Section 2

For the Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and the region, it is essential to adequately develop systems and the measures to do so in response to changes in the security environment. Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan. (See Fig. II-3-2-1)

This section explains the background of the deepening and expansion of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

1 Historical Background

During the Cold War era, the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting held the following year (1997), as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, new Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved, revising the previous Guidelines, which had been formulated in 1978.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan and the United States have enhanced consultations related to security. Through these Japan–U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan–U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage).

Fig. II-3-2-1 Changes in the Scope of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Posture for Deterring Aggression]</td>
<td>[Cooperation under normal circumstances]</td>
<td>[2005] Examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan]</td>
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<td>[Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Operations in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
<td>[Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities.]</td>
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<td>[SDF: Repel limited, small-scale aggression. Primarily conduct defensive operations. U.S. Forces: Support SDF. Conduct operations (strike power, etc.) to complement the functions of SDF. Cooperation in the case of a situation in the Far East]</td>
<td>[Security dialogues, armed control and disarmament, PKO; etc.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
<td>[Bilateral defense planning, mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Establishment of coordination mechanism, etc.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>[From the “Cold War era”, to the “post-Cold War era”, to the “post-9/11 world”, the Japan–U.S. Alliance has expanded in terms of the scope of defense cooperation in response to the changing environment. (Focused on the defense of Japan) »Response to situations in areas surrounding Japan ⇒ Improvement in international security environment]</td>
<td>[Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
<td>[Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Conduct studies on bilateral defense planning for the defense of Japan. Operations in response to an armed attack against Japan]</td>
<td>[Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan]</td>
<td>[Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Consult when required. Conduct studies on facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces.]</td>
<td>[Activities initiated by either government. Relief activities, search and rescue, etc. Japan’s support for U.S. Forces: activities. Use of facilities, rear area support Japan-U.S. operational cooperation SDF: Surveillance, minesweeping U.S. Forces: Operations to restore peace and security]</td>
<td>[Activities initiated by either government. Relief activities, search and rescue, etc. Japan’s support for U.S. Forces: activities. Use of facilities, rear area support Japan-U.S. operational cooperation SDF: Surveillance, minesweeping U.S. Forces: Operations to restore peace and security]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-「2005」 Highlighted the following roles, missions, and capabilities. Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group. Strengthening BMD and operational capability, enhancing BMD system capability, etc. -「2007」 Expand joint training and exercises. Study further joint and shared use of facilities. Expand cooperation in ISR activities. Transfer of SM-3 Block II to third parties. Establishment of a bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis. Space Cyber Trilateral/multilateral cooperation Cooperation on HADR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counterterrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc. Cooperation on environmental challenges Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</td>
<td>-「2007」</td>
<td>-「2011」</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, bilateral response capabilities have improved, such as operational information sharing and establishing the guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the U.S. closely cooperated and coordinated in responding to the missile launch carried out by North Korea in April 2009, and April and December 2012, which was purported to be a “satellite.” Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.

Concerning efforts to improve the international security environment, through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, international disaster relief activities and international peace-keeping operations in Haiti, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Japan is conducting activities in close cooperation with the U.S. Moreover, Japanese-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.

The importance of such cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S. is increasing in the context of Japan’s efforts for achieving stabilization in the Asia-Pacific region and for improving the global security environment.

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**Fig. II-3-2-2 Overview of Japan–U.S. Consultations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultation</th>
<th>First stage</th>
<th>Second stage</th>
<th>Third stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
<td>Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>Confirmation of common strategic objectives (at the first stage)</td>
<td>Roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S. (at the second stage)</td>
<td>Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Summary of studies on roles, missions, and capabilities</td>
<td>Recommendation on realignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finalization of realignment initiatives (at the third stage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Common strategic objectives</td>
<td>Roles, missions, and capabilities</td>
<td>Implementation of the realignment roadmap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting</td>
<td>Common strategic objectives</td>
<td>Strengthening of Alliance Security and Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Continued progress toward realizing Realignment Roadmap’s Objectives</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decision to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Realignment in the Kanto Area

- **[Yokota]**
  - Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
  - Partial return of airspace, and relocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
  - Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the U.S.)

- **[Sagami General Depot (SGD)]**
  - Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (a mission command training center and support facilities)
  - Release of a portion of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approximately 15 ha)
  - Release of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2 ha)
  - Joint/shared use of a specific area (approximately 35 ha) of open space in the western side of SGD

2. Realignment in Okinawa

- **[Joint/shared Use]**
  - Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
  - JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

- **[Land Returns]**
  - The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base
  - A detailed consolidation plan will be developed

- **Army POL Depot Kuwae**
  - Tank Farm No. 1 (total return, approximately 16 ha)

- **Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)**
  - Total return, approximately 271 ha

- **Naha Port**
  - Total return, approximately 56 ha

A replacement facility will be constructed under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan in the Urasoe-Pier district

(Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan)

Legend: Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base

- **Camp Kuyae (Lester)**
  - Total return, approximately 68 ha

- **Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)**
  - Partial return, some of approximately 596 ha

- **Camp Courtney**
  - Partial return, approximately 47 ha on July 31, 2010

- **Camp Schwab**
  - Total return

- **Camp Hansen**
  - Total return

- **Camp Courtney**
  - Total return

- **Kadena Air Base**
  - Total return

- **Makiminato Service Area**
  - Total return

- **Naha Port**
  - Total return

- **Kadena Air Base**
  - Total return

- **Replacement Facility**
  - SDF bases in mainland

- **Guam**
  - Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base

[Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]
- Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units

[Relocation of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force]
- Release of portions (1.1 ha) of housing area and others
- Joint/shared use of heliport

[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]
- III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approximately 8,000 personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam
  - The affected units will relocate from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.)
3. Relocation of Aircraft

Relocation of training conducted in Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to each of ASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, or Guam. Relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing (F/A-18: 49, EA-6B: 4, E-2C: 4, C-2: 2; 59 aircraft in total) to Iwakuni
- Deployment of X-Band Transportable Radar for BMD (AN/TPY-2: so-called “X-Band Radar System”)
- Relocation of KC-130 (12 aircraft) to Iwakuni
- Relocation of CH-53D (8 aircraft) to Guam
- Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3, U-36 A (17 aircraft in total) to Atsugi
- Note: Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni (the airport was opened on December 13, 2012)

Deployment of X-Band Transportable Radar for BMD (AN/TPY-2: so-called “X-Band Radar System”)

Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

KC-130 (12 aircraft) will deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Relocation of CH-53D (8 aircraft) to Guam

Note: Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni (the airport was opened on December 13, 2012)
Bilateral Agreement for a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance

The cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, which has borne numerous results thus far, as noted above, marked the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 2010. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on November 13, 2009, as part of efforts to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Hatoyama agreed to start dialogue processes to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance (processes for deepening the alliance) as the countries welcomed the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Thus, Japan and the United States have sought to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan–U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future, so as to make the Japan–U.S. Alliance even more unshakable at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on November 13, 2010, the two countries expressed their desire to deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. Alliance with three pillars at its center: security, economy and cultural and people-to-people exchanges; at the Cabinet level as well, repeated commitments have been made to the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, such as in the “2+2” joint statement on May 28, 2010 and at the talks between the Defense Ministers of the two countries held on January 13, 2011, and concrete bilateral discussions have taken place at the working level, based on ministerial instructions.

Discussions Concerning the Coordination of USFJ Realignment

As to the USFJ realignment, while carrying out tasks such as sending the environmental impact assessment statement concerning the FRF to the Okinawa Prefectural Government from the end of 2011 to the beginning of 2012, Japan continued to hold discussions with the U.S. at various levels. Following these discussions, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. decided to conduct full-scale bilateral discussions concerning the plan for USFJ realignment, in view of factors including the following:

1) The necessity of implementing measures promptly and steadily alleviating the visible burden on Okinawa;
2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package, placing a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. defense strategic guidance released in January 2012; and
3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Congress.

The discussions led to the release of the "2+2" Joint Statement on April 27, 2012.
the 2006 Roadmap.

Factors behind the adjustment of the USFJ realignment plan include, first, the fact that the U.S. is undertaking a review of the composition of the Marine Corps in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture, in light of the recent changes in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. This is so that the U.S., which emphasizes the Asia-Pacific region, can adopt a posture that enables it to deal with large-scale situations in Northeast Asia, in order to secure a stable presence in the region, as well as seeking to make efficient preparations that will enable the U.S. to deal effectively with a diverse range of situations across the region. The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, such as headquarters, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units in line with the basic approach detailed above. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)—consisting of headquarters, ground, aviation and logistic support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational force, in order to continue to ensure the presence of the U.S. forces in Okinawa, while securing a geographically distributed posture. Through this, preparations will be made that enable the U.S. military to respond more flexibly and promptly to a diverse range of situations in the Asia-Pacific region, by creating an agile posture in which each MAGTF unit has a high level of readiness and collaborates with each other, while increasing the strategic depth of unit deployment. The Governments of Japan and the U.S. made specific adjustments to the realignment plan based on this new unit composition, balancing the maintenance of the deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Alliance with a reduction of the burden on Okinawa; an outline of the statement is provided below.

(1) Preamble
1) The Ministers decided to adjust the plan set forth in the May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment.
2) The Ministers decided to delink the progress in regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility from both the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and the return of land south of Kadena that would arise as a result.
3) The Ministers confirmed that the overall deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be reinforced by strengthening Japan’s defense posture and promoting dynamic defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as through the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps.

(2) The unit composition in Guam and Okinawa (at capacity)
1) As well as stationing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii, a rotational presence will be established in Australia.
2) Approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.
3) The final Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap.
4) The number of Marine Corps personnel in Guam will be approximately 5,000.
5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam is $8.6 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars). Japan’s financial commitment will consist of direct cash contribution up to the amount of $2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. Other forms of financial support such as loans or equity investment will not be utilized. Even if Japan makes a contribution through cooperation with Item (3) 2) below, it shall be included in this commitment.

(3) New initiatives aimed at promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity
1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese Government will take various measures, including the strategic use of ODA (e.g. provision of patrol boats to coastal states).
2) The Governments of Japan and the U.S. will consider cooperation aimed at developing training grounds in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for joint/shared use by Japanese and U.S. forces, and will identify fields for cooperation by the end of 2012.

(4) The land returns in Okinawa
1) 1. Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (West Futenma Housing area and part of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), part of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (the north access road, area near Gate 5)
2) Areas eligible for return after relocation within the prefecture: Part of the Makiminato Service Area (the majority of the storage area), part of Camp Zukeran (the Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwe (Camp Lester), Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1
3) Areas eligible for return after relocation of the Marine Corps overseas: Additional elements of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area
2) A consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa will be jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. by the end of 2012.

(5) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma
1) The Ministers reaffirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.
2) Japan and the U.S. will both contribute to any refurbishment projects required at MCAS Futenma in order to protect the environment and ensure that the air station can be run safely until the FRF is fully operational.

See Reference 36