

Section  
2

## For the Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance

Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. III-2-2-1)

This section explains efforts for the deeper and broader Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the background to and the development of defense cooperation between the two countries.

## 1 Historical Background

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996, reaffirming the importance

of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting held the following year (1997), as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved,

Fig. III-2-2-1 Changes in Areas of Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

○ From the Cold War era, to the post-Cold War era, to the post-9/11 world, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has expanded in terms of the scope of defense cooperation in response to the changing environment. (Focused on the defense of Japan ⇒ Response to events in surrounding areas ⇒ Improvement in international security environment)

Cold War era (Previous “Guideline”(1978))	Post-Cold War era (Current “Guideline”(1997))	Post-9.11.era (“2+2” document (2005, 2007, 2011))
<p>[Posture for Deterring Aggression]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Japan: Possess defense capability, assure utilization of facilities and areas by U.S. Forces.</li> <li>○ U.S.: Maintain nuclear deterrent capability, forward deployments of combat-ready forces capable of reinforcing them.</li> <li>○ Conduct studies on joint defense planning for the defense of Japan. [Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</li> <li>○ SDF: Repel limited, small-scale aggression. Primarily conduct defensive operations.</li> <li>○ U.S. Forces: Support SDF. Conduct operations (strike power, etc.) to complement functions of SDF. [Cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East]</li> <li>○ Consult when required.</li> <li>○ Conduct studies on facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>	<p>[Cooperation under normal circumstances]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Japan and U.S. maintain required defense posture.</li> <li>○ Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities.</li> <li>• Security dialogues, armed control and disarmament, PKO, etc.</li> <li>○ Bilateral defense planning, mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan, establishment of coordination mechanism, etc. [Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan]</li> <li>○ Remain a core of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.</li> <li>○ Response to guerrilla-commando type attacks (SDF: Have primary responsibility for repel operations. U.S. Forces: Provide appropriate support.) Response to ballistic missile attack (SDF/U.S. Forces: Cooperate, coordinate. U.S. Forces: Provide intelligence, use strike power.) [Cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan]</li> <li>○ Activities initiated by either government.</li> <li>• relief activities, search and rescue, etc.</li> <li>○ Japan’s support for U.S. Forces activities</li> <li>• Use of facilities, rear area support</li> <li>○ Japan-U.S. operational cooperation</li> <li>• SDF: Surveillance, minesweeping</li> <li>• U.S. Forces: Opera</li> </ul>	<p>«2005» Examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas. [Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Confirmed important concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. [Improvement of the international security environment]</li> <li>○ Bilateral defense cooperation in improving the international security environment remains vital to the alliance.</li> <li>○ Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and benefit from Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises can improve these capabilities.</li> <li>○ Strengthen cooperation with other partners. «2007» Highlighted the following roles, missions, and capabilities.</li> <li>○ Redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peace keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan.</li> <li>○ Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group.</li> <li>○ Strengthening BMD and operational capability, enhancing BMD system capability, etc. «2011» Deepen and broaden following security and defense cooperation.</li> <li>○ Expand joint training and exercises. Study further joint and shared use of facilities. Expand cooperation in ISR activities, etc.</li> <li>○ Transfer of SM-3 Block II to third parties.</li> <li>○ Establishment of a bilateral extended deterrence dialogue on a regular basis.</li> <li>○ Space ○ Cyber ○ Trilateral/multilateral cooperation</li> <li>○ Cooperation on HA/DR, peacekeeping, reconstruction, counterterrorism, maritime security, counter-piracy, etc.</li> <li>○ Cooperation on environmental challenges</li> <li>○ Enhancement of CBRN Defense Working Group</li> </ul>


revising the previous Guidelines, which had been formulated in 1978<sup>1</sup>.

Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan and the United States have enhanced consultations related to security. Through these Japan-U.S. consultations, as shown in Figure III-2-2-2, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the

examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage). Their contents were confirmed at the “2+2” meeting in May 2007, and were supplemented at the “2+2” meeting in May 2010. Figure III-2-2-3 provides an outline of the realignment of U.S. forces set forth in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, which was formulated in May 2006 in the process of these discussions.

See References 37-43

Fig. III-2-2-2 Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations



<sup>1</sup> Previous Guidelines formulated in 1978. They prescribed the approach to Japan-U.S. cooperation, in order to effectively achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Fig. III-2-2-3

The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF Shown in "United States–Japan Roadmap" for Realignment Implementation

## 1. Realignment in Kanto Area

## [Yokota]

- Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- Return of portions of airspace, and collocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
- Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the United States)

## [Sagami General Depot (SGD)]


- Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (a mission command training center and support facilities)
- Release of a portion of land in front of JR Sagami-hara Station (approximately 15ha)
- Release of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2ha)
- Joint use of a specific area (approximately 35ha) of open space in the western side of SGD)

## [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]

- Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units

## [Camp Zama]

- Transformation of headquarters U.S. Army, Japan
- Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force
- Release of portions (1.1ha) of housing area and others
- Joint use of heliport



## 2. Realignment in Okinawa

## [Shared Use]

- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
- JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

## [Land Returns]

- The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base
- A detailed consolidation plan is being developed

Army POL Depot Kuwae  
Tank Farm No.1  
(total return, approximately 16ha)

Makimato Service Area  
(Camp Kinser)  
(total return, approximately 274ha)

Naha Port (total return, approximately 56ha)  
A replacement facility will be constructed in the Naha Port and Harbor Plan Urasoe-Pier district

Legend: Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base


(Land area as of January 1, 2012)

Camp Kuwae (Lester)  
(total return, approximately 68ha)

Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)  
(partial return, some of approximately 596ha)  
\* Completed return of Awase Golf Course (approximately 47ha) on July 31, 2010.

MCAS Futenma (total return, [Shared Use] approximately 481ha)

1. Base facility for helicopters—The Futenma Replacement Facility will be constructed in the area from Oura Bay to south coast of Camp Schwab
2. Base facility for aerial refueling tankers—Relocation to Iwakuni (deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam)
3. Base function for contingency use—Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases and others



[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approximately 8,000 personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam (The affected units will relocate from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makimato Service Area.)

### 3. Relocation of Aircraft

Relocate U.S. aircraft (Kadena, Misawa, Iwakuni) to such SDF facilities as Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, or Guam.  
Relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011.

Deployment of X-Band Transportable Radar for BMD (AN/TPY-2: so-called "X-Band Radar System")



Relocation of Carrier Air Wing (F/A-18x49, EA-6Bx4, E-2Cx4, C-2x2: total 59 aircraft) to Iwakuni



Relocation of KC-130 (12 aircraft) to Iwakuni



Notes: Portion of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni

Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Tsuiki  
Nyutabaru

Relocation of CH-53D (8 aircraft) to Guam



Relocation of JMSDF E/O/UP-3, U-36A (17 aircraft) to Atsugi



KC-130 (12 aircraft) will deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Mariana Islands

Saipan

Guam

In parallel with such bilateral political discussions, the two countries enhanced their cooperative relations in various aspects, including operations, and services in response to specific issues. For instance, as part of the cooperation under peace time stipulated in the aforementioned Guidelines, as well as working together on studies of bilateral operation plans to respond to armed attacks against Japan, and carrying out joint training, such as joint Japan-U.S. field exercises based on those studies, Japan also participates in trilateral training exercises with the armed forces of the U.S. and Australia, and in multilateral exercises such as Cobra Gold. As a result, the cooperative arrangements between Japan and the U.S. have made significant progress in a variety of fields. In recent years U.S. forces stationed in Japan have also participated in emergency drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the U.S. forces carried out relief activities as part of “Operation Tomodachi” in cooperation with the SDF, putting into practice the capacities acquired through joint Japan-U.S. training.

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, efforts are being made to improve the joint response capabilities, such as the sharing of operational information and guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the U.S. closely cooperated and coordinated their responses to the missile launch carried out by North Korea in April 2009 and its launch of what was purported to be an “artificial satellite” in 2012 and the two sides are also promoting the joint development of new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA).



GSDF members coordinating with a U.S. Marine in the field training. Interoperability is improving through joint training. (California, U.S.A.; January 2012)

Concerning efforts to improve the international security environment, through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, international disaster relief activities and international peace-keeping operations in Haiti, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Japan is conducting activities in close cooperation with the U.S. Moreover, Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.

The importance of such cooperative relations between Japan and the U.S. is increasing in the context of Japan's efforts for achieving stabilization in the Asia-Pacific region and for improving the global security environment.

## 2 Bilateral Agreement for a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance

The cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, which has borne numerous results thus far, as noted above, marked the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 2010.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on November 13, 2009<sup>1</sup>, as part of efforts to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Hatoyama agreed to start dialogue processes to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance (processes for deepening the alliance) as the countries welcomed the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. (On January 19, 2010, the actual day of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the remarks and statements

by the Japanese and U.S. leaders were published, and a joint statement on the “2+2” meeting was released).

Thus, Japan and the United States have sought to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan-U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future, so as to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance even more unshakable. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting<sup>2</sup> held on November 13, 2010, the two countries expressed their desire to deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. Alliance with three pillars at its center: security, economy and cultural and people-to-people exchanges; at the Cabinet level as well, repeated commitments have been made to the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, such as in the

<sup>1</sup> See <[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president\\_0911/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_0911/index.html)>

<sup>2</sup> See <[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president\\_1011/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_1011/index.html)>



“2+2” joint statement on May 28, 2010 and at the talks between the Defense Ministers of the two countries held on January 13, 2011, and concrete bilateral discussions have taken place at the working level, based on ministerial instructions.

See References 42, 43

## 1 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” Meeting (June 21, 2011)

As a result of bilateral discussions on the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance carried out on various levels under the aforementioned political leadership, on June 21, 2011, in Washington D.C., the first “2+2” meeting was held since the previous one four years earlier, in 2007, and the two sides confirmed the achievements of the process of deliberations in terms of security and defense cooperation.

- 1) The “2+2” Joint Statement revised and reaffirmed the common strategic objectives stipulated in the 2005 and 2007 “2+2” Joint Statements, based on an assessment of the changing security environment, including deterring provocation by North Korea, encouraging China to play a responsible and constructive role and improve openness and transparency with respect to China’s military modernization and activities, strengthening trilateral security and defense cooperation with both Australia and South Korea discouraging the pursuit and acquisition of military capabilities that could destabilize the regional security environment, maintenance of maritime security including ensuring the Freedom of Navigation and maintaining Japan-U.S. cooperation with respect to the protection of and access to space and cyberspace.
- 2) As to a deeper and broader Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, the Joint Statement refers to a wide range of matters as follows:
  - Expanding joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities, and promoting cooperation in areas such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities
  - Designating consultative bodies and standards that could facilitate permission of the transfer of SM-3 Block IIA to third-party countries
  - Deepening bilateral space security partnerships and welcoming the establishment of bilateral strategic policy dialogue on cybersecurity issues
  - Further cooperation in international operations, including disaster relief, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and anti-terrorism
  - Emphasizing the importance of further improving information security systems
  - Continuously examining and enhancing bilateral frameworks in order to make operational cooperation more effective, more tailored to the emerging security challenges, and more responsive to various situations

3) Furthermore, as to the realignment of U.S. forces, the joint statement reaffirmed the commitment to completing the verification and confirmation of the location, configuration, and construction method for the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station and to transferring the Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam. The Ministers supplemented the statements in the 2006 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, revising the previous target date for the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the relocation of and confirming their commitment to completing these projects at the earliest possible date after 2014.

4) In conjunction with this, in the Joint Statement, as well as agreeing to seek the strengthening of U.S. and Japanese abilities to deal with a diverse range of situations, in light of the collaboration between the SDF and the U.S. military in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident, both sides confirmed the agreement concerning Host Nation Support.

See Reference 44

## 2 Japan - U.S. Defense Ministers Conference

Following the “2+2” meeting in June 2011, the Ministry of Defense continued to undertake working-level discussions with bodies including the U.S. Department of Defense, with the aim of implementing the content of the Joint Statement published as a result of “2+2”. On October 25, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited Japan and held talks with Minister of Defense Yasuo Ichikawa at the Ministry. They exchanged opinions on a broad range of subjects relating to security and defense cooperation between the two countries, as well as USFJ realignment.

During the talks, Minister Ichikawa first expressed gratitude for the cooperation provided by the U.S. in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. He then stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is an essential cornerstone for the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the entire Asia-Pacific region, and that the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Alliance plays an important role in effectively dealing with many challenging security issues around the world. Secretary Panetta stated that, despite the harsh situation surrounding his country's defense spending, the U.S. would maintain and further strengthen its presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

With regard to security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., in light of the increasingly uncertain security environment, due to such matters as the expansion of military activity in the region, Minister Ichikawa and Secretary Panetta were unanimous in their agreement that, as well as exchanging opinions concerning cooperation regarding such matters as information security, space, cyberspace and BMD,

Japan and the U.S. should revitalize the activities of military units and demonstrate the presence and capabilities of both countries. The two ministers affirmed that dynamic defense cooperation should be promoted between the two countries, by such means as conducting timely, effective joint training and joint surveillance, and encouraging the joint use of facilities in both countries, in order to increase the options for bases for these activities.

With regard to USFJ realignment, Minister Ichikawa and Secretary Panetta were in accord that the risks posed by MCAS Futenma should be eliminated promptly, while securing the

understanding of Okinawa, and that the relocation and return of the air station should be carried out as soon as possible, based on the Japan-U.S. Agreement. Moreover, with regard to the relocation to Guam of Marines stationed in Okinawa, Minister Ichikawa requested that the U.S. secure the requisite budget and cooperate in ensuring that the various tasks involved in relocation are carried out swiftly and without interruption. In response to this, Secretary Panetta stated that it is vital to ensure solid progress towards completing the FRF, in order to move forward with the Guam relocation project, and that he wanted both countries to cooperate with each other to this end.

## 3 Discussions Concerning the Coordination of USFJ Realignment

### 1 Background of Bilateral Discussions

As to the USFJ realignment, while carrying out tasks such as sending the environmental impact assessment statement concerning the FRF to the Okinawa Prefectural Government from the end of 2011 to the beginning of 2012, Japan continued to hold discussions with the U.S. at various levels. These included exchanges of opinions concerning the relocation of MCAS Futenma and relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam between Secretary Panetta and Minister Tanaka, who was appointed to the position on January 16, 2012. Following these discussions, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. decided to conduct full-scale bilateral discussions concerning the plan for USFJ realignment, in light of factors including the following:

- 1) The necessity of implementing measures promptly and steadily alleviating the visible burden on Okinawa;
- 2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package, placing a greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. defense strategic guidance released in January 2012; and
- 3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of U.S. to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Senate.

Accordingly, a joint press release was issued on February 8, 2012, stating that formal discussions had commenced about separating the issue of the relocation to Guam of Marines stationed in Okinawa and the return of land south of Kadena from the issue of the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and indicating the direction of discussions concerning such matters as the review of the composition of the Marine Corps units to be relocated to Guam and the number of personnel involved.

Subsequently, as well as exchanging opinions with Defense Secretary Panetta and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, Defense Minister Tanaka tirelessly took various opportunities to hold discussions, including holding successive rounds of

talks at the deputy assistant secretary level. As a result, the Governments of Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. military, and the "2+2" Joint Statement was released on April 27, 2012.

### 2 The "2+2" Joint Statement

This recent "2+2" Joint Statement stated that, in light of important progress made in regard to the plan for USFJ realignment since the "2+2" Joint Statement in June 2011 and the increasingly uncertain security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, it had been decided to adjust the plans outlined in the 2006 Roadmap.

Factors behind the adjustment of the realignment plan include, first, the fact that the U.S. is undertaking a review of the composition of the Marine Corps in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture, in light of the recent changes in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. This is so that the U.S., which emphasizes the Asia-Pacific region, can adopt a posture that enables it to deal with large-scale situations in Northeast Asia, in order to secure a stable presence in the region, as well as seeking to make efficient preparations that will enable the U.S. to deal effectively with a diverse range of situations across the region. The Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, such as headquarters, with ground, aviation and logistic support elements remaining in Okinawa, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units in line with the basic approach detailed above. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) - consisting of headquarters, ground, aviation and logistic support elements - in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a

rotational force, in order to continue to ensure the presence of the U.S. forces in Okinawa, while securing a geographically distributed unit posture. Through this, preparations will be made that enable the U.S. military to respond more flexibly and promptly to a diverse range of situations in the Asia-Pacific region, by creating an agile posture in which each MAGTF unit has a high level of readiness and collaborates with each other, while increasing the vertical depth of unit deployment.

The recent Joint Statement makes specific adjustments to the realignment plan based on this new unit composition, balancing the maintenance of the deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Alliance with a reduction of the burden on Okinawa; an outline of the statement is provided below.

#### ① Preamble

- (1) The Ministers decided to adjust the plan set forth in the May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment.
- (2) The Ministers decided to delink the progress in regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility from the question of the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and the return of land south of Kadena that would arise as a result.
- (3) The Ministers confirmed that the overall deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be reinforced by strengthening Japan's defense posture and promoting dynamic defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S., as well as through the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps.

#### ② The Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa (at capacity)

- (1) As well as stationing Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam and Hawaii, a rotational presence will be established in Australia.
- (2) Approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.
- (3) The final Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap.
- (4) The number of Marine Corps personnel in Guam will be approximately 5,000.
- (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of the Marine Corps to Guam is \$8.6 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars). Japan's financial commitment will consist of direct cash contribution up to the amount of \$2.8 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. Other forms of financial support such as loans or equity investment will not be

utilized. Even if Japan makes a contribution through cooperation with Item ③ (2) below, it shall be included in this commitment.

#### ③ New initiatives aimed at promoting regional peace, stability and prosperity

- (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese Government will take various measures, including the strategic use of ODA (e.g. provision of patrol boats to coastal states).
- (2) The Governments of Japan and the U.S. will consider cooperation aimed at developing training grounds in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for joint use by Japanese and U.S. forces, and will identify fields for cooperation by the end of 2012.

#### ④ The land returns in Okinawa

- (1) 1. Areas that can be returned quickly after completing procedures:  
Part of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), part of the Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (north access road, area near Gate 5)
2. Areas that can be returned after relocation within the prefecture:  
Part of the Makiminato Service Area (the majority of the storage area), part of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1
3. Areas that can be returned after relocation of the Marine Corps overseas:  
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area
- (2) A consolidation plan concerning the facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa will be compiled jointly by Japan and the U.S. by the end of 2012.

#### ⑤ Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

- (1) The Ministers reaffirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.
- (2) Japan and the U.S. will both contribute to any refurbishment projects required at MCAS Futenma in order to protect the environment and ensure that the air station can be run safely until the FRF is fully operational.

**See** Reference 45



## 4 Dynamic Defense Cooperation

As stated above, consultations between Japan and the U.S. aimed at deepening and widening the Japan-U.S. Alliance include discussions concerning "dynamic defense cooperation" between the two countries as efforts to respond to the changing security environment. Translating this concept into reality is a key challenge in advancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

In the regions surrounding Japan, many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. In addition, it is increasingly important for nations with shared interests to cooperate with each other on security issues in peacetime. Considering these trends in the current security environment, the 2010 NDPG states that Japan will develop "dynamic defense force," which focuses on operational use of defense force, instead of basing its defense on the traditional "basic defense force concept," which places an emphasis on the existence of defense force.

Based on this concept of dynamic defense force, the Ministry of Defense and SDF are supposed to put its defense force into operation with an emphasis on conducting regular activities such as intelligence gathering and surveillance in peacetime constantly, continuously, and strategically, responding to emergencies in Japan and overseas promptly and seamlessly, and promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific region and other ones in a multilayered manner.

It is important to apply this concept of dynamic defense force to defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. and realize Japan-U.S. "dynamic defense cooperation," which will ensure effective deterrence and responses and stabilize the security environment in the Asia Pacific region. This dynamic defense cooperation includes reacting to various situations not responsively but proactively, conducting prompt and seamless cooperation from peacetime through to contingencies, demonstrating intentions and capabilities and strengthening deterrence and presence of the two countries by enhancing activities of units of the SDF and U.S. forces in peacetime, and advancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in a multilayered manner through trilateral defense cooperation with such countries as South Korea and Australia and Japan-U.S. cooperation within multilateral frameworks.

Based on this approach, Japan and the U.S. agreed in the "2+2" Joint Statement issued in June of 2011 to expand joint training and exercises, study further joint and shared use of facilities, and promote cooperation in areas such as expanding information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. Moreover, in the Defense Ministers' meeting held in October of 2011, the two countries agreed to promote dynamic defense cooperation, which aims to enhance activities of units of the SDF and U.S. forces and demonstrate the presence and capabilities of both countries, by conducting timely and effective bilateral training and joint ISR

activities and advancing joint and shared use of facilities in both countries to increase the number of options for bases used for these activities.

Furthermore, in the "2+2" Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012, the two countries noted that bilateral dynamic defense cooperation would strengthen deterrence and expressed their intention to explore new efforts to promote bilateral dynamic defense cooperation in the region. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on May 1, 2012, this "2+2" Joint Statement was highly appreciated as an important step toward the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, both leaders agreed that dynamic defense cooperation opened the way for new Alliance initiatives to enhance operational cooperation between the two countries and that they would steadily implement it.

Thus, the two governments are considering the expansion of joint training, joint ISR activities, and joint and shared use of facilities in both countries as bases for these activities as specific measures to promote dynamic defense cooperation.

Expanding joint training increases cooperative activities in peacetime, thereby improving readiness and operational capability of units as well as interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. Moreover, conducting joint training at an effective time and venue and on an effective scale demonstrates common intentions and unified capabilities between Japan and the U.S., thereby functioning as a deterrent.

Similarly, expanding joint ISR activities do not only ensure that the two countries gain information superiority over other countries but also function as a deterrent. Expanding joint and shared use of facilities increases bases for the SDF's activities such as maneuver areas, harbors, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as surveillance. Furthermore, it is also expected that advancing shared use of USFJ facilities and areas by the SDF will lead to a reduced burden on local communities.

In this way, synergy effect created by joint use of facilities, bilateral training, and joint ISR activities can further strengthen and improve operational capabilities of the SDF and U.S. forces, including efficiency, interoperability, readiness, mobility, and sustainability.

Both Japan and the U.S. are continuing to examine specific measures to promote dynamic defense cooperation while taking into consideration such factors as responses to the changing security environment, the strategic importance of Guam, defense of Japan's southwestern islands, and reduction of the burden on local communities hosting the U.S. forces. In particular, the two governments are to identify specific areas of cooperation by the end of 2012 concerning development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.