Enhancing Security and Stability
In Afghanistan

June 2020

Report to Congress
In Accordance With Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, as amended; Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017; Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note); and Section 1520 of the NDAA for FY 2020.

The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $101,000 for the Fiscal Year 2020. This includes $1,000 in expenses and $100,000 in DoD labor.

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This report is submitted in accordance with and fulfills the reporting requirements of Section 1225 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, as amended; Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017; Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note); and Section 1520 of the NDAA for FY 2020. The report also provides information on the requests contained in page 348 of House Report 116-84, the Committee on Appropriations Report to accompany H.R. 2968, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, and in page 264 of the Senate Report 116-48, the Committee on Armed Services Report to accompany S.1790, the NDAA for FY 2020. It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State’s designee.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2019, through May 31, 2020. The data cutoff date for this report is April 30, 2020. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States' vital national interest in Afghanistan is to ensure that Afghan territory is never again used as a safe haven from which terrorists can attack the United States, our Allies, or our interests abroad. Accordingly, the primary objective for Afghanistan under the President’s South Asia Strategy is to support a durable political settlement that ends the war and mitigates terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. The signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement and release of the U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration on February 29, 2020, represent significant milestones in U.S. efforts to achieve that objective. The United States agreed to a conditions-based, phased withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan over 14 months if the Taliban abides by its commitment to prevent the use of Afghan territory by terrorists, works to reduce violence, and enters into Intra-Afghan Negotiations (IAN) to determine the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire and reach an agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan. The first phase of the withdrawal—a reduction to 8,600 troops by July 2020—is complete.

During the initial portion of the reporting period, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) adjusted its operational approach to intensify pressure on the Taliban to reduce violence and meaningfully participate in IAN. Since the February 2020 reduction-in-violence (RIV) period, U.S. operations remained focused on counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and other terrorist organizations while operations targeting the Taliban have been in defense of the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). A distinct line of effort was added to the campaign plan to enhance ANDSF effectiveness, responsiveness, and overall protection of key Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) infrastructure—specifically provincial centers, highway checkpoints, and the Kabul metropolitan area. The Combined Situational Awareness Room (CSAR) and supporting Regional Targeting Teams (RTT) established by USFOR-A and the ANDF in early 2019 became fully operational as a cross-security-pillar network to prioritize, resource, and enable ANDSF operations based on a collective understanding of the security environment.

From Spring 2019 until the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, the CSAR, in concert with a network of Afghan leaders across the GIRoA, degraded Taliban networks by synchronizing personnel, assets, and leader focus at critical points on the battlefield. U.S. and Afghan close-air support of Afghan ground forces provided critical capabilities that enabled offensive and defensive operations. CSAR integration further enhanced the continued military pressure throughout 2019 and into early 2020, ultimately contributing to the weeklong RIV period in February 2020. The CSAR and RTT network has evolved to facilitate national-level crisis response, expedite intelligence sharing, and conduct broad targeting through predictive analysis to preempt Taliban violence. A Crisis Response Group (CRG) that incorporated this network was established in Kabul as a combined network of coalition and ANDSF personnel with the requisite communications, intelligence, and operational experience to support GIRoA’s security efforts. The additional capability provided by these initiatives, coupled with sustained military pressure, contributed to preventing the Taliban from seizing provincial centers in 2019 while denying safe havens for extremist networks targeting coalition homelands.
During this reporting period, terrorist and insurgent groups continued to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. Afghan forces maintain control of Kabul, provincial capitals, major population centers, most district centers, and most portions of major ground lines of communications (GLOCs). The Taliban contested several portions of main GLOCs, threatened some district centers, and, in late March, overtook Yamgan District in Badakhshan province. In April, the ANSF seized the districts of Khamyab and Qarqin in Jowzjan province. Since the February RIV period, the Taliban has sustained high levels of violence against ANSF checkpoints and convoys. Concurrently, the Taliban has avoided attacks against coalition forces and provincial capitals, likely to avoid risking the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The current level of violence conducted by the Taliban remains high.

Throughout this reporting period, sustained pressure from the ANSF, coalition forces, and the Taliban degraded ISIS-K through killing fighters and inducing surrenders; this pressure forced ISIS-K to relinquish control of territory in southern Nangarhar Province and in Kunar Province. ISIS-K maintains the ability to conduct mass casualty attacks despite CT pressure from the coalition, the ANSF, and the Taliban. Since it was dislodged from territory it controlled, ISIS-K may be moving to smaller groups in urban areas that are more difficult to locate and identify. ISIS-K’s effectiveness in these smaller cells will likely be constrained by ANSF, U.S., Coalition, and Taliban pressure, although it continues to demonstrate the ability to execute HPAs in 2020.

During this reporting period, the ANSF provided sufficient security to deny the Taliban and ISIS-K their respective objectives. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and Afghan Air Force (AAF) remain the most capable forces in the ANSF and continued to demonstrate operational and tactical proficiency. All components of the ANSF will, however, continue to rely over the long term on contracted logistic support and on the United States for the vast majority of the funding needed to sustain combat operations. The priority institutional capacity development focus areas for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) remain ensuring personnel are paid in a timely manner; performing ground vehicle maintenance; procuring and distributing quality food to their forces; maintaining facilities; and managing supplies. Improvements in implementing accountability systems such as the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), which accounts for and manages payroll for the ANSF, and Core-IMS, the inventory-management system that inventories and tracks the status of ANSF equipment and supplies, continued during this reporting period.

The Taliban and the Afghan Government are moving towards the next steps in the peace process. Both sides continue to prepare for IAN, although the start date for IAN has yet to be determined. The Taliban and the Afghan Government have started releasing prisoners in accordance with the terms of the agreement; however, high levels of Taliban violence and the COVID-19 outbreak in the country continue to hinder efforts to make progress on security and reconciliation.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The United States' vital national interest in Afghanistan is to ensure the country is never again used as a safe haven from which terrorists can attack the United States, or our Allies or interests abroad. Accordingly, the primary U.S. Government objective in Afghanistan is to support the Afghan government's effort to obtain a durable political settlement that ends the war and mitigates terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. The signing of the conditions-based U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the parallel U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration on February 29, 2020 represent significant progress towards that goal. Consistent with the Agreement and Joint Declaration, the United States will implement a conditions-based, phased withdrawal of troops within 14 months if the Taliban fulfills its commitment to prevent the use of Afghan soil by terrorists, seek to continue to reduce violence, and enter into intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) to determine the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire and reach an agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan. The first phase of the withdrawal involves the United States reducing the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 by mid-July 2020.

Under Operation FREEDOM’s SENTINEL (OFS), approximately 8,600 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan support complementary missions to train, advise, and assist (TAA) the Afghan Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) and their forces under the NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission and to conduct counterterrorism (CT) operations. In conducting OFS, U.S. forces partner with the ANDSF to counter terrorist threats from groups like al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the ISIS-K.

Although the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan fluctuates due to rotations of forces and conditions on the ground, there have been no changes to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) mission or to the United States commitment to our security partnership with the Afghan government. The United States maintains a presence primarily at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional hubs in Laghman and Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, Helmand Province in the southwest, Paktiya Province in the southeast, and Balkh Province in the north. DoD continually evaluates security conditions in Afghanistan to determine appropriate force levels to implement the South Asia strategy and to implement the withdrawal consistent with the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.

The RS mission continues to focus on building the institutional viability of the ANDSF and on improving the ability of ministry and ANDSF leaders to ensure their Soldiers and Police are paid, fed, and supplied and that their facilities and equipment are maintained. RS and USFOR-A have modified their organizational models in support of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. U.S. forces continue to monitor the operational environment and conduct counterterrorism operations consistent with the U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the Joint Declaration between the United States and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

The U.S. counterterrorism goal of preventing Afghanistan from serving as a safe haven remains unchanged. The U.S.-Taliban Agreement includes CT commitments that, if implemented, will help prevent terrorists from using Afghan soil to launch attacks against the United States or its
The drawdown of forces is contingent upon these Taliban commitments being implemented. The conditions-based approach of ongoing and future reductions in U.S. forces will help maintain the cohesion of the Coalition while ensuring a suitable military force structure in Afghanistan to accomplish our military objectives.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The DoD approach to implementation of the South Asia Strategy in Afghanistan focuses on the “R4+S” concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain.

**Reinforce:** DoD continued to build the ANDSF’s operational capabilities during this reporting period. Most notably, training of the last cohort of Afghan Air Force A-29 pilots is underway at Moody Air Force Base; once this cohort completes training later this year and begins operations, the buildup of AAF aerial fires capability under the 2016 aviation modernization program will be complete, and Afghan instructor pilots will conduct future A-29 training in Afghanistan. In addition, to leverage U.S. support and conditionality to drive necessary reforms and reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government, Secretary of State Pompeo announced on March 23 a potential $1 billion reduction in FY2020 security assistance support and the possibility of another $1 billion reduction in FY 2021 if President Ghani and former Chief Executive Officer Abdullah were unable to resolve their political differences and agree on an inclusive government that could meet the challenges of governance, peace, and security, and provide for the health and welfare of Afghan citizens. Since this announcement, President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah have agreed on a power-sharing government. The $1 billion reduction had not been implemented as of June 2020. Separately, Section 1520(d)(4) of the NDAA for FY 2020 requires the Secretary to determine whether the Afghan government is making sufficient progress toward shared security goals and to withhold $480 million of ASFF if it is not making sufficient progress. This report addresses the statutory assessment elements and determines that the Afghan government has made sufficient progress. The requirement in the FY2020 Appropriations Act that only those personnel biometrically enrolled in the Afghan Pay and Personnel System (APPP) may be paid with DoD funds has helped mitigate resistance within the MoD to implementing APPS.

**Realign:** The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of United States military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan Government control. The strategy cites the proper alignment of United States and Afghan forces as key to improved security. The push to realign authorities, resources, and the ANDSF continued to progress on schedule during this reporting period. During the first year of the South Asia Strategy, this realignment consisted chiefly of a United States shift in resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater. Beginning in the fall of 2019, however, this realignment increasingly took the form of force and materiel optimization towards locations and ANDSF personnel and units that can have the greatest impact on achieving campaign objectives.

**Regionalize:** Regional efforts aim to expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. and Coalition efforts, limit threats to our allies and partners, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. The South Asia strategy prioritizes regional engagement to
limit hedging against the Afghan Government and create an international consensus for peace. Pakistan, in particular, must play a key role in a peaceful resolution to the war in Afghanistan.

**Reconcile:** The primary goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to end the war in Afghanistan. The military campaign complemented diplomatic efforts by the United States, Afghanistan, and our international partners. During this reporting period, U.S. officials signed an agreement with the Taliban in Doha, which will help pave the way for intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

**Sustain:** The South Asia Strategy emphasizes achieving specific U.S. objectives at sustainable costs. The strategy seeks to maximize return on fiscal, military, and political investments. Efforts to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan must be feasible. Because the Afghan government will continue to rely on substantial international security assistance funding, even under conditions of peace, the RS mission continued working on building the institutional viability of the ANDSF. In addition, during this reporting period, the Administration submitted the President’s Budget Request for FY 2021. The amount of funding for direct war costs of OFS sought in that request is 27 percent less than the amount requested in FY2020. Most of this reduction in required funding reflects a smaller force level—a projected 8,600 at the beginning of FY2021 as compared with 14,000 at the beginning of FY 2020—resulting from continued efforts to optimize the U.S. force structure while retaining capability to provide necessary advising and combat enabler support to the ANDSF. The request for funding for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund also contributes to the reduced mission cost; it is nearly $800 million less than the FY2020 request and almost $200 million below the FY2020 enacted appropriation.

### 1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The vital U.S. interest in Afghanistan is to prevent it from serving as a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests, or U.S. allies. Towards that goal, the United States continues to seek a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan that ends the conflict there and prevents terrorists from using Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States or its allies. During this reporting period, the Afghan government continued to make progress toward meeting shared security objectives.¹

USFOR-A conducts two complementary missions in Afghanistan: 1) counterterrorism; and 2) training, advising, and assisting the MoD, MoI and ANDSF as part of the RS mission. USFOR-A conducts CT operations to mitigate the threat of AQ, ISIS, and other terrorist groups. USFOR-A works by, with, and through the ANDSF on the CT mission and on operations targeting insurgents. In partnership with NATO Allies and operational partner nations in the RS mission, U.S. forces train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANDSF. U.S. and coalition forces work with the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) at the “point of need”—that is, to advise ANDSF leaders who are effective leaders and reliable partners in addressing issues that affect the morale,

¹ Section 1520(d) of the NDAA for FY 2020 requires an assessment of the progress of the Afghan Government toward meeting shared security objectives and the efforts of the Afghan Government to manage, employ, and sustain the equipment and inventory funded by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The Secretary of Defense may withhold assistance if the Afghan government does not make sufficient progress in these areas. The elements of this assessment are addressed throughout this report as noted.
readiness, retention, and operational effectiveness of soldiers and police, such as getting paid, fed, clothed, housed, and equipped to ensure their combat readiness and effectiveness. This also involves continual engagement with MoD and MoI organizations, which have overall responsibility and authority over these matters, to address institutional capacity gaps. In addition, advisors work with the ANDSF to integrate capabilities (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and aerial fires) to improve operational planning, execution, and tactical proficiency. U.S. and coalition forces also advise the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of protecting U.S. investments in those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment with and combat enabler support to the ANDSF fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

**Operational Design**

The operational design process is a planning construct that synchronizes and coordinates U.S., coalition and ANDSF personnel and equipment to maximize effects on the enemy at a precise location. The endstate of the operational design planning process is to increase pressure on the enemy and the protection of ANDSF partners to demonstrate U.S. and coalition resolve. The process uses multiple inputs similar to other military planning processes and a clear understanding of the strategic implications in Afghanistan’s information environment. The success of the operational design centers on identifying the essential resources (e.g., ISR, fires, fuel, ammo, etc.) required to ensure the success of ongoing or planned ANDSF operations. To coordinate efforts with the Afghan government including the ANDSF, RS has organized a series of collaborative staff planning events to help synchronize overall TAA and enabler support to the ANDSF. The key planning event for the staff is the Operational Design Decision Board (ODB), which reviews intelligence, sets priorities, allocates assets and synchronizes operations. Additionally, RS conducts a weekly security meeting with MoD, MoI, National Directorate of Security (NDS) senior leaders and planners after the ODB to nest all independent and partnered operations and assess progress. RS and NSOCC-A also conduct a daily Joint Asset Allocation Meeting to review intelligence, establish daily operational priorities, and ensure support assets align to the priorities established at the ODB.

The establishment of the Crisis Response Group (CRG), a virtual network utilized by the ANDSF and Coalition to identify imminent or existing threats across Afghanistan, reassures the ANDSF by quickly providing resources at a tactical point of need. The CRG has been integrated in the Operational Design process and since its establishment, the CRG has been instrumental in enhancing the protection of ANDSF across Afghanistan. In addition, the Combined Situation Awareness Room (CSAR) is an operations center staffed by various elements of the ANDSF and Coalition, to create a common vision for focusing on GIRoA level counterterrorism objectives. The CSAR speeds intelligence integration and communication, and promotes a common operating picture for ongoing operations. The CSAR has reached full operational capability (FOC) during this reporting period. The additional capabilities provided by these initiatives, coupled with USFOR-A’s sustained military pressure, helped prevent the Taliban from
successfully seizing any provincial centers and reduced the Taliban’s ability to seize multiple
district centers during the reporting period.

The RS Operational Design continued to evolve during the reporting period to address the
convergence of peace, security, political complications and degradation of ISIS’s physical
territory. The process provides Commander, Resolute Support Mission (COMRS) a
mechanism to communicate his operational priorities in support of the RS Mission to
protect our collective homelands and create conditions for a political settlement. Regional
Targeting Teams (RTT), a new initiative, increased response time and has assisted in the
synchronization of regional assets across Afghanistan and is an example of how the process has
continued to evolve. During this reporting period, the operational priorities remained flexible to
adjust to emerging threats across Afghanistan. The Operational Design concentrated TAA
efforts on institutional viability of the ANDSF focusing on the following five items: fixing pay,
enhancing maintenance, ensuring distribution of quality food to the forces, appropriate facilities,
and distribution of supplies.

From December through February, USFOR-A kinetic operations focused on applying pressure to
influence U.S.–Taliban negotiations. An agreed Reduction of Violence (RIV) period followed
this effort from February 21-28, 2020. During the RIV, operational focus remained on
supporting ANDSF and maintaining awareness through the Crisis Response Group, CSAR, and
RTTs, and the five focus areas of institutional viability. During the RIV, CT operations against
remnants of ISIS also continued. The successful week of reduced violence, to the lowest levels
recorded in Afghanistan since 2016, set the stage for the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement
in Doha on February 29, 2020. Following the agreement, the Operational Design continued to
prioritize the resourcing of the CRG and institutional viability; essential since the Taliban’s
attacks against outlying ANDSF checkpoints resumed after the signing of the agreement. The
Operational Design also remained committed to defending the ANDSF and demonstrating our
commitment to the GIRoA. The Operational Design allows COMRS to apply critical assets and
focus the RS mission on key areas even as the environment shifts.

Resolute Support continued TAA optimization, building upon efforts during the last reporting
period, to refine TAA efforts to complement the Operational Design priorities and changing
environment (Figure 1) ². TAA optimization continued to focus on investing advisory efforts on
decisive people, places, and processes that can have the greatest impact on ANDSF
development; make a positive contribution to campaign objectives; and increase the immediate
return on United States and coalition investment. RS designates the people, processes, and
locations as “points of need” that require mission essential TAA, and revalidates these
designations dynamically to respond to the conditions in the environment. Investing in reliable
partners and executing TAA to the point of need are the guiding principles for the TAA mission.
RS conducted an optimization of TAA efforts in two periods. From January to February 2020,
RS conducted optimizations to HQRS, CSTC–A, and NAC–A. CSTC–A’s role is to TAA
Afghan security institutions at the ministerial and national level in Kabul. CSTC–A focused its
TAA on key people, places, and processes. During this period, CSTC–A transitioned to a “zone”
TAA model at the Afghan Security Institution level; a deliberate reduction in TAA persistence

² This section provides information sought as indicated on p. 264 of Senate Report 116-48 to accompany S. 1790, the
rebalancing TAA efforts towards the Ministerial Advisory Groups (MAGs) and continued funds management. Similar to CSTC–A, NAC–A reduced its advisor footprint in Afghanistan by adjusting how it conducts TAA to the Afghan Air Force. Instead of operating continuously from bases at several locations throughout Afghanistan, NAC-A transitioned its TAA methodology by consolidating its positions and adapted an additional “fly to advise mission.”

**Figure 1: TAA Optimization**

![Diagram of TAA Optimization](image)

The employment of 3rd SFAB continued to allow the United States Army to conserve an Infantry Brigade Combat Team that would have deployed to provide advisory capability to COMRS. USFOR-A initially employed 3rd SFAB as the headquarters for TAAC–E. In this role, the Brigade advised the 201st ANA Corps to improve their capacity and institutional viability. The brigade’s subordinate units advised MoD and MoI units across Afghanistan from the corps to the battalion level. After realignment during the drawdown of U.S. troops to 8,600, 3rd SFAB HQ assumed the role as Deputy Commanding General-Operations of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and two of its Task Forces assumed responsibility for the eastern and southeastern zones of Afghanistan. The Brigade HQ provides operational level advising to the MoD and MoI at the national level, while the majority of its subordinate elements continue to advise Corps and below formations at the tactical level. 3rd SFAB advising focused on building and sustaining the institutional viability of the ANA, ANP, and other partnered forces. Specifically, 3rd SFAB will continue to assist their partners in developing systems to ensure their supply, maintenance, and personnel functions supported their soldiers effectively. Through these actions, 3rd SFAB had a direct and substantial impact on the ability of ANDSF to sustain their forces both in the current fight, and after the eventual reduction of the RS mission.

On March 1, 2020, following the U.S.–Taliban Agreement in Doha, RS began reducing forces. Resolute Support reduced its requirements to approximately 12,000 personnel while the United States began its reduction to approximately 8,600 personnel. Advising efforts shifted from being
more persistent to periodic during this period. This corresponded to the closure of five tactical bases throughout Afghanistan and the reduction in the total number of advisors. Commanders refocused their advisory capability on the “Points of Need” assessing what TAA efforts would prove most effective with reliable partners in the ANDSF. Of all the organizations in the RS mission, NSOCC–A had the least reduction to its advisory efforts enabling it to continue focusing on development of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). This optimized TAA strategy continues to enable RS to protect participating nations’ homelands and prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for violent extremist organizations.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. USFOR-A continues to conduct CT operations under OFS. These CT operations, in addition to the increasing capabilities of the ANDSF, have helped preserve security gains and contributed to a maturing U.S.–Afghan CT partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts by training, advising and assisting the ASSF and accompanying the ASSF on partnered operations.

During this reporting period, USFOR–A maintained military pressure against insurgents in support of State Department-led reconciliation efforts. This strategy paved the way for a week-long (February 21-28, 2020) reduction in violence (RIV) that culminated with the signing of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement and the U.S.–Afghanistan Joint Declaration on February 29, 2020. Robust U.S.–led Coalition enabling and advisory support to ASSF elements (i.e. ANASOC, GCPSU, and Special Mission Wing (SMW)) was the core of this strategy. ASSF operations effectively sustained military pressure on the Taliban, thwarted ISIS territorial expansion, and mitigated the threat from high profile attack (HPA) networks. In the information space, the Information Warfare Task Force (IWTF) disseminated messaging that highlighted ASSF operational successes, promoted peace and condemned insurgent and terrorist attacks that resulted in civilian casualties and/or undermined the peace process.

During this reporting period, USFOR–A also continued to apply CT pressure in eastern Afghanistan to counter the threat of ISIS–K and other terrorist groups. In addition to unilateral U.S. efforts, USFOR-A enabled the ANDSF to conduct independent CT operations against ISIS. Through independent and partnered operations, and along with a separate but complementary offensive against the Taliban, the ASSF disrupted ISIS’s ability to conduct HPAs in Kabul and disrupted its physical presence in eastern Afghanistan. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation among Afghanistan and regional partners to support efforts to defeat ISIS.

U.S. and Afghan forces have maintained pressure on al-Qa'ida. During the last two years, U.S.–led CT operations have killed numerous AQ leaders and key members, which has disrupted and degraded the group. Moving forward, the United States and Coalition will continue to TAA ASSF as needed to facilitate the eventual conditions–based withdrawal of U.S. Forces and prevent terrorist groups from using Afghan soil to launch attacks against the United States, U.S. interests, or U.S. allies.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Figure 2: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of February 2020

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<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>16,651</td>
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</table>

The NATO-led RS mission advises the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about RSM requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the United States and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RSM “framework nations,” each leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Task Force (TF) Southeast and TF Southwest conduct TAA missions with the ANDSF but are not formally part of the RS mission.

The regional TAACs cover five of the seven ANA Corps and some Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial headquarters. TF Southeast and TF Southwest oversee persistent advising with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 203rd and 215th Corps, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the coalition. In addition,

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3 As stated above in section 1, the United States currently maintains approximately 13,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. By mid-July 2020, the United States will have approximately 8,600 personnel in Afghanistan supporting complementary missions to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces under the NATO RSM and to conduct counterterrorism operations. Figure 1 is derived from a NATO public website annotating U.S. Forces in support of NATO Resolute Support Mission as of February 2020.

4 As listed on the NATO public website, https://www.nato.int
coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabler support, primarily ISR and MEDEVAC, to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies and partners in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission reaffirmed their shared commitment to Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. Donor nations will make their financial pledges later this year to sustain the non-combat RSM and extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. As of February 2020, RS consisted of approximately 16,551 military personnel from 38 nations. The United States remains the largest force contributor.

Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)

The Resolute Support Headquarters (RSHQ) structure consists of two base pillars: security assistance and operations. Security assistance emphasizes ministerial advising, institutional development, and ANDSF resourcing, equipping, and sustaining. The Commander of DoD’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), is dual-hatted under the NATO mission as Deputy Chief of Staff, Security Assistance. CSTC-A builds institutional capacity of the Ministries of Defense and Interior and develop an effective, lethal, and sustainable ANDSF to secure the Afghan population.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations coordinates staff elements directly tied to TAA at the corps level and consolidates simultaneous planning for all TAACs. Operations advisors and personnel seek to increase near-term operational effectiveness and integrate strategic and institutional guidance at the operational level.

Figure 3: Resolute Support Mission Headquarters Organization

The following offices conduct TAA with the ANDSF:\textsuperscript{6}

**Rule of Law Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (ROL/CCAG)**

ROL/CCAG advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. ROL/CCAG efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sexual abuse.

**Operational Sustainment (OS): Sustain the Force**

OS advisors work with the MoD and MoI to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems.

**Strategy and Policy (S&P): Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

S&P personnel advise the MoD and the MoI on coordinating, planning, and executing campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives translate into operational and annual campaign plans.\textsuperscript{8}

**Strategic Communication (STRATCOM): Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

STRATCOM advisors work with the Afghan Government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. The advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice when addressing internal and external audiences.

**Resolute Support Gender Advisor (GENAD) Office**

The RS Gender Advisor (GENAD) Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). UNSCR 1325 addresses the inordinate impact that war and conflict has on women and the role women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace—and broader women’s perspectives into all policy and strategic planning within the ANDSF.

\textsuperscript{6}A separate RM section does not exist anymore and all TAA RM functions reside with the MAGs.

\textsuperscript{7}The Force Development branch was dissolved and a reduced number of advisors were transferred into MAG-D and MAG-I.

\textsuperscript{8}INT-TAA branch was dissolved as a part of TAA Optimization and a reduced number of advisors were transferred to RS CJ-2, MAG-D and MAG-I. INT TAA’s portfolio and advisors are now functionally aligned to the RS CJ-2 for programmatic and MAG-D and MAG-I for the advisors teams.
Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts, according to the need identified by the Coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels. Finally, the U.S.-led TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist ANA corps and some subordinate units and select ANP provincial headquarters in operational reporting of significant activities, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital (TAAC-C)

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Force (ABF), and Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E)

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes primarily U.S. and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Panshir, Parwan, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South (TAAC-S)

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by U.S. forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team further augments select functional advisors, as appropriate.
Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-W)

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North (TAAC-N)

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Task Force Southwest

TF Southwest (Headquarters in Helmand Province) includes Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. Led by U.S. forces, TF Southwest provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Task Force Southeast

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province) includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. Led by U.S. forces, TF Southeast provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203rd Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC–Air)

TAAC–Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC–Air’s U.S. and Coalition advisors provide functionally based security force assistance to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAAC-Air assists the Afghan Air Force to develop and fully integrate aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29, and AC-208 fixed-wing platforms, and the Mi-17, UH-60A, and MD-530 rotary-wing platforms.

NATO Air Command – Afghanistan (NAC–A)

Commander (COM) NAC–A is the principal air advisor to COMRS. NAC–A is directly responsible to COMRS for planning, prioritization, coordination, execution, and monitoring of all assigned air and space operations. NAC–A provides COMRS with operational-level advice and coordinates with the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) on the conduct, integration, and synchronization of air and space power with ground operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan. Additionally, COM NAC-A is responsible for the TAA of a sustainable AAF and for the operations of the U.S. Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs) at Bagram, Kandahar, and Jalalabad.
Combined Joint Engineers (CJ-ENG)

CJ-ENG conducts TAA with the ANDSF in infrastructure lifecycle management, general engineering, and combat engineering in order to deliver infrastructure capacity that enables a more effective, affordable and sustainable force. The TAA portion of the CJ-ENG Branch is organized around four key elements: MoD Construction and Property Management (CPMD), MoI Facilities Department (FD), MoD General Staff Engineer (GS-ENG), National Engineer Brigade (NEB). MoD CPMD and MoI FD goals are to ensure delivery of commitments after post-award execution, ensure facilities, operations, maintenance, and repairs are executed properly, build facility life cycle management capacity, and develop policies and procedures. MoD GS-ENG and NEB support TAA for checkpoint realignment, a national maintenance strategy, an increased attendance at the Afghan National Army Engineer School (ANAES), the promotion of a planning process discipline, and ensuring the advancement of mobility/survivability competence into the ANDSF.

1.5 RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is the key goal of the South Asia Strategy. DoD continues to support Department of State-led reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan.

During this reporting period, the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, led the U.S. Government’s efforts to resume reconciliation talks with the Taliban. As a result of these talks, and the President’s requirement for the Taliban to engage in a meaningful reduction in violence, the Taliban agreed to implement a reduction in violence (RIV) from February 21-28. The RIV period culminated in the signing of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement in Doha and the issuance of the parallel U.S.–Afghanistan Joint Declaration in Kabul on February 29, 2020.

The signing of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement paves the way for the next steps in the peace process, including the start of intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) between GIRoA and the Taliban, which aims to produce a negotiated settlement that ends the war in Afghanistan. The U.S.–Taliban Agreement included several core elements:

1) The Taliban’s commitment to prevent any group or individual, including al-Qa’ida, from using Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies. Specifically, the Taliban have committed not to host any individuals or groups – including al-Qa’ida – that threaten the United States or its allies, and not to allow these groups to train, recruit, or fundraise on Afghan soil. The Agreement also secures the Taliban’s commitment to block its members from cooperating with terrorist groups, among other actions.

2) The Taliban’s commitment to enter into intra-Afghan negotiations to reach an agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan and determine the date and modalities of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire, while seeking to continue to reduce violence in the interim.
3) A timeline for the conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, to 8,600 troops and proportional reduction in the number of allied and Coalition forces 135 days from the signing of the Agreement and a further timeline for the complete withdrawal of all remaining troops by the United States, its allies, and the Coalition within the remaining nine and a half months, provided the Taliban takes action on its obligations under the Agreement.

DoD started implementing the U.S. commitments under the U.S.–Taliban Agreement during this reporting period. As part of this implementation, U.S. forces have been conducting the initial phase of the troop reduction. U.S. forces will continue to draw down and adjust to the operational environment in implementation of the U.S.–Taliban Agreement. The RS Mission also continues to evolve to respond to changes in the operational environment and to protect Coalition Forces, partner nations, and the ANDSF.

Additionally, DoD will continue to participate in the interagency monitoring and verification effort to assess and monitor the Taliban’s compliance with its commitments under the Agreement.

**1.6 – COVID-19 IMPACTS AND RESPONSES**

The COVID-19 outbreak in Afghanistan posed additional challenges during the second half of this reporting period. As of May 31, 2020, Afghanistan had 14,525 confirmed COVID cases—including more than 40 positive COVID cases in the Afghan Presidential Palace—and 249 COVID-related deaths. The Afghan government implemented several measures to slow the spread of COVID, including instituting lockdowns in Kabul and other areas in the country. The Afghan government also released thousands of prisoners to reduce the potential spread of the virus in Afghan prisons. Additionally, the Afghan government tried to expand testing capabilities and increase the number of treatment facilities for COVID patients. The U.S. Government and other nations, international organization, and non-governmental organizations have also provided financial and other assistance to the Afghan government to help with response efforts. CSTC-A, for example, has used approximately $16 million of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) appropriation as of May 25, 2020, for procurement of COVID related medical supplies for the ANDSF, such as gloves, surgical masks, disposable gowns, disposable caps, N95 masks, antiseptic hand sanitizers, and infrared thermometers.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in Afghanistan, USFOR-A’s first priority has been to protect U.S. forces and personnel in order to minimize their risk of exposure to the virus. USFOR-A has heeded WHO and CDC guidance and taken necessary precautions. USFOR-A worked to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on CT operations and advising efforts. USFOR-A was able to complete the reduction to 8,600 military personnel despite the COVID-19 outbreak. USFOR-A also worked with the Department of State and relevant Afghan stakeholders to make notable progress on prisoner releases, which both sides have recognized is an important confidence building measure for IAN. Additionally, the U.S. Government made necessary adjustments in order to continue monitoring and assessing the Taliban’s implementation of the Agreement.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally supported insurgency and terrorist groups. These insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability and security. Revenue from drug trafficking, illegal taxation, extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, the insurgency continues to receive some sanctuary and support from external actors.

The Taliban’s insurgency is still the primary threat to Afghan stability. During this reporting period, the Taliban engaged in a noteworthy seven-day reduction in violence (RIV), which preceded in the February 29 signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. After the RIV ended and the U.S.-Taliban Agreement was signed, the Taliban resumed its attacks, primarily targeting ANDSF and GIRoA checkpoints and convoys in rural areas. The Taliban refrained from conducting HPAs in urban population centers and refrained from targeting U.S. and Coalition facilities.

The secondary threat to Afghan stability is from domestic political instability resulting from the protracted recount of votes in the presidential election, contested election results, and the opposition’s attempts to form a parallel government. This political instability contributed to the lack of a consensus Afghan government strategy and slow progress to form a negotiation team for intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) with the Taliban. After significant international pressure, including a decision by the United States to reduce $1 billion in security assistance to Afghanistan, President Ghani and former Chief Executive Abdullah were able to reach an agreement to resolve their political differences. Additionally, the Afghan government announced the formation of a negotiating team for IAN on March 25.

Terrorist groups also pose a current threat to the stability of Afghanistan. Some of these groups anticipate a future Afghanistan without coalition presence will reduce effective CT pressure, thus emboldening some to build their capabilities to pose a greater threat to the region, and potentially to the West. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including al-Qa’ida Core (AQ), al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K). Most of these groups focus their attacks within the South Asia region. Although ISIS-K aspires to attack the West, it likely remains limited to inspiring or enabling solitary attackers there. Terrorist sanctuaries on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border present security challenges for both countries, pose a threat to regional security and stability, and threaten U.S. national security interests. Cross-border attacks periodically strain cross-border relations. During this reporting period, the spread of COVID-19 in the region threatened Afghanistan’s limited health and screening systems.

Lastly among current threats to Afghan stability, during this reporting period, the spread of COVID-19 in the region threatened Afghanistan’s limited health and screening systems.
2.1 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The Afghan government maintains control of Kabul, provincial capitals, major population centers, most district centers, and most portions of major ground lines of communications (GLOCs). The Taliban contests several portions of main GLOCs, threatening district centers. In late March, the Taliban overtook Yamgan District in Badakhshan province. In April, the ANDSF seized control of the districts of Khanyab and Qarqin in Jowzjan province. Since the February 22-28 RIV period, the Taliban has sustained high levels of violence against ANDSF checkpoints and convoys. Concurrently, the Taliban has avoided attacks against coalition forces and provincial capitals, likely to avoid risking the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.

Separately, in February, ISIS started conducting terrorist attacks against ANDSF and Coalition Forces for the first time since it lost its main stronghold in Nangarhar province in November 2019. ISIS claimed several attacks against GIRoA, civilians, and Bagram Airfield, including indirect fire (IDF), person borne-IED (PBIED), and small arms fire attacks. During the reporting period, ISIS claimed two HPAs in Kabul, a complex PBIED attack against a crowd of Shi’ite celebrants who were commemorating former leader Ali Mazari on March 6 and an attack against a Sikh temple in Kabul on March 25.

Security Trends

From December 1, 2019 to April 30, 2020, violence levels in Afghanistan fluctuated in response to progress in the peace process. There were three distinct periods of violence during this reporting period: 1) Pre-RIV; 2) During RIV; and 3) Post US-Taliban Agreement.

1. Pre-RIV (December 1, 2019 - February 21, 2020): Before the 7-day RIV period in late February, the Taliban increased operations. Violence levels were elevated during this period and were above historical norms.

2. During RIV (February 22-28): From February 22-28, all sides implemented a weeklong RIV and the Taliban demonstrated the ability to control the levels of violence. During the weeklong RIV, the levels of violence were significantly lower than historical norms.

3. Post U.S.-Taliban Agreement (February 29-June 1): The U.S.-Taliban Agreement that was signed on February 29 included commitments to seek to continue reducing violence in Afghanistan. After the agreement was signed, however, violence levels increased above historical norms, though lethality remained below historical norms. The elevated violence level was possibly an attempt to gain leverage during prisoner release discussions and IAN. There were no Taliban attacks against Coalition forces, though there were several provincial center attacks at the end of the reporting period.
The coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks,\textsuperscript{10} which are a subset of all security incidents.\textsuperscript{11} Direct fire attacks against minimally manned Afghan outposts and checkpoints continued to be the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes. Consistent with trends during the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady during the last 18 months.

2.2 MITIGATING CASUALTIES IN AFGHANISTAN

\textit{ANDSF Casualties}\textsuperscript{12}

The number of ANDSF casualties, including those that occurred on local patrols, checkpoint operations, and offensive operations, decreased significantly during this reporting period compared to the same period in 2019, but still remained high, largely due to Taliban attacks at static ANDSF checkpoints. Direct fire attacks at checkpoints continue to cause the majority of casualties, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes.

\textit{U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks}

From October 2001, the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, through Apr 30, 2020, 1,909 U.S military personnel were killed in action (KIA), and 20,719\textsuperscript{13} wounded in action (WIA). During the reporting period, there were five U.S. military deaths because of hostile actions and 75 U.S. military personnel were WIA.

During this reporting period, there was one insider attack that killed two U.S. personnel and one Afghan. U.S. forces and the Afghan Government continue their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF personnel and new recruits.

During this reporting period, there were 40 "green on green" attacks. This is an increase in insider attacks against the ANDSF compared to the same period last year but a decrease compared to the previous reporting period. This reporting period had an increase in total deaths caused by insider attacks while recording a decrease in total wounded compared to both the same period last year as

\textsuperscript{10} Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks experience delays by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

\textsuperscript{11} Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found).

\textsuperscript{12} Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.

\textsuperscript{13} Data was accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on May 4, 2020.
well as the previous reporting period. KIA rates have risen from 1.8 killed per attack last year and 1.7 killed per attack last reporting period to 2.9 killed per attack during this reporting period.

**Civilian Casualties**

As noted in Section 1 of Executive Order 13732 of July 1, 2016, *United States Policy on Pre– and Post–Strike Measures To Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force*, the protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with the effective, efficient, and decisive use of force in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Minimizing civilian casualties can further mission objectives; help maintain the support of partner governments and vulnerable populations, especially during counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; and enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of U.S. operations critical to U.S. national security. As a matter of policy, U.S. forces therefore routinely conduct operations under policy standards that are more protective of civilians than is required by the law of war.

Protecting civilians continues to be a top priority for USFOR-A. In addition to complying with the law of war, USFOR-A demonstrates operational and tactical expertise by accomplishing its mission while minimizing civilian casualties. At the same time, USFOR-A recognizes that it can always improve its processes. As such, USFOR-A continuously strives to provide its forces with the best training, capabilities, and processes possible to reduce risks to civilians.

The Coalition trains its forces on the law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, and tactical guidance, which forms the basis of RS’s civilian casualty mitigation and prevention efforts. The COMRS Tactical Guidance emphasizes that civilian casualties are the single greatest threat to the RS mission. This guidance also directs RS forces to use force only when required and to use tactical patience to prevent civilian casualties when acting in self-defense or providing TAA to the ANDSF. In February 2020, based on RS’s request for external review of its civilian casualty mitigation policies and procedures, the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum conducted a civilian casualty mitigation assessment and the findings indicated that RS has inculcated a culture of civilian casualty prevention within its command.

USFOR-A reviews all reports of civilian casualties from military units as well as from external entities, such as international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). USFOR-A attempts to review and collect supporting documentation to make an initial assessment of any report of civilian casualties caused by Coalition forces within 24 to 72 hours of the incident or report. The results of this initial assessment are then presented to a U.S. General Officer/Flag Officer who determines whether further investigation or assessment is warranted. If so, USFOR-A directs an investigation and/or has the relevant operational command complete a Civilian Casualty Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) within 7 days. The command may direct an administrative investigation (e.g., an investigation in accordance with applicable Military Department procedures, such as those in Army Regulation 15-6 or those for an Air Force Commander-Directed Investigation) at any time.

When U.S. forces (working with their Afghan partners) assess that Coalition military operations more likely than not resulted in civilian injuries or death, they take steps to learn the facts, develop a thorough understanding of what occurred, and take appropriate steps to reduce the risk
of recurrence. Condolence payments are considered in certain cases where there is credible information indicating that U.S., Coalition force, or partnered operations may have resulted in civilian casualties. On June 22, 2020, DoD issued guidance titled, “Interim Regulations for Condolence or Sympathy Payments to Friendly Civilians for Injury or Loss That is Incident to Military Operations,” pursuant to Section 1213 of the NDAA for FY 2020. The U.S. or Coalition unit whose operations resulted in the civilian casualties additionally takes steps to conduct internal evaluations and implement lessons learned, incorporating feedback from adjacent units and supporting agencies to inform future operations.

USFOR-A sometimes takes actions to respond to civilian harm, such as by transporting injured civilians, adults and children, to U.S. medical facilities in Afghanistan for stabilization and treatment, when operationally feasible.

On May 1, 2020, DoD submitted to the congressional defense committees its “Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United States Military Operations in 2019,” pursuant to Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. This report states that as of March 1, 2020, approximately 108 civilians were killed and approximately 75 civilians were injured as a result of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan during 2019. Although this particular report does not provide information about child casualties, Commander, USFOR-A, confirmed that out of the 183 civilians who were killed or injured as a result of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2019, 53 were children, including 37 killed and 16 injured. The assessments of civilian casualties are based on reports of civilian casualties that were assessed to be “verified.” A report is considered “verified” if, based on the available information, the assessment officer finds that it is more likely than not that civilian casualties resulted from U.S. military operations. A report is considered a “possible civilian casualty incident” when it is not possible to determine if civilian casualties occurred, but there were U.S. military operations that correspond to the allegation that could have resulted in civilian casualties. A report is considered a “not attributable civilian casualty incident” when civilian casualties have occurred, but it is impossible to determine if they resulted from U.S., ANDSF or insurgent/terrorist military operations.

**Efforts to Mitigate Civilian Casualties**

RS advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan government, including at the highest levels, to reduce civilian casualties by, for example, raising awareness about the importance of trying to avoid causing civilian casualties, providing precision-guided munition to the AAF, and training pilots how to employ them. The advisor mission also focused on practical measures that the ANDSF could adopt at the tactical level to reduce civilian casualties. Since the beginning of 2017, RS has provided training to the ANDSF in the prevention and response to civilian casualties, 14 The June 22, 2020, interim DoD guidance on condolence or sympathy payments to friendly civilians for injury or loss caused by U.S. military operations can be accessed at the following link: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/23/2002320314/-1/-1/INTERIM-REGULATIONS-FOR-CONDOLENCE-OR-SYMPATHY-PAYMENTS-TO-FRIENDLY-CIVILIANS-FOR-INJURY-OR-LOSS THAT-IS-INCIDENT-TO-MILITARY-OPERATIONS.PDF

15 The May 1, 2020, Section 1057 report to Congress can be accessed at the following link: https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/06/2002295555/-1/-1/SEC-1057-CIVILIAN-CASUALTIES-MAY-1-2020.PDF
including by focusing on accurately identifying civilians in certain areas that may be at risk of harm during operations. The training addresses mitigation efforts during pre-operational planning, execution of operations, and post-operations. The instructional package covers reporting procedures, investigations, data collection, and possible follow-on support and assistance. In addition, U.S. advisors provide Afghan pilots with extensive training during all phases of flight training on the proper employment of weapon systems and their effects, including ways to minimize collateral damage and to abide by Afghanistan’s rules of engagement.

USFOR-A personnel regularly meet with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) staff to discuss reports of civilian casualties and to share the results of assessments. UNAMA and UNFOR-A also occasionally compare civilian casualty figures attributed to insurgents and terrorists. The Deputy Commander, RS, often meets with UNAMA leadership as well. On December 19, 2019, representatives of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) and the DoD Office of General Counsel hosted a meeting with the United Nations (UN) Secretary General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) to share information about DoD efforts to minimize civilian casualties in U.S. military operations, learn more about the UN CAAC mandate, and to discuss ways to improve coordination between UN offices and the U.S. military operational commands to help the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for CAAC avoid mischaracterizing U.S. military operations in her reports.

DoD is developing a Department-wide policy to guide DoD’s efforts to mitigate civilian harm and to respond to civilian casualties when they occur. On January 31, 2020, the OUSD(P) sent a memorandum about the importance of civilian harm mitigation during military operations to other senior DoD leaders.16 Subsequently, on March 6, 2020, the OUSD(P) hosted a roundtable with civil society representatives to express DoD’s commitment to civilian harm mitigation and to seek the various groups’ respective recommendations related to DoD policy.

**Civilian Casualty Data from November 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020**

Overall, civilian casualties caused by all parties to the conflict decreased by 9 percent during this reporting period compared to the same period last year. Insurgent and terrorist attacks caused 88 percent of civilian casualties. USFOR–A continued to support political reconciliation efforts by significantly reducing military operations against the Taliban before and during the week-long RIV period and after the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement on February 29, 2020.

USFOR-A documented 2,801 civilian casualties from November 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020, of which 1,021 civilians were killed and 1,780 civilians were injured. Of the 2,801 civilian casualties, USFOR-A attributed 47 civilian casualties (34 civilians killed and 13 civilians injured) to U.S.-led Coalition forces in 21 events; 133 civilian casualties (51 civilians killed and 82 civilians injured) to the ANDSF; 2,459 civilian casualties (891 civilians killed and 1,568 civilians injured) to insurgents and terrorists; and 162 civilian casualties (45 civilians killed and 117 civilians injured) to other/unknown parties to the conflict.

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16 The January 31, 2020, OUSD(P) memorandum to DoD leaders can be accessed at the following link: [https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/20/2002252367/-1/-1/1/DEVELOPMENT-OF-A-DOD-INSTRUCTION-ON-MINIMIZING-AND-RESPONDING-TO-CIVILIAN-HARM-IN-MILITARY-OPERATIONS.PDF](https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/20/2002252367/-1/-1/1/DEVELOPMENT-OF-A-DOD-INSTRUCTION-ON-MINIMIZING-AND-RESPONDING-TO-CIVILIAN-HARM-IN-MILITARY-OPERATIONS.PDF)
USFOR-A and UNAMA Reporting Differences During 1st Quarter 2020 (January 1 – March 31)

USFOR-A documented 1,303 total civilian casualties from January 1, 2020 – March 31, 2020, of which 504 civilians were killed and 799 civilians were injured. USFOR-A conducts assessments based upon both operational reports received, for example from the TAACs and the ANDSF, as well as information provided by outside entities, such international organizations and non-governmental organizations. During the quarter, USFOR-A attributed 1,139 civilian casualties (438 civilians were killed and 701 civilians were injured) to insurgents and terrorists; 76 civilian casualties (32 civilians were killed and 44 civilians were injured) to the ANDSF; and 19 civilian casualties (14 civilians were killed and 5 civilians were injured) to U.S.-led Coalition forces. USFOR-A attributed the remaining 69 civilian casualties (20 civilians killed and 49 civilians injured) to other parties to the conflict.

UNAMA’s latest report assessed that there were 1,293 civilian casualties from January 1 – March 31, 2020, of which 533 civilians were killed and 760 civilians were injured. UNAMA reported that insurgents and terrorists were responsible for 710 civilian casualties (282 civilians killed and 428 civilians injured). UNAMA also reported that the ANDSF were responsible for 267 civilian casualties (99 civilians killed and 168 civilians injured); and that international military forces were responsible for 105 civilian casualties (80 civilians killed and 25 civilians injured). UNAMA attributed the remaining 171 civilian casualties (53 civilians killed and 118 civilians injured) to other or unknown parties to the conflict.
The difference in the numbers of civilian casualties reported by USFOR-A and UNAMA is mainly due to differences in (1) information sources, and (2) understanding about who receives protection as civilians under the law of war. For example, U.S. forces often collect intelligence on persons and locations long before U.S. forces conduct attacks on or near those persons and locations. USFOR-A leaders also know where U.S. forces are operating and why they are targeting certain persons and objects as part of the armed conflict. Thus, in addition to the information provided by external entities, such as IOs and NGOs, USFOR-A has access to a wide range of information and data directly relevant to determining the actions of U.S. forces and the situation on the ground at the time of attacks they may conduct, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, and digital and other imagery, which are generally not available to external entities. USFOR-A also has access to and considers in its assessments open-source media, social media, and other sources that can be a basis for assertions made by external entities.

In contrast to USFOR-A, external entities are often reacting to information that is given to them by bystanders or other individuals who may not have perspective about: (1) which force conducted the attack; and (2) what was targeted and why. These sources might also have biases or reasons to lie. Thus, assessments by external entities often are efforts to piece together what happened after different incidents from limited and potentially inaccurate information. In many cases, USFOR-A cannot verify the credibility of the people providing information to external entities and the veracity of the information itself. In this context, it is worth noting that external entities’ efforts to assess reports of civilian casualties accurately may be undermined by non-State armed groups in Afghanistan generally not distinguishing themselves from the civilian population and those groups’ efforts to influence Afghan and Western audiences through propaganda and misinformation about civilian casualties.

In addition to differences in the information available to USFOR-A and external entities from which assessments are made, USFOR-A and some external entities are using different interpretations about who receives protections of civilians under the law of war (otherwise

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### Table: Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan, January 1 - March 31, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties to the Conflict</th>
<th>USFOR-A Data</th>
<th>UNAMA Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-led Coalition Forces</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Security Forces</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists and Insurgents</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>504</td>
<td>799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law). When assessing reports of civilian casualties, USFOR-A considers whether any members of the civilian population were wounded or killed as a direct result of U.S. military operations. For the purposes of such assessments, USFOR-A does not include persons who have forfeited the protections of civilian status by engaging in hostilities, such as by being part of a non-State armed group like the Taliban or ISIS. For example, if a U.S. strike targets a member of the Taliban or ISIS, USFOR-A would consider that person to be a combatant under the Laws of Armed Conflict (rather than a civilian) for the purpose of civilian casualty assessments, regardless of whether the person was continuously engaged in a combat function at the time he or she was wounded or killed.

Some external entities purport to be applying the same body of law as USFOR-A, but they have often been relying on interpretations of the law of war that have not been accepted by the United States. For example, some external entities appear to believe that members of the Taliban and ISIS that do not have a “continuous combat function” should be immune from attack except for such time as they participate directly in hostilities. These external entities would seem to support “revolving door” protections for members of the Taliban and ISIS, contrary to longstanding U.S. interpretations of the law of war. See U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual 5.8.4.2 (June 2015, Updated Dec. 2016). The International Committee on Red Cross document that has been cited for this view has been widely criticized for departing from established State interpretations and is not legally binding on the United States.

To the degree that external entities are relying in their assessments on interpretations of legal standards that the United States has not accepted, these entities are not applying an accurate understanding of who receives protections as civilians for the purposes of relevant civilian casualty assessments.

2.3 INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL ACTORS

U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia, by: building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan; emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation; garnering international support for an Afghan-led reconciliation process; and holding countries accountable for using proxies or other efforts to undermine stability in Afghanistan. DoD contributes to the whole-of-government effort that seeks to isolate insurgent and terrorist groups from sources of external support and mitigate the risk of malign influence or interference from regional actors.

Russia

Russia very likely continues to support U.S.-Taliban reconciliation efforts in the hope that reconciliation will prevent a long-term U.S. military presence. As of February, the Russian government was working with the central government, regional countries, and the Taliban to gain increased influence in Afghanistan, expedite a U.S. military withdrawal, and address security challenges that might arise from a withdrawal. As of late February, Kremlin officials expressed support for the U.S.-Taliban Agreement and offered to facilitate IAN, which Russian officials supported as the best path towards forming an interim government. Russia has politically supported the Taliban to cultivate influence with the group, limit the Western military
presence, and encourage counter ISIS operations, although Russia publicly denies their involvement. As of late 2019, Russian military forces stationed in Tajikistan have routinely conducted unilateral and multilateral exercises to maintain preparedness to defend against potential cross-border violence originating from northern Afghanistan. The Department of State has worked to leverage regional actors to support the U.S.-Taliban agreement. On March 6, the United States and Russian Federation issued a Joint Statement on the Signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (collectively, “Central Asian countries”) view stability and security in Afghanistan in the context of the wider Central Asian region. Uzbekistan continues to expand trade links, allowing the shipment of Afghan materials to China. Some of the Central Asian countries have expressed concerns that ISIS may expand into Central Asia and destabilize the region. Uzbekistan played a constructive role in reconciliation as it sought to leverage its desired position as a regional leader and key economic link to Afghanistan to promote reconciliation efforts and economic development.

Pakistan

Pakistan has publicly supported the U.S.-Taliban Agreement as a way to end the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s senior leadership were invited to attend the signing of a peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban in early March as a sign of Islamabad’s strong support to facilitating peace in Afghanistan.

Iran

Iran pursues its goals in Afghanistan by providing calibrated support to the Taliban and engaging with and trying to strengthen ties with the Afghan government. Iran’s interests include removing the U.S./NATO presence, eliminating ISIS, increasing economic and security ties to the Afghan government, securing water rights, and improving border security. During the past year, Iran increased its outreach to both the Taliban Political Commission and the Afghan government to increase its role in the reconciliation process and secure Iranian interests in an agreement. Iranian officials characterized the U.S.-Taliban Agreement as illegitimate because it did not include the Afghan government and Afghanistan’s neighbors, and demanded that U.S. forces withdraw from the country, according to open-source reporting. The State Department recently participated in a 6+2 UN meeting on Afghanistan, which included Iran’s participation.

China

The Chinese government engages both the Afghan government and the Taliban in an attempt to achieve regional stability, which would, thereby protect Chinese personnel and investments abroad, and secure China’s western border from Uighur militants. Although Oslo was set to hold IAN in early March, as of late 2019, the Chinese government was maintaining its offer to mediate between the Taliban and Afghan government.
India

India works with regional state actors, the Afghan Government, and Afghan power brokers to prevent transnational terrorist safe havens, and maintain access to Afghanistan as a gateway to Central Asian markets. The Indian government does not support the Taliban politically and continues to support the Afghan government. India has reiterated its support for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled peace process.

India has traditionally had strong ties with Afghanistan and remains the largest regional donor to the country ($3 billion since 2001). Indian aid to Afghanistan focuses primarily on four main categories: humanitarian assistance; major infrastructure projects; small and community-based projects; and education and capacity development. A significant deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan, however, may adversely affect the ability of India to provide aid.

The Gulf States

All of the Gulf states seek a stable Afghanistan. These states would support a ceasefire and peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Qatar hosts the Taliban Political Commission (TPC) and provides a venue for relevant parties to engage in dialogue about the implementation and monitoring of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. Qatari officials have also played a facilitation role with the Taliban to advance the peace agreement. Qatari C-17 aircraft also provide airlift for NATO operations in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE aspire to minimize Iranian and Qatari influence in Afghanistan.

2.4 THREATS FROM INSURGENT AND TERRORIST GROUPS

Terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and Coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 terrorist organizations in the region represents one of the largest concentrations of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

The Taliban

The Taliban and Haqqani Network very likely maintain the capability to conduct explosive and other offensive operations against Afghan and Coalition forces. At the beginning of the reporting period, Taliban offensive operations briefly decreased during the weeklong RIV in February 2020. Since the U.S.-Taliban Agreement was signed, the Taliban has reduced violence against Coalition forces, but has continued its offensive operations against the ANDSF and Afghan government officials. The Taliban is calibrating its use of violence to harass and undermine the ANDSF and GIRoA, but remain at a level it perceives is within the bounds of the agreement, probably to encourage a U.S. troop withdrawal and set favorable conditions for a post-withdrawal Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban captured the Yamgan district center in Badakhshan on March 29.

The Taliban has sustained levels of violence five times higher than those observed during the RIV period. U.S. Government Departments and Agencies continue to closely monitor violence levels in Afghanistan and assess whether the Taliban is sufficiently complying with its
commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The U.S. Government expects the Taliban to fulfill its commitments under the Agreement, which specifically states that withdrawal of troops below 8,600 will happen “With the commitment and action on the obligations” by the Taliban of their part of the agreement.

**ISIS-K**

Since the fall of 2019, sustained pressure from the ANDSF, coalition forces, and the Taliban degraded ISIS through deaths, captures, and surrenders of ISIS fighters; this pressure forced ISIS to abandon territorial control in southern Nangarhar and in Kunar. Resolute Support assesses reduced pressure is likely to provide ISIS with opportunities to regenerate the organization. In late 2019, after ISIS lost control of key terrain in southern Nangarhar, ISIS may have created smaller cells to continue operating in Afghanistan, according to COMRS. ISIS’s effectiveness in these smaller cells will likely be constrained by ANDSF, U.S., Coalition, and Taliban pressure.

During this reporting period, ISIS has maintained the ability to defend itself and conduct mass casualty attacks, despite pressure from the Coalition, ANDSF, and the Taliban. As ISIS was dislocated from territory it controlled, the group may be moving to smaller groups in urban areas that are harder to locate and identify. Since February, ISIS claimed multiple MAIED, IDF, and a suicide complex attack in Kabul, demonstrating their operational capabilities and continuing threat to stability. Over the past few years, ISIS has continued to take a more active role in the management of regional ISIS networks in India, Bangladesh, and other areas assigned by ISIS-Core, but its progress in enabling or inspiring external attacks outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan has likely been limited. Although ISIS-K continues to develop connections to other networks outside of Afghanistan, it is largely operationally limited to South and Central Asia.

**Al-Qa’ida**

Al-Qa’ida poses a limited threat to U.S. personnel and our partners in Afghanistan. Al-Qa’ida’s regional affiliate—al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—poses the greatest threat to those elements. AQIS routinely supports and works with low-level Taliban members in its efforts to undermine the Afghan Government, and maintains an enduring interest in attacking U.S. forces and Western targets in the region. Additionally, AQIS assists local Taliban in some attacks, according to al-Qa’ida statements. AQ faces continuous Coalition CT pressure and will focus on ensuring its safe haven remains viable.

The few remaining al-Qa’ida Core members focus largely on survival, while delegating leadership of AQ’s regional presence to AQIS leaders. AQ, including through AQIS, continues to work toward its stated goals of freeing occupied Muslim lands, establishing an Islamic caliphate, and implementing Shar’ia law. AQIS’s interest in attacking U.S. forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the region persists, but continuing Coalition CT pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan without the support of the Taliban. AQIS likely poses a low threat to Afghan and U.S. entities in Afghanistan. Despite recent progress in the peace process, AQIS maintains close ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan, likely for protection and training.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

During this reporting period, the ANDSF provided sufficient security to deny the Taliban and ISIS their respective objectives. The ASSF and AAF remain the most capable forces in the ANDSF and continue to grow their combat capabilities with maintenance and sustainment challenges being their chief remaining shortfall. The ANDSF will continue to rely over the long term on contracted logistic support and on the United States for the vast majority of the funding needed to sustain their combat operations. RS advisors continue to work with the ANA and ANP to address ongoing challenges in ensuring personnel are paid in a timely manner; performing ground vehicle maintenance; procuring and distributing quality food to their forces; maintaining facilities; and managing supply. The MoD and MoI continue to make gradual improvements in implementing accountability systems such as the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), which accounts for and manages payroll for the ANDSF, and Core-IMS, the inventory-management system for ANDSF equipment and supplies.

On May 13, 2020, President Ghani ordered the ANDSF to shift from the defensive posture they were in since the RIV period in February to an offensive mode in response to continued Taliban attacks against the ANDSF.

3.1 ANDSF STRUCTURE AND SIZE

The authorized ANDSF force structure that the international community is willing to fund remains 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel, including the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Security Forces. Separately, the United States funds up to an authorized level of 30,000 Afghan Local Police; this funding will end on September 30, 2020. As of March 29, 2020, APPS data validates that just over 295,000 ANDSF personnel are eligible for pay. Direct contributions of ASFF to the Afghan Ministry of Finance funds pay and incentives for 178,815 MoD personnel and 17,856 Afghan Local Police validated in APPS as eligible for pay, predicated on their completion of the payroll process. Within the MoI, 98,891 personnel are assigned to authorized billets in APPS and eligible for base pay utilizing funds from the United Nations Development Program-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to which a number of donor nations contribute. MoD oversees the ANA, the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), the Afghan Border Force (ABF), the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC and the SMW. The MoI oversees the four ANP forces that include the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), the Public Security Police (PSP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) as well as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF).

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17 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1520(d)(2)(C) and (D) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
18 The Afghan must load time and attendance into APPS and generate pay documents to complete process. See Figure 5.
3.2 ANDSF OBJECTIVES

**ANDSF Roadmap**

Developed by President Ghani in late 2016, the ANDSF four-year Roadmap is a broad-based reform effort with four key elements: 1) leadership development; 2) increase fighting capabilities; 3) unity of command/unity of effort; and 4) counter-corruption. Two of the four priorities—leadership development and counter-corruption—are documented in CSTC-A’s Top 10 Opportunities and Challenges. RS continues to emphasize improved unity of command, primarily through improved cross-pillar synchronization, and help to grow the ASSF. In 2020, the final year of the Roadmap, the effort to increase fighting capabilities by doubling the size of the ASSF and modernizing the Afghan Air Force are complete. The focus on the roadmap contributed to the AAF and ASSF being the most capable forces in the ANDSF.

**ANDSF Operational Campaign**

ANDSF Campaign Plan 1399 (Operation QIYAM) planning began on October 28, 2019. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) hosted planning conferences every week, incorporating representatives from each department of the General Staff, National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). MAG-D advisors assisted their counterparts during these sessions. The attendees presented a course of action decision brief to the Chief of the General Staff (COGS), LTG Waziri. LTG Waziri signed the Joint Order for 1399 Campaign on February 5, 2020. The ANDSF adjusted their campaign plan to reflect operational changes made after the signing of the U.S.-Taliban Agreement.

3.3 DEVELOPING MINISTRY CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY: INDICATORS OF PROGRESS

To assess efforts to build the capacity of Afghan security institutions, CSTC-A focuses on the following “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities”:

- Leader development,
- Reducing the number of vulnerable checkpoints,
- Countering corruption,
- Improving logistics,
- Improving accountability of equipment,
- Reducing attrition through better care of soldiers and police,
- Standardization of training,
- Better MoD and MoI budget execution,
- Improving processes for paying soldier and police salaries,
- Improving ANDSF facilities.

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19 This section addresses the request on page 348 of House Report 116-84, the Committee on Appropriations Report to accompany H.R. 2968, the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020.
Leader Development

RS advisors’ focused their efforts on senior leaders within the MoD and MoI that are reliable partners. The focus on leader development across the ANSF has been on institutionalizing processes and organizations that professionalize the force and build a cadre of future leaders. For example in the ANA, the focus has been on ensuring kandak and brigade levels commanders attend the pre-command course (PCC) prior to leading an organization. In the ANA, 100 percent of their brigade level commanders attended the course and over half of the kandak commanders were PCC trained. The MOI does not have a PCC equivalent but are implementing other initiatives to train and mentor senior leaders in the ANP. Over the last quarter, the MININT has established a PCOP conference to provide updates to the PCOPs on the current issues across the ministry as well to gain their feedback from a regional perspective of what is going on across the country. The MININT plans to conduct a similar conference every six months to share information and provide command guidance to the PCOPs.

Reducing Checkpoints

Most successful Taliban attacks against ANSF forces occurred at poorly manned static checkpoints (CPs). The Taliban targets these checkpoints to harass the ANSF, increase ANSF attrition, and capture ANSF equipment with which to resupply Taliban fighters. RS like ISAF before that—has focused on checkpoint consolidation and reduction for years. However, small, poorly defended, and redundant checkpoints remain prevalent due to political sensitivities and the fact that checkpoints provide a visible, albeit false, sense of security.

During this reporting period, RS and senior Afghan leaders focused significantly on reducing the number of checkpoints. President Ghani issued a presidential decree to reinforce checkpoint reduction. The ministries have made progress, including by developing a plan to identify and prioritize checkpoints that are the most dangerous. The ministries also started issuing ciphers and orders that drove faster reductions. These efforts, in conjunction with analysis of losses at CPs and TAA efforts, have helped foster additional progress. The ANSF are identifying groups of 200 checkpoints with the highest casualties and the highest tactical value. These are identified as CPs to be removed, reinforced, or converted to newly established patrol bases (PBs.) Progress is measured by the number of checkpoints that still need to be reduced, reinforced, or converted to a PB. Afghan forces are also taking into consideration how checkpoint reduction can reduce casualties and increase the availability of combat power for maneuver operations.

The ANSF continues to make progress with reducing CPs and reinforcing CPs that are tactically necessary. MAG-I advisors coordinate TAA actions with the TAACs to discuss checkpoint reduction efforts. MOI’s new Deputy Minister for Security has affirmed his commitment to checkpoint reductions/closures since assuming the post in early January. The MOI has completed to date approximately 197 of the over 200 CPs initially identified as the most dangerous checkpoints. MoD in closing out Phase II of IV, the ANA has reduced 220 (CPs) and repositioned soldiers within 49 newly built Patrol Bases (PBs) or 19 CPs that were improved to PBs.
Although progress was made during this reporting period, challenges with acquisition of construction materials (CL IV) and construction of checkpoints and patrol bases to standard remain. The efforts have a long way to go with over 10,000 known ANDSF checkpoints.

**Counter-Corruption**

Corruption, including corruption of Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)-funded commodities like fuel, undermines ANDSF readiness and combat power. RS continues to apply pressure on senior ANDSF leaders to enforce stewardship and accountability of U.S.-funded support. RS has focused advising efforts on trusted partners who demonstrate a willingness to take action against corruption. For example, in 2019, the Minister of Defense (MINDEF) realigned the MoD Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to report directly to MINDEF and to be led by a major general. Previously, MoD CID consisted of 69 investigators, led by a colonel, who reported to the ANA General Staff’s Legal section with all the agents aligned under the corps commanders. The realignment grew the organization to 133 investigators and administrative personnel and 138 military police and re-organized the field personnel into five zones, not attached to any particular Corps.

MoD CID continues to develop as an independent entity, and has made progress in the nearly seven months since the Interim Director was appointed. Prior to his arrival, the organization was leaderless and stagnant. Since his appointment, the Interim Director has aggressively sought qualified officers to fill the *Tashkil*. The expansion of the 1,398 *Tashkil* in numbers and grade, coupled with the low density of qualified officers in the ANA, presents a gap, which will take time to overcome until they can grow their force. However, as of this report, the Interim Director has filled 89 percent of the billets. Shortfalls include senior officers and soldiers for the Military Police Platoons. Although some senior leadership positions remain vacant or filled by junior officers (2-3 grades below authorized), the Acting Director has made an effort personally to assess and mentor each officer he has placed in a leadership position.

Because of a more aggressive CID, MINDEF has begun approving suspension orders for personnel under criminal investigation. In 2019, the MINDEF signed an Ethics and Military Conduct Policy for all MoD personnel. Unfortunately, the final product signed by the MINDEF did not include enforcement mechanisms or consequences for failure to comply. Nevertheless, the MoD Chief Legal Officer is working with GS Legal and the Assistant Minister for Personnel and Education to implement an ANA-wide ethics-training program. Despite the personnel shortfalls, RS Rule of Law advisors believe MoD is making considerable advancements in battling corruption. MoD CID has increased the number of corruption cases they are investigating since last year, while it works toward full operational capability.

The Minister of Interior has increased focus on reducing corruption in order to change the public perception of the police force. During this reporting period, the Deputy Minister for Security identified the most corrupt checkpoints within the MoI and made arrests and follow on prosecutions of individuals engaging in these activities. The MoI Corruption Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) made more than 100 arrests of corrupt individuals within the reporting period. On

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20 Information on counter-corruption addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1520(d)(2)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
November 2, 2019, the President of Afghanistan (PoA) issued a decree regarding the Afghan National and Security Forces (ANDSF) for the purpose of building relations between police and the public, enforcing the rule of law, and reducing ANDSF corruption at checkpoints.

In addition, the MCTF launched a public service messaging campaign across various venues (TV, radio, newspapers, magazines), titled "Corruption, Fraud, Waste, and Abuse". The campaign highlights the 24-hour hotline that allows callers anonymously to report corruption and crimes and to earn rewards if the report results in an arrest or conviction. In addition to this public service corruption initiative, the MCTF is focusing on having all staff, including the Director, screened using the Preliminary Credibility Assessment (PCASS), similar to a polygraph. These screenings include questions related to corruption, and results of these screenings have resulted in removal of some assigned personnel. From December 22, 2018, to December 31, 2019, the General Directorate of Internal Security (GDIS) PCASS Department conducted 21,727 PCASS screenings of Mol personnel.

**Improving Logistics**

The greatest improvement of the ANA/ANP distribution processes has been the successful establishment of the AAF channel flight program with weekly flights from Kabul to Herat, Shorab, Kandahar, and Mazer-e-sharif. These routine flights are providing more predictability and ability to move critical cargo. TAA by several RS organizations, including 3rd SFAB, TAAC-Air, and MAG-Air was able to fix the aerial distribution problem. Distribution of supplies by ground remains challenged due to security concerns as larger convoys are susceptible to enemy activity. Smaller convoys are more agile, easier to control in movement, have a shorter planning timeline and build momentum. The ANP shifted their distribution model and have been successful in operating smaller convoys at the national level to the Regional Logistic Centers. In the ANA, the LOGCOM commander recently issued a cipher (Afghan operational order) limiting all National Transportation Brigade (NTB) convoys to no more than 40 vehicles. The NTB has been successful moving convoys north to the 209th and 217th Corps, but moving south is still problematic through constricted transportation corridors.

**Improving Accountability of Equipment**

Since 2008 CSTC-A has used Core-IMS as the system of record to manage and track equipment, weapons, and vehicles provided to the Afghan government by DoD. Core-IMS is an Internet-based property accountability system placed into service through U.S.-funded contracts to track equipment, weapons, and vehicles across the ANSF. The long-term intent of Core-IMS is to provide the ANSF with a digital base for its logistics program to grow and mature as the security environment in Afghanistan stabilizes. Advisors continue to support the implementation of automated systems that increase accountability of materiel procured and provided to the ANSF with U.S. funds. Although use of the Core-IMS as a logistics automation system continues, the ANSF remain challenged to fully implement Core-IMS across the ANSF. During the reporting period, RS senior advisors focused on strategic level buy-in to the utilization and benefits of the Core-IMS, but tactical implementation remained a challenge. During this reporting period, the MoI demonstrated a renewed commitment to implementing
Core-IMS. Additionally, the ANP improved in closing out in-transit tickets so that the Core-IMS accurately reflects on-hand and in-transit equipment.

There has been some definite improvement in Core-IMS usage for inventory management. As of March 1, 2020, Core-IMS accounts for more than $940 million of items with a value of more than $1.1 billion, an increase of more than 128 million items and $304 million since January 2018. As noted above, during this reporting period, both the MoI and MoD demonstrated a renewed commitment to implementing Core-IMS and the ANP and ANA improved in closing out in-transit tickets so that Core-IMS more accurately reflects on-hand and in-transit equipment and supplies. Unfortunately, this same commitment has not affected the use of the Property Book Module (PBM) or the Military Maintenance Module (M3). The PBM within Core-IMS must be populated and accepted by the Property Book Officer (PBO) in order to utilize the M3 module. MoD has had difficulty in keeping PBOs in place long enough to conduct a 100 percent inventory to upload into the system. Additionally, the PBOs that are stable in their positions often refuse to accept all of the property, due to lack of visibility at the brigade levels. At this time, MoI is not utilizing PBM at any sites.

CSTC-A’s implementation of Core-IMS\(^2\) improved weapon and vehicle accountability at the national warehouse level of the ANDSF. CSTC-A developed and implemented a data-entry process for CSTC-A and ANDSF officials to enter initial data on weapons and vehicles into Core-IMS at the national warehouses when weapons and vehicles arrived in Afghanistan. This data-entry process included the entering and verifying of national stock numbers, serial numbers, vehicle identification numbers, and quantities of weapons and vehicles given to the ANDSF. The data-entry process clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of CSTC-A and the ANDSF for entering and verifying ANDSF weapons and vehicles in Core-IMS. During the CSTC-A data-entry process, CSTC-A and the ANDSF record inventories and receipt dates of weapons and vehicles that arrive in country at the national-level ANDSF warehouses. As in previous reporting periods, human capital, literacy, computer skills, and corruption all challenge integration of Core-IMS at various echelons of the MoD and MoI.

The ANDSF are able to use Core-IMS at all national warehouses and regional depots. However, the ANDSF did not fully implement Core-IMS at their local-level sites. Specifically, even though Core-IMS is available, the ANDSF did not use Core-IMS at 78 of 191 local sites. Consequently, after CSTC-A and ANDSF transferred weapons and vehicles from the regional depots to the local sites, the ANDSF could not maintain visibility using Core-IMS of the weapons and vehicles at the 78 local sites that did not use that system. Ongoing efforts to implement Core-IMS is part of the strategy to improve inventory management and accountability. The system has been established at national and regional supply depots and is

\(^2\)Core-IMS is an internet-based property accountability system that has evolved from a small-scale, off-the-shelf, PC-based tracking tool in 2010 to its current form. Core-IMS capabilities have expanded to allow the MoD and MoI to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to forward supply depots. U.S. materiel purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases populate directly into the Core-IMS through linkages with the SCIP, DoD’s system to track the shipment of equipment from the United States. Core-IMS software is functional at national and regional-levels of the ANDSF. At the national level, the MoD’s Central Supply Depot (CSD) and the MoI’s National Logistics Center (NLC) utilize Core-IMS. Since October 2017, the ANDSF have expanded connectivity of Core-IMS. Today, Core-IMS links to the MoD forward supply depots (FSDs), including the Corps HQs, and the MoI RLCs.
being rolled out to all MoI 34 Provincial Headquarters and 26 brigades within MoD, with requisite training by the end of 2020. During the implementation of Core-IMS at the lower levels, PBM and M3 will also be deployed. Once PBM is implemented and M3 utilized, the visibility issues below the national and regional level will slowly dissipate.

**FMS Life Cycle Management (LCM)**

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) maintains responsibility for receiving and executing title transfer of all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) materiel procured in support of the ANDSF. Most FMS materiel originates from the United States and is shipped into theatre via air or surface depending on the commodity type. During the period from October 2018 through March 2020, the SAO managed $1.68 billion worth of FY 2019 pseudo-FMS cases and $278 million worth of FY 2020 pseudo-FMS cases. SAO oversaw a total of 106 ongoing FY 2019 and FY 2020 cases.

All Class-II OCIE, Class-V (ammunition), Class-VII (weapons), Aircraft, and Class-VIII (pharmaceuticals) arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul (HKIA). Upon receipt of all FMS weapons, ammunition, and aircraft, SAO transfers title to the MoD or MoI at HKIA for integration into the Afghan supply system. OCIE and pharmaceuticals flown into HKIA are transited to nearby SAO-managed FMS Logistics Waypoints. There, items stay in temporary storage, in preparation for future title transfer to the ANDSF. Conversely, all Class-III Packaged POL, Class-VII Major End Items (e.g., vehicles) and Class-IX Repair Parts are shipped and then trucked through Afghanistan and delivered directly to the FMS Logistics Waypoints in Kabul. SAO manages a newly established southern vehicle transfer waypoint in Kandahar and a waypoint near Kabul. The increased efficiency of both waypoints will enhance vehicle distribution to the southern and western ANDSF elements, while facilitating the steady flow of vehicles and parts into and across Afghanistan. The southern waypoints reduce annual transportation costs, reduce vehicle transit time by about 60 days, and minimize the risk of damage during transportation.

Once the SAO delivers and title transfers FMS materiel to the Afghan Government, materiel oversight and life-cycle management turns over to the corresponding coalition requirement owner, with appropriate reach-back support from acquisition program managers in DoD. For example, TAAC-Air maintains oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured aircraft, whereas program managers in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army provide life-cycle management of the fixed-wing and rotary-wing fleets, respectively. CSTC-A’s Operations Sustainment Branch maintains the same oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured weapons, ammunition, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, repair parts, and OCIE, reaching back to program managers in the United States Army to manage the National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support (NMS-GVS) and procurement of tactical vehicles and ammunition.

When ANDSF units are ready to demilitarize FMS materiel at the end of the materiel’s life cycle, the owning units request approval from the corresponding ministry. Upon approval, the

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22 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Sections 1520(d)(2)(D), (F), (G), (H), and (I) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
owning ministry submits a Change of End Use Request (CoEUR) to the SAO, which verifies that
the serial numbers included on the CoEUR correlate to an FMS-procured asset, then approves or
disapproves the CoEUR. After the SAO approves a CoEUR, the ANDSF unit coordinates with
the requirement owner, such as OS or TAAC-Air, to turn in the assets to DLA for
demilitarization. After physically demilitarizing the asset, DLA submits a demilitarization
certificate to the SAO. Finally, SAO updates the corresponding case in the Security Cooperation
Information Portal (SCIP), thus completing the life cycle of the FMS asset. Although equipment
transferred to the Afghan government is not U.S. property, U.S. advisors and personnel continue
to develop the ministries’ logistics and distribution practices to ensure supplies, equipment, and
weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed, employed, and accounted
for by the ANA and ANP in accordance with security assistance policy and law. Core-IMS
serves as the primary tool to maintain property accountability and oversight.

**End-Use Monitoring**

Equipment provided to the ANDSF is subject to end-use monitoring (EUM). In Afghanistan,
DoD administers two types of EUM: routine and enhanced. For non-sensitive equipment
provided to the ANDSF, the SAO conducts routine monitoring in conjunction with other
required security assistance duties. These actions include observations made during interactions
with the ANDSF, visits to defense facilities, and Afghan reporting of on-hand equipment along
with serial numbers of lost or damaged equipment. Enhanced EUM for sensitive articles and
technologies is more intensive and formal. Enhanced EUM includes equipment delivery records
with serial numbers, routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial number, and
quarterly reporting on inventory results. In Afghanistan, night-vision devices (NVD) are the
primary articles requiring enhanced EUM, but additional articles like raid towers and aerostats
also require enhanced EUM. Security conditions and personnel present unique challenges to
SAO’s ability to conduct Enhanced EUM and Routine EUM. TAA Restrictions caused by the
fragile security situation and COVID-19 have degraded the Enhanced EUM site inspection
capability.

Core-IMS, with PBM and M3, will allow improved ANDSF equipment reporting and enhanced
accuracy and accountability of equipment purchased and transferred to the ANDSF. Security
conditions and personnel present unique challenges to SAO’s ability to conduct enhanced EUM,
but SAO continues to meet routine EUM requirements through physical inspections, visits to
maintenance sites, and reliance on United States personnel at the TAACs and TFs.

**Reducing Attrition through Better Care of Soldiers and Police**

Attrition remains problematic within the ANA and ANP and the most significant issue
affecting ANA and ANP efforts to reach full strength. The number of personnel “dropped from
the rolls” (DFR), which occurs when a member has been absent without leave (AWOL) for more
than 30 days, continues to dominate overall attrition statistics. DFR accounted for 66 percent of

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23 Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel dropped from rolls (DFR),
killed in action (KIA), separation, and other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement,
exempted (e.g., AWOL or permanent medical issue), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. The attrition rate is the
current month’s attrition (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength.
ANA and 73 percent of ANP attrition during the reporting period. DFRs occur for a variety of reasons, including poor unit leadership, low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Advisory focus on key reforms, leadership development, pay, and checkpoint reductions have a secondary effect by improving care for soldiers and police and reducing the threat of factors that negatively impact attrition.

**Standardization of Training**

The Unified Training, Education and Doctrine Command (UTEDC) provides “unity of command” and coordinates all efforts related to institutional training and education, as well as efforts in support of training fielded forces, and provides the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and PME institutions. UTEDC achieved full operational capacity (FOC) during this reporting period and enhanced its command and control over its training institutions. The UTEDC staff and subordinate directorates have succeeded in developing basic procedures for effective staff and directorate coordination. The latest UTEDC instructor training, conducted over this winter, provided the RMTT improved instructor capabilities. The UTEDC are continuing synchronization efforts to standardize training and programs of instructions across all Regional Military Training Centers. The UTEDC commander and staff have also begun to foster basic staff and directorate proficiency in logistics, accounting, assurance processes, and procedures. Additionally, they now have independent budgetary authority. This will improve resourcing of critical components of foundational and branch-specific training along with academic endeavors within its specialized institutions.

The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) continues to serve as the premier institutional training facility for the ANDSF in Afghanistan. KMTC saw an increase in overall attendance primarily at Basic Warfare Training (BWT). The branch schools continue to run under capacity because not all recruits from BWT are assigned to advanced training. In addition, the ANA Corps still have difficulty in filling their assigned spaces. TAA efforts focus on increasing utilization rates by the Corps. KMTC continued to struggle with basic facility management issues including issues with power, fuel deliveries, and facilities maintenance. Planned projects such as connection to the city power grid and a new water well will greatly improve the KMTC infrastructure. KMTC has appointed a new commander, and advisors believe they have a reliable partner who will make improvements to KMTC.

**Better MoD and MoI Budget Execution**

The MoD and MoI continue to struggle with budget execution, which averaged a 60 percent execution rate during the last fiscal year. Within the MoD and MoI, the contract award processes through the Requirements Approval Board (RAB) and Procurement Approval Board (PAB) and execution rates remained uneven and the standard procurement process remains slow. Both the MoD and MoI submitted prioritized procurement plans for the new fiscal year. The primary focus areas for resource management advisors are to develop capable and effective senior procurement and finance leaders, improve adherence to existing procurement and financial process and procedures, and continued oversight of ASFF resources.
The Delegation of Authority (DOA) through the MAGs for procurement using ASFF direct contributions down to corps and provincial HQ levels continues to be used by the ANDSF for critical requirements. During the COVID-19 crisis, the MoD and MoI have been able utilize the DOA process to buy much needed supplies. TAA focuses on optimizing the RAB and PAB as control mechanisms; establishing adequate communication and reporting mechanisms to track U.S. and Coalition-funded projects at the National Procurement Agency (NPA); and streamlining requirements planning at the security ministries to increase both throughput and percentage of contracts awarded.

**Improving Processes for Paying Soldier and Police Salaries**

APPS is currently the Human Resources and Payroll System of record for MoD and the HR system of record for MoI. MoI currently utilizes the WEPS system for payroll. The change from a manual paper-based process to the implementation of an APPS electronic-based process presents initial challenges but with the policy, programmatic and technical expertise advisement from CSTC-A, the ministries continue to make significant progress in adopting APPS as a system of record. One of the biggest challenges was the data cleansing and system baselining effort to ensure soldiers and policeman in APPS were biometrically enrolled, slotted in the right position (Tashkil), and eligible for base pay. As part of the incremental approach for the utilization of APPS, APPS planned to manually inform WEPS for the Hamal 1399 (Mar 20 – April 19, 2020) payroll period. Due to COVID-19 lockdown restrictions placed on Afghan's travel and ministry working hours, the Ministry of Interior recommended a three-month delay. The overall end state is for APPS to be the Human Resource System of Records for the Ministry of Interior. The utilization of APPS to inform the payroll process through WEPS will increase the accountability and oversight of LOTFA funds.

Each of the ministries completed their APPS shura during the reporting period, to work through the data cleansing resulting in the removal of “ghost soldiers”, processing personnel through the appropriate workflows, and ensuring APPS reflects an accurate representation of their force.

The MoD and MoI took additional steps to implement APPS, demonstrating continued ministerial-level buy-in and commitment to improved accountability of ANDSF personnel. Both the MoD and MoI improved APPS enrollment and the MOD is paying almost all soldiers utilizing APPS. Imposition of a restriction for FY 2020 that ASFF-funded payroll is provided only to those personnel enrolled in APPS has helped to spur MoD leadership focus on addressing problems that may arise in use of APPS. The small percentage of MoD forces who are not enrolled due to lags in data entry or other glitches are being paid using prior year funds. Technical enhancements to APPS are being implemented to eliminate these exceptions. Based on Afghan reporting, which cannot be independently verified, the MoD has about 3,600 personnel that still need to be enrolled and slotted in APPS and about 179,000 personnel who are entered and thus fully eligible to be paid using FY2020 ASFF. For the MoI there are ~117,000 enrolled but there could be as many as 125,000 on the ground. Their pay is funded primarily by other donor nations, not by ASFF.

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24 Information on APPS addresses Section 1225(b)(8) of the NDAA for FY 2015, which was added by Section 1215 of the NDAA for FY 2017.
Figure 6: ANDSF Pay Process

Figure 7: ANA Pay Process
The next phase of APPS implementation will be the transition of the system to GIRoA sustainment and management. GIRoA must complete the following tasks before CSTC-A transitions this responsibility: 1) the establishment of an APPS program management office, 2) an acquisition strategy to establish a sustainment contract managed by GIRoA; and to 3) demonstrate the ability to operate the system through proficient trained personnel. CSTC-A has successfully transitioned APPS help desk tier 1 support. The ID Card contract for MoI and MoD was completed on Mar 31, 2020. MoI has fully accepted the ID Card system: has administrator rights to the system, signed for all hardware, and signed for all of the documents, source code, technical layout. MoD has not completely accepted the IDC system: full administrator rights are pending due to a delay/issues with the Ministries’ contract to support the effort. The contractors have been fully trained but legally cannot have access rights until contract issues have been resolved. MoD has received all of the hardware but has not signed any documentation showing acceptance. Delivery of source code has been delayed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. The system has been set up for them and is operational, and the documentation has been provided. In addition, the “Training, Transient, Holding, Students” (TTHS) module still requires some technical fixes to be fully operational and eliminate remaining exemptions.

### Improving ANDSF Facilities

Limited local oversight and slow procurement processes limit ANDSF ability to maintain facilities. To address this problem, RS has identified points of need such as the ministries’ execution of their operation and maintenance contracts, connection to the commercial electric grid, and optimizing existing infrastructure rather than seeking new construction.

### 3.4 SECURITY OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

The RS Gender Advisor (GENAD) office assists the MoD and MoI to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and Afghanistan National Action Plan (NAP) 1325 and works to shape and influence the environment to increase women’s meaningful participation in the defense and security sector.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women Peace and Security on October 31, 2000. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. UNSCR 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all UN peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual violence, in situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for Member States and the entities of the UN system.\(^{12}\)

\(^{25}\) Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement in Section 1521(c) of the NDAA for FY 2017.
The RS Gender Office instigated the development of the Gender Integration and Participation Plan of Action (GIPPA) to guide the ANDSF’s implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and the Afghan National Action Plan 1325. The GIPPA focuses on four main efforts: ensuring the respect and security of women in the ANDSF; building women’s capacity in the force; creating and enabling a suitable force structure; and gender perspective in planning and fostering institutional trust.

Women’s participation numbers in the ANDSF have continued to increase slightly in both ministries. As of April 2020, the number of women in the ANA and the ANP was approximately 5,982. The ANP has 5,257 dedicated female positions in Tashkil 1398v1, while Tashkil 1399v1 has 5008 female positions. As of May 2, 2020, 3,346 ANP women were slotted in APPS. A number of females are not slotted yet due to movement, promotion or training workflow holdups. Their matriculation will bring the total number of ANP women up by an additional 100-200. The other 1,996 (ANA/AAF/ASSF) serve in the MoD. Additionally, 29 female cadets are attending the National Military Academy, 42 women are enrolled at the Afghan National Police Academy, 3 women are enrolled in the Master’s Degree Program at the ANP Staff College, and 15 are students at Kabul Medical University. The RS Gender Advisor Office prioritizes setting the conditions for women’s successful integration over simply increasing numbers. The RS Gender Advisor Office measures success through implementation of policies and initiatives that support the participation and integration of women, including enforcing standards of recruitment to prioritize quality over quantity, refining the force structure to support capacity-building and career progression positions for women, and encouraging appropriate workplace behavior such as preventing sexual misconduct and holding perpetrators accountable.

Both ministries continued implementation of recruitment and retention initiatives, including: financial incentives to encourage increased participation; capacity-building programs such as training in: Pashto and Dari literacy, English language, and computing and office skills; and professional development opportunities. These programs are designed to bridge the gap between opportunities typically available to men and women; however, these programs are not without their problems: without strong leadership support and messaging, they can be divisive. For example, financial incentives to attract and retain women in the security sector mean women receive higher salaries than men. Recruitment efforts of women into the ANDSF requires senior leadership in order to achieve Afghanistan’s National Action Plan 1325 goal of five percent females in the security sector.

The Deputy Minister of Interior for Strategy and Policy (DM S&P) and the Assistant Minister of Defense for Personnel and Education (AMOD P&E), the senior-most women in the Ministries of Interior and Defense, remain the strong sources of gender advocacy and integration efforts within the Ministries. Within the MoI, DM S&P is not part of the MoI Gender Directorate and Human Rights chain of command, which was moved in late 2019 from within the MoI Chief of Staff chain of command to under the Directorate of Legal Affairs. Additionally, within the MoD, AMOD P&E is not part of the Human Rights and Gender Integration Directorate. Within the Ministries, implementation of UNSCR 1325 and NAP 1325 requires senior level representation and authority requiring promotion of Gender Directorate positions to levels of AMOD in MoD and DM in MoI.
A large number of facilities have been constructed for women on both ANA and ANP bases, but some continue to be vacant or misused. Misuse occurs because for several reasons, such as changes in security situations that make areas insecure for the employment of women and a lack of ANDSF focus on integrating women in certain areas. Some facilities intended for use by women recently have been used for COVID-19 quarantine of men.

The RS Gender Advisor Office seeks to address the root causes of low female participation in the security sector, such as cultural and societal norms, high levels of illiteracy, and gender-based violence, while recognizing that these are long-term challenges. Key initiatives this reporting period included:

- Identification and alignment of authorized positions within the ANDSF for women.
- Continuation of campaigns by both Ministries to change community perceptions about employment of women in the security sector, including an initiative to serve as an intern for a year at MoD and MoI.
- Aiding both ministries in committing to a long-term plan to enhance women’s literacy, including support for a proposal to establish a girls’ military high school within the grounds of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul.
- Instigation and execution of multiple literacy initiatives – enhancing those skills that can’t be taken away from women.

One of the literacy enhancement programs is the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) Program, which provides training in Dari, Pashtun, and English language literacy, computer use, and administration skills. This program significantly improves opportunities to increase literacy levels and has been approved to expand by eight additional sites and employ an additional eight staff achieving a total of 34 local national teachers and one local national Program Manager. Another program provides 200 ANP members one year of English language or computer literacy training at the Muslim Institute in Kabul. The latest program is to provide an undergraduate education leading to a bachelor’s degree for 200 women in the ANDSF with execution delayed until August 2020. A program currently under development is the provision of an intensive English Language Diploma program achieved in six months rather than the standard 12-18 months. This is designed for a small number of talent-identified women to prepare them for international training abroad, particularly within military training institutions.

Training efforts at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) continue to support women’s participation. In the current class, 29 out of 226 cadets (25 percent) attending the six-month officer training course are female. However, women are less well represented in initial recruit training at the Kabul Military Training Centre (KMTC), and less than two percent of enrollees at the National Military Army Academy (NMAA) four-year undergraduate program are women. The new initiative to establish a network of Gender Field Advisors in conjunction with regional recruiting efforts will support increased opportunities and support for females to join the ANA and be assigned to a location near their home of record.

Current recruitment levels remain mixed across the ANP. Thirty-one students, or less than one percent, of the officer candidates at the Afghan National Police Academy (ANPA) are female. Thus far in 2020, 28 females have graduated from Afghanistan-conducted ANP basic
patrolwomen training – a dedicated female class of 22 students at Recruit Training Center (RTC) Nangarhar, two at RTC Parwan, and four at Central Training Command–Kabul (CTC-K.) Women continued to attend the six-month initial training program conducted in Sivas, Turkey for Patrolwomen, NCOs and Officers; however, this program has now ceased with the March 2020 graduation of 248 out of 250 women. The CTC-K female Police College, built in June 2019, is close to being fully operational and able to be utilized for in-country training as a replacement for Sivas but the facility is running well below capacity due to low numbers of recruits.

During this reporting period, advances in integrating women into the GCPSU and the Ktah Khas Female Tactical Platoon occurred. The Special Police Training Center conducted a non-commissioned officer course for 30 women and a SWAT course for women. The FTP completed professional development training for 30 women, enhancing operational effectiveness. A senior GCPSU officer and GCPSU Gender Director Colonel Nafisa Saba Sahar created a 90-minute documentary entitled “Special Women” highlighting leaders and opportunities for women in the GCPSU. CSTC-A hosted the premiere of the film in February.

The Family Response Units (FRUs) continue to generate interest and support from the international community. FRUs provide support to victims of domestic violence, under-age and forced marriages, sexual abuse, and other crimes covered by the law, “Elimination of Violence Against Women,” and the Afghan Constitution. The support level to FRU offices at the provincial and district levels has increased with assistance from a local Afghan NGO, “HEWAD,” that conducts training seminars to train the police investigators on how to assist survivors of violence. Coordination to equip and furnish all 256 FRU offices throughout the country and execution of the required two week “Investigators Course” for police assigned in FRUs continued. The program to investigate gender based violence, forced marriage, and human trafficking normally struggles due to societal reluctance to report these type of crimes.

**Infrastructure Support for Women in the ANDSF**

As a result of CSTC-A’s review of ANDSF gender-based facilities in mid-2019, CSTC-A revealed that approximately 60 percent of facilities are used as intended, 25 percent were vacant, five percent were misused, and 10 percent were not fully constructed, as reported in the previous report. CSTC-A’s review determined that certain facilities were vacant primarily because ministries did not take action to furnish them, hire childcare workers, or rectify poor security conditions for use by women. CSTC-A provided its assessments to both ministries and continued advising on how to address the shortcomings and best utilize the vacant facilities. Some of the ongoing facility projects for women include Women’s Police Town phases 1 and 2 out of 4 phases funded by other donor nations and other projects related to the addition of female barracks, daycare facilities, and enhancement of facilities such as the provision of changing rooms.

CSTC-A continues to ensure ministry officials are empowered, that there is additional research and planning throughout the procurement process, that the budgeting, approval, and accountability processes are centralized, and that there is a greater focus on developing women’s education and skill level so that they can serve and lead in the ANDSF. DoD will continue to
implement infrastructure enhancement projects for women in the ANDSF and to institutionalize complementary training, awareness, and initiatives that promote the meaningful participation of women in the ANDSF. These projects not only prepare Afghan women for service within the ANDSF, but also ensure appropriate working conditions for women who join the ANDSF. These projects, along with other efforts, are developing an effective, affordable, and sustainable ANDSF. As these development efforts continue, DoD remains committed to the principles of women’s equal participation in the ANDSF.

3.5 ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS ON OBJECTIVES

Figures 8 and 9 present the enumerated elements of the assessment called for in section 1520(d) and key points for each assessment element drawn from more detailed analysis presented elsewhere in this report. As noted in Section 1.1 of this report, consistent with section 1520(d)(4) of the NDAA for FY 2020, DoD shall withhold assistance upon any determination that the Afghan government has made insufficient progress in the noted areas. No such determination of insufficient progress has been made as of the date of this report.

During this reporting period, the Afghan government continued to make progress toward meeting shared security objectives. Nonetheless, DoD is concerned that corruption remains a key vulnerability. DoD will monitor closely whether the Afghan government continues to make significant efforts to counter corruption in its management of U.S.-funded equipment and materiel during the next reporting period. A lack of sufficient progress on this issue alone could trigger a DoD decision to withhold ASFF in the next reporting period.

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26 This section responds to Section 1520(d) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
### Overall Assessment Areas

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<th>Overall Assessment Areas</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
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| Progress of the Afghan Government toward meeting shared security objectives               | • ASSF operations effectively sustained military pressure on the Taliban, thwarted ISIS territorial expansion, and mitigated the threat from high profile attack (HPA) networks.  
• ANDSF provided sufficient security required to conduct a safe and credible Presidential election.  
• No provincial capitals captured and minimal district centers seized by Taliban (improvement from last period).                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Afghan government efforts to manage, employ, and sustain the equipment and inventory provided using FY2019 or FY2020 ASFF. | • Improving areas:  
  – AAF fleet utilization.  
  – Core-IMS inventory management utilization.  
  – National Maintenance Strategy-Ground Vehicle Support share of work performed by ANA and ANP increased relative to contractor support. NMS GVS has graduated 1,024 students in supply or maintenance and 537 ANP personnel in supply or maintenance.  
• Areas requiring long-term advisory support:  
  – Counter-corruption efforts.  
  – MoD and MoI capacity to consistently execute institutional systems and processes.  
  – Sustainment of aviation fleet, which will remain dependent on CLS over the longer term; organic maintenance cadre being built up but will never be able to fully sustain the fleet organically, just as the US military relies on some degree of CLS to sustain its aviation fleet.  
  – Development of Afghan “program managers” to identify aviation and ground fleet support needs; this effort has been stagnant since 2015.  |
**Figure 9: Summary of Assessment of Each Matter Enumerated in Section 1520(d)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Matters Assessed</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
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| (A) The extent to which the Government of Afghanistan has a strategy for, and has taken steps toward, increased accountability and the reduction of corruption within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan. | • Although MoD and MoI continue to implement directives and undertake efforts to address corruption, it is unclear if these are making a significant impact in reducing corruption.  
  • In 2019, the MINDEF signed an Ethics and Military Conduct Policy for all MoD personnel. The policy did not, however, include an enforcement mechanism or specify consequences for failure to comply.  
  • MoI’s Deputy Minister for Security identified the most corrupt checkpoints within the MoI and made arrests and follow on prosecutions of individuals engaging in these activities.  
  • The MoI Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) made more than 100 arrests of corrupt individuals.  
  • These and other initiatives ongoing in both MoD and MoI reflect a commitment to addressing corruption; however, corruption remains a significant threat to the viability of the ANDSF, and these efforts—including a willingness to investigate and prosecute high-level officials—must be continually prioritized by Afghan leadership to ensure sustained improvement. Continued advisory support and pressure on the Afghan government to sustain and enhance counter-corruption efforts will therefore remain necessary for the foreseeable future. |
| (B) The extent to which the capability and capacity of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces have improved as a result of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund investment, including through training, and an articulation of the metrics used to assess such improvements. | • ASSF commando force has nearly doubled as a result of President Ghani’s 2017 “ANDSF Four Year Roadmap;” training was conducted largely using an ASFF-funded contract. This program helped develop an ASSF that has effectively sustained military pressure on the Taliban, thwarted ISIS-K territorial expansion, and mitigated the threat from high profile attack (HPA) networks.  
  • The Afghan Air Force’s fleet of strike aircraft has grown from almost nothing in 2014 to more than 70 currently due to the ASFF-funded aviation modernization program. As a result, the AAF conducts nearly half of all airstrikes, even as U.S. airstrikes has surged over the last year and a half. |
| (C) The extent to which the ANDSF have been able to increase pressure on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan, and other terrorist organizations, including by re-taking territory, defending territory, and disrupting attacks. | • The synchronized military pressure of the combined Afghan-U.S. force supported U.S. diplomatic efforts to negotiate with the Taliban.
• Afghan government maintains control of Kabul, provincial capitals, major population centers, most district centers, and most portions of major ground lines of communications (GLOCs).
• The ANDSF remain capable of maintaining pressure on the TB while a multi-front focus detracts from their ability to address the existential TB threat. As such, the TB threat will continue to drive ANDSF actions and decision-making. The destruction of ISIS within the CJOA was the result of some independent US shaping fires and TB direct actions, without coalition support or a unified TB/GIRoA state, ISIS will regain operational capability. |
| --- | --- |
| (D) Distribution practices of the ANDSF and whether the Afghan Government is ensuring that supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed to, and employed by, security forces charged with fighting the Taliban and other terrorist organizations. | • Successful establishment of the AAF channel flight program. The weekly flights to critical hubs are providing more predictability and the ability to move critical cargo.
• ANA has increasingly conducted convoys as a ground combat operation, which improves effectiveness.
• Ground convoys have remaining challenges moving to southern corps.
• NTB limits convoys to no more than 30 vehicles. |
| (F) The extent to which the Afghan Government has designated the appropriate staff, prioritized the development of relevant processes, and provided or requested the allocation of resources necessary to support a peace and reconciliation process. | • Afghan government finalized its participant list for IAN and made progress on prisoner releases.
• The ONSC has reorganized and optimized their staff to address reconciliation and other governmental issues.
• Ongoing political impasse hinders reconciliation efforts. |
| (G) A description of the ability of the MoD and MoI to manage and account for previously divested equipment, including a description of any vulnerabilities or weaknesses the MoD and MoI and any plan in place to address shortfalls. | • ANDSF use of Core-IMS continued to improve; the MoD and MoI are able to use Core-IMS at all national warehouses and regional depots.
• ANDSF generally still rely on paper records at lowest echelons but are able to transfer records into CORE-IMS over time.
• Corruption remains a vulnerability. Although MoD and MoI IGs have been growing in capability and ministry leaders are emphasizing stewardship, prosecution of allegedly corrupt actors is often hampered. |
(H) A description of any significant irregularities in the divestment of equipment to the ANDSF during the period beginning on May 1, 2019, and ending on May 1, 2020, including any major losses of such equipment or any inability on the part of the ANDSF to account for it.

- ANDSF continue to face challenges with equipment loss as a result of combat operations. MoD has significantly improved its accountability process and reform the Estimated Cost Of Damage (ECOD) procedures in late 2019 including review by its Legal, IG and related departments for investigation per Decree 4.9. The ECOD Form 65-1 for non-recoverable loss is confirmed and signed by a two-star General. Accountability has become a higher priority due to a strong desire to remove lost or battle damaged weapons and equipment off of unit property books, a necessary condition for receiving replacement to bring up to full authorized unit equipment levels.
- CSTC-A/SAO-EUM section works effectively and directly with MOD & MOI Commodity Manager leadership for all equipment EUM and divestment/loss.

(J) The extent to which the Afghan Government is adhering to conditions for receiving assistance established in annual financial commitment letters or any other bilateral agreements with the United States.

- CSTC-A moved away from assessing the 1,300 items contained in the commitment letters of 2019. Assessing so many items became unwieldy, and Commanding General, CSTC-A judged that penalties had little effect and that incentivizing desired outcomes would be more effective.
- CSTC-A now assesses the ANDSF through outcome-based measures that address the capabilities of the ANDSF through its “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities” framework discussed in Section 3.3, which focuses on institutional viability. Where the MoD and MoI demonstrate reliable leadership and the ability to develop and resolve problems, additional support will be allocated. Where they demonstrate an inability to progress, support will be removed.

(K) The extent to which the Government of Afghanistan has made progress in achieving security sector benchmarks as outlined by the United States-Afghan Compact (commonly known as the “Kabul Compact”) and a description of any other documents, plans, or agreements used by the United States to measure security sector progress.

- CSTC-A uses its “Top 10 Challenges and Opportunities” framework to assess effectiveness of its efforts in five priority areas: (1) Generate combat and policing power; (2) TAA Optimization (advise decisive people, places and processes at the “point of need”); (3) Future Force development; (4) Stewardship and Accountability; and (5) Logistic Reform. The Assessment of Progress on Objectives primarily draws from this framework.
- The so-called “Kabul Compact” was not a method to assess progress; instead, it was essentially a list of tasks that the Afghans were expected to do.
Whether doing those tasks resulted in particular objectives or outcomes was not the point of the Compact; in fact, about a year after the Compact was inaugurated, the MoD and MoI largely completed the checklist and it became apparent that doing so did not translate into changes in institutional capacity. Thus, the list of Compact related tasks expanded to more than 1,300, and the impact on outcomes remained ambiguous. Therefore, Commander, CSTC-A stopped using it and initiated his Top 10 framework in early 2019.

Other Section 1520(d) Required Reporting Elements

(E) A description of:

(i) the policy governing the use of ACSAs.

On Nov 15, 2019, the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council issued a memorandum, “Guidance for Acquisition of Equipment and Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services (LSSS) for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF),” specifying that provision of such support in very limited circumstances to the ANDSF should use ASFF authority, with payment transacted using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests using ASFF funds. Normally, however, DoD's Foreign Military Sales processes should be used to ensure proper oversight, accountability, and stewardship of ASFF in transferring LSSS to the ANDSF.

(ii) each ACSA transaction by type, amount, and recipient for the period beginning on October 1, 2018, and ending December 31, 2019.\footnote{See Figure 10 for detailed ACSA transaction report}
Figure 10: ACSA Transactions with the ANDSF, October 1-November 15, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transaction</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Value ($)</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AF-18278-001</td>
<td>Meals</td>
<td>13,044</td>
<td>EVE</td>
<td>ANA 215th Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-18310-003</td>
<td>Meals</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>EVE</td>
<td>ARCENT MRE’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19043-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>29,800</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>209th Corp ANA/TAAC-N HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19071-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>188,654</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>205th Corp G3 Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19115-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>93,654</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>FOB TK Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19189-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>121,689</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>205th Corp G3 Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19196-011/012</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>6,748</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>AAF A-29 Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19197-001/3</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>122,509</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>AAF A-29 Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19197-002/4/6/7/8</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>717,470</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>1st Squadron Special Mission Wing (MEZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19197-005</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>71,064</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>AAF MD-530 Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19238-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>717,470</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>205th Corp G3 Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19238-002</td>
<td>2.75&quot; rockets</td>
<td>139,812</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>GiROA LOJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19253-001</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>71,064</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>FOB SHORAB CSTC-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19266-002</td>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>54,361</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>FOB QALAT CSTC-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19266-003</td>
<td>pallets</td>
<td>28,332</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>Herat ANA CSTC-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19267-001/2/3/4/5/6</td>
<td>pallets</td>
<td>169,992</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>ANA Operation TF-260 CSTC-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19267-007</td>
<td>pallets</td>
<td>23,610</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>ANA Operation TF-260 CSTC-A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19275-001</td>
<td>meals</td>
<td>49,567</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>MoD KANDAHAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19281-001</td>
<td>meals</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>ANA SOTF-A RTT-W Camp Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19294-001</td>
<td>meals</td>
<td>2,464</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>MOD/AAF (GiROA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19356-001</td>
<td>fuel</td>
<td>13,007</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>1st Squadron Special Mission Wing (MEZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF-19365-001</td>
<td>meals</td>
<td>4,205</td>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>ANA SOTF-A RTT-W Camp Arena</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL SALES ($)** 1,851,663  
**TOTAL TRANSACTIONS** 33

(iii) For any transactions from the United States to Afghan military forces, an explanation for why such transaction occurred.

These transactions occurred before the November 2019 policy cited in (i) was issued.
The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD's pillars within the ASSF (ANASOC and the SMW). All relevant security and operations functions executed under the ANA General Staff fall under the direct supervision of Chief of General Staff (CoGS), particularly directing corps Commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. The MoD continues to be able to independently execute missions at an operational- and tactical-level. During this reporting period, the MoD’s ability to conduct strategic level planning improved as well. The CoGS staff has demonstrated the ability to generate their own campaign plan, and make adjustments as the environment changed. Improvements in the ANDSF’s combat ability are primarily the result of having reliable partners in senior leadership positions. On a routine basis, the CoGS has delivered direct and synchronized guidance to the Corps Commanders based on Afghan-driven
intelligence. Although the MoD continues to improve through the leadership of reliable partners, it remains challenged in conducting sustainment activities including maintenance, supply and procurement. The MAG-D will continue to TAA the MoD at the point of need and focus their efforts on processes to institutionalize the force.

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoD completed planning and programming development ahead of Minister of Finance (MoF) timelines and developed next year’s Procurement Plan on schedule. MoD procurement continues to require oversight of procurement plans and execution, with just more than 20 percent of projects awarded this year.

As of May 1, 2020, the MoD executed 65 percent of its current budget, an increase of 45 percent since the last reporting period. During this reporting period, the MoD awarded 2 contracts valued at approximately $5 million, which represents 3 percent of its procurement budget.

The MoD ended its fiscal year 1398 in December 2019. During the fiscal year the MoD awarded contracts totaling $53 million for 51 of 94 approved requirements. In addition, the MoD expended all of the funding provided for soldiers’ salaries and other pay. APPS implementation has allowed CSTC-A to implement checks and balances on soldier pay and to hold the following month’s funding for salary reimbursement to the MoD until it completes the previous month’s payroll process. CSTC-A provides direct contribution of approximately $625 million annually to the Ministry of Finance for ANA salaries and other pay. Monthly payroll reimbursement is about $52 million depending on the exchange rate of Afs/USD28.

Based on the previous fiscal year’s execution, advisors and their Afghan partners are focusing on: prioritization of requirements to ensure the most important requirements are executed within the available funding; development of procurement packages to ensure high quality packages; and communication and ownership of procurement packages during the approval process. The MoD has current fiscal year total budget of approximately $1 billion, of which approximately $725 million is funded by ASFF. The MoD is capable of executing its procurement budget but has room for improvement.

**Personnel Management**

Personnel management remains a challenge for the ANA as it continues to develop merit-based promotion systems and retrain staff on a standardized process for promotion. This starts with annual evaluation forms and promotion recommendation letters that are combined with an annual promotion eligibility report that, beginning this reporting period, can now be pulled directly from APPS. The current process has limited promotion boards and features routine use of extraordinary promotions (e.g., promotion of individual before they have served required time in present grade). Previously, many promotions were reactive (needed to fill a vacancy) instead of proactive (scheduled promotion boards). During the last reporting period, MoD developed a Personnel Management Board, which drafted a Manpower Management Plan designed to set

28 This section responds to Section 1520(e) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
recruiting guidance and identify areas of need. The management plan struggles with proper sloting and placement of the appropriate rank structures into the right positions. Force modeling, continued review of the Personnel Manpower Plan, and more focused career management will better enable the implementation of a merit-based promotion system.

As part of the MoD optimization directed by President Ghani, the MoD sought to identify additional opportunities to civilianize the Ministry workforce. As of May 2, 3,323 civilian positions have been filled representing 51 percent of the current authorization (6,545 as part of the 1399v1 Tashkil). Civilian opportunities increased by 567 from the 1398v4 Tashkil to meet critical requirements. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, recruitment efforts to fill civilian positions have been postponed, resulting in civilianization efforts not being fully implemented. CSTC-A will continue its civilianization TAA efforts in order to assist MoD in identifying and encouraging young and talented civilians to assume leadership roles. Additionally, CSTC-A recommended a change to Inherent Law that would allow military retirement to be paid concurrent with civilian salaries in order to attract and retain experienced and qualified talent.

**Institutional Training**

The KMTC is the foundational military training pillar of the ANA Training and Education Landscape (ANA TEL) and serves as the MoD’s primary facility for Basic Warfare Training (BWT) and advanced combat training, including branch-specific training. As part of TAA optimization, the ANA schools continue to receive revitalized attention as CSTC-A assigned additional coalition advisors with requisite expertise to advise these institutions. The success of KMTC is essential for the institutionalization of the ANA and their ability to train new recruits to fill Tashkil positions in the Army. For this reporting period, KMTC continued to struggle with basic life support functions—including power, water and improvements to infrastructure—to provide quality conditions for ANA soldiers to train. KMTC witnessed a surge in the numbers and frequency of foundational courses; however, branch schools continue to run under capacity because not all recruits from BWT are assigned to advanced training. In addition, the Corps have difficulty in filling their allocated spaces and TAA efforts focused on Corps increasing their utilization rates. In particular, the basic warrior-training component indicated higher rates of trainees and graduates over the same period in 2019. Specifically, during the period from January 1, 2020 to April 1, 2020 basic warrior training graduated more than 5400 trainees over six cycles with an attendance rate average of 900 trainees per class and a graduation rate of 96 percent. In the NCO development component, both the Team Leader Course (TLC) and Master Skills Instructor Course (MSIC) have improved in terms of availability, capacity, and graduation. Due to external limiting factors, courses do not always finish within established times. The majority of course fill rates improved and are now higher than 90 percent.

Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) are decentralized training locations overseen by each Corps Commander. RMTCs offer unit-level collective training opportunities, and the CoGS has directed that RMTCs conduct BWT four times per year. UTEDC has started developing plans to standardize POI for schools across all RMTCs. Conversely, RMTCs suffer from a lack of equipment and inconsistent or substandard curriculum and trainer cadre. Each RMTC has unique operational, manning and leadership conditions. The RMTCs must include a
focus on sustainment and collective training to remain as a viable training location. Training
advisors continued to advise the ANDSF on the need to centralize initial and advanced combat
training at KMTC, and utilize RMTCs for only collective training.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The provision of food, fuel, equipment, ammunition, and maintenance, is essential to ensuring the
ANDSF can complete their missions. The MoD has the logistical capacity to support and supply
the ANA, and maintains robust stockpiles of equipment. However, the MoD struggles at times to
have accurate awareness of its inventory. The ANA continues to make incremental progress with
their supply system. However, the ANA remain challenged with ground distribution of material.
ANA distribution of supplies improved during this period with the AAF channel flight program
providing supplies to ANA corps on a routine basis. These routine flight are providing more
predictability in the ANA supply systems and increasing ability to move critical cargo. During
this reporting period, although CSTC-A continued to work with the SFAB to focus TAA efforts
on synchronizing ground movements with ANA operations, not much improvement was made in
ground distribution. MoD Forward Supply Depots (FSDs), particularly the ANA’s Kandahar
FSD+ continued to grow in capability, and this allows for supplies to be positioned closer to
certain ANDSF southern and western corps. Coordinating with advisors to enhance capabilities of
the NMCC, and NPCC, the SFAB worked to establish FSD+ in Kandahar, working in conjunction
with the southern waypoint, improving distribution to the southern corps because cargo coming
through Pakistan will not have to travel to the CSD in Kabul, but will be able to go directly to
Kandahar for distribution.

The NMS-GVS for ground vehicles improves near-term vehicle maintenance and builds long-term
capacity through formal training and mentoring of ANA personnel in the maintenance and supply-
chain management functions. During this reporting period, the NMS-GVS surge increased
ANDSF capacity and has three major components: 1) increased contact teams and maintenance
monitoring mentoring teams; 2) recovery training; and 3) part distribution by the NMS-GVS
contractor from the northern waypoint to the corps/ regional maintenance sites. The most
noticeable and tangible effect that the surge has had is the number of recovery mechanics trained
and the number of recovery tasks completed by the ANA. For example, the ANA recovered more
than 7,000 vehicles last year for a workshare split of 42 percent. The ANA’s capacity to conduct
organic maintenance has increased as reflected in the increase of total work orders closed.

Option Year 2 of the contract began Aug 31, 2019, and adjusted the workshare for the ANA
from 55 percent to 70 percent. The decrease in workshare split for ANA can be attributed to an
increase of attacks and a ramp up in security operations during September and October months
for the election and other operations. A continuous lack of personnel present for work at the
maintenance facilities and the ANDSF’s inability to conduct logistics operations continue to
hinder the successful attainment of the workshare split set forth by the National Maintenance
Strategy contract. As of February 26, 2020, the ANA average workshare for Option Year 2 is 47
percent and weekly work orders closed averaged 416. Contact teams continue to provide

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29 FSD+ is a forward supply depot that has increased storage capacity and capabilities beyond a typical FSD, however, it does not have the capabilities or capacity of the Central Supply Depot.
expedient maintenance support at remote locations in order to ensure combat power can be restored quickly.

**Figure 12: Percentage of ANA – NMS-GVS Workshare Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Percent Goal for ANA</th>
<th>Actual percent of ANA Workshare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>49.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>49.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>47.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>48.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data as of April 30, 2020

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

ANA corps maintained their focus on operations tied to security around population centers, key terrain, and along lines of communication. The ANA has also demonstrated their proficiency in conducting static security, which was demonstrated in their ability to secure election sites. The TAA focus on reliable partners in the ANA continued to increase their ability to conduct planning at echelon. The MoD made significant improvement in operations centers and associated processes, which allowed Senior MoD leaders to make strategic decisions and provide timely operational guidance to commanders in the field. The MoD still has room for improvement with subordinates and TAA efforts must continue to focus on changing the culture to encourage leaders to allow their subordinates to take disciplined initiative and not wait for guidance before taking necessary actions.

At the ministerial level, the MoD’s ability to maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP) of current operations improved; RS advisors noted that senior leaders within the MoD increasingly empower the AMoDs to think strategically about the long-term structure of the force. The processes and procedures established within the ministry have enabled senior leaders to engage creatively on strategic issues. The National Military Coordination Center (NMCC)\(^{30}\) provides a platform to coordinate and oversee near-term operations and manage the distribution of assets and tasks based on ministerial-level strategic guidance and priorities. The NMCC became more empowered during the reporting period and showed an ability to link ministerial-level strategy with national operational oversight and reduced active engagement of MoD officials in tactical-level decision.

\(^{30}\) The Afghan government has established a national level coordination center for the MOD (NMCC) and MOI (NPCC) modeled after the United States National Military Command Center Concept.
Intelligence

Since July 2019, the ANA Chief of General Staff (CoGS) has stressed the requirement for Corps to integrate organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms into all operations. As a result, Corps Commanders now brief on a daily basis numbers of ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Missions Flown (including results) and number of Wolfhound Radio Direction-Finding Reports processed. In additionally, the GSG2 has created an incentives and rewards program, pitting RAID tower and Aerostat operators against ScanEagle Pilots to see who can produce best tactical effects for their commands. Although many echelons of the ANA are still lacking in overall education on ISR system capabilities, this increased emphasis and healthy competition to prove utilization and effectiveness has increased demand for ISR assets by ground commanders.

The GSG2 has enabled improved information sharing both within the GSG2 and with the Corps and other staff sections, resulting in increased appreciation of ANA G2 tactical analytical products. This higher level of involvement encourages increased discipline and morale for the collectors. Improved targeting efforts also provide tangible results for collectors and analysts and motivate better products while highlighting the need to prevent CIVCAS.

The ANA utilizes a variety of intelligence equipment across Afghanistan, including Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) towers, TiF-25 Precision Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) aerostats, Wolfhounds Radio Direction-Finding system, and ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Systems. The ANA has generated about 70 percent of the required number of ScanEagle pilots to date.

Intelligence Sharing

The National Information Management System (NIMS), the ANDSF platform for intelligence sharing, continues to grow in number of users and applications and in breadth of information. During this reporting period, the ANA passed the 1 million reports mark since the system was introduced, bringing the ANDSF total to more than 2 million reports. Although the MOD, and particularly GS G2, is still the largest user, NIMS use is expanding within MoD, particularly in GS G3 and the Corps. Efforts are underway to use NIMS to develop a COP in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and Corps-level Tactical Operations Centers (TOC). This broadened use of NIMS provides increased access to intelligence products and improved communication vertically and horizontally in the chain of command.

Initiatives to Integrate Women into the ANDSF

The ANA and ANP continue to struggle to recruit, retain, and manage the career progression of women. Units continue to place men in positions reserved for women because there are not enough qualified women to fill the vacant positions. RS and the Ministries continue working to develop policies and refine processes to address the myriad of issues that challenge integration of women into the ANDSF. However, implementation of policies – not development of policies – is the significant weakness in these efforts, while a lack of facilities for female personnel hinders integration of females within the ANDSF.
Women, like men in the ANDSF, suffer from the absence of a clearly defined career progression. As noted during the last reporting period, RS Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoD to develop a career path plan from recruitment to retirement for ANA women. RS Gender Advisors work closely with Human Resource Management Advisors and the MoD to integrate considerations for female personnel into ongoing development of labor management plans and development of career progression opportunities for women within the MoD. Yet very little progress has been achieved for both men and women to date.

**Education and Training**

Additional initiatives to address integration of women include the promotion of development programs, enhanced training, and salary incentives. Women in the ANDSF have access to an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) Program, overseas training programs, childcare provisions, and retention bonuses.

The GOOD Program provides training to the uniformed and civilian members of the ANDSF in Dari and Pashto literacy, English language, computer skills, and office administration. Current GOOD Program training locations number 14 sites within Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar, and a further 8 sites are approved including locations in Helmand. RS works with NGOs in Afghanistan to ensure that efforts to improve women’s literacy are de-conflicted and not duplicative. During this reporting period, 664 women (148 ANP and 516 ANA) attended GOOD Program training, primarily in Kabul at training locations for GCPSU, Kabul Military Hospital, HKIA, MoI HQ, and Camp Scorpion. This training seeks to improve women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects, making them more competitive within the MoD. RS advisors are seeking to expand training locations and enrollment for the GOOD Program.

**Facilities**

During this reporting period, the MoD continues to improve facilities for women. However, they have had very little success with regard to restoring re-purposed facilities to their intended dedicated use for female personnel and utilizing unused facilities. Adequate separate facilities are available in many units, however there is an ongoing requirement for smaller scale facilities such as changing rooms, bathrooms, and childcare centers to facilitate greater integration of women. The major facilities are listed below and there are many smaller scale projects ongoing.

- Camp Shaheen, 209th women’s accommodation facility
- ANCOF changing room and daycare facility
- Camp Zafar daycare facility
- Camp commando (Morehead) female barracks
- Female tactical platoon compound (Camp Taylor)
4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA General Staff (GS) commands and controls all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), and the Afghan Border Force (ABF). In total, the ANA consists of 27 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 4 branch and basic training schools, 6 ANCOF brigades, 7 ABF brigades, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

There are 178,815 MoD personnel slotted in APPS and eligible for pay. CSTC-A reported that from November 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020, the ANA, Afghan Air Force (AAF), and ANA Special Operations Corps (ANASOC) slotted or cleansed 3,457 promotions, 34,805 reassignments, 13,365 initial assignments, and 20,055 separations in APPS. Attrition continues to degrade the force and outpace recruitment and retention. The primary driver of attrition is the large number of soldiers who are DFR for being absent without leave (AWOL) for more than thirty consecutive days. During the reporting period, MoD continued to implement APPS leading to greater accountability, which contributed to an increase in separations and retirements and reliable APPS data. Soldiers leaving the ANA at the end of the contracted service accounts for approximately a quarter of the monthly losses. Combat casualties account for a small percentage of monthly losses and reduced significantly for the reporting period compared to prior periods.

Afghan National Army Structure

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters kandak, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty kandaks. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, 215th Corps, and 217th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries. The ANDSF divided the 209th’s previous sector to incorporate the 217th Corps. The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.
ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF)

The ANA-TF is comprised of locally recruited ANA units intended to serve as a “hold force” in permissive security environments. ANA-TF units exist only where political alignment is achieved, thereby bringing provincial, district, and local leadership into agreement. This accountability serves two purposes: to ensure that local forces are tied to the central government with adequate discipline and oversight; and to assure that the central government is adequately supporting the units with training, supplies, and reinforcements. The three pillars of accountability are the elders of the community, government representatives, and the ANA corps commander. The key purpose of the ANA-TF is to provide political space to GIRoA within strategic districts through effective local security measures. Essentially, the ANA-TF's provision of security enables GIRoA to overmatch insurgent abilities to provide ad-hoc government structures. The ONSC is integral in identifying the districts that are considered politically, socially, or economically important, and providing the guidance and direction to the MoD on the use of the ANA-TF.

There are 105 authorized companies, of which 83 are operational, six are provisional, seven are in training, and nine are planned. The ANA-TF have largely struggled to gain full integration and acceptance from the ANA. Many among the ANA leadership view the ANA-TF as a "sixth finger" and therefore fail to fully integrate the ANA-TF into the organic organizational hierarchy. The rare exception is in ANA 201st Corps, which has largely embraced the ANA-TF, and the program in eastern Afghanistan has thrived under the Corps Commanders’ leadership. As the program grows, the ANA -- due in large part to emphasis from MoD leadership -- is beginning to demonstrate increased integration and acceptance of the program. The recent reassignment of several ANA Corps commanders has led to improved utilization and integration of the ANA-TF into current operations. Based on integration
concerns, COMRS GEN Miller recently placed a hold on expansion to allow time and space for the ANA to focus its institutional viability efforts toward the ANA-TF. Expansion will resume once the ANA senior leadership and subordinate Corps Commands address some of the programmatic and sustainment shortfalls within the ANA-TF. Notably, as the ANA-TF relies on ANA organic sustainment systems, the ANA-TF largely experiences the same challenges as its assigned Corps.

At present, the ANA-TF Coordination Cell manages a network of primarily SFAB advisors who advise at the Brigade and Kandak level throughout all seven Corps and the Capital Division. The most notable contribution of the ANA-TF during this period was in the completion of the counter ISIS campaign in southern Nangarhar. The ANA 201st Corps, assisted and advised by 3d SFAB, combined all ANDSF in southern Nangarhar to pressure and counter ISIS in that area. The ANA-TF was integral in this process by securing districts once they were liberated from ISIS control. The ANA-TF also played a role in the surrender of ISIS fighters and their families, and subsequent reintegration of former fighters into society. The ANA-TF is now active in 63 provinces and is expected to reach 105 Tolays by late Spring 2020.

**Afghan Border Force**

The Afghan Border Force (ABF) consists of six brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. Each Corps maintains command and control (C2) over one ABF brigade in its geographic location (the 209th Corps maintains C2 over two ABF brigades). The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABF also supports ANA operations against insurgents and terrorists.

**Afghan National Civil Order Force**

The Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) consists of seven brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. ANCOF missions include dealing with civil unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. The ANCOF support clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to secure seized terrain. The ANDSF plans to absorb the ANCOF force structure into the ANA over the next two years. The dissolution begins with the 203rd and 215th ANCOF formations. Subsequent ANCOF formation dissolution is being planned with those former ANCOF personnel filling empty Tashkil positions within their respective corps.

**Afghan Air Force**

The AAF is comprised of three flight wings and 18 detachments that provide aerial fires and lift support to ground and special operations forces. The AAF continues to show steady improvement in pilot skill, ground crew proficiency, and air-to-ground integration (AGI). The AAF can independently plan and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief
efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC),\textsuperscript{31} non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions. During this reporting period, the AAF increased synchronization, integration and operations with the Afghan Special Security Forces.

The AAF continued to improve its fighting capabilities over the reporting period, including routine delivery of laser-guided bombs by A-29s as well as Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets by AC-208 Eliminator gunships. The ANSF is confident in the AAF capability and there is an insatiable desire for precision munitions where in some cases conventional munitions could be employed. Advisors continue to note that Afghan crews demonstrated consistent progress in target selection and collateral damage estimation and showed impressive restraint and ability to minimize civilian casualties.

During the reporting period, as prescribed by the AAF Master Training Plan\textsuperscript{32}, the Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC) generated more than 50 additional qualified aircrew (pilots and co-pilots), 40 for UH-60A+ helicopters and ten for C-208 and AC-208 fixed wing aircraft. Among these newly trained aircrew are two female pilots, one of whom is a C-208 pilot and one is an AC-208 pilot, who will be the first AAF female combat attack pilot. Training is conducted both in Afghanistan and third countries using ASFF-funded DoD contractors.

The AAF’s ability to execute routine air operations and to identify and develop its future leaders without advisory support led to a shift from persistent to periodic advising during the reporting period at all echelons. The AAF Commander attends the weekly security meeting with COMRS and the TAAC-Air Commander, considerably increasing and improving synchronization of RS and MoD activities and objectives. During this reporting period, the AAF allocated senior squadron commanders on a rotational basis to the CSAR increasing synchronization across the ANDSF. Although human capital limitations remain a long-term concern, the AAF’s increased recruitment and high retention rates enable it to fill key positions. Growing the maintainer cadre to reduce reliance on contractor logistics support (CLS) remains the AAF’s top challenge.

\textsuperscript{31} MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have transit care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.

\textsuperscript{32} The Master Training Plan is designed to consolidate previously fragmented efforts to develop Afghan aviation maintainer and pilot capability into a single, structured plan with benchmarks and timelines.
Figure 14: Summary of AAF Airframes and Aircrews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Current Inventory</th>
<th>In Country &amp; Available or in Short-term MX</th>
<th>Number of Qualified Aircrew (Pilots and Co-Pilots)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15(^{34})</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17(^{35})</td>
<td>44(^{36})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49(^{37})</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A+</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total\(^{38}\) 174 149 294\(^{39}\)

The AAF has 174 aircraft that DoD and other donor nation funding sustains, of which 149 are in-country and available or in short-term maintenance. Ten A-29s are in the United States in support of Afghan training needs and five MD-530s should arrive in FY2021 to backfill combat losses. The remaining aircraft are in third countries for overhaul or heavy repair. The AAF fleet that DoD has procured include C-208, AC-208, C-130, and A-29 fixed-wing aircraft, and MD-530, Mi-17, and UH-60A+ helicopters.

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33 Numbers represent a snapshot in time and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking (combat operations and training) as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.

34 Fifteen aircraft are in Afghanistan. Ten aircraft are at Moody AFB, Georgia for training utilization.

35 This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. Two were destroyed in August, 2018 because they were at the end of their usable life and overhaul or life extension were deemed infeasible. The current inventory of 46 includes 24 that are in-country and available, 11 that have reached the end of their usable life and are awaiting decisions on overhaul or disposal, four that are in Bulgaria undergoing overhaul, and seven that are undergoing extensive repairs or are awaiting decisions on divestment or disposal.

36 Advising mission ended in June 2019 due to transition to UH-60s.

37 Five MD-530s were delivered in Oct 2019 and are still undergoing inspections.

38 This total does not include several Mi-35 attack helicopters. The United States does not provide any funding or advisory support for these aircraft, which were removed from the authorized fleet in 2015 and replaced by the A-29 Super Tucano Light Attack Support aircraft program. Nonetheless, the Afghan government has continued to attempt to sustain them. DoD has advised Afghan leadership against doing so and to instead focus on the aircraft that DoD has provided as a part of the aviation modernization program.

39 SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
The AAF’s C-130H aircraft provide an intra-theater medium- airlift capability to conduct airlift of personnel and equipment, re-supply, CASEVAC, and return of human remains missions.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields, providing a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements, CASEVAC operations, and wet-wing fuel deliveries to austere locations. C-130Hs transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts. Additionally, the C-130 is the primary mode of transportation for munitions between AAF Wing locations.

In early 2020, the newly appointed Afghan GSG3-Air Director directed a revision of the tasking processes for aerial resupply missions. The subsequent improvements in the mission tasking system assisted the small AAF C-130 fleet to become more effective and efficient. The C-130 fleet monthly average amount of cargo transported rose to 377,000 kg (41.96 percent total cargo) in January and February of 2020. The increase in C-130 operations is significantly improving sustainment for the ANA and ANP. TAAC-Air anticipates continued process improvements for the wider air mobility fleet over the coming year.

There are currently nine Afghan maintenance personnel trained to work on C-130s. The AAF relies on DoD CLS for C-130H logistics and maintenance. Two of the four AAF C-130Hs are currently in depot maintenance outside Afghanistan.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains capabilities for the ANDSF. AAF instructor pilots train new co-pilots and aircraft commanders without advisor support, and integrated airdrop training with other AAF platforms continues to mature and has been employed in combat. There are six C-208s modified to support tactical airdrops with individual payloads of up to 1,200 pounds. C-208s conduct airdrops in contested environments while receiving integrated support from armed AC-208s and MD-530s. C-208 airdrop crews have flown airdrop missions (including three-ship formations) to resupply ANA and ASSF outposts. Although the demand for C-208 airdrop has increased, risks associated with low-altitude daytime drops have limited mission success. The AAF is developing plans to qualify airdrop crews to conduct night airdrop using NVGs to address those risks. The AAF is also focused on improving the processes for requesting airdrops and further developing its organic aircrew training capability.

C-208 AAF maintenance capability is improving. There are 18 level-1 maintainers (four Avionic level-1s are still required); 24 level-2s (three Engine Body and nine Avionics level-2s are still required); and 30 level-3s.
The AC-208 Eliminator aircraft has provided ISR and strike capabilities in support of ANDSF ground and air operations since it was first fielded to the AAF in February 2019 following completion of training in the United States of the first crews. The AC-208 has a C-208 airframe but is equipped with a more powerful engine. The AC-208’s primary capability is to employ precision-guided munitions, in particular the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) modification to the 2.75-inch Hydra rocket. It also is equipped with the MX-15 sensor, which is the most capable in the AAF. The MX-15, along with the APKWS, allows the AC-208 to be an extremely capable armed-ISR platform. The AC-208 also can “buddy lase,” or guide a laser-guided bomb from an A-29, for partnered A-29 missions.

Since inception a year ago, ASFF-funded training efforts have produced 13 out of the 15 aircrews necessary for full operational AAF independence. These aircrews have developed new tactics, techniques and procedures for employment of illumination rockets to support night ANASOC ground operations and have provided integrated ISR and fires in support of day and night SMW helicopter assault force (HAF) operations.
The A-29’s accuracy has increased significantly with precision-guided munitions, and A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs. The first night strike by an AAF A-29 occurred on December 8, 2018, adding a significant capability to the AAF. Since this first night strike, the A-29 has routinely flown night operations in defense of ANDSF forces during periods of darkness.

The AAF A-29 crew has been focusing on single-seat sensor operations with the acquisition of new software. This will eliminate the need for dual cockpit operations allowing for a more realistic attainment of current crew ratios. Afghan instructor pilots will soon be able to train Initial Qualification Training (IQT) students in-country with the transition of IQT from Moody Air Force Base to Afghanistan. The first IQT class conducted entirely outside the United States is projected to start by September 2020. The Afghan A-29 schoolhouse is expected to be fully operational by April 2021 with a total of 25 in-country aircraft. A-29 advisors and contract instructor pilots are currently supplementing the organic instructor cadre to meet the current training needs.

There have been challenges standing up maintenance training in Afghanistan after A-29 maintenance training conducted in the United States. As a result, a new training contract was awarded in February 2020. Training was set to begin in April but has been delayed due to COVID restrictions.
The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

AAF maintainers can perform the majority of Mi-17 routine maintenance but have no ability to perform overhauls, which are required every 2,000 flight hours at a cost of about $6 million. Instead, NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts for limited overhauls accomplished at aviation depots in third countries. These aircraft will be transferred to the Special Mission Wing upon completing overhaul to ensure there is no capability gap pending induction of CH-47 Chinooks into the SMW. The AAF will fly off the remaining hours on the other Mi-17s as they fully complete the transition the rotary wing mission to UH-60s.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close-air attack and aerial escort to the ANSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. The Kandahar Air Wing has three operational MD-530 Scout Weapons Teams (SWT). The AAF has sufficient crews to support 16 operational SWTs.

The AAF’s MD-530s continues to rely on a DoD CLS maintenance as TAAC-A continues to work with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 maintenance students in training to improve organic maintenance capacity. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term and long-term. Although the AAF previously planned to build MD-530 night combat capability with the inclusion of NVG training in early 2019, this effort never formally progressed because the AAF instead focused on developing AC-208 night capabilities. The AAF is, however, now engaged in the requisite planning to begin NVG training for MD-530 pilots.
The UH-60A+ Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter with the ability to operate throughout Afghanistan. The DoD has provided the AAF with mission-configured UH-60As refurbished and upgraded to an A+ variant with the UH-60L model engine. Currently, these helicopters operate out of Kabul and Kandahar Air Fields performing personnel transport, resupply, patient and human remains transfer and other lift missions during both daylight and nighttime conditions utilizing NVGs.

AAF UH-60 pilots receive 15-months of basic rotary wing training followed by a 12-week UH-60 Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT) course in Slovakia. Upon graduation, aircrew attend Mission Qualification Training (MQT) at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, a six-week contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course that graduates pilots as mission-certified "co-pilots." As the AAF begins to develop their initial cadre of instructor (two instructor pilots with two more currently in upgrade training) and evaluator pilots, through contractor-led training courses, they will gain the ability to organically train and certify UH-60 aircraft commanders. The aircraft commander qualification is based on ability and experience not time. The AAF will utilize mission and training flight experience and local in-squadron training to achieve this goal.

UH-60 AAF maintenance capability is progressing, and the first 55 Aircraft Maintenance Training (AMT) and AMDC students graduated in March. In order to be fully capable the AAF requires 57 level-1, 143 level-2, and 86 level-3 UH-60 maintainers.
Sustainment

The AAF relies largely on CLS to ensure the sustainability of its fleet and will remain so for several years. With the exception of the Mi-17, for which the AAF conducts nearly 95 percent of flight line maintenance, CLS remains critical to platform sustainment; the AAF and SMW are, for example, completely reliant on CLS for parts supply and for engineering and technical support.40

Similar to aircrew production, AMDC continued to build an organic and sustainable maintenance pipeline capable of generating enough maintainers to meet the needs of their fleet. As more maintainers become fully trained, CLS contractors will begin to transition maintenance tasks to the AAF but retain an oversight role to ensure work is performed properly. Once CLS and TAAC-Air have validated that there are enough Afghan maintainers to perform specific maintenance tasks, they will begin assume full responsibility for those tasks, and TAAC-Air will remove that maintenance task from the CLS contract. The AAF, like any modern air force, will always require some level of long-term contractor support, but is it on a path to independent operations for the day-to-day generation of operations. Subsequent experience level upgrades will continue through the AMDC structure, eventually supporting independent and sustainable levels of maintainers for the AAF aircraft fleets with less reliance on CLS.

Commander, AAF has highlighted Afghan Maintenance as one of his primary concerns that is impeding their overall sustainment efforts. He has identified three primary challenges facing the AAF maintenance enterprise: 1) accountability, 2) standardized procedures, and 3) leadership. COM AAF has instituted a Procedure Improvement Plan (PIP) with the assistance of TAAC-Air advisors to build procedures, accountability, and leadership into the AAF maintenance enterprise. Building sustainability into this enterprise will take several months, but is a high interest item for TAAC-Air and the AAF.

**Figure 15: Percentage of AAF Organic Maintenance and CLS Maintenance**41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Percent Organic</th>
<th>Percent CLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mi-17 data does not include heavy repair or overhauls since the MoD does not possess the organic capability required to accomplish that level maintenance.

40 The AAF and SMW are unable to perform overhauls that are required every 2,000 flight hours; instead, overhauls are performed using NATO Support and Procurement Agency-contracted depots in Europe.
41 Organic maintenance data are general averages due to fluctuations in OPTEMPO, phased maintenance, and the degree of maintenance needs.
**Operations**

The AAF supports various stakeholders within the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the National Directorate of Security (NDS), and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) to include the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP). These customers each have their own competing time-sensitive targeting demands, which in the past often led to inefficient AAF operational planning and both ineffective airstrikes and ISR operations.

Ultimately, strategic intelligence informs decision making with respect to strategic priorities amongst the MoD, NDS, and MoI. These priorities drive the Chief of the General Staff’s (CoGS) Operational Design, which guides the GSG3’s ground scheme of maneuver (GSoM). The GSoM informs COM AAF’s weekly priorities. Due to this strategic alignment, the AAF is now able to provide a weekly Force Offering based on daily asset availability (i.e. A-29, AC-208, and MD-530), maintenance status (i.e. mission capable), asset locations, numbers of current and qualified crews, munitions and fuel availability, weather impacts and threats to air operations. The AAF priorities are then combined with the Force Offering to establish a strategic apportionment in support of the various stakeholders, and the apportionment serves as foundation for operational-level asset allocations.

Consequently, the MoD is better able to balance the needs of all strategic partners and establish a unified priority scheme. All echelons of command must adhere to these priorities to establish apportionment for credible planning and asset allocation for effective mission execution across the ANDSF.

**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)**

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) is a corps-level component of the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANASOC conducts precision short-duration, military special operations beyond the range, scope and capability of conventional ANA units across Afghanistan. Consequently, when properly resourced and employed, it sits at the forefront of ANA capability in securing national sovereignty and countering terrorist groups seeking to exploit under-governed and ill-governed spaces within Afghanistan. Positioned at key locations across the country, ANASOC units are the Ministry of Defense (MoD) arm of a cross-security pillar apparatus responsible for the upstream disruption of, and reaction to, a range of violent terrorist and insurgent actors. ANASOC Liaison Officers embedded within the CSAR and RTTs coordinate future operations planning and deliberate targeting efforts with other Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) elements and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) pillars to support these disruption and response efforts.

ANASOC consists of four Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and a National Mission Brigade (NMB). Ten battalion-sized ANA Commando Special Operations Kandaks (SOK), six Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSKs), two Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSKs), and seven support elements are spread across the corps. The MSKs and CSKs are equipped with three variants of the Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV), a vehicle based on the U.S. M1117 Armored Security Vehicle.
MSFs are armored, mine-resistant, four-wheeled fighting vehicles equipped with a variety of heavy weapons that provide a mounted combat mobility capability. The MSKs were previously trained in conventional mounted infantry tactics and assigned to the ANA Corps. In early 2017, the MSKs were reassigned to ANASOC to begin transition into CSKs. MSK personnel are required to attend the Commando Qualification Course (CDOQC) followed by the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) to successfully complete the conversion process into CSKs and ensure proper integration into ANASOC. This conversion process began in August 2017. To date, only two MSKs have completed conversion training.

**Special Operations Kandaks (SOK)**

The primary ANASOC tactical force element is the SOK. SOKs conduct special operations tasks against insurgent networks to support regional ANA Corps’ counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. They provide a response capability against terrorist and insurgent threats and can forward-deploy mission command packages in support of planned offensive and contingency operations. All 10 SOKs, both CSKs, and the six MSKs support regional special operations brigades (SOBs) and have the ability to complement the ANA Corps’ conventional response, using ciphers to guide complementary actions. The 6th SOK, assigned to the NMB and located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s National Mission Unit.

**MSK and CSK**

MSKs and CSKs utilize combined arms maneuver providing a rapidly deployable strike capability delivering mobile precision lethality and the ability to quickly respond to emerging crises. MSKs were originally designed to provide the ANA with a quick reaction force capability optimized for daylight hours. The CSKs address a capability gap associated with MSKs by employing a combination of mounted and dismounted combat maneuver tactics to conduct patrols and engage in urban warfare. CSKs can also operate at night with sophisticated night vision equipment mounted on their MSFVs to enhance combat effectiveness. The CSK capability enhances ANASOC’s firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield.

**National Mission Brigade**

The NMB provides the President of Afghanistan and the MoD with rapidly deployable special operations force capability to conduct short-notice, nation-wide direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, and COIN tasks. The NMB has a deployable mission-command package, including the 6th SOK, Ktah Khas (KKA), and two Special Forces (SF) Kandaks. The NMB routinely integrates a range of ANDSF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities into its mission profiles. Within the ANA, this ability to plan, coordinate, and integrate a range of tactical enablers into tactical operations is unique. Ministry of Interior (MoI) and National Directorate of Security (NDS) Liaison Officers serve in the NMB Headquarters (HQ) to coordinate resourcing of special operations missions between the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Special Mission Wing (SMW) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) provide priority ISR over-watch and strike support to the NMB. During this fighting season, the NMB has 50 percent of their assigned strength on duty. The NMB maintains an offensive
posture and high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to exert pressure on the Taliban and other terrorist threats. As a result, the NMB has a dysfunctional Operational Readiness Cycle (ORC). Notwithstanding, it has managed to generate prepared force packages when and where required.

**Special Forces Kandaks (SFK)**

SFKs are the ANASOC’s premier small team special operations capability. SFKs engage with security personnel across the ANDSF and the civilian population. SFK units also maintain regional expertise to support SOBs and can operate anywhere within the nation supporting mission requirements directed by the MoD.

**Ktah Khas (KKA)**

The KKA is a light infantry special operations kandak assigned to ANASOC’s NMB. The KKA is comprised of eight companies that remain nearly at full strength: three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the KKA training cycle and operations, including transportation for the KKA strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and the supporting female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. KKA platoons and companies conduct intelligence-led direct action assaults against high-value individuals. The KKA is also able to conduct vehicle interdictions utilizing ground and air mobility platforms. KKAs are not subject to the same misuse as the rest of the ASSF forces.

**General Support Kandaks (GSK)**

GSKs conduct emergency resupply and facilitate delivery of special operations forces (SOF)-specific equipment and supplies to ANASOC units based within Kabul. ANASOC’s suite of capabilities expands government options beyond those offered by the conventional ANA, supporting the government’s ability to neutralize a threat early before local forces are overwhelmed, reinforce ANA conventional force success, and rapidly reinforce the defense of key terrain, including provincial and district centers.

**Recent Trends**

ANASOC growth is meeting planned milestones, contributing to increased combat availability and force utilization. This increased OPTEMPO has directly impacted the ORC and integrity of ANASOC units. ANASOC endures, at times, a lack of consistent training and understanding of tactics, techniques, and procedures. ANASOC leadership has worked with MoD to reverse this trend over the last several months.

The ANASOC Corps Headquarters is the sole proponent for all ANASOC programs, policies, and procedures within the MoD and internally to ANASOC. Coalition advisors continue to utilize Concepts of Employment (COE) developed last reporting period to guide ANASOC Commanders and corps staff in the employment of ANASOC units in accordance with authorized roles and tasks. The Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) is responsible for the
ciphering of all ANASOC elements through the ANASOC Corps Commander. The resourcing, planning, and executing authority remains at the ANASOC Corps Command level and may be retained or delegated to subordinate ANASOC headquarters. The ANASOC Corps Commander is responsible for assessing if an assigned task or mission is consistent with the mandated roles and task of the corps and can be accommodated within the ORC. ANASOC capabilities are dependent on the preservation of the ORC, which specifically provides time for required maintenance, refit, and rest. Despite the measures described above, ANASOC misuse increased slightly during the reporting period.

NSOCC-A’s ANASOC Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) maintains a TAA relationship that, among other tasks, supports the ANASOC Corps Commander and subordinate Kandak Commanders to manage the competitive tension between the demand for operational support and the requirement to maintain programmed ORC downtime. NSOCC-A Advisors do this by determining the validity of ciphers and adjusting the level of Coalition support provided based on appropriateness of force employment and the assessed operational imperative.

Training

The ANASOC School of Excellence (SOE) trains and develops newly recruited ANASOC Commandos and SF leaders. Nearly half of ANASOC recruits have prior experience within the ANDSF. This experience typically translates into a higher success rate than that amongst recruits drawn directly from initial training at KMTC and other RMTCs. The SOE qualifies selected recruits through the 14-week CDOQC. The SOE delivers specialized training in communications, engineering, mortar, sniper, and combat first aid. Leadership and advanced skills training is also delivered by the SOE and includes courses in English, officer/NCO leadership, and advanced courses such as master driver and advanced special forces medical skills.

The Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) trains Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSKs), following successful completion of CDOQC, to become Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSKs). CSMC is a 12-week advanced course that covers topics like dismounted infantry collective training, vehicle commander training, gunnery skills training, Mobile Strike Fighting Vehicle (MSFV) platoon collective training, and battalion senior leader and staff training. High demand for maneuver strike capabilities affects ANASOC’s ability to place remaining MSKs into the CSMC. Once all MSKs are converted into CSKs, ANASOC will transition the CSMC to a platform for currency training. This transition was scheduled to occur by the fall of 2020. However, training restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and other current events mean the date of transition has been delayed. ANASOC and NSOCC-A Advisors are working to identify a new schedule.

The SOE also employs mobile training teams (MTT) to conduct on-site training and refresher courses for deployed SOKs, MSKs, and CSKs. MTTs provide tailored training at the request of the ANASOC units.

The Afghan Female Tactical Platoon (FTP) is an all-female Afghan Special Operations unit within the ANA and ANP that enables Afghan Special Operations units in missions across the
country. U.S. Army Cultural Support Team (CST) members train FTPs in search and tactical questioning techniques, first responder medical procedures, basic and advanced rifle marksmanship, communications, and land navigation. New FTPs are assessed several times annually and are consistently trained while assigned to the program in order to maintain proficiency and expertise. FTPs are also provided the opportunity to assess into staff and leadership roles within the ANA and ANP.

RS refocused ANASOC TAA on building combat power, achieving unity of effort across the wider security pillars, leadership development and processes to ensure institutional viability of the ASSF. RS TAA efforts and changes were made during this reporting period to improve the force generation model for ANASOC and other ASSF elements. The current operational design model and implementation of RTTs to complement the CSAR has increased effectiveness of ANASOC and improved synchronization across Afghanistan.

**Sustainment**

Sustainment is a critical issue underwriting ANASOC’s capability. Without a capable sustainment system, the ORC of ANASOC units is undermined reducing unit operational capability. ANASOC units routinely report sustainment concerns. Although many of these concerns can be attributed to shortfalls in what is a maturing ANDSF sustainment system, ultimate responsibility rests with the individual units through inadequate logistic planning. ANASOC’s organic logistical support extends for 72 hours when Commandos deploy in support of conventional ANA forces, after which the unit or company should return for refit and resupply. In cases where the ANASOC deploys beyond that timeframe, units rely on logistical support from the ANA corps and MoD for rations, OCIE, and ammunition. This logistical dependency upon the ANA corps subjects the ANASOC to ANA competing priorities, long logistics trains, and inconsistent ANA corps support. This compounds the effects of misuse. During this reporting period, efforts were made to address this problem by adding sustainment positions to the ANASOC Tashkil to improve logistic capability gaps and self-sufficiency.

**Special Mission Wing (SMW)**

The Special Mission Wing (SMW) is the Afghan Special Security Force’s (ASSF) aviation unit. It conducts special operations aviation missions that require precision, skills, complex coordination, and capabilities not found in the conventional Afghan Air Force (AAF). SMW is the only night-capable rotary wing assault unit capable of conducting multi-ship HAF support for the ASSF. The SMW also provides precision airborne ISR through its PC-12 fixed wing platform.

SMW’s structure consists of four rotary wing Mi-17 assault squadrons and one fixed wing PC-12 ISR squadron capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. Two rotary-wing assault squadrons are based in Kabul with the other two located at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and Mazar-e Sharif (MeS). The PC-12 squadron is headquartered in Kabul with smaller detachments operating out of KAF and MeS. The PC-12 ISR squadron provides ASSF with operational reach across the country while integrating with the AAF to provide real-time
intelligence to its A-29 light attack aircraft. This structure remains unchanged from the previous reporting period.

The NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) SMW Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) maintains a Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) relationship focused on facilitating the proper employment of the SMW. As a result, the SOAG assists with screening the validity of ciphers (formally tasked missions), concurs with the utilization of the SMW for various missions, and augments the level of Coalition support depending on type of mission (unilateral versus bilateral).

**SMW Operations**

The SMW conducts day and night infiltration and exfiltration of special operations forces into permissive and contested Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ) throughout Afghanistan. Prior to the implementation of the Reduction in Violence (RIV), the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, and COVID-19 restrictions, the SMW had increased its HAF missions by 90 percent while increasing the average assault count from 10 to 19 assaults per month. These missions typically support ASSF counter terrorism (CT) and counter narcotics (CN) operations designed to disrupt terrorist networks and deny narcotics funding sources. SMW Advisors applied concentrated effort to reinforce the institutional viability of the wing, promoting the adoption of operational procedures and references to support mitigation of inherently dangerous flight operations. Additionally, Advisors renewed their emphasis on individual and collective training conducted both independently and jointly with ASSF ground forces and the AAF.

During this reporting period, the SMW sustained a unilateral execution rate of 80 percent, mirroring the previous reporting period. However, following the U.S.-Taliban Joint Declaration, unilateral execution increased to 100 percent. These operations included HAF, A-29 strike support, CASEVAC, resupply, unit personnel rotation, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), ISR, over-watch, QRF employment, and unit staging. Collectively, 10 percent of these missions were in support of CN operations and 90 percent were in support of CT missions. There is often a significant overlap between the CT and CN mission sets. Additionally, during this reporting period the SMW achieved full operational capability for the Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System (FRIES) for the Mi-17, expanding the unit’s capabilities.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, force generation, training pipelines, and operational support functions have been paused until face-to-face TAA restrictions are lifted. Despite these pauses, the SMW has developed COVID-19 CASEVAC TTPs and implemented aircraft and personnel decontamination procedures. An Afghan-independent flight operations center was created and co-located with Special Operations Advisory Team – Central (SOAT-C) in Kabul to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while increasing the Afghan scope of control and responsibility. Operationally, the SMW has increased its HAF operational integration with the AAF.
SMW Misuse

The SMW Concept of Employment (CoE) tasks SMW with:

- Precision insertion and extraction of forces into contested or permissive HLZs, primarily at night using Night Vision Devices (NVDs)
- CASEVAC support to the HAF ground elements
- QRF support to ASSF HAF/GAF (Ground Assault Force) missions
- Aerial reconnaissance utilizing the PC-12 in support of ASSF operations
- ASSF Personnel Recovery Operations
- Expeditionary operations in support of ASSF.

Missions outside the CoE are considered misuse. The most prevalent misuse involves CASEVAC, personnel movements, and resupply general support missions. In this reporting period, misuse of the SMW has remained consistent with previous reporting period levels. These missions often fall into one of three categories: 1) general support for ASSF units (SMW supports the appropriate dependency but performs an inappropriate mission); 2) general support missions for non-ASSF units (inappropriate dependency and inappropriate mission); and 3) gross misuse (utilizing SMW assets for missions that would not qualify as general support). Gross misuse makes up less than 1 percent of SMW missions.

The SMW is making incremental improvements to mitigate misuse. The Afghan Joint Special Operations Coordination Center (JSOCC) Joint Air Command and Control Cell (JAC3) meets twice a week to review and prioritize ASSF missions in order to allocate resources in support of the SMW and AAF. However, the success of the process relies on the cooperation of Afghan leadership at all levels and between all entities, which requires a cultural shift across the MoD and MoI, which is slowly occurring.

SMW Modernization

During this reporting period, the Secretary of Defense approved plans to field 20 CH-47 Chinook helicopters to replace its Mi-17 fleet by the end of CY 2023 and end their reliance on Russian-made helicopters.
The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft, depicted above, to conduct ISR in support of day and night CT and CN operations, including over-watch of ASSF ground assault forces and HAF raids. In addition, the PC-12 integrates with AAF A-29 aircraft in support of strike operations, providing target identification, collateral damage scans, and post engagement battle damage assessment.

PC-12 ISR capabilities continued to mature during this reporting period. PC-12 aircraft provide the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station within its line of sight and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. Additionally, the SMW is upgrading to a new five-bladed propeller. The newly acquired Hartzell five-bladed composite propeller demonstrated a significant reduction in the noise level detected by a surface observer. This allows PC-12 crews to fly strategic ISR missions at lower altitudes with reduced risk of audible detection and acquisition by ground threats. Eight upgraded systems have been installed with the remaining ten scheduled for installation within the year.

The SMW SOAG is currently in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case-building phase to acquire an improved sensor, the MX-15. The SAFFIRE III Sensor currently installed on the PC-12 is unable to observe ground targets effectively from altitudes higher than 10,000 feet above ground level. Pairing the new MX-15 sensor with the five-bladed propeller will give the SMW PC-12 a significant increase in capability to observe targets with exponentially greater image clarity while reducing enemy detection of the aircraft during ISR missions.
**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The SMW Mi-17s conduct day and NVG air assault (AASLT) CN and CT operations. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions (including Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System and Aerial Sniper Platform), and personnel movement.

**SMW Training**

The SMW utilizes the AAF training pipeline for force generation of aircrews and maintainers. The initial individual training process is identical for the AAF and SMW except that the SMW conducts a more thorough CI vetting process for selected Soldiers completed during English Language Training (ELT), prior to Initial Entry Rotor Wing (IERW) training.

After candidates completed their respective pilot, non-rated aircrew, or maintainer pipeline at the AAF, they arrive at the SMW for instruction by training support service (TSS) contractors. TSS training includes Readiness Level (RL) progressions on advanced special operations aviation mission tasks such as NVG training, multi-ship dust landings, rooftop landings, and fast rope insertion training.

Additionally, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) provides numerous training and mentorship services to the SMW in a variety of areas including maintenance, English Language Training (ELT), and aircrew flight training. SMW personnel are required to attend English classes for improvement in conversational, aviation, and technical maintenance English vocabulary. Aircrew and maintenance training is conducted at all unit locations utilizing CLS support and Training Support Services (TSS) for both the PC-12 and Mi-17 platforms.

**Sustainment**

SMW’s proficiency in sustaining its Mi-17 fleet regressed during this reporting period. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, approximately 65 percent of overall Mi-17 maintenance and 90 percent of scheduled maintenance (routine maintenance based on the hours flown), was conducted by Afghan SMW personnel. Following the COVID-19 outbreak and restriction on face-to-face TAA, CLS began to conduct 100 percent of Mi-17 aircraft maintenance to ensure aircraft met U.S. airworthiness standards. Upon approval to resume TAA, the unit will require additional focus on CLS mentoring with an emphasis on troubleshooting and other complex maintenance tasks.

Approximately 30 maintainers were active in formal training classes ranging from level-3 (lowest) to level-1 (highest) mechanics to perform specialized procedures such as Non-Destruction Inspection (NDI). CLS remains the enduring airworthiness authority for all platforms during this period and is critically important in developing Afghan maintainers towards eventual independence as COVID-19 restrictions relax.

PC-12 engineers at the U.S. based program management office shifted the phase maintenance cycle from a 100-hour inspection to a 300-hour inspection interval to increase operational availability. This change required CLS to re-learn the new 300-hour maintenance procedures
before they could teach them to the Afghans. When the Afghan’s resume maintenance, their PC-
12 maintainers will initially conduct approximately 60 percent of maintenance. They should
rapidly progress to performing 90 percent of PC-12 maintenance within a quarter.

SMW Advisors have begun to implement measures to ensure SMW has sufficient numbers of
trained maintainers to field UH-60s and CH-47s. Maintainers require 12 months of training
before they are able to integrate into daily flight line maintenance. The Tashkil (authorized
manning) currently provides sufficient maintainer billets, but initiatives to produce fully trained
personnel to fill the positions have only been marginally successful. As a result, the SMW has
reserved additional designated training slots in the AAF maintenance training pipeline for their
personnel. UH-60 and CH-47 maintenance will be 100 percent CLS until organic SMW
maintainers are able to begin filling those roles.
5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

During the reporting period, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) continued to focus strategically on its future role in a stabilized security environment. Specifically, the MoI started conducting an evidence-based assessment to understand how it should be arranged and equipped in an environment of a political settlement. The MoI subsequently continued planning for transition from a paramilitary security force to a more traditional police force that focuses on “community policing” and rule of law. Included in these efforts is the reduction of the most dangerous checkpoints and re-evaluation of the training pipeline and training curriculum. Specifically, the MoI reviewed the curriculum of initial entry police training for officers and patrolmen to and revised it to reflect a civil law enforcement and community policing emphasis.

The MoI also underwent efforts to improve public perceptions and expectations of police officers. Several anti-corruption efforts were launched in the MoI during this reporting period to reduce corruption at checkpoints and prosecute personnel through the efforts of the Major Crimes Task Force. RS advisory efforts focused on ensuring the MoI and Afghan National Police are institutionally viable and prepared to implement this transition when the security and

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Information in this section responds to Section 1520(d)(2)(B) of the NDAA for FY 2020.
the political environment allows. The security environment during the reporting period did not allow the MoI to transition from its focus as a paramilitary security focus to a force focused on “community policing.”

During this reporting period, the First Deputy Minister replaced the Deputy Minister for Security and several Provincial Chiefs of Police were replaced in an effort to improve effectiveness of the force.

**Resource Management and Procurement (RM)**

For the fiscal year ending December 2019, the MoI awarded contracts totaling approximately $53 million for 40 of the 82 approved requirements. Based on the previous fiscal year’s execution, advisors are focusing with their Afghan partners on prioritization of requirements to ensure the most important requirements are executed within the available funding, development of procurement packages to ensure high quality packages, and communication and ownership of procurement packages as they go through the approval process. The MoI is capable of executing its procurement budget with room for improvement.

The MoI has a current fiscal year total budget of approximately $700 million, of which approximately $140 million is funded by ASFF and approximately $360 million is provided by the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan. As of March 13, 2020, the MoI approved nearly 35 percent of procurement requirements for the year. It continues to develop the procurement packages so contracts can be awarded.

**Personnel Management**

The MoI lacks a refined human resource and career management capability. The majority of the MoI’s personnel management activities for this reporting period consisted of enrolling and slotting ANP personnel in the APPS system. The MoI made significant steps in APPS enrollment during the reporting period and efforts were made to utilize APPS data for verification of personnel to pay in WEPS. Maintaining a clear picture of the ANP force size and ensuring police are paid is a fundamental service that the MoI must accomplish before it can develop additional human resource management tools. The MoI continues to struggle with an inadequate promotion process and an ambiguous career path structure. A functional performance appraisal system to support the promotion process does not exist. Instead, the ministry relies on the High Oversight Board (HOB) and advisory assistance to standardize promotion.

One element of MoI optimization is to “civilianize” part of its workforce, emphasize strong civilian leadership, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MISP and MoI optimization efforts. The MoI civil servant Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) programs were designed to integrate specialized civilian talent to manage critical ministerial programs and build Afghan civilian

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capacity within the ministry. The MoI has been unable or unwilling to leverage the SME program to continue to civilianize positions and attract new recruits. To date, the MoI remains reliant on the international community to fund and maintain this program.

The MoI assesses that headquarters organizations are bloated while operational units have insufficient personnel, and is working to optimize its structure through the Tashkil review process. Consequently, the MoI has a goal of 30 percent reduction of its headquarters personnel and plans to move these positions and personnel to operational police departments. In August 2019, the MoI Force Management Directorate identified approximately 800 positions for optimization. The First Deputy Minister directed the Deputy Minister for Personnel and Training to identify up to 3,000 positions for optimization in the Kabul headquarters organization. Advisors reviewed and provided feedback to this list in September 2019, and will continue to work with the ministry on optimizing its personnel.

The process of civilianization has stalled due to competing demands (operations, elections, and counter-corruption). The last successful civilianization efforts occurred in the MoI’s finance and procurement sections.

**Institutional Training**

The MoI lacks an institutional training arena that reinforces community policing and lacks training to create a professional cadre of police. Initiatives like the MoD’s UTEDC are notably absent within the MoI and, furthermore, the MoI lacks human resource expertise and career management. Over time, the Coalition has refocused efforts away from combat training for the ANP and towards community policing. Advisors will continue to focus at the ministerial level to assist the MoI as it transitions its force to become professional police focused on community engagement and rule of law.

The ANP recruit locally at each of the 34 Provincial Recruiting Stations and sends new recruits to one of the 10 Regional Training Centers (RTC) for police training. Police training generally consists of an 8-week training course and efforts were made during the reporting period to standardize the curriculum. Officer training for direct entry college graduates continued and the training is a one-year program. Beyond early training, the ANP still lacks an institutionalized leadership development program at the district and local level. Furthermore, mid-level ANP leaders lack leadership development opportunities.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

Similar to last reporting period, the MoI maintains a robust amount of supplies, but struggles to execute distribution processes. The MoI improved ground distribution and was successful in operating smaller convoys at the national level to the regional logistic centers. Smaller convoy sizes allowed a more agile movement force. MAG-I advisors are teaching and coaching supply chain managers in developing and coordinating supply and distribution planning, including using air and ground modes of delivery.
Supply and distribution planning and management is not well understood below the strategic level. This is further impeded by low levels of education and literacy at the operational and tactical levels. Items are not well tracked and visibility of items required is not readily available throughout the supply chain. Process mapping is ongoing to ensure basic processes can be understood and implemented at all levels. Ongoing efforts to implement Core-IMS will help improve inventory management and accountability. Core-IMS has been rolled out to all 34 Provincial Headquarters with requisite training expected to be completed by the end of 2020.

Through the Top 10, CSTC-A provided TAA on the decisive processes that would help improve the MoI’s logistics, but inadequate convoy security for logistics re-supply, lack of trained logisticians capable of understanding and correlating warehouse inventory with automated systems, poor retention of qualified logistics specialists, and inaccurate consumption reporting of commodities represent persistent roadblocks to ANP logistics maturity. The ANP’s lack of supply chain management and poor coordination and distribution of parts have direct impacts on equipment maintenance and the ANP’s ability to supply and sustain its forces properly.

The NMS-GVS continues to enable the progressive transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANP. As per the contract agreement, Option Year (OY) 2 began August 31, 2019; this transition entails a workshare increase for the ANP from 10 percent to 25 percent. The ANP’s past performance exceeded the required goal of 10 percent during the first year and, as of March 1, 2020, its workshare was 22 percent, below the current goal of 25 percent. This is partially due to the state of supply chain and lack of spare parts and tools to conduct the maintenance. A maintenance strategy has been developed to support TAA and this is now further developed by the MOI to have the ANP take responsibility for maintenance when the NMS-GVS contract concludes. Initiatives include a greater emphasis on tracking trained Afghan personnel and a focus on ensuring they are stationed at Regional Maintenance Centers instead of other locations. Parts are now being delivered directly to the Regional Logistics Centers to enable improved access by the ANP maintenance workforce. Advisors are assisting the MOI with the identification of high demand vehicle and weapons parts to enable effective supply planning and management. Advisors are also coauthoring with the MOI a maintenance transition plan for when the NMS-GVS contract concludes in August 2022.

**Figure 17: Percentage of ANP - NMS Workshare Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Percent Goal for ANP</th>
<th>Actual Percent of ANP Workshare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>13.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data as of April 30, 2020*
**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The MoI has improved its strategic planning at the ministerial level and saw improvements in its ability to streamline operational planning across its forces. Weekly security working groups (security meetings), which were hosted by RS DCOS-OPS and attended by MoI senior leaders, improved information sharing and collaborative planning. The MoI increasingly demonstrated an ability to produce operational plans and senior MoI leaders hosted meetings twice a week with all PCoPs to discuss operations. Advisors continued to note marked improvements in the processes and capabilities at the NPCC and the MoI’s ability to synchronize the NPCC with the NMCC. The NPCC has been empowered and its ability to synthesize and pass on data has improved cross pillar coordination. The NPCC builds situational understanding at a centralized headquarters by pulling operational information on the ANP. Within the NPCC, a trained cadre of MoI personnel conduct planning, track current operations, and integrate intelligence. Additionally, the MoI utilized the NPCC to track movements of strategic convoys, and maintain a common operating picture. RS advisors continue to TAA at the NPCC to enable it as a critical C2 node.

Finally, MoI leaders made substantial progress during the reporting period to address unnecessary casualties at checkpoints and have closed or reinforced 172 checkpoints. MoI efforts during this reporting period reduced attrition at checkpoints compared to the same reporting period in 2019.

**Intelligence**

Cooperation among the various intelligence stakeholders within the MoI has increased over time, but intelligence integration in operations requires more work. The operational design has driven some MoI progress towards intelligence integration, especially through the security meetings, which provide a forum for the MoI to share its organic intelligence and integrate intelligence from other security pillars.

The Combined Special Operations Cell (CSOC) is a new special operations cell within the Afghan Government. The cell’s personnel will train on NIMS and the Protected Internet Exchange (PIX) in order to view and analyze important intelligence and information data. The cell can also utilize the updated mapping tool that will exist on the new NIMS server. The new NIMS server has been installed into the CSOC facility. This broadened use of NIMS provides increased access to intelligence products and improved communication vertically and horizontally in the chain of command. Information sharing has increased between security pillars as well; NIMS ISR feeds and checkpoint information are being shared with the National Police Command Center (NPCC) under the Ministry of Interior. Some challenges to information still exist, as there is not an established standard for classification and dissemination of most intelligence information. Until the recently published national level classification and security policy is implemented, those challenges will continue to exist.

Efforts to increase information sharing across security pillars and between ANDSF and Coalition forces has had mixed success. MoD, MoI and NDS demonstrated steps toward greater cooperation in recent planning efforts and wargaming for security during the Afghan Presidential
Election. The three organizations collaborated on a joint intelligence assessment for the upcoming election, with NDS taking the lead during the brief. Outside of formal efforts (encouraged by CF Advisors), habitual sharing of reporting between the security pillars still appears to be limited.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

Approximately 3,346 (registered in the APPS and eligible for base pay) women serve in the MoI with 5,257 dedicated positions for women. A recruitment campaign focused on acquiring an increased number of female recruits produced positive results, with an increase of 184 more women serving in the MoI during the reporting period. A senior GCPSU officer and GCPSU Gender Director Colonel Nafisa Saba Sahar created a 90-minute documentary entitled “Special Women” highlighting leaders and opportunities for women in the GCPSU. CSTC-A hosted the premiere of the film in February. Additionally, the Special Police Training Center conducted a noncommissioned officer course and a female SWAT course for 30 women. The number of women in the MoI continued to grow steadily by incorporating women in future force discussions.

**Education and Training**

Unique training and education opportunities provide incentives for women to join the ANP. The female police training at Sivas, Turkey was a successful six-month program that ended in March 2020. It has been replaced by in-country training at the Central Training Command-Kabul female Police College. Despite female-only training capacity at some training centers, in-country initial training of female recruits remains low.

**Facilities**

Advisors continued to review to confirm appropriate use of facilities intended for use by women, particularly at Regional Training Centers, to ensure women in the ANP have access to adequate facilities. However have had very little success with restoring to their intended use facilities that have been re-purposed or with utilizing unused facilities. Adequate separate facilities are available in many units; however, there is an ongoing requirement for smaller-scale facilities such as changing rooms, bathrooms, and childcare centers to facilitate greater integration of women.

The international community continues to assist in the construction of facilities in support of gender integration to ensure safe and appropriate working environments. Current high visibility facility projects within the MoI include:

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44 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c) (1) (A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
Completed since last reporting period\textsuperscript{45}:

- Construct RTC PD-9 Training Bldg
- Construct Kabul Police Academy Ph II
- Family Response Unit PD 4
- Family Response Unit PD 8
- Family Response Unit PD 12
- Family Response Unit PD 17

Ongoing Projects:

- Police Town Ph I (NATF)
- Police Town Ph II (NATF)
- Police Town Ph III and IV (NATF) – on hold for the foreseeable future
- ABF Changing Rooms (NATF)
- ANCOF Changing Room (NATF)
- Herat Female Facility
- GCPSU Female Facility Gamberi
- GCPSU SPTC Female Facility
- GCPSU SPTW Logar Female Facility

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although ANP work with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the ANP lack training and are not equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics. The ANP’s focus on and employment in counterinsurgency military functions have hindered the development of anti-crime and other community policing capabilities, and the ANP are several years behind the ANA in terms of development.

The desired ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefine ANP roles and responsibilities, assign ANP pillar responsibilities, and establish training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

\textit{Afghan National Police Strength}

The MoI currently has slotted 99,000 ANP and 18,000 ALP personnel in APPS as of March 29, 2020\textsuperscript{46}. Separately, the ANP and ALP processed 1,782 promotions, 11,375 reassignments, 7,052 initial assignments, and 202 separations in APPS. As with the ANA, the number of ANP

\textsuperscript{45} All completed projects were funded utilizing Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
\textsuperscript{46} See Section 3.2 for more information on size of the ANDSF.
personnel dropped from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of attacks contribute to the high ANP attrition.

_Afghan National Police Structure_

The ANP is composed of four pillars (AUP, PSP, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, APPF, and CNPA). The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. The ALP and the APPF do not count as part of the 124,388 authorized levels; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. A significant share of ANP personnel costs is paid by international donors through the United Nations Development Programme’s Multidonor Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). The United States had been, but is no longer, the largest contributor to LOTFA. The ALP receive funding from ASFF, while the APPF do not.

_Afghan Uniform Police_

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a Provincial Police Headquarters (PHQ) in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

_Afghan Local Police (ALP)_

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate (SD) level. ALP personnel are not included in the overall ANDSF authorization, and the United States funds the salaries for the ALP. The President of Afghanistan is expected to sign a decree to initiate the process of nationwide dissolution of the ALP. Once that decree is signed, MoI will initiate the dissolution, which includes transferring or recruiting some of the ALP into other ANDSF and the dismissal of others from service. This effort will culminate at the end of FY 2020 when funding for the program ceases.
**Public Security Police (PSP)**

The PSP provide urban and metropolitan security, including anti-riot security, for major gatherings and can act as a medium-level response force for situations that exceed the capabilities of the regular uniformed police. The PSP consist of seven reserve support battalions subordinate to the PSP directorate in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kunduz. As a marked success for the MoI, five of the seven planned PSP Kandaks are at FOC, with the remaining two at IOC. The MoI recognizes that these units need to be equipped and employed properly, demonstrating emerging progress towards a community-policing model based around public security.

**Afghan Border Police (ABP)**

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP HQ is located in Kabul.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP)**

The AACP provide specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The AACP organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counter-narcotics efforts with regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors coordinate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

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47 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
MoI Afghan Special Security Forces

*General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU)*

The Ministry of Interior (MoI) General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) commands and controls Police Special Units established and authorized by the Afghan Government to conduct high-risk counter-terrorism (CT), counter-narcotics (CN), and counter-organized crime (COC) missions. GCPSU provides advice to the National Security Council (NSC)/National Security Adviser (NSA) through the Deputy Minister of Security (DM SEC), the MoI, and other commanders/organizations on the proper employment of special police capabilities. GCPSU’s special policing functions include warrant-based high-risk arrests (HRAs), hostage recovery operations (HROs), crisis response (e.g. HPAs and complex attacks), and time-sensitive operations that require precision, increased skill, and unique capabilities not suited to the conventional Afghan National Police (ANP) and Counter Narcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). A key element of GCPSU operations is the collection of evidence to support the prosecution of suspects.

GCPSU is a high-demand, low-density MoI law enforcement capability with military-like structures and capabilities that result from the nature of Afghanistan’s internal security situation. Like the MoD and NDS, the MoI assigns LNOs to the CSAR and RTTs to support deliberate targeting, operations, and crisis response across the country. The LNOs utilize the CRG to coordinate and facilitate GCPSU operations to support the CSAR and RTTs as required. GCPSU’s warrant-based targeting is intended to reinforce the importance and primacy of the rule of law, and counters terrorist groups exploiting Afghanistan as a safe haven to potentially launch external operations against our homelands.

*GCPSU Components*

GCPSU is composed of a HQ responsible for Command and Control (C2) of six National Mission Units (NMUs), 33 Provincial Police Special Units (PSUs), and 25 Intelligence Detachments. GCPSU is specifically designated to respond to emerging crises and terrorist threats across Afghanistan.

NMUs have a mandate to operate across Afghanistan to conduct a range of policing functions from CT to high risk arrests (HRA) and hostage recovery (HRO) and also possess surveillance and reconnaissance teams (SRT). NMUs are geographically located to provide security to regions and cities assessed to be vital to national stability. They have the ability to conduct missions unilaterally and in support of joint ANDSF operations. NMUs often train personnel, plan and execute operations independently but rely on coalition enablers such as intelligence, air, and fire support.

Kabul warrants the highest degree of National-Strategic focus, thereby translating to the priority resourcing of Crisis Response Unit (CRU)-222 and Counterterrorism Force (CF)-333 with an emphasis on HRA and crisis response.
A Provincial PSU is a quick reaction capability and special investigative element within a province and holds broad responsibilities for HRAs, evidence-based policing operations, and other policing functions not suited to the conventional ANP, within the rule of law construct. PSUs directly support the provincial chief of police (PCoP) in their assigned province, but remain under operational control of the GCPSU HQ. The GCPSU HQ maintains responsibility for the provision of manpower, training, and equipment of the PSUs, while the PCoP sustains the units through provisions of ammunition, food, pay, and other material. The PSUs consist of three Special Response Teams (SRT) and an intelligence detachment that provides localized human intelligence. There are only 33 PSUs but 34 Provinces in Afghanistan due to the Kabul NMU, CRU-222, covering PSU duties for Kabul, as Kabul is a densely populated city.

Intelligence Detachments provide a proactive investigation and surveillance capability, with a focus on CT and criminal networks that seek to destabilize GIRoA. They are also used in developing actionable intelligence on warranted targets. The PSU Intelligence Detachments primarily use HUMINT to conduct evidence-based operations. Intelligence Detachments are now integral to each PSU, NMU, and RTT, providing tactical level intelligence. They conduct operations under the PCoP but report directly to the Head J2 and GCPSU Deputy Commander in Kabul, often acting on targets identified by GCPSU HQ.

MoI lison officers embedded within the CSAR and RTTs coordinate future operations planning and deliberate targeting efforts with other ASSF elements and ANDSF pillars. During this reporting period, GCPSU’s ability to conduct crisis response was aided greatly by the realignment of NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A TAA to support regional level contingencies.

**GCPSU Growth and Misuse**

GCPSU achieved set ASSF personnel growth milestones during this reporting period and remains the MoI’s preeminent police component. Unlike some elements of the ASSF, the GCPSU does not endure high levels of misuse. Coalition advisors noted minimal misuse and high operational readiness rates of GCPSU. The quality of the GCPSU training pipeline enabled the growth and professionalism of the NMUs as GCPSU does not struggle to fill training courses. The NMUs remain the first choice ASSF unit for crisis response in urban areas across Afghanistan and the only option for HPA response within the Kabul metropolitan area. During this reporting period, GCPSU OPTEMPO was reduced due to the Reduction in Violence (RiV), followed by COVID-19 restrictions within Kabul. Despite these operational limitations, GCPSU still prosecuted targets and responded to multiple HPAs in Kabul including the Mazari Day gathering, a religious observance at the Sikh Temple, and the Presidential Inauguration.

**Recent Trends**

GCPSU has recently established three new NMUs in the regional metropolitan centers of Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Jalalabad to expand GIRoA’s crisis response, HPA prevention and reaction, and HRA civilian policing capabilities. These new NMUs complement the original NMUs located in the Kabul area and Kandahar in the south. Each new NMU consisted of two squadrons for the majority of the 2019 fighting season. Full operating capability (FOC) was achieved in March 2020 following the establishment of squadrons three and four in each of the
new NMUs. The establishment of these additional squadrons supports the implementation of an operational readiness cycle for the NMU in accordance with the NMU Concept of Employment. These squadrons include two operational squadrons, one training squadron, and one leave squadron.

The robust expansion of GCPSU may challenge NMUs to maintain operational effectiveness. These challenges are primarily associated with logistics (e.g. equipment distribution) and leadership development. The total number of NMUs has increased by 50 percent since the fall of 2018. As a result, the highly trained and experienced officers at the mid- to senior-level have been dispersed into leadership roles across the breadth of the expanded force. Consequently, junior officers have been appointed to higher duties such as squadron command on an accelerated timeline. Without the benefit of experience attained through time in rank these younger officers require more intensive mentoring from NSOCC-A Advisors. Compounding this issue, the MoI has also transferred many of the most experienced and capable mid-level officers to serve as PCoPs. This has achieved mixed results. Although often effective as PCoPs, they have demonstrated a willingness to reach back to the NMU to conduct tasks that overuse or misuse the GCPSU, undermining the NMU’s operational effectiveness.

The prestigious nature and reliability of the GCPSU itself contributes to the occasional misuse of its units. When another ministry, provincial governor, or ANA Corps commander requests support, the MOI will often dispatch a NMU squadron in response. These tasks can range from supporting checkpoints to guarding PCoP HQs - tasks not aligned with GCPSU’s COE. Despite these instances of misuse, the general trend of misuse of NMUs has decreased since the fall of 2019. Coalition advisors continue to utilize COEs developed last reporting period as a reference to guide senior GiRoA and ASSF official in the roles, tasks, responsibilities, and relationships of GCPSU.

To ensure the new NMUs are operationally proficient and properly integrated into their designated AORs, established NMUs provide training, advice and assistance support to the new NMUs. The capability to provide HPA response across Afghanistan, particularly in the major population centers, has increased. Established NMUs continue to execute fully Afghan independent HAF operations with SMW support and act on Afghan-derived targets. Despite this, GCPSU remains reliant on NSOCC-A-enabled fires and ISR.

**Training**

GCPSU training consists of a continuum of three training serials. The first, Basic Operator training takes place at the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) in Kabul and is similar to ANASOC’s CDOQC. The top 200 students from that course attend the second serial, the Special Police Advanced Training Wing (SPATW) in Mazar-e Sharif where they learn the advanced operator skills required within NMUs. The remaining students are assigned to PSUs. The third serial, conducted at the Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) in Logar provides career-long specialization training. In July 2020, the training pipeline will change and, after a 10-week basic course at the now unmentored SPTC, trainees will attend the Special Operations Basic Course (SOBC) at the SOE at Camp Morehead alongside their ANASOC colleagues prior to attending SPATW or commencing service in a PSU.
**Sustainment**

Sustainment remains an ongoing issue that marginally impacts GCPSU’s ORC. The MoI does not differentiate between the ANP and GCPSU for logistics support. There is no reliable way to move GCPSU units with airlift around Afghanistan without the support of the MoD. The NMUs use the M4 rifle, yet the MoI holds very limited stocks of ammunition usable in the M4, forcing the NMUs to rely on the MoD for support. The NMUs rely on local MoI logistics depots, often run by the ANP, and do not have a prioritized status. These logistic challenges occasionally affect operational readiness of GCPSU units.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continues to be funded primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to fund the Afghan Forces. The majority of ASFF is used for sustainment and operations of the Afghan forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on capacity building support and donor financial assistance in 2020 and beyond.

6.1 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan Government primarily to fund ANDSF pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. ASFF appropriations since FY 2005 total $81.3 billion.

In many cases, Afghan nationals are employed in Afghanistan by DoD contractors to support U.S. forces or DoD sustainment contracts that support Afghan forces. Figure 18 displays the number of Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from December 1, 2019 through May 31, 2020. The Department projects that U.S. forces in Afghanistan will continue employing approximately 5,000 Afghan nationals until the next reporting period.

48 The Department provides numbers of contractor personnel in Afghanistan employed by U.S. forces in a quarterly report to Congress in accordance with Section 1267 of the NDAA for FY 2018. The Department also publishes quarterly data of contractor employees in Afghanistan on its website at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM_reports.html for public viewing. The next contractor quarterly census report will be in July 2020.
6.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, the international community agreed to extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. NATO’s commitment enables the Afghan Government and its security forces to preserve past gains and maintain progress towards steadily increasing its financial contributions to security, and helps set the conditions for an Afghan-led political settlement. Future funding levels will depend on the current and future ANDSF force size and structure with the goal of ensuring the ANDSF maintains the capacity and capability to apply the appropriate amount of military pressure to compel a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban and secure the Afghan Government and populace. The magnitude of NATO’s past financial contributions and its reliability in the future are critical to the effectiveness of Afghan security forces on the battlefield.

NATO allies and partners will revisit their contributions prior to completion of the current 2017-2020 funding cycle, as previously established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF until the end of 2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago Summit. The United States does not commit to a specific amount, but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements with ASFF.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) and the LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw expect to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors.

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49 The number of Afghan national contractor personnel employed by U.S. forces during the previous six months and the projected number of such personnel who U.S. forces employ is submitted in response to Section 602(b)(14) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1101 note).
NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) serves as a flexible, transparent, and cost-effective mechanism to support and sustain the ANDSF. Created in 2007, the NATF was adapted, following agreement at the 2012 Chicago Summit, as part of NATO’s commitment to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond 2014. Over time, the scope of the Trust Fund expanded to support the sustainment of the ANA, literacy and professional military education, women’s participation in the ANDSF, and capacity-building activities. In 2019, the NATF Office implemented GIRoA/MoD review of proposed projects for sustainability and prioritization. These additional steps enhance the overall feasibility and ensure sustainment of completed projects.

The United States is responsible for overall trust fund management and execution of funds transferred from the SHAPE ANA Trust Fund Account to the ASFF in line with the ANA Trust Fund Implementation Plan and in line with national caveats on donated funds. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 36 nations have contributed nearly $3.1 billion. In 2019, nations pledged $367.6 million, and $381.8 million was donated, exceeding pledged amounts by $14.2 million dollars. Several countries either donated without a pledge or exceeded their pledge. In 2020, 22 nations have pledged to contribute a total of $379.9 million. As of May 5, 2020, 10 nations (including two that did not pledge) have donated a total of $79.9 million.

Activities funded through the ANATF are directly linked to mission requirements generated, reviewed, and approved by the CSTC-A. The NATFO Board monitors the NATF and reviews its costs effectiveness, financial integrity, and accountability, including through quarterly performance reports and annual financial audits. Since 2018, all ANATF-funded projects have been executed primarily through DoD or NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts rather than as direct contributions to the Afghan Government. During the reporting period USNATO, OUSD(P), NATFO and State began work to renew the ANA Trust Fund Memorandum of Understanding and Terms of Reference.

The June 2020 ANA Trust Fund plenary was rescheduled to the Fall of 2020 based on COVID-19 concerns.

Law and Order Trust Fund

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 124,626 members of the ANP. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA, and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

50 The salaries of the 30,944 ALP are paid for solely by U.S. funds.
6.3 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, participants agreed that, as the Afghan economy and revenues grow, Afghanistan’s annual share of the cost of the ANDSF will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. At the 2012 exchange rate, $500 million equals about 25 billion afghani. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF, falling just short of the goal in afghani terms. In 2017, the Afghan national budget allocated 26.9 billion Afghanis ($396 million) and in 2018, the Afghan Government allocated 30.3 billion afghani ($445 million) for the ANDSF. In 2020, the Afghan Government plans to allocate 34.1 billion afghani ($448 million). Therefore, the Afghan Government has continued to meet its 2012 pledge. Given the persistence of the insurgency and continued slow growth of the Afghan economy, however, full self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force structure, reduce significantly. DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayers’ funds to address long-term affordability of the ANDSF.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The Afghan Government remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the Afghan Government to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues. Continued international support for economic development is based on the Afghan Government’s progress towards economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.

Realistically, however, Afghanistan will remain reliant on the international community to fund its forces, even in a post-reconciliation environment. Afghan government funding for its MoD and MoI forces—about $500 million per year—is equivalent to about two percent of its GDP and about one fourth of total government revenues. It will be years before the Afghan economy would fully generate sufficient government revenues to finance a peacetime force, even if there was no more risk that terrorist groups could use Afghanistan as a safe haven.
### ANNEX A – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Acronym and Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Afghan Border Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA-TF</td>
<td>ANA Territorial Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOF</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qa’ida</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA G</td>
<td>Counter-Corruption Advisor Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDOQC</td>
<td>Commando Qualifications Course</td>
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<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoEUR</td>
<td>Change of End Use Request</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMRS</td>
<td>Commander, Resolute Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CSAR</td>
<td>Combined Situation Awareness Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Central Supply Depot</td>
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<td>CSK</td>
<td>Cobra Strike Kandak</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSMC</td>
<td>Cobra Strike Maneuver Course</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FD</td>
<td>Facilities Development</td>
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<td>FRU</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Forward Supply Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Ground Assault Forces</td>
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<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOOD</td>
<td>Gender Occupational Opportunity Development</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<td>GSK</td>
<td>General Support Kandak</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>High-Profile Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMTC</td>
<td>Kabul Military Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Tayyiba</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>Military Maintenance Module</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MSFV</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Force Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSK</td>
<td>Mobile Strike Kandak</td>
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<td>NAC-A</td>
<td>NATO Air Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NATF</td>
<td>NATO ANA Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIU</td>
<td>National Interdiction Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Logistics Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>National Mission Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Maintenance Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS-GVS</td>
<td>National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMU</td>
<td>National Mission Unit (ASSF portion of GCPSU)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Coordination Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSOCC-A</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
<td>National Transportation Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVG</td>
<td>Night-Vision Goggles</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORC</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Cycle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Operational Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCASS</td>
<td>Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Public Security Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Special Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>R4+S</td>
<td>Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB</td>
<td>Requirements Approval Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLC</td>
<td>Regional Logistics Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Management</td>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>Resolute Support Mission</td>
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(U) Article; Reuters; 2020-03-01; (U) Iran dismisses U.S.-Taliban agreement over Afghanistan; Extracted information is classified U; Overall classification is U.

(U) OSC; OSL072020190812413552; 15 Jul 2019; (U) China, Pakistan and Russia gain foothold in Afghanistan; Classification of extracted information is U; Overall classification is U.