

## Chapter 2

# The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Build-Up of Defense Capability

For appropriate execution of various SDF missions, it is necessary to acquire equipment such as destroyers and aircraft, and to establish a unit operation posture. However, developing a defense force takes time, therefore it needs to be planned and carried out on the basis of the medium- to long-term outlook.


For this reason, since FY1977, the Government has developed the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which set forth the basic policies for Japan's security, the security environment surrounding Japan, and basic guidelines for the upgrading of Japan's defense capability development, as well as the significance and role of Japan's defense force, the specific organization of the SDF, and the deployment targets for major equipment.

Also, the government developed the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) since FY1986, to steadily and systematically achieve goals set in the NDPG, such as the SDF operation posture or major equipment deployment, according to the basic security policy and defense force roles stipulated in the NDPG. The MTDP sets the total amount of defense expenditure and quantities of major equipment to be deployed for the next 5 years. Based on the MTDP, each year's defense buildup programs are designed and implemented.

NDPGs have been formulated four times, in 1976, 1995, 2004, and 2010, in light of such factors as the security environment at the time. However, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe in recent years, so on January 25 this year, the Cabinet decided that the government would review the 2010 NDPG and reach a conclusion within the year. The Ministry of Defense has established a committee chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister, which is currently studying the concept of a defense force. (See Fig. II-2-0-1)

In this chapter, the first section explains the features of the past NDPGs, while the second section explains the status of the review of the 2010 NDPG. The third section explains the defense buildup programs in FY2013, the fourth section explains defense-related budget and the fifth section explains approaches to the stable use of global commons such as outer space, cyberspace, and the oceans.

**Fig. II-2-0-1** Developments in the Upgrading of Defense Capability to Date



Section 1

# The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program

## 1 Features of the past NDPGs

### 1 1976 Guidelines

Formulated against the backdrop of the détente<sup>1</sup> of the 1970s, the 1976 Guidelines were based on an awareness that (1) in general, a full-scale military clash between East and West would be unlikely to occur, and (2) in the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. security alliance would continue to play a substantial role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan.

In addition, with regard to Japan's defense capability, the Guidelines stipulated that it should (1) be furnished with the various functions required for defense and (2) be in a balanced posture in organization and deployment, including logistic support, (3) take adequate surveillance posture in peacetime, (4) effectively cope with limited and small-scale aggression, and (5) be capable of shifting smoothly to a new setup when


an important change occurs in the situation. The concept of Basic Defense Capability introduced by the 1976 Guidelines attached importance to deterrence, emphasizing measures to prevent an invasion of Japan.

### 2 1995 Guidelines

The 1995 Guidelines were formulated with consideration to the change of the international security environment such as the end of the Cold War, and increasing public expectations for the SDF in the wake of Peace Keep Operations activities and response to the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake.

The 1995 Guidelines pointed out that previous defense buildup policies were based on the concept of Basic Defense Force, that aimed to maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct

Fig. II-2-1-1 Changes in the Role of Defense Capability



1 This refers to the process of the easing of tensions between East and West during the Cold War, through such developments as the Helsinki Accords, which advocated peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

military threat to Japan, and basically followed the same approach.

At the same time, in terms of the content of Japan's defense capability, the Guidelines were characterized by their emphasis on the further utilization of SDF capabilities not only in the defense of Japan but also in response to large-scale disasters and various other situations, and in contributions to a more stable security environment, as well as reviewing the scale and function of the defense force.

### 3 2004 Guidelines

Amid the emergence of new threats and the challenges of diverse situations such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the activities of international terrorist organizations, the 2004 Guidelines were formulated on the decision that new guidelines for the approach to the national security and defense capability were necessary.

The 2004 Guidelines established two security goals: (1) preventing direct threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that one does, repel it and minimize any damage, and (2) improving the international security environment, so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. To this end, the Guidelines set an integrated combination of three approaches, (1) Japan's own effort, (2) Japan-U.S. Arrangements, and (3) Cooperation with the international community.

Accordingly, in terms of the concept of defense capability, the Guidelines stipulated that a "multifunctional, flexible, effective defense force" was necessary to address new threats and diverse situations, with emphasis on response capabilities, while maintaining effective aspects of the concept of Basic Defense Capability, which emphasized deterrence by the existence of a defense force.

### 4 2010 Guidelines

The 2010 Guidelines were formulated in light of the recognition that (1) large-scale military capacity, including nuclear capability, still exists in the surrounding region, with many countries modernizing their military forces and intensifying various activities; (2) dramatic progress in such fields as military science and technology has shortened the time between the first signs of a contingency and its development making a seamless response necessary; and (3) many security issues extend across national borders, making partnership and cooperation between countries important from times of peace, so the role of military forces is diversifying and it is becoming common to continuously military forces operate, in peacetime.

Accordingly, the 2010 Guidelines focus on SDF operations, rather than the Basic Defense Force Concept, which emphasized the existence of the defense force; as such, the Guidelines stipulate that it is necessary to ensure that future defense capability be dynamic and can proactively conduct the various activities required to fulfill. Therefore, the 2010 Guidelines prescribe the development of a Dynamic Defense Force that demonstrates readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, underpinned by advanced technical capabilities and intelligence skills, in light of trends in the level of military technology.

One key characteristic of the concept of a dynamic defense force is its focus on fulfilling the given roles through SDF activities.

**See ▶** Reference 7, 8, & 9

(See Figs. II-2-1-1, II-2-1-2)

## 2 Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015)

The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015) for the period from FY2011 to FY2015 set forth the policies and major projects for the build-up of defense capabilities over the five years from FY2011, based on the 2010 Guidelines, but it was abolished in January this year as the revision of the 2010 Guidelines was initiated. In conjunction with this move, the FY2013 defense budget formulation policy was approved by Cabinet.

In addition, along with the start of the revision of the 2010 Guidelines, necessary measures will be taken after due consideration of future mid-term defense planning.

**See ▶** Reference 10

Fig. II-2-1-2 NDPG Comparison Tables

Category		1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2010 NDPG	
GSDF	Authorized personnel		160,000	155,000	154,000	
	Regular	180,000	145,000	148,000	147,000	
	Ready reserve		15,000	7,000	7,000	
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
Mobile operation units		1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 combined training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	
Ground-to-air guided missile units		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups	
Main equipment	Tanks Artillery (Main artillery) <sup>1</sup>	(About 1,200) <sup>2</sup> (About 1,000/vehicle) <sup>2</sup>	About 900 (About 900/vehicle)	About 600 (About 600/vehicle)	About 400 (About 400/vehicle)	
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units for mobile operations regional district units Submarine units Minesweeping units Patrol aircraft units	4 escort flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 7 units 6 divisions 1 minesweeper flotilla (Land-based) 16 squadrons	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 minesweeper flotilla 9 squadrons	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 4 destroyer units 6 submarine units 1 minesweeper flotilla 9 flight squadrons	
	Main equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	About 60 ships 16 ships About 220 aircraft	About 50 ships 16 ships About 170 aircraft	47 ships 16 ships About 150 aircraft	48 ships 22 ships About 150 aircraft
ASDF	Major units	Aircraft control & warning units	28 warning groups 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)
		Fighter units Fighter-interceptor units Support fighter units	10 squadrons 3 squadrons	9 squadrons 3 squadrons	12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units Air refueling/transport units	3 squadrons —	3 squadrons —	3 squadrons 1 squadron	3 squadrons 1 squadron
		Surface-to-air Guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups
	Main equipment	Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)	About 430 aircraft (About 360 aircraft) <sup>2</sup>	About 400 aircraft About 300 aircraft	About 350 aircraft About 260 aircraft	About 340 aircraft About 260 aircraft
Main equipment & major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense <sup>3</sup>	Aegis-equipped destroyers	—	—	4 ships	6 ships <sup>4</sup>	
	Aircraft control & warning units	—	—	7 groups	11 surveillance groups/ units	
	Surface-to-air guided missile units	—	—	4 squadrons 3 groups	6 groups	

Notes: 1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.

2. Although not stated in the 1976 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG table after 1995.

3. "Main equipment and major units that can also be used in defense against ballistic missiles" refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.

4. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.