Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations
Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan U.S. Security Arrangements
Chapter 3 Multi-layered Security Cooperation with the International Community
Chapter 4 The Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF
The foundation for achieving Japan’s security is its own efforts.

Based on this understanding, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2010 and beyond stipulates that the nation will constantly utilize all means and, in the event of various contingencies, will seamlessly deal with the situation as it unfolds. For this reason, the nation must carry out unified and strategic efforts, and the Ministry of Defense and SDF are engaged not only in the operation of the SDF during the occurrence of various contingencies, but in various activities under normal conditions, including the improvement of response capability.

The first section of this chapter explains this country’s basic framework for armed attack situations including the operation of the SDF. The second section explains specific measures of the SDF for each of various situations. Finally, the third section explains the lessons learned from SDF responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake.

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure to deal with serious situations that threaten the peace and security of the country, and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated), contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack, and is also vital from the perspective of achieving civilian control in an armed attack situation.

This section outlines the key aspects of Japan’s response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework. (See Fig. III-1-1-1)

Notes: a fixed concept has not necessarily been designated for the term “emergency legislation”. For example, in the past, a study on legislation concerning operations of the SDF, in which defense operation orders shall be delivered pursuant to Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Act was conducted as an emergency legislation study. When used in this white paper, it refers to legislation for responses to situations that has been developed since 2003.

Situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged

A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected
Amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law
- Determines measures to construct self-defense facilities prior to the issuance of self-defense operations orders, and special provisions, including exemptions from related laws to facilitate smooth operations of the SDF.

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law
- In order to ensure national independence and security as well as the safety of the people
- The posture for response to armed attack situations is prepared by stipulating the basic items such as the fundamental principles, responsibilities of the national and local governments, and procedures
- The law clearly states the policy, items, and system for examinations on the development of individual legislations that become necessary when responding to armed attack situations.

Amendment to the Act for Establishment of the Security Council of Japan
- Clarifies and enhances the role of the Security Council in responding to situations
- Adds as council members: Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; and Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
- Establishes the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning.

Individual Legislation under the Armed Attack Situation Response Law

Measures to Protect Lives, etc., of the People and Minimize the Effects on Their Daily Lives, etc.
- Civil Protection Law
- Maritime Transportation Restriction Law

Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations
- U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law
- Amendment to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
- Amendment of the SDF Law in conjunction with ACSA amendment agreement

Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others
- Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities

Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws
- Prisoners of War Law
- Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law
- Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I
- Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II

Notes: Underlined laws fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense

- Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2003 (three laws related to emergency legislation)
- Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (seven laws related to emergency legislation)
- Treaties ratified in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (three related treaties)
1 The Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law\(^4\) determines the fundamental nature of Japan’s response to armed attack situations and defines basic principles, basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. That is to say, this legislation and other emergency legislation, such as the Civil Protection Law, prescribe that the relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions\(^5\)) (See Fig. III-1-1-2)

See References 22, 23

Fig. III-1-1-2 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.

In situations such as armed attack situations, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures:

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\(^4\) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>

\(^5\) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services
1) Certification of the facts, and the premises to that certification supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated.
2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation.
3) Important items related to the response measures.

(2) Response Measures
When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following countermeasures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

a. Measures to Bring Armed Attack Situations to an End
   1) The use of military force, unit deployment and other activities conducted by the SDF.
   2) Provision of materials, facilities and services, and other measures to facilitate the smooth and efficient implementation of the SDF and U.S. Forces’ operations.
   3) Diplomatic measures other than those described in items 1) and 2) above.

b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People’s Lives and Economy
   1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of disaster victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures.
   2) Price stabilization, distribution of necessities of daily life, and other necessary measures.

(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments
The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defined in the Armed Attack Situation Response Law are outlined in Fig. III-1-1-3

(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures
Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.

In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

2 Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations
The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

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6 An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.
In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be taken including the following: 1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis, and situational evaluations; 2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; 3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations.

(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan
In an emergency response situation, the Cabinet must decide the following items for those policies concerning emergency response situations (emergency response situation response plan) and must obtain approval of the plan by the Diet. Also, on the approval of the emergency response situation response plan, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation will be temporarily established within the Cabinet to deal with the relevant situation.
① Certification of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the certification

(2) Emergency Response Measures
The designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following emergency response measures based on legal provisions, during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan:
① Measures most appropriate to end the emergency response situation and measures to prevent or suppress attacks during emergency response situations.
② In order to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people from attacks or to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions in emergency response situations, the following measures will also be implemented according to current developments in the emergency response situation: the issuance of warnings, evacuation instructions, the rescue of disaster victims, the emergency restoration of facilities and equipment, etc.

2 Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law

There were seven pieces of emergency legislation, and three treaties enacted and signed in June 2004 as a result of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law that was enacted in June 2003. Based on that the framework to enable necessary measures for responding to attacked situations, etc. to be taken was prepared. The following items summarize that.

See References 22, 23

1 Measures to Protect the Lives, etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People

Japan established the Civil Protection Law, which prescribes measures for three necessary items to protect the lives, etc., of the people in armed attack situations and emergency response situations. In addition, it prescribes similar measures in the case of emergency response situations.

See subsection 3 of this section

2 Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations

(1) Facilitation of SDF Operations
The Emergency Legislation Study, resulting from the partial amendment of the SDF Law at the same time the Armed Attack Situation Response Law was enacted, required enactment of Classification 1 (laws pertaining to the Ministry of Defense) and Classification 2 (laws pertaining to ministries other than the Ministry of Defense) legislation, so that new laws were enacted such as measures for the construction of defense facilities before orders for defense operations, laws pertaining to emergency activities during defense operations, and specific regulations necessary for application of laws related to road and other laws.

Japan also enacted the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law, which enables the implementation of measures to restrict the maritime transportation of foreign military supplies
(2) Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations

a. Japan established the Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc. The Law was created to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely in armed attack situations and to ensure that prisoners’ lives, bodies, health, and dignity are always respected and protected from any violations or threats.

b. The Diet approved partial amendment of the Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA — Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement). The scope of application for this Agreement has been widened so that it now additionally applies to responses to armed attack situations, the efforts of the international community to contribute to global peace and security, and for disaster response measures. Also, the revision of one part of the SDF Law has enabled the SDF to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces implementing these actions.

(3) Other (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others)

Japan established the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities, ensuring that the SDF and U.S. forces’ actions and measures to protect the people of Japan can be implemented appropriately and promptly. The Law enables the comprehensive coordination of specific public facilities, etc., (ports, airfields, roads, territorial waters and airspace, and radio frequencies) that may be required in armed attack situations.

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7 The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc. See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/presiding/law/yujihousei/003b.html>

8 The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/presiding/law/yujihousei/index02_03.html>


10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)

11 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)

12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
4 Efforts towards High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations

With the passing of the emergency legislation, Japan has established a legal foundation but still needs to confirm the legislation’s effectiveness and also ceaselessly strive to maintain the effectiveness of the required operational infrastructure to ensure an appropriate response in an ever-changing security environment.

As part of these efforts, during peacetime, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning, under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, will study responses to emergency situations, such as armed attacks, terrorist attacks, or the appearance of unidentified vessels. In addition, it will formulate plans for the specific response measures to be implemented by designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions in armed attack situations. The Council will also take steps to formulate role-related plans and ensure that these plans are reflected into policies and operations.

The government also works to utilize a range of opportunities to educate the public on all of the important measures that it will implement to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people in armed attack situations. Also, it verifies the effectiveness of its operational structure through methods such as training, and maintains high levels of readiness for armed attack situations.

The Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces conducted integrated field training in November 2011 based on plans created by the Joint Staff, to maintain and improve their capabilities to jointly utilize those functions and capabilities in various situations.

Moreover, a U.S.-Japan joint exercise (command post exercise) was held in January 2012, focused on verifying and providing training regarding U.S.-Japan cooperation and the SDF’s response to various situations, as well as the joint handling of Japan’s defense by the U.S. and Japan; this exercise sought to increase proficiency and maintain and improve joint operational capability. Relevant government ministries and agencies, such as the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also participated in this exercise for the first time, so an exercise in inter-ministerial coordination was also carried out and the functions and frameworks for government decision-making and response measures set forth in the 2010 NDPG were put to the test.

3 Efforts for Civil Protection

1 Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)

All organizations and functions of the government will implement their measures for civil protection in armed attack situations based on the Basic Response Plan1 and basic guidelines for civil protection in armed attack situation. Also, the country as a whole will give its unfailing support for all civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions.

Local governments will implement their respective civil protection measures based on the national government policies, and will be responsible for the overall coordination for the civil protection measures implemented by relevant authorities in their jurisdiction.

See Reference 22

2 The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in response to each of them. In addition, it prescribes the content and distribution of roles to implement the measures for the national, prefectural and municipal governments and designated public institutions for civil protection measures in response to evacuation, relief and disasters.

Designated government institutions and prefectural governments, etc., established the plan concerning civil protection (the Civil Protection Plan) based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines.

3 Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

In October 2005, the Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, both designated government institutions, established the “Civil Protection Plan”2, based on
the Civil Protection Law, Article 33, Section 1, and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to evacuation, relief support, and responses to armed attack disasters.

See Reference 24

(1) Civil Protection Dispatch
The outline of the stipulations of Civil Protection Dispatch is as follows:

a. Dispatch Procedure
For situations where it is recognized that a dispatch is required, the Minister of Defense may issue a Civil Protection Dispatch order to dispatch relevant units to implement civil protection measures following a request by a prefectural governor or the Task Force Chief. (See Fig. III-1-1-4)

Also, when a defense operations order has been issued in an armed attack situation, or on the issuance of a public security operations order as a response measure in an emergency situation, the Minister of Defense may implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures as a part of the consistent defense or public security operations without civil protection dispatch orders.

b. Authorities
Only in cases when police officers are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation is authorized to execute evacuation and other measures, to prevent and control crime, and to enter private premises. And only in cases when officials other than police officers are not at the scene the SDF personnel are authorized to use weapons, as prescribed by the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials.

In addition, only in cases when the municipal mayors, etc., are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation instructions, perform emergency public duties, to establish areas on alert, to request cooperation of residents and other measures.

c. Organization of Special Units
When civil protection dispatch operations are being conducted, special units may be organized temporarily based on necessity, and SDF ready and reserve personnel may be called to duty.

d. Emergency Response Protection Measures
The same provisions as measures in armed attack situations, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines etc., shall apply for measures in emergency response situations.

(2) Measures implemented by the SDF

a. Evacuation of Residents
The SDF will collect and distribute essential information, coordinate with relevant organizations, and provide guidance and transportation services for the evacuation of residents.

b. Relief of Evacuated Residents
Centered on measures for the relief of lives (search, rescue, and emergency medical care) and following a request from the Task Force Chief or other authorized persons, the SDF will implement measures to support medical care activities (transporting injured people, etc.), to support the livelihood of the people when necessary (distributing hot meals, supplying water, transporting relief materials, etc.), and to gather safety

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3 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.
4 Police officers, coast guard officers or assistant coast guard officers.
c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters
The SDF will carry out the following response measures: confirming the damage, providing monitoring support, implementing measures for secure of lives (search, rescue, providing emergency medical care, etc.), preventing damage expansion (supporting evacuation of surrounding residents, extinguishing fires, etc.), and removing dangerous substances as a result of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attacks. Otherwise, the SDF will implement other important measures to maintain the security of facilities such as those related to daily life (guidance and advice, dispatching personnel, etc.) and other necessary measures as ordered by the Prime Minister.

d. Emergency Recovery
While implementing emergency recovery measures for SDF facilities and equipment support operations will be conducted including the removal of dangerous rubbles, and emergency repairs of roads and runways based on a request from prefectural governors, etc.

4 Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

(1) Training for Civil Protection
In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat, prefectural government organizations, or local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities.

Joint exercises between the national and local governments regarding civil protection were started in FY2005 and field exercises were conducted in five prefectures including Fukui that year, and exercises were conducted in Hokkaido, Saga, and Nagasaki in FY2011, with command post exercises in Yamagata, Niigata, Fukui, Gifu, Hyogo, Tokushima, Ehime, Fukuoka and Miyazaki.

In addition, the joint exercises regarding civil protection that were carried out in the city of Omura, Nagasaki Prefecture, in January 2012, were the first such exercises which envisioned a terrorist attack at an airport. The SDF, with participations of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Nagasaki, and relevant ministries and agencies, conducted training on initial response measures and medical rescue, in coordination with the central and local crisis management headquarters. See Section 2-4, Reference 25

(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments, etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.

Civil protection councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. Furthermore, related staff of the Regional Defense Bureaus, which are designated regional government institutions, are assigned to be members.

Staff from the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, as well as other relevant ministries and agencies, the prefectural government and the police holding discussions concerning countermeasures during a public safety exercise (Nagasaki Prefecture)
In 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operational structure. This established the basis for unified SDF operations among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its expanding range of already diversified duties in an effective and prompt manner.

The 2010 NDPG also emphasizes the strengthening of the Joint Staff, as well as joint operations infrastructure such as command and control, intelligence collection, and joint training, and reorganization, merger, centralization, and creation of hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF. (See Fig. III-1-1-5)

Fig. III-1-1-5 Situation Response with the Joint Operations Posture (Image) (Diagram of an Example of a Response to an Invasion of Japan’s Remote Islands)

Notes: The Chiefs of Staff are not military commanders of units, but provide expert military perspective as advisors to the Minister of Defense. Before the transition to the joint operations posture, orders from the Minister of Defense for SDF operations were executed through the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces, but since the transition to the joint operations posture, orders from the Minister of Defense relating to SDF operations go through the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff to be executed in a centralized manner.

1 Outline of Joint Operational Structure

(1) Role of the Chief of Staff

a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and solely supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective.

b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the
Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to take responses.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to those SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff. The GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

In addition, from the perspective of facilitating smooth SDF joint operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium-to long-term defense concepts and strategies, and annual planning policies to clarify the requirements of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF functions. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will implement all measures in accordance with these plans.

The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which is the “central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense,” to the Joint Staff and relevant units.

(See Fig. III-1-1-6)

2 Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure

Within the joint operational structure, it is essential that the Joint Staff and each SDF unit maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. Therefore, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), the common network of the Ministry of Defense and SDF, and the Central Command System (CSS) that supports command supervision for the Minister of Defense connecting with the primary command systems of each SDF to collect intelligence, were prepared as part of the foundation to support that essential requirement. The New NDPG also stipulates the possession of a command and control function utilizing a high level communications network that includes satellites and a system for sharing intelligence to strengthen the joint operational infrastructure, and the development of a flexible and wide-ranging communications system using advanced communications technology acquired from within and without.

Furthermore, as it is necessary for information systems and communications networks to be protected from threats such as cyber attacks, efforts are being made to strengthen the combined cyber attack response capability.

(See Section 2-3)

At the unit level, commanders of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such forces’ operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime, and if necessary, the number of Joint Staff personnel will be increased.

In addition, through integrated exercises such as the SDF joint exercise (field training exercise) and the U.S.-Japan joint exercise (command post exercise) that took place in FY2011, efforts are being made to maintain and improve integrated operational capability, and to verify the effectiveness of the various plans that have been made.

Deliberation for a more effective joint operational structure continues and necessary measures will be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarter structure, and the development of human resources and common equipment to fit joint operations.

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2 Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.

3 Refer to "Defense Agency/SDF Outline for Comprehensive Measures Related to Handling the Information and Communications Technology Revolution" for details on each system. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/security/ityoukou/index.html>

4 Satellites are used for timely communication with destroyers and aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance operations in nearby seas by utilizing the advantages of wide range and immediacy, for communications during disasters, and for communications between Japan and units deployed overseas.

5 GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on
Fig. III-1-1-G Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces

Basic Rule for Joint Operation
- The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert's viewpoint.
- The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff.
- The Minister of Defense's orders to the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff.

Responsibilities for force operations

Prime Minister

Minister of Defense

Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training, build-up of defense capabilities)

Force provider

Force user

Chain of command for operations
- - - Chain of command for affairs other than operations

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