ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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Report to Congress

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This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92) and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the fifth in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2019.

This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2016, through May 31, 2017. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1, 2017, through November 30, 2017.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) began the third year of full responsibility for their nation’s security with a new plan to end the stalemate with the Taliban and restructure the force to become more agile and lethal over the next four years. During the December 1, 2016, through May 31, 2017, reporting period, the ANDSF completed their winter campaign plan, Operation Shafaq II, implementing operational readiness cycles (ORC), including collective training across all Afghan National Army (ANA) corps. While executing the winter campaign, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) worked to transform President Ghani’s plan to increase security and governance in Afghanistan by 2020 into a “Road Map” that restructures the ANDSF into a force that can achieve such a goal. During this reporting period, the ANDSF developed Operation Khalid to guide combat operations during the next year and to begin restructuring the force.

U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) currently retains a force posture of approximately 8,400 personnel in Afghanistan, down from approximately 9,800 personnel in 2016, and conducts two well-defined and complementary missions: supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda, its associates, and other terrorist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K); and training, advising, and assisting (TAA) the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) mission. The drawdown of U.S. forces during this reporting period presented moderate to moderate-high risk to the mission, but the United States and coalition partners maintained sufficient numbers of personnel to conduct the TAA mission at the ministries, ANA corps, and Afghan National Police (ANP) zones.

THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY CONDITIONS

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from as many as 20 insurgent and terrorist networks present or operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, including the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, ISIS-K, and al Qaeda, in what is the highest concentration of extremist and terrorist groups in the world. Despite the convergence of these groups in Afghanistan, the ANDSF retained control of all major population centers during this reporting period. Taliban capabilities and operations varied significantly by region. The group continued to exploit its limited successes and tout them as strategic victories through the proficient use of social media and propaganda campaigns.

The combination of U.S. counterterrorism operations, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and a lack of support from the local populace have diminished ISIS-K’s influence and caused it to decline in size, capability, and ability to hold territory. At its height, ISIS-K had a presence in six provinces but it is now largely confined to four districts in Nangarhar Province. ISIS-K remains a threat to security in Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, and ISIS-K retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks in urban centers.

The ANDSF are generally capable of protecting major population centers, preventing the Taliban from maintaining prolonged control of specific areas, and responding to Taliban attacks. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) have proven to be effective at leading offensive clearing
operations. While the ANDSF has had success in urban areas, the Taliban have experienced success in controlling some rural areas through exploiting opportunities to occupy cleared areas after the ANDSF failed to consolidate gains and establishing a persistent presence. Continued Taliban attacks across the country, including the complex attack on April 21, 2017, in Mazar-e-Sharif against the 209th ANA Corps headquarters that killed 144 personnel, have weakened public confidence in the Afghan Government’s ability to provide security.

Other nations in the region affect the Afghan threat environment. Attacks in Afghanistan attributed to Pakistan-based militant networks continue to erode the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. Militant groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani Network, continued to utilize sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s belief that Afghanistan is not doing enough to prevent cross-border attacks, such as a suicide bombing at a shrine in Pakistan’s Sindh Province in February 2017 that killed 72 people, further hampers bilateral relations.

**ANDSF ROAD MAP**

President Ghani directed the development of a four-year strategy to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, and strengthen and restructure security institutions and the ANDSF. The four phases of the plan are: 1) to restructure and realign the force in 2017 to set conditions for offensive operations; 2) to continue building offensive capability in 2018 through ASSF growth while disrupting insurgent strongholds, setting conditions for major offensive operations; 3) to execute large-scale offensive operations in 2019, targeting areas necessitating increased Afghan Government presence and control; and 4) to realign the ANDSF to protect these expanded population centers, which represent 80 percent of the Afghan population. The MoI and MoD focused efforts during this reporting period on the development of plans to support the strategy. The ANDSF plan to implement President Ghani’s strategy, commonly referred to as the “ANDSF Road Map,” begins with Operation *Khalid* this year. This broad-based reform effort has four key elements: increasing ANDSF fighting capabilities, improving leadership development, better unity of command and effort, and countering corruption.

To increase the capabilities of the ANDSF, the Road Map calls for nearly doubling the size of the ASSF through reallocating positions within the existing force management cap and integrating new enablers. The ASSF currently conducts the majority of offensive combat operations, despite making up a small percentage of the overall force. The ANDSF Road Map contains plans to increase the size of the ASSF, add logistical support units to its formations, and establish the ASSF as the primary offensive maneuver force within the ANDSF, while the conventional forces become the primary option for consolidating gains and holding key terrain and infrastructure. This approach focuses increased attention and resources on forces that have proven most effective on the battlefield.

In addition to growing the ASSF, the Road Map seeks to align components of the MoI with the MoD to achieve better command and control of combat and counterinsurgency operations. The nine Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) brigades, which perform paramilitary duties within the MoI, are designated for transfer to MoD control. In addition, the paramilitary portions of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) will also transition to MoD responsibility. These realignments
consolidate the combat capabilities of the ANDSF under the MoD and allow the MoI to focus its efforts on developing community policing capabilities and upholding the rule of law.

The Afghan Air Force (AAF) has become increasingly capable, and recapitalization efforts are required to sustain and improve AAF effectiveness and to enable the ground force to become more agile and lethal. Through the continuing acquisition of additional MD-530 helicopters and A-29 attack aircraft, its aerial fires capabilities are increasing. Along with the increased expense and difficulty in maintaining the Mi-17 helicopter fleet, utility helicopters are in high demand and the required maintenance exceeds current capacity and capability, leading to maintenance backlogs and a reduced number of aircraft available. Included in the recapitalization effort is an initiative to transition the force away from Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters to more reliable, cost-effective, and easier to sustain U.S.-made UH-60 helicopters.

**ANDSF DEVELOPMENT**

The ANDSF successfully concluded Operation *Shafaq* II, having executed ORCs and collective training in units nationwide. With the transition to Operation *Khalid*, the ANDSF embarked on their first yearlong campaign in support of President Ghani’s vision of security by 2020. Previous operations covered periods of less than one year, and were tied to traditional fighting season timelines and winter reset periods. Throughout the winter, Afghan planners demonstrated their increased capability to conduct strategic and operational planning – including cross-pillar planning between the MoD and MoI.

In addition to planning, the ANA continued to show improvement in their ability to integrate combat enablers into operations. During this reporting period, the AAF received a shipment of four A-29 light attack aircraft, increasing its fleet size by 50 percent. April 2017 marked one year of operations with the A-29 platform, with impressive progress: the AAF dropped its first bomb in April 2016, and it now conducts the targeting process, prioritizes missions, launches and flies aircraft, conducts air-ground integration with maneuver forces, and releases bombs with precision, all without U.S. or coalition assistance. The ANA also demonstrated significant progress in its ability to employ the ScanEagle remotely piloted aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system. ScanEagle crews have become increasingly competent at providing target surveillance, guiding the employment of aerial fires, and conducting battle damage assessments.

In addition to the new combat capabilities, the ANDSF planned and executed an ORC during Operation *Shafaq* II. The planning concepts were sound; however, implementation was inconsistent among the different ANA corps. In some areas where there was a persistent enemy threat, leaders were reluctant to provide training cycles for their units, focusing instead on immediate combat needs. Elsewhere, collective training was executed at the *tolai* (company) level to build confidence and improve leader capabilities. The ANP was less effective in managing its ORC, and it did not achieve the intended increased readiness prior to the traditional spring and summer fighting season.

The ASSF remains among the most capable special operations force in the region. The ASSF frequently is used as the offensive arm of the ANDSF and tends to suffer misuse by conventional
forces, which then requires the ASSF to hold the territory it captures. The ASSF is capable of conducting fully Afghan-led missions, and integrates well with its aviation counterparts, the Special Mission Wing (SMW), to conduct helicopter assault force raids throughout the country.

IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Efforts to encourage greater transparency and accountability within the MoD, MoI, and the ANSF have been successful over the last six months. President Ghani has renewed emphasis on countering corruption at all levels, coupled with U.S. and coalition actions, such as common policy agreements (CPA), conditionality letters, and commitment letters, are having positive impacts on the force. Conditions imposed on funding, such as stipulating that ANSF salaries will only be funded at validated personnel levels, are prompting some improvement in ANSF behavior. In this case, both the MoD and the MoI conducted countrywide personnel asset inventories to ensure that ANSF personnel increased enrollment in the Afghan Human Resource Information Management System (AHRIMS). That effort was critical in helping set the conditions for the implementation of the Afghan Personnel Pay System (APPS) later this year, and it is expected to provide better fidelity on unit strength, improved record keeping, and reduced problems associated with unverified and absent personnel.

Greater utilization of systems such as Core-IMS\(^1\) has also helped account for equipment. Core-IMS is the Afghan system of record used for tracking inventory down to the corps and zone levels. The MoD and the MoI now have much greater visibility of personnel and equipment at lower levels and have started cross-leveling supplies to support operations.

Corruption is considered the critical vulnerability within the ANSF and it brings significant risk to the overall mission. Good leadership is the key to any solution to Afghanistan’s corruption problems. Leader development, movement towards merit-based promotions, and counter-corruption programs have created positive momentum. Counter-corruption efforts this reporting period include the prosecution of some senior ANSF leaders, providing an opportunity to change the culture of corruption that has undermined the force for years.

ANDSF FUNDING

The ANSF are funded primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) appropriation. For FY 2017, Congress appropriated $4.26 billion for ASFF, which includes $814.5 million to begin transitioning the Afghan aviation fleet. The President’s 2018 budget request includes $4.937 billion for ASFF.

In addition to U.S. contributions, the international community contributes a sizeable amount of funding to sustain the ANSF. During the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, the majority of NATO member states and coalition partners agreed to continue their national contributions in 2018, 2019, and 2020, at an average combined contribution of approximately $900 million per year. Afghanistan continues to contribute to its own defense funds as well. The Afghan Government remains committed to its 2012 pledge to provide a minimum of 25 billion Afghanis,

\(^1\) Core-IMS is the Afghan system used to track warehouse inventories down to the ANA corps and ANP zone levels.
or $500 million at the 2012 exchange rate, in support of the ANDSF. The international community expects Afghanistan to increase its contribution over time.

In order to maintain international donor confidence and improve the institutional capacity of the Afghan Government, USFOR-A/RS has implemented oversight measures for expenditure of ANDSF funds. Primarily managed by Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), USFOR-A/RS has instituted a network of CPAs and commitment letters that set conditions for the use of international funds and hold the Afghan ministries accountable for the transparent and responsible management of the funds. The Afghan Government has pledged to continue to fight corruption while encouraging transparency to provide for the responsible use of donor funding.

The Road Map is still in the early stages of development, but its emphasis by senior Afghan leaders make it among the most significant planning initiatives since Afghanistan took full responsibility for security in the country. While the planned growth in the ASSF is neutral in terms of the overall personnel growth of the ANDSF, it will require sustained effort and resources to plan and implement the force structure modifications. Increased costs will be associated with ASSF-specific equipment, infrastructure growth, and increases in pay and salaries from bonuses. The President’s 2018 budget request includes a $1.4 billion increase over the 2017 budget to account for AAF recapitalization and ASSF growth.

LOOKING AHEAD

The ANDSF are at a critical point in the fight against the insurgency. The plan to modify the force structure and develop into a more agile and lethal force is underway, but 2017 is a year of setting conditions to build momentum. The ANDSF must weather the storm from the insurgency and deny the Taliban strategic victories on the battlefield, fight ISIS-K, grow and train the ASSF, conduct planning to realign forces within the MoD and MoI, and posture itself to become a more offensive force in 2018. Through periodic reviews and yearly planning cycles, the ANDSF intend to implement President Ghani’s vision to break the stalemate with the Taliban, seize the initiative, and extend security and governance to the preponderance of the population, compelling the Taliban to pursue peace through reconciliation or risk becoming irrelevant.

With renewed interest in planning for the future, Afghanistan has demonstrated its intent to face a myriad of challenges, furthering its commitment to be a viable security partner to the United States. The United States and its NATO allies and operational partners remain committed to supporting the Afghan people and institutions in partnership with the Afghan Government and to furthering the promise of a secure, stable, and prosperous Afghanistan.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

The United States currently maintains approximately 8,400 military personnel in Afghanistan as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), down from approximately 9,800 personnel in 2016. These personnel maintain a presence at bases in Kabul and Bagram with regional outstations, including in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province in the east, Kandahar Province in the south, Herat Province in the west, and Balkh Province in the north.

This presence enables a platform that allows the United States to pursue counterterrorism targets and, as part of the coalition, to develop the ANDSF further, capitalizing on the effectiveness demonstrated by expeditionary advising teams that provide tailored support to the regional ANDSF commands for both enduring and emergent capability gaps. This posture reflects a consolidation of forces and takes advantage of efficiencies gained by working and sharing functions with coalition partners and the ANDSF.

The risk to the mission due to reduced U.S. military personnel is moderate-to-moderate-high. Critical shortfalls remain with advisors, specifically expeditionary advising packages (EAPs) that enable advising at dispersed ANDSF headquarters. Long-term basing requirements have not changed, and there are currently no planned base closures or transfers. The U.S. force reduction was mitigated by partner nation contributions to the NATO-led RS mission and formal commitment to remain at these levels through 2017. RS retained at least the minimum amount of force protection, advisors, command and control, and enablers to continue the mission at a level sufficient to improve the MoD, MoI, and ANDSF incrementally.

1.1 U.S. STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan remains centered on working with NATO allies, operational partners, and the international community to defeat the remnants of core al Qaeda and to defeat other violent extremist organizations and terrorist groups, such as ISIS-K, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe-haven for groups to plan and execute attacks against the United States, U.S. persons overseas, or allies and partners; and continuing efforts to provide financial and advisory support to the Afghan Government and to enable a well-trained, equipped, and sustainable ANDSF that provides security in Afghanistan.

The U.S. and Afghan Governments agree that the best way to ensure lasting peace and security in Afghanistan is through reconciliation and a political settlement with the Taliban. The United States supports an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned reconciliation process and supports any process that includes violent extremist groups laying down their arms. The success of this peace process will require the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence and break ties with international terrorist groups. As the Afghan Government works toward this end with the Taliban and other groups, developing ANDSF capabilities, improving MoD and MoI capacity, and supporting Afghan leadership are critical to enabling the Afghan Government to secure the country.

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against a persistent, externally enabled insurgent threat. In a positive sign of the potential for insurgent groups to accept and to participate in an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process, in December 2016 the Afghan Mission to the United Nations (UN) submitted a formal request to de-list Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), from the sanctions list following a peace agreement between HIG and the Afghan Government. Russia dropped earlier objections to the request on February 3, 2017, allowing Hekmatyar’s formal de-listing to proceed.

1.2 U.S. OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN

The current U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are to defeat threats posed by al Qaeda, support the ANDSF, and give the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed and stand on their own. In early 2016, the United States expanded counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan to include targeting ISIS-K as part of the broader fight against ISIS. The focus on defeating ISIS-K increased significantly during this reporting period. The ultimate goal of U.S. and international efforts is a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified Afghanistan.

To achieve U.S. objectives and to build upon the gains of the last 15 years, USFOR-A is conducting two well-defined and complementary missions in support of the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. First, through OFS, U.S. forces are continuing the counterterrorism mission against ISIS-K and al Qaeda and its associates in Afghanistan to prevent their resurgence and external plotting against the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests in the region. Second, in coordination with NATO Allies and operational partner nations, U.S. forces are conducting a TAA mission to continue building the capabilities and long-term sustainability of the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI. The United States supports the institutionalization of ANDSF gains by conducting functionally based security force assistance (SFA) as part of the NATO-led RS mission. U.S. and coalition forces conduct TAA efforts at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and with the MoD and the MoI to improve their ability to support and sustain the fighting force. U.S. and coalition forces also TAA the AAF and ASSF at the tactical level, underscoring the importance of those two critical capabilities.

In support of these two specific missions, U.S. forces make use of operational authorities for U.S. military personnel serving in Afghanistan. These authorities address the circumstances in which U.S. forces may use force in support of its counterterrorism mission and the circumstances in

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4 Functionally based SFA is a term developed by ISAF in 2013 to describe its shift to a primary emphasis on capacity building as its combat mission was winding down. According to the RS Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12, SFA is defined as a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Fundamental guidance for joint forces conducting SFA is published in Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, April 29, 2013. According to this document, SFA consists of “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, July 12, 2010). The activities described as SFA, particularly the advisory effort focused on “essential functions,” are elements of security cooperation activities normally defined by NATO and DoD as defense institution reform and defense institution-building.
which U.S. forces may accompany or provide combat enabler support to the ANDSF in support of its fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. In certain circumstances, U.S. forces may support Afghan forces proactively in two critical ways: by providing enabling support, including close air support, and by advising and sometimes accompanying ANDSF on the ground and in the air. During the scope of this report, these authorities promoted the sustainability of the ANDSF by helping to prevent insurgent groups from gaining operational momentum and by boosting ANDSF confidence and its offensive mindset.

1.3 U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

U.S. counterterrorism efforts remain focused on defeating al Qaeda and its associates, defeating ISIS-K, protecting U.S. forces, and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe-haven for terrorists to plan attacks against the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and allies and partners. Counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan have helped the United States avoid another major terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland since September 11, 2001. However, the existence of up to 20 terrorist or insurgent groups present or operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including ISIS-K, requires a U.S. presence in the region that can monitor and address threats, even as the United States builds an Afghan capability to deter terrorist exploitation of Afghan territory.

U.S. efforts against ISIS-K in Afghanistan are part of the U.S. global effort to defeat ISIS. In addition to U.S. unilateral efforts, USFOR-A is enabling the ANDSF to conduct independent operations against ISIS-K and is encouraging more robust intelligence and operational cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other regional partners to defeat the organization in 2017. As part of the continued commitment to defeat ISIS-K, U.S. forces deployed a GBU-43 Massive Ordinance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb in Nangarhar Province on April 13, 2017, against ISIS-K forces.

The United States remains in an armed conflict against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, and it continues to rely on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force as the domestic legal basis for counterterrorism combat operations in Afghanistan. In addition to targeting al Qaeda and ISIS-K, U.S. forces may use force against individuals that directly participate in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces, and U.S. forces always maintain the inherent right of individual and unit self-defense.

The U.S. counterterrorism mission complements the TAA mission to build the capacity of the ANDSF. Limited U.S. direct action, coupled with a stronger and increasingly capable ANDSF, will help preserve the security gains to date and contribute to a robust, enduring counterterrorism partnership. The Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) supports U.S. counterterrorism efforts through TAA with the ASSF and by accompanying them on certain operations. The ASSF will continue to conduct operations throughout the country using their growing organic capabilities to address both insurgent and transnational threats. The focus of SOJTF-A TAA efforts remains building the ASSF’s capacity in logistics, command and control, intelligence analysis and sharing, aviation, and interoperability between the ASSF and conventional forces.
1.4 NATO-LED RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

The NATO RS mission remains focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI in all aspects of their ability to achieve and maintain a stable Afghanistan during a period of conflict. The United States continues to consult with NATO Allies and operational partners about the requirements of the RS mission and any follow-on NATO-led efforts to ensure that the U.S. and NATO missions are mutually supportive.

On January 20, 2017, the RS mission began transitioning from a geographically based TAA approach to a conditions-based approach focused on ministerial development and support to ANDSF development tied to the overall risk to the mission. The RS mission will retain its limited regional approach with the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) and task forces (TF) aligned with the regional ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters. To assist with ANDSF capability development across the country, the coalition increasingly relies on EAPs that provide immediate, focused, and tailored TAA support to the ANDSF for both enduring and emergent capability gaps. As RS refines the mission construct, TAA efforts in the central “hub” focused on developing the ANDSF, the MoD, and the MoI will continue.

The United States, Germany, Italy, and Turkey serve as “framework nations,” each leading a regional TAAC and being responsible for coordinating support and capabilities within its respective command region. Two regional task forces conduct efforts to TAA ANDSF pillars in the southeast and southwest. As a reflection of the ANDSF’s need for continued TAA support, the RS mission is increasingly focusing on organizationally and functionally based TAA.

The regional TAACs persistently cover four of the six ANA corps as well as the associated regional ANP zone headquarters. The two task forces, TF Anvil and TF Forge, oversee expeditionary advising with the ANA 203rd and 215th Corps respectively and ANP Zone 303 and Zone 505 respectively. The TAACs and the task forces serve as the principal connections between the ministries and fielded forces. They play a central role in the coalition’s ability to assess the efficacy of its ministerial advising efforts, to determine how well the ministries support ongoing ANDSF security operations, and to provide an outer ring of sensors and security for the coalition. In support of this mission, and because the ANDSF will have key enabler gaps in the near term, coalition forces provide limited non-combat enabling support, primarily ISR and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), to the ANDSF as the Afghans continue to field and develop their organic capabilities.

As of April 2017, RS was composed of military personnel from 39 nations (26 NATO Allies and 13 operational partner nations) with individual national contributions described in Figure 1. The United States remains the largest force contributor in Afghanistan.

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5 NATO launched its non-combat RS Mission on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of the previous NATO-led combat mission of ISAF and the assumption of full security responsibility by the ANDSF. The legal framework for the NATO presence in Afghanistan is provided by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which entered into force on January 1, 2015. The SOFA prescribes the terms and conditions under which NATO forces will be deployed in Afghanistan.
Figure 1: Resolute Support Mission Troop-Contributing Nations, as of April 2017

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Functional Advising

The cornerstone of the RS mission is functionally based SFA, an advisory effort focused on developing functions, systems, processes, and organizational development connections between the ministerial and operational levels. Military and civilian advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on one of three levels of advising:

- **Level One:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis, either from an embedded footprint or in close proximity.
- **Level Two:** Advisors work with their Afghan counterparts on a less-frequent basis (determined by commanders) to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to and the capability of their Afghan counterpart, the threat level to advisors, and coalition resources.
- **Level Three:** Advisors are not co-located with their Afghan counterparts and provide TAA support from a centralized location. Expeditionary advising teams and visits are planned and coordinated with Afghan counterparts to assist periodically with operations and sustainment.

U.S. and coalition advisors focus the TAA mission within the MoD and the MoI on generating, employing, and sustaining capabilities within the ANDSF, with advising extending to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters levels. The main effort for RS is building capacity within the ministries and the ANDSF at the national and regional levels.

The RS mission focuses on eight essential functions (EF) and associated sub-functions, as well as gender integration efforts, in order to develop a capable and sustainable MoD, MoI, and ANDSF. A U.S. or coalition general officer or a member of the DoD Senior Executive Service is typically

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6 As listed on the NATO public website, [http://www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int), accessed on April 25, 2017. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.
the lead advisor for each of the eight EFs. The EF leads vertically integrate the efforts of their EF advisors across the ANA corps, ANP zone, and at the institutional and ministerial levels. RS advisors focus their efforts on building a responsible and efficient MoD and MoI that can support an effective, sustainable, affordable, and credible ANDSF capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan. Also during this reporting period, DoD, in concert with USFOR-A, utilized pools of former advisors and regional and functional experts to provide additional expertise and support to functional advisory efforts at the ministerial level.

**Essential Function 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute**

EF 1 has three priorities: to increase resource management capability within the ministries; to build donor confidence and trust that the Afghan resource management process is transparent, accountable, and effective; and to set conditions to sustain an effective ANDSF in the future. Resource management includes formulating a defense strategy, generating requirements by determining the products and services that need to be purchased to support that strategy, developing a resource-informed budget to meet prioritized requirements, executing a spend plan by awarding contracts to purchase items from the budget, and monitoring the status of the funds expended. Advising efforts in this area are focused on enhancing resource management and procurement capability in accordance with Afghan laws, policies, and regulations; assisting with the drafting and execution of annual funding commitment letters; and helping the Afghans with the initial integration of various Afghan personnel management and payroll systems into the APPS.

**Essential Function 2: Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight**

Ensuring third-party oversight of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process is an international community-stipulated requirement for continued funding. EF 2 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help improve internal controls and to maintain accountability and oversight to help improve transparency. This affects the oversight of Afghan financial and non-financial processes, including those pertaining to fuel and salaries. CSTC-A continues to administer measures, such as financial commitment letters, that establish performance expectations and implement internal controls over all aspects of resource management. This helps to ensure that the Afghan Government properly uses funds from the United States and international donors. EF 2 supports the Inspectors General (IG) in the MoD and the MoI and their staffs in the development and implementation of the Counter- and Anti-Corruption Plan, including the Ministerial Internal Control Program (MICP) and Annual Inspection Plans.

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7 CSTC-A commitment letters stipulate how the MoD and the MoI can allocate funding for the Afghan fiscal year and under what conditions CSTC-A will provide funding. CSTC-A commitment letters also identify various legal constraints, such as the Berry Amendment and the Leahy law, that apply to U.S. funding.

8 APPS is an enterprise resource planning system that will integrate existing MoD and MoI systems for personnel management and payroll into a single platform providing timely and accurate accountability of all personnel, including civilians, within the MoD and the MoI.
Essential Function 3: Rule of Law

In order to provide security, retain public support, and instill confidence in Afghanistan’s institutions of governance, the ANDSF must operate effectively and respect human rights. EF 3 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to help ensure that the ANDSF respects and adheres to the rule of law and operates in accordance with Afghanistan’s constitution, domestic laws, and international obligations. Efforts focus primarily on assisting the ANDSF to prevent and, when necessary, respond properly to significant acts of corruption and to allegations of gross violations of human rights (GVHR), such as extra-judicial killings. RS advisors continue to engage with leaders at all levels of the ANDSF to reinforce the importance of preventing and responding to GVHR and all types of human rights violations – not only to maintain long-term viability, but also to retain U.S. and coalition assistance to the ANDSF.

Essential Function 4: Force Generation

EF 4 advisors work with the MoD and the MoI to build combat power through recruiting, training, retaining, managing, and developing a professional security force. The ANA and the ANP utilize the AHRIMS to store human resources information, track recruits, record training, and assign qualified personnel into needed assignments based on force requirements. The force generation TAA mission is grounded in an interconnected and mutually supportive five-fold effort: recruit, train, retain, manage, and develop. These five focus areas help the ANDSF to build forces that are more professional. The RS Capabilities Development Directorate works closely with EF 4 advisors to assist the MoD and the MoI as they develop their official personnel and equipment requirements through the tashkil⁹ development process.

Essential Function 5: Sustain the Force

EF 5 advisors work to help the ANDSF sustain combat power through the development of appropriate maintenance, medical support, and logistics systems. The primary focus of EF 5 is assisting the ANP and the ANA in the logistics and maintenance of vehicles, equipment, and weapons, predominantly at the ANA corps, ANP zone, and national levels to help support an affordable and sustainable ANDSF. Advisors in EF 5 also assist the ANP and ANA on points of injury care, ground medical evacuation, medical logistics, medical equipment maintenance, medical support planning, and medical staffing. Additionally, EF 5 advisors work with the Afghans on communication, information, and infrastructure to develop a sustainable communications network. The RS Combined Joint Engineering team also provides support through engineering TAA efforts in support of ANDSF sustainment.

Essential Function 6: Plan, Resource, and Execute Effective Security Campaigns

EF 6 advisors work to help the ANDSF employ all elements of the ANDSF effectively in support of the Afghan Government. It is divided into two parts: strategic planning and policy, and execution and employment of the force. In support of developing strategic planning and policy, advisors assist strategic planning efforts at the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC),

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⁹ *Tashkil* means “organization” in Dari and refers to the official list of personnel and equipment requirements used by the MoD and MoI to detail authorized staff positions and equipment items for each unit.
the MoD, and the MoI. These efforts develop the capability of the MoD and the MoI to coordinate, plan, and execute in support of national-level objectives. The strategic guidance and objectives that are developed are in turn translated into operational and annual campaign plans.

**Essential Function 7: Develop Sufficient Intelligence Capabilities and Processes**

EF 7 advisors work to help the ANDSF develop and integrate intelligence into operations. Advisors work with several organizations, including the Assistant Minister of Defense for Intelligence, the ANA General Staff (GS) Intelligence Directorate, the MoI Directorate of Police Intelligence (DPI), and the Nasrat, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center, a national-level intelligence fusion center. The goal of this effort is to help the ANDSF collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence effectively and integrate intelligence into combat operations. RS intelligence advisors work at the national and regional levels to mature Afghan intelligence capabilities, work with analysts as they learn to prepare intelligence estimates in support of military and policing plans and strategies, and help the ANA and the ANP field expanded ISR capabilities. Additionally, advisors assist the ANP and ANA intelligence schools with developing a cadre of instructors to train future intelligence personnel. EF 7 has four main lines of effort: intelligence integration with operations, intelligence cycle development, training self-sufficiency, and sustainment of intelligence capabilities.

**Essential Function 8: Maintain Internal and External Strategic Communication Capability**

EF 8 advisors work with the Afghan Government to help develop counter-insurgent messaging and to offer a positive narrative to both the Afghan people and the international community. Advisors help Afghan partners speak with one consistent voice, both externally and within their own organizations. EF 8 advisors focus on bridging gaps and overcoming challenges to improve communication within the MoD, the MoI, and the ANDSF, while continuing to reinforce successes and look for opportunities for improvement. Building the MoD and the MoI strategic communications capability depends more on developing human capital and institutionalizing processes than it does on managing resources or developing technical systems.

**Resolute Support Gender Office**

The RS Gender Office conducts TAA with Afghan leadership to integrate UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and broader gender perspectives into all policy and strategy planning within the security ministries and through policy implementation at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels. The RS Gender Office is a “stand-alone” advising directorate, though each EF has a gender focal point, as gender issues are integral to the efforts of each EF. Recognizing this interdependency, gender-centric issues are included in all major RS briefings and forums with senior RS and Afghan leaders. The RS Gender Office supports the Afghan Government as it

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10 The DPI tasks and coordinates intelligence at a basic level, produces analysis and intelligence products capable of informing senior MoI leaders and shaping MoI operations, and effectively targets terrorist and criminal networks through the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC).
implements the Afghan constitutional guarantee of equal rights to men and women, as well as Afghanistan’s National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, which addresses the inordinate impact of war on women and the role that women should and do play in conflict management, conflict resolution, and sustainable peace.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and Regional Task Forces**

RS advisors conduct their TAA mission with the ANDSF at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels through the TAACs and the regional task forces. Turkey currently leads TAAC-Capital (TAAC-C) in the Kabul area, the United States leads TAAC-East (TAAC-E) and TAAC-South (TAAC-S), Italy leads TAAC-West (TAAC-W), and Germany leads TAAC-North (TAAC-N). Personnel at each TAAC conduct training and provide advice and assistance to their Afghan counterparts depending on the need identified by the coalition and their Afghan partners. In addition, TF Forge and TF Anvil provide oversight of expeditionary advising efforts for the ANA corps and the ANP zones in the southeast and southwest, formerly covered by regional Advise and Assist Cells, to ensure full coverage of all ANA corps and ANP zones. Finally, TAAC-Air provides TAA support to the AAF.

The TAACs and TFs assist Afghan units in reporting at the ANA corps and ANP zone levels, while reinforcing the importance of building and improving the systems and processes that support combat operations. With the re-establishment of the ANP zones, the TAACs and TFs are focusing TAA support at the ANP zone headquarters level rather than at the provincial police headquarters level. TFs Anvil and Forge have also proven successful at strengthening relationships between the MoD, the MoI, the ANA corps, and the ANP zones in areas without a persistent coalition presence. RS relies on the TFs and their expeditionary advising teams to maintain progress in building Afghan capabilities in select parts of the country.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Capital**

TAAC-C, which includes Kabul Province (except Sarobi District, which falls within the 201st Corps area of responsibility), provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 111th Capital Division, ANP Zone 101 / Kabul City Police, ABP, and ANCOP elements operating in Kabul. Turkish forces lead the TAA effort with forces from several additional contributing nations. TAAC-C maintains Level 1 advising with the ANA 111th Capital Division and Levels 1 and 2 advising with ANP Zone 101 and the Kabul City Police.

**Train, Advise, and Assist Command – East**

TAAC-E, which includes U.S. and Polish forces, covers the provinces of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. TAAC-E provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 201st Corps and

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12 Additional information on each TAAC’s activities can be found throughout the report.
13 Expeditionary advising teams are composed of a mission command cell to provide command and control for the advising effort; the team is further augmented by select functional advisors as appropriate.
ANP units in ANP Zone 202. TAAC-E maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Train, Advise, and Assist Command – South*

TAAC-S, led by U.S. forces, includes the provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul. TAAC-S provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 205th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 404. TAAC-S maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Train, Advise, and Assist Command – West*

TAAC-W, led by Italian forces, includes Badghis, Farah, Ghor, and Herat Provinces. TAAC-W provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 207th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 606. TAAC-W maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Train, Advise, and Assist Command – North*

TAAC-N, led by German forces, includes the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Samangan, Sar-e-Pul, and Takhar. TAAC-N provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 209th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zones 707 and 808. TAAC-N maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Task Force Forge*

TF Forge, led by U.S. forces, includes Helmand Province. TF Forge provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 215th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 505. TF Forge maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Task Force Anvil*

TF Anvil, led by U.S. forces, includes the provinces of Paktika, Khost, Pakiya, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Bamyan. TF Anvil provides functionally based SFA to the ANA 203th Corps and ANP units in ANP Zone 303. TF Anvil maintains Level 1 advising with all ANDSF pillars at the ANA corps and ANP zone level within its area of responsibility.

*Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air*

TAAC-Air is a functional command that covers all of Afghanistan. RS advisors provide functionally based SFA to the AAF from the ministerial level down to the wing, group, and squadron levels. TAAC-Air’s advising priorities for this reporting period included ensuring the timely flow of AAF personnel into formal training programs, improving operational level command and control, encouraging AAF force management and a flying hours program,
improving in-country maintenance and logistics, and developing and fully integrating aviation platforms, including the C-130, C-208, A-29, Mi-17, and MD-530.

1.5 INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Assessments of MoD and MoI progress are conducted using mutually agreed milestones and processes developed by both the coalition and the associated ministry. Each EF lead is responsible for assessing progress in ministerial development using a program of actions and milestones (PoAM) developed in conjunction with Afghan counterparts in the MoD and the MoI. The PoAMs consist of five categories of information: essential function, system, organization, process, and action. Annex A lists the indicators of effectiveness for the MoD and the MoI under each PoAM.

The leader of each EF identifies critical processes in order to develop milestones and measure progress for their EF. These processes are completed over time through the execution of a series of supporting actions or tasks that achieve desired effects and/or preclude undesired effects. Progress toward each milestone is dependent upon the progress made within each of the listed actions or tasks. A five-stage capability and effectiveness scale (see Figure 2) is used to rate overall ministerial progress on actions and milestones, and the associated series of tasks listed in each EF PoAM.

Figure 2: Capability and Effectiveness Rating Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agreed</td>
<td>Tasks/milestones scoped and agreed to between advisors/advisees; efforts to develop baseline capability and measures in progress but not complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Development</td>
<td>Condition initiated: baseline design to achieve capability and associated measures initiated by Afghan element; plan to move forward is sound and ready for implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Partially Capable/Effective</td>
<td>Condition in progress/incomplete: Afghan element is partially capable/effective. Measures have been designed and partially implemented, but neither fully operational nor adequately effective. Condition can be achieved by end of RS with current level of TAA; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fully Capable/Effective</td>
<td>Condition nearly achieved/incomplete: Afghan element fully capable but still requires attention to improve effectiveness and to solidify the day-to-day use of processes and systems that will lead to sustaining capability. Condition on track to be achieved by end of RS; advising will continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sustaining Capability</td>
<td>Condition fully achieved: Condition achieved; Afghan element actively applying capability effectively and refining associated processes and systems as needed to drive future growth/progress. Advising will only continue on this effort as requested by Afghan counterparts and as opportunity allows.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Levels three through five are based on a combination of focused advising and reporting, data-informed assessments, and the professional judgement and subjective assessment of the EF lead. Each EF directorate maintains and updates their PoAM assessments using the tracking methodology maintained by the RS SFA Center, which is responsible for the integration, coordination, management, and synchronization of functionally based SFA across the coalition. The EFs synchronize their PoAMs on a monthly basis by either validating or updating their
consolidated PoAM. Every six months, the SFA Center and EF directorates refine the PoAMs to ensure they accurately project the ministries’ ability to achieve functional milestones.

The TAAC and TF commanders account for ANDSF progress quarterly at the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters level through an ANDSF Assessment Report. The report tracks ANDSF capability development by assessing progress along the five pillars of leadership, combined arms operations, command and control, personnel and training, and sustainment. Similar to the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment has five capability and effectiveness ratings. The ANDSF assessment is one component of the larger RS mission assessment; it reflects the advisors’ assessments of the ANDSF at the headquarters level.

Advisors at the regional TAACs submit their assessments of ANDSF capabilities to the Afghan Assessment Group within RS, which then combines the assessments into an overarching assessment of the ANDSF as it relates to the campaign plan. MoD and MoI advisors use the EF milestone assessments along with the ministerial leadership’s strategic priorities to develop their focus areas for TAA efforts. Assessments of the ANDSF’s progress on achieving milestones are conducted continuously and are collected by the SFA Center on a monthly basis. Each month, the EF leads provide their assessments to the RS senior advisors to the MoD and the MoI, and synchronize TAA efforts across the multiple functional areas of focus. The Afghan Assessment Group and the SFA Center continuously determine methods to improve and streamline reporting and assessment processes. Despite changes to the milestones in the PoAMs, the ANDSF assessment methodology, and advisor reporting mechanisms, the strategic conditions required for the success of the RS mission have not changed.

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14 In addition to the ANA corps and ANP zone headquarters, the report also provides an assessment of the AAF headquarters, ANASOC division headquarters, the Ktah Khas at the kandak level, SMW headquarters, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) headquarters, and the ALP Staff Directorate within the MoI.

15 *Leadership* is the ability of the commander and subordinate leaders (including staff primaries) to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area and to provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks and missions while being accountable for their actions and responsibilities. *Combined arms operations* is the ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to bring all available forces, assets, and enabler systems to bear effectively. *Command and control* is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. *Personnel and training* is the ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training and institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks. *Sustainment* is the ability to sustain training and operational missions independently.
SECTION 2 – THREAT ASSESSMENT

General Nicholson, Commander of USFOR-A and RS, assesses that the exploitation of ungoverned sanctuaries outside of Afghanistan by terrorists and Afghan insurgents is the single greatest external factor that could cause failure of the coalition campaign. External sanctuary hampers efforts to bring Afghan Taliban senior leadership to the negotiating table and allows space for terrorist groups like the Haqqani Network to plan coordinated operations against U.S. and coalition forces, the ANDSF, and civilians. External sanctuary allows the Afghan Taliban to rest, refit, and regenerate, thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence.

Afghanistan faces a continuing threat from an externally enabled insurgency and as many as 20 total terrorist organizations present or operating in the country, the highest concentration of terrorist groups in the world. These pervasive insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks constitute a threat to Afghanistan’s stability. Revenue from drug trafficking, illicit mining, and foreign financial support continues to sustain the insurgency and Afghan criminal networks. Additionally, extortion and kidnappings by low-level criminal networks have increased in some areas of Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains a sanctuary for various groups, including al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIS-K, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Sanctuary on the Pakistan side and presence on the Afghan side remain a security challenge for both countries and pose a threat to regional security and stability.

2.1 IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Pakistan is the most influential external actor affecting Afghan stability and the outcome of both the USFOR-A and the RS missions. Pakistan views the outcome of Afghanistan to be in its vital national interest and thus remains driven by its India-centric regional policy objectives. Afghan-oriented militant groups, including the Taliban and Haqqani Network, retain freedom of action inside Pakistani territory and benefit from support from elements of the Pakistani Government. Although Pakistani military operations have disrupted some militant sanctuaries, certain extremist groups—such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—were able to relocate and continue to operate in and from Pakistan. The United States continues to convey to Pakistan at all levels the importance of taking action against all terrorist and extremist groups.

Increased collaboration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical to maintaining pressure on militant and terrorist groups and for meeting the enduring security requirements on both sides of the shared border. The trust deficit resulting from Pakistan’s support of and inaction against Afghan-oriented extremists hampers the bilateral military collaboration required to achieve enduring security. Since the beginning of President Ghani’s tenure, leaders from both countries have made several attempts to improve relations and to address mutual security interests more effectively, such as the threat from various extremist groups that reside in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. These efforts have largely ceased following major high-profile terrorist attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and public statements by each government disparaging one another. Each country publicly claims that the other provides sanctuary to certain militant groups and lacks
the will to combat them. In Afghanistan, the Taliban claimed responsibility for attacks on January 10, 2017, that left more than 70 people dead in Kabul, Helmand, and Kandahar Provinces. In Pakistan, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine in Sindh Province on February 10, 2017. This attack, along with others, led Pakistan to close border crossings temporarily and conduct cross-border artillery shelling into Afghan territory. The shelling has continued almost daily since that time.

Despite tensions in the bilateral relationship, Afghanistan-Pakistan border cooperation at the tactical level took positive steps, maintaining constructive dialogue and informally operationalizing border management mechanisms functionally similar to those outlined in the Bilateral Military Coordination Standard Operating Procedures. During the reporting period, multiple general officer-level engagements maintained open communications, enhanced information sharing, and facilitated some military-to-military cooperation along the border. In particular, Pakistan contributed operational support to a U.S.-ANDSF combined operation to combat ISIS-K. RS continues to facilitate meetings between Afghanistan and Pakistan through its Tripartite Joint Operations Center. Meetings focus on border management and security, countering terrorist groups, and countering the threat from improvised explosive devices (IED). In an effort to de-escalate border incidents more effectively, Afghanistan and Pakistan established telephone hotlines for corps commanders and have begun the initial calls between corps headquarters. Following the completion of these calls, both delegations hope to re-initiate corps commanders meetings to better de-escalate border incidents.

Addressing long-term issues associated with the large Afghan refugee population in Pakistan also continues to affect bilateral relations negatively. Pakistan is host to a sizable population of Afghan refugees who have been returning in large numbers to Afghanistan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs expects the number of refugees crossing into Afghanistan in 2017 to increase up to 52 percent over 2016. Afghanistan’s efforts to secure population centers will be complicated by returnees and changing demographics in their intended destinations.

The United States continues to work closely with international partners and regional actors, including Pakistan, to set conditions for an eventual Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated resolution of the conflict and peaceful political settlement with the Taliban. During this reporting period, progress has been minimal in advancing a potential peace process.

2.2 CURRENT SECURITY CONDITIONS

Afghanistan continues to face an externally enabled and resilient insurgency. As Afghanistan enters its third year of full responsibility for the security of the country, Afghan forces have shown determination and continued capability growth in their fight against the Taliban-led insurgency. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul, major population centers, most key transit routes, provincial capitals, and a majority of district centers. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to contest district centers, threaten provincial capitals, and temporarily seize main lines of communication throughout the country, especially in high-priority areas like Kunduz and Helmand Provinces. As of February 2017, RS assessed that the Afghan Government maintained control or influence over 65 percent of the population, while the Taliban had control or influence over approximately 11 percent of the population, with the remainder being contested.
On April 28, 2017, the Taliban announced the commencement of Operation Mansouri and the beginning of what the organization considers the fighting season. The Taliban claims that its strategy will focus on building governance while sustaining violence. The Taliban also indicated that the target of its violent attacks would center on foreign forces, the Afghan Government, and its military forces and intelligence infrastructure. Of note, the Taliban claims that they will take caution to minimize civilian casualties. The ANDSF is generally capable and effective at protecting major population centers, preventing the Taliban from maintaining prolonged control of specific areas, and responding to Taliban attacks. The Taliban has proven capable of taking rural areas, returning to areas after the ANDSF have cleared but not maintained a holding presence, and conducting attacks that undermine public confidence in the Afghan Government’s ability to provide security.

The Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to perpetrate high-profile attacks, particularly in the capital region, to attract media attention, create the perception of insecurity, and undercut the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. From December 1, 2016 through May 31, 2017, there were eight high-profile attacks (HPAs) in Kabul and 42 elsewhere in Afghanistan. On April 21, 2017, insurgents killed 144 personnel and wounded another 65 people in a complex attack against the 209th ANA Corps headquarters at Camp Shaheen in Mazar-e-Sharif. Further, on May 31, 2017, vehicle explosion attack near the German Embassy killed approximately 50 people and wounded over 400 Afghan and coalition civilians. Nevertheless, the total number of HPAs decreased in Kabul 20 percent compared to the same period last year, and the number of HPAs for the remainder of the country decreased by 11 percent.

Since late 2015, private militias and other non-state actors have played a more public role in maintaining security in their respective regions – particularly in the north of Afghanistan – as there is a tendency for local and provincial government officials and warlords to employ these groups to address local security challenges. In addition, over the last year, the Afghan Government has begun using government funds to establish and support local security forces, also known as National Uprising Forces, in rural areas to provide additional security in remote parts of the country. The inclusion of these groups and other non-state entities remains a component of overall security and stability efforts, but raises policy and implementation questions as these groups have limited accountability and a disregard for human rights, and they can exacerbate tribal and ethnic tensions if not properly monitored.

**Influence of Other Regional Actors**

During this reporting period, the Afghan Government continued its outreach to regional and international countries.

**Russia**

Russian-Afghan relations suffered due to Russia’s public acknowledgment of communications with the Taliban and support of the Taliban’s call for coalition withdrawal from Afghanistan. During the reporting period, Russia invited Afghanistan to meetings hosted by Russia, including a six-nation (Russia, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and India) dialogue on February 15, 2017,
and a meeting that included five Central Asian States on April 14, 2017, which the United States chose not to attend. Moving forward, Afghanistan likely will continue to press for an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led reconciliation process and has offered to host the next multi-nation meeting in Kabul.

**China**

China’s low but increasing levels of military, economic, and political engagement in Afghanistan are driven both by domestic security concerns that violent extremism will spread across the Afghan border into China and, increasingly, a desire to protect regional economic investments. In late February 2017, China committed $85 million to establish and sponsor an Afghan-led Mountain Brigade in Badakhshan, but political, logistical, and resource hurdles will likely prevent the unit from becoming operational in 2017. China is a member of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) seeking to support Afghan and Taliban peace and reconciliation efforts, and Afghanistan continues to seek Chinese pressure on Pakistan to assist reconciliation efforts and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries.

**Central Asian States**

In 2016, the Central Asian States (CAS) continued to be concerned about Afghanistan’s stability and terrorist threats to their own stability emanating from Afghanistan, specifically returning foreign fighters, and the potential spread of ISIS-K. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan positively influence Afghanistan by providing infrastructure, security, and economic assistance to build Afghanistan’s self-sustainability.

**Iran**

Iran’s desire for influence in Afghanistan remains strong and is not expected to wane. Iran seeks increased influence in Afghanistan through government partnerships, bilateral trade, and cultural and religious ties, and its ultimate goal is a stable Afghanistan where Shi’a communities are safe, economic interests are protected, and U.S. military presence is reduced.

Iran provides some support to the Taliban and Haqqani Network and has publicly justified its relationships as a means to combat the spread of the ISIS-K threat in Afghanistan. This undermines the Afghan Government’s credibility, adds to instability in the region, and complicates strategic partnership agreements.

In 2016, Afghanistan and Iran focused on mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The Chabahar port agreement, which will provide Afghanistan with an alternative trade route to bypass Pakistan, may act either as an asset to Afghanistan or as an additional means for Iran to influence Afghanistan depending on Iranian disposition.

**Saudi Arabia**

Afghanistan prioritizes Saudi Arabia’s religious credibility and political support over seeking material support from Saudi Arabia. Particularly, Afghanistan seeks greater recognition of fatwas
and statements by the Grand Mufti condemning terrorists and ISIS-K as “incompatible with Islamic values.” Saudi Arabia historically has not provided material or fiscal support to Afghanistan, despite Afghanistan joining the Saudi-led Counter Terrorism Coalition. Saudi Arabia likely views Afghanistan as a space to compete with Iran for influence.

**India**

India is Afghanistan’s most reliable regional partner and the largest contributor of development assistance in the region, including civil development projects such as the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam and the Afghan parliament building. India is providing significant training opportunities for Afghan officers and enlisted personnel. Approximately 130 Afghans travel to India each year to attend various military academy and commissioning programs. India has also donated limited security assistance, most notably four Mi-35 aircraft. In May 2016, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed the Chabahar Port agreement opening a trade route into Central Asia and Europe and allowing for the bypass of Pakistan.

**Threats from Insurgent and Terrorist Groups**

Collectively, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to present a formidable challenge to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. The presence of as many as 20 terrorist organizations creates the largest concentration of terrorist and extremist organizations in the world and a complex threat environment.

The externally enabled Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to Afghan, U.S., and coalition forces. Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani’s role as a Taliban deputy has solidified Haqqani influence within the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani’s position has likely allowed the Haqqani Network to increase its area of operations within Afghanistan and provided the Taliban with additional operational and planning capabilities. Haqqani and Taliban integration has become so robust that many observers no longer look at them as separate entities, but as factions within the same group.

ISIS-K has regressed since its operational emergence and initial growth in 2015. Several factors have disrupted ISIS-K’s growth and diminished its operational capacity, including U.S. counterterrorism operations against the group, ANDSF operations, pressure from the Taliban, and difficulties in gaining local populace support. During the last reporting period, ISIS-K had a limited presence in six provinces; however, it is now largely confined to four districts in southern Nangarhar Province. Nonetheless, ISIS-K remains a threat to Afghan and regional security, a threat to U.S. and coalition forces, and it retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks in urban centers, such as a suicide attack on a hospital in Kabul that killed more than 30 Afghan civilians on March 8, 2017.

ISIS-K is still conducting low-level recruiting and distribution of propaganda in various provinces across Afghanistan, but it does not have the ability or authority to conduct multiple operations across the country. Moreover, command and control and funding from core ISIS elements in Iraq and Syria are limited. Still heavily reliant on external funding, ISIS-K is struggling to develop funding streams within Afghanistan, which has increasingly put it into conflict with the Taliban.
and other groups vying to raise revenue from illegal checkpoints and the trade of illicit goods. ISIS-K continues to draw its members from disaffected TTP fighters, former Afghan Taliban, and other militants who believe that associating with or pledging allegiance to ISIS-K will further their interests.

The Taliban has demonstrated increasing capability to threaten district centers, but the ANDSF has also proven its ability to recover district centers lost to the Taliban quickly. Seeking to exploit ANDSF weaknesses and the reduced international military presence, the Taliban maintains control in some rural areas that lack effective Afghan Government representation, continuing a trend since the beginning of the RS mission and OFS.

The al Qaeda threat to the United States and its allies and partners has decreased, and al Qaeda is primarily focused on its own survival and its efforts to regenerate. The organization has a sustained presence concentrated in the east and northeast of Afghanistan, with smaller elements in the southeast. Some lower- and mid-level Taliban leaders provide limited support to al Qaeda, but during this reporting period, there have been no signs of a stronger relationship at the strategic level. In addition, al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, AQIS, has built a presence in the south and southeast of Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Whereas al Qaeda continues to recruit from Arab populations, AQIS is composed primarily of militants from within the broader South Asia region.

**Security Trends**

From December 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017, there were 4,806 effective enemy-initiated attacks, with a monthly average of 801 (see Figure 3). By comparison, the total number of effective enemy-initiated attacks during the previous reporting period was 4,727, with a monthly average of 788.
Reflective of the historically lower levels of violence during the traditional winter fighting season, the number of reported effective enemy-initiated attacks was low during the winter months and gradually rose as the Taliban and the ANDSF increased operations in the spring. The overall level of reported enemy-initiated attacks during this reporting period was slightly lower than the same period the previous year. Consistent with the two previous reporting periods and the overall trend since the end of the U.S. and NATO combat missions and the transition to OFS and the RS mission, very few reported effective enemy-initiated attacks involved coalition or U.S. forces.

The coalition relies largely on ANDSF reporting for all metrics, including effective enemy-initiated attacks, which are a subset of all security incidents. Direct fire remains by far the largest source of effective enemy-initiated attacks, followed by IED attacks and mine strikes. (see

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16 Reports on security incidents and effective enemy-initiated attacks are often delayed by several weeks due to translation and long data base reporting and processing timelines. In addition, ANDSF units frequently do not report insurgent attacks that do not result in casualties, such as indirect fire or attempted IED explosions that do not wound or kill ANDSF personnel.

17 Security incidents comprise all enemy action, including enemy-initiated direct fire and indirect fire, such as mortar, rocket, and artillery; SAFIRE and explosive hazard events, including executed attacks (IED explosion, mine strike); and potential or attempted attacks (IEDs or mines found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins). Security incidents do not include friendly action (e.g., direct fire and indirect fire that are initiated by friendly forces). Due to this change in reporting since the ISAF mission, the number of effective enemy-initiated attacks is the most representative metric of overall security conditions rather than the total number of reported security incidents. This change in reporting metrics for security trends is indicative of the challenges associated with the coalition’s increasing reliance on the ANDSF for nearly all types of reporting data.
Figure 4). Consistent with trends over the last several years, indirect fire and surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) remain the least frequent sources of effective enemy-initiated attacks. The number of IED attacks and mine strikes has remained relatively steady over the last 18 months. The number of direct fire attacks has grown as the Taliban increased attacks on vulnerable ANA and ANP fixed positions.

**Figure 4: Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type**

![Effective Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type](chart)

ANDSF Casualties

The number of ANDSF casualties suffered while conducting local patrols and checkpoint operations has steadily increased since 2015. Simultaneously, the number of casualties occurring during planned offensive operations has decreased over the same period. The majority of ANDSF casualties continue to be the result of direct fire attacks, with IED attacks and mine strikes contributing at a much lower level.

U.S. Casualties and Insider Attacks

Although OFS and RS are considered non-combat missions, conducting counterterrorism operations and TAA with the ANDSF still entail risks to U.S. and coalition forces. Since the beginning of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, 1,865 U.S military personnel have been killed in action (KIA) and 20,272 have been wounded in action (WIA), as of May 31, 2017.

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18 Additional information on ANDSF casualties can be found in the classified annex to this report.
19 Data was reported in the Defense Casualty Analysis System, accessed on June 1, 2017. This number reflects reduction of one WIA from previous reporting period who was elevated to KIA.
During the reporting period, there were 5 U.S. military deaths as a result of hostile actions and 36 U.S. military personnel WIA.

On November 12, 2016, during the previous reporting period, a suicide bomber attacked Bagram Airfield, killing 4 U.S. service members and civilians and wounding 17. One U.S. service member wounded in that attack died of his wounds on December 6, 2016.

On April 9, 2017, one U.S. soldier died as a result of wounds sustained during operations in Nangarhar Province. The soldier was a member of a U.S. Special Forces team operating with Afghan forces and conducting operations against ISIS-K. Two Army Rangers were killed in Nangarhar Province on April 26, 2017, in another operation with Afghan forces against ISIS-K.

During this reporting period, there were two insider attacks against U.S. personnel. On March 20, 2017, an ANDSF member fired upon U.S. personnel performing their TAA mission at a base in Helmand Province. Three U.S. military members were wounded in the attack.

Given the reduced number of insider attacks over the last several years, coalition advisors assess that current force protection measures have been successful in limiting the number of insider attacks (also known as “green-on-blue” attacks), although it is impossible to mitigate all risk to U.S. personnel. Investigation and analysis of insider attacks will continue to shape the coalition’s approach to mitigating the insider threat. RS Headquarters employs Joint Casualty Assessment Teams following any insider attack. These teams seek to determine the causes of the attack quickly and to identify any lessons learned for immediate dissemination throughout the command. The Joint Casualty Assessment Team report is the foundation for more in-depth analyses conducted by the Insider Threat Assessment Board to determine causation, motivation, and additional lessons learned.

Afghan security forces are at risk for attacks from within their own forces (otherwise known as “green-on-green” attacks). During this reporting period, there were 38 “green-on-green” attacks. RS advisors continue to engage both the MoD and the MoI on the requirement for formal personnel screening to be included in official policy at the national level. Compared to the previous reporting period, insider attacks against the ANDSF, the deaths and the wounded caused by those attacks has increased slightly, and compared to the same time period last year, insider attacks against the ANDSF has increased slightly, and the deaths and wounded caused by those attacks have decreased slightly.

Civilian Casualties

The RS Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) collects information on civilian casualties for the coalition. The CCMT primarily relies upon operational reports from the TAACs and the ANDSF. From December 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017, the CCMT documented more than 3,600 civilian casualties, of which approximately one-third were deaths and two-thirds were injuries. This represents an approximately 32.7 percent increase compared to the same time one year ago.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) also tracks civilian casualty reporting on a quarterly basis. UNAMA’s data from January to March 2017 (the latest available
data) reports 2,181 civilian casualties, of which 715 civilians were killed and 1,466 civilians were wounded, a 4 percent decrease from the same three-month time period the previous year. CCMT reports 1,441 civilian casualties during the same quarter. While CCMT and UNAMA report differing numbers due to different collection methodology, both sources attribute the largest portion of civilian casualties to the actions of insurgents.

Preventing civilian casualties remains a major concern of the ANDSF, the Afghan Government, and U.S. and coalition forces. U.S. and coalition advisors continue to work closely with the Afghan Government to reduce civilian casualties by raising awareness of the importance of civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. The coalition is continuing TAA efforts with the ANDSF on practical measures that they can adopt at the tactical level to prevent civilian casualties. The Afghan Government also continues to host its Civilian Casualty Avoidance and Mitigation Board, with the most recent meeting occurring on February 7, 2017. This board is scheduled to meet quarterly to discuss civilian casualty prevention procedures.

Security of Afghan Women and Girls

Structural barriers, traditional cultural norms, and insecurity remain key challenges facing Afghan women throughout Afghan society and the ANDSF. Relevant indicators such as literacy rates and percentage in paid employment show the disparity between men and women. Afghanistan reports that only 17 percent of women are literate, compared to nearly half of the men, and just 15 percent of women are in paid employment. The lack of security affects Afghans every day and hampers the delivery of services across the country. Conflict, criminality, and narcotics continue to be critical threats to personal safety, public service delivery, and private investment. Access to education, particularly for young women and girls, is affected by the fighting, family economic instability, and conflict-induced displacement.

A large majority of reported cases of violence against women is the result of domestic abuse within their own homes. To assist woman and child victims of domestic abuse, the MoI has established Family Response Units (FRU) across the country, which are staffed with specialists such as psychologists and social workers and can interview and screen victims for follow-on physical and mental health treatment. Since establishing 41 FRUs in 2014, the program has expanded to more than 208 FRUs in 2017.

The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), in coordination with the MoD and MoI, is developing an ombudsman program to enable external reporting, oversight, and victim support for women employees of the MoD and MoI. This program will enable members of the ANDSF and the Afghan population to report gender-based violence and human rights abuses safely to the AIHRC, which can take action or assist law enforcement as appropriate. It is designed to provide an avenue for women employees of the MoD and MoI to seek independent mediation outside of their chain of command, should the chain of command be complicit or fail to act appropriately in such cases. The ombudsman program, while developed and planned, has yet to be funded and implemented.

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20 Information on the security of women and girls addresses a reporting requirement outlined in Section 1531(c)(1)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2016.
Security remains a concern for female members of the ANDSF. Women are frequently afraid to wear their uniforms while travelling to work sites for fear of attacks. Once at work, inadequate facilities, a lack of female changing rooms, and female changing facilities occupied by men contribute to an air of exclusion and present opportunities for sexual harassment.

Although demonstrable progress has been made in some areas, the Afghan Government continues to implement its programs inconsistently. The National Action Plan for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 was published on June 30, 2015, and a monitoring and evaluation plan was issued subsequently. Both the MoD and MoI formally committed to implementing gender initiatives as well. Although plans were published and responsibilities were assigned, little progress has been made towards implementation.

2.3 ANTICIPATED SECURITY CONDITIONS

Afghanistan’s political stability and the effectiveness of the ANDSF throughout 2017 will have a significant impact on the future security environment in Afghanistan. Discord between various political, ethnic, and tribal factions within the Afghan Government, particularly those related to ongoing tensions between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah and scandals involving First Vice President Dostum, pose a threat to the stability of the National Unity Government and the security situation. However, President Ghani is conducting more outreach to political rivals, dealing with poor leadership and corruption, and navigating challenges with Parliament.

Terrorist and insurgent groups will present a formidable challenge to Afghan forces as these groups continue offensives that threaten provincial centers, while rural areas will remain contested between the Taliban and the ANDSF over the next year. The historically reduced tempo of insurgent activity during the winter months continues to be less pronounced than in previous years. This may be largely attributable to Taliban fighters and some commanders remaining in Afghanistan year-round, which facilitates greater insurgent mobility, or it may be attributable to a change in insurgent tactics.

The threat groups will continue exploiting vulnerabilities in ANDSF force posture by conducting concentrated attacks. The Taliban are likely to use smaller groupings of fighters and cross-provincial mobile units as the AAF’s capabilities grow and coalition airstrikes continue. The Taliban will likely use harassing attacks against lightly defended checkpoints, challenge the reach of the ANDSF in rural areas, isolate villages by staging smaller attacks in surrounding areas, and impede ground lines of communication ahead of attacks against district and provincial centers in order to isolate key urban areas.

Insurgents will likely focus on prioritized targets, such as in Helmand and Kunduz Provinces, while also conducting attacks in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul and seeking to expand their influence throughout rural Afghanistan. The Taliban will continue to plan high-profile attacks and portray localized tactical successes as strategic victories with the media. In addition, the Taliban may continue its recent efforts to overrun a provincial capital, such as Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, or Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province.
The relatively low number of ISIS-K fighters suggests that the group will have a limited capability to present a security impact outside of isolated provinces in eastern Afghanistan. However, the group has demonstrated a capability to conduct sporadic attacks in urban areas and high-profile attacks, such as the March 2017 hospital attack in Kabul.
SECTION 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF followed its 2016 offensive campaign, Operation Shafaq I, with a winter campaign, Operation Shafaq II, designed to consolidate gains and address deficiencies in the force. The Taliban failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives because of ANDSF efforts during Operation Shafaq I; however, the campaign concluded with Afghan and Taliban forces in a stalemate. In order to seize momentum in the fight against the Taliban during the winter and into the spring, the ANDSF designed Operation Shafaq II to ensure the security of major population centers while addressing critical shortcomings in leader development, collective training, and personnel accountability. The winter campaign also implemented ORCs and sought to improve sustainment operations at all levels.

On March 21, 2017, the first day of the Afghan solar year (SY) 1396, the ANDSF ended Operation Shafaq II and began Operation Khalid, the inaugural phase of the campaign focusing on implementation of President Ghani’s multi-year plan. Additionally, the ANDSF began to implement initial force structure changes designed to support the plan to build offensive capability within the force and place Afghanistan on the path to victory over the insurgency.

3.1 STRATEGY

Following renewed commitments of support from NATO through 2020 and lessons learned from the measured success of Operation Shafaq, President Ghani directed the development of a four-year strategy. Commonly referred to as the “ANDSF Road Map,” the ANDSF plan to implement President Ghani’s strategy requires action to seize the initiative in the fight against insurgent and terrorist forces, further professionalize the ANDSF, and modify the force structure so that it can extend security, expand governance and economic development, and compel the Taliban to seek reconciliation. Operation Khalid is the ANDSF’s plan for the first year of the Road Map. This broad-based reform effort has four key elements.

- **Increase Fighting Capabilities.** Reinforce the success of ASSF by increasing the size and capability of the force to increase ANDSF offensive reach and lethality. The AAF initiative will provide a larger, more capable air force through a combination of aircraft acquisition, pilot training, aviation maintenance capability development, and target development and integration throughout the ANDSF. Having an organic, relatively large, and highly capable air force will provide the ANDSF with a distinct advantage against its enemies.

- **Leadership Development.** Produce honest, competent, and committed ANDSF professionals by introducing merit-based selection of leaders, better instruction and education, and a unified training system. In addition, the ANDSF will employ improved human resource and personnel management systems to provide appropriate leader development from recruitment through retirement and ensure that trained leaders are assigned to the right positions.

- **Unity of Command/Effort.** Increase unity of command and effort between the MoD and the MoI, starting with a review of Command and Control structures.
Counter Corruption. Implement reforms to address illicit activity and patronage networks within security organizations in order to reduce corruption and increase ANDSF effectiveness.

The ANDSF Road Map began in early 2017, but it is designed to be a four-year plan. The ANDSF intends to move towards a more offensive-oriented and sustainable security strategy that relies on a robust ASSF to serve as the primary offensive ANDSF force while the conventional forces protect the population, hold key terrain, and secure critical infrastructure. ANCOP and portions of the ABP will transition over time from the control of the MoI to the MoD, unifying military and paramilitary portions of the ANDSF under one ministry. The MoI will focus on building a competent community police force capable of enforcing the law.

The significant effort and resources required to make the force structure modifications of the ANDSF Road Map make 2017 a building year, but one in which the ANDSF will make important progress. The ANDSF plans to increase offensive operations in 2018 and 2019 and to expand security to cover the preponderance of the population by 2020, compelling the Taliban to seek reconciliation.

Although 2017 is considered a year to build momentum, the ANDSF is conducting offensive operations. Offensive operations are enabled by reducing the number of checkpoints, consolidating combat power, and constituting forces large enough to conduct major offensive operations. CPAs between RS, MoD, and MoI, requiring the ANDSF to take necessary action, remain an effective tool to enforce adherence to the plans. CPAs requiring the ANDSF to reduce checkpoints, implement ORCs, and properly employ ASSF and individuals with specialized skills such as mechanics, unmanned aircraft operators, and logistics, have proven effective within the MoD. However, the continued misuse of ASSF highlights the fact that CPAs alone are insufficient to solve these problems. The MoI is still reluctant to embrace the CPA process. The MoI has not disseminated the details of the CPA or ordered its zone commanders to comply with the agreement.

The ANDSF modified its campaign planning process during this reporting period. Rather than planning separate campaigns for the summer and winter, the ANDSF planned a joint annual operational campaign that spans both seasons. Additionally, as part of the 2017 annual operational plan, Operation Khalid, ORCs will continue through the year.

Operation Khalid allows the ANDSF to restructure, grow offensive capability, and realign its forces for a more effective force disposition. The ANDSF objectives under Operation Khalid are to isolate the enemy, secure population centers and economic resources, and defeat ISIS-K. The intent is to degrade enemy capability by denying the insurgency its resourcing and by setting conditions to execute operations in 2017 in accordance with the ANDSF Road Map.

3.2 BUDGET

The Afghan Government relies on international funding for the vast majority of its security costs. This reliance will increase as security costs increase. The requirement to fund the current ANDSF force structure in FY 2017 is $5.72 billion, and it is expected to increase to approximately $6.23 billion in FY 2018, primarily due to costs associated with recapitalizing the AAF. For FY 2017,
the United States will fund $4.26 billion of the cost of the ANDSF ($3.33 billion for the MoD and
$930.8 million for the MoI) through the ASFF. Approximately $1.01 billion of the FY 2017 ASFF
will be provided directly to the Afghan Government ($796.5 million for the MoD and $212.5
million for the MoI) to fund salaries and incentive pay, equipment, and facilities maintenance. The
other $3.25 billion of the FY 2017 ASFF will be executed by DoD primarily through contracts on
pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. The remaining $1.46 billion of ANDSF costs will be
funded by international donors ($152 million for ANP salaries, information technology, aviation
training and maintenance, uniforms, and medical supplies) and the Afghan Government ($544
million, primarily for food and subsistence).

The United States, along with international partners, is working closely with the Afghans to reduce
ANDSF costs further through a number of cost savings initiatives, most notably the divestiture of
excess facilities. Conditionality letters from CSTC-A encourage the divestiture by awarding
incentives of 493.2 million Afghans and 290 million Afghans, to the MoD and MoI respectively,
if the conditions are met. Neither CSTC-A nor the respective Ministers of Defense and Interior
have signed the SY 1396 Bilateral Financial Commitment Letters. Therefore, the divestiture of
facilities has not been enforced and deadlines (originally May 1, 2017) have not been officially
communicated to either Ministry. However, the MoI has already identified the 10 sites for
divestiture within SY 1396. The MoD has not identified any sites for divestiture. No penalties in
regards to these conditions have been assessed yet.

CSTC-A continues to take steps to increase the MoD’s and MoI’s ability to manage international
donor funding directly and in a fiscally transparent and accountable manner. CSTC-A is able to
leverage bilateral funding commitment letters to hold the MoD and MoI accountable for managing
programs effectively and to ensure that transparency and accountability remain an important aspect
of MoD, MoI, and ANDSF operations. Additionally, CSTC-A is working closely with the ANDSF
to implement personnel asset inventory (PAI) procedures designed to ensure accurate
accountability of assigned personnel and avoid erroneous salary payments. CSTC-A is changing
ANDSF behavior for the better through making use of policies such as only funding ANDSF
salaries at levels of validated personnel. In this case, both the MoD and MoI are conducting
countrywide PAIs to ensure that ANDSF personnel increase enrollment in AHRIMS. This effort
is critical in helping set the conditions for the implementation of the APPS in summer 2017. The
PAIs have provided better fidelity on unit strength, improved record keeping, and have helped
reduce problems associated with unverified and absent personnel, also known as “ghost soldiers.”

Once APPS becomes active, the actual size and strength of the ANDSF will become clearer,
leaving rigor to oversight initiatives to combat wasteful spending and corruption. Over the last
year, media reports of “ghost soldiers” suggested that U.S. and coalition forces are funding salaries
well in excess of the number of people actually serving in the MoD and MoI. Soldiers who could
not be accounted for in the AHRIMS system were rumored to be false accounts set up to gain
illegal access to funds. In reality, most of the soldiers not accounted for in the system are
performing duties and have been getting paid; however, they were not properly input into the
system for reasons such as a lack of infrastructure, missing biometric data, or missing ID cards.
In another instance, approximately 12,000 soldiers and police were administratively tracked in
categories of Transit, Training, Holding, and Schools (TTHS) and not actually slotted in a formal
tashkil billet, causing additional confusion that affected salaries.
Despite the efforts of CSTC-A and the ANDSF to reduce costs, implementing required initiatives under the ANDSF Road Map will require additional funding, placing the anticipated requirement for ASFF funding near $5 billion annually through at least 2020. Increasing the size of the ASSF will cost an estimated at $203.3 million (ANASOC $140.3 million, General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU) $30 million, infrastructure $33 million) in FY 2017. Recapitalization of the AAF will cost approximately $6.8 billion over seven years and requires $814.0 million in FY 2017. Restructuring the ANDSF command and control structure could cost up to $6 million, and the establishment of a Counter-Corruption Task Force will require $81.2 million. Additional costs in FY 2018 will include $192.5 million for ASSF growth (ANASOC $180 million, GCPSU $12.5 million), $709.8 million for AAF recapitalization, and $70.4 million for Counter-Corruption efforts.

3.3 FORCE SIZE AND STRUCTURE

The current ANDSF authorized force level as part of the tashkil remains at 352,000 ANA and ANP personnel\(^1\) plus 30,000 Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP is funded solely by the United States, and although overseen by the MoI, it is not part of the 352,000 authorized ANDSF tashkil.

During the reporting period, the ANDSF began developing the plan to modify its force structure to implement the ANDSF Road Map. Over the next several years, ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) plans to increase combat power through the integration of the two existing Mobile Strike Force Vehicle (MSFV) Brigades, adding a fourth Commando Company to the existing Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs), and building two Special Forces kandaks. The addition of the MSFV Brigades will provide the ANASOC with an organic ground assault force capability and will reduce reliance on conventional ground forces. The manpower required for the ANASOC growth will come from realigning tashkil positions from conventional forces. To provide the appropriate level of command and control, the ANASOC division will expand to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade. The ANASOC School of Excellence will expand to enable this growth, and add general support kandaks to the brigades to enable the ANASOC to support themselves logistically rather than relying on logistical support from conventional ANDSF forces.

The MoI planning to support the ANDSF Road Map focused on how best to transfer the ANCOP and portions of the ABP to the MoD. This plan will move the paramilitary and civil order functions to the MoD to alleviate problems associated with cross-pillar coordination while fighting insurgents and will enable the MoI to focus on community policing and enforcing the rule of law. The MoI will retain control of its GCPSU and is working with ASFF to add three more Police Special Units (PSU).

Under the ANDSF Road Map, the SMW will also expand to provide additional helicopter crews, consolidate the PC-12 aircraft into a new fixed-wing kandak, and create an aviation support kandak. The AAF will more than double the size of its fleet by 2023 as a result. This reporting period, construction began on the first two of six additional A-29s for the AAF, refurbishment

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\(^1\) The authorized strength of 352,000 includes 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP.
commenced on the first 53 of a planned 159 UH-60As, and funding was allocated for AC-208 light-attack aircraft and 30 additional MD-530 helicopters. Pilot, maintainer, and support personnel changes will be made within the authorized tashkil level of 195,000 for the ANA.

The ANA continue to explore options to build combat power through the formation of reserve units. Several corps within the ANA have worked to recruit former ANA soldiers who served honorably to rejoin the ANA on one-year contracts. Originally intended to serve as the basis for creating reserve kandaks, those corps who are participating in the effort have instead focused on recruiting reserve tolaiss.22 The goal of reserve recruiting is to allow the reserve soldiers to serve in their home areas and integrate into kandaks with existing leadership rather than serving as an entirely reserve cohort unit. The 209th, 203rd, and 201st ANA Corps are making the best use of the reserve recruiting program.

During this reporting period, the first of two MSFV Brigades officially transitioned from the conventional ANA to the ASSF. The MSFV soldiers began cycling through Commando training while ensuring that the bulk of the force remains available for combat operations throughout the training cycle. This transfer of ANA billets to the Commandos was accomplished within the authorized tashkil level for the ANA.

**Attrition**

Attrition levels vary widely among the different corps and zones. Aggregate attrition within the ANDSF during this reporting period averaged 2.31 percent, consistent with the three-year historical average of 2.20 percent. The ANA averaged 2.54 percent attrition, as compared to the three-year historical average of 2.50 percent. ANP attrition averaged 2.11 percent, consistent with the three-year historical average of 1.99 percent.

During the reporting period, overall ANDSF recruitment kept pace with losses, resulting in a relatively constant end-strength over the past year. However, maintaining overall end-strength is a misleading metric. Although recruiting has generally kept pace with attrition, retention has not. As attrition levels remain high, the ANDSF becomes younger and less experienced as new personnel replace those with combat experience.

Although separations, retirements, and casualties contribute to overall attrition, the number of ANDSF personnel dropped from the rolls23 dominates ANDSF attrition, representing more than 70 percent of all personnel losses. ANA soldiers and ANP police dropped from the rolls rarely return to duty, which increases the recruitment effort required to maintain the overall force size. Consistent with previous reporting periods, the ANA continues to have a higher rate of soldiers dropped from the rolls than the ANP.

Several factors are known to contribute to the high number of ANDSF personnel dropped from rolls, including poor leadership and leader accountability, lack of casualty and martyr care, poor

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22 *A tola* is a company-size unit in the ANA.

23 Individuals are dropped from the rolls when they leave their units without authorization for more than 30 days. Some personnel who leave without authorization, including those dropped from the rolls, eventually return to their units.
implementation and understanding of leave policies, lack of timely and accurate pay, and inadequate living and working conditions. In addition, soldiers in units in high-threat areas are often not granted leave due to operational requirements and receive only limited rest and training between deployments due to the absence of an ORC. Attrition remains a larger problem for the ANA than for the ANP, in part because ANA personnel management policies do not allow soldiers to serve in their home areas in order to decrease the potential for local influence. However, these policies have the second-order effect of increasing transportation costs and creating additional obstacles for soldiers attempting to take authorized leave, which contributes to the problem of soldiers dropped from rolls.

ANA and ANP both have policies to prevent personnel from going absent without leave, although enforcement is inconsistent. Coalition advisory efforts continue to focus on the ANDSF’s ability to regenerate forces through recruitment and operational readiness programs. Despite these challenges, the size of the ANDSF has remained relatively stable over the past year, although it is several thousand personnel below the authorized level of 352,000 personnel.

**Force Posture**

The reduction of static checkpoints continues to be an area of concern for the ANDSF. There is significant social and political pressure to maintain checkpoints around villages and along highways. However, an abundance of checkpoints reduces the available combat power for maneuver, and many of these checkpoints are tactically unsound, creating a vulnerability often exploited by the enemy. President Ghani instructed the MoD and MoI to reduce the number of permanent fixed checkpoints in order to increase the available combat power of the ANDSF to support combined arms operations.

CPAs between RS, the MoD, the ANA Chief of General Staff (CoGS), and the Minister of Interior Affairs have identified a number of agreed-upon operational behaviors and performance goals, including the reduction of checkpoints. The MoD has agreed to reduce the number of permanent fixed checkpoints across Afghanistan. Each corps must also demonstrate that it employs no more than 25 percent of its forces in the operational phase of the ORC in permanent static checkpoint positions. During this reporting period, the ANA did not make any significant reduction in checkpoints. Remaining checkpoints will be scrutinized more closely to determine whether they are planned and resourced appropriately and whether the decision to establish the checkpoint is tactically sound.Checkpoint reduction remains a work in progress, and it is complicated by political pressure to accommodate portions of the Afghan population that stand to lose a permanent ANDSF presence.

The ANA resumed offensive operations in the spring as part of Operation *Khalid* and Operation *Hamza*. The operations were designed to protect population centers while defeating ISIS-K and to hold key terrain and critical infrastructure while some ANDSF elements restructure in support of the ANDSF Road Map. The geographic focus of ANDSF operations was primarily in the south and southwest, with an increased emphasis on security around Farah Province. Additionally, the 201st Corps and the ASSF continued to conduct operations in Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces as part of Operation *Hamza* to defeat ISIS-K. RS assisted the ANDSF by sending Expeditionary
Advising Packages to Farah, Tarin Kot, and Qalat Provinces to provide TAA at the ANA brigade level.

3.4 CAPABILITIES

The ANDSF operational trend continues to be positive, particularly in units led by quality leaders, but challenges remain. Poor leadership, corruption, misuse of ASSF, and improper utilization of specialty (low-density) personnel continue to hamper progress in too many units. On a positive note, the initial implementation of ORCs, improved collective training, and improved logistics planning and execution indicate that the ANDSF are incorporating lessons learned from previous campaigns.

Operational Capabilities

Integration of enablers such as attack aviation, ISR, and indirect fires is essential for the ANDSF to close the capability gaps that exist without coalition support. Synchronization and employment of enablers is improving but is still lacking. The AAF entered Operation Khalid with two years of experience providing aerial fires to ground forces, and the AAF continues to improve its support to embolden ground forces. In April 2016, the Afghans employed A-29s for the first time in combat, conducting a single airstrike with some coalition assistance. One year later, the ANDSF regularly conduct airstrikes with A-29s with little to no coalition assistance, relying instead on Afghan Terminal Air Controllers (ATAC) to control fires through direct communication with Afghan A-29 pilots. The ANDSF continues to train ATACs and conduct collective training on combined arms maneuver to integrate air assets more effectively into operations.

The ANDSF ability to use ISR to plan and, to a lesser extent, control combat operations is improving. Integration of intelligence gained from ScanEagle remotely piloted aircraft, along with Afghan and coalition-provided information, has aided in the planning of some operations and has become a pillar of ASSF operations. The ANA 215th Corps has demonstrated exceptional use of ScanEagle, employing the system for target surveillance and air-to-ground integration for aerial fires and conducting battle damage assessments after strikes. The 209th Corps began utilizing the ScanEagle in March 2017 in Kunduz Province, and the demand for more systems continues to increase as the ANA have begun to realize the system’s effectiveness.

Intelligence collection and sharing continues to improve in both the MoD and the MoI. The three primary intelligence fusion centers – the Network Targeting and Exploitation Center (NTEC) within the MoI, the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) in the ANA, and the Nasrat, also known as the National Threat Intelligence Center, under the direction of the National Directorate of Security – share intelligence regularly, aiding in the development of targeting packages. Although intelligence sharing is an established strength across the ANDSF, intelligence analysis remains a weakness. Sorting through the vast amounts of information collected and understanding how the various pieces fit together still require considerable level-1 TAA from coalition advisors.

24 Additional information on ANA and ANP force component capabilities and MoD and MoI capacity and ministerial support to the ANDSF are detailed in the relevant sections below.
The use of indirect fires from Afghan artillery and mortar systems lags behind other enablers, primarily due to the lack of trained forward observers and competent fire-direction controllers. Artillery and mortars are used primarily as direct-fire systems or counter-fire systems following insurgent rocket attacks. The ANDSF prefer aerial fires, if available, to indirect fires during maneuver.

The implementation of ORCs that include a focus on collective training has experienced some success. Some advisors have experienced difficulties convincing the ANDSF to embrace the concept of continued training during combat operations, but some corps have maintained a robust ORC in the midst of heavy fighting. Overall, we see more progress in implementing ORCs within the ANA than with MoI forces. Some corps and zone leaders have met expectations, while others demonstrated little progress. The MoD and MoI collective training requirement instructed ANA corps to conduct exercises at the platoon, tolai, and kandak levels. Senior MoI officials directed that the ANP execute small-unit and individual training. All ANA corps succeeded in executing their first ORC, albeit some more easily than others. Due to weak leadership skills at the tolai level, training often did not achieve intended results. A lack of command emphasis on training was also an issue for both the 207th and 209th Corps. There is a risk that headquarters, whose units most need to conduct collective training, will use their high operational tempo as a reason not to conduct collective training. The trade-off for having more units operating in the field is a reduction in overall ANDSF readiness over time.

Some ANDSF corps headquarters continue to misuse attached ASSF despite both the MoD and MoI having signed formal CPAs validating their intent to curb such misuse. The greatest misuse of ASSF is through employment in conventional roles, such as employing ASSF at checkpoints or as personal security detachments. This undermines the ASSF ORC and does not hold ANA and ANP units accountable in their roles.

The ANDSF demonstrated significant improvements in its planning capabilities throughout the planning process for Operation Khalid. Although both the ANA and ANP received advice and guidance from RS personnel, the campaign was an ANDSF plan. The ANDSF commanders clearly designated main and supporting efforts and allocated resources and enablers appropriately. ANDSF conducted the formal planning briefs to senior leaders with RS personnel only observing. Once the planning cell had completed the plan and issued the order, the CoGS held a conference for corps and zone commanders to afford them the opportunity to discuss their understanding of their respective parts of plans for the campaign. The conference was a powerful event as zone and corps commanders came to Kabul to inform each other collectively of their plans.

Logistical operations and sustainment of the force remain critical capability gaps. The ANDSF still struggles to maintain its weapons, vehicles, and equipment, primarily due to the lack of professional logistics leaders and the institutionalization of key processes. Poor situational awareness of vehicle maintenance status, inaccurate logistics reporting, inadequate coordination between headquarters, and misleading reports of ammunition consumption are persistent shortcomings that negatively affect the overall force.
On May 23, 2017, the National Maintenance Strategy (NMS) contract was awarded in an effort to improve overall maintenance capability within the ANDSF. The NMS consolidates existing maintenance contracts under one contract and is designed to improve maintenance in the near term. The NMS contains provisions for building the capacity of ANDSF and Afghan civilian contractors to take control of maintenance over time. In the case of the MoD, the goal is to build the capacity of the ANA to conduct its own maintenance. Within the MoI, the overarching goal is to transition away from coalition contracts to Afghan-contracted support. The NMS is expected to achieve initial operational capability in June 2017.

Leadership Challenges

Leadership at all levels within the MoD and MoI remains a significant challenge throughout the ANDSF. Following the Taliban attack against the ANA 209th Corps headquarters that killed 144 people and wounded 65, President Ghani accepted the resignations of Minister of Defense Habibi and CoGS Qadam Shah on April 24, 2017. The overall performance of ANDSF leaders is considered uneven, and consequently, improved leader development is one of the primary pillars of the ANDSF Road Map. RS advisors have placed increased emphasis on merit-based leader selection and assignments throughout the ANDSF, and recent large-scale changes in the general officer ranks are indicative of progress. Additionally, the ANA have instituted a formal selection board process for senior officers and non-commissioned officers. The board process is designed to eliminate the practice of paying for promotion and to create a system that selects officers and noncommissioned officers based on merit.

Advisors have also worked with ANDSF leaders to place a priority on professional education and leadership training, especially within the ANP, to build a cadre of experienced leaders. A lack of professional leader training and education has contributed to the challenges facing the ANDSF. Many educational opportunities outside of Afghanistan require the Afghan leader to speak English. A shortage of English-speaking Afghan leaders coupled with increasing absence without leave incidents involving Afghans training in the United States have decreased ANDSF leader training opportunities abroad and created a demand for creative approaches to leader training in Afghanistan.

Corruption, patronage, and an inability to remove ineffective leaders erodes confidence in the ANDSF and ultimately reduces the combat capability of the force. ANDSF headquarters actions against corruption have demonstrated small but positive steps. A number of corps and zone commanders have initiated investigations into leaders whose actions warrant suspicion.

Ministerial and Cross-Pillar Coordination

Ministerial coordination continues to improve at the national level and, to a lesser extent, at the corps and zone levels. Unfamiliarity between ANA and ANP leaders on the ground, coupled with a lack of trust between leaders of the ANDSF institutions, has limited overall ANDSF effectiveness in some corps areas. The inability of the ANA and ANP to plan and rehearse operations collectively has also contributed to tactical errors and increased casualties on the battlefield.
ANDSF personnel often bypass the Operations Coordination Centers (OCC) designed to improve communication and coordination between the pillars. ANA and ANP personnel send reports to higher authorities within their own ministries, complicating planning and support during cross-pillar operations and crisis response. Although standard operating procedures (SOP) exist to correct these problems, many are not signed or implemented below the ministerial level.

When utilized appropriately, the OCC – Regional (OCC-R) have generally proven effective at enhancing unity of effort while integrating ANA and ANP activities, providing an accurate picture of the force dispositions across their respective regions and promoting the integration of all ANDSF functions into the operational planning process. Similar to other ANDSF institutions, the degree of functionality depends on the selection and empowerment of capable leaders. Tactical coordination between ANA and ANP forces through the OCC – Provincial (OCC-P) is not as effective, leading to confusion at the district level as to the appropriate lead agency. The OCC-Ps are still developing their capability to manage information, and they suffer from insufficient Manning, equipment, and ministerial-level guidance, and from conflicts with existing local and informal command and control channels.

Coordination on strategic communications provides an example of strong coordination between the MoD, the MoI, and the Afghan Presidential Palace. The Government Media Information Center director chairs a weekly strategic communication meeting to synchronize messaging on security issues with the MoD and the MoI. As a result, the Afghan Government is better able to counter insurgent information operations. The ANA runs a recurring and effective information operations working group, which synchronizes many non-lethal capabilities and assets of the MoD and ANA (religious leaders, Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Operations Security, Military Deception, etc.). Additionally, with the inclusion of the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs, Ministry of Information and Culture, High Peace Council, and Afghan civil society organizations in the information operations working group, there is great promise and hope for greater strategic communication activities and effects throughout Afghanistan.

3.5 ASSESSMENT

Although the overall ANDSF performance in combat operations is uneven, there is reason for optimism going forward. This reporting period marks the beginning of the second year of a sustainable security strategy that allocates and focuses combat power across the country. In 2016, the ANDSF prevented the Taliban from accomplishing any of its stated operational objectives and from taking over any major population centers. In 2017, the ANDSF is better trained and has initiated force structure changes that have resulted in a more offensive and lethal force.

Further integration of ISR and aerial fires this reporting period has improved the overall effectiveness of ANDSF operations. The presence of MD-530s and four additional A-29s has emboldened ANDSF ground forces and consistently disrupted the Taliban. With the ANDSF focused on holding key terrain and infrastructure while it restructures the force, aerial fires and enhanced intelligence collection and fusion capabilities will become even more critical.

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25 Assessments of the ANDSF by force pillar can be found in the classified annex to this report.
Cross-pillar coordination between ANA and ANP forces continues to be a challenge; however, command relationships between some ANCOP units and ANA headquarters have served to improve coordination. The ANP struggles to hold terrain without significant ANA support and has yet to demonstrate a sufficient ability to conduct community policing and law enforcement operations.

The ASSF and AAF remain the most effective ANDSF forces and will be the recipient of the largest investment of resources in accordance with the ANDSF Road Map. The ASSF make up a small fraction of the overall ANDSF force, but it conducted a majority of the offensive operations during the past year.
SECTION 4 – MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

4.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The MoD oversees the ANA, which includes the AAF and the MoD’s pillars within the ASSF: the ANASOC, the Ktah Khas, and the SMW (see Figure 5). Following the Taliban attack against the ANA 209th Corps headquarters that killed 144 people and wounded 65, President Ghani accepted the resignations of Minister of Defense Habibi and CoGS Qadam Shah on April 24, 2017. Major General Tariq Shah Bahrami was appointed the new Minister of Defense, having served as the MoI Senior Deputy Minister prior to his appointment; the appointment is pending confirmation from Parliament. Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali was promoted from Commander, 203rd ANA Corps, to CoGS. During this reporting period, the MoD’s main focus areas included improving the professionalization of the military; campaign planning and execution; improving planning, programming, budgeting, and execution; improving force sustainment; improving infrastructure and facilities sustainment and repair; increasing transparency and accountability; and implementing civilianization policies.

Figure 5: Ministry of Defense Organizational Chart

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26 The Ktah Khas is a light infantry special operations kandak accomplished in conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms.
The MoD-authorized end-strength includes positions for MoD headquarters, various command staffs, the ANA, the AAF, and elements of the ASSF (see Figure 6). The MoD also includes an additional 5,502 authorized civilian positions that augment military forces for certain duties, build institutional knowledge and experience within the ministry, and free up soldiers to perform inherently military functions.

**Figure 6: Ministry of Defense Manning Authorization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MoD Echelons</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395</th>
<th>Solar Year 1396</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Headquarters</td>
<td>2,765</td>
<td>2,722</td>
<td>2,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Staff</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>6,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Commands</td>
<td>25,365</td>
<td>31,422</td>
<td>31,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Commands</td>
<td>119,252</td>
<td>121,224</td>
<td>120,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
<td>11,651</td>
<td>11,730</td>
<td>11,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and SMW</td>
<td>7,981</td>
<td>8,877</td>
<td>8,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
<td>13,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Resources</td>
<td>8,384</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>4,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military</strong> (includes R coded positions)&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>195,000 military and 8,004 civilians</strong></td>
<td><strong>195,000 military and 5,502 civilians</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoD is unable to identify requirements effectively below the corps level. Subsequently, the General Staff and ministry budget personnel are not able to consolidate requirements effectively. However, the MoD is able to identify funding and program requirements over a three-year horizon. The MoD successfully formulated its annual budget, and included prioritized unfunded requirements remaining from FY 1395.

The MoD is making steady progress on its FY 1396 budget execution, with 33 percent of its $796 million budget executed. As of May 31, 2017, the MoD has awarded 86 FY 1396 contracts totaling $144 million, and the Requirements Approval Board (RAB) had approved 264 contracts identified in the FY 1396 Draft Prioritized Procurement Plan. Finally, five framework contract bids have been advertised; two of those contracts have completed the entire contract bid process and have been awarded. The MoD completed its spend plan and submitted it to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) on January 30, 2017.

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<sup>27</sup> Although the MoD and MoI budget process coincides with the Afghan fiscal year, the *tashkil* process coincides with the Afghan solar year. The Afghan fiscal year follows the SY numbering system, but is offset by one quarter. FY 1396 runs from December 21, 2016 – December 20, 2017.

<sup>28</sup> TTHS denotes training, transient, holding, and students.

<sup>29</sup> “R” coded positions denotes positions currently filled by military personnel that will revert to civilian positions once they are vacated.
The APPS, a system to integrate personnel management and payroll systems with biometric ID cards, is under development, with implementation expected to begin in summer 2017. As implementation has not yet begun, challenges and delays remain minimal. There is a planned slowdown in development during the month of Ramadan, from approximately May 26 to June 25, 2017, to account for the limited availability of personnel. Once operational, it will take several months before the data is sorted, updated, and validated accurately to provide detailed usage information. Pending the APPS implementation, no improvements are being made to the current paper-based pay process. However, RS continues to encourage stronger governance in the control of reported personnel numbers by allocating funding for ANA personnel per approved $tashkil$ positions. As of March 5, 2017, 93 percent of the ANA was assigned to valid $tashkil$ positions.

The APPS will provide greater clarity regarding the overall size of the force and could affect the total amount paid in salaries. The benefits of APPS extend beyond improvements in the payroll system. Advisors and the ANDSF have already gained much greater fidelity on personnel information through conducting the PAI and updates to AHRIMS. APPS is designed to improve that process by creating real-time reporting, reducing the number of personnel required to process AHRIMS data and conduct personnel and equipment transactions. In APPS, all aspects of the $tashkil$ are visible and may be tracked more effectively by the ANDSF and their advisors. From an equipment standpoint, advisors and ANDSF leaders will have better clarity on what equipment is authorized and what they have on hand. There will be fewer instances of purchasing the wrong type or wrong quantity of equipment, potentially creating cost savings.

APPS training is planned to begin in July 2017; units will be required to attend the training prior to transitioning to APPS. Units fielding the system will have two months to work with the system and ensure that all soldier data is loaded. After the first two months, soldier pay will become tied to the APPS system. Once APPS is fully implemented, soldiers will only be paid if they are in the system and slotted in an authorized $tashkil$ billet.

**Legal Affairs**

The Counter- and Anti-Corruption (CAC) Plan is a framework document developed by the MoD in 2016 to establish, implement, and enforce processes to prevent and fight corruption throughout the ministry. The CAC Plan enabled the MoD to synchronize internal efforts to achieve transparency, accountability, and oversight. These efforts include the Ministerial Internal Controls Program that identifies and mitigates sources of corruption and enforcing asset declarations by senior leaders. The Minister of Defense holds weekly CAC meetings to monitor anti-corruption efforts under the CAC Plan.

For the first time, as required by Afghan law, high-ranking military officers were required to provide their asset declarations to the High Office of Anti-Corruption, the government entity responsible for vetting and validating asset declarations. The MoD initially resisted having an outside agency control and vet declarations, but then-Minister of Defense Habibi directed the MoD to give declarations to the HOOAC. In another effort to counter corruption, former Minister Habibi demanded rotations for all officers who occupied sensitive positions for more than three years. The MoD and GS IG implemented the IG continual rotation plan that has already resulted in personnel moving to new positions.
The MoD IG has established processes to receive and respond to complaints from the ANA and the MoD. The ministry placed complaint boxes, which are accessed by IG staff, at various locations throughout the country. In addition, the ANA GS IG provides calling cards to soldiers with information regarding how to make formal complaints. As a result, the GS IG received a fourfold increase of complaints, indicating increase usage of the system.

The Organizational Inspection Program (OIP) supports and enables annual and special inspection plans within the MoD. It directly supports the senior leaders’ desire for efficient and appropriate control mechanisms, and it increases the IG’s role to provide ministry leadership a clear picture regarding resource expenditures and ANDSF operational readiness. Although the ministry has the annual and special inspection plans in place, challenges remain with execution, reporting, and follow-up. OIP effectiveness is slowly trending upward.

The MoD has the personnel and training required to investigate and prosecute GVHRs effectively, and it made progress towards identifying, investigating, and acting on GVHR allegations. The MoD improved self-reporting, investigation, and compliance, though results vary between ANA corps commanders. The MoD does not have a standard procedure to address corps commanders who do not follow through with investigations of GVHR, but RS advisors are assisting the ANA with developing a solution.

**Personnel Management**

The MoD continued to prepare for initial implementation of the APPS in July 2017. Throughout the reporting period, the MoD and advisors conducted PAIs at each ANA corps location in order to update and validate soldier data in the AHRIMS. When implemented, personnel records from AHRIMS will be migrated to the APPS personnel module and AHRIMS will be retired. In order to be validated in AHRIMS, soldiers must provide personal data, be in possession of an identification card, and have biometric data on file. The intent of the PAI process was to increase the accuracy of the AHRIMS data as much as possible in order to facilitate a successful initiation of the APPS system. PAI visits were productive, but many soldiers were not validated due to lack of time and other factors. Soldiers not validated in AHRIMS will not be paid when data is migrated to APPS unless they take additional measures to ensure that they have provided all necessary information, including biometric data.

On January 1, 2017, CSTC-A began funding the monthly ANA and ALP payroll disbursements from the validated personnel records within AHRIMS. Accordingly, CSTC-A withheld funds for those personnel not accounted for in AHRIMS. This served as a forcing function to encourage Afghan leaders to place renewed emphasis on the thorough and deliberate PAI process to validate all Afghan soldiers.

The ANA Training and Education Doctrine Command has made progress in doctrine development and implementation. The CoGS approved the completed revision of the “ANA-0” Doctrine Development System Manual in March 2017. ANA-0 establishes the process by which doctrine is revised and updated to enhance a systematic approach to training throughout the ANA. This will include the integration of refined processes to incorporate lessons learned in combat into
doctrine. This represents a doctrinal system that is able adjust to the needs of the ANA thus enabling the synchronization of doctrine with manpower, budgeted logistics, and facility requirements.

The MoD is conducting a “civilianization” effort designed to transition some senior leader positions within the ANA from military to civilian billets. This effort is intended to provide civilian oversight of the force, bring in subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the organization. However, implementation of the civilianization plan has been slow for several reasons. For example, transitioning a position from military to civilian requires authorization from senior leaders within the ANA, and in several cases, the senior leaders stand to lose their position to a civilian. Culturally, the idea of civilians working alongside combat soldiers has not resonated with many decision-makers in the ANDSF. The MoD has conducted six internal hiring actions for senior civilian leadership positions, although processing positions through the civil service commission for approval has been slow. RS advisors are focusing on improving the recruitment processes and filling positions that will build capacity and meet the civilianization goal.

The MoD closed the Officer Candidate School and consolidated its officer training efforts within the Afghan National Officer Academy to gain efficiencies in the education program. Despite closing the Officer Candidate School, the ANA reserved 50 seats for exceptional noncommissioned officers in the academy each year to improve the quality of junior officer leadership with proven, combat-seasoned leaders. This reporting period, 47 noncommissioned officers began their transitional education. These changes will improve leadership deficiencies, but it will take time to identify, educate, select, and promote the best-qualified leaders.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The basis for proper equipment procurement planning is a clear picture of requirements compared to current equipment on hand. Accountability for and visibility into key commodities continue to improve transparency at the MoD and ANA corps levels through increased use of Core-IMS. The system has undergone a number of modifications over the last year and is becoming a more useful tool for tracking the distribution of equipment. Core-IMS is now linked to the Security Cooperation Information Portal system, allowing some material purchased for the Afghans by the United States through pseudo-FMS cases to be populated directly into the Core-IMS system. Additionally, Core-IMS now has the ability to track transfers of equipment out of national warehouses to corps forward supply depots. In the past, equipment shipped from the MoD disappeared from the Core-IMS system and had to be manually re-entered by the corps upon receipt. Now, the transfer of equipment from the MoD automatically generates a receipt at the forward supply depot so the receiving corps knows exactly what is shipped and when it is due to arrive. Core-IMS does not extend to levels below corps, so the MoD still has limited capacity to maintain accurate accountability and serviceability of equipment at the unit level. As with any automated system, effectiveness is dependent on the data provided. At the corps level, inconsistent and inaccurate reporting of equipment readiness in the Core-IMS system inhibits the MoD’s and ANA’s ability to identify equipment shortages and build procurement plans.
The MoD does not currently conduct effective life-cycle management of its equipment. The MoD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) office life-cycle management section is understaffed and lacks the training and expertise required to review weapons and vehicle fleet densities, to conduct analysis based on expected useful life, and to develop appropriate equipment replacement plans. The MoD remains reliant on CSTC-A to perform life-cycle management of its equipment on its behalf. EF 5 advisors continue to work to build this capability within the MoD.

Representatives from CSTC-A, TAAC-Air, and AT&L participated in the spring 2017 Program Management Review (PMR) in Washington, D.C. The PMR brought together representatives from the MoD and MoI, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. military departments that provide training, equipment, and sustainment support to the ANDSF through pseudo-FMS cases. Approximately two-thirds of the ASFF appropriation is spent through the pseudo-FMS system, ensuring both the quality of materials provided and the accountability of funds. This event provided Afghan leaders with the opportunity to inform U.S. implementing agencies and program managers of ANDSF materiel needs. In turn, the program managers and implementing agencies were able to discuss the status of current FMS cases and projected support capabilities over the next four years with the Afghan delegation directly. Discussions during the PMR included aviation recapitalization, ground wheeled vehicles and protected mobility, weapons, ammunition, training, and maintenance. The Afghan delegation, headed by First Minister of Defense Abdul Khaliq, provided valuable input to ensure that the ANDSF has the resources required to succeed. The next PMR is currently scheduled for fall 2017.

Although there has been some improvement, MoD logistics planning and execution capabilities are still lacking. In the operational planning of the winter 2016-2017 campaign, Operation Shafaq II, the MoD exhibited a satisfactory level of staff synchronization between the MoD AT&L office, ANA GS G4 (Logistics Directorate), and the GS Weapons and Technology section. With the assistance of advisors, GS G4 produced its first winter clothing distribution plan based upon validated requirements of subordinate units. Furthermore, it successfully distributed the winter clothing in accordance with operational priorities and geographic location of units, prioritizing those units in the coldest parts of the country. Conversely, while the organizations produced a combat service support order for Operation Shafaq II that established support priorities and metrics to replenish ANDSF units, MoD’s execution failed to adhere to the plan, with the exception of the winter clothing. The MoD is still incapable of executing logistics support for more than one major operation at any given time.

Readiness rates for protected mobility in prioritized corps stagnated and, in some cases, dropped. It required significant coalition prompting for the MoD to recognize its lack of progress and to take corrective action to send additional maintenance enablers to prioritized ANA corps. Organic ANDSF maintenance capability is hampered by a lack of maintenance management capability, production planning, and poor coordination for the distribution of repair parts. The timely and accurate delivery of critical repair parts remains a significant challenge.

On a positive note, the MoD has taken steps to improve its ability to manage its ammunition. During this reporting period, the MoD signed the Ammunition Stockholding Policy arrangement

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Protected mobility refers to tactical vehicles designed to provide varying degrees of protection from mines, IEDs, and small arms fire.
with CSTC-A. In the past, the MoD distributed nearly all of the ammunition it had down to the unit level. Under the new policy, the MoD agreed to create a strategic ammunition reserve consisting of one year’s supply of ammunition that will be available in a crisis. Additionally, the MoD will establish an operational reserve of ammunition that will allow for flexible distribution in support of combat operations.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

The ANA continues to demonstrate progress in its ability to execute a military planning process and to develop long-range strategic and operational plans. During the reporting period, the MoD primarily focused on building the Five-Year Management Plan and the SY 1396 Annual Operational Plan. The Five-Year Management Plan provides ANA with joint operational priorities and a management plan for budget, personnel, equipment, and capabilities development. The Five-Year Management Plan objective is designed to implement a sustainable and affordable ANA over the next five years, capable of providing effective security across the country. The plan is managed by the National Security Council, the MoD staff, and the ANA GS. The SY 1396 Annual Plan, Operation *Khalid*, is a joint operational plan replacing the seasonal construct previously used by the ANDSF. Each year, the ANDSF intends to develop a joint operational plan based on the guidance issued in the Five-Year Management Plan and its annual updates.

While the ANA made progress with operational planning, the MoD remains weak in strategic planning capabilities, relying on assistance from advisors. The military portions of the Road Map were well developed, but the MoD faced difficulties in planning for the counter-corruption and leader development pillars. MoD planners also struggle with how to synchronize operations over the course of a campaign. While planners understand the concept of establishing a main effort and supporting efforts, they fail to resource those efforts appropriately.

Before their resignations late in the reporting period, the Minister of Defense and CoGS have remained focused on winning the current fight, while simultaneously planning for a successful 2017 campaign and preparing the force for increased combat operations. The ANA planned and implemented a formalized ORC during Operation *Shafaq II*, which included collective training, key leader training, vehicle maintenance, and regeneration of combat power. This was specifically designed with the intent to bring the Afghan units to a high state of readiness and to set the conditions for success during the transition to Operation *Khalid*.

The ANDSF improved its capability to conduct cross-pillar ministerial coordination for planning operations in advance of Operation *Khalid*. The ANA-led planning process incorporated plans from the MoI, the NDS, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Although RS advisors assisted the ANDSF with the planning process, the GS led the planning effort. Once the plan was complete, senior leaders from the GS visited each corps to socialize the plan and ensure corps commanders understood what was expected of them. In March 2017, the ANA GS hosted an Operation *Khalid* synchronization conference with senior leaders from the ANA, the MoI, and other key stakeholders to ensure that each organization understood the plan and that the plan was resourced appropriately. The MoD and ANA demonstrated a good
grasp of the maneuver portions of the plan, but they continue to struggle with planning for logistics support to operations.

At the ANA corps level, strategic and operational planning capability continues to improve. The 201st and 203rd Corps have shown the greatest consistency in their ability to plan operations. Their performance can be attributed to the fact that U.S. and coalition forces have partnered with those units the longest. Both the 201st and 203rd Corps implemented ORCs with great success, placing special emphasis on leader involvement in collective training.

The 215th and 207th Corps demonstrated the greatest amount of improvement in their ability to plan this reporting period. Both corps commanders assumed command after their predecessors were fired and they have been in command for less than one year. Their leadership has proven to be the single greatest contributing factor to their units’ success. Following the resignation of the Minister of Defense and CoGS in April 2017, President Ghani directed a number of leadership changes and reassignments. Lieutenant General Yaftali’s vacated 203rd Corps command was filled by Brigadier General Abdul Wase of the 2nd Brigade, 203rd Corps. President Ghani removed the commanders of the 209th and 205th Corps based on poor performance.

**Intelligence**

The overall goal of intelligence capacity building within the ANDSF is to enable the force to plan and execute special and conventional operations using Afghan-derived intelligence to counter current and future threats. The MoD and GS G2 (Intelligence Directorate) made significant contributions in preparation for Operation *Shafaq II* with better overall analysis, intelligence preparation for operations, and contributions to the planning process. Those efforts continued with Operation *Khalid*.

The GS G2 recently directed the Combined Collection and Reporting Center to create a “one-stop shop” for collection management and oversight. Previously, many requests for information went unanswered because the information request module in the National Information Management System (NIMS) did not accurately track requests and was limited to a small user base. A new module was developed for NIMS as a remedy and provides increased visibility into requests and responses through a sustainable tracking mechanism.

Responsibility for the conduct of classroom intelligence training has transitioned to the MoD, with a few exceptions for newly fielded equipment. The ANA Intelligence Training Center, while a very capable training institution, has not sent mobile training teams to assist the ANA corps with initial and refresher training on their intelligence equipment.

The ANA completed the fielding of its originally planned 6 aerostats, 22 RAID towers, and 120 Wolfhounds. It continues to field a wideband microwave network to the corps, and it has successfully fielded initial ScanEagle systems. It has employed its ISR enablers to good effect by integrating with operations and planning.

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31 The AN/PSS-7 Wolfhound is a lightweight radio direction finding system that targets VHF and UHF radio bands. With the Wolfhound, users can listen to and locate Push-To-Talk radios from a mobile configuration with the custom backpack.
Where used by the ANA corps in conjunction with offensive operations and planning, Wolfhound equipment is experiencing high demand, although some units use it only in a defensive posture. As ANA units employ the system, many users still lack training. The Wolfhound course at the Intelligence Training Center has been extended to three weeks to enhance training. Maintaining sufficient numbers of trained operators has also been problematic, due to trained soldiers often being assigned to duties not related to their skill set.

The NMIC assesses threat capabilities in support of ANDSF operations and has refined Afghan target intelligence packages and targeting process development. This includes the development of a targeting module for the NIMS, which covers the range from target nomination to battle damage assessment. The NMIC’s ability to create target packages for A-29 crews has been particularly impressive. The PC-12 and ScanEagle platforms have become major contributors to this target preparation and battle damage assessment process for the AAF A-29 and MD-530 platforms. The GS G2 Targeting section continues to receive requests with vague target descriptions, incomplete grid coordinates, and inaccurate information on civilian locations in the area. To improve the effectiveness of target request submissions, GS G2, in concert with the Intelligence Training Center, is developing an intelligence-focused three-week targeting course.

**Strategic Communication**

The MoD demonstrated increased capability to communicate strategically. Weekly meetings hosted at the Presidential Palace by the Office of the Presidential Spokesman included representatives from the MoD and MoI, and they have ensured that messages are synchronized and represent the whole-of-government. Improved policies and procedures for strategic communication have aided in crisis response efforts and aided planning efforts for Operation **Shafaq II** and Operation **Khalid**. The MoD recognizes the importance of strategic communication in securing public understanding of the institutional changes that will result from President Ghani’s plan.

The MoD is beginning to improve its integration of information operations and non-lethal effects into its targeting process. Additionally, there has been a significant improvement in the MoD’s ability to manage its information operations **tashkil**. With his attendance at the first bimonthly Combined Joint Effects Working Group in February 2017, the MoD Psychological Information Director – formerly Information Operations Director – briefed information operations manning and communication equipment inventories at the corps level. This was the first time MoD had demonstrated intimate knowledge of resourcing. The MoD demonstrated an increased capability in psychological operations with its use of “Radio-in-a-Box” equipment to support the national response to a crisis, particularly in the eastern and northern provinces.

The ANA corps have made slow but steady improvement in conducting their own media operations, independent of direction from the MoD Strategic Communication Office. The current MoD strategic communication policy allows corps commanders to engage the media regarding anything that they directly control. Implementation of the policy had been slow because of the uncertainty of corps commanders and their public affairs personnel to engage the media without
direction from the Afghan Government and because the MoD Strategic Communication Office did not have the capability to direct and receive media operational information from the corps level.

There was noticeable improvement in corps-level media operations. Although not yet standardized across the ANA, several corps actively engaged media and improved relationships with the provincial governors and their spokesmen, enabling constant and consistent messaging to the press and populace. Communicators from the 201st Corps in particular were very effective in their engagement with the media and population.

**Gender Office Efforts**

The RS commander and the First Lady of Afghanistan chair the Women in Security Advisory Committee, intended to facilitate the participation of women in the ANDSF. The committee includes the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, the Chief Executive’s Senior Advisor for Women and Youth Affairs, and the Minister of Women’s Affairs to provide oversight on activities designed to integrate women into the ANDSF and to exchange information on human and women’s rights.

Gender inequalities within the MoD continue to be problematic and have not been sufficiently addressed. The facilities for women in the ANA are largely inadequate or misused. In newer facilities, men often occupy facilities intended for women, even in the MoD headquarters. Men have broken the locks to female restrooms and used the restrooms for themselves, leaving the women with no immediate access to the facilities. Elsewhere, facilities have been identified as substandard and in need of repair or have yet to be built despite having plans and funding. To address these problems, RS developed commitment letters with the MoD and MoI that would ensure adequate facilities are built and available and are not misused by men, and subject the ministries to withholding of 34 million Afghanis, on budget lines of the coalition’s choosing, per compound found in violation. CSTC-A will release the funds upon mitigation of the problems or approval of exception from the minister. As of May 31, 2017, the commitment letters have not been signed.

During this reporting period, the MoD initiated a number of gender-focused activities. Notably, the MoD procured appropriate uniforms for ANA women in regards to sizing and functionality. The MoD also drafted a human resources policy for women of the ANA, and the Minister of Defense has personally directed periodic updates on the progress of implementing the policy.

The MoD continues to provide women in the ANA with training and education opportunities. The MoD has initiated the Gender Occupational Opportunity Development (GOOD) training program to build the capabilities of more than 600 women in the ANA to perform their duties. The program includes specialty training on the English language, computer use, office management, and professional ethics and human rights. The GOOD programs take place in several ANA locations throughout the country. In addition to specialty skills, the MoD provides additional educational opportunities to its women, such as a bachelor’s degree program at Dunya University. There are currently 83 female cadets attending professional military education in ANA institutions.
The MoD is working to address shortcomings in the way women are assigned to positions, promoted within the ranks, and afforded opportunities for career progression. They are also working to address gender-based violence and inappropriate workplace behavior, including discrimination, bullying, and harassment. RS advisors are assisting with the development of internal reporting and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the ANDSF investigates and takes action on alleged incidents.

4.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

The ANA GS provides command and control over all of Afghanistan’s ground and air forces, including the ANA conventional forces, the AAF, the SMW, and the ANASOC. In total, the ANA consists of 24 combat brigades, 3 combat air wings, 24 branch and basic training schools, and additional support facilities (e.g., depots and hospitals).

Afghan National Army Strength

The ANA is authorized up to 195,000 personnel as part of its tashkil. As of May 2017, ANA manning was approximately 174,274 personnel. This includes 7,294 AAF personnel and approximately 1,044 women between both the ANA and the AAF. Civilians are not included in these numbers. See Figure 7 below for authorized tashkil level, current end-strength, and gain/loss for each month over the last year.
Recruiting is the ANA’s primary method for force generation, while the primary source of attrition is soldiers dropped from rolls. To combat this mismatch, the ANA is placing more emphasis on the retention of soldiers. Despite the high attrition levels, ANA recruiting of 52,257 soldiers resulted in a small net gain during the past 12 months. During that period, losses due to soldiers being dropped from rolls were approximately 70 percent of ANA attrition, while separations were approximately 24 percent.

**Afghan National Army Structure**

The largest ANA elements are the six regional corps, typically composed of a headquarters *kandak*, three to four infantry brigades, and various specialty *kandaks*. The 201st Corps, 203rd Corps, 205th Corps, 207th Corps, 209th Corps, and 215th Corps are responsible for their geographic regions aligning with provincial boundaries (see Figure 8). The 111th Capital Division is independent from any corps and is responsible for security in Kabul.

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Note: The ANA military strength depicted above includes the military members of the AAF, which is a component of the ANA.

* Attrition encompasses all unplanned and planned losses.

** Gain includes all gains (recruits, re-accessions, and return from being dropped from the rolls) to ANA strength.

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32 ANDSF personnel strength, recruiting, retention, and attrition information is derived from Afghan reporting. RS analysts interpret the Afghan data and rectify discrepancies and inconsistencies.
Other national-level assets include two Mobile Strike Force brigades and the National Engineer Brigade. The two Mobile Strike Force brigades consist of seven Mobile Strike Force *kandaks* based in Kabul and Kandahar Province.

**Afghan Air Force**

The AAF is the primary air enabler for the ANDSF, responsible for air mobility and aerial attack missions across all of Afghanistan. The AAF can independently plan for and provide air assets for logistics, resupply, humanitarian relief efforts, return of human remains, MEDEVAC, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), non-traditional ISR, air interdiction, armed overwatch, and aerial escort missions. The AAF headquarters is in Kabul and provides command and control of eleven detachments and three wings: the Kabul Air Wing, the Kandahar Air Wing, and the Shindand Air Wing. TAAC-Air provides tactical-level TAA support to the AAF at Kabul and Kandahar.

The AAF is authorized up to 8,626 personnel as part of its *tashkil*. At the end of this reporting period, AAF end-strength was 7,952 personnel (see Figure 9). This figure includes 243 civilians

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33 MEDEVAC differs from CASEVAC in the level of care provided to the patient and the type of vehicle or aircraft used. MEDEVAC missions typically have en-route care provided by a medic, and make use of dedicated or specialty vehicles. CASEVAC is conducted more often on an ad hoc basis, often without medical care provided en route, and in vehicles or aircraft not specifically designated for patient transfer.
and 73 women. 109 Afghan women graduated from a Turkish officer candidate school program in October 2016 and were assigned to positions in the ANA; 54 of the graduates were tested in late March 2017, with plans to accept 34 into the AAF.

**Figure 9: AAF Strength**

The AAF has some of the highest retention and lowest attrition rates in the ANDSF. Attrition is consistently less than 1 percent of the force, and 89 percent of AAF pilots and maintenance personnel re-contract when their tour is complete. Recruiting individuals with the requisite education and language capabilities remains a challenge. Furthermore, the timeline required to train both pilots and maintenance personnel is significant. Given these challenges, any shortfall in recruiting or a higher than anticipated attrition rate among trainees would cause a major negative effect on the AAF’s ability to operate and to maintain the force.

In partnership with coalition and international partners, TAAC-Air continues to expand its capacity to train pilots and maintenance personnel, including in locations in the United States, the Czech Republic, and the United Arab Emirates. This construct of training abroad enables the AAF to focus on combat operations while continuing to develop human capital.

The AAF underwent a change in senior-level operations leadership in January 2017 to bring in more energy and direction towards achieving the end-state of a professional, capable, and sustainable fighting force. This change of leadership met the goal of expediting AAF progress.
Airframes

As of May 31, 2017, the AAF has 118 aircraft.\textsuperscript{34} Fixed-wing platforms include C-208s, C-130s, and A-29s; rotary-wing platforms include Mi-35s,\textsuperscript{35} Mi-17s, MD-530s, and Cheetahs.\textsuperscript{36} During this reporting period, Afghanistan took delivery of four additional A-29s. Deliveries of the remaining seven A-29 aircraft will continue through 2018. The AAF is now authorized an additional 30 MD-530 helicopters, 6 A-29s, and 32 AC-208 aircraft to bolster its aerial fires capabilities. Although the AAF continues to develop pilots, some platforms are limited by an insufficient number of flight engineers or other personnel that comprise a fully trained flight crew.\textsuperscript{37} Figure 10 details the number of AAF airframes, fully trained pilots, and fully trained flight crews.

Figure 10: Summary of AAF Airframes, Pilots, and Aircrews*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Qualified Aircrews</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
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<td>C-208</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12\textsuperscript{38}</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46\textsuperscript{39}</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD-530</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-35 N/A</td>
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<td>No coalition TAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheetah N/A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No coalition TAA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*as of May 31, 2017

\textsuperscript{34} SMW aircraft are not included in this total.
\textsuperscript{35} The Government of India donated four Mi-35s to Afghanistan. The AAF’s previous fleet of Mi-35 aircraft has reached the end of its service life; it is no longer included in the official tashkil, and the coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.
\textsuperscript{36} The Government of India donated three Cheetah helicopters during the first half of 2015. The coalition does not provide TAA support to these aircraft or their crews.
\textsuperscript{37} The C-130 crew complement is three pilots, two loadmasters, and one engineer. The C-208 flight crew complement is two pilots. The A-29 crew complement is one pilot. The Mi-17 crew complement is two pilots, two gunners, and one flight engineer. The MD-530 crew complement is two pilots.
\textsuperscript{38} This reflects the number in Afghanistan available for combat operations. There are currently seven aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, being used for training Afghan pilots and maintenance personnel. One A-29 crashed during a March 6, 2017, training mission near Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. The instructor and student pilots both sustained minor injuries, but the aircraft was destroyed.
\textsuperscript{39} This number does not include the additional Mi-17 helicopters used by the SMW.
The C-130 transport aircraft provides a medium- airlift capability in support of personnel and equipment transport, CASEVAC, and return of human remains.

C-130s operate from Kabul and can conduct operations throughout Afghanistan to improved airfields. AAF C-130s have been used primarily as a strategic airlift capability for large passenger movements and CASEVAC operations. In addition, they have been used to transport cargo that is too large or unsuitable for the C-208 or Mi-17 aircraft, such as maintenance equipment and parts, bombs, and weapons. C-130s have recently been used to transport MD-530 helicopters to support combat operations across Afghanistan.

Aircraft availability currently limits C-130 operations. The current logistics support contract requires that one C-130 aircraft be available every twelve hours. The AAF has four qualified crews and is capable of flying two aircraft in a twelve-hour period. TAAC-Air and the AAF are working to modify the contract to allow for greater aircraft availability while also accelerating the growth of flight engineers and loadmasters through in-country training. There are currently four pilot candidates undergoing vetting prior to training.
The C-208 aircraft provides light-lift, personnel transport, CASEVAC, and recovery of human remains for the ANDSF. TAAC-Air continues to expand the employment envelope for the C-208 by developing soft field landing and airdrop capabilities. This will free Mi-17 helicopters for other mission sets and operating environments for which it is uniquely designed.

C-208s operate from Kabul, Kandahar, and Shindand, and they can forward deploy to improved and some unimproved airfields throughout the country. A mix of contract logistics support (CLS) and organic maintenance provides sustainment support for the C-208 fleet and is required for the foreseeable future.
The AAF use the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to attack targets of strategic significance and to provide critical air support to ground forces. The A-29 can carry Mk-81 250-lb bombs, Mk-82 500-lb bombs, rockets, and two .50 caliber machine guns mounted in the wings. The A-29 is also capable of employing laser-guided bombs, but due to technical issues with front seat targeting and aircraft performance limitations, employment training has been delayed. However, the A-29 pilots continue to achieve high accuracy with unguided bombs, and there has been no operational impact due to the delay of the laser-guided bomb training.

Twelve A-29s are in Afghanistan along with their Afghan pilots and associated maintenance personnel. Seven additional Afghan A-29s are at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, to support pilot and maintenance training, and they will be delivered to Kabul by late 2018. Procurement of an additional six A-29s has been approved.

The second class of eight A-29 pilots completed training in March 2017. Delivery of the seven A-29s from Moody Air Force Base to Afghanistan will be synchronized with graduating classes of pilots and maintenance personnel. The current schedule builds the AAF A-29 fleet to 19 airframes by the end of 2018 and to 25 airframes as construction allows.
**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The Mi-17 helicopter conducts day and night personnel transport, MEDEVAC, resupply, close-combat attack, aerial escort, and air assault missions. Making up just fewer than half of total AAF aircraft, the Mi-17 is considered the “workhorse” of the AAF. The AAF is capable of deploying and operating Mi-17s throughout the country.

Thirteen Mi-17s are capable of being configured for a fixed forward-firing capability, and eleven of those are also capable of employing rockets. Armed Mi-17s accounted for more than 37 percent of the aerial fires missions tasked in support of ANDSF operations during the reporting period. Using the Mi-17s as armed gunships limits the AAF’s ability to employ Mi-17s in support of other mission sets, such as MEDEVAC and aerial resupply.
The MD-530 helicopter provides close air attack and aerial escort to the ANDSF. The MD-530 has two weapons pylons, capable of firing .50 caliber machine guns and rockets.

The AAF currently relies on CLS for MD-530 sustainment, but it is building its organic maintenance capability. TAAC-Air is working with the AAF to increase the number of MD-530 pilot and maintainer students in training to maximize independence and sustainability of the fleet. Full aircrew manning is forecasted to be achieved by 2018.
The AAF struggles to identify candidates with adequate English language skills in sufficient time to complete the complex, multi-agency vetting process prior to training dates. As a result, the AAF has not yet trained sufficient operations and maintenance personnel for the current and projected fleet. The AAF exhibits sufficient capability to execute its current mission sets and it has enough personnel to operate the aircraft on-hand. However, the AAF does not have the capacity to meet the excessive demands of the ANA.

In recognition of the capacity shortfalls, the AAF is pursuing several avenues to train new pilots. More than 200 students are currently enrolled at the Afghan air academy, Pohantoon-e-Hawayee, 22 at Moody Air Force Base for A-29 pilot and maintainer training, and 14 at Fort Rucker for rotary-wing pilot training.

TAAC-Air advisors focused their efforts on developing professional aviation practices within the AAF, including mission planning, avoidance of civilian casualties, and airspace discipline. TAAC-Air continued advising on air-to-ground integration, the Afghan national targeting policy, and procedures to nominate, process, prioritize, and execute targeting. TAAC-Air advisors continue to build training programs to improve capabilities, such as using the A-29 to deliver precision-guided munitions and airdrop capabilities for the C-208 to alleviate cargo requirements from the Mi-17.

In addition to the standing TAA priorities, TAAC-Air established objectives for each aircraft during the reporting period to help tailor advising efforts. C-130 training was focused on increasing the number of crews and improving the crews’ ability to fly at night using night-vision goggles (NVG). The same objectives were used for the C-208 crews, with additional focus on airdrop capability in order to assume some missions normally assigned to the Mi-17 fleet and help reduce Mi-17 flying hours.

Objectives for the A-29 crews focused on general crew development and training Afghan instructor pilots. During this reporting period, the first two Afghan A-29 instructor pilots completed instructor training in the United States and are now helping instruct pilots in Afghanistan. The number of trained A-29 pilots in Afghanistan also increased from 9 to 13, enabling the AAF to fly A-29s from multiple forward operating locations.

Mi-17 objectives included increasing the total number of crews and increasing the amount of training at night with NVGs. Unfortunately, the high demand for Mi-17s to fly combat missions prevented most of the planned training. MD-530 training proved more successful and resulted in the growth of three scout weapons teams, taking the total number of teams from 7 to 10.

TAAC-Air advisors developed a new ATAC course curriculum along with a new plan to ensure that trained ATACs are employed properly. In the past, soldiers who graduated ATAC training returned to their units within the ANA and were often assigned to positions that did not utilize their skills. The SY 1396 tashkil created 95 new billets for ATACs within the AAF rather than within the conventional ANA. In the future, AAF ATACs will be assigned to ANA units to
perform that mission, but will remain under the control of the AAF. During this reporting period, 21 new ATACs completed training and are now filling available ATAC billets.

**Sustainment**

The AAF has proven that it has the capability to maintain Mi-17s and C-208s at sites without coalition partners, but maintenance capability for the other airframes is still lacking. Aviation maintenance training is ongoing, but the AAF will continue to require CLS and supporting training contracts to maintain combat capability in the mid-term.

The AAF is slowly reducing its reliance on CLS. On December 4, 2016, the Afghans conducted their first MD-530 100-hour inspection and annual phase maintenance inspections. Four Afghan airmen recently completed their level-2 certification and demonstrated their maintenance proficiency by successfully conducting inspections previously only accomplished by contractors. Although this is important progress in the transition to a self-sustaining MD-530 fleet, maintenance capability will likely take longer than aircrew capability to develop fully.

**Operations**

AAF MEDEVAC capability continues to evolve and improve. Over the past three years, total AAF MEDEVAC missions have increased significantly, from 1,243 missions in 2014, to 3,169 in 2015, and to 3,289 missions in 2016. This increase in operational capacity is partly due to the training and fielding of 15 of a planned 20 new AAF medics in 2016. The medics attended a two-month MEDEVAC course during winter 2016 and were fully trained before the 2017 spring campaign.

Overall, the operational tempo is growing in all mission areas as new aircraft are fielded, and this increased tempo will continue throughout 2017 as additional airframes and crews are added. The A-29 introduced a much-needed capability to strike targets across the country rapidly and was critical to solidifying ANDSF gains. Afghan pilots exercised good aircrew discipline in avoiding situations where there was a high risk of civilian casualties or fratricide.

Integration of ground and air assets continues to improve. In Helmand Province, the AAF demonstrated increasing capability by integrating MD-530s, ScanEagle ISR, and ATACs to conduct strikes in support of ANDSF operations. The U.S.-trained Afghan pilots demonstrated good judgement and the ability to perform real-time airspace de-confliction, which enabled them to destroy insurgent strongholds threatening ANA forces.

On January 11, 2017, the AAF C-208 successfully demonstrated the capability to conduct aerial resupply missions following a series of tests of airdrop resupply. The Afghan pilots dropped bundles with a high degree of precision, validating the method as a viable means to resupply forces. This important milestone was the culmination of several years of work by TAAC-Air, and it will increase the AAF’s operational flexibility to resupply isolated locations and reduce Mi-17 airlift requirements. The AAF airdrop capability will grow throughout 2017 as more aircraft are modified with the requisite roll-up doors.
**MoD Afghan Special Security Forces**

Afghan special operations forces are considered some of the best in the region, and they continue to mature with coalition assistance. The ASSF have proven their ability to conduct counterterrorism raids successfully and are furthering their capability to analyze and exploit intelligence gained from these operations.

MoD’s ASSF components rely primarily on MoD elements and typically the closest ANA corps headquarters and regional logistics node for sustainment support. Part of President Ghani’s four-year plan involves restructuring the ASSF and adding general support *kandaks* to ANASOC brigades in order to make them less reliant on conventional ANA logistics systems and units. Planning for the addition of regional support *kandaks* is ongoing and the effort is still conceptual. In the interim, the ASSF plan to establish logistical nodes at the forward supply depots and regional logistics centers to ensure they are able to take possession of material before it enters the unreliable logistics supply networks of the MoD and MoI.

ASSF continue to suffer from misuse and overuse by the ANA despite signed CPAs intended to reduce such practices. The ANA misuses ASSF through employment in conventional roles, such as employing ASSF at checkpoints or as personal security detachments. This undermines the ASSF ORC and does not hold ANA units accountable for their training and performance. Corps commanders also routinely employ the SMW on improperly assigned missions, detracting from its ability to fulfill its pre-planned and authorized missions.

**Afghan National Army Special Operations Command**

The ANASOC’s mission is to increase the Afghan Government’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations, and, as directed, execute special operations against terrorist and insurgent networks in coordination with other ANDSF pillars. ANASOC is a division-level headquarters responsible for command and control of all ANA special operations forces. The ANASOC is currently authorized 11,700 personnel and is organized into 10 battalion-sized ANA Commando SOKs. The SOKs are the primary tactical elements of the ANASOC, and they conduct elite, light-infantry operations against threat networks in support of the regional corps’ counterinsurgency operations and provide a strategic response capability against strategic targets. Each SOK contains eight ANA Special Forces teams and several support elements. Nine of the ten SOKs are aligned with specific ANA corps. The 6th SOK, located in the Kabul area, functions as the ANA’s national mission unit, and it was assigned to the National Mission Brigade when it reached initial operating capability in May 2017. While the ANASOC comprises approximately six percent of the ANA manning, it conducts a majority of the ANA’s offensive missions.

ANASOC is one of the most effective elements of the ASSF and it is the preferred force for both combat missions and military support to civil authorities. In December 2016, President Ghani ordered the 6th SOK to deploy to Kabul to quell fears of civil unrest resulting from concerns of ethnic division within the MoI. On February 1, 2017, 52 SOK commandos deployed to Barg-e-Matal District in Nuristan Province to support relief efforts following devastating avalanches. The
commandos provided the outer security cordon for President Ghani’s visit, successfully completing a mission planned, led, and executed unilaterally by Afghan forces.

The largest challenge facing ANASOC remains the misuse and overuse of its forces by the MoD. Misuse refers to the employment of ANASOC forces outside of their designed mission set, while overuse pertains to tasking ANASOC forces at a rate that precludes rest and recovery cycles. The MoD and ANA corps headquarters often request more commandos than are available, causing ANASOC to commit forces that are supposed to be in the rest and recovery cycle.

As part of the ANDSF Road Map, the ANASOC division is expanding from a division of 11,300 personnel to a corps with four brigades and a National Mission Brigade, totaling approximately 23,300 personnel. Two existing MSFV Brigades will transition from the conventional ANA to the ANASOC and will be trained and equipped as Commandos. Three additional SOKs will be established, and the requisite number of ANA Special Forces Teams and headquarters elements will be consolidated into two SOKs under the National Mission Brigade (NMB). Each brigade in the ANASOC Corps will have its own general support kandak.

The ANASOC School of Excellence graduated more than 1,500 students from more than 30 courses since December 2016. On February 11, 2017, ANASOC began a 14-week Commando Qualification Course with 769 students. Expansion efforts are underway in preparation of doubling course sizes in summer 2017 to meet requirements of the ASSF growth plan.

ANASOC’s force generation efforts were largely successful throughout the winter months, resulting in approximately 95 percent of positions manned. During the previous year, the attrition rate was approximately 14 percent and the retention rate was approximately 96 percent, with personnel staffing levels for the various SOKs ranging between 89 percent and 97 percent.

**Ktah Khas**

The *Ktah Khas* is a light infantry SOK consisting of three operational companies, a training company, an engineer company, a military intelligence company, a support company, and a headquarters company. These additional companies support the *Ktah Khas* training cycle and support operations including transportation for the *Ktah Khas* strike forces, explosive ordnance disposal to conduct counter-IED (C-IED) operations, and supporting the female tactical platoon, which enables interactions with women and children on missions. *Ktah Khas* platoons and companies are accomplished in conducting intelligence-driven counterterrorism raids, particularly against high-value individuals, and vehicle interdictions utilizing both ground and air mobility platforms. A focus on recruiting and retention has enabled the *Ktah Khas* to remain near full strength, with 1,190 personnel of an authorized 1,291.

The ANDSF is establishing a new National Mission Brigade to provide the President of Afghanistan and the ANA CoGS with a rapidly deployable special operations force able to respond to national-level crises throughout Afghanistan. The brigade and associated headquarters element will consist of elements of the ANA 6th SOK and the *Ktah Khas*. The brigade will have approximately 200 personnel to provide command and control capabilities for ASSF elements during contingency operations across the country. The National Mission Brigade headquarters
remains in the early stages of development, and it is scheduled for initial operational capability in July 2017 and full operational capability in March 2018.

*Ktah Khas* recruiting is a two-month process where incoming recruits, primarily from among recent graduates of the ANA, ANP, or National Directorate of Security basic courses, are screened and selected to enter a thirteen-week *Ktah Khas* basic course. This course focuses primarily on physical fitness, marksmanship, mobility, medical, and small-unit tactics in order to prepare the candidates for integration, training, and deployment. Between the recruiting and basic training process, candidates for the *Ktah Khas* have a pass rate of approximately 12 percent.

*Ktah Khas* is capable of executing a well-planned ORC. The *Ktah Khas* ORC is a 32-week cycle that consists of “Red, Amber, and Green” phases. During the red cycle, units focus on individual training tasks and individual combat specializations. The amber cycle includes collective training tasks, such as a platoon live-fire exercise, full mission profiles, fire support coordination, and a validation exercise. Lastly, the green cycle is when the units are focused on deployment and are available to execute missions. The three *Ktah Khas* companies are staggered in their cycles to have one company in each phase of the ORC at all times. Each cycle is separated from the next by one week where soldiers can take leave, with an additional four weeks available for leave after companies return from an operational deployment.

**Special Mission Wing**

The SMW is a special aviation wing that provides expeditionary reach for the ASSF during counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions designed to disrupt insurgent and drug smuggling networks in Afghanistan. The SMW supports helicopter assault force raids and provides resupply, close-air attack, CASEVAC, and ISR support for ASSF and ANA conventional forces. The SMW is the only ANDSF organization with night-vision, rotary-wing air assault, and fixed-wing ISR capabilities. The SMW consists of four squadrons, two located in Kabul, one in Kandahar Airfield, and one in Mazar-e-Sharif, providing the ASSF with operational reach across the country.

The SMW currently has 788 personnel out of an authorized end-strength of 902. Recruiting standards for the SMW are higher than for the AAF or other ANDSF pillars. Both the MoD and the coalition vet all SMW recruits to ensure that they are capable of maintaining a high standard of operations and professionalism. The SMW struggles to find qualified candidates to fill pilot and maintenance personnel slots.

**Airframes**

The SMW now possesses 77 percent of authorized Mi-17 V5s, 86 percent of authorized Mi-17 V1s, and 100 percent of authorized PC-12s. The Mi-17 V1s are used primarily for counternarcotics missions. During this reporting period, there was a 12 percent increase in the number of fully trained Mi-17 pilots and a 40 percent increase in qualified Mi-17 aircrews. There were no changes in the number of PC-12 pilots or aircrews.
**PC-12 Aircraft**

The SMW utilizes the PC-12 fixed-wing aircraft to conduct ISR in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, including overwatch of ASSF ground assault forces and helicopter assault force raids during both daytime and nighttime operations.

Eighteen PC-12 aircraft are currently operational, providing the ANDSF with day and night surveillance and air-based signals intelligence capabilities. The PC-12 can send full-motion video to a ground station, and the onboard crew can perform real-time analysis of collected data. Despite these capabilities, SMW personnel still require training to improve the integration of intelligence into combat operations.

**Mi-17 Helicopter**

The primary mission of the SMW Mi-17 fleet is to support ASSF helicopter assault force raids for both counternarcotic and counterterrorism missions. Additionally, the Mi-17s are used to conduct resupply operations, CASEVAC, quick reaction force, personnel movement, and reconnaissance support.
Training

The SMW makes use of multiple training opportunities under its contracted logistics support contract including maintenance training, English language training, and flight training. All SMW personnel are authorized to attend English classes that include conversational, aviation, and maintenance vocabulary.

Through the Kabul Security Assistance Office, the SMW is able to make use of extensive International Military Education and Training program opportunities. The SMW has sent one soldier to National Defense University, one to the U.S. Marine Corps Warfare Course, and three to the Building Partnerships Aviation Capacity Course Seminar.

Sustainment

The SMW reports directly to the MoD and receives new recruits from the ranks of the AAF. Coalition advisors are establishing a recruiting and retention incentive program for the SMW, which went into effect at the beginning of April 2017. Mentors also recommended the addition of two positions for recruiting to the SMW 1396 tashkil.

The SMW is slowly increasing its ability to conduct unilateral maintenance actions, particularly involving regularly scheduled 25-hour and 50-hour Mi-17 maintenance services. The SMW conducted 45 Mi-17 services and 6 PC-12 services without coalition assistance during the reporting period. There were also significant increases in the number of partnered maintenance services during the reporting period, involving Afghans and contract support.

On May 15, 2017, the SMW completed its first ever 100-hour aircraft inspection at Mazar-e-Sharif. Maintainers at Mazar-e-Sharif are still reliant on specialty tools from Kabul to perform services. SMW expects to receive delivery of the tools in June 2017, after which the SMW will be able to complete maintenance services without assistance.

Operations

The SMW operates four squadrons capable of conducting independent missions in support of ASSF elements. They continue to demonstrate improvements in operational effectiveness and efficiency, as well as independence. During this reporting period, the Afghans executed 87 percent of all SMW operations unilaterally.

Most SMW missions were counterterrorism missions, with air movements, CASEVAC, and a small number of counternarcotics missions also flown during this reporting period. The SMW remains agile and capable of executing increasing numbers of planned and short-notice missions in support of ASSF.

The SMW is capable of fielding helicopter assault forces at night and from multiple locations. From December 1, 2016, to May 25, 2017, the SMW conducted 86 deliberately planned operational missions. Of these missions, 85 percent were counterterror missions and 15 percent were counternarcotics missions.
SECTION 5 – MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

5.1 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

The MoI oversees the ANP, which includes four pillars and three sub-pillars that focus on security for specialized mission sets, investigations, and support to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations (see Figure 11). General Taj Mohammed Jahid, who was confirmed as Minister on January 24, 2016, leads the MoI. Following major leadership changes in the MoD, the Afghan government implemented major leadership changes within the MoI in late May of 2017. Thirteen top officials, including deputy ministers were replaced, and former ANA Deputy Chief of Staff General Murad Ali Murad was appointed Deputy Interior Minister for Security. General Murad is an ethnic Hazara and is seen as part of a younger generation of leaders, untainted by links to the communist-era security institutions.

Minister Jahid directed a nationwide assessment of the MoI by February 2017, which generally identified areas for improvement. Although MoI forces generally failed to implement ORCs properly, utilization of ANCOP forces did enable some ANP to complete individual training. The ALP earned high marks for increased enrollment status in AHRIMS and for training on medical and police operations tasks. Overall, the assessment identified significant deficiencies in training. A lack of trained instructors at training centers coupled with poorly prepared or non-existent training plans severely hampered efforts to increase the capabilities of ANP units. Poor reporting, substandard logistics, and problems distributing winter clothing were also cited in the assessment.

Figure 11: Ministry of Interior Organizational Chart

In addition to RS advisory efforts, eight other organizations and several bilateral advising programs continue to focus on MoI institutional reform and improving the professionalism of the ANP. These organizations include the UN Development Program, UNAMA, the German Police...
Project Team, and U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Department of Justice. The European Union Police mission officially ended its support for the RS mission this reporting period; however, the European Union will send 15 senior police advisors to continue advising. Several of the organizations coordinate their efforts through the International Community Advisor Steering Council, which meets weekly in Kabul.

The overall MoI authorized uniformed end-strength includes positions for the MoI headquarters and the ANP pillars (see Figure 12). The Afghan Government also funds more than 9,500 civilian positions for the MoI. Beginning in SY 1394, the MoI adjusted its tashkil to begin counting the Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) under the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) authorized level. However, the AACP remains a separate pillar and retains a separate command and control system.

*Figure 12: Ministry of Interior Manning Authorization*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police by Pillar</th>
<th>Solar Year 1394</th>
<th>Solar Year 1395</th>
<th>Solar Year 1396</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
<td>23,315</td>
<td>23,599</td>
<td>23,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
<td>16,203</td>
<td>17,202</td>
<td>16,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Command of Police Special Units</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>1,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police (includes Afghan Anti-Crime Police)</td>
<td>100,402</td>
<td>103,681</td>
<td>98,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior HQ &amp; Institutional Support</td>
<td>15,144</td>
<td>10,121</td>
<td>15,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTHS Accounts</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated Resources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Police Authorized</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Resource Management and Procurement**

The MoI is facing challenges in accurately and effectively identifying resource requirements in order to build annual budgets and has been hindered by the lack of a signed tashkil. The MoI signed its SY 1396 tashkil in April 2017, which should alleviate some of the prior issues. Subordinate organizations fail to follow the requirements submission process, with many organizations bypassing the local, provincial, or commanding headquarters. When requirements are collected, the Program and Analysis Division is effective at consolidating the requirements for review, although only slightly effective at hosting working groups and general officer steering committees to prioritize programs to allocate funding.

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40 Beginning in SY 1394 the MoI and ANP began counting the AACP as part of the AUP on its tashkil, although it remains a separate force pillar.

41 In SY 1395 the MoI and ANP adjusted the training, transient, holding, and student account on their tashkil to account for those members participating in out-of-country training for periods greater than six months.
The MoI continues to make slow progress on its FY 1396 budget execution, with 15 percent of its $213 million budget executed. As of May 23, 2017, the RAB had approved 55 of 66 requirements totaling $30.4 million. Furthermore, $7.7 million in requirements, not including facilities requirements, have been identified for execution and are in the process of being submitted for RAB approval. $30 million of requirements from FY 1395 have been authorized for execution.

The MoI continues to make use of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) program to hire young, college-educated, and technically proficient Afghans to provide skilled civilian support to the MoI. CSTC-A funded 300 SMEs to work on one-year contracts for the MoI, ensuring critical needs were met while enforcing eventual transition of the positions to typical civil servant positions funded by Afghanistan. The SME employees have done well in identifying and resolving critical problems in their subject areas and within the bureaucracy.

The suspension of senior members of the MoI has left procurement offices void of senior leadership, experience, and knowledge. The MoI only executed 59 percent of its allotted budget in FY 1395. The MoI did not complete its FY 1396 requirements packages in a timely manner, further delaying execution of requirements in support of the police pillars. In October 2016, the National Procurement Authority terminated the employment of a number of officials in the MoI procurement department and removed the ministry’s procurement authority. The MoI hired new leadership and enlisted the help of several SMEs to reestablish the organization and regain procurement authority.

Legal Affairs

The MoI’s CAC Plan, a framework document to establish, implement, and enforce processes to prevent and fight corruption throughout the MoI, was signed in April 2016, but comprehensive implementation, monitoring, and evaluation have been slow. The array of MoI offices with assigned responsibilities and confusion over leadership roles has complicated implementation; however, the MoI IG is working toward a written implementation plan.

Under the auspices of the CAC Plan and with assistance from RS advisors, the MoI IG has begun implementation of the MICP program within his office. The MICP offers MoI leadership an opportunity to improve their processes while decreasing the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. The MoI is developing plans to expand it to other MoI organizations after training the Deputy Ministers.

The MoI has an anti- and counter-corruption mechanism, called Transparency, Accountability, and Law Enforcement (TALE) committees, at three levels of the organization. These committees offer a forum to coordinate among various organizations and at the ministry, IG, and ANP zone levels to address corruption, elevate significant issues to senior leaders, and disseminate decisions downward, as appropriate. TALE committee meetings have been sporadic so far, but advisors continue to encourage the MoI IG to schedule further meetings. In further anti-corruption efforts, the Minister of Interior appointed 20 investigation teams to identify and resolve police problems. These teams traveled to different provinces to assess and report on police problems, then recommended solutions at the ministry level.
The Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), operational since November 2016, has successfully prosecuted five major corruption cases, including two major generals from the Attorney General’s Office and the MoI. In January 2017, the ACJC sentenced a two-star general from the MoD to 14 years in prison for forgery and accepting bribes. In March 2017, the ACJC sentenced two senior MoI officials to 20 years in prison and two others to 7 years in prison for embezzlement. All trials were conducted in an open, public, and transparent manner, where members of the public and news outlets were able to witness the trials. The subjects were all represented by legal counsel, and international legal observers praised the manner in which the trials were conducted. Additionally, a new courtroom and office facility for the ACJC, funded by the United Kingdom, was completed on January 1, 2017, and is currently in operation.

The MoI IGs have developed processes for receiving and responding to complaints, including a national hotline for complaints about corruption and other issues. This hotline receives complaint calls from both civilians and MoI personnel. In addition to the hotline, the MoI IGs allow for walk-in complaints from MoI personnel. There is a major effort underway within the MoI, with the assistance of EF 5 and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), to modernize the hotline so that complaints are recorded and automatically routed to the appropriate offices.

The MoI possesses the basic systems and organizations to investigate and adjudicate allegations of corruption and GVHR. However, the political will to hold violators, especially senior officers, accountable remains fragile. The MoI lags behind the MoD in its capacity to train personnel and units on rule of law and corruption issues. Minister Jahid’s legal advisor has indicated that the MoI is committed to upholding the rule of law, as evidenced by the recent progress in GVHR investigations and adjudication.

**Personnel Management**

Although the police recruitment rate remains sufficiently high, retention remains the primary challenge to maintaining effective end-strength. By maintaining overall force size primarily through recruitment, not balanced with retention, the force is disproportionally young and inexperienced.

The MoI continued to prepare for the implementation of the APPS in June 2017. Throughout the reporting period, the MoI and advisors conducted PAIs at each zone location in order to update and validate personnel data in AHRIMS. When fully implemented, the personnel data from AHRIMS will be transferred to the APPS, and AHRIMS will be discontinued. In order to be validated in AHRIMS, personnel must have been able to provide personal data, be in possession of an identification card, and have biometric data on file. The intent of the PAI process was to increase the accuracy of the AHRIMS data as much as possible in order to facilitate the successful initiation of the APPS system. Personnel not validated in AHRIMS will not be paid when data is migrated to APPS.

As with the MoD, APPS implementation is scheduled to begin in summer 2017 in the MoI. Implementation is scheduled for one police zone at a time, lasting approximately 12 months. Units will receive APPS training in the month prior to transitioning to APPS. Units fielding the system will have two months to work with the system and ensure all personnel data is loaded. After the
first two months, pay will become tied to the APPS. Once APPS is fully implemented, personnel will only be paid if they are in the system and slotted in an authorized tashkil billet. The APPS will provide greater clarity regarding the overall size of the force and could affect the total amount paid in salaries.

The MoI police training enterprise continues to have difficulties planning and budgeting for basic services such as food, fuel, training supplies, and uniform items for their Regional and Provincial Training Centers. The MoI’s budget, facilities, procurement, contracts, and construction priorities are aligned to the previous training construct with Training General Command as the central hub for the MoI Police Training Infrastructure. Coalition advisors’ efforts to build MoI capacity have become increasingly difficult due to the ANP decentralizing its higher education centers such as the Afghan National Police Academy and Staff College.

The presence of several different funding mechanisms — the Afghan Government, the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and CSTC-A — hinder efforts to harmonize MoI salaries across the civil service pay scale. The baseline salaries of 66 senior-level and 125 mid-level civilian positions are funded by Afghanistan, with additional LOTFA funds added to their salaries through the Capacity Building for Results initiative. This has created a salary differential between the MoI civilians hired on as “experts,” with LOTFA funds added to their salaries, and their traditional civil service counterparts conducting the same tasks at the lower, base civil service pay rate. The remaining 9,640 civil servant positions in the MoI are funded by Afghanistan, while the SME program is funded by CSTC-A. The deputy ministers have used the SME program to circumvent requirements to employ more civilians; the deputy ministers consistently request extensions for SMEs rather than develop integration plans to transition the positions to their workforce.

Civilianization of the MoI continues to progress slowly. The civilianization effort is designed to transition SMEs and some senior leader positions within the MoI to civil service billets. The intent is to provide some civilian oversight of the force, bring in subject matter expertise, and build continuity within the organization. Additionally, civilianization efforts are designed to address the salary differential problem. Civilianization has been slow as transitioning billets requires authorization of senior leaders, who themselves stand to lose positions, and Afghan leaders are hesitant to transition positions funded by donors (such as SMEs) to Afghan-funded positions.

**Logistics and Maintenance**

The MoI lacks the systems and capabilities to procure equipment, which is complicated by not having updated its equipment tashkil since SY 1391 and by significant disagreements within the MoI regarding approved equipment levels. These disagreements have resulted in continual dialogue within the MoI and between MoI and coalition advisors regarding tashkil fill levels. As a result, CSTC-A began taking greater control over the MoI tashkil development process in spring 2017. Through baselining requirements, advisors are building the capacity of the MoI to conduct equipment procurement planning.

In addition, the MoI also lacks the capabilities required to conduct effective life-cycle management of its equipment. MoI logistics leaders lack the institutional training and experience required to
review weapons and vehicle fleet densities, to conduct regression analysis based on expected economic useful life models, and to develop appropriate equipment life-cycle replacement plans. Like the MoD, the MoI remains reliant on CSTC-A to perform life-cycle management on its behalf.

The planning and execution of logistics is a key focus area for coalition advisors. Major challenges include a lack of timely and accurate reporting of inventory levels and consumption across key commodities, continued resistance to the use of Core-IMS as a tool for asset visibility, and resistance to cross leveling of supplies and equipment. Although the MoI published a zone SOP in fall 2016 that made zone commanders the single point for the submission of logistical reports and requisitions, implementation and adherence to the SOP has been uneven at best. The MoI eventually produced a plan for the distribution of winter clothing, but only because of significant advisor efforts. Actual distribution of the winter clothing to ANP units during winter 2016-2017 was slow and inconsistent, but eventually resulted in most ANP units reporting receipt of requested winter clothing.

Efforts to transition ANP forces to NATO standard weapon systems continued this reporting period. With the focus on small arms, the MoI distributed 16,000 M4 rifles to the ANP and collected approximately 15,900 AK-47s. The serviceable AK-47s were provided to ALP forces, who will continue to utilize that weapon system.

**Strategic and Operational Planning**

Over a year into his tenure, Minister Jahid has not appointed a First Deputy Minister. This vacancy has detracted from his ability to assess the complex political environment and implement appropriate solutions to many of the MoI’s problems. Corruption at the highest levels of the MoI continues to present a major challenge and has slowed progress. The MoI has baseline strategic plans and conducts periodic Strategy Board meetings, but it lacks sufficient numbers of senior leaders who think strategically. As a result, the MoI struggles to conduct any strategic planning without direct involvement of RS advisors.

Although the MoI lacks the ability to develop its own plans, it has demonstrated the will and capability to integrate with the MoD in planning for major operations. Planners from the MoI operations, logistics, engineer, and administrative sections participated in the planning for the SY 1396 annual operational plan, Operation *Khalid*. MoI planners were enthusiastic about the planning process and produced a well-developed concept that supported the joint operational plan. Although nested with the joint plan, the MoI plan does not adequately address the transition to evidence-based law enforcement where applicable. RS advisors continue train their counterparts at the ministry and zone levels to identify locations where AUP can focus more on police tasks and incorporate them into plans.

Despite improved ability to conduct operational planning, reporting from ANP zone headquarters is generally poor. Commanders do not enforce proper reporting procedures, and they routinely bypass chains of command to address issues with more senior leadership. As a result, zone headquarters rarely have acceptable situational awareness of the status of their units.
Intelligence

The MoI has a highly successful counter-intelligence screening program designed to discover and prevent insider threats and to support counter-intelligence. This program was originally intended to vet personnel for potential green-on-blue or other violent risks. Following its success, the MoI has developed an initiative to employ a similar process to screen personnel placed in senior and other critical positions. On March 20, 2017, the MoI issued orders directing screening for all high-level positions within the MoI, including general officer promotion boards and National Procurement Authority senior positions and promotions.

The MoI has improved intelligence-sharing relations with counterparts in the other ministries, notably the ANA GS, MoD, Office of the National Security Council, and NDS, although there is still reluctance to share intelligence. The Directorate of Police Intelligence’s NTEC is the ANDSF’s most advanced targeting center and continues to grow in capability and size with a proven ability to enable and support warrant-based targeting. As part of its growth in capability, NTEC is developing counter-threat finance capabilities and the Lawful Intercept Program to provide for a judicial process to obtain warrants and monitor communications of suspected criminals and terrorists. These programs are designed to provide valuable and effective collection mechanisms for obtaining admissible evidence that can be used in court. In addition, NTEC continues to work with GCPSU to refine and improve sensitive-site exploitation procedures to maximize intelligence gathered from sites for further exploitation.

The National Police Coordination Center (NPCC) has begun development of an intelligence cell as part of its organization. The NPCC currently functions as a 24-hour watch center but is lightly manned, precluding effective intelligence coverage of operations. The NPCC also lacks processes and procedures to prioritize, share, and display relevant intelligence.

Afghans have taken the lead in MoI intelligence classroom training with a few exceptions. To support intelligence training across the country, the MoI’s Police Intelligence Training Center has fielded mobile intelligence training teams to reach remote units and has exceeded its projected throughput for the past year.

Strategic Communication

The MoI Media and Public Affairs Directorate is developing a long-term, sustainable plan for retaining public affairs personnel and improving their budgeting and procurement processes. The MoI is working to improve communication and messaging coordination with the MoD, ANA corps, and ANP zone public affairs offices, while ensuring that viable public affairs organizations at zone headquarters are properly equipped.

In March 2017, the MoI spokesman, Mr. Sediq Sediqqi, ascended to the head of Afghanistan’s Government Media Information Center. The center is responsible for synchronizing messages across the MoD, MoI, and other government agencies. Mr. Sediqqi has taken on the additional responsibility of creating themes and messages that are promulgated down to the ministries.
Gender Office Efforts

The MoI is steadily improving its treatment and inclusion of women, and recently developed an SOP outlining the process for filing complaints of sexual harassment or assault and violence in the workplace. These documents were provided to each employee within the provincial headquarters and staff directorates. In addition, the MoI Human, Child, and Women’s Rights Director conducts weekly meetings with the senior women of the ANP to discuss issues regarding women in the workplace. The top three priorities identified are sexual harassment and assault, capacity building, and the lack of promotion of women to senior-level positions.

In addition to meeting regularly with senior women, the MoI Human, Child and Women’s Rights Directorate’s first female director now attends meetings with her male senior colleagues. This is groundbreaking within the ANSF. The meetings provide a voice to the growing population of women in the MoI, and issues are brought to the Minister of Interior for his decision.

The recruitment target for the MoI is 600 women per year, with a long-term goal of having 5,000 women in the MoI. Television, radio, and print media advertising is used to reach women across the country, while the MoI Recruitment Chief personally visits the provinces to conduct seminars and educate the local mullahs and women about the ANP. In addition, representatives from the Human, Child, and Women’s Rights Directorate visit and campaign at the female high schools and universities. The MoI continues to develop recruiting incentives for women, such as police training opportunities in other countries.

The MoI is providing training to women in areas such as basic police training, radio maintenance, and C-IED training. During this reporting period, 245 women graduated from basic police training in Turkey and 49 graduated from the police academy in Afghanistan. In another first for the MoI, four women attended and graduated from the C-IED course as the first females certified to train others. The MoI also conducts training for women in basic computer skills, literacy, understanding human rights, laws related to violence against women, women’s rights according to Islam, self-defense, and sexual harassment and assault awareness. There is still room for improvement as gender-based issues can affect training; for example, in many cases the instructors refuse to train women to drive. In cases such as this, the MoI has contracted an outside source to provide the women with training.

The facilities for women in the ANP have been carefully assessed and identified for renovations, including training centers, barracks, changing rooms, toilets, child care centers, classrooms, and gyms. FRUs, who work with victims of abuse, have been identified as essential service providers for women and children in communities across the country. Despite their importance, many FRU facilities are in unsuitable conditions for the police officers to conduct their duties; four are in the process of being renovated or built.

5.2 AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

The ANP mission is to maintain civil order, reduce corruption, and prevent the cultivation, production, and smuggling of illegal narcotics to provide security for individuals and the community, as well as to safeguard legal rights and freedoms. Although the ANP currently focuses
on working with and alongside the ANA to fight the insurgency, the long-term goal remains to transition the ANP to a more traditional community police force.

One of the key initiatives in the ANDSF Road Map involves the transition of ANCOP and elements of the ABP to control of the MoD, allowing the ANP to focus almost exclusively on the community police mission. ANP forces are currently on the front lines during the “hold” phase of counterinsurgency operations. However, they are not sufficiently trained or equipped for traditional counterinsurgency tactics; they have limited or no crew-served weapons, anti-armor weapons, armored vehicles, or ISR assets. The focus and employment in counterinsurgency military functions have hindered the ANP’s development of sufficient anti-crime and other community policing capabilities. The ANP is generally recognized to be several years behind the ANA in its development.

**Afghan National Police Strength**

The ANP has an authorized end-strength of up to 157,000 personnel; as of April 19, 2017, the ANP had approximately 148,710 personnel (see Figure 13). This does not include students in the police academy or those enrolled in ten Regional Training Centers. Although the number of women within the ANP continues to increase and is now approximately 2,881, women comprise only 1.94 percent of the total ANP end-strength. Given the challenges associated with “ghost” personnel and other personnel accountability issues, RS is employing measures such as the PAI process to gain greater visibility and accountability of ANP end-strength.
**Figure 13: ANP Strength**

The average ANP attrition rate was 2.11 percent during the reporting period, which is consistent with its three-year historical average of 1.99 percent. Although the ANP continues to demonstrate positive recruiting rates, reenlistment remains the primary challenge to maintaining effective strength. As in the ANA, the number of ANP personnel who are dropped from the rolls continues to comprise by far the largest portion of overall ANP attrition. ANP personnel frequently deploy to remote checkpoints with minimal provisions and equipment for lengthy periods; the combination of difficult living conditions and the near-constant possibility of combat contributes to many ANP personnel leaving the ranks.

**Afghan National Police Structure**

The ANP is composed of four pillars – the AUP, the ANCOP, the ABP, and the AACP – and three additional sub-pillars – the ALP, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The GCPSU is the MoI’s component of the ASSF. The ALP and the APPF are not counted as part of the 157,000 tashkil, but they provide additional security under the MoI; the ALP are funded by ASFF, while the APPF do not receive any U.S. funding. The ANP is divided into eight zones that generally align with the ANA corps areas of responsibility. There are nine ANCOP brigades, eight of which are with an ANP zone and an additional brigade located in Helmand Province (see Figure 14).
Afghan Uniform Police

With its current end-strength of approximately 86,094-people, the AUP is the largest police agency in Afghanistan and the primary police force that the local populace will encounter in their daily lives. The AUP consists of the traffic police, the fire and rescue departments, and a provincial police headquarters in each of the 34 provinces.

The mission of the AUP is to maintain the rule of law, provide security and civil order, prevent cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and prevent the smuggling of weapons and other public property like historical and cultural relics. Other duties of the AUP include the detention of criminal suspects to be handed over to the judicial system, maintenance of reliable security measures for key infrastructure including roads and facilities, intelligence collection, and the provision of firefighting and rescue services during natural or man-made disasters. Leadership across AUP units varies, but generally senior MoI and AUP leaders do not empower leaders at the lower levels to make decisions. Moreover, local AUP units and leaders are susceptible to influence by local power brokers and government officials.
Afghan Local Police

The ALP is designed to provide security within villages and rural areas to protect the population from insurgent attacks and to protect facilities. ALP personnel are recruited in concert with local elder approval and employed within villages to provide local security and prevent the spread of insurgent influence and activity in that area. The current ALP end-strength is approximately 29,000 out of an authorized end-strength of 30,000. NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) provides TAA support to the ALP at the ALP Staff Directorate level.

As part of the ALP winter 2016-2017 training campaign, 3,193 ALP personnel were trained, 1,438 of whom were new recruits. On average, ALP attrition during the reporting period was approximately 820 ALP personnel per month. To encourage retention, ALP are being enrolled in the AHRIMS to maintain contract timelines as well as electronic funds transfer and mobile money plans to ensure proper pay distribution. Coalition advisors reinforce these efforts by advising at the ministerial level to ensure that these requirements are properly resourced. Enrolling all of the ALP into AHRIMS poses some significant challenges. Seventeen districts where the ALP operates do not have the infrastructure required to support AHRIMS. Over the last year, 30 ALP personnel were killed travelling from their duty locations to areas where they could participate in PAIs and enroll in AHRIMS. Despite these challenges, 75 percent of the ALP are presently enrolled in AHRIMS. Current funding for the ALP is limited to the 21,220 enrolled in AHRIMS based on the policy only to fund salaries for those ANDSF that can be verified.

During the reporting period, the Minister of the Interior signed off on reallocations of 1,500 ALP positions to support 20 new districts. In most cases, the reallocated positions were taken from ALP units that were consistently unable to fill their authorized positions. The ALP positions were distributed based on an analysis of the threat and influenced to a degree by the desire to satisfy local political leaders. Due to frequent redistribution of ALP positions throughout the police zones by the ministry leadership, there is no long-term stability within the ALP tashkil. The reallocations negatively affect the ability of the MoI to implement and follow the ALP reforms properly, resulting in personnel and equipment accountability challenges.

Afghan National Civil Order Police

The ANCOP provides the primary offensive capability within the ANP. The ANCOP mission includes dealing with civil unrest and reacting to insurgent activities in remote and high-threat areas. The ANCOP also conducts civil order presence patrols and provides response capabilities to handle crisis or counterterrorism events in urban and metropolitan areas and to mitigate violent public incidents. ANCOP units support the ANA during clearing operations, providing intelligence, tactical support, and manpower to hold and secure terrain as it is seized. With approximately 14,579 personnel, the ANCOP current end-strength is at 88 percent of its authorized Manning level.

The ANCOP consists of nine brigades, eight of which are largely aligned with the ANP zones, the ninth of which is deployed to Helmand. Because ANCOP units receive a higher level of training than typical AUP or other ANP pillars and have an often-misunderstood mission set, local police
commanders and political officials frequently misemploy ANCOP units for tasks outside their mission set. The MoI is drafting plans to transfer the ANACOP to the MoD as a commando unit by 2018. The planned transfer is a doctrinal formalization of what present ANCOP employment and utilization reflect.

**Afghan Border Police**

The ABP secure and safeguard national borders, provide security at Afghanistan’s international airports, and maintain security in the border security zone – which extends 30 miles into the territory of Afghanistan – in order to deter terrorists, criminal groups, and smugglers. This includes securing and patrolling border and control entry ports, such as airports and border-crossing points, and guarding against the illegal entry of persons, weapons, narcotics, and other goods. ABP forces along the border are trained and equipped with rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 82mm mortars. The ABP current end-strength is approximately 21,694 personnel out of an authorized strength of 23,322. The ABP headquarters is located in Kabul, and brigade-level units are assigned to six zones throughout the country that nest under the ANP zones. RS advisors continue to provide TAA support to the ABP at the headquarters level through the ANP zones.

ABP responsibilities are categorized into two distinct sets: a paramilitary mission and a more traditional border police-type mission. This dual mission supports the overall ANDSF model of achieving layered security and unity of effort with both ABP and ANA forces along the borders. The paramilitary mission involves providing security in the 30-mile zone along Afghanistan’s border. The policing mission involves providing border security and customs operations at crossing points and airports. The MoI plans to transfer portions of the ABP structure and mission to the MoD by 2018 to serve as a combat organization.

**Afghan Anti-Crime Police**

The AACP provides specialist police expertise and counterterrorism, anti-corruption, criminal investigation, biometrics, forensics, and specialized security detail support. Coalition subject matter experts work side-by-side with their Afghan counterparts in the AACP’s forensic and biometric programs to support evidence-based operations. AACP personnel also work closely with criminal investigators, prosecutors, and judges to ensure that the police remain the primary face of the rule of law. AACP structures include the AACP headquarters, the Criminal Investigation Directorate, and the Counterterrorism Police division. The AACP also includes the Major Crimes Task Force. With approximately 1,394 police officers, the AACP manning has stayed close to its full end-strength as authorized under the *tashkil*.

**Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan**

The CNPA is the lead ANDSF pillar for counternarcotics efforts. It consists of regular narcotics police and specialized units that are located in all 34 provinces. Specialized units include the Sensitive Investigation Unit, National Interdiction Unit, and the Intelligence Investigation Unit.

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44 Evidence-based operations entail arresting individuals for whom there is sufficient unclassified evidence to attain a conviction in an Afghan court of law.
The CNPA has approximately 2,000 personnel assigned, with approximately half in Kabul and the other half in the provinces.

The MoI’s National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and Sensitive Investigative Unit, which are components of the CNPA, continue to demonstrate their capability through interdiction operations that target senior narcotics traffickers. CNPA operations during this reporting period included major counternarcotics missions to destroy drugs, drug precursors, and drug-manufacturing equipment valued at over $50 million. The NIU changed commanders during the reporting period due to the previous leader failing a polygraph test; this is a positive development, as the previous commander was ineffective and likely leaking information to hostile forces. NSOCC-A provides support to the NIU for joint counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations, training, and sustainment. These advisors collaborate with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Agency.

**Afghan Public Protection Force**

The APPF is a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MoI, and it was originally established to provide contract-based facility and convoy security services. The APPF’s current end-strength is approximately 11,391 personnel. The APPF currently guards key infrastructure, facilities, governmental and non-governmental public welfare projects, and other international projects. The APPF also escorts and protects convoys against insurgent attacks and provides security for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations with diplomatic immunity, and political agencies of foreign countries located in Afghanistan. In addition, the APPF is responsible for protecting facilities donated to the Afghan Government by international organizations and the private sector. No set tashkil authorization exists for the APPF, and the force is largely funded by billing customers for contracted work. Currently, NATO and U.S. forces do not support the APPF except through the security contracts already in place, and the coalition does not advise the APPF as part of the RS mission.

**MoI Afghan Special Security Forces**

**General Command of Police Special Units**

The GCPSU is the MOI component of the ASSF, and it provides the ANP with a capability to conduct rule-of-law operations based on evidence in accordance with Afghanistan’s Criminal Procedure Code, execute high-risk arrests, and respond to high-profile attacks. The GCPSU also provides rapid response to critical situations such as emergencies or hostage scenarios. Due to its employment in these situations, the GCPSU incurs a higher rate of casualties than other specialized ANP units do, which contributes to combat fatigue, higher attrition, and challenges with maintaining overall personnel and equipment readiness. The GCPSU authorized end-strength is 7,042, with approximately 6,426 personnel assigned as of April 2017. There are 426 trainees.

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45 The APPF was established subsequent to Presidential Decree #62, signed on August 17, 2010. The decree’s intent was to decrease the presence of private security contractors operating in Afghanistan. However, in August 2015, President Ghani signed Presidential Decree #66, which allows U.S. forces, NATO, and their respective contractors to use private security contractors outside of NATO and U.S. facilities or if they are in “direct support” of the ANDSF.
enrolled in the noncommissioned officer course at the Special Police Training Center scheduled to graduate on July 4, 2017.

The GCPSU is responsible for the command and control of all MoI special police units, including 3 National Mission Units, 33 PSUs that operate in direct support of the provincial chiefs of police, and 19 Investigative and Surveillance Units. In practice, because provincial chiefs of police and provincial governors oversee payroll systems and salaries for the PSUs, they are frequently more responsive to provincial officials’ directives than to the GCPSU chain of command.

The GCPSU Special Police Training Center provides both basic and advanced infantry training. There are two advanced infantry courses per year with 25 students in each class. GCPSU recruits are typically drawn from other AUP units and are chosen specifically for their skills and experience. During this reporting period, a number of high-risk arrest operations demonstrated the ability to conduct complex, independent helicopter and ground assault force operations. However, the GCPSU remain reliant on coalition enablers, including ISR support, to be effective.
SECTION 6 – FINANCING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES

The ANDSF continues to be funded primarily through annual congressional appropriations to the DoD via ASFF, an annual appropriation made available to the Secretary of Defense, to provide assistance to the security forces of Afghanistan with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, which supports the equipping, sustainment, training, and operations of Afghanistan’s security forces. NATO Allies and partner nations also play a prominent role in the financial support of the ANDSF by contributing to the NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF), which supports the ANA, and the UNDP-administered LOTFA that pays the salaries of police and builds MoI capacity. In addition, the Afghan Government draws upon its domestic revenues to contribute to ANDSF sustainment and operations and to pay for food for ANDSF personnel. The ANDSF will continue to depend on coalition security and advisory assistance and donor financial assistance for 2017 and beyond. At the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, the Afghan Government reiterated its original commitment made at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago to increase financial support incrementally each year to its own security forces.

6.1 HOLDING THE AFGHAN MINISTRIES ACCOUNTABLE

CSTC-A makes use of bilateral funding conditionality letters, commitment letters, and the CPA to hold the MoD and the MoI accountable for ASFF-funded equipment and services and for direct contributions of ASFF funding provided to them. Accountability is managed through executing agreed-upon rewards and penalties based upon performance metrics in the letters; for example, CSTC-A has withheld funds from both the MoD and MoI for their Customs and Revenue Departments’ lack of cooperation regarding taxation exemptions of trucks providing U.S. support and for insufficient numbers of personnel enrolled biometrically in the APPS. CSTC-A utilizes a single commitment letter with the MoD regarding the NATF, focused on literacy and English language training.

During FY 1395, which ended on December 20, 2016, there were more than 130 commitment letters, too many to enforce and track accurately. In addition, the penalties imposed under the previous year’s letters were designed in such a way that imposing penalties sometimes would have detracted from combat effectiveness of the ANDSF; penalties such as withholding fuel allocations can inhibit unit mobility. Entering into FY 1396, CSTC-A is reviewing the commitment letters, reducing the number of letters, and writing them such that penalties are undesirable, yet do not affect combat capabilities. Previous successful penalty constructs – such as withholding senior leader travel pay – are being used as models for new commitment letters to create the drive to comply without negatively affecting ANDSF capabilities.

NATF supports Afghan-executed programs within the MoD, where the MoD awards and executes contracts. CSTC-A advisors validate the invoices from the contracts, and NATF pays validated invoices only. CSTC-A pays validated invoices from contracts executed properly in the MoD rather than giving NATF funds directly to Afghanistan to execute.
6.2 U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS

The United States provides the bulk of funding necessary to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF through the ASFF. ASFF provides the ANDSF with the resources needed to fund ongoing ANDSF operations while continuing to develop it into an effective and independent force capable of securing Afghanistan, protecting the Afghan people, and contributing to regional security. The majority of the ASFF funding is executed through DoD contracts on pseudo-FMS cases, with the rest provided directly to the Afghan Government primarily to fund ANA pay and facilities sustainment contracts. The FY 2017 ASFF appropriation request is $4.26 billion, which includes $814.5 million for Afghan aviation transition. Since FY 2005, Congress has appropriated more than $65 billion for ASFF.

6.3 INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

At the July 2016 Warsaw Summit, the international community agreed to “continue national contributions to the financial sustainment of the [ANDSF], including until the end of 2020.” This extended prior commitments made at the 2012 Chicago Summit, where donors agreed to support the training, equipping, financing, and capability development of the ANDSF until the end of 2017. At Warsaw, donor nations pledged about $900 million in annual funding for the ANDSF for the years 2018-2020, totaling approximately 93 percent of the contributions pledged at Chicago. The United States does not commit to a specific amount but funds the majority of ANDSF requirements by annually seeking an ASFF appropriation from Congress, based on the President’s guidance for the overall force structure that the United States is willing to support.

International donors provide funding either on a bilateral basis or through one of two multi-lateral channels, NATF and LOTFA. Approximately one-half of annual international contributions pledged at Warsaw are expected to flow through the NATF, with the remainder through LOTFA. U.S. funding is not part of the Warsaw commitment. To provide transparency and accountability of donor funding, donor nations can participate in the Kabul-based ANDSF Funding Oversight and Coordination Body, co-chaired by the Afghan MoF and representatives from major international donors, which receives regular updates from the Afghan Government and CSTC-A.

The DoD manages NATF on behalf of international donors to provide support and sustainment of the ANA. Since the beginning of the NATF in 2007, 33 nations have contributed more than $2 billion. For calendar year 2017, 11 nations have so far pledged $60.64 million to the NATF. Since Afghan FY 1394 (December 2014 – December 2015), CSTC-A has enforced a NATF commitment letter with the MoD and the MoI that relies on the same stringent controls included in ASFF commitment letters.

The UNDP has managed LOTFA since its inception in 2002. In FY 2017, the portion of international contributions apportioned for LOTFA was $454.6 million. The UNDP receives and manages donor contributions through LOTFA to pay the salaries of up to 157,000 members of the ANP, and CSTC-A coordinates closely with the UNDP regarding the use of LOTFA. Donor nations have the opportunity to participate in the LOTFA Project Board, which provides oversight over activities funded by LOTFA.
6.4 AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, the Afghan Government committed to providing an annual minimum of 25 billion Afghanis, or $500 million at the 2012 exchange rate, in support of the ANDSF with the expectation from the international community that this contribution would gradually increase over time to assume greater financial responsibility for the ANDSF by 2024. The 2016 Afghan national budget allocated 24.7 billion Afghanis ($387 million) for the ANDSF. Due to persistent security challenges and limited economic growth, the United States and the international community accept that the Afghan Government is meeting its obligations. The Afghan Government has budgeted to provide 25 billion Afghanis ($400 million) in 2017.

Efforts to Increase the Afghan Government’s Financial Responsibility for the ANDSF

Increasing revenue from the Afghan Government is important to long-term ANDSF sustainment and to the stability of the Afghan Government. The ability of the Afghan Government to assume increased financial responsibility for the ANDSF is also closely tied to the functioning and growth of the Afghan economy. During this reporting period, the Afghan Government took important steps to increase legitimate government revenue and to facilitate economic growth, but the prospects for robust economic growth in the near-term remain limited. The United States, the international community, the Afghan Government, and civil society organizations continue to work together in mutually reinforcing ways to support a sustainable Afghan economy as Afghanistan completes its first year as a member of the World Trade Organization.

In FY 1396, Afghan Government revenue continued its upward trend. The Afghan Government collected nearly 9.8 billion Afghanis through May 2017, five months into the fiscal year—a 30 percent increase over the previous year. MoF officials attribute the enhanced performance to internal improvements, such as personnel changes and increased attention on anti-corruption initiatives, as well as the additional revenue measures enacted in 2015. The MoD and the MoI’s use of framework contracts also contributed to cost reductions in contracted goods and services as a direct result of open-tender bidding and regionalizing contracts by provinces. The MoF’s internal year-end revenue target is 152.5 billion Afghanis, while the FY 1396 budget calls for 161 billion Afghanis, leaving open the possibility of a year-end budget surplus.

The Afghan Government continues to implement a range of economic, governance, and anti-corruption reforms. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) adopted at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in 2012 to support economic growth and development of Afghanistan provided a construct to help guide Afghan-led economic reforms so the international community’s continued high levels of economic assistance could be sustained by ensuring the Afghan Government delivered on its reform commitments. The TMAF was replaced by the “Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF),” adopted at the Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015. The SMAF outlines the reform commitments of the Afghan Government through 2018 and lays out the agreed-upon principles of effective international donor assistance. During the October 2016 Brussels Conference on development assistance for Afghanistan, the Afghan Government presented its renewed SMAF and Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework, which detail the government’s strategic plan for achieving self-reliance and provide
benchmarks for reform efforts. Other international forums, such as the Asian Development Bank-sponsored Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, the Heart of Asia Istanbul Process, and the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, provide opportunities for regional leaders to break down trade barriers, increase cross-border investment, and improve trade routes in Central and South Asia.

CSTC-A continues to work with the Afghan Government to ensure appropriate oversight of direct contributions to the MoI and the MoD. The SY 1396 commitment letters consolidated, eliminated, or refined 85 of the original 170 conditions in the SY 1394 commitment letters. Additional changes include structuring incentives to encourage the government to meet its Chicago Summit commitment of 25 billion Afghanis annually and to continue to increase its contribution to funding the ANDSF as its economy and revenues grow, with the aim of assuming financial responsibility for its security forces by the end of the “Decade of Transformation” in 2024. The conditions for Afghan Government use of ASFF contributions within the FY 1396 commitment letters focus on improving and implementing enduring ANDSF processes and systems directly linked to strengthening the accountability of equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel, personnel, and pay—all areas of opportunity for corruption and graft.

Finally, CSTC-A is assisting the MoD and the MoI as they develop their resource management and procurement capacity. This effort focuses on strengthening the MoD and the MoI’s ability to manage their fiscal resources more effectively while helping to provide oversight of U.S. and international funding being spent by the Afghans. For instance, CSTC-A is integrating all ASFF- and LOTFA-funded forces into AHRIMS in order to account for all personnel disbursements to the ANDSF. Initiatives such as the implementation of APPS will help automate and streamline the payroll process. As the ANA implements the APPS, CSTC-A plans to provide full funding only for authorized tashkil positions that are paid electronically and fund all other positions at 80 percent of the authorized amount. CSTC-A continues to perform and assist with independent assessments and audits to ensure appropriate scrutiny of Afghan financial processes and make recommendations for improving Afghan capabilities. Improving the ability of the MoD and the MoI to provide appropriate oversight and accountability of international funding for the ANDSF and developing Afghan capability in financial management will remain a core focus of the RS TAA mission.
## ANNEX A – INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Essential Function</th>
<th>Indicators of Effectiveness</th>
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| **EF 1:** Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution | - The MoD and MoI are able to identify requirements, programs, and funding accurately over a three-year horizon based on strategic guidance.  
- The Ministry of Finance provides timely guidance to enable the MoI and MoD to develop a budget.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to formulate an accurate annual budget to meet internal and external requirements.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to develop an executable procurement plan and execute their spend plan within budget and stipulated timeframes.  
- The MoD and MoI are able to submit, award, and complete contracts to ensure execution as planned.  
- The MoD can fully pay all of its employees accurately, timely, and in a secure fashion.  
- The Ministry of Finance provides timely approvals, in-year guidance, and funds to the MoI and MoD.  
- The MoD and MoI possess an effective and efficient system to recruit and hire subject matter experts. |
| **EF 2:** Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight | - The MoD’s Ministerial Internal Controls Program is effectively implemented and sustainable.  
- The MoD and MoI IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
- GS IG has an effective accountability oversight program for sustainability.  
- Critical items (the “big four” issues – fuel, ammunition, food, and pay) are managed by transparent, accountable, and sustainable processes to the appropriate organizational level.  
- Ensure the appropriate engagement of relevant external and internal agencies to establish transparency, accountability, and oversight within the Afghan Government. |
| **EF 3:** Rule of Law and Governance | - The MoD and MoI have appropriately staffed and qualified units to prevent or address extra-judicial killings and other GVHR.  
- The MoD and MoI identify, investigate, and appropriately act upon acts of major corruption and GVHR.  
- The MoD and MoI conduct inter-ministerial cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office on corruption adjudication and GVHR allegations. |
<p>| <strong>EF 4:</strong> Force Generation | - The MoD utilizes AHRIMS down to the corps level to manage the force, and the MoI utilizes AHRIMS down to the provincial headquarters level to manage the force. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EF 5: Logistics and Maintenance</th>
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<tr>
<td>▪ The MoD meets civilianization goals and objectives as outlined in the bilateral agreement.</td>
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<td>▪ MoD and MoI manpower plans are developed and used to project future manpower requirements that inform recruiting goals, mitigates attrition rates, and achieve the desired end-strength.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD and MoI establish systems to integrate lessons learned; tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine; and programs of instruction.</td>
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<td>▪ All untrained ANP receive formal police training, and the MoI prevents future untrained police by forecasting training requirements and scheduling courses to accommodate recruit intakes.</td>
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<td>▪ The ANA has established a system for training in air and ground coordination; capability is established and used for information operations delivery.</td>
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<td>▪ Training is delivered that results in reduced casualties.</td>
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<td>▪ Measurement and reporting has command emphasis.</td>
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<td>▪ The ANDSF documents processes for generating and capturing requirements.</td>
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<td>▪ The ANDSF has adequately executed a demand-based inventory management system.</td>
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<td>▪ ANDSF organic maintenance is supplemented by contractors.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoI assumes responsibility for equipment maintenance, which is transitioned from the coalition-funded AMS contract.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD has developed an operational medical resource optimization process that is sustainable.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD and MoI have sufficient numbers of trained and qualified health care personnel to fill <em>tashkil</em>.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD and MoI have an operational and sustainable medical logistics process.</td>
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<td>▪ The ANP operates inventory management processes, including cold chain management for medicines.</td>
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<td>▪ The Afghan Government-backed Afghan Medical Council establishes and sustains ANDSF and Afghan national healthcare.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD is capable of managing its portion of the frequency spectrum for the Afghan Government.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD and MoI are able to identify and sustain key information and communications technology infrastructure.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD is able to sustain information management systems throughout their lifecycles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ The MoD implements fundamental cybersecurity structures and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information and information systems.</td>
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<td>▪ The MoD is able to produce and sustain information and communications technology forces that are manned, trained, and equipped to conduct operations.</td>
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<td>EF 6: Command and Control Operations</td>
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| EF 7: Intelligence | The SMW develops as a strategic Afghan government organization capable of manning, equipping, training, employing, and sustaining a force to conduct special operations force air assault and airborne ISR capability in support of the ASSF.  
The AAF has developed sustainable enterprise manning, a sustainable aerial fires capability, and a sustainable theatre mobility system. |
|---|---|
| | The Afghan police intelligence model effectively engages security issues.  
MoD intelligence integrates into MoD strategic decision-making and into ANASOC and ANA corps-level operations.  
DPI human intelligence institutes a sustainable human intelligence network that can action and report on intelligence requirements and tasking.  
Establish NMIC as an operational intelligence center capable of retrieving and analyzing information obtained from various intelligence sensors and developing products that support Afghan government intelligence operations.  
DPI trains technically proficient personnel for intelligence operational needs and manages intelligence sustainment requirements to meet operational needs.  
Establish an enduring and sustainable organic intelligence capability at the Intelligence Training Center, ANA corps, and ANASOC. |
| EF 8: Strategic Communication | Develop and sustain events and mechanisms designed to facilitate cross-ministerial coordination and delivery of strategic communication guidance, priorities, and direction.  
The National Unity Government develops and distributes strategic communication guidance; guidance will be utilized to develop respective MoD and MoI communication plans and products.  
GS Operations Directorate Information Operations has the knowledge and capability to submit effectively (and modify as necessary) yearly (personnel and equipment) tashkil inputs, as well as to plan and submit its yearly budget requirements, which will enable MoD information operations capability throughout the country. |
| Gender | The MoI and MoD/ANA implement approved strategies and plans on gender integration.  
The MoI and MoD provide safe training and working environments (facilities) for women.  
The MoI and MoD take actions to eliminate gender-based violence and other types of violence and sexual harassment of women. |
### ANNEX B – ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACP</td>
<td>Afghan Anti-Crime Police</td>
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<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACJC</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resource Information Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANA-0</td>
<td>Doctrine Development System Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANASOC</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANDSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Defense and Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPS</td>
<td>Afghan Personnel and Pay System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASSF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATAC</td>
<td>Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Counter- and Anti-Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>Casualty Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMT</td>
<td>Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-IED</td>
<td>Counter-Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLS</td>
<td>Contract Logistics Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Core-IMS</td>
<td>Core-Information Management System</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Common Policy Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPI</td>
<td>Directorate of Police Intelligence</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
EF  Essential Function
FRU  Family Response Unit
FY  Fiscal Year
GCPSU  General Command of Police Special Units
GOOD  Gender Occupational Opportunity Development
GS  General Staff
GVHR  Gross Violation of Human Rights
IED  Improvised Explosive Device
IG  Inspector General
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
ISIS  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISIS-K  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria - Khorasan
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
KIA  Killed in Action
LOTFA  Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation
MICP  Ministerial Internal Controls Program
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MoI  Ministry of Interior
MSFV  Mobile Strike Force Vehicle
NATF  NATO ANA Trust Fund
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NIMS  National Information Management System
NIU  National Interdiction Unit
NMIC  National Military Intelligence Center
NPCC  National Police Coordination Center
NSOCC-A  NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan
NTEC  Network Targeting and Exploitation Center
NVG  Night-Vision Goggles
OCC  Operations Coordination Center
OCC-P  Operations Coordination Center – Provincial
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCC-R</td>
<td>Operations Coordination Center – Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>Operation Freedom’s Sentinel</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
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<td>ONSC</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORC</td>
<td>Operational Readiness Cycle</td>
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<td>PAI</td>
<td>Personnel Asset Inventory</td>
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<td>PoAM</td>
<td>Program of Actions and Milestones</td>
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<td>PSU</td>
<td>Police Special Unit</td>
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<td>RAB</td>
<td>Requirements Approval Board</td>
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<td>RAID</td>
<td>Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment</td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Resolute Support</td>
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<td>SAFIRE</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Fire</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SMAF</td>
<td>Self-Reliance Through Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMW</td>
<td>Special Mission Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOJTF-A</td>
<td>Special Operations Joint Task Force – Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOK</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
USFOR-A  U.S. Forces – Afghanistan
WIA  Wounded in Action