ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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Report to Congress

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This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91); Section 1223 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232); Section 1216 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92); addresses p. 348 of the FY 2020 House Appropriations Committee-Defense Report on H.R. 2968 (Rpt. 116-84.); and provides information sought as indicated on p. 264 of Senate Report 116-48 to accompany S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020. It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the eighth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2018, through May 31, 2019. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1 through November 30, 2019.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The principal goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive settlement to the war in Afghanistan that protects the United States homeland from terrorist attacks.

General Miller’s new operational design synchronizes U.S. counterterrorism (CT) capabilities with increased Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) operations and focuses NATO Resolute Support Mission’s Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) efforts to the “point of need.” This model has restored the Coalition’s tactical initiative and put heavy pressure on the Taliban. The objective of the operational design is to bring the Taliban to the bargaining table and to provide strong incentives for them to engage in meaningful negotiations with the U.S. and Afghan governments.

The injection of new military capabilities and operational authorities coupled with the continued growth of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), have increased the effectiveness and efficiency of the United States’ small footprint military campaign.

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR), remains engaged in talks with the Taliban achieve a peace agreement that safeguards the U.S. homeland and could lead to a reduction in the number of U.S. forces deployed in Afghanistan. As the SRAR has stated, any comprehensive peace agreement will be made up of four interconnected parts:

- counterterrorism assurances;
- troop withdrawal;
- intra-Afghan negotiations that lead to a political settlement; and,
- a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire.

During this reporting period, the ANDSF, which bears the brunt of the fighting in Afghanistan, continued to improve its ability to fight the insurgents. The ANDSF engaged in the most hard-fought winter campaign since 2002. Despite the high operational tempo, the United States and the Afghan government have gone to unprecedented lengths to limit civilian casualties. The ANDSF and Coalition focused on counter-network operations against the Taliban and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan (ISIS-K). These operations inflicted heavy losses on militants and prevented these groups from reaching their objectives.

Cooperation and coordination between U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the ANDSF reached unprecedented levels as U.S. advisers synchronized CT and TAA efforts with ANDSF campaign objectives. Key Afghan and U.S. senior leaders met weekly to share intelligence, prioritize objectives, allocate assets, and coordinate operations. These initiatives resulted in a more focused, successful military campaign.

The NATO Resolute Support Mission’s Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) adjusted its advisory programs and took advantage of the deployment of the 2nd U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB), which enabled the Command to send advisors to more...
locations to work with the ANDSF, including in districts where the Coalition did not have a large presence.

Terrorist and insurgent groups continue to challenge Afghan, U.S., and Coalition forces. During this reporting period, ISIS-K made territorial gains in eastern Afghanistan. Regionally the group continues to evade, counter, and resist sustained CT pressure. While ISIS-K remains operationally limited to South and Central Asia, the group harbors intentions to attack international targets. Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) routinely support, train, work, and operate with Taliban fighters and commanders. AQ maintains an enduring interest in attacking U.S. forces and Western targets. Even if a successful political settlement with the Taliban emerges from ongoing talks, AQ, ISIS-K, and some unknown number of Taliban hardliners will constitute a substantial threat to the Afghan government and its citizens, as well as to the United States and its Coalition partners. This enduring terrorist threat will require the United States, the international community, and the ANDSF to maintain a robust CT capability for the foreseeable future.

Despite elevated levels of violence and heavy losses, ANDSF recruitment and retention outpaced attrition for the first time in several reporting periods. The ANDSF increased its offensive operations and reduced or consolidated static checkpoints. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) curbed the misuse of forces in defensive positions, met growth milestones, and increased the number of independent, offensive operations. Finally, the Afghan government instituted a number of leadership changes that are helping move the ANDSF towards becoming a more professional force. However, the ANDSF will continue to require sustained TAA and financial support to overcome shortfalls. The ANDSF struggles to maintain, account for, and distribute equipment and material throughout the country, properly manage facilities, and adhere to strict training and reset cycles. While the ANDSF can secure population centers, provide security for elections, and control major ground lines of communication, the conventional Afghan security forces require persistent TAA, and the ASSF needs fires, lift, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to maintain peak combat effectiveness.

The Commander USFOR-A continues to improve the ability of his forces to implement their two missions: TAA and CT. He eliminated unnecessary overhead in Afghanistan in order to reduce waste and focus energy on supporting the ANDSF in a more narrowly defined military campaign. Together, the new operational design and the current U.S. military footprint represent the most efficient use of small numbers and resources to generate combat power and battlefield effects since the opening year of the war in Afghanistan.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The vital national interest driving the South Asia Strategy is to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. citizens and interests overseas from threats originating from South Asia. The principal goal is a durable and inclusive political settlement that ends the war in Afghanistan and mitigates the terrorist threat in the region. The U.S. conditions-based strategy, punctuated by an increase in military pressure on Taliban commanders, has helped set the conditions for Taliban leadership to initiate peace negotiations with the United States. At the time of the writing of this report, the United States is actively engaged in negotiations with a delegation from the Taliban and, separately, with representatives of the Afghan Government. These talks, led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) Zalmay Khalilzad, are an important step towards ending the war in Afghanistan.

Reinforcing Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL (OFS) remains a priority for U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) since release of the South Asia Strategy. This prioritization has allowed the Department of Defense (DoD) to shift much-needed resources and enablers from Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria to OFS and the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The United States currently maintains approximately 14,000 military personnel in Afghanistan under OFS, approximately 8,500 of whom participate in the RSM mission. These personnel maintain a presence primarily at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional hubs in Laghman and Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, Helmand in the southwest, Paktiya in the southeast, and Balkh Province in the north. Our strategy in Afghanistan is conditions-based; our commanders on the ground continually evaluate the current conditions and make recommendations on appropriate force levels.\footnote{Current and projected U.S. force presence submits in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).}

The presence of U.S. forces makes possible the execution of two well-defined and complementary mission-sets: the NATO-led TAA mission in support of ANDSF development, and the additional authorities and enablers provided by OFS to partner with the ANDSF to defeat Taliban insurgents, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). The RS and OSF mission sets work together to protect U.S. interests in Afghanistan and its region.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The DoD approach to implementation of the South Asia Strategy can be described by the R4+S concept—Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain.

Reinforce: The reinforce section of the strategy calls for U.S. and international funding commitments to sustain ongoing ANDSF combat operations and implementation of President Ghani’s ANDSF roadmap. U.S. and Coalition partners remain committed to sourcing the vast majority of the RS TAA personnel and funding requirements. The continued international support reinforces a strong message of Coalition unity to the Taliban and other regional spoilers.
Realign: The South Asia Strategy calls for the realignment of U.S. military and civilian assistance and political outreach to target key areas under Afghan Government control. The strategy cites the proper alignment of U.S. and Afghan forces as a key to improved security. The push to realign authorities, resources, and the ANSF continued to progress on schedule during this reporting period. During the first year of the South Asia Strategy, this realignment consisted chiefly of a U.S. shift in resources (lethal and non-lethal) from outside of Afghanistan into theater. Beginning in the fall of 2018, however, this realignment increasingly took the form of force and materiel optimization.

Regionalize: Regional efforts aim to expand burden sharing, neutralize potential spoilers to U.S. and Coalition efforts, limit threats to the United States and our allies and partners, and develop and support a durable political settlement in Afghanistan. The South Asia strategy prioritizes regional engagement to limit hedging against the Afghan Government and create an international consensus for peace. Pakistan, in particular, must play a key role in a peaceful resolution to the war in Afghanistan.

Reconcile: The primary goal of the South Asia Strategy is a durable and inclusive political settlement to the war in Afghanistan. The current military campaign increases military pressure on the Taliban and complements ongoing diplomatic efforts by the United States, Afghanistan, and our international partners. During this reporting period, U.S. representatives met with a Taliban delegation in Doha and with a group of Minister and Deputy Minister-level Afghan Government officials in Kabul to discuss elements of a peace deal. The next step in the process must be an intra-Afghan dialogue in which Taliban and Afghan delegations meet together directly.

Sustain: The South Asia Strategy replaced a rigid timeline with a focus on achieving specific U.S. objectives at sustainable costs. The strategy seeks to maximize fiscal, military, and political return on investment, and to decrease levels of U.S. and international investment over time. Efforts to achieve a sustainable political outcome in Afghanistan must be feasible. The United States and NATO will work to promote Afghan self-sufficiency across the security, political, and economic spheres; over the long run, such advances will make possible a steady reduction in the Afghan Government’s reliance on international support.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States has a single vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from becoming a safe-haven from which terrorist groups can plan and execute attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. citizens, and our interests and allies abroad. Our ultimate goal in Afghanistan is a negotiated political settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. During this reporting period, the Afghan government continued to make progress toward meeting shared security objectives.²

² Section 1223 of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232) requires an assessment of the progress of the Afghan Government toward meeting shared security objectives and the efforts of the Afghan Government to manage, employ, and sustain the equipment and inventory funded by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. The Secretary of Defense may withhold assistance if the Afghan government does not make sufficient progress in these areas. The elements of this assessment are addressed throughout this report as noted.
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) currently conducts two well-defined and complementary missions. First, through OFS, U.S. forces continue the counterterrorism (CT) mission against al-Qa’ida, ISIS-K, and their associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and ability to conduct external attacks. OFS authorities also allow USFOR-A to work by, with and through the ANDSF on the CT mission and on operations targeting the Taliban. Second, in partnership with NATO allies and operational partner nations in the RS mission, U.S. forces train, advise, and assist (TAA) the ANDSF. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and Coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps-level, the Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial-level, and with the MoD and MoI to develop institutional capacity, integrate capabilities (e.g., intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and aerial fires), and improve tactical proficiency. U.S. and Coalition forces also conduct TAA missions with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of those two critical capabilities.

An array of operational authorities govern the conduct of U.S. military personnel engaged in the U.S. CT and RS TAA missions in Afghanistan. These authorities address U.S. CT operations and SFA in support of the ANDSF in their continued fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Operational authorities also address circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of the CT and TAA missions, including U.S. accompaniment and combat enabler support to the ANDSF fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

**Operational Design**

The current Resolute Support operational design focuses the efforts of U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces in a manner that bolsters ANDSF security of population centers and key terrain, and concentrates effects on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks. Commander RS executes the operational design by synchronizing the authorities granted to him by NATO’s Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and by the U.S. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). The operational design aligns these authorities to the following priorities: Interdict High-Profile Attacks (HPAs) in Kabul; conduct operations against the Taliban to disrupt their command and control nodes, support zones, and HPA networks; defeat ISIS-K; posture the ANA-Territorial Force (ANA-TF); and sustain TAA efforts. The design’s success relies upon all ANDSF components enabled by NATO TAA and augmented by precision targeting under OFS authorities. In addition to the physical domain, the operational design encourages the Afghan Government to compete increasingly with the Taliban and ISIS-K to gain advantage in the information domain. The most significant change in the operational design from previous reporting periods is that U.S. CT and ANDSF combat capabilities are better integrated and employed in a more expeditionary, focused, and agile manner.

The operational design places the ASSF in the lead role as the primary offensive force with conventional ANA conducts supporting offensive operations, holds terrain, and consolidates gains to create an environment where the Taliban are unable to establish or expand their influence. Rather than focus on conducting simultaneous brigade and corps level operations to dominate large geographic areas of responsibility, the ANDSF narrowed its focus under the new design on commonly agreed upon strategic areas and key terrain.
The operational design has several supporting missions to ensure the overall success of the ANDSF. Some of the key supporting missions include empowering leaders, reducing vulnerable checkpoints, enforcing supply accountability and responsiveness, eliminating ASSF misuse in static defense missions, and ensuring soldiers paid on time. To ensure efforts are coordinated with the Afghan interagency and ANDSF, RS has organized a series of collaborative staff planning events that help synchronize overall TAA and enabler support to the ANDSF. The key planning event for the RS staff is the Operational Design Meeting (ODM), which reviews intelligence, sets objective priorities, allocates assets, and synchronizes operations. Additionally, RS conducts a weekly security meeting with MOD and MOI senior leaders and planners after the ODM to nest all operations and assess progress.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

The U.S. CT mission complements the NATO TAA mission. U.S. application of OFS authorities coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF helped preserve security gains and contributed to a maturing U.S.-Afghan CT partnership. The Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (CSOJTF-A) supports U.S. CT efforts through TAA with the ASSF and accompanying the ASSF on certain operations. During this reporting period, the ASSF used its growing capabilities to conduct operations synchronized with USFOR-A to address insurgent and transnational threats. The CSOJTF-A TAA efforts remain focused on building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, fire support, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and ASSF/conventional force interoperability. The new RS Operational Design further synchronized CT and TAA efforts. Placing ASSF in the lead for offensive operations with conventional ANDSF in a supporting role, along with better integration of operations with USFOR-A allowed for increased effects on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks.

During this reporting period, the United States increasingly apportioned CT assets to operations designed to set conditions for negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. ASSF forces completed independent operations primarily focused on expanding security around population centers and clearing terrain. U.S. and Afghan forces conducted partnered and enabled operations throughout the country to increase military pressure on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks. U.S. forces conducted the largest number of operations during this reporting period in the South and Southeast followed by the North and East. Roughly ten percent of operations focused on the Kabul region and preventing high-profile attacks.

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the U.S. global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A enables the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K. The United States is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners in the effort to defeat ISIS. Despite renewed efforts to target Taliban leaders and networks, ISIS-K remained disrupted throughout Afghanistan and ISIS-K’s ability to conduct HPAs in Kabul was limited.

U.S. and Afghan forces have continued to maintain pressure on al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. During the last two years, U.S.-led CT operations have killed numerous AQIS leaders and key members, disrupting and degrading the group.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of June 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>North Macedonia</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The NATO-led RS mission advises the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MOI to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about RS mission requirements and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as the RS mission “framework nations,” each leading a regional Train, Advise, and Assist Command (TAAC) responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Two regional Task Forces (TF), TF Southeast and TF Southwest, conduct TAA missions with the ANDSF, one in Paktiya Province and one in Helmand Province.

The regional TAACs cover five of the seven ANA corps and some Afghan National Police (ANP) provincial headquarters. TF Southeast and TF Southwest oversee persistent advising with the Afghan National Army (ANA) 203rd and 215th Corps, respectively. The TAACs and TFs serve as the principal connections between the Afghan ministries and fielded forces. The field commands play a central role in the Coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine the ministries’ ability to support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the Coalition. In addition, Coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabler support, primarily ISR and MEDEVAC, to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, Allies and partners in NATO’s Resolute Support

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3 As listed on the NATO public website, https://www.nato.int
Mission reaffirmed their shared commitment to Afghanistan’s long-term security and stability. The nations committed to sustain the non-combat RS mission and extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024, and welcomed Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as RS operational partners. As of May 2019, RS consisted of military personnel from 39 nations (27 NATO allies and 14 operational partner nations). The United States remains the largest force contributor.

**Resolute Support Headquarters (HQ)**

The Resolute Support Headquarters (RSHQ) structure consists of two base pillars: security assistance and operations. Security assistance emphasizes ministerial advising, institutional development, and ANDSF resourcing, equipping, and sustaining. Led by Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), these efforts enable an effective, lethal, and sustainable ANDSF and build the long-term institutional capacity to secure the Afghan population.

Operations establish an enhanced TAA unity of effort by coordinating staff elements directly tied to TAA at the Corps level and consolidating simultaneous planning for all TAACs. Operations advisors and personnel seek to increase near-term operational effectiveness and integrate strategic and institutional guidance at the operational level.

*Figure 2: Resolute Support Mission Headquarters Organization*

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4 DCOS SA/CSTC-A was elevated to a three-star command in October 2018.
The following offices conduct key functional TAA with the ANDSF:

**Resource Management (RM): Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

RM has three priorities: 1) increase resource management capability within the ministries; 2) build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and 3) set sustainability conditions. Resource management includes generating requirements by determining the products and services to purchase to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spending plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of the funds expended. Advising efforts in this area focus on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS).

**Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO)**

One of the four key elements of the ANDSF Roadmap is counter-corruption. The MoI and MoD Inspectors General (IG) lead the anti-corruption program. RS TAO advisors TAA the MoD and MoI IGs to improve policies and procedures in transparency, accountability, and oversight. The IGs work to prevent corruption through inspections, investigations, assistance, teaching, and training. TAO advisors work with MoD and MoI IGs to develop preventive programs and controls to identify areas vulnerable to corruption and put measures in place to reduce corruption.

**Rule of Law (ROL)**

To provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s governance institutions, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. ROL advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. ROL efforts focus on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings and child sex abuse. RS advisors continue to engage with ANDSF leaders at all levels to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHR and all types of human rights violations—not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and Coalition assistance to the ANDSF.

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5 CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.

6 The Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI. Additional information on APPS is located in Section 3.4.
**Force Development (FD)**

FD advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power and a professional force through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. FD personnel advise on the enforcement of an Inherent Law policy that lowers mandatory retirement ages, time-in-service maximums (e.g., 40 years for generals), and time-in-grade limits (e.g., 8 years for generals). This effort opens senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate (CDD) works closely with FD advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as the ministries develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the *tashkil*\(^7\) development process.

**Operational Sustainment and Logistics (OS/LOG): Sustain the Force**

OS advisors work with the ANDSF to sustain and reconstitute combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, communications, medical, and logistics systems. It is organized into three subordinate staff sections: Logistics (OS-LOG); Medical (OS-MED); and Information and Communications Technology (OS-ICT). OS-LOG advisors assist the ANDSF in the logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, select ANP provincial headquarters, and national levels to support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. For medical systems, OS-MED advisors assist the ANDSF on injury care, ground MEDEVAC, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. For communications, OS-ICT advisors work with the Afghans providing technical advice and guidance for secure, interoperable, and sustainable ANDSF telecommunications and networked infrastructures. Additionally, OS provides logistics advisors to augment both Ministerial Advisory Groups.

**Strategy and Policy (S&P): Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns**

S&P personnel advise the ANDSF to employ all elements of the ANDSF effectively in support of Afghan Government priorities. S&P has two sections: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. Strategic planning and policy advisors assist the ANDSF strategic planning efforts at the Afghan Office of the National Security Council (ONSC), the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the strategic-level capabilities of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute campaigns in support of national-level objectives. Once developed, the strategic guidance and objectives translate into operational and annual campaign plans.

**Intel TAA (INT): Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

INT helps the ANDSF to develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors assist several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI),\(^8\) and

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\(^7\) *Tashkil* means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.

\(^8\) The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
the Nasrat, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center (NTIC), a national-level intelligence fusion center. The INT goal is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and law enforcement plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. INT advisors also help the ANP and ANA intelligence schools develop a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. The INT has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Strategic Communication (STRATCOM): Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

STRATCOM advisors work with the Afghan Government to develop counter-insurgent messaging and a positive narrative for the Afghan people and the international community. The advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice when addressing internal and external audiences. STRATCOM advisors help bridge gaps and overcome challenges to improve communications within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF, while reinforcing successes and seeking opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communications capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than it does on managing resources or developing technical systems.

**Resolute Support Gender Integration Office**

The RS Gender Integration Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and broader gender perspectives into all policy and strategic planning at the ministerial, ANA corps, and ANP zone levels. Although the RS Gender Integration Office is a “stand-alone” advising directorate, it integrates with all eight RS subordinate branches as each has gender-related issues relevant to the overall efforts. Recognizing this interdependency, issues pertaining to women are included in all major RS briefings and fora with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Integration Office supports the Afghan Government as it implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women and Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces**

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts, according to the need identified by the Coalition and their Afghan partners. TF Southwest and TF Southeast provide oversight of TAA efforts for the ANA corps.
and select ANP provincial headquarters levels in their regions, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters levels. Finally, the U.S.-led TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in ANA corps and select ANP provincial headquarters level reporting, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the dissolution of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs focus modest levels of TAA support at the ANP provincial headquarters level. The U.S.-led Southeast and Southwest TFs have also succeeded in strengthening relationships between the MoD, MoI, and ANA corps in areas without a persistent Coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.  

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital (TAAC-C)**

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, Kabul City Police, Afghan Border Force (ABF), and Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several other contributing nations.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East (TAAC-E)**

TAAC-E (Headquarters in Laghman), which includes primarily U.S. and Polish forces, covers Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Panjshir, Parwan, and Nuristan Provinces. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South (TAAC-S)**

TAAC-S (Headquarters in Kandahar), led by U.S. forces, includes Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West (TAAC-W)**

TAAC-W (Headquarters in Herat), led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North (TAAC-N)**

TAAC-N (Headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh Province), led by German forces, includes Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar

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9 Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team further augments select functional advisors, as appropriate.
Provinces. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Task Force Southwest**

TF Southwest (Headquarters in Helmand Province) includes Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. Led by U.S. forces, TF Southwest provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Task Force Southeast**

TF Southeast (Headquarters in Paktiya Province) includes Paktika, Khost, Paktiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan Provinces. Led by U.S. forces, TF Southeast provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203th Corps and select ANP provincial headquarters.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air)**

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. TAAC-Air’s U.S. and Coalition advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAA priorities for this reporting period include:

- ensuring the timely flow of AAF personnel into formal training programs concurrently with planned growth and aircraft delivery schedules;
- improving operational-level command and control;
- encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program;
- improving in-country maintenance and logistics;
- developing and fully integrating aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29, and AC-208 fixed-wing platforms, and the Mi-17, UH-60A, and MD-530 rotary-wing platforms;
- assisting with AAF implementation of elections planning.

1.5 BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPABILITY

**TAA Optimization**

During this reporting period, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) completed an internal review of Coalition and contract advisory efforts and used the review to design a more effective TAA approach. Previous approaches to the TAA mission focused on assigning advisors to ANDSF leaders and units based on performance and readiness needs, resulting in more advisors assigned to underperforming leaders and units. CSTC-A’s TAA optimization focuses on investing in “reliable partners” that are positioned to make a positive contribution to campaign objectives and to increase the return on TAA investment. CSTC-A designates the positions and locations that are critical to the execution of the Operational Design

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and that require an investment in TAA as “points of need.” Investing in reliable partners and providing TAA to the point of need are the guiding principles for the TAA mission and involves a networked approach to increase proficiency across the spectrum of warfighting functions including accountability and pay, mission command, and logistics.

In order to achieve unity of effort, CSTC-A empowered the Ministerial Advisory Groups for Defense (MAG-D) and Interior (MAG-I) and realigned the 12 branches charged with ministerial advising to be responsive to Ministerial Advisory Group director direction and guidance. This TAA optimization enhances ministerial advising and better enables Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of U.S. and Coalition security assistance efforts. All advisors that engage the MoD and MoI now synchronize efforts through MAG-D and MAG-I to prioritize engagements with Afghan officials and focus TAA efforts in line with an established set of priorities. Moving forward, RS will further synchronize ministerial advising with TAA below the corps and provincial levels through increased integration of CSTC-A, DCOS Ops, the TAACs and TFs, and the Second Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB).

During this reporting period, RS established a set of ten priority TAA focus areas seeking to improve the institutional capacity of the ANDSF and the security ministries.\(^{11}\)

**U.S. Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB)**

The 1\(^{st}\) SFAB completed its deployment at the beginning of the reporting period and was effective in providing operational and tactical TAA support to ANA brigades and *kandaks*. The 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB deployed to Afghanistan in March 2019 and re-engaged select brigades, provided additional TAA support for Kabul security, provided expeditionary TAA capabilities, helped improve ANDSF mission command through TAA of the National Military Coordination Center (NMCC), improved logistics operations through TAA of the ANA Logistics Command, and provided expertise and oversight at training centers.

Extending TAA to the point of need below the Corps level sometimes requires expeditionary advising. Resolute Support continued to employ Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAP), which included enablers to support advisors in remote locations focused on a variety of areas including planning, logistics, and accountability of personnel and equipment. During this reporting period, the arrival of the 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB coupled with a modified prioritization of U.S. CT assets allowed U.S. forces to apply military pressure in conjunction with an EAP and present multiple dilemmas to an enemy trying to respond to new advisory efforts. U.S. CT assets operated as an Expeditionary Advisor Task Force (EATF) to support the desired TAA effects.

The 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB’s employment is integrated with the RS Operational Design and provides advisors to the point of need for select ANDSF units. The 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB’s employment differs from that of the 1\(^{st}\) SFAB in a couple of ways. First, 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB’s advisor teams are employed in a more expeditionary manner, shifting locations and TAA priorities based on changes in the operational environment and operational design priorities. Additionally, 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB provides expeditionary advisor support, under the direction of HQRS, at the point of need. The 2\(^{nd}\) SFAB provides advisor

\(^{11}\) A detailed breakdown and analysis of the RS top ten priorities is located in section 3.3.
teams a combination of 5 ANA Corps and Brigades persistently, the Kabul City Gates and 111th Capital Division, the TAAC-S Regional Military Center; and the ANA Logistics Command.

The training provided by SFAB advisors to their ANDSF counterparts during this reporting period included individual training such as combat casualty care, communications, supply and distribution management, individual soldier skills, and substantial staff and leader training. SFAB advisors improved ANDSF systems, focusing on: implementation of the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS), property accountability, maintenance, and operational planning. SFAB advisors also assisted their ANDSF counterparts with the employment of Afghan organic UAS assets, integration of the AAF in ground maneuver, and integration of Afghan artillery with ground maneuver.

1.6 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The South Asia Strategy prioritizes reconciliation and directs appropriate U.S. agencies to set conditions for a political settlement to end the war. In 2018, the combination of military pressure on the Taliban, grassroots peace initiatives in Afghanistan, the unprecedented nationwide Eid al-Fitr ceasefire, and Islamic community support for peace threatened the legitimacy of the Taliban cause and provided strong incentives for the Taliban to come to the negotiating table.

The SRAR’s duty is to negotiate a peace agreement to end the war and ensure terrorists cannot threaten the United States from Afghanistan. In January 2019, SRAR Khalilzad identified four core elements required for a potential peace settlement with the Taliban:

(1) The Taliban will break with all terrorists and prevent the use of Afghan soil under its control against the United States, its Allies, or any other country;
(2) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan;
(3) Formation of a power-sharing government through intra-Afghan dialogue;
(4) A comprehensive and permanent ceasefire.

SRAR Khalilzad is currently negotiating the first two areas (counterterrorism guarantees and withdrawal of foreign forces) with the Taliban. He assesses that concluding those elements of the agreement will open the door to intra-Afghan negotiations and violence reduction.

As a complement to SRAR Khalilzad’s negotiations, DoD supports peace efforts by applying military pressure on the Taliban to encourage its leaders to negotiate. DoD also continues to support efforts to facilitate local peace initiatives in Afghanistan in order to reduce violence. Local peace initiatives, or “bottom-up” reconciliation efforts, require the participation of many military, civilian, and non-governmental actors in Afghanistan. DoD is uniquely positioned to provide the security, transportation, and logistical support to help facilitate local peace initiatives.

At the provincial level, Afghan Government officials continue to work with USFOR-A to identify opportunities to broker local peace deals with Taliban and other fighters who agree to lay down their arms. Leaders at the local level are exploring opportunities that may offer a path to peace on a small scale.
1.7 INDICATIONS OF PROGRESS

On August 23, 2017, two days after the United States unveiled the South Asia Strategy, President Ghani announced the establishment of the Afghanistan Compact, a set of specific reform measures that the Afghan Government committed to fulfill. The Afghan Government developed the Compact to hold itself accountable for making progress towards milestones and objectives linked to the desired conditions described in the U.S. conditions-based strategy. President Ghani directed the creation of four Compact committees to examine ways to improve efforts and measure progress in the following areas: Security, Governance, Peace and Reconciliation, and Economic Growth.

Over time, the strategic objectives described in the Compact contributed to a growing number of related tasks that RS attempted to use to gauge progress towards its mission to build institutional capacity. By the end of 2018, the task list had grown from 138 tasks to more than 1,300 tasks, of which only a small number contributed to strategic objectives. During this reporting period, RS began refining its assessment process for institutional development, resulting in roughly 50 to 60 inputs for the MoD and MoI respectively. These inputs are both objective and subjective. They will feed into a developing assessment process. Assessments will contribute to both the MoI and MoD advisory group priorities, and will inform CSTC-A’s overall TAA priorities. Assessment outputs will also inform program of actions and milestones (PoAM) updates related to the NATO RS Campaign Plan.

The Compact still provides a useful platform to facilitate periodic meetings between diplomatic leaders and their Afghan counterparts to discuss progress towards strategic objectives and provide a status of ongoing activities. The Compact also allows senior MoD and Mol (Deputy Minister) leadership to maintain pressure on their respective ministries to accomplish milestones. The Afghan National Security Council is responsible for monitoring and reporting ministerial progress to PoA. The RS Executive Advisory Group (EAG) maintains responsibility for the U.S. contingent. President Ghani’s personal oversight of the Compact provides his NSA and ministers with incentive to achieve positive progress.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress quarterly at the ANA corps and ANP provincial headquarters level through an ANDSF Assessment Report. The report tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the RS Assessment and Analysis Group (AAG), which then combines the reports into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. Assessments of the ANDSF’s progress on achieving milestones are conducting continuously and are collected by the CSTC-A on a monthly basis.

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12 Information on the Afghanistan Compact addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e) (2) (K) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).

13 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP provincial headquarters, the report also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, SMW headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally supported insurgency and the highest regional concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, taxation/extortion, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks continue.

Afghanistan faces multiple internal threats, each of which receives significant support from external actors. The primary threat to Afghan stability is the Taliban, which receives sanctuary and support from many external actors. During this reporting period, the Taliban conducted more attacks than it historically has during this time of year, however, the total number of effective enemy initiated attacks decreased significantly. These attacks were predominantly carried out against outposts, checkpoints, and other poorly defended or un reinforced ANSF positions; the increased tempo may reflect a Taliban attempt to increase leverage in peace negotiations. Because of these attacks, the ANSF continues to suffer record-high casualties. ISIS-K poses a threat not only to Afghanistan, but also to the West, which it continuously seeks to target for terrorist activity. In addition to the internal threats, powerful regional actors surround Afghanistan. These powers have varied interests in the political, military, and economic future of Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including the Taliban and its component Haqqani Network (HQN), al-Qa’ida core (AQ), al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Terrorist sanctuaries on both sides of the border present security challenges for Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to regional security and stability.

Afghan security forces likely will continue to clash with Pakistani forces along the border. This strains limited resources and heightens regional tensions. Senior leaders of both countries accuse the other of using their security agencies to support militant groups that launch cross border attacks. Despite an escalating border skirmish in early May 2019, President Ghani and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan were effectively able to de-escalate the situation peacefully.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan is actively supporting Afghan reconciliation. During this reporting period, Pakistan played a constructive role in attempting to bring Taliban leaders to the negotiating table. In January, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi met with the Afghan President’s special envoy for Afghan peace talks. Separately, as of January 2019, Pakistani security forces continued fencing along the Afghan border region to stop the flow of anti-Pakistan militants from entering its territory.
Pakistan’s military has sought to oppose ISIS-K and combats the group through security efforts in Pakistan. Pakistan continues to conduct CT operations against AQIS operational networks in Pakistan when an assessed threat is present.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. The Taliban and ISIS-K continue to prioritize high-profile attacks (HPAs), particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of widespread insecurity, and undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. The total number of high-profile attacks have steadily decreased in both Kabul and the country as a whole over the past year and a half. From December 1, 2018, to May 15, 2019, there were 6 high-profile attacks in Kabul, as compared to 17 during the same period last year. One such attack occurred on April 20, 2019, when ISIS-K initiated an attack against the Ministry of Communications. The attack caused an estimated 16 civilian casualties and six ANDSF casualties.

Influence of Other Regional Actors

U.S. strategy calls for a regional approach to enhance stability in South Asia by building a broad consensus for a stable Afghanistan, emphasizing regional economic integration and cooperation, stressing cooperation for an Afghan-led peace process, and holding countries accountable for their use of proxies or other means to undermine stability and regional confidence. DoD is part of a whole-of-government approach designed to isolate the Taliban and other terrorists from sources of external support and to mitigate malign influence from regional actors.

Russia

Russia engages a wide range of actors in Afghanistan—the government in Kabul, northern power brokers, key regional actors, and the Taliban—to expand its influence and mitigate instability in Central Asia. Russia considers the Taliban an unavoidable element of a stable Afghanistan and provides limited materiel support to cultivate influence with the group. Amid rumors of a U.S. troop drawdown, Russia has expanded its efforts to influence reconciliation talks, cast the United States as an unreliable security partner, and bolster military capabilities in Tajikistan.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) touts peace talks in Moscow as inclusive, Afghan-organized alternatives to U.S. negotiations with the Taliban. The second iteration of the Moscow Format, on November 9, 2018, featured a Taliban Political Commission (TPC) delegation, the Afghan High Peace Council, representatives from eight regional countries, and observers from the United States and India. On February 6, 2019, the intra-Afghan dialogue between the Taliban and Afghan opposition politicians convened in Moscow, but Russia claimed that the Moscow-based Council of Afghans Society organized the meeting with no direction from the Russian Government.

Russian MFA officials continue to encourage the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan and claim that U.S. airstrikes increase the risk of transnational terrorism. Russia publicly complains...
that the United States undermines Russian efforts to cooperate with the Afghan Government on arms sales and military training. Russian military forces stationed at the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan maintain a high training tempo, routinely conducting unilateral and multilateral exercises to maintain preparedness against cross-border violence originating in northern Afghanistan. In his yearly December press conference, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned of increasing ISIS activity in Afghanistan, claiming that Russia would improve its force posture at the 201st as long as threats persist.

**Central Asia**

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (collectively, Central Asia) view stability and security in Afghanistan in terms of the development of the wider Central Asian region. Some of the States have expressed concern that ISIS-K may expand from Afghanistan into Central Asia and destabilize the region. During this reporting period, two of the Central Asian states have expressed a willingness to host peace talks. Uzbekistan seeks to leverage its desired position as a regional leader and key economic link to Afghanistan to promote peace efforts and economic development. Tashkent hosted a peace conference in March 2018 on Afghanistan and engages with the international community and Taliban representatives to foster dialogue.

**Iran**

Iran seeks a stable Afghan Government that is responsive to Iranian goals, the elimination of ISIS-K, the removal of the U.S./NATO presence, and the protection of Iranian concerns, such as water rights and border security. Iran pursues these goals using a multitrack strategy of engaging and trying to grow ties with the Afghan Government, expanding trade and economic investments, and providing calibrated support to the Taliban while trying not to alienate Afghanistan. Iranian involvement is most prominent in western, central, and northern Afghanistan, where local Afghans share common history, culture, religion, and language with Iran. Iran is currently Afghanistan’s largest trading partner, having surpassed Pakistan in 2016, according to press reporting.

Iran provides weapons; explosives, training, financing, and political support to the Taliban to counter the Western military presence, combat ISIS-K, and position itself as an arbiter for peace talks. Iran has historically calibrated its assistance to the Taliban to provide enough aid to maintain influence with the group and achieve its goals without providing the Taliban the capability to alter the strategic balance and return to power. Iran provides this support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), Iran’s external operations element. In April 2019, the United States declared the IRGC a terrorist organization.

Following widespread indications in December that the United States would draw down its forces in Afghanistan, Iran increased outreach to Kabul and portrayed itself as a broker of peace between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. In late December, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, traveled to Kabul to discuss combating terrorism, improving border security, and promoting cooperation between the two countries. A few days later, Iran hosted a Taliban delegation in Tehran to discuss reconciliation negotiations.
Iran reportedly provides funding to political candidates in Afghanistan. This is to cultivate allies in an attempt to support an Iran-friendly candidate in the upcoming Afghan presidential election. Members of Parliament and security officials also report that Iran bribes local and central government officials to advance Iranian interests.

**China**

China has broadened its relationship with Afghanistan, which largely confined to economic matters before 2015, toward a greater emphasis on political and military engagement. China has integrated Afghanistan into new multilateral security mechanisms, and promoted counterterrorism (CT) and economic integration between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China is primarily concerned that Uighur militants transit through the Afghanistan Wakhan Corridor, which borders China’s Xinjiang Province. In late 2018, Afghanistan’s ambassador in Beijing told reporters that Afghan troops would train in China, which would assist in the establishment of an Afghan mountain brigade to patrol the Wakhan Corridor. China’s Ministry of National Defense has not confirmed whether the program has reached its finish. Their only comments were that China and Afghanistan have normal military-to-military cooperation and that China supported Afghanistan’s efforts to build CT capabilities.

China formed the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM) on CT with member states Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan in 2016. The QCCM holds several yearly dialogues that focus on CT cooperation in Central Asia. In 2017, China claimed that it was ready to use the QCCM mechanism to address terrorism and safeguard regional stability, and extended public support for an Afghan-led reconciliation process.

**India**

India desires a stable Afghanistan that does not harbor terrorists who could target Indian interests and does not have close ties with Pakistan. There are no reports indicating that India has taken any serious action during the reporting period that would affect the situation in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, India supported the former Northern Alliance; and maintains contact with Afghan power brokers.

India has transferred a total of eight Mi-35 helicopters to the Afghan Air Force, four during 2015/2016 and four more during 2018. This aid marks a significant departure from India’s previous policy of providing only non-lethal military assistance. Pakistani sensitivities towards Indian involvement in the country ultimately limited the assistance. Additionally, the Indian military provides procurement and training support to help professionalize the Afghan military and to improve its vehicle maintenance capabilities.

India has traditionally had strong ties with Afghanistan and remains the largest regional donor to the country ($3 billion since 2001). Indian aid to Afghanistan focuses primarily on four main categories: humanitarian assistance, major infrastructure projects, small and community-based projects, and education and capacity development. In the event of a U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan, India likely will attempt to continue its support to Afghanistan and try to limit
Taliban, Pakistani, and Chinese influence. A significant deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan, however, may adversely affect the ability of India to provide aid.

**The Gulf States**

The Gulf States seek a stable Afghanistan, and they support a ceasefire and peace process between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. Press reports from 2019 also indicate that Saudi Arabia and the UAE aspire to minimize Iranian and Qatari influence in Afghanistan. Qatar hosts the Taliban Political Commission (TPC) and provides a venue for peace negotiations. The UAE hosted a multilateral dialogue on the peace process in December 2018, and Saudi Arabia has participated in and supported the peace process. Qatar’s C-17 aircraft provide airlift for NATO operations in Afghanistan.

**Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups**

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and Coalition forces. The presence of more than 20 terrorist organizations in the region creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world.

**The Taliban**

During this reporting period, the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network (HQN), has continued to conduct operations. On April 12, 2019, the Taliban announced the start of their spring offensive, naming the campaign Operation *Fath* (Arabic for “Victory”). The Taliban is conducting a nationwide insurgency in Afghanistan in pursuit of the following goals: the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, establishment of a government with Islamic principles, and international political recognition. The Taliban is attempting to use its battlefield efforts to strengthen its negotiating position with the United States. Throughout the winter, the Taliban conducted attacks against ANDSF and Coalition Forces, including a high-profile attack and a complex attack. Recent peace negotiations have not halted the Taliban’s military operations and asymmetric attacks. During the reporting period, Pakistani military operations had no observable impact on Taliban battlefield activities or military capabilities.

The Haqqani Network continues to be integral to the Taliban’s effort to pressure the Afghan Government in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. According to press reporting and public Taliban release statements, since Sirajuddin Haqqani’s installment as Deputy Leader of the Taliban in 2015, he has likely increased the Haqqani Network’s influence within the Taliban organization, as well as in areas outside of HQN’s normal operating region: Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost Provinces in eastern Afghanistan.

The Taliban has demonstrated an increasing capability to threaten district centers, attack well-defended military installations, and attack compounds with a Coalition presence. During this reporting cycle, however, more than 50 percent of Taliban attacks against the ANDSF targeted isolated checkpoints and outposts. The Taliban maintains control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan Government representation, seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence. The Taliban continues to maintain its ability to conduct
high-profile asymmetric attacks. The early March 2019 attack on the 215 Maiwand Corps at Camp Shorab in Helmand Province killed 23 soldiers at the cost of 20 Taliban fighters. This attack penetrated a heavily defended base, suggesting that the Taliban has enough confidence of success to commit considerable resources towards high-profile assaults against heavily defended military installations.

**ISIS-K**

During this reporting period, ISIS-K maintained the ability to defend itself and conduct attacks, and made territorial gains in its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan despite pressure from the Coalition, ANDSF, and the Taliban. The detention of ISIS-K militants in Kabul temporarily degraded the attack tempo and denied propaganda victories. Over the past few years ISIS-Khorasan continues to take a more active role in the management of regional ISIS networks in India, Bangladesh, and other areas assigned by ISIS-core, but its progress in enabling or inspiring attacks outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan very likely has been limited.

ISIS-K maintains the capability to conduct mass casualty attacks with the intent to weaken public support for the Afghan Government and the Taliban. During this reporting period, it conducted attacks primarily against Afghan Government and security forces and election targets of opportunity. ISIS-K also conducted several attacks in December and again in February and March against Taliban forces and ANDSF in Kunar Province aimed at expanding their territory. In March 2019, ISIS-K launched a rocket attack against a political gathering in Kabul and a suicide attack near Jalalabad Airfield killing at least 11 and 16 people, respectively. ISIS-K has fewer than 2,000 fighters operating in its safehaven in eastern Afghanistan. In this period, ISIS-K remained consolidated in pockets of its primary safehaven in Nangarhar, but did make territorial gains against the Taliban in Kunar Province. Social media remains the primary method for ISIS affiliates to communicate, and it is also a medium through which ISIS propaganda influences online.

Regionally, the group continues to evade, counter, and recover from sustained CT and combat pressure to maintain its territorial safehaven in eastern Afghanistan, from which it plans attacks and spreads its ideology to displace al-Qa’ida and the Taliban as the predominant regional militant group. Although ISIS-K continues to develop connections to other networks outside of Afghanistan, it remains operationally limited to South and Central Asia.

**Al-Qa’ida**

Al-Qa’ida poses a very limited threat to U.S. personnel and our partners in Afghanistan. Al-Qa’ida’s affiliate—al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)—poses a greater threat to those elements. AQIS routinely supports and works with low-level Taliban in its efforts to undermine the Afghan Government, and maintains an enduring interest in attacking U.S. forces and Western targets in the region. AQIS faces continuous Coalition CT pressure and will focus on ensuring its safe haven remains viable. Additionally, AQIS assists local Taliban in some attacks, according to al-Qa’ida statements.

The few remaining al-Qa’ida personnel focus largely on survival, while ceding al-Qa’ida’s regional presence to AQIS. AQIS continues to work toward its stated goals of freeing occupied
Muslim lands, establishing an Islamic caliphate, and implementing *Shar’ia* law. AQIS’s interest in attacking U.S. forces and other Western targets in Afghanistan and the region persists, however, continuing Coalition CT pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan.

**Security Trends**

From December 1, 2018, to May 15, 2019, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks was 4,312 and the monthly average was 784. By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the same time last year (December 1, 2017 to May 15, 2018) was 4,795 and the monthly average was 872.

*Figure 3: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks*

The Coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks,\(^{13}\) which are a subset of all security incidents.\(^{14}\) Direct fire attacks against minimally manned Afghan outposts and checkpoints remain by far the largest source of effective

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\(^{13}\) Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks experience delays by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

\(^{14}\) Since ANDSF units often do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire initiated by friendly forces).
enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes (see Figure 4). Consistent with trends during the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady during the last 18 months.

Figure 4: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type

ANDSF Casualties

The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting local patrols was at the same level as the same period last year. The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting checkpoint operations were seven percent higher than the same reporting period last year. The number of casualties incurred during offensive operations has increased by 17 percent over the same period. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks; IED attacks and mine strikes contribute to overall casualties but at a much lower level.

U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

Conducting U.S. CT operations and RS TAA missions with the ANDSF still entails risks to U.S. and Coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, October 2001, 1,894 U.S military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) and 20,493 have been wounded in action (WIA) as of May 31, 2019. During the reporting period, there were eight U.S. military deaths because of hostile actions and 34 U.S. military personnel WIA.

15 Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
16 Data was accessed in the Defense Casualty Analysis System on December 12, 2018.
The following summary includes KIA casualties from operations and from insider attacks:

On December 2, 2018, one service member died because of an IED attack during combat operations in Andar District, Ghazni Province on November 27, 2018.

On January 13, 2019, a service member was KIA because of small arms fire while conducting operations in Jawand District, Badghis Province.

On January 22, 2019, one service member was KIA in Uruzgan Province.

On March 21, 2019, military personnel were conducting a dismounted operation in Talawka Village, Kunduz Province when they engaged enemy forces and came under fire. The attack resulted in two military personnel KIA.

On April 8, 2019, military personnel were conducting convoy operations in Bagram when they came under attack by enemy forces. The attack resulted in three military personnel KIA and three WIA.

During this reporting period, there were no insider attacks against U.S. personnel. U.S. forces and the Afghan Government continue their efforts to reduce the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks). Improvements included the increased use of enhanced screening techniques for existing ANDSF and new recruits. On September 8, 2017, the Afghan MoD signed a new Force Protection / Insider Threat policy. The policy improves training and procedures on force protection of Afghans and Coalition members. The MoI is developing a similar policy.

Between December 1, 2018, and May 25, 2019, the Afghan Government reported 25 insider attacks against Afghan personnel (also known as “green-on-green” insider attacks). RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Compared to the previous reporting period and to the same time-period last year, insider attacks against the ANDSF have decreased by over 50 percent and the number deaths caused by those attacks have decreased by almost 20 percent.

2.3 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Preventing civilian casualties remains a top priority for U.S. forces. USFOR-A takes extraordinary measures to reduce and mitigate civilian casualties. USFOR-A recognizes and respects its moral, ethical, and professional imperative to reduce and mitigate these casualties, consistent with the law of war. USFOR-A uses reports of civilian casualties to determine if and how such losses of life could have been averted and to evaluate and improve upon its ability to protect civilians in the future.

On May 1, 2019, DoD submitted to the Congress the report, entitled “Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United States Military Operations,” pursuant to Section 1057 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. In this report, DoD informed Congress that USFOR-A was responsible for 76 civilians killed and 58 civilians wounded in Afghanistan.
from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Although DoD does not enumerate child casualties in its
official reports to the Congress, the Commander, USFOR-A, confirmed that out of the total 134
civilian deaths and injuries in 2018 for which USFOR-A was responsible, 42 were children,
including 31 killed and 11 injured.

**RS and UNAMA Reporting Differences During 1st Quarter of 2019**

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT), which collects civilian casualty data for the
coinalition, documented 1,512 total civilian casualties during the first quarter of 2019 (January 1 –
March 31, 2019), of which 401 were killed and 1,111 were injured. The CCMT relies primarily
upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. During the first quarter of 2019, the
CCMT attributed 1,289 casualties (303 killed and 986 injured) to insurgents and terrorists; 84
casualties (36 killed and 48 injured) to the ANDSF; and 70 casualties (47 killed and 23 injured)
to U.S.-led Coalition forces. The CCMT attributed the rest of the 69 casualties (15 killed and 54
injured) to other parties of the conflict.

**Figure 5: RS CCMT vs UNAMA Reporting for 2019 Quarter 1 (January 1 – March 31, 2019)**

In contrast, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) latest report
claimed that there were 1,773 civilian casualties for the same period in 2019, of which 581 were
killed and 1,192 were injured. UNAMA reported that insurgents and terrorists were responsible
for 963 casualties (227 killed and 736 injured). UNAMA also reported that the ANDSF were
responsible for 305 casualties (115 killed and 190 injured); and that international military forces
were responsible for 232 casualties (146 killed and 86 injured). UNAMA attributed the remaining 273 casualties (93 killed and 180 injured) to other parties to the conflict.

The difference in the reported numbers of civilian casualties between the CCMT and UNAMA is primarily due to different sources of information and different standards of evidence collection methodology. CCMT has access to a wider range of forensic data than such civilian organizations, including full-motion video, operational summaries, aircraft mission reports, intelligence reports, digital and other imagery, open-source media, social media, and other sources. CCMT’s civilian casualty assessment process requires that all reports of civilian casualties be initially assessed within 24 hours of receipt to identify quickly whether additional assessment will be necessary to determine whether the report is likely accurate. Allegations for which there is sufficient, reliable information are forwarded to the responsible operational command for additional review. These procedures allow USFOR-A to assess with a relatively high degree of confidence the circumstances of each report of civilian casualties. By contrast, the UNAMA reports rely primarily on human sources that may have only limited relevant information about an event, or, at times, may provide false information, including even about whether a casualty was a noncombatant civilian or a combatant.

**Resolute Support Civilian Casualty Data from December 1, 2018, to May 31, 2019**

The CCMT documented 3,163 civilian casualties from December 31, 2018, to May 31, 2019, of which 950 were killed and 2,213 were injured. Of the 3,163 civilian casualties, CCMT attributed 115 (60 killed and 55 injured) to the U.S. led Coalition, 158 (68 killed and 90 injured) to the ANDSF, 2,749 (778 killed and 1,971 injured) to insurgents and terrorists, and 141 (44 killed and 97 injured) to unknown parties to the conflict.

**Figure 6: CCMT Reported Civilian Casualties During Reporting Period**

![Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan by Cause (December 2018 – May 2019)](image)

17 The vast majority of the civilian casualties (81 percent killed and 89 percent wounded) can be attributed to the Taliban, ISIS-K, and other insurgent groups.
Efforts to Mitigate Civilian Casualties

U.S. and Coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan Government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. Advising also focuses on practical measures the ANDSF can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. Since the beginning of 2017, RS has provided training to ANDSF in the prevention and mitigation of civilian casualties, focusing on accurate definition and identification of civilians during conflict and civilian casualty preventing. The training also addresses mitigation efforts during pre-operational planning, execution of operations, and post-operational consequence management, such as reporting, investigation, data collection, and victim assistance. In addition, U.S. advisors provide Afghan pilots with extensive training on the proper employment of weapons systems and their effects during all phases of flight training and provide pilots and units with training on proper employment of the Afghan rules of engagement.

RS personnel meet with UNAMA staff every month to discuss RS assessments of UNAMA’s allegations of civilian casualties and to compare UNAMA and RS tracked casualties caused by insurgents and terrorists. The Deputy Commander, Resolute Support also meets monthly with UNAMA leadership. During this reporting period, COMUSFOR-A, met with United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA Yamamoto to discuss civilian casualties in Afghanistan during first quarter of calendar year 2019 (January 1 – March 31, 2019) and actions to mitigate them. It is important to note that since late 2018, USFOR-A increased military pressure in support of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban; this led to an increase in kinetic strikes and operations across Afghanistan.

USFOR-A routinely halts combat operations in order to render aid to civilians in distress, often at considerable risk to its forces’ own lives, and USFOR-A regularly transports injured civilians, adults, and children alike, to U.S. medical facilities in Afghanistan for stabilization and treatment. Many of the civilian casualties are self-reported by USFOR-A, in adherence to military professional standards. It is also worth noting that, as the United Nations has documented, the Taliban routinely uses civilians as human shields and coerces civilians in order to use their dwellings, both to billet their fighters and to conduct attacks, thereby deliberately placing civilians in harm’s way. In order to continue creating conditions for an Afghan State that respects fundamental human rights, the United States and its partners must continue to fight the Taliban alongside efforts to negotiate peace.

Moreover, DoD has a designated senior civilian official responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing compliance with DoD policies addressing civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. DoD is in the process of developing an additional overarching policy to guide our forces’ efforts to minimize civilian casualties. During this reporting period, DoD hosted one senior and three working-level roundtables with key humanitarian and human rights organizations to inform and consult on the civilian harm mitigation policy. DoD is also developing capacity-building approaches to support partner nation development, including in Afghanistan, of standard operating procedures to avoid civilian casualties, to implement the law of war more effectively, and to collect, track, and analyze civilian casualty data.
2.4 SECURITY OF AFGHAN WOMEN AND GIRLS\footnote{Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c) (1) (A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.}

The RS Gender Directorate works with key representatives in the ANA and ANP to develop tangible female integration objectives in the security sector. Advisors link gender integration objectives to the ANDSF Roadmap through a Gender Plan. In addition to TAA of the MoD and MoI, the Gender Directorate maintains responsibility for ensuring RS and ANDSF incorporate gender perspectives and considerations into all aspects of mission planning, operations, and activities, including efforts in support of peace and reconciliation.

The number of women in the ANDSF increased during this reporting period to roughly 4,500, but significant organizational and cultural challenges to integrate women into the ANDSF and Afghan society remain prevalent. Women in the ANDSF suffer from the lack of a deliberate force development and planning mechanism, which inhibits women’s career progression, perceived value, and utilization. Structural barriers towards women in the security sector, combined with traditional cultural norms and insecurity in the country, have resulted in incremental progress on recruitment and integration efforts during this reporting period.

Security remains a concern for female members of the ANDSF. Some women are afraid to wear their uniforms while travelling to work sites for fear of harassment and personal attacks. Once at work, inadequate facilities and a lack of female changing rooms contribute to an air of exclusion and present opportunities for sexual harassment. With the support of RS advisors, MoD and MoI officials conduct site surveys of Afghan locations that employ women to determine how to improve those facilities for the women. A large percentage of women, especially in the ANA, are located in Kabul. Although some provinces have few (if any) female ANDSF represented, force development and recruitment efforts need to be initiated for select provinces where the recruitment of women can provide employment opportunities, while demonstrating their abilities and value in the security sector. True change can only occur once communities (religious leaders, families, etc.) can be convinced that women can and should play a role in the security of their country.

Sexual abuse, harassment, and gender-based violence present a threat to the successful integration and long-term retention of women in the ANDSF. The MoD approved a sexual harassment and sexual assault policy in October 2018 and began implementing the training and education plan to support this policy. The MoI has not developed an agreed-upon policy, but it has processes in place for managing sexual harassment complaints in the workplace. Training in the management, investigation, and successful prosecution of sexual misconduct crimes is essential for a secure workplace, and RS advisors will continue to TAA this line of effort.

Most reported cases of violence against women are the result of domestic abuse. The MoI established Family Response Units (FRU) across Afghanistan in 2014 to assist women and children victims of domestic abuse. Some FRUs are staffed with specialists, such as psychologists and social workers, who interview and screen victims for follow-on physical and mental health treatment. The goal is for each FRU site is to have an onsite female FRU manager, female police officer and additional security in the event of multiple cases.
Momentum towards peace negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban during this reporting period directly affected the campaign objectives and method of employment of the ANDSF. With U.S. and Coalition support, the ANDSF increasingly targeted the Taliban with military pressure throughout the winter and into the spring to convince the Taliban that they cannot achieve their objectives by prolonging the conflict, and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement. Increased ANDSF offensive operations against the Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks, primarily by the ASSF, during this reporting period focused on disrupting the Taliban’s freedom of action and defending key terrain. Key terrain included major population centers, critical infrastructure, points of entry into Afghanistan, and lines of communication between population centers. During the last six months, the ANDSF focused on applying constant military pressure to the Taliban and ISIS-K networks to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement. The ANDSF experienced an extended summer fighting season and transitioned to parliamentary election security in the fall, followed by an increase in offensive winter operations. Although Taliban fighting capacity also suffered during this period, the Taliban retain safe havens and recruiting pools in areas not targetable by ANDSF. Meanwhile, the ANDSF must fulfill security and governance responsibilities, limiting opportunities to reset.

Neither the ANDSF nor insurgent forces have been able to gain a decisive advantage during the reporting period. The ANDSF maintain control of most of the populated areas and the Taliban consolidated gains in rural and remote portions of Afghanistan, as well as of contested lines of communications. Despite the atypical levels of violence during this period, the security situation and the geographical disposition of forces remained largely the same with the ANDSF in control of the population centers and the Taliban controlling or contesting large portions of lightly populated rural Afghanistan.

During this reporting period, the RS staff significantly improved integration of U.S. and Coalition CT and TAA objectives with ANDSF campaign objectives. On a weekly basis, RS operational planners and senior leaders met with MoD and MoI senior planners and senior leaders to share intelligence, set objective priorities, allocate assets, and synchronize operations. This collaborative process resulted in more focused application of military pressure and concentrated effects on Taliban and ISIS-K leaders and networks. It also reduced the number of operations not tied to priority objectives, and trained ministerial and ANDSF senior leaders to do a better job of planning and synchronizing operations.

Combined arms maneuver and integration of combat enablers such as artillery, ISR, and aviation assets presented challenges to the ANDSF as Operation NASRAT ended and Operation KHALID, the 2019 annual campaign plan, began. Kabul security remained a top priority for the ANDSF. HPAs in Kabul undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan Government and undercut population confidence in Afghan security forces.

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19 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(C) and (D) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
Outside of Kabul, Operation *KHALID* prioritized agile and responsive concentration of combat power integrated with U.S. CT and RS TAA operations over large, Corps and Brigade-level extended operations. The ANDSF continued to utilize ASSF forces for most offensive operations, and conventional ANDSF focused on wide area security with an emphasis on controlling population centers. Where possible, the ANDSF extended security around the population centers to provide the standoff necessary to engage Taliban forces massing for an attack and mitigate the risk of civilian casualties. These efforts were only marginally successful due to the continued overuse of static checkpoints siphoning away combat power and presenting vulnerable targets for Taliban attacks.

**Afghan Special Security Force Misuse**

During this reporting period, ASSF misuse, which had risen to unsustainable levels in September 2018, improved considerably. Codification of proper employment of ASSF into Concept of Employment (CoE) documents resulted in a common understanding among U.S. and coalition advisors and ANDSF leaders on ASSF employment and were a useful tool in holding the ANDSF accountable. In rare instances, RS levied financial penalties on the ANDSF for misuse; however, the establishment of a common standard and relationships based on trust and mutual respect between leaders and advisors proved sufficient.

Statistically, the number of reported incidents of misuse decreased by nearly 50 percent. Strict interpretation of the CoEs would result in a somewhat smaller reduction of ASSF misuse. The most significant change during this reporting period was the reduction in instances where ASSF occupied static defensive positions or checkpoints. ANA Corps commanders increasingly utilized ASSF on offensive operations to expand local security around population centers and ANA defensive positions. Although not technically a special operations force mission, these types of activities were a positive step forward in employing ASSF. Additionally, significantly improved RS and ANDSF collaboration via weekly security meetings provided a routine forum to address ASSF misuse and encourage proper employment.

### 3.1 ANDSF ROADMAP PROGRESS

The third year of the ANDSF Roadmap continued during this report period. The Roadmap develops capability and capacity of the ANDSF by focusing on four key elements: leadership development, enhanced fighting capabilities, unity of command/unity of effort, and counter-corruption. The priority is the enhancement of the ASSF to reinforce the success of the most effective units.

**Leader Development**

In 2018, the MoD established the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC). This critical point of TAA has brought together disparate organizations under one three-star command. UTEDC’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) will enable the ANA to reduce 13 separate branch schools to four, increasing affordability and effectiveness. RS identified the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), the Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC), and the Regional Training Centers (RTC) as decisive terrain for advising. With massed advising efforts
and prioritized resourcing at these nodes, CSTC-A will synchronize Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate (AME) TAA to ensure the institutions produce a capable soldiers, police, and leaders.

A generational change in leadership began within the MoD in January 2018 with the first wave of Inherent Law retirements (including 657 colonels and generals)—and subsequent merit-based promotions—and continued this reporting period when the MoD retired 996 colonels and 83 generals under the second and third waves of the Inherent Law. Similar changes in MoI leadership continued this reporting period when the MoI retired 1,138 colonels and 281 generals. This generational change of leadership will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders selected based on merit rather than patronage and who’s formative military experience were with U.S. forces and training institutions rather than with the former Soviet Union. The anticipated rapid turnover of personnel underscores the importance of ministerial commitment to facilitate an orderly transition and oversee the education and training of new leadership.

Figure 7: Inherent Law Retirement Waves

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Increase Fighting Capabilities

The priority of the ANDSF Roadmap is the enhancement of the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) and addressing Afghan aviation capability gaps. The ASSF accounts for a small portion of the ANDSF, but conducts the majority of the ANDSF offensive missions. During this reporting period, ASSF growth progressed on schedule and achieved over 80 percent of its projected end strength planned for 2020. The United States addresses Afghan aviation capability gaps through the replacement of the Mi-17 fleet with U.S.-made helicopters and the delivery of additional platforms organic to the AAF and SMW. The AAF pilot training is maintaining pace with AAF growth milestones and incoming platforms.

Unity of Command/Effort

The National Military Coordination Center (NMCC) and the National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) provide unity of command vertically from ASI to ANDSF, and horizontally across Corps and provinces. The NMCC and NPCC build situational understanding at a centralized headquarters by pulling operational information from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). During this reporting period, primary TAA efforts focused on strengthening the command and control process and using 24-hour advising at the Coordination Centers to enable these two agencies to affect the fight.
**Counter-Corruption**

RS has a Counter-Corruption Advisor Group (CCAG) to analyze and target corruption networks in both the MoI and the MoD, as well as corruption stemming from criminal patronage and narcotics networks. The CCAG synchronizes counter-corruption efforts among Afghan security institutions, RS, and international partners. Additional information on counter-corruption is located in section four.

### 3.2 ANDSF STRUCTURE

The current ANDSF authorized force level remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP).\(^\text{20}\) The United States is the sole international financial supporter of the ALP. The ANDSF consists of three components: conventional ground forces (ANA and ANP), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF). The MoD oversees the ANA, the Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF), the Afghan Border Force (ABF), the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC and the SMW. The MoI oversees the four ANP forces that include Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Public Security Police (PSP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP), ALP, and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The MoI also provides oversight of the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU) and the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).

MoD forces provide security to the Afghan people through the execution of offensive combat operations against threats to the government and the Afghan populace. MoD forces also provide security along the Afghan border and protect lines of communication and critical infrastructure. MoI forces execute community policing and rule of law. In addition, they also conduct counter-corruption and counter-narcotics operations.

The MoD is authorized 227,374 personnel and the MoI is authorized 124,626 personnel. Lack of U.S. and Coalition presence at lower levels throughout the ANDSF forces increased reliance on manual Afghan reporting. Over the past two years, Coalition advisors have assisted the MoD and MoI in the conduct of Personnel Asset Inventories (PAI) to account properly for ANDSF personnel and to facilitate enrollment in the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS). The collection of biometric data and other information required for APPS has begun to provide a more realistic assessment of the actual size of the force. CSTC-A only pays salaries based on validated personnel in the APPS database.

The APPS improves situational understanding and financial accountability for the Afghan Government. As of May 26, 2019, APPS validated 180,888 ANA and 91,596 ANP personnel as enrolled in APPS and assigned to authorized positions. The APPS mandate for pay incentivizes the Afghan Government to make an enduring commitment to new Soldier and Police enrollment in APPS. ANDSF authorization data transitioned from a hard-copy document maintained by U.S. and Coalition advisors to an Afghan-accessible database, hosted in APPS. This extends process

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\(^\text{20}\) The authorized strength of 352,000 personnel includes 227,374 ANA and 124,626 ANP. Before implementation of the ANDSF Road Map, which moved certain MoI forces to the MoD, the ANA was authorized 195,000 personnel and the MoI was authorized 157,000. The ALP counts as a separate organization.
ownership to the Afghans with oversight by U.S. and Coalition advisors. Afghan MoD personnel can make authorization changes and corrections. APPS training for the MoI personnel is ongoing, setting them on the path to also process authorization changes and corrections in the coming years.

3.3 PROGRESS ON DEVELOPING MINISTRY CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

During this reporting period, RS focused on 10 priorities:
- leader development,
- reducing the number of vulnerable checkpoints,
- countering corruption,
- improving logistics,
- improving accountability of personnel and equipment,
- reducing attrition through better care of soldiers and police,
- standardization of training,
- better MoD and MoI budget execution,
- improving processes for paying soldier and police salaries,
- improving ANSF facilities.

Leader Development

Although ANDSF branch schools and training centers remained a priority, MoD and MoI leaders routinely chose to assume risk in institutional development and soldier and police training by assigning trainers to line units in need of replacement personnel. More coalition forces with the right expertise were assigned to advise these institutions; however, the lack of qualified Afghan instructors again prevented the training centers and schools from operating at full capacity. Through the inherent law, a change of leadership will open senior leadership positions for the next generation of ANDSF leaders selected based on merit rather than patronage and who’s formative military experience were with U.S. forces.

Reducing Checkpoints

When properly emplaced and managed, checkpoints may play a part in enabling security forces to provide security. Excessive and ineffective checkpoints, however, change the ANDSF posture from offensive to defensive, and create a gap in the ability of the ANDSF to generate sufficient combat or policing power to preempt or even counter Taliban operations. During this reporting period, the ANDSF continued to occupy an excessive number of checkpoints, hampering efforts to expand security and providing the Taliban opportunities to inflict a high number of casualties. The overwhelming majority of successful Taliban attacks against ANDSF forces and over half of the ANDSF casualties occurred at poorly manned static checkpoints.

The agreement to reduce the number of fixed checkpoints across Afghanistan and the increasing number of casualties taken at checkpoints led to a reduction in the number of checkpoints during the reporting period. More frequently, RS advisors worked with ANDSF leaders to assess the efficacy of checkpoints and validate ones that were positioned appropriately and served a legitimate tactical purpose. TAAC advisors and CSTC-A worked with ANDSF leadership to harden validated checkpoints with protective materiel and ensure the checkpoints were manned appropriately. Overuse of static checkpoints remains a significant concern for Resolute Support.

**Counter-Corruption**

President Ghani continues to demonstrate his commitment to addressing corruption by enforcing the investigation and prosecution of corrupt officials through the concerted efforts of the MoI’s Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), the Ministry of Justice’s Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), and the Afghan Attorney General’s office.

From December 1, 2018 to March 1, 2019, the ACJC prosecuted more than 30 high-level corruption defendants, with a 94 percent conviction rate. Convictions included four Colonels, a Deputy Finance Minister, a Mayor, multiple police chiefs, and a Provincial Council Member. The most notable conviction is that of COL Abdul Hamid, former Chief of the General Command Police Special Units (GCPSU), who is carrying out a sentence of seven years and six months in jail for treachery and forgery in connection with an $80,000 fraud scheme. COL Hamid’s case also marks the first time that a suspect arrested through the Rule of Law-led Warrant Action Group process led to trial and conviction.

The ACJC’s monthly rate of prosecutions is still far below expectations for the 84 investigative prosecutors currently assigned there. From December 1, 2018 to March 1, 2019, however, the number of ACTC trials was 33 percent higher than during the same period in 2018. In fact, in January 2019, the ACJC held five trials—more than in any other month since the court’s inception.

**Improving Logistics**

The provision of food, fuel, equipment, ammunition, and maintenance is essential to ensuring the ANDSF can complete their missions. Both the MoD and MoI have the capacity to support the ANA and ANP, and have robust stockpiles of equipment as a result of nearly $47 billion worth of supplies provided by the United States alone since 2002. Still, ANDSF units often claim that a shortage of supplies hampers operations. In reality, the ANDSF do not have a supply problem; rather, they have a distribution problem. During this reporting period, OS-LOG focused TAA efforts on improving distribution of supplies from the MoD’s Central Supply Depot (CSD) to the MoD Forward Supply Depots (FSDs), and from the MoI National Logistics Center (NLC) to the Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs). These efforts proved largely successful and resulted in supplies moving closer to the point of need.

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22 Information on counter-corruption addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e)(2)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
RS also advised the MoD and MoI to treat onward movement of supplies and logistics as tactical convoy movements that require planning, communication, and coordination. In doing so, MoD and MoI planners began utilizing the NMCC to coordinate with ANA Corps for security along the route.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC) for ground vehicles established maintenance standards and training across 17 national and regional-level sites in support of the ANDSF. During this reporting period, the ANP actual workshare split exceeded their target goal of 10 percent. The ANA actual workshare split fell short of the target goal of 55 percent, although it remains within 10 percentage points of the target goal.

**Core-IMS**

The ANDSF expanded use of the Core-Information Management System (Core-IMS) and began implementing additional modules to improve visibility and awareness of equipment across the ANA and ANP. Inconsistent and inaccurate equipment reporting within the system at the Corps and RLC-levels, however, continues to restrict the ministries’ ability to track equipment transfers, identify equipment shortages, and build a procurement plan, while literacy issues have resulted in local users struggling to reconcile on-hand inventories with the system. Core-IMS has enhanced transparency and accountability of U.S.-funded equipment and supplies, including OCIE, weapons, ammunition, and vehicle spare parts, across the ANDSF’s warehouse network, but the ANDSF require continued TAA to optimize the system.

Core-IMS is an internet-based property accountability system of record that has evolved from a small-scale, off-the-shelf, PC-based tracking tool in 2010 to its current form. Core-IMS capabilities have expanded to allow the MoD and MoI to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to forward supply depots. U.S. materiel purchased for the Afghans through pseudo-FMS cases populate directly into the Core-IMS system through linkages with the SCIP, DoD’s system to track the shipment of equipment from the United States. Core-IMS software is functional at national and regional-levels of the ANDSF. At the national level, the MoD’s Central Supply Depot (CSD) and the MoI’s National Logistics Center (NLC) utilize Core-IMS. Since October 2017, the ANDSF have expanded connectivity of Core-IMS. Today, Core-IMS links to the MoD forward supply depots (FSDs), including the Corps HQs, and the MoI regional logistics centers (RLCs).

Human capital, literacy, computer skills, and corruption all challenge integration of Core-IMS at various echelons of the ANDSF. Some personnel slotted to logistics positions within the ANDSF are not properly trained or may be employed or engaged in non-logistics related tasks following training. In some instances, the ANDSF use logistics positions as placeholders or stepping-stones, preventing the position from filling by the necessary talent. 274 Afghan Logistics Specialists (ALS), local nationals hired to train the MoD and MoI on Logistics Operations, Warehouse Management, and Core-IMS, deploy at the national and regional level to build capacity logistics capacity and help address some of these challenges.

Like APPS, Core-IMS optimization relies on accurate and consistent inputs to ensure proper accountability of equipment and readiness. Although equipment visibility and accountability at
the national and regional levels have improved, many transfers have not been completed within Core-IMS, leaving transactions unacknowledged or improperly receipted. For example, customers typically do not close out transactions once received from the depot. This has led to a steady increase of “In-Transit” items, which reduces the accuracy of the system. RS advisors continue to monitor the issue through observation and site-visits, but the lack of trained personnel, poor connectivity, and a lack of advisor access below the Corps restricts opportunity to resolve these issues.

RS advisors expanded the Military Maintenance Module (M3) and Property Book Module (PBM) during this reporting period, enhancing the ministries’ capability to assign and move assets between organizations and personnel with real-time transparency. M3, first piloted within the ANASOC and 215th Corps last reporting period, is operational at ANASOC and the 215th, 205th, and 203rd Corps. OS has revised the phased-fielding approach to expedite the fielding at the Minister of Interior (MoI) RLCs and remaining Ministry of Defense (MoD) Corps. In late June 2019, OS will conduct a mass M3 training for all ALS assigned to Corps and RLCs. These ALS will then return to their forward duty locations and conduct the training for both M3 and PBM. This change in training method should expedite operational capability at all remaining regional logistic nodes in both the MoD and MoI and allow focus to be applied to Kandaks and Brigades with connectivity. M3 provides units the ability to view available equipment and repair parts across the logistics train. RS advisors hope that enhanced awareness or repair parts allows units to locate and request available parts, thereby expediting repairs of critical combat equipment like vehicles. M3 provides the ANDSF the ability to schedule routine vehicle services and evacuation to higher maintenance nodes when repairs are not possible at local facilities. PBM expanded to six Corps during this reporting period. PBM allows all Corps to see on-hand equipment across the ANA.

**FMS Life Cycle Management (LCM)**

The CSTC-A Security Assistance Office (SAO) maintains responsibility for receiving and executing title transfer of all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) materiel procured in support of the ANDSF. All FMS materiel originates from the United States and ships into theatre via air or surface depending on the commodity type. In FY 2018, the SAO managed $2.95 billion worth of pseudo-FMS cases.

All Class-II Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE), Class-V Ammunition, Class-VII Weapons, Aircraft, and Class-VIII Pharmaceuticals arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul (HKIA). Upon receipt of all FMS weapons, ammunition, and aircraft, SAO transfers title to the MoD or MoI at HKIA for integration into the Afghan supply system. OCIE and pharmaceuticals flown into Kabul transited to nearby SAO-managed FMS Logistics Waypoints. While there, they stay for temporary storage in preparation for future title transfer to the ANDSF. Conversely, all Class-III Packaged POL, Class-VII Major End Items (e.g., Vehicles) and Class-IX Repair Parts are shipped and then trucked through Afghanistan and delivered directly to the FMS Logistics Waypoints in Kabul. During this reporting period, the SAO established a southern vehicle transfer waypoint in Kandahar and consolidated two waypoints near Kabul. The

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23 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Sections 1223(e)(2)(D), 1223(e)(2)(F), 1223(e)(2)(G), 1223(e)(2)(H), and 1223(e)(2)(I) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
increased efficiency of both waypoints will enhance vehicle distribution to the southern and western ANDSF elements, while facilitating the steady flow of vehicles and parts into and across Afghanistan. SAO projects savings of $10.5 million in annual transportation costs from the southern and northern waypoint improvements, reduction in vehicle transit time by about 60 days, and minimization of the risk of damage during transportation.

Once SAO delivers and title transfers FMS materiel to the Afghan Government, materiel oversight and life-cycle management transfer to the corresponding coalition requirement owner, with appropriate reach-back support from acquisition program managers in DoD. For example, TAAC-Air maintains oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured aircraft, whereas program managers in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army provide life-cycle management of the fixed-wing and rotary-wing fleets, respectively. CSTC-A’s Operations Sustainment-Logistics (OS-LOG) branch maintains the same oversight and life-cycle management of all FMS-procured weapons, ammunition, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, repair parts, and OCIE, reaching back to program managers in the U.S. Army to manage the National Maintenance Contract-Ground and procurement of tactical vehicles and ammunition.

When ANDSF units are ready to demilitarize FMS materiel at the end of its life cycle, the owning units request approval from the corresponding ministry. Upon approval, the owning Ministry then submits a Change of End Use Request (CoEUR) to SAO. SAO verifies that the serial numbers included on the CoEUR correlate to an FMS-procured asset, then approves or disapproves the CoUER. After approving the CoEUR, the ANDSF unit coordinates with the requirement owner, such as OS or TAAC-Air, to turn in the assets to DLA for demilitarization. After physically demilitarizing the asset, DLA submits a demilitarization certificate to SAO. Finally, SAO updates the corresponding case in Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), thus completing the life cycle of the FMS asset. Although equipment transferred to the Afghan Government is not U.S. property, U.S. advisors and personnel continue to develop the ministries’ logistics and distributions practices to ensure supplies, equipment, and weaponry supplied by the United States are appropriately distributed, employed by, and accounted for by the ANA and ANP. Core-IMS serves as the primary tool to maintain property accountability and oversight.

**End-Use Monitoring**

In accordance with statutory requirements, equipment provided to the ANDSF is subject to end-use monitoring. In Afghanistan, DoD administers two types of end-use monitoring (EUM): routine and enhanced. For non-sensitive equipment provided to the ANDSF, the SAO conducts routine monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance duties. These actions include observations made during interactions with the ANDSF, visits to defense facilities, and Afghan reporting of on-hand equipment along with serial numbers of lost or damaged equipment. CSTC-A has included this Afghan reporting requirement in its commitment letters for the MoD and MoI.

Enhanced EUM for sensitive articles and technologies requires more intensive and formal monitoring. Enhanced EUM includes equipment delivery records with serial numbers, routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results. In Afghanistan, night-vision devices (NVD) are the primary articles requiring enhanced EUM. SAO logistics personnel are currently performing enhanced EUM efforts to gain accountability of the remaining NVDs. Core-IMS, with PBM and M3, will allow improved
ANDSF equipment reporting and enhanced accuracy and accountability of equipment purchased and transferred to the ANDSF.

**Improving Accountability of Personnel and Equipment**

Personnel management requires ministerial emphasis on training, assignment, promotion and career progression. During this reporting period, advisory and ministerial reform efforts focused on three key areas: validation and optimization of personnel and skillsets within each ministry, identification of future leaders, and career management. APPS implementation continues to allow the ministries to validate personnel and ensure soldiers and police are paid. At President Ghani’s request, the MoD and MoI initiated a review of its headquarters to reduce redundancies and streamline processes. Additional optimization efforts included ensuring that individuals with the right skillsets and the right authorization level perform the functions they are trained to perform. The Inherent Law and merit-based promotions progressed this reporting period, with advisors noting tangible changes in leadership’s adherence to principals like accountability and counter-corruption. Career management maintains a nascent function within both ministries, and a transparent, standardized system for managing individuals’ career from recruitment to retirement does not exist.

According to advisors, a large number of personnel previously trained on APPS no longer occupy APPS user positions. The ministries and RS have established training plans to produce more APPS users, but ensuring trained personnel remain in a position to use the system remains a challenge. In coordination with the APPS Program Manager, RS offered refresher courses in Kabul with a specific focus on PME and attendance. The MoD and MoI utilize an initial four-week APPS operator-training course. After completion, over-the-shoulder (OTS) training occurs at each unit for four to eight weeks. OTS reinforces daily time and attendance record requirements, assists with identifying and reconciling pay discrepancies, and troubleshoots issues.

The benefits of APPS extend beyond payroll system improvements and advisors are working with the ministries to expand the functional capabilities of APPS, including an Evaluation Module that could assist future MoD promotions boards by generating reports of promotable personnel and their records. APPS alone cannot solve the problem of poor career management, and simply understanding where a soldier, NCO, or officer is assigned is insufficient to build a sustainable personnel management capacity. The implementation of APPS can set the conditions for a successful HRM system to grow, but intensive advisor support is required.

**Personnel Asset Inventory and Enrollment**

RS advisors and the ministries have completed personnel asset inventory (PAI) for existing service members and police forces, but biometric enrollment and validation of PAI data is a continuous responsibility. The ministries will biometrically enroll and collect the necessary data for new recruits at entry point into the ANDSF. Within the MoD, the ANA GS G1 has set up PAI operations in each Corps HQ to ensure all new recruits, transfers, service returnees, and personnel requiring renewal of their service member ID be biometrically enrolled. The MoI’s General Recruitment Command (GRC) is reviewing recruiting procedures to the MoI biometrically enrolls and slots new recruits into APPS.
AHRIMS transitioned to a read-only system after all information migrated to APPS. The ministries and RS advisors worked throughout the reporting period to identify, correct, and normalize discrepancies in data transferred from AHRIMS. In some instances, records transferred from AHRIMS to APPS without a Transaction Control Number (TCN)—a number generated through biometric enrollment. At the end of this reporting period, all individual files without a TCN or other missing information was either unassigned and marked as inactive in the system, or removed.

**Reducing Attrition through Better Care of Soldiers and Police**

During this reporting period, recruiting outpaced attrition, but attrition\(^\text{24}\) remains problematic for both the ANA and the ANP. ANA attrition data is more accurate than ANP attrition data due to better personnel systems and higher ANA enrollment rates in APPS. The number of personnel dropped from the rolls (DFR) accounts for the greatest portion of ANA and ANP attrition rates, but DFR rates for both the ANA and the ANP are the lowest levels in four years\(^\text{25}\). DFRs occur for a variety of reasons, including poor unit leadership, low pay or delays in pay, austere living conditions, denial of leave, and intimidation by insurgents. The single greatest contributor to DFRs is poor leadership. Soldiers and police grow disillusioned with leaders who fail to take care of them by ensuring they can take sufficient leave, get promoted, and get paid regularly.

**Standardization of Training\(^\text{26}\)**

The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) made strides to improve its leadership, facilities, and program of instruction under the oversight of the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTED-C); however, lack of trainers largely muted the effects of these improvements. Coalition advisors helped improve the efficiency and quality of the training at KMTC. Advisors assist the MoD and MoI with efforts to make better use of Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC).

UTED-C training and education programs operate at 60 percent of capacity due to a shortage of students and trainers. KMTC has the capacity to conduct concurrently training for up to five classes of 1,400 recruits. With a 12 week Program of Instruction, the annual output would be approximately 28,000 soldiers. In 2018, however, ANAREC was only able to recruit enough soldiers to produce 13 classes, and none of them at capacity. Fifteen of 28 classes cancelled.

During this reporting period, RMTCs saw some improvement, but still struggle with a number of challenges. RMTCs are owned and operated by ANA Corps commanders rather than UTED-C and are required to conduct Basic Warrior Training (BWT) four times per year in support of ORCs.

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\(^{24}\) Attrition is unplanned and planned total losses, including losses resulting from personnel dropped from rolls (DFR), killed in action (KIA), separation, and other [disappearance/captured, disability, death (not in action), retirement, exempted (e.g., AWOL or permanent medical issue), or transfer to the ANA/ANP] losses. The attrition rate uses the current month’s attrition numbers (total losses) divided by the previous month’s strength numbers.

\(^{25}\) DFR personnel are those soldiers and police who leave the organization prior to the end of their contracts for reasons that include desertion or being absent without leave (AWOL) for over a month.

\(^{26}\) Additional information on institutional training is available in section 4.
The RMTCs do not contain enough manpower and equipment to conduct this training, and operational requirements often result in lack of adherence to ORCs and canceled training. UTED-C is working to standardize the program of instruction for initial and advanced combat training at the KMTC in Kabul, reducing the burden on Corps and allowing RMTCs to focus on collective training. This in turn presents challenges across certain provinces such as 215th and some ANA-TF tolays, where success heavily relies upon local recruitment and training at a facility nearby rather than Kabul to aid in recruiting. Increased RS emphasis on building capacity at RMTCs tied to implementation of the ANA-TF program may result in better and more convenient training opportunities for ANDSF units.

Poor human resource and career management systems across the ANDSF continue to prevent progress with Professional Military Education (PME). Career management systems provide the roadmap for ANDSF personnel to attend progressive PME courses preparing them for positions of increased responsibility and remaining on path for promotion. A functional human resource system is required to ensure individuals stay on path and attend PME at the appropriate time in his or her career. Presently, dysfunctional human resource systems often deprive individuals of the opportunity to attend PME and courses are too often filled based on favoritism and nepotism.

**Better MoD and MoI Budget Execution**

Inefficient MoD and MoI budgeting processes have traditionally led to under execution of funding. In order to build and maintain long-term security cooperation relationships with the United States and the international community, the MoD and MoI must improve its planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) capability. Presidential Ghani issued a decree on November 11, 2018, directing procurement centralization in the Afghan Government. The National Procurement Authority (NPA) issued a circular on January 13, 2019, to all Afghan Government procurement entities, including the MoI and the MoD, enacting centralized procurement and providing implementation instructions. The first phase of implementation included all U.S. and Coalition funded projects and all GIRoA projects above the National Procurement Commission (NPC) approval threshold. In the centralized process, the MoI and MoD now deliver requirement packages to the NPA after approval from the Requirements Approval Board (RAB). The NPA will then produce a Standard Bid Document, advertise for bids, receive bids, execute bid opening and bid evaluation, obtain Procurement Approval Board (PAB) and NPC approval, and deliver a contract to the MoI or MoD for signature and implementation.

This centralized procedure should result in decreased opportunities for corruption, increased transparency, and decreased procurement timelines. TAA focuses on the efficient transfer of U.S. and Coalition-funded projects to the NPA; optimizing the RAB and PAB as control mechanisms; establishing adequate communication and reporting mechanisms to track U.S. and Coalition-funded projects at the NPA; and streamlining requirements planning at the security ministries to increase both throughput and percentage of contracts awarded.
Improving Processes for Paying Soldier and Police Salaries

APPS integrates previous MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll, like the Afghan Human Resources Information System (AHRIMS) and Afghan Automated Biometrics Information Systems (AABIS), into a single platform capable of providing timely and accurate reporting of all ministerial personnel, including civilians. The extensive, multi-year effort to implement APPS improves transparency, audit capability, and personnel accountability; helps root out “ghost soldiers” and limits ANDSF payroll fraud. MoD and MoI personnel must provide personal data, possess an identification card, have biometric data on file, and occupy a valid and current authorized level position to validate and slot within the APPS system. APPS achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC) during the last reporting period, and since September 2018, CSTC-A only funds ANA personnel that meet the minimum base pay requirements. To meet minimum base pay requirements in APPS, individuals’ files must contain a biometric number, name, father’s name, grandfather’s name, ID card number, date of birth, and actual rank.

APPS is a major shift in the ministries’ traditional way of managing pay and personnel. This transformation will encounter challenges; however, with RS assistance, the MoD and MoI already have made progress towards greater accountability and transparency.

RS normalized APPS data and finalized enrollment of the current force during this reporting period. ANA and ANP forces are enrolled in APPS and eligible for pay.

Improving ANDSF Facilities

During this reporting period, advisors continued to assist the MoD to draft a policy defining the proper use of female facilities, which resulted in a draft Ministerial Order. Additional information on ANDSF facilities is located in Sections 4 and 5.

Other Priorities

Planning

ANDSF planning at the ministerial and Corps level improved during this reporting period. Weekly security working groups (security meetings) hosted by RS DCOS-OPS included senior leaders from the ANDSF, the MoI, and the MoD, and allowed for improved information sharing and collaborative planning. These working groups focused on establishment of operational priorities within the Operational Design and the allocation of U.S. and ANDSF enablers to include ISR and strike assets. Increased transparency and opportunities to synchronize with U.S. and Coalition partners helped ANDSF planners leverage U.S. CT operations and focus their own operations to achieve greater effects against the Taliban. ANDSF planners were also able to understand where operations under consideration would actually hinder the concentration of effects and pull resources away from more important and strategic efforts.

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27 Information on APPS addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1215 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328)
At lower levels, ANDSF planners focused less on planning large Brigade-level extended operations and more on smaller, focused operations tied to expanding security around population centers and along lines of communication. Additionally, ANDSF planners did an increasingly better job of utilizing ANASOC forces assigned to operate in conventional ANA corps areas of operation. Rather than assigning ANASOC units to static defensive positions, planners employed them in active roles conducting offensive operations in areas where Taliban staged to threaten population centers.

The expansion of the ANA-TF program also affected ANDSF planning efforts. MoD planners worked together to identify districts across Afghanistan where ANA-TF units could be fielded and utilized to hold terrain and deny the Taliban freedom of movement. ANDSF planners planned operations to help set the conditions for ANA-TF units to form, focusing ASSF and conventional ANDSF operations to create permissive environments to recruit, train, and employ ANA-TF units.

**Strategic Communications**

In March 2019, the Afghan government published “The GIRoA Strategic Communications Guide” and “GI RoA Communication Plan 1398,” representing its first attempt to create an overarching communication strategy. The guide intends to synchronize messaging between the Afghan Government, and various ministries. During this reporting period, the MoD and MoI improved integration of information operations. The ANDSF’s ability to respond to crises with proper messaging is improving thanks to a Crisis Management Team at the Strategic Communications Coordination Center (SCCC) consisting of representatives from the MoD, MoI, NDS, Independent Directorate of Local Governance, and the Coalition.

TAA efforts at the SCCC have resulted in improved synchronization of communication across the ANDSF. STRATCOM teams at the MoD, MoI, NDS, and the ONSC meet weekly as part of the SCCC to share information, ensure messages are mutually supporting, and communicate the need to be more proactive in the information space. ANDSF efforts to install reliable partners in the information space in both the MoI and the MoD are producing better effects. ANDSF media spokespersons are increasing their capabilities and doing better at taking queries, gathering the facts, and presenting a more cohesive message through media. The ANDSF are improving their accuracy in reporting and have increased synchronization across ministries to prevent information fratricide. The ANDSF are leveraging all information outlets to include print, social media, radio, and television. However, ANDSF still require positive promotion at times to respond to items in the information space to maintain information dominance over insurgent groups.

Representatives from across the ANDSF understand the need to build comprehensive communication plans that include branch plans for a variety of contingencies. The ANDSF are also discussing long-range information environment requirements, e.g. elections, or a negotiated settlement, to improve deliberate STRATCOM planning. The ANDSF will continue to improve in the information space with persistent TAA and engagement from RS senior leaders on the importance of the information environment.

Overall, advisors note that the MoD has increased its STRATCOM engagements, improved transparency with the media, and delivered information on a regular and timely basis. MoD and
STRATCOM have also demonstrated credibility with the Afghan population. Although reports show that MoI messaging holds higher credibility with the Afghan population, during this reporting period, the MoD made significant improvements to gain credibility and close the gap in capability compared to the MOI.

**Intelligence**

Both the MoD and MoI continued to make strides in improving organic intelligence capabilities. The ANA is improving its use of ScanEagle ISR assets by deploying them more appropriately due to TAA efforts from Coalition advisors. ANA commanders are beginning to use intelligence gained from ScanEagle employment with operational planning efforts and force protection. Instances of ScanEagle use to monitor subordinate ANA units are decreasing.

The National Information Management System (NIMS) is the system of record for MoD and MoI agencies. NIMS improves information and intelligence sharing across the ministry and makes it easier to share intelligence across ministries. The use and value of the NIMS program continues to grow and improve with 2,017 current active accounts, an increase of more than 200 accounts from the last quarter. Success with NIMS by intelligence elements is inspiring the operations side as a recent demonstration of the capabilities of the GSG2 has driven the former ANA GSG3, MG Habibi, to order its use by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and all Corps-level Tactical Operations Centers. The use of this tool by these centers is a key step forward in integrating intelligence and operations.

MoD and MoI leadership culture poses challenges to better intelligence analysis. In the last five years, the ANDSF intelligence enterprise has vastly increased its capability and capacity. They are regularly using high-frequency signals intelligence, low-level voice intercept (LLVI), aerostats, and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles to understand the intentions and disposition of the enemy. Additionally, they are sharing this information across the entire country using secure automated systems. Unfortunately, having not experienced these capabilities during their earlier careers, ANA and ANP officers outside of the intelligence community are unaware of these strides and do not know how to integrate the new information into their planning. They do not know what they should demand of their intelligence elements. Recent tours with the NMIC and efforts to integrate intelligence products within NMCC should address this problem.
The MoD oversees the ANA, the AAF, and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF (ANASOC and the SMW). All relevant security and operations functions fall under the direct supervision of Chief of General Staff (CoGS), particularly directing Corps Commanders to execute the Campaign Plan. MoD priorities over the past six months included election security; counter-corruption; professionalization of the security forces; leadership development; Headquarters optimization; resource planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; combat power improvement; transparency and accountability; and implementation of civilianization policies. At President Ghani’s request, the MoD initiated a review of its headquarters and functions to reduce redundancy and excess within the headquarters; merge service functions between the various ministries, where logical, for efficiency; and continue civilianization efforts. The MoD reduced roughly 4,000 total
positions by merging or eliminating redundant functions and reallocated roughly 700 positions to
grow other functions.

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoD developed a comprehensive budget within agreed-upon budgetary constraints, drafted a
spend plan without any Coalition TAA, and submitted both to the Ministry of Finance earlier than
in past years. Because of sustained advisory efforts to refine Afghan procurement capability, the
Afghan Government instituted a newly formed centralized procurement process through the
National Procurement Authority (NPA). During this reporting period, advisors worked to optimize
the Requirements Approval Board (RAB) and Procurement Approval Board (PAB) as control
mechanisms, establish adequate communication and reporting mechanisms to track CSTC-A
funded projects at the NPA, and streamline requirements planning at the MoD.

The MoD’s budget for this fiscal year is roughly $700 million. As of May 25, 2019, the MoD
executed 20 percent of its current budget. During this reporting period, the MoD awarded 22
contracts valued at $30 million, which represents 19 percent of their procurement budget.

**Personnel Management**

Personnel management requires ministerial emphasis on training, assignment, promotion, and
career progression, but MoD human resource management has not matured, and the promotion
process remains plagued by a general lack of transparency and standardization. The MoD began
standardizing officer performance evaluations during this reporting period. Presently, promotion
boards are only able to consider an officer’s training, an officer’s education, and members of the
promotion board’s personal knowledge of an officer when considering him or her for a merit-based
promotion. Standard evaluations could reduce the control of patronage or favoritism in evaluating
talent and promoting personnel. Other MoD developments include the establishment of a
Personnel Management Board, which drafted a Manpower Management Plan designed to set
recruiting guidance and identify areas of need. Force modeling, continued review of the Personnel
Manpower Plan, and more focused career management will better enable the implementation of a
merit-based promotion system.

As part of the MoD optimization directed by President Ghani, the MoD sought to identify
additional opportunities to civilianize the Ministry workforce. Although the MoD identified
additional civilian-authorized positions, many individuals occupying those positions are recorded
correctly in APPS. The MoD has not placed a heavy emphasis on converting military positions to
civilian positions, and civilianization within the ministry has not progressed.

**Institutional Training**

Progress towards developing institutional training within the ANDSF hinges on MoD leadership’s
willingness to choose long-term investment in the holistic development of its forces over
maximizing its combat power in today’s fight. Every soldier or recruit enrolled in or conducting
training is a soldier that is not on the battlefield. This dilemma manifests itself in choices like
pulling conventional ANA soldiers from the field for continued professional development or
reducing the timeline of basic warrior training to get recruits into the field sooner rather than later. The MoD’s general lack of discipline regarding soldier training and development demonstrates it is willing to accept long-term risk in favor of increasing its short-term combat power. Historically, TAA efforts to build strong training institutions have been insufficient, with TAA resources and efforts directed at field units rather than institutions that train and develop ANDSF forces throughout their careers. Over the past year, RS has shifted its focus towards building stronger institutions through advancing two lines of effort: increasing advisor coverage at MoD military training centers and strengthening MoD oversight of the entire training and education landscape.

In 2018, the MoD established the Unified Training, Education, and Doctrine Command (UTEDC). UTEDC provides “unity of command” and coordinates all efforts related to institutional training and education, as well as efforts in support of training fielded forces, and provides the MoD with an organization responsible for developing doctrine and training programs to inform activity within branch schools and PME institutions. Eventually, UTEDC will enable the ANA to merge the 13 separate branch schools into four. Since UTEDC’s activation in December 2018, its headquarters and command staff have succeeded in developing basic procedures for effective staff and directorate coordination. The UTEDC commander and staff have also begun to foster basic staff and directorate proficiency in logistics management, accounting requirements, and assurance processes and procedures across the ANA TEL. With the budgetary authority acquisition, UTEDC has materially enhanced proficiency in internal budget management and fiscal planning processes and procedures across the TEL that improve resourcing for critical foundational and branch-specific training components along with academic endeavors within its specialized institutions.

The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) is the foundational military training pillar of the ANA Training and Education Landscape (ANA TEL) and serves as the MoD’s primary facility for Basic Warrior Training (BWT) and advanced combat training, including branch-specific training. In the last reporting period, KMTC came under scrutiny after the facility delayed classes and advisors received reports of unsatisfactory training, poor living conditions, and inadequate trainer support. The conditions at KMTC had deteriorated to the point where trainees were arriving at their units malnourished and poorly trained. RS addressed these issues by increasing their advisor presence at KMTC, adding an additional advisory team called the KMTC Advisory Group to focus on renewed oversight of KMTC foundational military training. Additionally, RS established a Soldier Training Brigade Advisor team dedicated to institutional TAA for BWT. These efforts helped address the immediate problems plaguing KMTC.

Despite persistent TAA during the last nine months, training utilization rates at the ANA branch schools remain low due to a lack of consistent enforcement of ANA training progression, which requires a soldier to attend BWT followed by branch-specific training at one of the 12 branch schools. This demonstrates an institutional-level indifference towards training specialization and a lack of discipline by ANA commanders to keep soldiers in the training pipeline. At times, these issues result in combat units consisting of soldiers without essential advanced combat skills training or unit-level collective training. During this reporting period, enhanced advisor presence at KMTC revealed significant trained instructor shortfalls due to KMTC personnel backfilling positions in other locations.
Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC) are decentralized training locations overseen by each Corps Commander. RMTCs offer unit-level collective training opportunities, and the CoGS has directed that RMTCs conduct BWT four times per year. With the exception of some RMTCs such as the 201st Corps RMTC where ORC training and some individual course training did occur, most RMTCs are not equipped or scaled to conduct BWT, and operational imperatives often disrupt training cycles. RMTCs help advance recruitment and retention in several provinces, where success heavily relies upon local recruitment and training to incentivize soldiers. Conversely, RMTCs suffer from a lack of equipment and inconsistent or substandard curriculum and trainer cadre. Training advisors are assessing the impact of centralizing initial and advanced combat training at KMTC, and utilizing RMTCs for only collective training.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The provision of food, fuel, equipment, ammunition, and maintenance, is essential to ensuring the ANDSF can complete their missions. The MoD have the logistical capacity to support and supply the ANA, and have robust stockpiles of equipment, but conventional ANA units often claim that a shortage of supplies hampers operations. In reality, the MoD do not have a supply problem; they have a distribution problem. During this reporting period, OS-LOG focused TAA efforts on improving distribution of supplies to MoD Forward Supply Depots (FSDs), particularly the ANA’s Kandahar FSD+, to position supplies closer to certain ANDSF Corps and to achieve similar repair and supply efficiencies realized at SAO’s Kandahar vehicle transfer waypoint. To move equipment and supplies across the country, the MoD began treating supply convoys as security operations that require planning, communication, and coordination from the Ministry to the Corps, Corps-to-Corps communication, and Corps ownership of the ground lines of communication within its battlespace. Continued use of national command and control nodes, like the NMCC, will enable the MoD to provide better security and support of supply convoys using its organic assets while ensuring a more tailored and national focus on materiel distribution.

The NMC for ground vehicles improves near-term vehicle maintenance and builds long-term capacity through formal training and mentoring of ANA personnel in the maintenance and supply-chain management functions. During this reporting period, RS advisors and the ANA leveraged 12 additional contact teams and new recovery teams to increase combat power. Contact teams increased the throughput at Equipment Maintenance Sites workshop locations while recovery teams recovered equipment from Corps Maintenance Collection Points and forward sites and returned equipment to locations for repair or future demilitarization, if required. The activity of contact and recovery teams represent another opportunity to validate on-hand vehicles and equipment.

The NMC for ground vehicles enables incremental transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANA. Although the ANA did not meet its workshare split goal over the course of this reporting period, the actual workshare remained within 10 percentage points. Low enrollment and attendance at NMS-GVS provided training, persists as it did with the previous vehicle maintenance contract. CSTC-A will continue to advise Afghans to take advantage of available training.
ANA Corps transitioned from trying to “win their geographic battlespace” and conduct large-scale corps maneuvers to conducting smaller, focused operations tied to expanding security around population centers and along lines of communication. In many instances, MoD ASSF operational priorities either directly overlapped with the Operational Design or provided complementary affects. At the tactical level, ASSF forces can conduct mission command from both the Brigade and Kandak Headquarters as well as plan, prepare, coordinate, and execute tactical operations while utilizing Afghan ISR and intelligence methods.

At the ministerial level, the MoD struggles to maintain a common operating picture (COP) of current operations. The National Military Coordination Center (NMCC) provides a platform to coordinate and oversee near-term operations and manage the distribution of assets and tasks based on ministerial-level strategic guidance and priorities. If empowered, the NMCC can link ministerial-level strategy with national operational oversight, thereby alleviating past instances of MoD officials responding to and actively engaging in tactical-level decision.

Intelligence

The overall effectiveness of the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) continues to improve. Analytical sections are doing a better job of working together and sharing intelligence products. Increasingly detailed intelligence analysis produced by the NMIC provides better support to the operational force. Recent MoD approval to allow for open access to social media websites and increased bandwidth has increased open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection capabilities. TAA efforts to produce comprehensive adversarial country studies are also underway. Furthermore, the NMIC Director has a firm understanding of NMIC operations and continues to be the driving force for their success.
The MoD intelligence enterprise has vastly increased its capability and capacity during the last five years but efficient tactical integration of intelligence remains a challenge. With focused and persistent TAA efforts by advisors, the MoD can utilize intelligence to conduct coordination and planning at the strategic and operational-level, but remains challenged during operational and tactical-level execution.

MoD senior leadership often fails to empower intelligence analysts at the Corps-level and below, which results in oversaturation of intelligence products at the highest level. The large volume of mostly tactical intelligence results in an MoD fixated on tactical actions rather than identifying and solving national issues. TAA efforts are concentrated on coordinating TAA vertically to focus on the decisive personnel in the MoD, NMCC, and at the Corps to enable synchronized planning and execution.

During this period, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence (AMoD-I) and the General Staff Intelligence Directorate (GS G2) prioritized properly aligning the roles of each organization and then organizing like functions under Deputies that have authority and responsibility. Under this concept, AMoD-I will concentrate exclusively on strategic issues, policy, and oversight. The GS G2 will focus on operational and tactical intelligence support.

ScanEagle tactical unmanned aerial systems detachments continue to improve technical proficiency and tactical integration. Currently, the ANA has fielded five operational Scan Eagle detachments in addition to one training detachment. The ANA expects two additional detachments to be activated this year. The ANDSF still requires Field Service Representatives (FSRs) to provide maintenance support and operational advice at most sites. ScanEagle allows for target surveillance, air-to-ground integration for aerial fires, and battle damage assessments after strikes. Advisors continue to encourage the ANA to utilize ScanEagle collection data to better identify target locations and descriptions. During this period, the ScanEagle Directorate within the GS G2 improved their integration with the NMCC. The team is now actively communicating with the Corps ScanEagle detachments and building daily and projected synch matrixes for all five detachments. The matrix covers a seven to ten day period and allows for coordination and synchronization with future operations.

**Gender Integration Initiatives**

Although circumstances have improved for Afghan women since 2001, sexual abuse, harassment, gender-based violence, cultural norms, and certain inequalities threaten the successful integration and long-term retention of women in the ANDSF. The current ad hoc method of recruitment, training, and placement can lead to underutilization or ineffective use of women in the ANDSF. The ANA continues to struggle to recruit, retain, and manage the career progression of women. Units continue to place men into positions reserved for women because there are not enough qualified women to fill the vacant positions. NATO RS and the MoD continued working to develop policies and refine processes to address the myriad of issues that challenge integration of women into the ANA.
Women, like men in the ANDSF, suffer from the absence of a clearly defined career progression. As noted during the last reporting period, RS Gender Advisors continue to assist the MoD to develop a career path plan from recruitment to retirement for ANA women. RS Gender Advisors work closely with Human Resource Management Advisors and the MoD to integrate considerations for female personnel into ongoing development of labor management plans and development of career progression opportunities for women within the MoD.

**Education and Training**

Additional initiatives to address the ANA gender integration effort include the promotion of development programs, enhanced training, and salary incentives. Women in the ANA have access to an undergraduate sponsorship program, the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) Program, overseas training programs, childcare provisions, and retention bonuses.

The GOOD program provides training to the uniformed and civilian members of the ANDSF in Dari and Pashto literacy, English language, computer skills, and office administration. Current GOOD Program training locations include Kabul, Herat, and MeS. RS works with NGOs in Afghanistan to ensure that efforts to improve women’s literacy are de-conflicted and not duplicative. During this reporting period, approximately 400 women attended GOOD Program training, primarily in Kabul at training locations for GCPSU, Kabul Military Hospital, HKIA, MoI HQ, and Camp Scorpion. This training seeks to improve women’s proficiency in their current duties and improve their career prospects, making them more competitive within the MoD. RS Advisors are seeking to expand training locations and enrollment for the GOOD Program.

**Facilities**

During this reporting period, advisors continued to assist the MoD to draft a policy defining the proper use of female facilities, which resulted in a draft Ministerial Order. Although progress has been slow, persistent TAA and comprehensive emphasis on the importance of integration can help positively shift cultural understanding of female facility management. Advisors review female facilities to confirm appropriate use and identify areas for improvement. Current female facility projects within the MoD include:

- Kabul National Military Hospital Pediatrics and Women’s Wellness Clinic
- Afghan Air Force Academy women’s barracks S-HKIA
- Kabul Military Training Center daycare
- Marshal Fahim National Defense University women’s gym, conference center, and daycare
- S-HKIA women’s barracks and daycare
- Camp Zafar daycare facility
- MoD Women’s Training Center – Kabul

**4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

The ANA General Staff (GS) commands and controls all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the Afghan Air Force (AAF), the Special Mission Wing (SMW), the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the Afghan National Civil Order
Force (ANCOF), and the Afghan Border Force (ABF). In total, the ANA consists of 27 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 4 branch and basic training schools, 6 ANCOF BDEs, 7 ABF BDEs, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

**Afghan National Army Strength**

The MoD is authorized 227,374 personnel. Attrition has historically been a chronic problem for the ANA, but with the advent of APPS in the fall of 2018 and other institutional reforms, retention numbers are improving. During every month throughout this reporting period, gains have surpassed losses. The primary driver of attrition in all services is the large number of soldiers who drop from rolls (approximately 60 percent of losses) for being absent without leave (AWOL) for more than thirty consecutive days. Soldiers leaving the ANA at the end of the contracted service accounts for approximately 30 to 35 percent of monthly losses. Combat casualties account for the remaining 8 percent of monthly losses.

**Afghan National Army Structure**

*Figure 10: ANA Corps and 111th Capital Division Boundaries*
The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps. Each corps is typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, 215th Corps, and 217th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions that follow the provincial boundaries. The ANDSF divided the 209th’s previous sector to incorporate the 217th Corps. The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.

**ANA Territorial Force (ANA-TF)**

The ANA-TF is a nascent program that allows development of a locally recruited ANA “hold force” to serve in permissive security environments. The hold force conducts framework operations to secure the local populace, create and maintain space and time for the police to reorient from threat to population, and conduct limited offensive operations in conjunction with strike forces. The ANA-TF serves as the backbone for this framework aligned to the local populace. The purpose of the ANA-TF is to expand Afghan Government influence, deny the Taliban freedom of maneuver, and set conditions for a political solution. ANA-TF “community mobilization” forces the Taliban away from key lines of communication and urban areas, increases military and social pressure, and strengthens the Afghan Government’s position in negotiations. Following a final peace deal, the ANA-TF or similar construct may serve as a potential vehicle for reintegration as one part of a whole-of-government approach.

RS identified three pillars of accountability for an ANA-TF unit to succeed. First, local governance must fully support the establishment of an ANA-TF unit from the elected provincial and district leadership down to tribal leaders and local spheres of influence. Second, ANA leadership must be capable and willing to develop and support an ANA-TF unit. If RS leadership is concerned about an ANA-TF unit being misused or not supported, that particular ANA-TF unit may not be created. Third, the military and political leadership must have buy-in to develop an ANA-TF unit. The ANA-TF are locally recruited and employed with strong connections to local governance efforts to improve overall security in their areas. The ANA-TF are employed in *tolay* (company)-sized elements to critical locations across the country. RS advisors overseeing implementation of the program are incorporating lessons learned from past programs, like the VSO-ALP program, to set the conditions for the successful establishment of ANA-TF units.

The ANA has employed 26 *tolays* across Afghanistan. Sixteen additional *tolays* are in training, and recruiting is ongoing for thirteen more *tolays*. These 55 *tolays* comprise Phase I of ANA-TF employment. Approximately 50 additional ANA-TF *tolays* will join the force throughout Phase II. Some of these may replace conventional ANA companies where authorizations exist and in areas where conditions are appropriate for the unit to thrive. The greatest impediments to bringing the ANA-TF online are logistical challenges and the chronic limitations of the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) or Regional Military Training Centers (RMTC), which suffer from infrastructure, manning, and organizational shortfalls.

**Afghan Border Force**

The Afghan Border Force (ABF) consists of six Brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. Each Corps maintains command and control (C2) over one ABF Brigade in its geographic
location (the 209th Corps maintains C2 over two ABF brigades). The ABF maintains security in the border security zone, which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan, to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers and support ANA operations against insurgent and terrorist forces.

**Afghan National Civil Order Force**

The Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) consists of seven Brigades under the operational control of the ANA Corps. ANCOF missions include dealing with civil unrest, reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas, conducting civil order presence patrols, and providing crisis response to public unrest and terrorist attacks in urban and metropolitan areas. The ANCOF support clearing operations by providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to secure seized terrain.

**Afghan Air Force**

The AAF serves as the primary air enabler for the ANA ground forces by providing aerial fires and lift support to ground forces across Afghanistan. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of 18 detachments and 3 wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahan Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing.

The AAF continues to show steady improvement in pilot skill, ground crew proficiency, and air-to-ground integration (AGI). The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, close air attack, armed over watch, and aerial escort missions.

The AAF improved fighting capabilities over the last year, including now-routine laser-guided bombs delivered by A-29s. The AAF achieved a significant milestone with the first night A-29 strike in December 2018. Advisors also noted that the Afghan crews have made significant progress in collateral damage estimate ability and have shown impressive restraint and ability to minimize civilian casualties. The AAF C-208 pilots are now capable of airdropping essential supplies to isolated ANDSF units.

TAA at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the Afghan Air Force primarily occurs in three locations: Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. NAC-A and TAAC-Air TAA the AAF at the ministerial, AAF headquarters, wing, group, and squadron levels. The co-location of TAAC-Air and the AAF headquarters at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) allows for strong coordination and regular interaction between advisors and AAF personnel. Additionally, the AAF Commander is now attending the weekly security meeting with COMRS, considerably increasing and improving synchronization of RS and MoD activities and objectives.

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28 MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have transit care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC missions are usually on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
Although the AAF continues to make incremental progress in capabilities, lack of effective leadership continues to present a challenge. Recent high-level leadership changes are promising. Advisors continue to focus on promoting and enabling reliable partners and the Inherent Law continues to remove ineffective leaders. Human capital limitations remain a significant challenge due to high recruiting standards and administrative shortfalls.

**Airframes**

*Figure 11: Summary of AAF Airframes and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Current Inventory</th>
<th>In Country &amp; Available or in Short-term MX</th>
<th>Number of Qualified Aircrew (Pilots and Co-Pilots)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-208</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A+</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60+FFF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35</td>
<td>(432)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetal</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td><strong>126</strong></td>
<td><strong>222</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AAF has 162 aircraft, of which 126 are in-country and available or in short-term maintenance, and eight are in the United States in support of Afghan training needs. The AAF’s fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s, and its rotary-wing platforms include MD-530s, Mi-17s, UH-60A+s, and Mi-35s. Understaffed crew positions, like flight engineers, that the AAF require to assemble fully trained flight crews limit some aircraft platforms. Under the aviation modernization program, DoD is delivering two UH-60A+s per month and five armed MD-530s per quarter to the MoD until program objectives are met.

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29 Numbers represent a snapshot in time and are based on multiple reporting sources. Numbers in this column include aircraft available for tasking (combat ops/training) as well as those in short-term routine or unscheduled maintenance.
30 Twelve aircraft are in Afghanistan. Thirteen aircraft are at Moody AFB, Georgia, for training utilization.
31 This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW. Seven aircraft are undergoing depot repair, and 46 are either destroyed or expiring.
32 The United States does not provide any funding or advisory support for Mi-35s. The Mi-35s were removed from the authorized fleet in 2015 but the Afghans continue to attempt to sustain them. DoD has advised them against doing so and to instead focus on the aircraft that DoD is providing as a part of the aviation modernization program. A modification to nonproliferation sanctions that allows DoD to continue to sustain Mi-17s specifically does not include Mi-35 variants. The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s prior Mi-35 fleet reached the end of its service life and is not included in the official authorization level. All four aircraft required their 500-hour inspection and have been grounded until completed. The AAF is trying to source funding to complete repairs. The United States does not provide advising or funding for the Mi-35 aircraft or aircrew.
33 Not counted.
34 SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
DoD will continue to ensure the modernization plan meets operations requirements while keeping sustainment costs manageable by utilizing and leveraging the growing body of AAF and SMW operational data to inform any future decisions. Figure 11 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews currently on-hand.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

AAF C-130Hs assigned to the Kabul Air Wing conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to locations with improved airfields, providing a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. C-130Hs transport cargo too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts. Additionally, the C-130 is the primary mode of transportation for munitions between the AAF Wing locations.

Small fleet size, aircraft availability, and aircrew availability currently limit C-130H operations. One of the four AAF C-130Hs is currently in out-of-country for depot maintenance until May 2020. Three C-130Hs will remain in country from now until February 2020. The AAF relies on a DoD contractor logistics support (CLS) contract for C-130H logistics and maintenance.
C-208 Aircraft

The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains capability for the ANDSF. C-208s operate primarily from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand. Air advisors’ focus on expanded C-208 employment envelope by developing soft field landing and airdrop capabilities resulted in successful forward deployment to improved and unimproved airfields throughout the country. The C-208 fleet relies on a mix of CLS and AAF organic maintenance. NAC-A and TAAC-Air continue to help the AAF develop its nascent airdrop capability, with the intent to increase operational flexibility, but the MoD’s demand signal for this capability remains low. C-208s conducted combat airdrops during this reporting period, including two-ship formation airdrops. In the future, the AAF will need to support airdrop operations with platform integration (PC-12 and A-29) to facilitate safe airdrops in contested environments. Overall, airdrop capability is limited to low threat areas due to the C-208 airdrop altitude, airspeed, lack of armor, and a maximum cargo load of 1000 pounds. NAC-A and TAAC-Air advisors coordinate with other TAAC advisors to educate ANA commanders on the AAF’s airdrop capability.

The AC-208 Eliminator aircraft can provide a range of both ISR and strike capabilities in support of ANDSF ground and air operations. The AC-208 has a C-208 airframe but is equipped with a more powerful engine and maintains different capabilities. In February 2019, the first AC-208s arrived in Kabul to support the AAF with an emerging ISR and precision strike capability.
The AAF uses the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and provide close air attack in support of ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb. bombs, Mk-82 500-lb. bombs, a GBU-58 250-lb. laser-guided bomb, a GBU-12 500-lb. laser-guided bomb, rockets, and two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. In March 2018, the AAF A-29s started using precision munitions in combat, which went from a training concept to reality in under one year. The A-29 has significantly increased its accuracy with precision-guided munitions, and A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs. The first night strike by an AAF A-29 occurred on December 8, 2018, adding a significant capability to the AAF.

AAF assigns A-29s to the Kabul and a detachment at Mazar-e-Sharif. Kandahar Air Wing supports A-29s, some pilots temporarily assigned from Kabul to enable full-spectrum AWT employment, and an A-29 maintenance squadron. A-29s and the maintenance squadron rotate from Kabul to Kandahar on a weekly basis. AAF plans to stand up an A-29 Formal Training Unit at Mazar-e-Sharif in July 2019, thereby representing a national training option for advancing A-29 pilot qualifications.

Advisors noted that AAF A-29 pilots continue to show disciplined restraint and tactical proficiency during weapons employment to achieve battlefield effects while minimizing the possibility of civilian casualties.

As aviation maintenance training continues, the AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in these airframes over the mid-term.
Mi-17 Helicopter

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

AAF maintainers have a proven ability to perform the majority of Mi-17 maintenance.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close-air attack and aerial escort to the ANDSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets. As of March 1, 2019, the Kandahar Air Wing has two operational MD-530 Scout Weapons Teams.

The AAF’s MD-530s currently rely on a DoD CLS contract; however, the AAF continues to develop an organic maintenance capability for the MD-530. TAAC-A is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintenance students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet.

Currently, the AAF has the capability to support MD-530 operations (rearm and refuel only) at forward-deployed locations for short intervals without CLS presence. The AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term and long-term. The AAF plans to build MD-530 NVG combat capability by integrating NVG curriculum into advanced training courses to support flying point-to-point navigation sorties.
The UH-60 Black Hawk is a medium-lift, multi-role utility helicopter that performs cargo and personnel transport and patient and human remains transfer, and has the ability to operate throughout Afghanistan. DoD provided the AAF with mission-configured and training-configured UH-60A+s refurbished and upgraded to an A+ variant with the UH-60L model engine. These helicopters operate out of Kandahar Air Field and perform personnel transport, patient transfer, resupply, and other lift missions.

AAF UH-60 pilots receive basic UH-60 flying skills training through a six-week Aircraft Qualification Training (AQT). Upon graduation, pilots can attend Mission Qualification Training (MQT), a ten-week contractor-led, academic and flight instruction course that graduates pilots as mission-certified “co-pilots.” Through accrual of flying time and certification, squadron leadership can certify pilots as aircraft commanders. The AAF has 53 qualified UH-60 pilots. As of March 1, 2019, the AAF flew its first UH-60A+ NVG resupply mission.

Training

Training pipelines for the AAF continue to meet growth targets. However, the lack of qualified candidates with the necessary technical skills to complete training presents a challenge and identifying suitable candidates with English skills remains difficult. Following desertion issues at CONUS AAF training locations, DoD has steadily shifted elements of training to OCONUS
locations. Those programs and pipelines continue to mature, but advisors note no noticeable difference in training quality and outputs and advisors visit and observe training at these sites quarterly for quality assurance. These OCONUS training efforts allow Afghan training sites to focus on mission qualification and combat skills proficiency training, although reallocation of aircraft for training purposes presents a persistent challenge of priorities against resources. TAAC-Air advisors continue to engage with AAF leadership to increase training efficiency.

The AAF previously did not formally track the training status of AAF maintainers. To address these concerns, TAAC-Air developed an AAF Master Training Plan to standardize and define skill level descriptions across platforms. Initial training to achieve a routine-level maintenance competency (Level 3) takes 12 to 18 months and includes general English-language training. Subsequent training to achieve an intermediate level maintenance competency (Level 2) takes an additional two to three years and includes enhanced English training. Finally, achieving high-level competency (Level 1) requires an additional two to three years and includes continued English training to achieve literacy in technical English. The AAF Master Training Plan now gives the AAF and TAAC-Air a guideline to follow and adjust as necessary.

**Figure 12: Training Requirement for AAF Maintainers by Total Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintainer Training Level</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rotary Wing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In support of the AAF Master Training Plan, the MoD approved an Aircraft Maintenance Development Center (AMDC) that is in the ELT stage of producing the first classes of aircraft maintainers. The maintenance portion of the pipeline should begin in August 2019 in third country locations. The AMDC will produce the required amount of Level 3 entry-level maintainers during the next two years. Subsequent experience level upgrades will continue though the AMDC structure eventually leaving the AAF in as self-supporting a situation as possible to sustain the AAF aircraft fleets.

The AMDC pipeline will streamline the production of aircraft maintainers; however, it will still take up to seven years to create a fully qualified Level 1 maintainer from no experience. The AMDC will ensure that the training stays focused and sustainable for the AAF future. Using the AMDC, the AAF can develop the overall human capital required—though not to the required skill levels—by 2021. Advisors predict that AAF maintainers could achieve mature maintenance skill levels by 2023-2027, depending on platform. The AAF likely will always require some contractor support, but the AAF should be able to support a majority of its daily operations in the future.
NAC-A TAA educates leadership on the proper application of airpower and assets to ensure the proper application of aircraft and personnel. At the senior level, NAC-A is designing a training/exercise program to improve senior-level AAF leadership decision-making for the development, sustainment, employment, integration, and command and control of the AAF within the ANDSF.

The development of qualified, experienced, and correctly slotted Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) remains a key AAF training effort. The 9-week ATAC training course expects to produce 30-40 AAF ATACs per year.

**Sustainment**

The AAF relies largely on contractor logistics support to ensure the sustainability of its fleet. With the exception of the Mi-17, for which the AAF conducts nearly 90 percent of overall maintenance, CLS remains critical to platform sustainment. In an effort to build organic sustainment capabilities, TAAC-Air advisors continued developing the National Maintenance Strategy-Air (NMS-Air), a program designed to develop and implement a long-term strategy to increase organic AAF capability and responsibility for maintenance and logistics by gradually shifting responsibility for maintenance from CLS to the AAF.

AAF MD-530 maintenance capability steadily progressed during this reporting period. AAF maintainers can complete launch and recovery and most scheduled maintenance for the MD-530, however, the AAF requires CLS oversight to sign off for coalition airworthiness. Their small work force and short working days are the biggest inhibitor to completing a larger portion of MD-530 maintenance. The expectation is to improve as more maintainers complete formal training. The AAF still regularly depend on CLS assistance for trouble shooting and comprehension of English-language technical data.

**Figure 13: Percentage of AAF Organic Maintenance and CLS Maintenance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>%Organic</th>
<th>%CLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-208</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-60A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mi-17 data does not include heavy repair or overhauls since the MOD does not possess the organic capability required to accomplish that level maintenance.

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35 Organic maintenance data are general averages due to fluctuations in OPTEMPO, phased maintenance, and the degree of maintenance needs.
Operations

Persistent TAA of the AAF’s targeting process increased the quantity and impact of AAF targeting packages, but target package quality remains inconsistent. Issues like outdated imagery, clear target descriptions, and stale targets without enemy activity contribute to target package quality issues. However, whereas AAF Headquarters could not build a targeting package for independent AAF offensive operations merely four years ago. Today, AAF can create, staff, validate, and execute target packages from all ANA Corps. Advisors noted improvement in the overall process and enterprise of strike packages during the last six months. Out of all target packages submitted, the percentage of successful missions flown improved by roughly 20 percent during the past year. In fact, the targeting process and A-29 capabilities are outpacing the current written doctrine. TAA efforts have shifted to recommendations and improvements for writing updated targeting doctrine. This doctrine will include definitions and descriptions of the deliberate targeting process, dynamic targeting process and approvals, and time-sensitive targeting.

The AAF AGI increased its ATAC support via an enduring deployment rotation from three of six ANA Corps to all six ANA Corps in January of 2019. Additionally, the AAF AGI transitioned responsibility for its Initial Qualification Training and is now 100 percent Afghan led and executed.

MoD Afghan Special Security Forces

Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC)

ANASOC exceeded ASSF personnel growth milestones and continues to serve as the premier strike unit of the MoD, conducting nearly 80 percent of all offensive operations independent of U.S. and coalition enablers or advisors. During this reporting period, ANASOC, with the assistance of advisors, curbed the levels of ANASOC misuse and worked to repair damaged readiness rates of ANASOC units. ANASOC took these necessary actions and improvements despite remaining engaged in an active winter fighting season. Advisors expect the effectiveness and tempo of ANASOC operations to improve over the coming months due to the sustainment actions taken during this reporting period.

ANASOC is a Corps-level organization responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. ANASOC consists of four Special Operations Brigades (SOB) and a National Mission Brigade (NMB). Ten battalion-sized ANA Commando Special Operations Kandaks (SOK), eight Mobile Strike Kandaks (MSK) and Cobra Strike Kandaks (CSK), and seven support elements spread across the Corps. ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC can respond to simultaneous crises across the country, as well as conduct future operations planning with other ASSF components and ANDSF.

SOKs, ANASOC’s primary tactical elements, conduct core special operations tasks against threat networks to support regional corps’ COIN operations. They provide a strategic response capability against select threats and can forward-deploy expeditionary mission command packages in support
of planned offensive and contingency operations. Nine of the ten SOKs align with regional SOBs and have the ability to work with a specific ANA corps, if requested. The 6th SOK, assigned to the NMB and located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit.

MSKs and CSKs utilize maneuver with combined arms to conduct lightning strike, enhanced direct-fire lethality, strongpoint penetration, and high-mobility operations. This capability enhances ANASOC’s firepower, mobility, survivability, and lethality on the battlefield. General Support Kandaks (GSK) conduct emergency resupply and facilitate delivery of SOF-specific equipment and supplies to the Kabul Cluster units.

The NMB provides the President of Afghanistan and the MoD with rapidly deployable special operations forces capable of conducting national-level operations to achieve strategic effects across Afghanistan. The NMB has a deployable mission-command package, including the 6th SOK, Ktah Khas (KKA), and two Special Forces Kandaks. The NMB conducts short notice, theater-wide counterterrorism operations, crisis response, national emergency response, and internal defense and development. The NMB performs direct action, hostage rescue, special reconnaissance, security forces assistance, and counterinsurgency, and it can integrate Afghan ISR) into operations. MoI and NDS liaisons serve in the NMB HQ to ensure ANA-ANP coordination. The SMW and the AAF provide priority support to the NMB.

The KKA is a light infantry SOK assigned to ANASOC’s NMB. The KKA has eight companies that remain nearly at full strength: three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the KKA training cycle and operations, including transportation for the KKA strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. KKA platoons and companies conduct successful intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. According to RS advisors, KKA are not subject to the same misuse as the rest of the ASSF forces.

As part of the ANDSF Roadmap, the ANDSF expanded the ANASOC from a Division to a Corps with four brigades and a NMB. ANASOC’s growth exceeded scheduled growth by nearly 15 percent during this reporting period.

**Training**

ANASOC growth during this reporting period outpaced anticipated growth due, in part, to the ANASOC School of Excellence (SOE) training pipeline, which trains and develops newly recruited ANASOC Commandos and Special Forces leaders. Nearly half of ANASOC recruits have prior experience within the ANDSF, leading them to maintain higher rate of selection than new recruits flowing from KMTC and the RMTCs. The SOE qualifies selected recruits through the 14-week Commando Qualifications Course (CDOQC). Furthermore, the SOE offers specialty courses like Communications, Engineering, Mortar, Sniper, and Medical courses; Leadership courses like English, Master Diver, and Officer/NCO classes; and advanced courses such as Advanced Special Forces Medical Training class.
The Cobra Strike Maneuver Course (CSMC) trains Mobile Strike Kandaks to become Cobra Strike Kandaks. The 12-week course covers topics like dismounted infantry collective training, vehicle commander training, gunnery skills training, Mobile Strike Fighting Vehicle (MSFV) platoon collective training, and Battalion Senior Leader and Staff training. The ANASOC has two qualified CSKs and six MSKs. Although the ANASOC growth plan calls for all MSKs to transition to CSKs, high demand for maneuver strike capabilities affects ANASOC’s ability to place the remaining six MSKs into the CSMC. Therefore, ANASOC plans to restructure by transitioning the CSK growth plan from eight CSKs consisting of three companies to six CSKs made up of four companies. This transition should allow ANASOC to reinforce operational readiness.

The SOE also employs mobile training teams (MTT) to conduct on-site training and refresher courses for deployed SOKs, MSKs, and CSKs. MTTs provide tailored training at the request of the ANASOC Corps and are essential to addressing training requirements for kandaks unable to block off time to pursue collective training.

Sustainment

ANASOC’s organic logistical support extends for roughly 72 hours when commandos deploy in support of conventional ANA forces, after which the unit or company should return for refit and resupply. In cases where ANASOC deploys beyond that timeframe, units rely on logistical support from ANA Corps and MoD for rations, OCIE, and ammunition. This logistical dependency upon the ANA Corps subjects ANASOC to ANA competing priorities, long logistics trains, and inconsistent Corps support, which compound the effects of misuse. Furthermore, ANASOC does not have clear doctrine on whether kandaks request support to SOBs, FSDs, or BSKs. Advisors continue to seek ways to shorten the logistics train for ANASOC and increase logistics supply cooperation between ANA Corps and ANASOC.

Operations

ANASOC conducts the vast majority of all ANDSF offensive missions. RS TAA since 2006 resulted in ANASOC’s increasing ability to conduct independent operations; nearly 80 percent of ANASOC operations during this reported period were conducted independent of the Coalition, while the remaining 20 percent consisted of enabled and partnered operations. ANASOC’s expanded offensive capabilities make them more prone to misuse or overuse, an issue that significantly affected their readiness rates last reporting period. ANASOC misuse levels, however, dropped significantly, and readiness rates increased.

Special Mission Wing

The SMW is a special operations aviation wing that provides operational reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism (CT) and counter narcotics (CN) missions designed to disrupt insurgent and narcotics networks in Afghanistan. It supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision and rotary-wing air assault capabilities. Its structure consists of assault
squadrons in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif and an ISR squadron in Kabul that provides ASSF with operational reach across the country and integrates with the AAF to provide real-time intelligence to their A-29 bombers.

SMW’s ability to conduct unilateral operations improved, with all four squadrons now effectively conducting operations, and SMW misuse issues notably decreased during this reporting period. Challenges to long-term SMW recruitment and growth remain, due to high recruiting standards, additional levels of screening, competition with other ANDSF forces, and training timelines. SMW recruits ground specialties from the AAF, ANDSF, and ASSF, but selects aviation recruits from initial entry rotary-wing and fixed-wing students. Once identified, SMW vets candidates via a comprehensive background check and recruiting board review. Advisors are working to build standard operating procedures for recruiting that provide a level of predictability and standardization to the process. SMW does not currently have any challenges with retention.

*PC-12 Aircraft*

The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of CT and CN operations, including over watch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids, during both daytime and nighttime operations. In addition, the PC-12 integrates with AAF A-29 aircraft in support of strike operations, providing target identification and collateral damage scans.

PC-12 aircraft provide the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video (FMV) to a ground station and
the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. PC-12 ISR capabilities continued to mature during this reporting period.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The SMW Mi-17 conducts day and Night Vision Goggle (NVG) air assault (AASLT) CN and CT operations. Additionally, the Mi-17s conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force missions, and personnel movement.

**Training**

The SMW makes use of multiple CLS training opportunities, including maintenance, English language, and flight training. All SMW personnel attend English classes, including conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

SMW SOAG Standardization mentors SMW to produce General Flight Rules, Aircrew Training Management Program, and Tactical Standard Operating Procedures publications to provide the foundation for SMWs training efforts. Current TAA priorities include increasing the Mi-17 NVG capability, developing an operational readiness cycle to facilitate aircrew progression and training, increasing the sustainability of organic Mi-17 aircrew progression rather than contractor supported training, and increasing the depth of PC-12 ISR capability and integration. SMW is also focused on preparation for the arrival of the UH-60 by identifying training support requirements and developing a cohesive transition plan. Each squadron completed a validation exercise (VALEX) as part of the annual squadron rotation to ensure they were adequately prepared to conduct operations in their new area of operations. The VALEX consisted of academics, emergency procedure simulators, local area orientation, and two full-mission profile evaluations.

**Sustainment**

This reporting period saw a shift from a contractor-led to an Afghan-led scheduled maintenance posture. Afghan performance increased to 60 percent of scheduled maintenance and 40 percent of unscheduled maintenance. SMW is building maintenance capability by conducting seminars and courses and currently has twelve maintainers actively in class and five seminars to commence at the outstations. Twenty-five maintainers certified at their training level in the last quarter. SMW is overcoming the challenge of conducting academic classes at outstations by working with contractor logistics support (CLS) and training contractors to identify personnel ready for upgrade training.

SMW is working to develop a pass-back maintenance construct with CLS to increase the Afghan to CLS ratio, but a significant challenge is the requirement to maintain U.S. standards of airworthiness on the aircraft. CLS mentors supervise and coach Afghan maintainers who are performing the inspections to overcome this challenge. Another challenge to Afghan maintenance capability is the proficiency of Afghan maintainers with respect to their level of qualification. This is being resolved through follow-on maintenance training seminars that advance the Afghan maintainers proficiency level. These seminars improve Afghan maintainer’s ability to perform
tasks that they were previously unable to perform and resulted in an increase in capability for scheduled inspections.

*Operations*

The SMW operates four rotary-wing squadrons and one fixed-wing squadron capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. SMW conducts day and night infiltration and exfiltration from three locations throughout Afghanistan in support of the ASSF. SMW increased their helicopter assault missions by 90 percent, flying an average of 19 assaults a month, up from 10 in previous years.

During this reporting period, SMW sustained a unilateral execution rate of 80 percent, in line with last reporting period. This included helicopter assault, A-29 strike support, casualty evacuation, resupply, unit rotation, assault support, preparation of the battlefield, ISR, over watch, Quick Reaction Force, and unit staging. Ten percent of these missions were in support of counter narcotics and 90 percent were in support of counterterrorism. During this reporting period, the SMW achieved full operational capability for Fast Rope Insertion Extraction System and Aerial Sniper Platform.
The MoI dissolved the ANP Zone structure during this reporting period. The Zones HQs served as the MoI HQ’s subordinate reporting commands HQ and acted as the administrative control for the provincial headquarters (PHQ) within each geographic location. Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCOP) reported directly to the Zone Commanders who, in turn, reported to the MoI HQ. The Zone structure served Ministerial-level interests by providing centralized, geographic locations for MoI HQ to maintain management and oversight of its forces. In practice, however, PHQs routinely bypassed Zones and Zone Commanders by reporting directly to the Ministry. Zone Commanders maintained limited influence over the PCOPs in their zone.

Due to the generally weak administrative control capability of the zones, advisors witnessed limited impacts on RS TAA efforts when the zones dissolved. For example, logistical nodes like the Regional Logistics Centers (RLC) provide regional area support to the PHQs; Zone HQs and Commanders did maintain C2 of this structure. Furthermore, elements of the Ministry—not the local Zone Commanders—support ANP training and education institutions like the Regional Training Centers (RTC). Zone dissolution has limited some of the TAACs from being able to conduct direct TAA. TAACs and Task Forces plan to leverage telephonic TAA through weekly

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36 Information in this section addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1223(e) (2) (B) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (P.L. 115-232).
or monthly touchpoints with PHQs, as well as fly-to-advice efforts, to overcome challenges associated with Zone dissolution, remote PHQs, and the need for continued coordination and TAA.

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoI formulated a budget aligned to projected resources and monitored budget execution to identify opportunities to reallocate available resources, however they continue to have significant unexecuted resources. Similar to past reporting periods, MoI offices do not effectively communicate strategic guidance to the PHQs, so finance personnel at lower levels cannot conduct requirements planning based on high headquarters guidance. These shortcomings demonstrate poor vertical communication; RS will continue to focus resource-related TAA on improving communication and linking requirements to strategic guidance.

The MoI’s budget for this fiscal year is roughly $141.4 million. As of May 25, 2019, the MoI executed 17 percent of its current budget. During this reporting period, the MoI awarded 09 contracts valued at $40.4 million, which represents 54 percent of their procurement budget.

**Personnel Management**

The MoI lacks a refined human resource and career management capability. The majority of MoI’s personnel management activities this reporting period consisted of enrolling and slotting ANP personnel in the APPS system. Maintaining a clear picture of the ANP force size and ensuring police are paid is a fundamental service that the MoI must accomplish before it can develop additional human resource management tools. The MoI continues to struggle with an inadequate promotion process and an ambiguous career path structure. A functional Performance Appraisal system to support the promotion process does not exist. Instead, the ministry relies on the High Oversight Board (HOB) and advisory assistance to standardize promotion.

One element of MOI optimization is to “civilianize” part of its workforce, to emphasize strong civilian leadership, leverage subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the MoI, in accordance with the MISP and MoI optimization efforts. The MoI civil servant Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the Capacity Building for Results (CBR) programs were designed to integrate specialized civilian talent to manage critical ministerial programs and build Afghan civilian capacity within the ministry. Unfortunately, MoI has been unable or unwilling to leverage the SME program to continue to civilianize positions and attract new recruits. To date, the MoI remains reliant on the international community to fund and maintain this program.

**Institutional Training**

The MoI’s institutional training arena has suffered from shifting visions and priorities for how best to train and utilize MoI police forces. Police training over time has swung from combat training to law enforcement training as the ANP and its employment have transitioned towards typical policing functions, but institutional training remains nascent. Initiatives like the MoD’s UTEDC are notably absent within the MoI. The MoI also lacks human resource expertise and career management.
The ANP recruit locally at one of the 34 Provincial Recruiting Stations and send new recruits to one of the ten Regional Training Centers (RTC) for police training. Police training generally consists of an eight to twelve week training course. Beyond early training, the ANP lacks an institutionalized leadership development program at the district and local level. Furthermore, mid-level ANP leaders lack leadership development opportunities.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoI maintains a robust stockpile of supplies, but struggles to execute distribution processes. Inadequate convoy security for logistics re-supply, lack of trained logisticians capable of understanding and correlating warehouse inventory with automated systems, poor retention of qualified logistics specialists, and inaccurate consumption reporting of commodities represent persistent roadblocks to ANP logistics maturity. The ANP’s lack of supply chain management and poor coordination and distribution of parts has direct impacts on equipment maintenance and the ANP’s ability to properly supply and sustain its forces. During this reporting period, advisors dedicated efforts to improving the MoI’s distribution gaps and emphasizing the importance of logistics and logisticians.

The National Maintenance Contract (NMC) for ground vehicles enables progressive, incremental yearly transfer of responsibility from the contractor to the ANP. The MoI leveraged the ground vehicle contract to supply repair parts directly to the point of need, and worked with the SAO to enhance MoI Regional Logistic Centers (RLC) and the ministry’s ability to stage parts closer to the units in need. The ANP exceeded its goal for workshare and displayed a steady month-to-month increase in their maintenance capabilities over the course of this reporting period, as defined by the NMC for ground vehicles.

*Figure 15: Percentage of ANP - NMC Workshare Responsibility*

![Graph showing percentage of ANP-NMC workshare responsibility from December to May 2019.]

*Data as of May 07, 2019*

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

Weekly security working groups (security meetings), which were hosted by RS DCOS-OPS and attended by MoI senior leaders, improved information sharing and collaborative planning.
Increased transparency and opportunities to synchronize with U.S. and MoD planners helped the MoI focus its own operations to achieve greater effects against the Taliban. MoI planners were able to understand where operations were taking place and determine how to integrate law enforcement operations.

In April 2018, the MoI developed the comprehensive Ministry of Interior Strategic plan (MISP). The MISP provides a single and coherent plan to meet the strategic vision for reforming the Ministry and ANP through 2021. The MISP seeks to transform the ANP into a publicly trusted, accountable, transparent, and professional organization focused on enforcing the rule of law by establishing a framework of goals that can be achieve and strategic direction on how to achieve them. Successful implementation requires considerable national effort and international support to build ministerial-level ownership and capacity of national-level strategy, planning, and dissemination.

PHQs and the MoI struggle to translate a flood of intelligence and reports from sources and district police into a common operating picture (COP) of operations or activities within the province. Furthermore, many PHQs have poor or limited coordination with ANA brigades. Part of this challenge stems from the dissolution of the zones; the responsibility to coordinate with ANA Corps rests with the PCoP instead of the Zone Commander.

**Intelligence**

Following efforts last reporting period to increase information sharing between the Directorates of Police Intelligence (DPI) and Counter-Terrorism Police (CTP), the Ministers of Defense and Interior issued a verbal order to share intelligence data between the two ministries. Neither ministry, however, produced official directions to authorize the departments to share the data.

In an effort to increase coordination inside the MoI, the Directors of the CTP and the Passport Office entered into a data-sharing agreement and began developing a system to provide access for the CTP to data stored on the Passport Office’s storage server. This effort is the first to allow the sharing of National Information Management System (NIMS) intelligence or Information within Afghanistan. Building on this intra-agency collaborative effort, advisors are pursuing data sharing agreements opportunities where other obvious equities exist between organizations and departments.

In an effort to develop the Afghan forensics capabilities, the Police Intelligence Team (PIT) Forensics section coordinated for contracted training for personnel from the MoI’s Criminal Techniques Laboratory (CTL) and Biometrics Center. The training focused on Afghan logistics and procurement processes, legal and administrative responsibilities, Core-IMS system training, and property-book management. Additionally, the CTL is acquiring a new capability that will significantly benefit the laboratory’s Firearms and Toolmark Examination (FTE) section. The new digital ballistics database system, called “CADRE”, will digitally scan cartridge casings and automatically enter them into the appropriate database, which will automate the current, more time-consuming manual process. The new capability will improve the laboratory’s ability to match cartridge casings against criminal and terrorism cases in a timely manner.
Gender Integration Initiatives

Approximately 3,215 women serve in the Afghan National Police. Although women have a higher presence in the ANP as compared to the ANA, women in the ANP face the same organizational, cultural, and structural barriers as women in the ANA. RS’s Gender Advisors assist the MoI to develop a career path plan for ANP women from recruitment to retirement. A number of incentives help overcome cultural recruitment barriers. The MoI’s incentives policy offers several types of incentives for women: recruitment bonuses; re-contracting bonuses; referral bonuses; retention incentives; instructor incentives; child care allowances, relocation and housing allowances; training and education allowances; police prison incentives; and medical attendant travel allowances.

Education and Training

Unique training and education opportunities provide incentives for women to join the ANP. The MoI offers training for female police at Sivas Police Training Academy in Sivas, Turkey, until the Central Training Center-Kabul (CTC-K) female facility construction work is complete and the facility is fully equipped, furnished, and staffed with instructors. General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) successfully completed its first female-only NCO training course. 85 percent of the female NCOs fill assignments across the National Mission Units (NMUs) and Police Special Units (PSUs), improving previous female reluctance to serve outside of the Kabul area and within kinetic and operationally focused units. The presence of additional female members within the PSUs has boosted the GCPSU’s ability to recruit new female GCPSU. Two of the NMUs have helped drive female integration through dedicated female-only facilities and by providing female operators access to secure childcare facilities. Other targeted female-only training includes tactical combat casualty care (TC3) training for female operators, English language training at the GCPSU HQ, and integrated male/female Afghan Terminal-Air Coordinator (ATAC) refresher training. Continued emphasis on recruiting, training and retaining females within GCPSU will further improve GCPSU operational capability.

Facilities

Advisors continued to review female facilities to confirm appropriate use of facilities, particularly Regional Training Centers, to ensure women in the ANP have access to adequate facilities. Concerns over resource stewardship of construction projects resulted in the development of a working group with key stakeholders to address gender considerations. The international community continues to assist in the construction of facilities in support of gender integration to ensure safe and appropriate working environments. Current female facility projects within the MoI include:

- ANP WPP New Women's Compound, Gardez
- ANP FRU Police District 4, 8, 12, 17
- Kabul Police Academy
- AUP Kapisa Province HQ Daycare-Barracks
- ANP Police Town
- ANP Central Training Center—Kabul
5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order; reduce corruption; prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics; provide security for individuals and the community; and safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although ANP work with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, ANP lack training and are not equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics. ANP’s focus and employment in COIN military functions have hindered the development of anti-crime and other community policing capabilities, and they are several years behind the ANA in terms of development.

The desired ANP end-state is a professional and effective police force focused on community-centric, traditional, evidenced-based law enforcement policing. Milestones include determining the proper operating model and force distribution to police Afghanistan effectively, redefine ANP roles and responsibilities, assign ANP pillar responsibilities, and establish training standards and work ethics to facilitate effective policing.

Afghan National Police Strength

The MoI is authorized 124,626 personnel. As with the ANA, the number of ANP personnel dropped from the rolls continues to comprise the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. The combination of frequent and lengthy deployments to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment, difficult living conditions, and the near-constant prospect of attacks contribute to the high ANP attrition.

Afghan National Police Structure

The ANP is composed of four pillars (AUP, PSP, ABP, and AACP) and three sub-pillars (ALP, APPF, and CNPA). The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. The ALP and the APPF do not count as part of the 124,626 authorized levels; however, they provide additional security under the MoI. The ALP receive funding from ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding.

Afghan Uniform Police

The AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force the local populace encounters in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters (PHQ) in each of the 34 provinces.

The AUP mission is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property, such as historical and cultural relics. Other AUP duties include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally

37 See section 3.2 for more information on size of the ANDSF.
senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower lower-level leaders to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.

**Afghan Local Police**

The ALP provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate (SD) level. ALP personnel are not included in the overall ANDSF authorization and the United States funds the salaries for the ALP.

**Public Security Police**

The PSP provide urban and metropolitan security, including anti-riot security, for major gatherings and can act as a medium-level response force for situations that exceed the capabilities of the regular uniformed police. The PSP consist of seven reserve support battalions subordinate to the PSP directorate in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, MeS, and Kunduz.

**Afghan Border Police**

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders and provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. The ABP HQ is located in Kabul.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work alongside their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure the police, not the military, remain the primary face of the rule of law. The AACP organizational structure includes the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Counterterrorism Police Division, and the Major Crimes Task Force.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counter-narcotics (CN) efforts with regular narcotics police and specialized units located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit (SIU), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), and the Intelligence Investigation Unit.

The MoI’s NIU and SIU conduct interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. NSOCC-A supports the NIU for joint CN and CT operations, training, and sustainment. These

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38 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
advisors collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

**MoI Afghan Special Security Forces**

*General Command of Police Special Units*

GCPSU met ASSF personnel growth milestones during this reporting period and remains the MoI’s preeminent police component. Unlike some elements of the ASSF, the GCPSU does not suffer from high levels of misuse. Advisors noted that the quality of the GCPSU training pipeline enabled the growth and professionalism of the National Mission Units (NMU).

The GCPSU is the most capable law enforcement component of the MoI. It conducts rule of law operations, including CT, CN, and counter-organized crime, and can execute high-risk arrests and crisis response operations like hostage recovery. The GCPSU is composed of a HQ responsible for C2 of all special police units, six NMUs, 33 Provincial Special Units (PSU), and 25 Provincial Intelligence (J2) Detachments. Advisors noted that misuse and low operational readiness rates of GCPSU special police were minimal during this reporting period.

The ANDSF Roadmap calls for the expansion of the GCPSU HQ and Training Directorate, an increase in the number or Provincial J2 Detachments, and the creation of three additional NMUs as part of ASSF expansion. The new NMUs will provide crisis response, HPA prevention and reaction, and high-risk arrest capabilities to areas in western, northern, and eastern Afghanistan. The three new NMUs reached initial operational capability during this reporting period. In September 2018, each new NMU deployed and collaborated with an existing NMU as part of a “big brother” concept in which advisors and existing NMUs mentor the new units. Advisors assess that continued TAA over the next six months is necessary to help mature the new units’ target development and intelligence integration. With the expansion of the GCPSU, challenges associated with maintaining the effectiveness of existing NMUs while distributing the necessary equipment and leadership may grow. Key leaders from the existing NMUs redistribute across the GCPSU to help build the new capabilities. Although this may reduce the effectiveness of existing NMUs, advisors noted that they have not witnessed an atrophy in existing capabilities.

Overall, NMUs have continued to develop, conducting a range of complex Helicopter Assault Force (HAFs) and HPA response operations. The existing NMUs are conducting fully independent HAF operations utilizing SMW, and acting on Afghan-derived targets. However, NMUs—and the GCPSU—remain reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be fully effective.

PSUs provide a quick reaction capability and special investigative element for the provinces and hold broad responsibilities for public order, high-risk arrests, and evidence-based policing operations within the rule of law construct and other police tasks not suited to the conventional ANP. PSUs directly support to the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) in their assigned province, but reside under operational control of the GCPSU HQ. GCPSU HQ maintains responsibility for the provision of manpower, training, and equipment of the PSUs, while the PCoP sustains the units through provisions of ammunition, food, pay, and other sustainment material. The PSUs consist
of three Special Response Teams (SRT) and an intelligence detachment that provides localized human intelligence.

GCPSU recruits attend the Special Police Training Center (SPTC) for basic police training. The Special Police Training Wing (SPTW) provides advanced special police training. SPTW courses provide advanced training on topics like special reconnaissance, explosive ordnance, ATAC, and sensitive sight exploitation. Advisors plan to leverage the SPTW to enable NMU growth so that new units learn specialized skills like special reconnaissance and explosive ordnance.

During this reporting period, the GCPSU continued to focus on developing its high-profile attack (HPA) response and high-risk arrest (HRA) capability. HRA of counter-terrorist-related warrants remains the focus for the NMUs. The PSUs, through their tasking by the PCoPs, typically focus on lower complexity operations as a show of force in areas of increasing criminal activity. The MoI has employed the PSUs and NMUs heavily this year in a crisis response role across Afghanistan. The majority of GCPSU operations are independent ground assault forces (GAFs), with advised operations typically occurring when coalition air assets and ISR are required.

GCPSU has minimal organic sustainment assets, which make them dependent on the MoI to provide logistical support. During this reporting period, the MoI and ALS performed logistics and sustainment operations to maintain GCPSU’s operational readiness. GCPSU logistics and maintenance during this reporting helps explain why it remains an impactful force within the MoI.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continues to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). This appropriation enables the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to fund the Afghan Forces. The majority of ASFF funds sustainment and operations of the Afghan forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment operations for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2019 and beyond.

6.1 STEWARDSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Lieutenant General Rainey assumed command of the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in October 2018. As part of his initial commander's assessment, he directed a comprehensive contract management review of all of the contracts funded by the ASFF. One hundred and forty three contracts were identified which support $4.3 billion of ANDSF requirements. Of these contracts, 45 of the largest contracts accounted for $3.9 billion of ASFF spending (90 percent); the remaining 98 contracts accounted for $409 million of ASFF spending. From October 2018 to March 2019, LTG Rainey's staff worked with the requirement owners in Afghanistan as well as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the security cooperation and program management offices within the Military Departments, and the associated contracting commands to review the larger contracts. The CSTC-A is currently conducting a contract management review for the remaining 98 contracts.

Although the contract review did not result in a formal report or document, the CSTC-A did identify areas for potential savings and organizational processes to improve requirements development, increase control and oversight of contracts, improve forecasting of various classes of supply, and reassess and improve contractor performance metrics. All of these efforts will enable the CSTC-A to make more resource-informed decisions and recommendations as it relates to contract management. The congressionally mandated Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC), which is co-chaired by representatives from the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, and Comptroller, will review and approve CSTC-A's recommendations for contract adjustments as they arise based on the respective contract periods of performance.

6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. The ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while developing the ANDSF into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional
security. The majority of ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases; the remainder is provided directly to the Afghan Government primarily to fund ANDSF pay, logistics, and facilities sustainment contracts. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $77 billion for ASFF.

In many cases, Afghan nationals are employed in Afghanistan by DoD contractors to support U.S. forces, including DoD sustainment contracts that support Afghan forces. Figure 16 displays the number of Afghan nationals employed by or on behalf of U.S. forces in Afghanistan from January 1 through June 1, 2019. The Department projects that U.S. forces in Afghanistan will continue employing approximately 6,000 Afghan nationals until the next reporting period.

Figure 16: Afghan Nationals Employed by or on Behalf of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Nationals</td>
<td>6,311</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>6,082</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>5,779</td>
<td>5,938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, the international community agreed to extend financial sustainment of the ANDSF through 2024. NATO’s commitment enables the Afghan Government and its security forces to preserve past gains and maintain progress towards steadily increasing its financial contributions to security, and helps set the conditions for an Afghan-led political settlement. Future funding levels will depend on the current and future ANDSF force size and structure with the goal of ensuring the ANDSF maintains the capacity and capability to apply the appropriate amount of military pressure to compel a negotiated peace settlement with the Taliban and secure the Afghan Government and populace. The magnitude of NATO’s past financial contributions and its reliability in the future are critical to the effectiveness of Afghan security forces on the battlefield.

NATO allies and partners will revisit their contributions prior to completion of the current 2017-2020 funding cycle, as previously established at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. At the 2012 Chicago Summit, donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF until the end of 2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress.

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39 The Department provides numbers of contractor personnel in Afghanistan employed by the U.S. forces in a quarterly report to Congress in accordance with section 1267 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (Public Law 115-91). The Department also publishes quarterly data of contractor employees in Afghanistan on its website at https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/CENTCOM_reports.html for public viewing. The next contractor quarterly census report is due in July 2019.

40 The number of Afghan national contractor personnel employed by U.S. forces during the previous six months and the projected number of such personnel who U.S. forces employ is submitted in accordance with Section 1216 of H.R. 114-270, which accompanied H.R. 1735 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92).
International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw expect to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors.

**NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF)**

The NATO ANA Trust Fund serves as a flexible, transparent, and cost-effective mechanism to support and sustain the ANDSF. Created in 2007, the NATF was adapted, following agreement at the 2012 Chicago Summit, as part of NATO’s commitment to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF beyond 2014. Over time, the scope of the Trust Fund expanded to support the sustainment of the ANA, literacy and professional military education, women’s participation in the ANDSF, and capacity-building activities. In early 2018, the NATF Board took additional steps to enhance the overall reliability and transparency of the Trust Fund while increasing flexibility to apply support to some areas to other elements of the Afghan security forces, thereby providing donor nations with broader visibility into Trust Fund projects and NATO’s support to ANDSF sustainment.

The United States manages the NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the NATF’s inception in 2007, 34 nations have contributed nearly $2.8 billion. In 2018, nations contributed a total of $561 million to the NATF, exceeding pledged amounts by almost $200 million. Several countries either donated without a pledge or exceeded their pledge. As of the end of this reporting period, the NATF received over $200 million in contributions.

Activities funded through the NATF are directly linked to mission requirements generated, reviewed, and approved by the Afghan MoD and CSTC-A. The NATF Board monitors the NATF and reviews its costs effectiveness, financial integrity, and accountability, including through quarterly performance reports and annual financial audits. Since 2018, all NATF-funded projects primarily have been executed through DoD or NATO Support and Procurement Agency contracts rather than as direct contributions to the Afghan Government.

**Law and Order Trust Fund**

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 124,626 members of the ANP. CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA, and donor nations can participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over LOTFA-funded activities.

**6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS**

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, participants agreed that, as the Afghan economy and revenues grow, Afghanistan’s annual share of the cost of the ANDSF will increase progressively from at least $500 million in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial
responsibility for its own security forces. At the 2012 exchange rate, $500 million equals about 25 billion afghani. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghani ($387 million) for the ANDSF, falling just short of the goal in afghani terms. In 2017, the Afghan national budget allocated 26.9 billion Afghani ($396 million) and in 2018, the Afghan Government allocated 30.3 billion afghani ($445 million) for the ANDSF. In 2019, the Afghan Government plans to allocate 34.1 billion afghani ($448 million). Therefore, the Afghan Government has continued to meet its 2012 pledge. Given the persistence of the insurgency and continued slow growth of the Afghan economy, however, full self-sufficiency by 2024 does not appear realistic, even if levels of violence and, with it, the ANDSF force structure, reduce significantly. DoD continues to review the costs of ASFF-funded programs to ensure responsible stewardship of U.S. taxpayers’ funds to address long-term affordability of the ANDSF.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

The Afghan Government remains dependent on international support to fund both security and non-security sector costs. Donor nations are working with the Afghan Government to implement economic reforms with a goal to increase economic growth and government revenues. Continued international support for economic development is based on the Afghan Government’s progress towards economic and social reforms necessary to remove constraints on private-sector investment to spur economic growth and job creation.

Realistically, however, Afghanistan will remain reliant on the international community to fund its forces, even in a post-reconciliation environment. Afghan government funding for its MoD and MoI forces—about $500 million per year—is equivalent to about two percent of its GDP and about one fourth of total government revenues. It will be years before the Afghan economy would fully generate sufficient government revenues to finance a peacetime force, even if there was no more risk that terrorist groups could use Afghanistan as a safe haven.
## ANNEX A – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Afghan Border Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIAT</td>
<td>Army Institutional Advisory Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>Afghan Intelligence Reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALS</td>
<td>Afghan Logistics Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANATEDC</td>
<td>ANA Training Education and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA-TF</td>
<td>ANA Territorial Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOF</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOF</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAPPS</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator</td>
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<td>AUMF</td>
<td>Authorization for Use of Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Counter- and Anti-Corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>Combat Advising Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<td>CCAG</td>
<td>Counter-Corruption Advisor Group</td>
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<td>CCMC</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Capabilities Development Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDO</td>
<td>Commando</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDOQC</td>
<td>Commando Qualifications Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
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<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoEUR</td>
<td>Change of End Use Request</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMRS</td>
<td>Commander, Resolute Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Common Policy Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Command and Staff Academy</td>
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<td>CSD</td>
<td>Central Supply Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSK</td>
<td>Cobra Strike Kandak</td>
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<td>CSMC</td>
<td>Cobra Strike Maneuver Course</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afgahnistan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DCOS-SA</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff – Security Assistance</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>Expeditionary Advisory Package</td>
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<td>EF</td>
<td>Essential Function</td>
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<td>ESAT</td>
<td>Expeditionary Sustainment Advisory Team</td>
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<td>ETIM</td>
<td>East Turkestan Islamic Movement</td>
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<td>FD</td>
<td>Force Development</td>
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<td>FRU</td>
<td>Family Response Unit</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Forward Supply Depot</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAF</td>
<td>Ground Assault Forces</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Ground Coordination Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GOOD</td>
<td>Gender Occupational Opportunity Development</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
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<td>GSK</td>
<td>General Support Kandak</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVHR</td>
<td>Gross Violation of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>High-Profile Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Election Commission</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<td>INT</td>
<td>Intelligence TAA</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>ISIS-K</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>Kabul Garrison Command</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
<td>Killed In Action</td>
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<td>Kabul Peace Conference</td>
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<td>Kabul Security Force</td>
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<td>Kabul Surveillance System</td>
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<td>Lashkar-e-Tayyiba</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MCTF</td>
<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<td>MICP</td>
<td>Ministerial Internal Controls Program</td>
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<td>Military Maintenance Module</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>Mobile Strike Kandak</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>National Information Management System</td>
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<td>National Interdiction Unit</td>
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<td>National Logistics Center</td>
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<td>NMB</td>
<td>National Mission Brigade</td>
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<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Coordination Center</td>
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<td>NMIC</td>
<td>National Military Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Maintenance Strategy</td>
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<td>NMS-GVS</td>
<td>National Maintenance Strategy Ground Vehicle Support</td>
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<td>National Mission Unit (ASSF portion of GCPSU)</td>
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<td>NSOCC-A</td>
<td>NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NTB</td>
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<td>Network Targeting and Exploitation Center</td>
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<td>NUOC</td>
<td>National Unit Operators Course (GCPSU)</td>
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<td>NVG</td>
<td>Night-Vision Goggles</td>
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<td>OCC</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center</td>
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<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
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<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<td>ORC</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Cycle</td>
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<td>OS-LOG</td>
<td>Operational Sustainment and Logistics</td>
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<td>PAI</td>
<td>Personnel Asset Inventory</td>
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<td>PCASS</td>
<td>Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System</td>
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<td>PIAT</td>
<td>Police Institutional Advisory Team</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Personnel Management Office</td>
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<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
<td>Public Security Police</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Special Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCG</td>
<td>Quadrilateral Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4+S</td>
<td>Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize, Reconcile, and Sustain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAB</td>
<td>Requirements Approval Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
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<td>RLC</td>
<td>Regional Logistics Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Resource Management</td>
</tr>
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<td>ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIP</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Information Portal</td>
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<td>SEM</td>
<td>Sensitive Election Material</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>Senior Executive Service</td>
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<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SFAB</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Brigade</td>
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<td>SMAF</td>
<td>Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SOB</td>
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<td>SOJTF-A</td>
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<td>Strategic Plans and Assessments</td>
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<td>UTEDC</td>
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