Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure to deal with serious situations that threaten the peace and security of the country and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated) and contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack.

This section outlines the key aspects of Japan’s response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework. (See Fig. III-1-2-1)

Notes: Underlined laws fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense

1 Three pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratified in the same year. With this, a basis for emergency legislation was established. The development of these legal systems reflects many results of the "emergency legislation study," which had been conducted by the former Defense Agency since 1977. Notes: a fixed concept has not necessarily been designated for the term "emergency legislation." When used in this white paper, it refers to legislation for responses to situations that has been developed since 2003.

2 Situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.

3 A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected.
1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law specifies basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding response to armed attack situations and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. Moreover, in preparation for the outbreak of armed attacks, a framework is being developed which allows relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions) to implement response measures in a coordinated and cooperative fashion based on individual legislations dealing with military emergencies such as the Civil Protection Law, thereby the whole nation can fully prepare for armed attack situations.

See References 42, 43
(See Fig. III-1-2-2)

(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.

In situations such as armed attack situation, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures:

1) Certification of the facts, and the premises to that certification supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated.
2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation.
3) Important items related to the response measures.

(2) Response Measures

When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions will implement the following measures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

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4 Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services.
Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1

Systems to Protect Citizens’ Lives and Property and Defend Japanese Territorial Land, Waters and Airspace

Chapter 1

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Chief and other members of the Task Force.

Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.


In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

2 Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be taken including the following: 1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis and situational evaluations; 2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; 3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations.

3 Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law

There were seven pieces of emergency legislation, and three treaties enacted and signed in June 2004 as a result of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law that was enacted in June 2003. Based on that, the framework to enable necessary measures for responding to armed attack situations, etc. to be taken was prepared.

See References 42, 43

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5 An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.
2 Efforts for Civil Protection

1 The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection and the Roles of the MOD and SDF

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerrilla or special forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in response to each of them. In addition, it prescribes the content and distribution of roles to implement the measures for the national, prefectural and municipal governments and designated public institutions for civil protection measures in response to evacuation, relief and disasters.

The MOD and SDF established the Civil Protection Plan based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Policy. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to support for evacuation and rescue, and responses to armed attack disasters.

In the event of an armed attack situation and an emergency situation, the SDF has the authority to conduct such activities as protection of residents, including evacuees, and emergency recovery as a civil protection measure and emergency response measure based on the provision for civil protection. (See Fig. III-1-2-4)

2 Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

1 Implementation of Training for Civil Protection Organized by the SDF

In FY2012, the MOD and SDF organized training for civil protection in cooperation with the Cabinet Secretariat (security and crisis management) and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency with the participation of local governments and other relevant organizations from the viewpoint of promoting understanding of the operation of SDF units concerning civil protection and sharing recognition of armed attack situations with relevant organizations.

In a comprehensive combat capability exercise conducted by the GSDF Northern Army in FY2012, the SDF implemented training for civil protection with the participation of external relevant organizations, including local governments and the Disaster Medical Assistant Team (DMAT) in order to enhance the SDF’s capability to respond to various situations and strengthen cooperation with such organizations.

Moreover, in the Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise in FY2012, the SDF implemented training for civil protection in order to strengthen cooperation with local governments (Aomori, Akita, Iwate, Miyagi, Yamagata and Fukushima Prefectures) and local administrative agencies in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, including the Cabinet Secretariat (security and crisis management) and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, with regard to civil protection measures to be taken in situations such as an emergency response situation and an armed attack situation, in addition to maintaining and strengthening the capability to jointly execute operations with the U.S. military.

2 Participation in Training for Civil Protection

In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training
implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat, prefectural government organizations, or local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities.

Joint exercises between the national and local governments regarding civil protection were started in FY2005 and field exercises were conducted in five prefectures including Fukui that year, and exercises were conducted in Yamagata, Toyama, Mie, Shiga, Miyazaki and Kagoshima in FY2012, with command post exercises in Fukui, Okayama, Tokushima, Ehime and Okinawa.

In addition, the joint exercises regarding civil protection that were carried out in the city of Yasu, Shiga Prefecture, in October 2012, were the first such exercises which envisioned a terrorist attack on a passenger train in operation. The SDF, with the participation of the Cabinet Secretariat, Shiga Prefecture, relevant ministries and agencies and West Japan Railway Company, conducted training on initial response measures and air medical transport, in coordination with the central and local crisis management headquarters. See Section 1-5; Reference 52

(3) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments, etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office. Civil protection councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. Furthermore, related staff of the Regional Defense Bureaus, which are designated regional government institutions, are assigned to be members. In addition, in some cases, retired SDF personnel are employed by local governments as crisis management supervisors to facilitate cooperation with the MOD and SDF and help to conceive and implement disaster response plans and training programs as experts on civil protection.

The Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces

In 2006, the Defence Agency (then) and the SDF shifted to a joint operations structure. This established the basis for unified SDF operations among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF from peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its expanding range of already diversified duties in an effective and prompt manner.

Thereafter, as the need for efficient operation of defense capabilities and the need for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to work as one are growing, the joint operations structure should continue to be strengthened in light of the current security environment. Therefore, the MOD and SDF are making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the joint operations, including the functions of the Joint Staff.

Outline of Joint Operations Structure

(1) Role of the Chief of Staff

a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and solely supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective.
b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force¹ is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

¹ Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.
(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the Grand, Maritime and Air Staff Offices. The Grand, Maritime and Air Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

In addition, from the perspective of facilitating smooth SDF joint operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium-to long-term defense concepts, and annual operational policies to clarify of its required functions for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will implement measures in reference to these plans.

The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which is the “central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense,” to the Joint Staff and relevant units.

(See Fig. III-1-2-5)

2) Establishment of Foundation to Enhance the Joint Operations Structure

Within the joint operations structure, it is essential that the Joint Staff and SDF units maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. Therefore, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), the common network of the Ministry of Defense and SDF, and the Central Command System (CCS) that supports command and supervision for the Minister of Defense by connecting with the primary command systems of each SDF to collect intelligence, were developed as part of the foundation to support that essential requirement2. The MOD and SDF are required to possess a command and control function utilizing an advanced communications network that includes satellites and a system for sharing intelligence3 to strengthen the joint operational foundation, so they are developing a flexible and wide-ranging communications system using advanced communications technology acquired from within and without.

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2 Refer to "Defense Agency/SDF Outline for Comprehensive Measures Related to Handling the Information and Communications Technology Revolution" for details on each system.

3 Satellites are used for communication with destroyers and aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance operations in nearby seas by utilizing the advantages of wide range and immediacy, and for communications between Japan and units deployed in disaster areas and overseas.
Furthermore, as it is necessary for information systems and communications networks to be protected from threats such as cyber attacks, efforts are being made to strengthen the combined cyber attack response capability.

See Section 1-3

At the unit level, commanders4 of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such forces’ operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime, and if necessary, the number of staff personnel will be increased. In addition, through exercises such as the U.S.-Japan joint exercise (field exercise) that took place in FY2012, efforts are being made to maintain and improve integrated operational capability and to verify the effectiveness of the various plans that have been formulated.

Deliberation for a more effective joint operations system continues and necessary measures will be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarters structure, and the development of human resources and common equipment suited for joint operations.