Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute one of the pillars of Japan’s national defense. And the Japan–U.S. Alliance, having the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, is indispensable to maintain not only the peace and security of Japan, but also that of the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on the alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effectively dealing with numerous and complex global security issues. Furthermore, the Japan–U.S. Alliance is playing an increasingly important role in promoting the shared fundamental values in the international community such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy. Under the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan is further deepening and developing the Japan–U.S. Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment. (See Fig. III-2-0-1)

The military presence of the U.S. forces in Japan not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence against and response to contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. On the other hand, the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan impacts upon the living environment of local residents, and efforts corresponding to the situation on the ground must be made to reduce the burden on regions such as Okinawa.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, which holds great significance to the security of Japan, Section 1 of this chapter explains the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its basic framework and provides an overview of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Section 2 focuses on the deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and explains its historical background and the Japan-U.S. agreement and discussions concerning the coordination of the plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan, aimed at deepening and widening the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the future. Finally, Section 3 describes the relocation of the Futenma Air Station as well as measures pertaining to the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
Section 1

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

This section presents an overview of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, such as the significance of the Arrangements for Japan’s security, the basic framework that supports the Arrangements, and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, as well as the framework relating to this.

1 The Significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security

In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by the military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. In today’s globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate for our country and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military superpower, the United States, with which it shares the aforementioned basic values as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, as well as providing facilities and areas for the U.S. military, based on Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 of that treaty stipulates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks.

Japan intends to continue to effectively utilize the deterrence power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan’s peace and safety.

2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty states for the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. forces within Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

Large-scale military forces, including nuclear forces, still exist in the areas surrounding Japan, and many countries are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. In addition, there remain unclear and uncertain elements in the region, such as disputes over territories and the maritime domain, and issues over the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. In such a security environment, the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by unclear and indeterminate regional factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations of the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States commitment to the peace and security of the region. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances...
established between the U.S. and other countries in the region such as South Korea and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an essential role in maintaining the peace and security of the region.

### Improvement of the International Security Environment

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in the defense but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic, and social aspects. The cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multilateral security dialogue and cooperation and cooperation in various activities of the United Nations.

Current security issues in the international community include responses to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace. It is extremely difficult for any single country to tackle such global security challenges alone, and it is important for countries with common interests to work together regularly. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such issues faced by the international community.

In particular, under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and U.S. forces, and is resulting in the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to that of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

### Basic Framework Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

#### Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (‘‘2+2’’ meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC).

(See Fig. III-2-1-1)

#### Fig. III–2–1–1 Major Fora for Japan–U.S. Security Consultations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting)</strong></td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</strong></td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of view on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)</strong></td>
<td>(1) Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff; (2) Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976 as a sub-committee under the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the on June 28, 1996 Japan–U.S. vice-ministerial consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan–U.S. Joint Committee</strong></td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XXIV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. (See Fig. III-2-1-2)

In the table below, the outline and results of various Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2009) are summarized:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Consultation/Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Outline and Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-May-09</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Hamada and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Confirmed the necessity of continuing consultations at a high level with regard to a number of issues involving the U.S. and Japan, including response to North Korea; the commitment of the U.S. to the defense of Japan; continuous progress in the realignment of the U.S. Forces; continuing Japan–U.S. dialogue regarding the QDR and the National Defense Program Guidelines; Exchanged views on assistance to Afghanistan/Pakistan, counter-piracy measures, F-X, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-May-09</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Hamada and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would continue to discuss response to North Korea including diplomatic efforts, strengthened extended deterrence, and MD; Exchanged views on the U.S. forces realignment and F-X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Oct-09</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Minister Kitazawa stated his desire to move forward with specific items of cooperation for the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty while confirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance; Exchanged views on regional posture, the U.S. forces realignment, and HNS; Agreed to strengthen cooperation in MD and information security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-May-10</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Agreed that both countries would continue to work closely to find a solution regarding the issue of the relocation of MCAS Futenma; Regarding the sinking incident of the ROK vessel, Minister Kitazawa announced that Japan also denounces North Korea and intends to work closely with international society including the U.S. and ROK; Regarding the recent activities of Chinese vessels, Minister Kitazawa explained his desire for wide ranging Japan–U.S. cooperation under the given conditions, and concurred with Secretary Gates on the importance of such cooperation; Agreed on steady cooperation across a wide range of areas for the Japan–U.S. Alliance. Also agreed to strengthen ties between the defense ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Jan-11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Reaffirmed the importance of Japan–U.S.–ROK cooperation; Concurred on accelerating discussions for deepening the Japan–U.S. Alliance so that the two countries can show their joint vision for the Japan–U.S. Alliance in the 21st century in the field of security; Reaffirmed their commitment to implement the May 2010 Japan–U.S. agreement on the relocation of the MCAS Futenma; Confirmed the progress of work undertaken to add Guam as one of the relocation sites for aircraft training; Exchanged opinions on HNS and BMD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Jun-11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates</td>
<td>Expressed gratitude to the U.S. for its assistance in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, and confirmed that Japan–U.S. joint training, etc. over the long time have led to a closer collaboration; Exchanged opinions on transfer of SM-3 block II A to a third country by the U.S. and relocation of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Jun-11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting/Washington D.C.</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto and Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton</td>
<td>Revalidated and updated the Common Strategic Objectives in 2005 and 2007; Agreed to deepen and expand Alliance security and defense cooperation; Determined that the Futenma Replacement Facility is to have two runways aligned in a “V”-plan, noting that completion of the FRF and the marine relocation will not meet the previously targeted date of 2014 while confirming the commitment to complete those projects at the earliest possible date after 2014; Agreed on enhancing capabilities to respond to a wide variety of contingencies in the future, based on the Japan–U.S. joint responses on the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Oct-11</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Ichikawa and Secretary of Defense Panetta</td>
<td>Agreed on energetically promoting Japan-U.S. Dynamic Defense Cooperation; Agreed to advance the relocation and the return of MCAS Futenma as quickly as possible; Exchanged opinions on cooperation in space and cyberpace etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Chiefs of Staff of SDFs, and other MOD officials have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan–U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively engaging in these efforts.

2 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure Their Effectiveness

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fill in case of an armed attack on Japan or other situation in advance in order to respond rapidly in that event. There is a framework pertaining to those roles between Japan and the United States, the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring its effectiveness. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously study bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, and hold consultations on them.

The following is an overview of the framework.

The outline of the Guidelines acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” meeting) in 1997 is as follows.

See Reference 32
a. Objectives of the Guidelines
The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, as well as in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan\(^1\).

b. Cooperation Items Prescribed in the Guidelines
(a) Cooperation under Normal Circumstances
Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

(b) Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations\(^2\) while U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF’s operations. Both parties will respond based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner.

See Reference 33

(c) Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic means, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan from occurring.

See Reference 34

c. Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines
In order to promote Japan–U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must share information adequately at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and operational functions.

(a) Comprehensive Mechanism
The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. III-2-1-3)

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1 Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

2 Operations conducted to interdict an enemy’s offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search for and defeat enemies.
(b) Coordination Mechanism
The coordination mechanism is being set up in peacetime so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-1-4)

(2) Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

a. Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan–U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime.

Based on this, laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999) and the Ship Inspection Operations Law (2000) were established in light of Japan–U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1

b. Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures) that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

○ The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

The term “rear area” refers to Japan’s territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.
to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved a revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

○ In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

○ Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan.

c. Rear Area Support
Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities, and base activities.

d. Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations
Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transporting those rescued). If there are non-combatants who face a mishap, he/she will be rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

e. Ship Inspection Operations
Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ).

3 Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

1 Significance of the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan
In order for the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrent that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan, and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas that enables the U.S. forces in Japan to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies.

For this purpose, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan. (See Fig. III-2-1-5) This results in the necessity for opposing countries to be prepared to find themselves in direct confronta-
tion with the U.S. forces in addition to the SDF when attacking Japan as mentioned previously. Thus the U.S. forces in Japan serve as deterrence against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan–U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. forces in Japan in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. forces, and the U.S. forces in Japan will serve as the basis of such support.

In order for the U.S. forces in Japan to carry out the above-mentioned role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. forces hold a primarily offensive role as a “spear” when responding to armed aggression to Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. forces function in this way, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work as one to fully exert their functions.

In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East,
and overall Japan–U.S. obligations are kept in balance. This point is different in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty which stipulates only joint defense of member countries.

2 USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities

In order for USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local communities. Meanwhile, the social conditions in the surrounding areas have changed a lot through, for example, their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support of the public in the true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities.

Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of U.S. forces’ aircraft have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to reduce the burden with the realities of each area in mind.

3 U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to East Asia. Consequently, when it is necessary for units to respond rapidly in the region, U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa are able to do so swiftly. In addition, Okinawa has the geographic advantage that it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan. Furthermore, it is situated in the extremely important location with regard to security—it is located roughly in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes. Thus, the stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa — including the U.S. Marine Corps which has high mobility and readiness and is in charge for a variety of contingencies — with the abovementioned geographical characteristics, contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, many USFJ facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas, and logistics support facilities. As of January 2012, about 74% of the land area of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide

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MV-22 Osprey

The MV-22 is an aircraft possessing the combined technologies of a rotorcraft, which enables vertical take-off and landing and hovering functions, and a fixed wing aircraft, which enables high velocity and a long flight range. Compared with the CH-46, the MV-22 boasts about twice the maximum velocity, three times the carrying capacity, and four times the cruising radius. Fulfilling all of the reliability and safety requirements, the U.S. Government decided to mass-produce the MV-22 in 2005 as a medium-sized air transport aircraft, and the Marine Corps is planning to procure 360 MV-22s. As of July 1, 2012, the Marine Corps possesses about 150 MV-22s and these aircrafts have been deployed globally and operated in various missions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and disaster relief activities in Haiti.

The Marine Corps is advancing its plan to replace its outdated rotorcraft, the CH-46, with the MV-22 that has superior basic capabilities, and the U.S. Department of Defense made an announcement in June 2011 concerning updating the CH-46 currently deployed at Futenma Air Base with the MV-22. Then, the U.S. Government gave the Japanese Government a Host Nation Notification on June 29, 2012, that one CH-46 squadron at Futenma Air Base would be replaced with one MV-22 squadron in October 2012.
(for their exclusive use) was concentrated in Okinawa. Utmost efforts must therefore be given to reduce the burden on Okinawa while keeping in mind the aforementioned security considerations. (See Fig. III-2-1-6)

**Fig. III–2–1–6** The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed There

1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
   - Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia.
   - In the event of an urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly.
   - Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with a certain distance from Japan's neighbors.
   - Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of access to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands, close to Japan's sea lanes.

2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa
   - With their high levels of mobility and readiness*, the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006.
   - Thanks to the Marine Corps' high level of mobility and readiness, as well as their ability to carry out a wide range of duties, the stationing in Okinawa (with its particular geographic characteristics) of the U.S. forces including the Marine Corps which deal with a variety of emergencies, contributes significantly to the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

* The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations.
The stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan forms the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. forces in Japan greatly contribute to the peace and stability of Japan and the region in various ways. In particular, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan tries to enhance the credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements by actively taking various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan.

# 1 Japan’s Measures, etc., Based on the Status of Forces Agreement

Matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. forces in Japan are stipulated in the Status of Forces Agreement¹ (SOFA), which has provisions regarding facilities and areas for the use by the U.S. forces (USFJ facilities and areas), satisfying labor requirements of the USFJ, etc.

(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Special Measures Law Regarding Use and Expropriation of Land, etc.² after compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process³.

(2) Satisfying Labor requirements of the USFJ

The USFJ requires manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the labor requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2011, approximately 26,000 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security units and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of SOFA. The Ministry of Defense supports the stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

# 2 Burden of Host Nation Support (HNS)

HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the United States has felt considerable pressure in bearing the costs for the stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan. In consideration of such circumstances, and with a view to making efforts to the greatest extent possible within the framework of SOFA, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs (costs for the employee’s welfare) in FY1978. Then in FY1979, due to the suddenly stronger yen against the dollar, Japan began to bear the burden of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, employment stability of the employees was adversely impacted, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore in 1987 the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)⁴ as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan would bear labor costs such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance), and as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government

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1 The official title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

2 The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

3 The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

4 The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utility costs from FY1991, and its financial responsibility further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Still, Japan carefully considered its own difficult financial situation when reviewing HNS, and it peaked in the FY1999 budget (annual expenditure base) and has since been declining.

According to the comprehensive review conducted in 2010, the Japanese and the U.S. Governments agreed that the overall expense borne by Japan to station the U.S. Forces in Japan during the period in which the SMA is in effect (for 5 years from FY2011 to FY2015), was determined to be at the same level of FY 2010 (approximately 188.1 billion yen).

3 The Special Measures Agreement (SMA)

The key points of the SMA that took effect in April 2011 are as follows:
1) Effective period: Five years
2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear labor costs, utilities costs, and all or part of the costs incurred in training relocation. With regard to training relocation costs, on top of the additional costs incurred on domestic relocations, costs incurred on training relocation to areas under the control of the U.S. Government, such as Guam, have also been added.

<Operational Guidelines (Exchange of Notes)>

Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625. The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.

Utilities costs: The upper limit for utilities costs is set at 24.9 billion yen for each fiscal year. At the same time, the share of costs to be borne by Japan is reduced in stages from the current 76% (approximate) to 72% (approximate). The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period.

(3) Cost-saving efforts: It is clearly stipulated that the United States shall make further efforts to reduce these expenditures (See Figure III-2-1-7)

### Fig. III-2-1-7 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Outline</th>
<th>Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)</td>
<td>Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ</td>
<td>Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor costs</td>
<td>Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance, which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)</td>
<td>Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1995)</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period.</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities costs</td>
<td>Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995).</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001.</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010.</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen. The adjustment will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period.</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training relocation costs</td>
<td>Training relocation costs: Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Government of Japan have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996.</td>
<td>Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the “Criteria for adopting FIP projects” to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:
   1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors.
   2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others).

5 The Security Consultative Committee Document issued on June 21, 2011: “The Ministers shared the view to continue to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan while reducing labor costs.”

6 The decreased labor and utility costs resulted from the measures described above are applied to make up the increased costs of FIP.
In addition to costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan the various costs associated with the U.S. forces in Japan include costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report (see Section 3-1) for alleviating the burden on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to reducing the burden on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. armed forces. (See Fig. III-2-1-8)

Fig. III-2-1-8 USFJ-related Costs (Budget for FY 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (¥186.7 billion)</th>
<th>Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (¥186.7 billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs for taking measures to improve a living environment in the surrounding areas of the USFJ facilities</td>
<td>¥57.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent for the Facilities</td>
<td>¥99.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation</td>
<td>¥0.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Costs (Compensation for fishery, etc.)</td>
<td>¥25.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>¥182.2 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non MOD-related budget
- Expenditures borne by other Ministries (base subsidy, etc.)
- Estimated costs of government-owned land provided for the use as the USFJ facilities

Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥144.4 billion)

- Labor Costs (Basic salary, etc.) | ¥113.9 billion |
- Utility Costs | ¥24.9 billion |
- Training Relocation Costs (NLP) | ¥0.4 billion |
- Total | ¥139.2 billion |

SACO-related costs (¥8.6 billion)

- Projects for Land Returns | ¥2.1 billion |
- Projects for Training Improvement | ¥0.2 billion |
- Projects for Noise Reduction | ¥2.4 billion |
- Projects for Facilitating SACO Project | ¥2.8 billion |
- Total | ¥7.5 billion |

Realignment-related Costs (¥62.7 billion)

- Relocation of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam | ¥8.8 billion |
- Projects for Realignment in Okinawa | ¥3.8 billion |
- Projects related to reform of U.S. Army Headquarters | ¥2.2 billion |
- Projects for Relocation of Carrier Air Wing | ¥32.6 billion |
- Projects for Training Relocation (local coordination cost) | ¥0 billion |
- Projects for Facilitating Realignment Initiatives | ¥11.3 billion |
- Total | ¥58.7 billion |

Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend into the SACO-related costs and the Realignment-related costs.
2. The SACO-related costs aim for implementation of the SACO Final Report to reduce burdens on Okinawa people, and the Realignment-related costs aim for contribution to reducing burdens on local communities affected by the Realignment initiatives. Since the Cost-Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary efforts to bear some costs in light of the importance to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the Realignment-related costs, which are categorized separately.
3. The Stationing of USFJ-related Costs include the MOD-related budget, other Ministries-related budgets (base subsidy: ¥38.1 billion, JFY2011 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for the use as the USFJ facilities (¥165.6 billion, JFY2012 Estimated Costs).

5 Japan–U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. forces are categorized as command post exercises, in which hypothetical situations are set up, with the objectives of improving the decision making of commanding officers and the coordination ability of staff, and field training, in which actual units move in training areas in the sea and air space with the objective of improving overall coordination between Japan and the United States. Such joint training exercises are indispensable as a means of improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth implementation of Japan–U.S. bilateral actions by facilitating mutual understanding in regard to technical aspects and close communication during peacetime. In addition, these exercises are useful in improving the tactical skills of both Japanese and U.S. forces, and it is important for the SDF to conduct the requisite training for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. forces in peacetime, so that the SDF
may carry out the missions conferred by the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts also serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with the U.S. forces. For example, the Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise that commenced in 1985 involves a generally annual, alternative command post exercise and field training exercise; the command post exercise held in January 2012 was the 19th to be held.

In addition, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are expanding the scope of joint exercises, by such means as dispatching units not only to areas within Japan, but also to the U.S., to participate in exercises such as the Japan–U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan–U.S. Joint Fighter combat training; thus, continuous efforts are being made to improve interoperability at the military service and unit levels.

(See Fig. III-2-1-9)

**Column**

**VOICE**  
**Commentary**  
**Q&A**

**Japan-US Joint Exercise – the First Participation in KOA KAI**

Captain Shinji Marusawa, commander, Escort Division 2 (commander of contingent to the U.S. exercise KOA KAI)

From October to December of 2011, I as the commander of an escort division participated in 2011 U.S. KOA KAI exercise conducted in Hawaii and its surrounding ocean area. This was the first participation for the MSDF. I boarded the escort vessel Kurama and took its command.

KOA KAI means “marine warrior” in Polynesian. The exercise is aimed at checking and evaluating whether the Hawaiian surface vessels under the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 31 are prepared for real missions.

Because this was our first participation, we conducted the exercise on the common platform with the U.S. Navy focusing on acquisition of tactics of the U.S. Navy to carry out real missions. I believe that we could achieve the original purpose by improving tactical skills through the exercise. At the same time, the fact that MSDF vessels joined the exercise for the U.S. Navy that has a great deal of experience in real missions and could carry out the exercise toe-to-toe with them proves a high interoperability and close coordination between the MSDF and U.S. Navy. I believe that MSDF’s participation in KOA KAI will be beneficial for MSDF also in the future.

The author (left) and the Commander of the Destroyer Squadron 31 (right)
These joint exercises between Japan and the United States contribute significantly to maintaining and enhancing joint response capability, and efforts are being made to enrich the contents of the exercises. In response to the Great East Japan Earthquake that struck Japan in 2011, the smooth response provided in cooperation between Japan and the United States stood testament to the relations built up through the Japan-U.S. joint training exercises conducted thus far. See Reference 35.

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States is that if either of the SDF and the U.S. forces requests the provision of goods or services, the other side can provide them. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-2-1-10)

The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States

Temporary shower facilities provided by the U.S. military at the disaster relief deployment, marking the first time the ACSA had been applied. Managed by the SDF, twelve sets of the facilities were used to provide bathing support for those affected by the disaster. (Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture; April 2011)

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1 The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America

2 The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food, water, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oil and lubricant, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance, airport and seaport services, and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations). (Provision of weapons is not included.)
Mutual Exchanges in the Areas of Defense Equipment and Technology

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in areas of defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan’s technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In June 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was concluded to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes.

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan decided to provide the United States with 19 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 18 joint projects (14 of which have been completed). Japan–U.S. cooperation in defense equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future. Moreover, while bearing in mind discussions with the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the Standards for the Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc., which were issued in December 2011, further cooperation with the U.S.A. will be promoted, in terms of equipment and technology.

Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake

The cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011 can be considered proof of the strong ties that have developed over the years.

The success of the joint response in which the U.S. military provided large-scale support in disaster-affected areas in partnership with the SDF in “Operation Tomodachi” was the result of joint exercises involving Japanese and U.S. troops over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future.

“Operation Tomodachi”, as the U.S. military named its humanitarian Assistance and Relief rescue operation following...
the Great East Japan Earthquake, involved the deployment of a large-scale force, including up to approximately 16,000 troops, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft; in this operation, the U.S. military carried out extensive support activities in disaster-affected areas, including search and rescue, transporting supplies, restoring Sendai Airport, cleaning schools ahead of the new semester, removing rubble on Oshima Island, Kesennuma, and participating in an intensive search for the missing, which was a joint Japan-U.S. endeavor. (See Fig. III-2-1-11)

The support activities of the U.S. military took place on an unprecedented scale; as well as contributing greatly to the recovery and reconstruction of Japan, the lessons learned from the response to the disaster will be of considerable assistance in further deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The main factors behind the success of the joint Japan-U.S. response were the cooperation between the two countries that takes place even under normal circumstances, the swift, thorough implementation of coordination between them, and the presence of the U.S. military in Japan. In addition, the success of these endeavors was also due not only to the ongoing policy discussions and joint exercises carried out between the two countries, but also to the fact that the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan means that their troops here are well-acquainted with the geography and culture of the country.

At the same time, some issues for the future have emerged. It is necessary to conduct deliberations concerning such matters as clarifying the roles, mission and capability of Japan and the U.S. in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. military in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination, seeking to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance further through these endeavors.

In light of these facts, in order to enable the SDF and the U.S. military to support each other so that they can respond to a diverse range of situations in the future, it is important to make better preparations and the Ministry of Defense and SDF are at present conducting concrete deliberations based on the lessons learned.
Fig. III-2-1-11 Overview of U.S. Military Activities

**Support activities by the U.S. military**
(U.S. military forces at their largest)
Personnel: approx. 16,000
Ships: approx. 15
Aircraft: approx. 140

**March 11~**
- Restoration of Sendai Airport by U.S. Marine Corps & Army
- Establishment of bilateral coordination centers (Ichigaya, Yokota, Sendai)
- Provide comprehensive coordination functions to facilitate U.S. aid

**March 13~**
- Transport support for infrastructure reconstruction
- Support for infrastructure reconstruction
- U.S. Air Force C-130s, etc. commence operations

**March 16~**
- Japan-U.S. joint operation for removal of rubble around train stations (Operation Soul Train)
- USS Tortuga dock landing ship (Tomakomai~Ominato)
- Transport support (for approx. 300 GSDF troops, etc.)
- 10 U.S. vessels including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (waters off Sendai)
- Restoring Sendai Airport by U.S. Marine Corps & Army

**March 19~**
- Restoration of Sendai Airport by U.S. Marine Corps & Army
- Support for infrastructure reconstruction
- Airlift using HC-46s, etc.
- Airlift using KC-130Js, etc.

**March 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake</th>
<th>April 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search activities (March 13~)</td>
<td>(Intensive search)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of Sendai Airport (March 19-31)</td>
<td>Rubble removal at Oshima Island (April 1-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport support and search &amp; rescue</td>
<td>Support for infrastructure reconstruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These are just some of the activities carried out in March & April*
Tomodachi Operation – a bond that tied Japan and the U.S.

Stephen (Steve) A. Town (now ex-service)  Former Director, Army Air & Missile Defense Division (AAMDD) Liaison Officer in Japan

For about four and a half months from just after the Great East Japan Earthquake to the end of July 2011, I as a liaison officer at the Joint Staff Office at Ichigaya was engaged in liaison and coordination between the JSDF that was responding to the disaster and the U.S. forces that were supporting them.

Supporting Japanese people in cooperation with the JSDF that was responding to the unprecedented disaster required wide ranging coordination. Through the coordination efforts, we recognized anew that there are differences in culture and those in operation procedure based on the former between Japan and the United States. However, we could overcome these differences by mutual understanding developed through exchanges and joint exercises during peace time and the efforts on the both side to bring Japan-U.S. cooperation to a success for reconstruction of the disaster areas as early as possible.

Thanks to proactive Japan-U.S. coordination and the efforts of the people involved such as personnel in the field, Operation Tomodachi produced results including expeditious recovery of the Sendai Airport that was heavily damaged by the earthquake, showing a strong “bond” between the two countries.