

Section 6

Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

In recent years, a strong awareness has developed concerning the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction, the missiles that serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials proliferating among terrorists and countries of concern. Accordingly, non-proliferation efforts for controlling this situation and strictly regulating exports have become an pressing challenge to maintain the peace and stability of today's international community.

Moreover, from a humanitarian perspective, there is growing international public opinion that certain conventional weapons should also be regulated. For this reason, dealing with the issue of regulating those weapons while taking into account the need to maintain the balance with defensive requirements has become an important challenge for each country.

One of the efforts to deal with these issues is the development

of a framework for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, based on cooperation between countries. (See Fig. III-3-6-1)

In light of the above, Japan has been playing an active role in efforts to create a world without nuclear weapons by taking realistic and progressive measures on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as in international endeavors for disarmament and non-proliferation relating to other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that serve as their delivery systems, not to mention in the problem of regulating certain conventional weapons.

This section explains the commitments taken by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, in regard to efforts of international organizations, including the United Nations.

Fig. III-3-6-1

Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials

Category	Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Nuclear Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Systems (Missiles)	
Conventions, etc. on Arms control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) Convention on Cluster Munitions United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Nonproliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540				

1

Efforts on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.

1 Nuclear Weapons

From the perspective of strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks, Japan has been making continuous efforts aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the reinforcement of

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Moreover, Japan is actively participating in meetings examining better ways to operate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in discussions held in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

See Reference 59

2 Biological / Chemical Weapons

(1) Efforts on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), etc.

In 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces started to dispatch experts in the field of chemical protection to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. They made contributions toward drafting the convention as a member of the Japanese delegation. Moreover, since 1997 when the convention came into effect, Japan has dispatched GSDF experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in the Hague of the Netherlands, in order to implement the verification measures stipulated in the convention following its entry into force. Currently a Ground Self-Defense Force officer is serving there.

See References 60, 61

Small quantities of chemical substances subject to regulation under the convention are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. So the chemical school has undergone a total of eight inspections since its establishment, in accordance with the convention regulations.

Moreover, the whole government is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, according to the CWC. The existence of abandoned chemical weapons has been confirmed over a wide area, from Heilongjiang Province in the north of China to Guangdong Province in the south; it is estimated that approximately 300,000 - 400,000 tons of chemical weapons abandoned by the former Japanese Army are still buried at Haerbaling District, in the city of Dunhua, Jilin Province. The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces have seconded seven personnel, including Ground Self-Defense Force officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of disposing of the abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC. Since 2000, Ground Self-Defense Force specialists in chemicals and ammunition have been dispatched to the relevant sites for excavation and recovery projects on a total of 11 occasions. In 2011, from August to September, seven Self-Defense Force officers participated in an excavation and recovery project conducted by the Cabinet Office in the Lianhuapao district, Dunhua, Jilin



Members of the Ground Self-Defense Force excavating and studying abandoned chemical weapons in Jilin Province, China

Province, China, providing the Chinese workers with guidance concerning such matters as the identification of shells, checking whether or not pollution had occurred, and managing the safety of workers.

(2) Efforts on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

With regard to the Biological Weapons and Convention (BWC), The Ministry of Defense has sent medical officers and instructors who are experts in pharmaceutical and medical science to relevant meetings to work in cooperation to strengthen BWC.

(3) Efforts on the Australia Group (AG)

Since 1994, the Ministry of Defense has dispatched personnel to these meetings each year and cooperates in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of AG regulations and agreements.

3 Delivery Systems (Missiles)

Since 1992, the Ministry of Defense has dispatched personnel to the meetings of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) each year and cooperates in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of MTCR regulations and agreements.

See Reference 62

2 Efforts on Treaties Relating to Arms Control of Certain Conventional Weapons

1 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

The CCW is a convention that prohibits or restricts the use of conventional weapons such as land mines, booby traps, incendiary weapons and laser weapons that are considered to

be excessively injurious or whose effects are indiscriminate; as well as the framework convention stipulating procedural matters, it consists of five additional protocols, each focused on a different type of weapon. Japan has adopted Protocols I-IV.

Regarding the CCW, discussions continued to deal with

problems associated with unexploded ordnance, particularly cluster munitions (ammunition containing multiple sub-munitions in themselves), and at the Meeting of the CCW States Parties in November 2007, it was decided to conduct negotiations aimed at swiftly addressing humanitarian concerns regarding cluster munitions. However, discussions ended at the meeting in November 2011, without reaching an agreement.

With regard to the problem of cluster munitions regulations, as well as efforts for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Japan believes that it is important to formulate an effective protocol regarding cluster munitions within the CCW framework, in which countries that are major producers and owners of cluster munitions - including the United States, China and Russia - participate; accordingly, in the future, Japan will continue to actively contribute to negotiations once a decision on renegotiation has been made.

2 Convention on Cluster Munitions

Outside the CCW framework, as a result of negotiations in 2008 at a series of international conferences (Oslo Process)¹ with the objective of formulating an international agreement prescribing the prohibition of cluster munitions, the Convention on Cluster Munitions² was adopted by 107 participating countries, including Japan, in May 2008. In December the same year, 94 countries including Japan signed the convention in Oslo, and Japan submitted the acceptance of the convention in July 2009.

In February 2010, the 30th instrument of ratification, etc. required to make the convention effective was deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General and the convention entered into force on August 1 that year. As a result, the use, etc. of all Cluster Munitions in the possession of the Self-Defense Forces was immediately prohibited. Meanwhile, however, countries such as the United States, China and Russia, which are major producers and owners of cluster munitions, have not yet signed the convention.

At present, in order to ensure the security of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are introducing precision-guided equipment to immediately supplement some of the functions of cluster munitions.

Moreover, it is prescribed that all cluster munitions held by signatories be destroyed within eight years after the convention

enters into force, in principle. Therefore we are safely and steadily disposing of the stockpiles.

3 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)

International interest in the problem of anti-personnel mines began to increase from 1999. In 1999, the Ottawa Treaty entered into force and the number of signatories of the treaty has currently reached 156.

By February 2003, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces had disposed of all anti-personnel mines, apart from the minimum exceptional stocks necessary for technological development and training in the detection and removal of land mines, as permitted under the treaty.

At the same time, in order to ensure the security of Japan, the Ministry is developing an anti-personnel obstacle system that includes directional fragmentation charges³ as an alternative that does not constitute anti-personnel mines banned under the treaty and which does not pose any risk of harming civilians.

Moreover, only 13 out of the 26 countries participating in the ARF have concluded the treaty, so the Ministry of Defense takes every opportunity to lobby those ARF participants who have not yet concluded the treaty, to conclude it.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense actively cooperates in efforts of the international community, focused on the problem of anti-personnel mines, such as submitting annual reports including the data on Japan's exceptional stocks to the United Nations⁴.

See Reference 63

4 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

As well as registering the number of items of imported equipment each year to the United Nations, the Ministry of Defense voluntarily provides information concerning its military holdings, the domestic procurement and small arms and light weapons procured through domestic production.

Moreover, the Ministry dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings held in order to improve and strengthen this system.

¹ As well as Norway, this process was initiated by the sponsor countries (such as Peru, Austria, New Zealand and Ireland) and NGOs, and many developing countries in Central and South America and Africa are also participants in the process

² See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/shomei_37.pdf>

³ Explosives used in anti-infantry combat to obstruct the approach of enemy infantry. In order to ensure that civilians are not harmed indiscriminately, soldiers activate these visually recognizing a target, and they are not designed to explode due to the presence of, approach by or contact with a person.

⁴ Between 1999 and December 2006, the Ministry of Defense nominated retired Self-Defense Officials to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to support anti-personnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these retired Self-Defense Force members were dispatched to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA's long-term expert dispatch framework.

5 United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures

The United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures was established in 1980 with the objective of increasing transparency in regard to military expenditure and reducing the amount of such expenditure. There were three reporting categories: “Personnel, Operation and Maintenance”, “Procurement and Construction”, and “Research and Development”; the Ministry of Defense submitted its first report in 1982 and has been reporting annually since 1997.

On the other hand, rather than being a means of reducing military expenditure, this system has resulted in a heightened awareness of its effectiveness, as a means of increasing transparency, so in November 2010, for the first time since the

system was established, a meeting of governmental experts was held concerning this instrument and discussions took place regarding the revision of the instrument. In order to ensure the effectiveness of this system as an international confidence-building measure, it is important to increase the number of participating countries and improving the quality of the information provided, so, following deliberations at a number of meetings, recommendations for the revision of the report forms, etc. were drawn up at the third meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts, which took place in May 2011; as a result, from 2012, the forms were changed to incorporate four categories: Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement and Construction, and Research and Development⁵.

3 International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.

1 Security initiatives focused on proliferation

(1) The Background to Formation

In December 2002, the USA, which had grave concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles by countries of particular concern in regard to proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, announced its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which advocated

a comprehensive approach focused on three main pillars: nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and management of the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

As part of this, in May 2003, the U.S. announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)¹; as a result of the U.S. seeking the participation of other countries, it has become an international initiative supported by approximately 100 countries, including Japan, as of June 2012.

Under this initiative, 37 PSI interdiction exercises have been held as of the end of June 2012, in order to improve the ability of participating countries to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.; the initiative also encompasses meetings held to consider various issues relating to policy and legislation.

(2) Initiatives to Date by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces

The Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces believe that it is necessary to collaborate with relevant organizations and countries and utilize the abilities of the Self-Defense Forces in order to participate in PSI. Accordingly, since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), as well as dispatching Ministry of Defense staff, including Uniforms, to the various meetings, the Ministry has also dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas and sought to gather



Maritime Self-Defense Force troops preparing for a drill to practice vessel boarding inspections

² - ⁵ As a result of this revision, problems with the Standardized Reporting Form and the Simplified Reporting Form - particularly the fact that disparities emerged in the total amount of expenditure due to a lack of consistency between these two forms - were improved. And also, reporting categories that were difficult to complete due to the various circumstances of each country were rethought, making the forms more user-friendly. As a result, it is anticipated that the quality of the reported content and the number of participating countries will increase.

³ - ¹ The Proliferation Security Initiative is an initiative that seeks the strengthening of relevant domestic laws by each country, as far as possible, as well as considering the measures that participating countries can take jointly while complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, etc.

relevant information, and since 2004, Japan has continuously participated in these exercises.

To date, Japan has held PSI maritime interdiction exercises twice with the collaboration of relevant organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard. In addition, Japan will hold PSI air interdiction exercise for the first time in July 2012. In light of the cases of proliferation in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense sees PSI as a security question that encompasses a broad range of issues, including defense, diplomacy, law enforcement and export controls, so we believe that it is necessary to strive constantly to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. Accordingly, the Ministry will continue to devote its energies to activities aimed at strengthening nonproliferation frameworks, including PSI, as well as participating in and holding various meetings and exercises, with the objective of improving the ability of the Self-Defense Forces to deal with such matters. (See Fig. III-3-6-2)

2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, based on Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council unanimously

adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, concerning appropriate, effective action to deal with the threat posed to the peace and safety of the international community by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery; the content of the resolution included the following:

- (1) That States should refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, etc. weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- (2) That States should adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit the manufacture, etc. of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular; and
- (3) That States should establish border controls and export control measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

In light of the risk posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. to the peace and stability of the international community, including ourselves, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, based on the awareness that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc. amongst non-State actors such as terrorists is a pressing issue for the international community, and hopes that all United Nations member countries will comply with this resolution.

Fig. III-3-6-2

Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Training (Since 2009)

Date	Training	Location	Participation of MOD/SDF
Oct 2009	PSI maritime interdiction training hosted by Singapore	Singapore	1 destroyer and 2 patrol planes (P-3C)
Sep 2010	PSI air interdiction training hosted by Australia	Australia	Dispatch of observers
Oct 2010	PSI maritime interdiction training hosted by ROK	Republic of Korea	2 destroyers