest 14-day recall training and enjoy shopping discounts at BXs/PXs and lodging discounts at the Hero Houses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-call Awards</td>
<td>If a reservist has attended 5 recalls, no matter they are done voluntarily or mandatorily, he or she will be given an award after the completion of the 5th one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Deductions</td>
<td>Employees shall be given official paid leaves during recalls, and their employers are entitled to deduct 150% of their annual income tax from the same amount paid to the individual during his or her recall.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 3 Integrating Civil-mil Cooperation Mechanism

To carry out the all-out defense mechanism, the MND plays the role of a secretariat for all-out defense mobilization committee hosted by the EY, and is responsible for coordinating mobilization policy planning and implementation efforts with governmental agencies and local governments to collectively build up the defense resilience of a whole-of-society and support a collaborative mechanism to execute military HA/DR missions at peacetime and military operations at wartime.

I. Preparation for All-out Mobilization

To strengthen interagency integration and improve mobilization results, the ADMA of the MND continues hosting coordination meetings and initiating collaboration efforts periodically to invite the participation of related governmental agencies and local governments. Attendees at the meeting will verify the inventories of strategic materials, review the status of important life-sustaining facilities, and plan for mobilization exercises. Furthermore, the ADMA has issued the All-out Defense Adaptation Handbook to help enhance preparation for all-out defense mobilization at central and local government levels and optimize comprehensive preparations for combat readiness and responsive procedures to handle crises and emergencies.

1. Interagency Coordination and Collaboration

Starting in January 2022, the MND has been hosting “all-out defense mobilization interagency coordination meetings” to invite the participation of the MOI, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), and local governments, and has hosted 20 meetings till August 2023. Their agendas have encompassed (1) planning for Min An and Wan An exercises; (2) revisions to mobilization initiatives and preparation plans; and (3) combat casualty care and treatment in order to deepen interagency collaboration through this mechanism and facilitate the processes to deal with all policy matters. In addition, to cope with a variety of issues, such as proposing revisions to all mobilization plans and related laws and regulations, stockpiling wartime materials, conducting status checks on air raid shelters and victim shelters, planning for civil-mil drills, and developing mobilization information systems, the MND has invited representatives from all related agencies to collaborate with the ADMA for 209 days to discuss 402 issues to manage the comprehensive all-out defense power effectively and strengthen our interagency integration capacities.

2. Mobilization Exercises for Personnel and Material Resources

On the occasion of HK exercises, reserve forces and military service teams will be mobilized to participate in several drills, including (1) beach-wise garrisoning, (2) rapid repair on runways and taxiways, (3) validating commandeered important materials, transportation vehicles, and heavy machineries, and (4) integration of civil factories and civil-mil medical systems so that the Armed Forces may refine the mobilization
processes, sharpen the operations of reserve forces, and raise the effectiveness of manpower and material mobilization mechanisms.

3. Integrated Information System for All-out Defense Mobilization

To integrate interagency administrative work and improve transmission and exchange efficiency of information, the MND has set up an all-out defense mobilization information integration system to integrate mobilization data, which will be transmitted via T-Road encrypted channels, from 39 related agencies. The system provides comparison and analysis functions to sift through civil-mil data to facilitate mobilization preparations, such as pinpointing the exact reservist with specific MOSs to be mobilized, managing materials to be commandeered, and monitoring strategic materials. Furthermore, it can collect mobilization requests from local governments to push for mobilization preparations, and speed up mobilization to support military operations in a timely fashion.

4. All-out Defense Adaptation Handbook

In April 2022, the ADMA first published the All-out Defense Handbook (Template), which received wide comments that because of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the handbook should address stringent situations during wartime and offer more information for the people to adapt. Consequently, in the following May, the MND collected all comments and suggestions from the news media, lawmakers, and
related domestic and international publications and hosted several interagency seminars and two scholar workshops to finally complete the revision, which was renamed and announced as the All-out Defense Adaptation Handbook in June 2023. To help deal with all possible situations at war and enable the people to save themselves and the others, the revised Handbook is divided into 2 parts: preparation at peacetime and adaptation at wartime with contents, including: (1) preparing for emergency evacuation, (2) identifying note and sound of air-raid sirens, (3) getting oriented neighboring important locations, (4) acquiring correct information, (5) possible situations at wartime, (6) identifying friend or foe, (7) dispersing and evacuating during emergency, (8) how to keep alive at battlefield, (9) how to do during telecommunications cutoff, (10) combat casualty care and rescue, (11) battlefield crisis management, (12) adaptation methods to various disasters, (13) hotlines for emergency and contingency, and (14) appendix.

5. Min An (All-out Defense Mobilization and HA/DR) Exercise

To strengthen the adaptability and resilience of local governments in the event of war, the Min An #8 exercise in 2022 incorporated wartime and HA/DR scenarios for the first time, focused on mobilizing civilian manpower and material, protecting critical infrastructures, applying civil-defense teams, and combat casualty care. During the exercise, 8,192 personnel, 1,896 pieces of hardware, and 10 helicopter sorties from police and fire departments, public and civilian enterprises, charitable organizations, and civil groups, were mobilized, so as to effectively verify the application of a comprehensive all-out defense, deal with difficulties during the processes, accumulate experience in the exercise, and keep refining all undertakings in this regard.

II. Verification for Commandeering Materials

To fulfill operational requests of regular and reserve forces, all units at peacetime shall review their needed civilian material according to their designated “combat operations” and concerns about “filling up gaps in equipping.” After a verification and authentication of supply and demand, the needed items will be input into the commandeering preparation plans in 3 categories: “military purpose material,” “military transportation,” and “military purpose industry.” The processes will be examined in annual Zi Qiang exercises to strengthen our resilience in defensive operations.

1. Reviewing and Certifying Requirements

From January to March every year, each unit has to complete a request after reviewing their needed civilian materials based on their missions and those needed by reserve forces in the event of war, and then submit the request in the form of the “annual item list of requested civilian materials to be commandeered at wartime” to their commands or service command headquarters for approval to carry out commandeering preparations and ensure the integrity of the combat strength of all units in the event of war.
2. Acquiring Certification and Distribution of Commandeered Items

From April to March every year, local reserve commands will join hands with local governments to operate the “information system for commandeered civilian materials” to complete related certification and distribution processes for important materials, fastening and packaging facilities, transportation vehicles, and heavy machinery so as to satisfy the requests of all forces to reach their combat readiness.

3. Shortening Enrollment Timeline

The assembly locations of those civilian materials and vehicles will be chosen depending on the tactical location, available area, and transportation routes of the units. On the occasion of the annual Zi Qiang exercise, those commandeered items shall be transported by their owners to the assembly location as requested by the units so as to verify the commandeering mechanism, shorten the time consumed during the process, and support the combat operations in a timely fashion.

III. Integrating Industries for Military Articles

In peacetime, the Armed Forces are doing production and maintenance capabilities surveys on government-owned and private manufacturing companies and will sign production transfer agreements with applicable companies beforehand. The production transfer activities will be incorporated into our annual exercises so that all production capabilities of government-owned and private manufacturing companies can be integrated as an effective supply chain to support production and maintenance missions as requested in the event of war.

1. Transferring Production Activities

To maintain a steady supply chain, the Armed Forces have signed production transfer agreements and made production transfer plans for 2023 with 517 civilian manufacturing companies for aircraft, vessels, and various pieces of hardware. This arrangement will be examined in upcoming exercises to establish an effective production and maintenance support system and will be reviewed and refined continuously to fulfill the actual demands of all units during wartime.

2. Maximizing Production Efficiency

For the purposes of military necessity, civilian manufacturing companies under the agreement will be integrated during wartime to produce items for military purposes instead of those for civilian applications. After coordination with military factories, these companies may increase additional manufacturing and maintenance assets, such as manpower, funds, raw materials, tools, equipment, and transportation, to supply items of necessity for combat operations and help combat forces recuperate during wartime.
The Origin of the Armed Forces Day

Armed Forces Day is a commemorative holiday for our service members. It was announced by the government in 1955 to designate the anniversary of the Day of Victory for the War of Resistance on 3rd September each year as Armed Forces Day to honor the courageous sacrifice of our service members, who perished in the War and the duty and glory of the Armed Forces to safeguard the nation. At the same time, through this commemorative holiday, we may relay the all-out defense concept to the people and raise the awareness of service members towards the trust and confidence with which the people are leaning on their shoulders.

In the early days, each service had its own holiday. For instance, Army Day is observed on each 7th June to commemorate the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Navy Day is observed on each 2nd September to commemorate the naval campaign on 2nd September 1958, and Air Force Day is observed on each 14th August to commemorate the air campaign on 14th August 1937. Moreover, we have Military Police Day on the 12th of December and Combined Service Forces Day on the 1st of April.

As a footnote, in the U.S., the last Monday in each May is the Memorial Day, and each 11th November is the Veterans Day, they are both federal holidays in the U.S., and Americans will show their respect to all men and women in uniform on these occasions. Is it very meaningful?
Joining Hands to Protect the Homeland and Safeguard the Nation
Comprehensive and Circumspect Planning for Forging Elite Armed Forces
Self-reliant Defense

In parallel with force buildup efforts, the Armed Forces continue properly allocating defense financial resources from government appropriations to carry out all defense undertakings, including attending to service members by constructing a safe working environment; using diversified recruiting means to attract aspiring young adults to serve; demonstrating total organizational efficiency by maintaining effective force management, having conformity with defense laws, and keeping cleanliness and integrity; and sustaining robust forces to safeguard the nation while preserving combat casualty care capabilities. To carry out the policy of developing a self-reliant defense, the Armed Forces are fully dedicated to advancing the programs to domestically develop aircraft, vessels, ground equipment, UAVs, and precision munitions. Furthermore, the Armed Forces continue deepening defense and military exchange and cooperation with the U.S. and the other friendly countries and expanding partnerships by establishing strategic dialogue via think tanks to jointly maintain security and stability in the region.
Chapter 7
Performance of Defense Undertakings

To improve the efficiency of overall defense undertakings, the Armed Forces are committed to (1) optimizing national defense governance; (2) reforming recruiting efforts, organizational management, welfare and caring measures, self-reliant defense programs, military medicine, and defense legal affairs; (3) integrating and allocating all defense resources; and (4) raising the quality and performance of handling defense undertakings to construct the Armed Forces as a modernized defense power.

Section 1  Diversified Recruiting Means

In an era of rapid change in society and diversified information, the Armed Forces continue recruiting with innovative thinking and actively publicizing our positive image to attract more promising young adults to serve in the military.

I. Goals and Policies

To construct a military service system that matches our national security and all-out defense system and adapts to the trends of evolving military technologies and sub-replacement fertility, the Armed Forces must remain consistent in refining recruiting means and training efforts to actively enhance the manpower and quality of volunteer service members to ensure a steady growth of our strength and capabilities.

II. Overall Planning

The Armed Forces continue amplifying publicity and getting more exposure for recruiting aspiring young adults to join the service so that the recruiting goal of "reaching an even personnel turnover and a parity between quality and quantity" can be reached.

1. Reaching out Deeply into Campuses

To enhance recruiting results on campus, the Armed Forces continue sending recruiters to reach out to headmasters (presidents), teachers, instructors, and students in educational institutions to understand graduating students' willingness to sign up. Recruiters will give personal advice regarding admission exams and future career tracks and will encourage them to enroll in military academies and the Reserved Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs.

2. Optimizing Recruiting Network

The Armed Forces continue using the recruiting network, composed of northern, central, and southern recruiting centers and ad hoc recruiting teams, and integrating local resources
under their jurisdiction to reach out to students and unemployed young adults in rural areas and on campus and invite them to visit and experience military academies and installations personally to encourage them to sign up either for the academies or military service.

3. Multi-channel Publicity

In recent 2 years, the Armed Forces have used diversified publicizing channels, such as (1) Elite Programs, (2) recruiting drives in university exhibitions, (3) all-out defense educational activities, (4) job fairs sponsored by governmental or private institutions, (5) events of lot-drawing and physical checks for military service, and (6) advertisements on the internet, to provide annual recruitment information and get more exposure for Armed Forces recruitment.

III. Achievements

1. To encourage aspiring students to sign up, the Armed Forces have sponsored all-out defense educational courses in educational institutions and signed agreements for ROTC programs and Defense Cultivation Classes with 130 universities and 410 senior high and vocational schools nationwide to construct a sustainable recruiting mechanism on campus to provide steady and quality manpower for the Armed Forces.

2. Recruitment drives for commissioned officer and NCO classes are separated according to their short, mid, and long-term length of service, admission requests, and employment perspectives after discharge. As for regular recruits, the pool of volunteer enlistees is being filled by unemployed young adults, conscripts in BMT and on active duty, and reservists. The recruiting focus is placed on both quality and quantity, and a variety of recruiting methods will be applied to look for quality candidates from their sources. Once admitted, new recruits will gain professional skills through the training package and will undergo a scrutiny process so that only those who are qualified will be retained to improve the overall quality of the Armed Forces.

3. To strengthen retention, the Armed Forces have refined the leadership course for all classes in military academies and provided living quarters and better living conditions for all service members. For those serving in units with a lower manning ratio and retention rate, they will be given retention bonuses or other incentives to boost their willingness to stay. In addition, depending on the types of their units and actual vacancies, service members can apply to be reassigned to the ones closest to their household location, choose to be reassigned through a routine job transfer, or accept encouragement to serve in the main forces, depending on their decisions for future career tracks and family concerns. It is hoped that through the above-mentioned efforts, the strength of our rank-and-file units will be stable and firm.
Section 2 Managing the Forces

A well-rounded management and stringent discipline are indispensable to maintaining the robust combat power of the units. In addition, effective internal management and vigorous training are beneficial for service members to improve their awareness of hostility and for the units to get stronger. Potential risk factors at all levels shall be analyzed and handled properly; consequently, the Armed Forces have been consistently refining the risk management mechanism based on the principle of demanding over criticizing and preventing over prosecuting. At the same time, the Armed Forces remain committed to taking good care of service members, exerting full organizational potential, strengthening the leadership of cadre members, and consolidating their sense of unity to shape them as a rock-solid combat force.

I. Optimizing Internal Management

1. Strengthening Management Functions

   In the past 2 years, the Armed Forces have hosted 3,755 various courses and demonstration events for commissioned officer and NCO corps, company and battalion commander, cadre, which invite experts, scholars, and ranking members to share their experiences and exhibit their skills in person to sharpen the management skills of our rank-and-file cadre members. Moreover, based on the current operational and management status of our rank-and-file units and the principle of abiding by the law, the Armed Forces have pragmatically revised and added a total of 254 articles with regard to relevant management regulations, such as the Regulations on Interpersonal Relations and Behaviors for the Armed Forces, with regard to internal management, anti-drug, and psychological consultation, to optimize the management system that meets the criteria for managing a modernized combat force.

2. Exerting Organizational Effectiveness

   To build a “learning” organizational culture, the Armed Forces have announced 100 exemplary examples of learning in personnel bulletins and the Youth Daily News from 2022 to 2023 and requested cadre members to disclose the stories of those exemplary examples on all gathering occasions. All units are encouraged to emulate and are requested to be operated in the fashion of “taking the company as a foundation, the company commander as a core, and its organic structure as a link.” They have to observe the principle of “holding one accountable according to one’s hierarchical position” to shoulder their organic responsibilities and improve their organizational efficiency.

II. Strengthening Effectiveness of Oversight

   To carry out all defense undertakings appropriately, the MND has assembled representatives from related units to form ad hoc inspection teams to oversee and verify the statuses of force realignment, discipline, flight safety, and installation security in selected units in order to discover potential problems timely and offer advice on solutions. The MND has hosted
training courses, educational tours, control meetings, workshops, and questionnaire surveys to strengthen the effectiveness of oversight in order to strengthen the combat power of all units.

1. Verifying Force Realignment

Following the timelines of the revised conscript service term and force buildup, ad hoc inspection teams will go to newly established units to verify their progress in manning, equipping, installation renovation, and training ground preparation for various ongoing programs. Such verification is done in the form of meetings, workshops, interviews, and on-site surveys. Afterwards, each team will give advice to program management units on their statuses of MOSs, instructors, training requests, doctrines and regulations, course materials, and hardware based on the findings so as to facilitate follow-on rectifications by recipient units.

2. Tightening Military Discipline

In an effort to connect with the rank-and-file units, over the past 2 years, the MND has hosted 23 “military discipline educational tours” and 72 workshops, in which a total of 4,893 participants of all units attended and made multiple military discipline-related episodes on TV. These events were mainly used to share the practical management experiences of exemplary commanding officers, deliver management reports on how to make the forces progress, and announce noteworthy policies to help cadre officers avoid major emergencies and strengthen service members’ sense of discipline. In addition, the MND has assigned personnel of choice to follow up on compliant cases to keep the channel available to safeguard service members’ rights and privileges and consolidate the unity of all units.

To curb cases of driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, the MND has published down-to-earth comics of drunk-driving prevention to spread the related information on transportation laws and regulations and real DUI cases, demonstrate the serious results of “drunk-driving against the law,” “consequences of drunk-driving,” and serious consequences of “refusing alcohol tests,” and instill an awareness of not taking drunk-driving lightly in order to ensure combat readiness of all units.

3. Realizing Risk Management

Till 2022, the MND has conducted ad hoc inspection tours on all aviation and fleet units to supervise their statuses in terms of overall flight/flight deck safety, improvements on flight/flight deck operations and risk management, logistic workshops and warehouses, and security services, and to give them innovative training instructions so as to (1) timely discover potential risk factors, (2) propose measures to deal with readiness issues and eradicate potential risks, and (3) realize the hierarchical oversight to track corrective actions in order to ensure the safety of all service members.
To execute internal control and oversight through routine inspection, self-evaluation, and internal auditing, the MND has held 5 annual training courses on internal oversight periodically in the past 2 years with 1,076 participants to enhance their expertise and strengthen the risk management of all units.

III. Strengthening Effectiveness of Counseling

The counseling tasks of the Armed Forces are broken down into three distinct levels: (1) the first level is to identify and prevent psychological problems; (2) the second level is to provide professional consultation; and (3) the third level is to offer medical care. Each level has distinctive responsibilities and consultation processes for all involved units. Civilian consultation and medical resources are also incorporated to form a close-knit network to maintain the psychological health of all service members. In addition, the MND continues actively providing cadre member training courses and reach-out events to disseminate psychological health information to all participants to build up their positive mindset and sharpen their consultation skills.

1. Refining Counseling Mechanism

Under their respective organizations, units at all levels are given specific mutual responsibilities for psychological consultation and will carry out such tasks in a hierarchical fashion. Following the “processes of the mechanism linking psychological consultation with security precaution” prescribed by the MND, all units shall unearth and monitor any abnormal symptoms and incidents of their members and provide instant care or communicate with their relatives if necessary. In the past 2 years, the MND has listed 418 members for psychological consultations, and their colleagues have effectively demonstrated mutual support as the “guardians to prevent suicidal acts” to eliminate potential psychological risks.

2. Joining Hands with Civilian Counseling Providers

Facing defense organizational realignment and shifting counseling cases, the MND collaborated with civilian counseling providers for the first time in 2018 for the purpose of providing diversified counseling services. Currently, there are 109 contracted providers who have provided 441 members (1,203 visits) with a 90% approval rating over the past 2 years. Moreover, the MND has followed the MHW’s policy to construct a “social security net” to create an interlinked mental health safety net and has willingly connected with 155 Social Welfare Service Centers and 22 Community Mental Health Centers to provide counseling services for service members in need.

3. Hosting Counseling Carriage Tours

To foster a sense of alertness to potential mental risks, unearth any abnormal symptoms effectively, report potential risks actively, and strengthen the effectiveness of risk prevention measures, the MND has planned to host 807 Counseling Carriage tours in 2023 to (1) provide courses of case discussion and expressive skills to train our counselors, (2) reach out to rank-and-file units with the Counseling Carriage
tours, and (3) incorporate all personnel, accounting, legal service, controlling, internal security, medical, and counseling specialties into content-rich courses for cadre members at and below battalion levels and those members who are helping to carry out the first level of counseling to have a clear concept of being “guardians to prevent suicidal acts” and master the counseling skills through these tours.
IV. Diversified Disclosure of Law and Order

To help service members acquire legal knowledge, abide by the law, and adapt to a fast-growing social media environment and a pervasive presence of communications applications (app), the MND has stipulated the Supplement Regulations on Law and Order Education of the Armed Forces to require that all legal affairs units’ legal officers explain the concept of maintaining law and order through diversified channels, such as Facebook pages, LINE apps (based on the frequent use by service members), posters, propaganda items, cultural competitions, quiz contests, and radio broadcasts, to lower the risks of breaking the law or unbecoming behaviors.

V. Protecting Rights and Privileges

To allow service members to serve with no worries behind and improve the efficiency to perform undertakings by law, the MND has established the Rights and Privileges Protection Committee (RPPC), composed of external fair third-party persons, scholars, and experts, and internal related officers-in-charge, a total of 11~15 committee members, which shall have at least a 40% sex ratio for male or female. All cases concerned will be reviewed and reconsidered in the RPPC. Concerning civil and criminal lawsuits involving service members while performing duties legally, involved members shall apply for subsidies paid to attorneys, and the applications shall also be reviewed in the RPPC to protect their legal rights and privileges.

In the past 2 years, the RPPCs at all levels have thoroughly reviewed and reconsidered 668 cases and 20 applications for subsidies within their designated time frames. For those reconsidered cases within a fiscal year, the MND will analyze the causes and propose solutions for all units’ reference.
Section 3  Attending to Service Members

To reach the goals of “making units safe, helping members settle, and easing dependents’ minds” and improve the outcomes of recruiting and retaining, the Armed Forces continue providing amenities for service members and their dependents, renovating their living quarters, and offering other benefits to allow them to devote themselves to both carrying out their mandates and caring for their families.

I. Amenities

Following the emerging trend in a digital era, the MND has incorporated a trinity concept of convenience, innovation, and intelligence in offering a variety of amenities, such as setting up shopping websites, procuring office supplies, installing intelligent vending machines in military installations, and offering discounted goods provided by designated vendors to provide well-rounded shopping options and improve the quality and efficiency of services.

II. Reconstructing Military Installations

To provide individual living space and amenities for service members, the MND has initiated the Xin An Program since 2017 to renovate military installations for prioritized units, such as those located on offshore islands, in rural and mountainous areas, and the units of the main forces. Under the Program, there are 103 cases due for completion by 2027 to accommodate 82,731 service members. The MND will continue checking the availability of the Funds for Rebuilding Military Living Quarters and Facilities to activate additional cases and construct more premium living and working space to accommodate more members.

III. Providing Childcare

To follow the governmental policy of “providing public childcare and optimizing childcare environments,” the MND has set up 79 kindergartens and childcare centers at 30 locations in 10 cities and counties based on the demands of service members, the distance to neighboring units, and the convenience of transportation. Furthermore, the MND also follows the policy of the MOE to balance the ratio between teachers and pupils in its childcare facilities, which can accommodate 1,478 pupils, to provide better childcare service and allow service members to take care of both their work and families.

IV. Renovating Living Quarters

The MND has constructed 1,104 units in 7 living quarters, including the newly constructed Fu Hsing Kang Barracks, to increase the level of care provided for military dependents. To carry out public housing policy, the MOI, on behalf of the MND, has also built 486 units in 4 living quarters, including the recently built Shen Jian Barracks, to meet the leasing demands of service members. To provide a premium living environment and reach the goal of “helping members settle and easing dependents’ minds,” another 7,704 listed units in various living quarters have been undergoing renovation, and 2,247 of them have been completed by now.
V. Uniform Supply

Since 15th March 2021, the original “periodical supply” of uniforms has been changed to a pattern where service members place purchasing orders on base exchanges (BX) or post exchanges (PX) for uniforms, including military outfits, expendable clothing, sportswear, and shoes, which are outsourced to garment providers and will be put on shelves in local BXs/PXs. Over the past 2 years, there have been more than 470,000 orders placed on physical BXs/PXs or through their websites, and the total transaction value has reached more than NT$ 1.345 billion. Furthermore, the Armed Forces have modified 26 uniform styles and offered a total of 59 diversified clothing items, including sneakers, for service members to choose from. In the future, the Armed Forces will develop more diversified clothing items based on local features and popularity among service members to satisfy their clothing needs.
Section 4 Defense Financial Resources

After factoring in potential enemy threats, our joint defensive operations requirements, force buildup instructions, and force realignment plans, as well as paying equal attention to our national security, financial burdens, and comprehensive economic development, the Armed Forces have prioritized budget distributions and allocations to construct a rock-solid defense power pragmatically and complete force buildup missions successfully.

I. Growing Trend and Allocation of Defense Budgets

1. Trend Analysis of Defense Budgets

Over the past 5 years (from 2019 to 2023), overall defense budgets, including the master budget, special budget, and fund budget, have been increased from NT$ 381.5 billion to NT$ 580.3 billion, with a GDP growth rate rising from 2.0% to 2.5%, showing a steady growth trend year by year and being helpful for our defense capability development.

![Defense Budget in GDP Percentage from FY 2019 to FY 2023](image)

1) Master Budget of Fiscal Year

Over the past 5 years, the master budgets of the MND have grown from NT$ 342.2 billion in FY 2019 to NT$ 409.2 billion in FY 2023. To deal with intensifying hostile threats and regional situations, the master budget of FY 2023 has increased by NT$ 40.7 billion, a growth of 11.04% from that of FY 2022, to speed up defense buildup and substantively demonstrate our staunch faith in safeguarding our national sovereignty.
To speed up upgrading our capabilities, demonstrate our self-defense determination, and ensure our national security, the MND has earmarked NT$ 247.2 billion (from FY 2020 to FY 2026) for the “acquisition of F-16V fighter jet” and NT$ 237 billion (from FY 2022 to FY 2026) for the “Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan.”
2. General Status of Defense Budget in FY 2023

The defense budget in FY 2023 is NT$ 409.2 billion and is divided into 3 categories as follows:

(1) Personnel budget is NT$ 178.6 billion, which is mainly calculated on the manpower of FY 2023 and is also factored in recruiting and retaining results, and actual payroll numbers in recent years to authenticate all figures of salaries, bonuses, stipends, and subsidies and adjust the figures in a rolling fashion.

(2) Operating and support budget is NT$ 133.6 billion, which is used to sustain the required capabilities of all units and is mainly spent on strengthening hardware readiness, replenishing ammunition, improving the capabilities of reserve forces, oil purchase, and renovating military living quarters.

(3) Military investment (acquisition) budget is NT$ 97 billion, which is divided into NT$ 72.1 billion for domestic acquisition programs and NT$ 24.9 billion for foreign acquisition programs (including U.S. FMSs). The self-reliant defense (domestic R&D and production) ratio is 74.33%, which indicates that we continuously carry out our domestic production programs for aircraft and vessels, continue our efforts on critical R&D technologies, and expand our self-reliant defense and industrial capacities, and the rest of the figure can be used to actively acquire the latest weapons and hardware from foreign sources.
II. Defense Budget Oversight

1. Deepening Oversight Mechanism and Improve Financial Services

As instructed by defense policy guidelines and relevant missions, the MND has been tightly overseeing its financial activities in recent 2 years and expanding the coverage of computer-aided auditing through upgraded remote accounting systems to improve supervision and oversight mechanisms. In addition, the MND continues working out a way to deposit recall payment directly into the account of the on-call reservist and improving the efficiency of its financial services to demonstrate its core accounting and statistics values of “integrity, cleanliness, professionalism, innovation, and service.”

2. Refining Cost Analysis as a Decision-making Aid

To perform defense undertakings, fulfill combat readiness requirements, and demonstrate functions of instant cost feedback, the MND continues refining data collection and analysis, as apps and cost databases being developed to conduct cost analysis and transformed the results into a tool to facilitate decision-making efforts, further strengthen the efficiency of defense undertakings.

3. Adjusting Rolling Payments and Checking Account Balance Accurately

The FMS cases are settled and paid according to the payment schedule stipulated in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), i.e., the contract. To effectively control budget execution, the payment amount is revised on a rolling basis according to the US delivery plan, and the annual financial management meeting is used to check the accounts with the US side on a case-by-case basis to improve FMS payment management mechanism.

4. Integrating Funds and Optimize Services

The MND has improved the management of various funds under its jurisdiction by integrating them together and has generated more financial resources by managing budget allocations comprehensively and maximizing the return on investments. The MND is pouring these financial resources into programs to renovate dated living quarters and military hospitals and medical facilities, optimize amenities and medical services, and provide better caring services for all service members by offering innovative financial assistance, leisure activities, and food supplies.
Domestically built Missile Families

Our country is one of the few in the world that can self-develop a variety of missiles, and there are 3 major domestically built missile families, as shown below:

- Skybow series: Skybow I, II, and III are land-based surface-to-air defense systems that can effectively defend against threats such as fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and short-range tactical missiles. With more mature development on shipborne missiles, a variant for the next-generation naval shipborne air defense system is likely to be developed on the horizon.

- Skysword series: Skysword I and II are the major short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles of our fighter aircraft. Based on their design, we have developed vehicle-based and shipborne variants to improve the air defense capabilities of our field forces and combatant vessels. They are widely used on our land-based, maritime, and airborne platforms.

- Hsiung Feng series: Hsiung Feng I, II, III, and Hsiung Sheng missiles are our major sea control and counter-offensive weapons and can be deployed on vessels and land-based mobile platforms. Among them, Hsiung Feng III is one of the few anti-ship missiles in the world that could penetrate targets at supersonic speed, inflicting a precision strike against the enemy’s HVTs at sea.

When our country was suffering from diplomatic isolation in the 1970s, our people voluntarily initiated donation drives to save the nation, and the charity went to a government-sponsored "development fund for defense industries," which laid the foundation for our self-reliant R&D of defense capabilities, as the Skybow, Skysword, and Hsiung Feng missile families are today. This history of marching toward a self-reliant defense does not only reveal our determination to defend ourselves but is also the best proof of our technological R&D potential.
Section 5  Self-reliant National Defense

Pursuant to Article 22 of the National Defense Act, indigenous R&D shall be prioritized so that we can acquire weapons and hardware. In order to develop advanced weapons and hardware systemically, the MND continues pushing for R&D programs of advanced defense technologies, weapons, and hardware through the contemplation of future combat scenarios and technological development. These R&D programs are motivating developments in related industries and helping to accomplish the goal of establishing our self-reliant national defense.

I. Defense Technologies

As led by planned joint capabilities of the Armed Forces and the developing trends of defense technologies around the world, the MND has been deepening its technological studies based on a target-oriented foundation to widen its defense technological R&D capacities and generate critical and technological breakthroughs steadily. Furthermore, the MND has been collaborating with domestic industrial, academic, and research institutions to collectively push for self-reliant R&D initiatives for weapons and hardware to satisfy the future operational demands of all services and demonstrate our determination for self-defense. At the same time, in order to yield industrial spin-offs from our defense investments, the MND will consider transferring mature military technologies to the industrial sector.

1. Advanced Technological Studies

(1) Hosting Defense Technology Forums to Expand Advanced Technological Studies

To combine technological capacities in the industrial, academic, and research sectors to broaden the scale of our advanced defense technological studies, the MND has hosted 9 seminars and 7 defense technology forums in top-notch universities from 2021 to 2022 to discuss the future development and application of 26 advanced defense technologies and encourage attending scholars and experts to dive into defense technological studies. The number of studies is increasing from 81 cases in 2021 with a budget of NT$ 120 million to 156 cases in 2023 with a budget of NT$ 990 million. The focuses of the studies are placed on technologies of fighter aircraft, vessels, armored vehicles, UAVs, missiles, information security, communications, optoelectronics, microwaves, lasers, meteorology, and hydrology, and final evaluations on all the studies have been completed while their research results will be applied to follow-on weapon systems or practical operations.

(2) Consolidating R&D Capacities and Fostering Talents Systematically

The MND has joined hands with 7 academic and research centers of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to conduct multi-year advanced technological research programs, consolidate R&D capacities in domestic universities, and groom technological talents systematically. In the past 2 years, there have been 317 participants with PhD degrees and 1,272 with master’s degrees in these programs.
2. Civil-mil General-purpose Technologies

(1) Application of R&D Results

The MND has been actively applying for grants from EY’s National Science and Technology Development Fund to subsidize civil-mil general-purpose technology research programs, such as the program of “upgrading key technology of power electronics and integration of application and R&D for communications and green power industries,” and transfer research results to private industries in order to generate industrial spin-offs from defense technologies.

A. The Program of Upgrading Key Technology of Power Electronics and Integration of Application and R&D for Communications and Green Power Industries

To upgrade our high-power gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductor technology for the communications industries of extreme high frequency (EHF)/millimeter waves (mmWave), we have been developing key technology to grow GaN epitaxy and will transfer it to private industries for them to produce GaN products to meet the needs to develop our 5G communications industries. In the future, this technology can satisfy the performance requirements of radio frequency (RF) components and power modules for high-power radar signal transmitters, receivers, jammers, and military communications systems and can be applied to civilian green energy products, electric vehicles, and mega-sized energy storage systems.

B. Development and Validation of Application-oriented Intelligent Additive Manufacturing Technology
The MND has established a full industrial demonstration line to produce aerospace-grade additive manufacturing powder and perform validation tests for the whole process. In the future, this technology can be used in military or civilian aerospace designs to produce mega-sized, sophisticated, light-weight components and can help shape a standard procedure to produce additive components and a technology for highly reliable manufacturing.

C. Development and Validation of Powered Exoskeleton System for Increased Muscle Strength and Endurance

This technology can be applied to tasks such as operating heavy weapons, carrying ammunition, and performing HA/DR in the future for the Armed Forces to improve the capabilities of individual service members. It also has civilian applications in heavy machine manufacturing and HA/DR fields to alleviate human workload.

Results of Technology Transfer

From 2021 to 2022, the MND has invested NT$ 261 million in R&D programs for civil-mil general-purpose technology, acquired 24 patents, helped increase the employment of 254 people, assisted in 17 industrial investments, and attracted industrial investments of NT$ 471 million. The MND may expand the applications of these patents and their technical authorizations to generate more success in transferring the results of defense technological R&D to the industrial sector.

II. R&D for Weapon Systems

While it is going to complete domestic production of aircraft, vessels, and basic ground vehicles, the development of asymmetric capabilities, and industrial offset operations successively by following the Five-year Force Buildup Plan, the MND is putting equal emphasis on weapon R&D and technology transfer to carry out the policy for a self-reliant defense and maximize the effectiveness of defense resources to ensure our national security.

1. Production of Indigenous Aircraft

The production of the Advanced Jet Trainers (AJT) has further built up our R&D capacities for military aircraft and motivated domestic aerospace industries to join the supply chain for military aviation materials and help develop various types of military aircraft. Since 2021, 16 AJTs have been delivered to date, and a total of 66 AJTs is aimed to be delivered by 2026. As per the requirements of future air defense operations, the Armed Forces continue investing in R&D initiatives for advanced aircraft systems, stealth capabilities, avionics, and critical technologies to lay a solid foundation of R&D capacities for follow-on military aircraft.

2. Production of Indigenous Vessels and Submarines

The MND has adopted a strategy to execute the programs of domestically producing naval vessels and submarines in a long-term and batch-wise fashion. Among them, the program for High-speed Minelayers was completed, and all 4 of them were delivered in December 2021. A new Landing Platform Dock (LPD) was commissioned in June 2023, while a new ARS was launched in the first half of 2023.
A new submarine will complete the hull welding phase and system tests in the second half of 2023, while the first batch of 5 HPVs will be delivered by the end of 2023. Furthermore, the programs for the second batch of HPVs and the new generation of light frigates (of 2 mission types: air defense and anti-submarine) were initiated and signed with contractors. Currently, all programs are moving ahead on schedule, while the MND continues upgrading and developing key technologies for combat systems, electronic warfare, and sonars in order to broaden our capacities to produce vessels and submarines independently and strengthen our naval surface and underwater capabilities.

3. Basic Ground Vehicles

Based on the design of the 8-wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC), the program to develop a 105 mm cannon-equipped armored fighting vehicle (AFV), which is highly mobile and has high firepower and light-weight armor, was initiated in 2018, and the new AFVs will operate with MBTs to demonstrate a superior mix of short- and long-range firepower. The system integration and R&D test and evaluation for the AFV prototype were completed in March 2023, while its initial operational test and evaluation (OT&E) is due in October 2023. In addition, a variant of the armored reconnaissance vehicle (ARV) to improve the scouting, alerting, and maneuverability capabilities of reconnaissance Platoons of ROCA's combined armed brigades (CAB) was designed to have high mobility and firepower, light-weight armor, and flexible communications. The system integration of the first ARV model with “light-weight, smart, agile, and fast” features was completed in 2022, and its program is planned to pass the milestone of OT&E in October 2024. The MND will review and consider the possibilities of moving into mass production phases for the above vehicles to meet the operational requirements of the services.

4. Asymmetric Capabilities

(1) Military UAVs

To deal with hostile threats, the MND has reviewed the UAV requirements in all planned operational phases of the Armed Forces and decided to delegate the R&D and production of 5 military-grade UAVs, including Teng Yun UAV, to the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), which will integrate domestic industries to accomplish the mission. Excluding the percentage involved in sensitive technologies, 80% of the UAV production will be outsourced to the industrial sector, and more than 700 military-grade UAVs are planned to be built from 2022 to 2028 as demanded by operational requirements from the services. On the other hand, the MND has entrusted the MOEA with choosing contractors from domestic UAV industries to manufacture commercial-grade UAVs. Development of 5 prototypes including the "army-purpose UAVs" has been completed, with all 36 units delivered by 31st July 2023. More than 7,000 commercial grade UAVs are planned to be built from 2024 to 2028 as demanded by operational requirements from the services, and the figure can be seen to improve our domestic UAV production capacities and drive the development of related industries.
【From FY2018 to FY2022 Defense Resources Released to the Private Sector】

(2) Precision Munitions

The mass production of 9 precision munitions under the Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan is being carried out as planned. The MND continues to closely oversee all services and the NCSIST to step on track to have these munitions in place, upgrade our capabilities, and carry out the policy for a self-reliant defense so as to maximize the performance of defense resources and ensure our national security.

5. Industrial Cooperation (Offset)

In the past two years, MND has implemented industrial cooperation by exploiting the acquisition of weapons and equipment from foreign countries. The EY integrated the cooperation efforts between the MOEA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the MND and the joint efforts such as establishing the F-16 aircraft maintenance center, etc., had introduced 192 technologies and carried out applicable technology transfer. The maintenance expenditure was thus reduced by about NT$ 605 million, while domestic manufacturers invested NT$ 2.941 billion, increasing the output value by NT$ 15.312 billion.

6. Development of Domestic Defense Industries

In line with the self-reliant defense policy of the government, the MND continues the establishment of a domestic defense industrial supply chain. It is hoped that through a mechanism to verify contractors’ graded qualifications, request bidders with qualification certificates, assist in tests on military-grade articles, and provide incentives for contractors, we may expand the pool of our competitive defense industries. Furthermore, by raising the level of transferring defense technologies, increasing domestic demands, revitalizing economic dynamism, and offering more incentives for contractors to join the defense industrial supply chain, we shall acquire adequate defense industrial capacities, upgrade our technology levels, make technological breakthroughs, broaden the scale of our industries, enter foreign markets, and accumulate enough momentum to achieve a self-reliant defense.
Section 6  Staying Healthy to Safeguard the Nation

The medical system of the Armed Forces is supported by 3 pillars: medical education and R&D, Armed Forces hospitals, and health service units. To hold up these pillars, enhance the healthy status of the service members, and reach the goal of “staying healthy to safeguard the nation,” the MND remains committed to (1) constructing a robust military medical organization to groom talented members in medical, dental, medicine, nursing, public health, and health services; (2) upgrading all digital and intelligent medical information systems; (3) formulating standardized combat casualty care training modules and activities to strengthen health, promote preventive healthcare, and health management; and (4) creating a friendly and healthy workplace.

I. Constructing a Robust Military Medical Organization

1. Strengthening Manpower for Hospital Branches

   To strengthen the manpower of each military branch hospital to a medical center level, starting on 1st July 2021, Tri-Service General Hospital (TSGH) Penghu Branch and Keelung Branch, Kaohsiung Armed Forces General Hospital (AFGH) Pingtung Branch, Taichung AFGH Zhongqing Branch, and Taoyuan AFGH Hsinchu Branch have been filling up all vacancies to beef up their organization, maintain medical readiness, and provide well-rounded medical services for service members and their families.

2. Improving Educational and R&D Capacities

   To carry out the concept of developing educational administration, the National Defense Medical Center (NDMC), by referring to the management and academic-oriented leadership styles in universities and the educational features in military academies, revised its organizational charter on 1st July 2021 and stipulated that the positions of its vice president, chief of education, and first-tier administrators shall be taken by medical instructors so as to facilitate the progress of administration affairs. In addition, the NDMC has established the Graduate Institute of Life Science to combine the best manpower and facilities from domestic top medical research institutions and integrate educational resources in clinical medicine and basic medicine to cultivate biomedical technology professionals with international competitiveness.

II. Promoting Intelligence Military Medicine

1. Development of Intelligent Medical Service

   In order to predict the risk of hyperkalemia and myocardial infarction in the patients and lower their mortality effectively, the TSGH has merged electrocardiogram (ECG) machines with AI predictive technology that can instantly print out inspection results to medical personnel. Since 2022, such technology has been offered to 13 Armed Forces hospitals, including Kaohsiung AFGH, for clinical applications.
2. Demonstrating Medical R&D Results

The Armed Forces hospitals joined hands with the Institute for Biotechnology and Medicine Industry (IBMI) and the MOHW to sponsor the Healthcare EXPO 2022 to demonstrate our latest medical technologies. Among them, the Omnipotent Integrated AI and ECG Healthcare Platform for Acute and Chronic Cardiovascular Disease, the Application of Non-intrusive and Multi-functional Physiological Monitor Using Fiber-optic Technology on Test-subject Animals, and the Well-rounded Treatments for Sudden Deafness won the spotlight during the EXPO. The Armed Forces presented 27 posters, 15 video clips, and 12 physical items and hosted 7 medical experience activities in 3 major categories: innovative medical R&D, cutting edge technologies of medical consortiums, and military medicine during the event to unveil the latest progress of Armed Forces’ medical system.

In recent 2 years, the Armed Forces have joined the contests of the Symbol of National Quality (SNQ) hosted by the IBMI and the Innoaward and have won 24 SNQs, while the Institute of Preventive Medicine of the NDMC and the TSGH have won 5 Innoawards for their COVID-19 virus tests, technology transfer of Chingguan Yihau (NRICM101), multi-functional anti-pandemic healthcare, and courses of virtual pandemic situations to demonstrate the dedication and excellence of the Armed Forces hospitals during the process of fighting against COVID-19.

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<th>List of Innoaward Winners of 2022</th>
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The above projects have won 5 innoawards.
3. Establishing Individual Combat Casualty Care Capabilities

To improve survivability on battlefields and strengthen combat resilience, the Armed Forces have absorbed the concept of tactical combat casualty care (TC3) of the U.S. military to review our combat casualty care capacities and initiated 5 measures: (1) issuing the Combat Casualty Care Handbook; (2) providing combat casualty care training, (3) offering training courses for combat casualty care instructors, (4) supplying individual combat casualty care first-aid packs, and (5) preparing training grounds for combat casualty care to equip service members on the first line of defense with necessary self-aid and buddy-aid skills.

(1) Issuing the Combat Casualty Care Handbook

To meet the requirements of medical care for combat casualties and the policy of “2 tiers and 3 levels,” the Armed Forces published the Combat Casualty Care Handbook on 9th December 2022 to lay out battlefield emergency medical procedures as the basis for service members to perform all combat casualty care skills either in training or in operations and enhance the overall combat casualty care capabilities of the Armed Forces.

(2) Training of Combat Casualty Care

A. Individual Combat Casualty Care Training (entry level): The training contents include instructions for an individual combat casualty care first-aid pack, medical evacuation under fire, hemorrhage treatment, and respiratory care. The training has 8 course hours, and trainees are required to take a refresher course of 4 hours every quarter of a year. Entry level training is listed in the annual training curriculum of all units, and service members from all units shall be trained to build up their basic individual self-aid and buddy-aid skills.

B. Professional Combat Casualty Care Training (advanced level): The training contents include triage, medical care at casualty assembly points, and medical evacuation (MEDVAC). The training has 40 course hours to teach trainees to quickly evacuate wounded members from the front line to a second-level health service facility or a military hospital. Furthermore, the training slots shall be given from the bottom (the units at platoon level) up to strengthen all service members’ professional combat casualty care skills.

(3) Training Courses for Combat Casualty Care Instructors

A. Individual Combat Casualty Care Instructor Training (entry level): Trainees shall have a certificate of professional combat casualty care. The training contents include making course plans and teaching rehearsals, and the training has 24 course hours. After graduation, new instructors can give new enlistees and individual combat casualty care refresher courses. In past 2 years, 959 service members had completed this training.

B. Professional Combat Casualty Care Instructor Training (advanced level): Trainees shall have both EMT-2 and professional combat casualty care certificates. The training has 80 course hours and is focused on evaluation of traumatized wounded members, treatment processes for all casualties, real
combat applications at small unit levels, and teaching rehearsals. In past 2 years, 75 service members had completed this training.

(4) Supplying Individual Combat Casualty Care First-aid Pack

By referring to the standard specification of the U.S. military first-aid pack, the Armed Forces have been procuring individual combat casualty care first-aid packs composed of quick clot gauze, tactical tourniquet, elastic first-aid bandage, duct tape, bandage scissors, latex gloves, nasopharyngeal airway (NPA), triage tag, cover pack, and emergency blanket to comprehensively improve our combat casualty care capacities. After reviewing our maximum domestic production capacity and our training requirements, the Armed Forces decided to procure these packs in 2 phases. From 2022 to 2024 as phase 1, more than 173,000 packs will be procured, while 264,000 more packs will be procured from 2023 to 2025 as phase 2. All required budgets have been earmarked, and orders have been placed.

(5) Preparing Training Grounds for Combat Casualty Care

In the first half of 2023, the Armed Forces prepared the training grounds in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th TOs to allow training courses to take place simultaneously in different TOs and meet the actual demands of all units. A TC3 and HA/DR training facility was inaugurated around the same time, and it offers realistic training in a battlefield setting by employing virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies to enhance the results of overall combat casualty care training.

4. Strengthening Medical R&D Capacities

Based on their respective expertise, the NDMC, hospitals of the Armed Forces, and health service units of all services are all committed to proposing integration programs of policy applications, operating procedures, compatibility of equipment, and medical materials on topics of military medicine. In recent 2 years, 350 defense medical R&D programs have been authorized, while 1,093 medical R&D programs sponsored by the Medical Enterprise Fund have been approved. During the same time span, 1,441 academic papers from medical experts from the above institutions have been published and won the Science Citation Index (SCI) by international journals, and some of them have applied for 17 patents and transferred 7 technologies to the private sector. We will continue improving our medical R&D capacities to fulfill the needs of our defense policies and undertakings.

The Institute of Preventive Medicine of the NDMC has been helping more than 20 domestic institutions perform R&D studies on COVID-19 virus testing and cures and has facilitated 3 COVID-19 test kits on the market. The Institute has acquired 14 domestic and international (such as the U.S.) patents, won 4 Innoawards, and helped 18 research fellows from 5 institutions, including the National Health Research Institutes, complete the high-protection laboratory (BSL-3, ABSL-3, and BSL-4) training to demonstrate our anti-pandemic R&D capacities.
III. Creating a Friendly and Healthy Workplace

1. Carrying out Health Management

To improve healthiness, the Armed Forces have followed the Guidelines and Instructions of Promoting Healthiness Management and 7 proven factors to stay healthy: managing body weight, routine exercise, a balanced diet, quality sleeping, mental health, physical check management, and prevention of tobacco and betel nut hazards. They also employed professional nutritionists to propose cuisine menu templates and provide group health courses and individual nutrition consultations to enhance service members’ awareness of their health and strengthen the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Due to the fact that cancer is the first among the 10 major causes of death of our people, starting from 2023 the MND has listed live cancer, diabetes, colorectal cancer, pancreatic cancer, gallbladder cancer, prostate cancer, and breast cancer as items of routine physical check diagnosis and will ask those members with abnormal health status to go back to the hospital, determine the causes, and receive adequate treatments through the “health management information system of the Armed Forces.” To deal with illnesses in a timely fashion and regain health sooner, the MND keeps a tracking and monitoring mechanism to follow those at high risk of sudden cardiac death and asks them to return to the hospital on schedule to help them recover.

2. Offering Accurate Anti-pandemic Measures

In line with the structure of the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC), the Armed Forces have inaugurated the Military Epidemic Command Center, working as a counterpart to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of the MOHW to grasp the latest anti-pandemic/epidemic policies and the progress of epidemic control operations of the Armed Forces, detect outbreaks or mass infection cases effectively and timely, and take necessary preventive measures. To increase mass immunity, the Armed Forces have been executing COVID-19 vaccination drives in units prioritized on the basis of their location and importance to combat missions since 10th May 2021.

To timely detect suspected cases of COVID-19 in units at confined and sensitive locations or in rural areas, the Armed Forces, as suggested by the CECC, have installed automated COVID-19 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) machines in all hospitals of the Armed Forces, TOs, and offshore islands where PCR tests are unavailable. On 23rd November 2020, 46 PCR machines were accepted to meet the demands for anti-epidemic tests and maintain the combat strength of all units.
Section 7  Upholding Defense Laws and Regulations

To realize the legalization of defense undertakings and protect the human rights of all service members, the MND has been reviewing and revising related laws and regulations and reforming military penalty and legal salvation systems in accordance with the actual requirements of operations. In addition, to groom legal talents and improve the efficiency of military legal professions, the Armed Forces have been promoting the Defense Legal Officers Exams and strengthening legal education and training for military operations.

I. Reviewing Laws and Regulations Scrupulously

To date, the MND has stipulated the *Sea-Air Combat Power Improvement Plan Purchase Special Regulations* and the Act Governing Preferential Treatment for Recalled Reservists and proposed 10 amendments, including the *Armed Forces Uniforms Act*, and they were all promulgated by the President after being approved by the EY and reviewed by the LY. In addition, the MND has revised another 39 regulations, such as the *Regulations on Admission to High and Senior High School Departments of the Armed Forces Preparatory School*. Depending on the requirements of the related units, the MND may invite external scholars and experts to join a reviewing committee to make well-rounded revisions to laws and regulations and enhance the resilience of our defense organization.

In line with the inaugurations of the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) and the ADMA of the MND and the title change of the former Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the MND has started programs to review and collect those laws and regulations that need to be addressed accordingly. Furthermore, the MND will help all related departments and agencies review associated laws and regulations that may need to be revised due to our revision of conscription service. All scrupulous reviewing activities are incorporated into our annual collating plans for defense laws and regulations so as to realize all defense policies and force buildup goals as required by law.

### Comparison of Defense Legal Officers’ Missions in Peacetime and Wartime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacetime Mission</th>
<th>Wartime Missions</th>
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<tr>
<td>The legal officer handles missions regarding legal affairs, defense legal system, agent ad litem, legal advice on military operations. Currently, the MND is revising regulations on the protection of rights and privileges for service members and will give legal offic- ers the authority to conduct legal and disciplinary investigations and provide legal salvation for service members under penalties.</td>
<td>Considering their qualification certified by national ex-ams, legal officers in wartime can help Judge Advocates provide legal advice on perpetuation of evidence, prose- cutors’ orders, and proposing legal papers based on the needs of national security and military operations.</td>
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II. Reforming Penalty and Legal Salvation Systems

Considering the features of law and order in our nation, military discipline, and the rights and privileges of service members, the MND has invited external scholars and experts to complete the amendment bill of the *Armed Forces Punishment Act* and the bill of the *Act Governing the Rights and Privileges of the Service Members of the Armed Forces* and has submitted them to the EY for approval. The amended parts of the former are related to categories, causes, and investigations of penalty, and the amended bill will allow punishments to be meted out more credibly, flexibly, and efficiently to curb further unlawful and unbecoming behaviors of the service members. The latter one is used to raise its level of significance for current service members’ legal salvation channels to reveal to the people the government's willingness and determination to protect service members’ rights and privileges, and the people will be more supportive of our defense undertakings.

III. Enhancing Awareness of Legality During Military Operations

To familiarize service members with the laws and regulations defined by the *International Law* by which all military operations in the event of war shall abide, the MND has requested the attendance of military legal officers in the drills of operations meetings, published the *Operational Manual for Military Legal Personnel to Join Military Operations*, and asked legal officers to teach fundamental courses of the *International Law*, the *Law of Armed Conflict*, and the rules of engagement (ROE) for all participants in the drills and provide appropriate legal opinions to which commanding officers at all levels can refer. The MND will continue providing related legal courses in military basic and advanced education and on-the-job training (OJT) phases to sharpen operations officers’ understanding of the legality involved in military operations.

IV. Fostering Professional Legal Personnel

To improve overall capacities for handling legal affairs, the MND has been promoting the Defense Legal Officers Exams for current defense legal officers to go through a national exam system to authenticate their legal expertise and allow civilian legal personnel after passing this exam to serve as defense legal officers to handle all legal affairs for the Armed Forces.

The LY added Article 3-1 to the *Act of Assignment for Officers and Noncommissioned Officers of the Armed Forces* on 24th May 2022 to allow the Examination Yuan to host the Defense Legal Officer Exam and authorize itself to prescribe exam regulations. The amended Act was promulgated on 15th June of the same year by the President, and the Examination Yuan subsequently passed the Regulations on Defense Legal Officer Exam on 31st October. The first exam was held from 25th to 26th March 2023 and 24 personnel passed the exam on the following 4th July to supplement the pool of our quality legal manpower and increase the efficiency of our professional legal administration.
To help judge advocates accumulate practical experience in investigation and trial to strengthen their capabilities to handle military trials in wartime, the MND, in accordance with Article 66-4, Item 2 of the Court Organization Act, and the provisions of the Operation Regulations Governing Temporary Transfers of Judge Advocates Affiliated with the Ministry of National Defense for Dealing with Prosecutor Investigators' Affairs at the Prosecutor Offices of All Levels issued by the Ministry of Justice, selects judge advocates to be affiliated with various Prosecutor Offices as prosecutorial officers every 2 years to assist in handling judicial investigation cases so as to improve their professionalism in investigation and trial, help the prosecution organs understand the special and professional nature of the Armed Forces, make their investigation closer to the reality, and promote the exchanges between the military and prosecution organs.

【Cultivation of Defense Legal Officers】
Section 8 Keeping Cleanliness and Integrity

To carry out the goal of “administration with cleanliness and integrity,” the MND continues pushing for “preventing, countering, and eradicating corruption” efforts to eradicate corruptions, prevent scandals, and shape a culture of cleanliness and integrity. We continue performing “defense undertakings with cleanliness and integrity,” “shaping a culture of cleanliness and integrity,” and “enhancing auditing on acquisitions” to foster an invisible strength of cleanliness and integrity in the Armed Forces.

I. Results of Promoting Cleanliness and Integrity

Fostering a culture of cleanliness and integrity continues to be a focal point for the Armed Forces. Our country has been receiving the appraisal of the Government Defence Integrity Index (GDI) and according to its 3rd assessment published on 16th November 2021, Taiwan has been listed in the B band (low risk) for the 3rd time. We are not only sharing the No. 6th ranking with Germany among the 86 countries, but also being the only Asian country within the Top 10. The results have demonstrated that our GDI has gained international attention and raised our people’s satisfaction with the cleanliness and integrity of the Armed Forces. During the period of 4th GDI assessment from 2022 to 2026, we will continue to uphold the international integrity values of openness, transparency, accountability, and participation to perform our defense undertakings and will host Assessment Workshops for Military Cleanliness and Integrity and International Defense Integrity Forums to exchange views with domestic and international experts and scholars and members of Transparency International and actively prepare for the upcoming assessment.
In 2023, the MND and the National Taiwan University of Arts (NTUA) co-sponsored the Reading and Character Education Camp to instill the character of integrity, increase societal participation, offer all-out defense courses, and encourage civil-mil exchanges in an “entertaining and enjoyable” way to ingrain excellent character of integrity in schoolchildren and win our people’s recognition for the culture of cleanliness and integrity and the social image of embracing the people on the part of the Armed Forces. This activity will be highly beneficial for us to regain positive status from the GDI assessment.

II. Shaping a Culture of Cleanliness and Integrity

1. Observing Sunshine Law and Avoiding Conflict of Interests

To maintain administrative transparency and avoid corruption, the MND continues requesting all members to declare their properties as required by law and reviewing and authenticating all submitted declaration forms. There were 3,024 and 3,096 applicants submitted in 2021 and 2022, respectively, and the authentication processes had been done in each following February through an open and fair session to choose a certain percentage of submitters in the Open Lot-Drawing Press Conference for Authentication of Declared Properties of the Armed Forces. Then, the forms of those chosen submitters were authenticated by reviewers to compare with previous submitted forms to demonstrate our full administrative transparency. Each fiscal year, the Armed Forces host cleanliness and integrity educational tours to teach the Act on Property Declaration by Public Servant and the Act on Recusal of Public Servants Due to Conflicts of Interest courses and joint inspection tours to supervise all defense undertakings in order to realize the essence of sunshine policy and foster a culture of cleanliness and integrity.

2. Ingrain Education and Sense of Cleanliness and Integrity

Following the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the Instructions on Cleanliness and Integrity Education of the Armed Forces, all military academies and training centers are required to provide cleanliness and integrity courses from 2 to 8 hours, while 60 seed instructors completed their training for the courses in 2022. In recent 2 years, the Armed Forces have hosted 7 cleanliness and integrity educational tours, mainly for members doing risky undertakings, such as acquisition, accounting, logistics, and engineering. Furthermore, the Armed Forces have produced anti-corruption TV episodes, 3D animation clips, interactive games, video clips of anti-vote-buying, an acquisition platform for cleanliness and integrity, and the Anti-Corruption Guidebook in order to use vibrant, understandable, and diversified ways to ingrain service members with cleanliness, integrity, and correct anti-corruption concepts.

III. Realizing Cleanliness and Integrity in Defense Undertakings

To construct an “open, fair, and transparent” acquisition mechanism, the MND has set up the Acquisition Auditing Supervision Unit (AASU) to invite attendance from internal acquisition, ethics, inspection, and legal units, as well as external experts with a higher percentage of
female participation. Each year, the AASU will conduct periodical or abrupt auditing activities on large procurement programs or major defense undertakings in accordance with the auditing targets set by the Public Construction Commission (PCC) of the EY and will input all discovered shortcomings and wrongdoings as case samples in a database, which may be chosen as case studies for training courses on cleanliness, integrity, and acquisition and will be announced to all units for reference. The AASU will follow up on the rectification statuses to prevent similar cases from happening.

On 11th July 2022, the MND initiated the program for the Acquisition Platform for Cleanliness and Integrity of the Armed Forces to invite the participation of internal auditing personnel to oversee all new construction projects under the Xin An Program based on the principle of “cooperation across boundaries, collaboration between official and private domains, administrative transparency, and civil oversight. During the first coordination meeting for the Platform on 7th September, the MND invited representatives from the Prosecutor's Offices, the PCC, experts, and scholars to offer their perspectives to help solve existing problems and issues. To demonstrate our determination to realize cleanliness and integrity in defense undertakings, the MND continues (1) hosting the coordination meetings for the Platform, (2) helping participants in those construction projects acquire necessary certificates, (3) offering periodical acquisition courses, (4) executing internal control mechanisms to inspect the quality of projects by on-site surveys or documentation reviews, and (5) maintaining a redundant auditing mechanism composed of the AASU, the Construction Supervision Unit (CSU), and the PCC’s CSU.

The second coordination meeting was held on 19th April 2023, and reached a consensus on 3 issues concerning (1) installing on-site closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, and (2) stipulating the Directions for Setting up the Acquisition Platform for Cleanliness and Integrity of the Armed Forces and (3) the Instructions on Setting Up the Webpages for the Acquisition Platform for Cleanliness and Integrity of the Armed Forces and Information Updates, which were promulgated on 22nd May 2023. The webpages will be uploaded to the MND’s website on the internet by the end of 2023 to realize our administrative transparency.
Taiwan is located at the key node pivot of the first island chain and an air and maritime transportation hub in the Indo-Pacific, and its adjacent waters are connected with major SLOCs in the West Pacific. While advanced semiconductor industries are indispensable for the development of the global economy, Taiwan has maintained its dominance of advanced semiconductor manufacturing technologies and has played a key role in the geostrategic world. In order to strengthen our defense capabilities and resilience, the Armed Forces continue deepening military cooperation and engagement with the U.S. and other friendly countries to construct a close partnership and a security connection to maintain peace and stability in the region and ensure sustainable development and prosperity for the nation.

Section 1  Defense and Military Engagement and Cooperation

In line with the comprehensive security and diplomatic policies of the government and existing relationships, the Armed Forces continue consolidating partnerships with the U.S. and other allies and friendly countries and are vigorously expanding multilateral relations with like-minded countries and those having common strategic interests with us to further deepen all military engagement and security cooperation.

I. Taiwan-U.S. Defense and Security Cooperation

Based on the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, we have been making the best of constant FMS cases and military engagement to improve the quality of our military drills, exercises, and reserve capabilities and establish multiple military engagement channels to deepen our defense cooperation with the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. Congress has passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA 2023) and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, to (1) incorporate several friendly articles and resolutions to our nation, (2) continue promoting the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to help allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific establish integrated deterrence capabilities, and (3) demonstrate U.S. commitment to assisting in building up our defense capabilities by raising Taiwan-U.S. military interaction level and providing professional education and training of joint operations to ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait and stability in the region collectively.

I.  Comprehensive Engagement

The military engagement with the U.S. are divided into 3 tiers: National Security, Defense Strategy, and Military Operations, and 10 categories: policy dialogue, FMS and commercial sales management, arms R&D, defense assessment, professional defense, education and training, intelligence exchange, combat readiness, logistics and maintenance, and C3I. Despite the impact of COVID-19 outbreak, we and the U.S.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)  
1st January 2021

* The bill of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act was only passed by the U.S.  
House of Representatives for now and we are attentive to its progress.

【Recent U.S. Laws Governing the Relations with Taiwan and Relevant Important Documents】

The Indo-Pacific Strategy  
11th February 2022

The National Security Strategy  
12th October 2022

The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) of the NOAA 2023  
23rd December 2022

The Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act  
23rd March 2023

side have been keeping in contact through alternative means, and, for instance, more  
than 80 engagement cases were done via video, teleconferencing, and transmission  
of documentation in the past 2 years. Around the same period, we paid more than 320  
physical visits to the U.S. and received over 250 visits from U.S. counterparts. A total  
of 4,800 persons have been involved in such visits, and in order to keep open the  
strategic communication channels and consolidate the security partnership, the topics  
of engagement and cooperation are mainly focused on (1) strengthening whole-of-  
society defense, (2) defense R&D, (3) cyber security, (4) practical combat training, (5)  
upgrading our overall defense capabilities, and (6) PRC’s threats of cyber warfare,  
cognitive warfare, blockade operations, full scale invasion, and gray zone tactics.

To further strengthen our defense capabilities, we continue focusing on cyber  
security, intelligence sharing, reserve capabilities, military and industrial cooperation,  
international HA/DR, advanced military technologies, combat and training experience  
sharing, and improving joint staff capabilities to exchange with the U.S. side so as to  
quickly build up a multi-domain deterrence with multi-layered defense and to dedicate  
ourselves to peace and security in the region.

2. The U.S. FMS

Facing PRC’s military threats and frequent harassment and incursions in our  
neighboring airspace and waters, it is necessary for us to build up our defensive  
capabilities, and the U.S. FMS is our major channel to acquire defensive articles  
to beef up our capabilities. In the future, we will continue to focus on our needs for
defensive operations to upgrade our deterrent capabilities through the FMS channel, which may further expand our cooperation with the U.S. on topics such as military engagements, personnel training, and defense industrial development.

In recent 2 years, the U.S. has agreed to sell the following weapons and hardware: AIM-9X air-to-air missiles, AGM-84L air-to-surface missiles, PAC-3 MSE air defense missiles, AGM-88B air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles, AIM-120C AMRAAMs, the HIMAS, and the VLSAS. Coupled with the follow-on FMS cases, such as the surveillance radar program (SRP), naval vessels, and aviation spare parts and accessories, these new weapons and hardware can help the Armed Forces deal with PRC’s constant harassment and incursions by manipulating gray zone tactics.

3. The U.S. NDAA 2023 – the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act

To accelerate the modernization capabilities that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and deny PRC’s attempts to conduct coercive or grey zone activities, blockade Taiwan, or even occupy our territory, the U.S. Congress inserted the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act as one of the select Taiwan provisions in the NDAA 2023.

The Act authorized the U.S. DoD, State Department, and other U.S. governmental agencies to use multiple security assistance means, such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Regional Contingency Stockpile for Taiwan (RCST), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), and Fast-Tracking under the Foreign Military Sales, to fulfill Taiwan’s needs for defensive operations and strengthen Taiwan’s defense partnership with us through Taiwan-U. S. defense and military engagement mechanisms to deter PRC’s threats in the region. In the future, we will continue dedicating ourselves to strengthening military interoperability with the U.S. and our resilience of defense based on the foundation of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.

II. Military Engagement with the Other Friendly Countries

Following the principle of “maintaining engagement across the board, solidifying international relations earnestly,” the Armed Forces have set up defense attachés offices (DAO) or service coordination divisions (SCD) in 25 countries to perform military diplomatic missions in the fields of mutual visits at ranking levels, midshipman cruise training, intelligence exchange, military medicine, donation of military articles, training and education, think tank engagement, military legal affairs, and HA/DR. In recent 2 years, we have arranged more than 180 outbound visits, received over 70 inbound visits, and executed 20 or more alternative engagement cases by video and teleconferencing and transmission of documentation, with a total of 1,600 or more persons participating in these cases.

During the period of the pandemic in recent 2 years, we have been keeping contact with friendly countries through various alternative means. Since the lockdown was lifted, we have been pushing for mutual visits at ranking levels and creating opportunities to attend foreign training or observe foreign HA/DR drills and exercises based on existing cooperation
programs in cyber security and protection, think tank engagement, and military medicine to strengthen substantive partnerships and further expand military change.

Moreover, the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies of the National Defense University (NDU) has hosted engagement programs for 15 delegations (4 of them were done via video-conferencing) from foreign research institutions and think tanks in the past 2 years, while the National Development Course (NDC) has done academic interactions, visits, and signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) with foreign military entities on the occasion of international military educational conferences to effectively expand bilateral academic and military engagement with friendly countries.

The ROCN is going to select designated vessels to form a task force for the midshipman cruise training of 2023, which will be joined by graduating midshipmen from the ROC Naval Academy and graduating cadets from naval sections in the Fu Hsing Kang College, the Chung Cheng Institute of Technology, and the Management College of the NDU so as to serve at sea and have basic military skills. At the same time, the task force will validate its blue water capabilities, help the new blood broaden their international perspectives, and consolidate our friendship with our allies and our unity with our expatriates.

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**Why do we have the midshipman cruise training?**

The midshipman cruise training of the ROCN was first done in 1967, and thereafter each year the ROCN assigns 2 to 3 vessels to form a task force for this important annual blue-water training and a vital undertaking to maintain friendship with allies. The training is a major transformation phase for midshipmen before their commissions and will pave the way for them to build up their maritime capabilities during this long-distance cruise.

The midshipman cruise training has a 56-year history and has made several records.

☆ The Lengthiest Maritime Journey: the lengthiest midshipman cruise training was accomplished in 2003 for a record of 30,250 nm.

☆ The First Circumnavigation Cruise: The task force of 2005 sailed through the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean to complete the circumnavigation in 105 days.

☆ The Longest Cruise: The task force of 2013 sailed 110 days for 26,120 nm visiting 9 allies, including the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, the Republic of Panama, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Republic of Honduras, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Guatemala, Belize, and the Dominican Republic, and achieved a non-stop sailing record of 39 days.
Section 2  Strategic Dialogues via Think Tanks

The Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) was inaugurated with funds from the MND to concentrate on regional security situations, help the MND to groom defense and security professionals, provide defense policy consultations for the government, host regional security dialogues, and construct a second track of communication channels so as to earn the right to speak in the international community on our country’s behalf.

I.  Bilateral Visit and Engagement

After the eruption of the Russian-Ukraine war, situations across the Taiwan Strait caught the international spotlight, and some scholars and experts from the INDSR began to be invited to go to foreign countries to attend seminars, while some foreign former ranking officials came to the INDSR in engagement programs or became research fellows. These engagement activities are beneficial for us to expand contact and dialogue with foreign strategic research circles, strengthen the depth and width of multilateral strategic communication, and participate in regional security affairs.

II.  Elaboration on Policies

As a major national think tank, the INDSR has laid a solid foundation and accumulated international prestige by being highly attentive to changes in strategic situations and conducting in-depth studies on security across the Taiwan Strait and international affairs. Its achievements have widely won recognition and attention from international media and think tanks. Since November 2021 to date, the INDSR has received 335 inbound visits, arranged 35 outbound visits, hosted 76 engagement programs with international think tanks, conducted 23 MND-delegated studies, and cosponsored 50 studies with the other governmental agencies. The advice and recommendations regarding national security policies provided by the INDSR can be used as important reference for refining defense undertakings or proposing associated measures for defense policies.

To keep a clearer public discourse on our national defense, the INDSR has written 210 related essays printed in the Youth Daily News and hosted 244 external seminars in the hope of increasing the people’s confidence in self-defense and boosting their morale. In addition, the INDSR has invited scholars and former officials from the U.S., Japan, Somaliland, and Ukraine to become in-house research fellows, who may offer perspective analysis and policy advice on the INDSR website and elaborate on our defense undertakings and security concepts via social media, like Facebook and Twitter. There are 516 of their articles reported by international media and 1,024 by domestic media. These reports can strengthen our
international engagement and dialogue, attract international attention to the security situation across the Taiwan Strait, and help incorporate our country into a regional security dialogue mechanism.

**One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances**

One Act, Three Communiques, and Six Assurances have laid the foundation for trilateral relations between the U.S., the PRC, and the ROC (Taiwan).

- One Act is referred to as the Taiwan Relations Act, which is a domestic law of the U.S. and was passed on 10th April 1979.
- Three communiques are referred to: the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of 1979, and the August 17th Communique of 1982.
- The Six Assurances and the Taiwan Relations Act are the important foundations of the U.S.-Taiwan relations. At first, the Six Assurances were written as a set of statements for then U.S. President to respond to the announcement of the August 17th Communique and they were authorized to release by a joint resolution of both the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. The Six Assurances are as follows:

  1. The U.S. has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
  2. The U.S. has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.
  3. The U.S. will play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.
  4. The U.S. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.
  5. The U.S. has not altered its position regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
  6. The U.S. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.
Passing Down the Spirit of Whampoa and Perpetuating the Camaraderie

Do not enter the gate if you wish to live and fear to die, and please leave if you wish to get promotion or fortune.
To Protect the Homeland and Safeguard the Nation is Our Eternal Promise.
Heritage of Honor and Glory

Sacrifice, Unity, and Responsibility

Young adults join the military to use their toil and sweat and their prime period of life to inherit the spirit of Whampoa and write down their glorious pages in their history to protect the people and safeguard the nation. The Armed Forces have been going through tough and robust drills and exercises with a rock-solid defense power to secure the people’s normal life and laid a sturdy foundation for our national security and the peace across the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the MND has been publicizing defense policies through a variety of channels, enhancing social communication to build up awareness against the cognitive battleground, and timely providing accurate information to actively curb fake messages in order to allow the people to recognize the current threats to our national security and consolidate our will to initiate all-out defense and strengthen the resilience of the whole-of-society defense. Furthermore, whenever major disaster strikes the Armed Forces always offer substantive help and actions to protect the people and their persistent and steadfast silhouettes do surely alleviate the people’s worries because they are providing all-directional and around-the-clock protection for the people.
Chapter 9

Civil-mil Unity

We may notice from the Russia-Ukraine war that the Ukrainian people and military have shown their unity and will to fight against the invasion by a massive enemy and their determination to defend the country. In contrast, under a trial of relentless hostile threats and a rampant epidemic in recent years, the Armed Forces remain committed to expanding a variety of educational channels with a pragmatic attitude to instill a collective confidence and understanding into the people that we are “shouldering the responsibilities for the nation to fail or prosper together” and consolidate the people’s will for delivering all-out defense and the power of “civil-mil unity.”

Section 1  All-our Defense

The purpose of all-out defense education is to impart the knowledge and consciousness necessary to defend the national security. The MND has been making annual educational plans to effectively integrate governmental agencies, local governments, and educational institutions at all levels in accordance with the All-out Education Act in order to promote the concept of all-out defense and merge all tangible military assets, civil resources, and intangible psychological will into one persistent power to safeguard the nation.

I. Promoting All-out Defense Education

To realize the concept of all-out defense of “being concerned, supported, and participated by all the people,” the MND has joined hands with all government agencies and municipal and local governments to co-host a variety of events in several categories, such as “school education, interagency on-the-job education,” “social education,” and “protection, publicizing, and education of defense relics.”

1. Instilling National Defense Concept through Interactive Activities

   To improve the people’s sense of self-defense, the MND has been hosting a series of all-out defense educational activities, including simulated shooting drills of T91 rifles, wearing camouflage, simulated handling unexploded ordinance, wearing parachutes, and the ultimate trial of the frogman’s “path to heaven” to provide interactive military experiences, weapons and equipment exhibitions, and combat skill demonstrations to allow attendees to interact and exchange views with service members and experience in person what the military life is like to allow our all-out education to reach out to campuses and rural areas and deepen our educational results.

2. Employing Multiple Publicizing Channels to Expand Educational Efforts

   On the principle that “the people shall know the worthiness of the Armed Forces,” the MND has been publicizing the voices of service members and the concept of national defense
II. Winning Support for Defense Policies

To increase the people's attention and support for defense undertakings and their willingness to participate, the MND has been imitating publicizing, exchange, and interactive efforts to widen their consensus on self-defense.

1. Earning Recognition through Communication

To effectively communicate with the people and earn their recognition and support for our policies, the MND has produced 34 image videos, such as “The Island of Resilience,” and uploaded them to YouTube and Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter pages of MND's
spokesperson. In 2022 alone, those videos on social media were viewed by 73.7 million viewers. In addition, the MND has cooperated with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and other governmental agencies to broadcast those image videos to demonstrate the results of our hard work and preparation for combat readiness and win the people's recognition and support for our defense policies.

2. Deepening Consensus on Defense

The MND has issued common defense education course materials attached with supplementary digital video clips and disseminated them in schools and communities for the purpose of reinforcing the faith of conscripts-to-be and reservists to safeguard the nation, helping promote all-out defense education, attaining the educational goal of “building foundation while being enlisted and refreshing capabilities during recall,” strengthening the overall effectiveness of defense education, and ultimately consolidating the core values of “achieving the unity of the people to guard the homeland and defend the nation, and everyone is indispensable to all-out defense.”

III. Strengthening Multi-pronged Communication with Society

The purpose of the journalism and communication undertakings of the Armed Forces is to combine governmental and private communication efforts to disclose our defense policies, placate the people’s worries, boost their morale, consolidate their consensus effectively, and win recognition and support from international media. In the future, we will continue following our comprehensive goals of national defense to formulate topics for policy discussions, shape the image of excellence for the Armed Forces, and deliver exponential publicizing effects by employing multiple emerging communication means.

1. Enhancing Public Communication to Prompt the Peoples’ Support

To win the people’s recognition and support, allow them to understand defense undertakings, consolidate their patriotic consensus, and enhance their faith to support the Armed Forces, the MND continues properly disclosing defense policies, major defense undertakings, focuses of drills and exercises, or facts of contingencies by using visual aids, such as figures and charts, on the occasion of press conferences and media visits to deliver the message that a rock-solid national defense is the most credible and stable power to maintain sustainable development for our nation.

2. Dominating Cognitive Battleground to Debunk Fake Messages Promptly

Facing the current environment of cognitive warfare, the Armed Forces are well aware of the idea of “gaining information superiority before a major offensive” and are doing their best to verify suspicious messages, communicate with the people, debunk fake messages, and eliminate the people’s suspicions and worries so as to convince them to trust and support the Armed Forces.

To eliminate the adverse effect of fake messages on service members’ perception and morale, the MND has been reinforcing its efforts to collect any suspicious false and
fake messages, timely verify their authenticity, give feedback promptly, track down their sources, and issue press releases for clarification with comparison diagrams of true and false to offer accurate information to the people. In recent years, the MND has been collaborating with third-party entities, such as the Taiwan FactCheck Center (TFC) and Cofacts, to verify and clarify fake messages to offer accurate information to the people in a timely fashion.

In recent 2 years, we have clarified 85 pieces of false and fake news, such as the news about “a hashtag of a lost-contact Taiwanese F-16 defected at night,” and all press releases for clarification have been issued on the Real-time News Clarification Reports Section of the MND’s website. For example, during PLA’s exercises in August 2022, the MND issued 21 related press releases, such as the “clarification on a Su-35 crossing over the Taiwan Strait,” and 7 clarification comparison diagrams, such as the one titled “Raising Awareness and Don’t Trust Rumors,” to lower those fake messages’ impact on the image of the Armed Forces, the national security, and the public audience.

3. Diversified Communication Means to Promote Defense Policies

To improve our promotion of defense policies and publicizing efforts, the MND has been disclosing the results of defense undertakings and responding to topics of concern from the media on the occasions of routine press conferences and media visits. In addition, concerning the dynamic status of PRC’s military exercises and saber rattling activities attracting public and international attention, the MND continues using a variety of publicizing means, including hosting press conferences and issuing press releases, news highlights, illustrative diagrams, and topic-oriented video clips, to alleviate the people's worries, consolidate their faith in “protecting our country with our own hands,” and build up their psychological resilience to achieve the goal of our defense strategy of “hardening security for the nation and protecting the people’s wellbeing.”
Section 2 Inheriting Heritage

To enhance the mental strength of the Armed Forces and instill the glorious heritage of safeguarding the nation and protecting the people, the MND continues publishing military historical literature and reprinting translated foreign military publications for service members to read and improve their professionalism. In addition, through a collection of military relics on display at the History Exhibition Hall of the MND and the Armed Forces Museum, the MND may demonstrate the splendid achievements of the Armed Forces, foster a sense of camaraderie, and deepen the concept of all-out defense among all viewers. The National Military Museum is still under construction and will link up with the Armed Forces Museum to present the glorious history and precious military relics to evince the contributions of the Armed Forces to “guarding the homeland and protecting the people” from their establishment to date.

I. Compiling and Publishing Military Historical Literature

The MND has been compiling and publishing military historical books to write down and preserve the glorious history of the Armed Forces’ contributions to the nation through their acts of sacrifice, struggle, and loyalty and to the protection of the people. In recent 2 years, the MND has published 9 military historical books, such as the 4th Army of National Revolutionary Army and a board game of the August 23rd Battle, to faithfully present the noble ethic of our service members: “If one’s survival may bring down the nation, one’s death may keep her alive.” By reading these publications, service members will be motivated to follow in the footsteps of their forerunners and endure all the trials and tough training ahead to ensure our national security and the people’s wellbeing.

II. Translating and Reprinting Foreign Military Publications

To improve the professionalism of our service members, grasp the latest trend of global military developments, and capture the changes in the security environment in the region, the MND has been translating and reprinting authorized select foreign books and journals in 8 categories for service members to absorb new military knowledge and for the people to have a wider understanding and comprehension of defense concepts and their related matters. These categories are as follows: defense technology, military operations, military strategy, PLA study, revolution in military affairs (RMA), leadership, regional situation, and national strategy.

1. Introducing Foreign Military Publications

In the past 2 years, the MND has reprinted 7 authorized foreign military books, such as the translated version of The Chinese Information War and will continue translating publications of the latest foreign military developments and trends to improve the professionalism of the Armed Forces.
2. Introducing Foreign Journals

The MND has been publishing the National Defense Digest monthly, collecting articles that reveal the latest international trends and visionary perspectives in 8 selective subjects, such as strategic and international relations. Moreover, depending on the status of reprint permission, viewers may check the index of a paperback Digest to choose an article of interest and download it from the same index shown on the website of the MND. We are hoping to gather more topics of interest to attract more of our members and public viewers to read them to foster a culture of military academic studies and win their support for our defense policies.

III. Displaying Military Relics

To publicize the history of the glorious endeavors of the Armed Forces, the MND continues collecting historical documentation and relics through all periods of the Armed Forces and presenting them to show the evolution and development of our military establishment by displaying these precious military historical documentation and relics.

1. The Armed Forces Museum

The Armed Forces Museum was inaugurated on 31st October 1961 to display military documentation and relics from the period of the establishment of the Armed Forces at Whampoa to a modernized nation’s defense as of today and is the earliest location to publicize military history after our government’s relocation to Taiwan. The museum was mandated to promote military history and preserve military documentation and relics; however, its current mission of passing down military legacies was suspended after a farewell ceremony on 31st December 2021 to revitalize its estates together with the adjacent Armed Forces Officers’ Club.

2. The History Exhibition Hall of the MND

The History Exhibition Hall of the MND is used to completely present its glorious history and its roles and contributions to performing all defense undertakings. The Exhibition of Soaring High with Aspiration — Documentation and Relics of Martyr Wu Zai-xi of the ROCAF was held in the Hall from 10th December 2021 to 14th January 2022 to display uniforms and decorations of Martyr Wu, a former member of Black Cat Squadron of the ROCAF. All items on display were donated by his surviving family members, who received a certificate of appreciation from the MND. From 1st June to 31st July 2023, the Hall held the exhibition “Honor and Glory, Heritage, and Innovation” to display items of significance during the relocation processes of the MND and all successive Ministers of National Defense.
IV. Constructing the National Military Museum

In line with the policy of the EY to revitalize the estates of the Armed Forces Officer’s Club and relocate the Armed Forces Museum, the MND had planned in 2014 to establish the National Military Museum at the defense and cultural area in Dazhi to do collection research, exhibitions, and cultural education activities to expand its research and exhibition capacities and broaden the effects of all-out education so as to inherit the military historical and cultural mission as the Armed Forces Museum was mandated.

The construction site of the National Military Museum is close to the locations of the MND, the Command Headquarters of the ROCAF, the Command Headquarters of the ROCN, the Ching-kuo Chi-hai Cultural Park, the Martyr Shrine, the 823 Memorial Park, the Taipei Municipal Dazhi Elementary School, the Taipei Municipal Beian Junior High School, the Taipei Municipal Dazhi Senior High School, and Shih Chien University. While it is facing and adjacent to the waterfront of Keelung River with Jinan Mountain on its back, the site is surrounded by several scenic spots, such as the Grand Hotel, the Chien Mu House, the Taipei Fine Arts Museum, and the National Palace Museum, to form a natural and cultural sightseeing corridor.

The construction of the main building began on 21st May 2021 and is being carried out as planned. To complete the main building and all furnishings simultaneously, the MND had signed all contracts for acquiring necessary equipment and hardware for collections,
Passing Down the Spirit of Whampoa

The origin of the Armed Forces can be traced back to the Whampoa Military Academy, which was inaugurated on 16th June 1924 as instructed by our founding father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, to organize a revolutionary force that belongs to and is loyal to the nation. Dr. Sun laid out the spirit of Whampoa in a series of Chinese dicta that can be translated as follows: “fraternity, dexterity, and sincerity (camaraderie),” “sacrifice, unity, and responsibility,” “being not covetous and not afraid of death, loving the country and the people,” “do not enter the gate if you wish to live and fear to die, and please leave if you wish to get promotion or fortune.” Chiang Kai-shek is the first superintendent of the Academy.

This spirit that the Armed Forces have inherited is the righteousness around us, the camaraderie that unites us, and the grit that resides inside us. This is exactly the inner ethos and decency the Armed Forces have received.
拔之英勇氣節，俾使各單位之軍風與史蹟，得以永續傳承。蒐錄現今國軍各單位隊徽及沿革，藉由簡潔有力的圖案，體現其堅忍不亂艱難之際，國軍先賢先烈更是以鮮血譜出可歌可泣的史詩篇章。本書識的設計，可呈現單位特性與價值觀，闡述其對建軍備戰的付出、努力。國軍部隊歷史傳承可透過諸如軍事史籍、隊史館、軍歌、旗幟、隊徽等方式來宣揚，其中隊徽是代表單位榮譽的符號，透過簡單明瞭、易於辨識的設計，可呈現單位特性與價值觀，闡述其對建軍備戰的付出、努力。
略布局與實力建設,除了贏得戰爭,更能避免戰爭。

開始。值此大國競爭下之變勢,美國如何以全面、嚴謹且完備

成其國家目標,從而在強權環伺之國際社會站穩腳步,透過戰

期使美國先行完成整備、強化軍事戰略,並妥善分配資源以達

略之軍事戰略;不僅如此,本書更提出嚴謹且具時效之方案,

明引領美國國防戰略的廣泛地緣政治,進而提出支持前揭戰

《拒止戰略》係以大戰略為基礎,採演繹法撰述方式,首先敘

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就如同在南海的島嶼奪取一樣。我們可以稱

之為併吞,當然這也是一種新的攻克方式。

民主、分權國家,政府於法無據不能要求工

民主、分權國家,政府於法無據不能要求工

展 並 擴 充資訊 戰 的準則,但

本書根據訪談、解密檔案與公司報告分析彙集而成的

本書根據訪談、解密檔案與公司報告分析彙集而成的

本書根據訪談、解密檔案與公司報告分析彙集而成的

機報復等無止境競逐。美國與其盟邦已不復以往地坐

府駭客發起的刺探與欺敵、攻擊與反制、製造動盪與伺

國之道,而地緣政治優勢競逐也邁入網路空間。

的優勢競逐中,中共、俄羅斯、北韓、英國與美國的政

書

本書為新時代國家安全議題提供縝密分析,作者群涵蓋當今最具創意的國安專家,文中

充滿活力十足的深刻見解,高度推薦給讀者!

—P.W. Singer, Strategist at New America and author of

—John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service

—Ashley J. Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and Senior Fellow,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

如無人機用於善與惡的案例比比皆是,

無人機(Drone)或無人飛行載具(UAV)為一種具備動力,

未來可能發展潛力,甚至是法律與道德層面的議題,

《無人機國度》網羅無人機領域各專家學者之見解,

能獨立自主飛行或藉由遙控方式飛行,

同時也開啟一個無人機國度的大門,

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Section 3 Protecting the People

It is both a mandate and a responsibility of the Armed Forces to safeguard the homeland. Facing non-traditional security challenges and the need to protect the people, the Armed Forces, as instructed by the EY, will coordinate HA/DR, fishery protection support, anti-terrorism support, maintaining the rule of law, transportation support, and medical care missions to demonstrate our concrete actions to “protect the people and safeguard the homeland.”

I. HA/DR and Anti-epidemic Operations

In accordance with the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act and the Regulations on Assisting in Disaster Prevention and Protection Operations by the Armed Forces, we continue following the unified command of the central government and coordinating the needs of local governments, based on the spirit of sympathy and empathy, to help marshal manpower and machinery to support HA/DR and anti-epidemic operations, lower casualties and damages, and protect the lives and properties of the people.

1. Preparations for HA/DR

   Normally, the Armed Forces have 2,400 more transportation vehicles and 1,700 more engineering machineries, such as excavators and life detectors, readily available. On the brink of disaster, we will preposition more than 1,700 members at 97 designated locations, and another 33,000 more members will be on standby at their units to provide support. If needed, liaison officers and intelligence officers can be assigned to coordinate with local governments to assist military units in executing HA/DR operations.

2. HA/DR Exercises

   As instructed by the EY, the Armed Forces had assigned over 300 members, over 60 different types of vehicles, and more than 30 machineries to join HA/DR exercises held by 22 municipal and local governments before the flood season in 2023. In addition, as coordinated by the MOI, the Armed Forces will assign manpower and machinery to join the National Disaster Preparedness Day Mobilization Drills for Disaster Relief after a Massive Earthquake in Hsinchu County, Hsinchu City, and Miaoli County to strengthen our coordination and reaction capabilities to work with local governments on HA/DR operations.

3. Anti-epidemic and Sanitization

   From 1st January to 24th October 2022, the chemical forces assigned over 3,800 members and 3,400 more vehicles and machineries in 10 categories to execute sanitization operations for quarantine centers, hospitals for quarantine and isolation, personnel, vehicles, and buildings, covering an area about 4,708,000 m² to effectively contain the spread of the epidemic and keep the people healthy.
4. Anti-epidemic Support

To effectively improve the production capacity of the rapid test kits (RTK), the MND had assigned a total manpower number of over 49,000 from April to December 2022 to help contractors pack and load the RTKs in the northern, central, and southern parts of Taiwan to support a national drive for producing RTKs. To alleviate the workload of the hotline service of the CDC, the MND assigned a total manpower number of 11,000 more from May to June 2022 and supported the Hotline 1922 to timely offer assistance to deal with the people’s urgent needs for infection tests and relevant consultations.

5. Anti-drought and Dredging

As instructed by the EY and the anti-drought policy of the central government, the Armed Forces had assigned a total manpower number of 7,900 and over 3,400 machineries and excavators in 11 categories out of the available engineering forces from 15th March to 5th June 2023 to help dredge Tsengwen Reservoir and Agondian Reservoir. Total dredged sediments had reached 320,000 more m³ to effectively increase the volume of these 2 reservoirs.

6. Results of HA/DR Operations

From January 2022 to date, the Armed Forces have taken part in HA/DR operations for Muifa, Hinnamnor, Nesat, Nalgae, and Doksuri typhoons; 2022 Taitung earthquakes; transportation support for relief goods for Turkey earthquakes; and anti-drought dredging. They have provided emergency rescue support over the mountains and at the sea so as to decrease the loss of lives and property.

II. Fishery Protection Support

By maintaining a staunch position to protect our maritime rights, the Armed Forces continue monitoring the status of our air space and territorial waters closely. During the fishing season (from April to June), the ROCN assigns maritime surveillance and patrol units to work closely to enforce the law and execute fishery protection operations, and it deploys more forces to amplify the frequency and density of such operations if necessary. The Armed Forces coordinate with the Coast Guard Administration to share intelligence and cooperate in protecting our maritime rights, maintaining law and order in our territorial waters, maritime salvage and rescue, and fishery protection operations to demonstrate our government’s power and determination to protect our fishery rights and proclaim our sovereignty.
III. Anti-terrorism Support

As instructed by the Guiding Points to Establish the Homeland Security Committee of the EY and the Contingency Plan for Major Violent and Man-made Emergencies, the Armed Forces continue improving the anti-terrorism precautionary reporting process, reaction to contingencies, and protection for critical infrastructure to optimize our overall reactive mechanism and readiness for anti-terrorism operations. During our annual national celebration events, such as National Day and the flag-raising ceremony on New Year’s Day, the Armed Forces deploy anti-terrorism reaction force to maintain security and continue performing exchanges through joint drills and international anti-terrorism training to increase our overall capabilities for anti-terrorism and reacting to contingencies and maintain our national security.

IV. Maintaining the Law and Order

1. Cracking down on Narcotics

Conforming with the guidelines for the New Generation Strategy for Anti-Drug, we set up Military Walking Dog Squads at Military Police (MP) Offices in Taipei (Shihlin), Taichung, Kaohsiung, and Hualien on 28th March 2019 to perform TDYs for security checks for military installations and judicial investigations requested by local prosecutor’s offices. To date, a total of 1,589 TDYs have been carried out to show our determination to eradicate narcotic abuse and purify our society.

2. Helping maintaining Law and Order

The MP has another identity as the judicial police, and it supports local law enforcement to jointly fight against crimes and illegal activities. As instructed by EY’s policies, the MP may join police departments and civil defense units to investigate judicial cases. In recent 2 years, local MP Offices have helped investigate 817 judicial cases, put 983 suspects behind bars, dealt with 149 criminal cases during the Lunar New Year holidays, and done 1,473 car patrols and 1,343 roadblock checks to consistently maintain law and order and prevent crimes.

3. Performing Criminal Forensics

The Forensics Science Center (FSC) of the MP is mainly responsible for performing forensics on evidence of criminality for the Armed Forces, judicial and prosecutors’ offices, and on-site investigations at major crime scenes. The FSC can do forensics on narcotics, urine, handwriting, and stamp prints; perform ballistic comparisons and polygraphs; and recover deleted files from data storage devices. In recent 2 years, the FSC has carried out 1,596 cases of forensics to effectively support the military legal system and judicial and prosecutors’ offices to collect evidence of unlawful acts and collectively maintain law and order in society.
V. Providing Transportation Support

Our people living on offshore islands constantly suffer from inconveniences in transportation, mostly due to weather conditions and mass transit congestion during major holidays. On the condition of no interference with our routine operations and no conflict of interests with civilian transportation providers, the Armed Forces may provide air transport sorties for travelers on these occasions. From November 2021 to May 2023, the Armed Forces assigned 19 C-130 sorties to transport 1,325 service members and local travelers to help them timely arrive at home.

VI. Offering Medical Care

The medical system of the Armed Forces includes 14 military hospitals and continues pushing for R&D in innovative medical technologies, integrating and providing new medical services, renovating medical buildings, updating medical equipment, and cooperating with social security and healthcare units to offer long-term care (LTC) service in order to reach the goal of “staying healthy to safeguard the nation.”

1. Containing the Spread of COVID-19

(1) Integrating Medical Support

In compliance with our policy of COVID-19 prevention, the Taoyuan AFGH and the TSGH Songshan Branch were entrusted with managing the quarantine centers in Dagan, Linkou District of New Taipei City, and Shuang’lienpo, Zhongli District of Taoyuan City. From 22nd May 2021 to 16th November 2022, medical staff from these 2 military hospitals helped settle 38,653 transiting travelers and people under quarantine restrictions at the centers.

(2) Expanding Social Services

To follow the compartmentalization and division concepts adopted by hospitals nationwide, all military hospitals were designated by the MOHW as local rapid test stations. Among them, the TSGH and its Penghu Branch were given the role of hospitals to admit patients with severe symptoms. From May 2021 to August 2022, a total of 95,195 people were tested by our medical staff. To answer the requests from local governments, all military hospitals have helped in vaccination for a total of 341,315 persons, and we continue doing our part to carry out epidemic prevention, community monitoring, and medical care operations to be the first responder to provide quality medical service.

2. Improving Medical Services

The TSGH has established the Thyroid Tumor Ablation Center and the like to meet the needs of local people and set up the 3T MRI Imaging Center at its Tingzhou Branch to provide complete medical service for acute and severe illnesses. Moreover, in order to improve the overall capacities and levels of the Armed Forces’
medical system and offer adequate medical care for service members and their dependents, the TSGH has set up Da Vinci surgical operating rooms and other new facilities through the northern and southern subsidiaries of the Healthcare Systems Consortium.

3. Updating Medical Equipment and Constructing New Medical Buildings

To provide complete medical care for service members, their dependents, and local people, the Armed Forces have updated and introduced advanced medical equipment in recent 2 years, such as an “intraoperative computed tomography (CT) scanner,”
“magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),” “a linear accelerator,” “an extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) life support system,” “a biplane image-guided therapy system (Philips Azurion 7B2012),” and “a multi-slice CT scanner,” and established new medical buildings for severe illnesses to optimize the entire environment and quality of medical services in our military hospitals.

4. Providing LTC Services

As our nation is passing across the threshold of a “super-aged society” (the age group of older than 65 reaches 20% of the total population) by 2026, our LTC institutions (senior welfare agencies, general homecare stations, and veterans' homes) are inadequate to provide services. To carry out the Ten-Year Long-Term Care Plan 2.0 of our nation and offer sufficient LTC capacity, the MND has assigned the Kaohsiung AFGH Gangshan Branch to participate in the Incentive Program for Revitalizing Boarding Facilities as Public Resources for LTC of the MOHW to renovate a LTC building with 110 beds by 2026 to provide service coverage over areas with insufficient housing resources for LTC. It is hoped that this building can provide senior citizens with preventive healthcare, delay their gradual disability, enhance their healthiness and well-being, and improve their quality of life. In the future, we are going to offer multi-targeted community-based support services to connect with palliative care at senior citizens’ residences to alleviate the burden of their families and vacate more available LTC boarding slots for the people in need. Moreover, we are setting up nursing homes attached to military hospitals to provide professional medical service for senior citizens to provide a sustainable arrangement for all LTC institutions.
To strengthen the efficiency of employing our manpower, the MND is dedicated to developing itself as a learning organization through comprehensive planning for military education and a system to groom our civilian officials. All service members are expected to learn and mature on their own and are encouraged to acquire multiple skills in order to become quality defense talents who are good at handling defense affairs with an upright military ethos, excellent leadership, and expertise for combat readiness.

Section 1  Optimizing Manpower

Aiming at improving service members' comprehension level of foreign languages and fostering them as talents with abilities for defense management, the MND continues enhancing exchange with domestic universities and colleges, introducing foreign linguistic teachers, introducing new pedagogy, and deepening professional training to bring up our service members as having both linguistic and leadership skills. We are not only enabling members to put their respective skills into practice and dedicate themselves to the nation, but also providing multiple referring channels and relevant information services for them to connect with the private sector seamlessly after discharge, contribute their expertise to society, and strengthen our national competitiveness.

I. Inheriting the Decency of Forerunners

On the 99th anniversary of the Whampoa Military Academy's establishment in 2023, the MND hosted a series of events titled “ninety-ninth keeps Whampoa alive all the time” to symbolize the passing down of the spirit of Whampoa and encourage cadets and midshipmen to inherit their forerunners' legacies to make glorious achievements for their new generation of Whampoa.

I. Passing Down the Mandate

The motto “being not covetous and not afraid of death; loving the country and the people” has always been the belief and mandate of all faculty and cadets of the ROC Military Academy since its inception at Whampoa. Through a series of events to celebrate the anniversary, the cadets may learn about the history of the Academy and the glorious legends on the battlegrounds, written with blood and toil by their forerunners. During the evolving phases of modern Taiwan, graduates from all classes of our military educational institutions have been serving as the backbone of the Armed Forces and becoming the critical power to ensure our national security and maintain our social stability.
2. Fostering Talents for Force Buildup

A military saying goes, “Quality talents are the cornerstone for force buildup.” In a knowledge-based, innovative, technological-oriented, and joint warfighting era, even though quality manpower can employ capabilities effectively, those with staunch patriotism are indeed the keys to success. Consequently, we have been instilling patriotism, military ethics, life, military, and military law and discipline education for all cadets and midshipmen since their BMT to establish their correct values as men and women in uniform. Starting in their basic education, cadets and midshipmen must go through accredited and ethical courses, political training activities, and ethic evaluation. Furthermore, they may browse websites on campus and attend academic seminars to solidify their fundamental faith in “country, duty, and honor” of the Armed Forces, establish their core values as a service member, and transform themselves into modernized military personnel who can both write and fight and are equipped with both excellent skills and ethics from their military schooling.

II. Enhancing Capacity and Quality of Military Education

To satisfy the demands for more self-reliant defense talents, technological patterns of operations, and the formation of emerging units, the Armed Forces have been actively raising cadre members’ expertise and skills through deepening military education to provide needed manpower in units and cultivate quality members for the Armed Forces.
1. Deepening Military Education

Our military education is divided into 3 phases: basic education (BE), higher education (HE), and advanced education (AE) to nurture professional military personnel in 2 career tracks: commissioned officers and NCOs. The educational contents for officers in each phase are as follows: BE — to cultivate “leadership officers,” who can write and fight and are equipped with both excellent skills and ethics; HE — to provide regular courses and MOS courses at service branch schools to strengthen their expertise and skills; AE — to offer command and staff and strategic educations in the NDU and graduate and doctoral programs in universities to effectively raise our mid and high-ranking officers’ professionalism. The educational contents for NCOs in each phase are as follows: BE — to nurture “skillful NCOs” with healthy and solid characters and expertise; HE and AE — to offer NCOs regular and advanced courses to sharpen their technical skills.

2. Sponsoring Higher Education for Academic Exchange

To improve the quality and expertise of service members, the MND continues sponsoring select officers and NCOs annually to receive higher education in domestic and foreign educational institutions to study in disciplines as needed in maintaining our combat readiness and operations. In addition, we are encouraging them to pursue higher education after work on the premise of no interference with their missions to allow us to grasp international military trends, strengthen officers’ planning and leadership abilities and NCOs’ practical and technical skills, and fulfill our manpower needs for national defense and force buildup. Moreover, to nurture innovative and flexible thinking in our cadets and midshipmen, we are sending them to do exchanges with domestic and foreign educational institutions to absorb multi-pronged academic concepts and even choosing some of them during summer and winter breaks to attend exchange events to comprehend global trends and broaden their perspectives and world views.

3. Career Management for Personnel Stationed Overseas

To strengthen our drive to cultivate quality personnel, when our members complete their overseas assignments, they must first take major commanding positions or pursue career tracks in operations, planning, and armament fields, regardless of their original MOSs. A career management meeting is held periodically to oversee their adaptive status in their respective positions. In addition, we continue keeping track of the progress of those having sponsorship to acquire higher and advanced education to widen our pool of manpower for handling foreign affairs and doing defense and strategic studies and facilitate our personnel selection, cultivation, and application processes.

III. Improving Foreign Language Proficiency

In conformity with the policy of the 2030 Bilingual Nation of the EY, the MND has been strengthening all-English teaching capacities, integrating language learning resources, motivating service members to take language studies after work or English proficiency exams,
and enhancing linguistic teaching qualities in military academies to raise our language proficiency altogether annually.

1. Motivating Service Members to Take Language Proficiency Exams

To motivate our members to take language proficiency exams, starting in 2022, the MND has been giving subsidies, administrative merits, and extra points for potential promotions to those who have gotten qualified certificates, and they will be listed in a roster for candidates for overseas positions and liaison officers so as to improve the language proficiency of service members and expand the pool for professional talents.

2. Enhancing English Proficiency for Cadets and Midshipmen

Aiming at enhancing English proficiency for cadets and midshipmen, since 2023, we have been hiring professional English teachers to impart military English skills. Bilingual classrooms have been set up to meet the specific needs of each academy and military unit to provide a diversified learning environment to improve learners' English proficiency.

IV. Improving Management Courses

To meet the needs for developing self-reliant defense technologies, commissioning emerging units, and cooperating with our allies and partners, the MND has been strengthening the basic education system and imparting cadre members with management skills to achieve the goal of cultivating quality service members.

1. Academy Education

Starting in 2022, more management courses have been added to the original curriculum to impart new management knowledge and allow military learners to have strategic thinking, decision-making, and planning abilities. They are as follows: (1) BE of military academies — management science and organizational management theory courses; (2) HE of service branch and regular classes — 5 practical courses of case studies, strategic planning, communication and coordination, performance-based control, and teamwork to improve military leaders’ management skills; (3) AE — the MND has cooperated with domestic universities to offer in-service accredited programs of master’s degrees in management for officer students in service command and staff colleges of the NDU.

2. Higher Education after Work

To strengthen service members’ management skills, the Armed Forces have cooperated with domestic universities to set up 87 “studying posts” in military installations in Taiwan and its offshore islands to provide after-work courses to motivate their pursuit of life-long learning, inspire their new thinking, and merge their learning results with their MOSs to enhance the entire quality of service members. To date, a total of 29,886 service members have attended these courses.
V. Pursing INDSR Fellowship

To deepen exchange between service members and civilian officials and equip them with international perspectives and strategic professionalism, the MND has been assigning general and field-grade officers and mid and high-ranking civilian officials to be research fellows at the INDSR, a venue for them to exchange views. Through research paper studies, topic-oriented workshops, interagency visits, war gaming, and exchange with in-country defense attaches from allies, all research fellows may broaden their strategic research knowhow to become talents with strategic analysis abilities. In recent 2 years, 40 officers and 1 civilian official have concluded their fellowship at the INDSR.

VI. Career Transitioning

To incentivize talented young adults to join the military, the MND continues providing career transitioning assistance to help retiring service members to find their next career tracks after leaving. We are cooperating with the Veterans Affairs Council (VAC) to provide occupational aptitude tests, job-matching opportunities, and stable employment stipends after career transitional training or job-matching to help retiring members to join the private sector and fully exert their potential to maximize the effectiveness of overall manpower of the nation. In recent 2 years, the MND has hosted 55 job-matching events providing 67,113 job vacancies to help retiring service members to continue their contributions to the society and the nation.
Section 2  Nurturing Civil Officials

Since the implementation of the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense to define the features of our defense system as the “professional division of responsibilities,” “civilian control over the military,” and “unified commanding and policymaking organ,” the MND has been hunting for excellent civilian officials, through government-hosted exams for civil servants or open selection processes, to join our organization and work with service members to collectively contribute our efforts to plan for and handle defense affairs.

I. Appointing Civilian Officials via Diversified Channels

1. Encouraging Young Adults to Become Defense Civilian Officials

   Since 2018, the MND has been joining the Public Sector Internship Program for Undergraduates of the Youth Development Administration of the MOE and annually offers appropriate slots for interns, who are led by officials of senior rank and newly appointed officials, to become familiar with the operations and functions of the MND. The interns will be encouraged to take the positions of the MND as their top choice if they pass the civil servant exams to realize the purpose of grooming civilian officials from the bottom up. To deepen their understanding of defense affairs and motivate their participation as defense civilian officials, there have been 75 undergraduates taking the internship in the MND to date.

2. Having Retirees as Civilian Officials

   To encourage retired service members to resume their contributions, the MND has 3 channels to keep experienced retirees as defense civilian officials, and they are as follows: (1) civil servant exams for officers ranking colonel and above; (2) special civil servant exams for retired and discharged service members and (3) requesting the transfer of active civil servants of military background from the other governmental agencies to fill in vacancies in the MND. Currently, there are 23 civilian officials of military background serving in the MND and its subsidiary units to realize our personnel policy of having retirees “continue serving the country.”

3. Actively Bringing in Qualified Civil Servants

   The MND is in need of quality civil servants to dedicate themselves to defense undertakings and has been offering vacant slots in line with the civil servant exams’ schedule to the Ministry of Examination to process. Furthermore, the MND is actively attempting to usher in and foster excellent defense civilian officials by bringing in those potential civil servants via transfers from other governmental agencies and following applicable personnel regulations for civil servants. In the past 2 years, we have promoted 19 defense civilian officials internally, brought in 14 newly appointed officials, and will continue having talents join the pool of defense civilian officials.
4. Career Development of Civilian Officials

In compliance with the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense, the MND has been bringing in an increasing number of civilian officials, and to date, there are 70 officials (ranking from junior rank of grade 9 and above and including those of military background) serving in positions of section chief and above as the persons-in-charge or the seconds-in-charge. To demonstrate the MND’s impartial attitude to employing manpower of either military or civilian background and recognizing the efforts of dual career tracks, some officials have been promoted because of their outstanding performance, and the MND will continue to keep a great working environment of unity between service members and civilian officials to construct an organizational culture favorable for civilian officials’ career development.

II. Grooming Defense Civilian Officials

1. Strengthening OJTs

To help newly appointed civilian officials settle down for both the environment and defense undertakings, the MND has launched an internal web-based program of digital-format courses for new appointees as a self-learning platform and has hired senior members as instructors to provide pre-job training. In recent 2 years, 46 civilian officials have completed the training. Moreover, following the governmental policy of lifelong learning, the MND continues hosting 3 OJTs for management and development per year to improve common know-how for defense civilian officials. In the past 2 years, a total of 469 officials have completed the OJTs, and the MND
continues providing OJTs to strengthen the administrative efficiency of our defense civilian officials.

2. Deepening Military Professionalism

In order to strengthen civilian officials’ understanding of defense undertakings, the MND has been hosting professional courses for key and core functions starting in 2019 and courses for civilian officials of senior and junior ranks, starting in 2022. While 50 civilian officials have completed the courses for now, the MND will continue offering these courses to cultivate cross-domain and multi-functional civilian officials capable of planning future defense policies. To foster military professionalism for civilian officials of junior and senior grades and fully employ existing educational resources, the MND has prescribed a condition for extra scores on the criteria for promoting civilian officials in the current promotion system to assign select officials to attend in-service strategic (or command and staff) courses to deepen exchange education between them and service members. Since 2017, 15 officials have graduated from those courses, and the MND will continue this way to help civilian officials become defense professionals and achieve their higher pursuits.

3. Improving Bilingual Proficiency

In line with the national policy of promoting bilingualism, the regulations on providing subsidies for taking English proficiency exams were stipulated in the “Key Points of Training and Further Training of Civilian Officials of the MND”. By the end of 2022, 112 civilian officials, accounting for 43.4% of their total number, had passed the English proficiency exams. In addition, to improve the English ability of the civilian officials of the MND, English seminars have been held since 2017, and various training channels have been provided. In 2022, 45 civilian officials participated in the training to enrich their English expertise to meet workplace demands and strengthen competitiveness at work.
To avert war by standing combat-ready and to end it by competence to fight and win