

Chapter  
3

# Development of the Dynamic Defense Force

In order to proceed with a systematic transfer toward the defense structure indicated in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, the Government decided the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2011-FY2015) (2011 MTDP), which was approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2010. The 2011 MTDP was the first MTDP formulated based on the 2010 NDPG, and it outlines the path toward realizing national defense capabilities provided in the 2010 NDPG.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense is conducting vigorous studies toward the aim of building up the Dynamic Defense Force indicated in the 2010 NDPG and the 2011 MTDP, in order to promote structural reform for improving the effectiveness of Japan's national defense.

This chapter will describe the 2011 MTDP, the structural reforms for improving the effectiveness of national defense capabilities, and the national defense program for FY2012, etc.

See Reference 8

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## The Mid-Term Defense Program

### 1 The Program Guidelines

The 2011 MTDP, which is the update of the 2010 NDPG, consists of the following six fundamental objectives in effort to develop appropriate defense capacities:

- Developing systems that suit the role of defense force
- Appropriate resource allocation given priorities to important functions
- Efficient development of quality defense capabilities
- Implementation of measures regarding to build a foundation to maximize defense capabilities
- Continuing to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements
- Developing defense capabilities that are efficient and logical

### 2 Reviewing Central Units

The 2011 MTDP reorganizes necessary units in accordance with the future direction set by the 2010 NDPG. (See Fig. II-3-1-1)

**Fig. II - 3 - 1 - 1** National Defense Program Guidelines Appendix and Structure of the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program at the Time of Completion

Category			2004 NDPG	End of FY2010	At the completion of the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program	2010 NDPG
GSDF	Authorized ersonnel		155,000	160,000	157,000	154,000
	Regular		148,000	152,000	150,000	147,000
	Ready reserve		7,000	8,000	7,000	7,000
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operation units	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division
Ground-to-air guided missile units		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiment	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiment	
	Main equipment	Tanks Artillery (Main artillery) <sup>1</sup>	About 600 (About 600/vehicle)	About 800 (About 730/vehicle)	About 640 (About 500/vehicle)	About 400 (About 400/vehicle)
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units			4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 4 destroyer units
		(for mobile operations) regional district units	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions		
Submarine units		4 divisions	5 divisions	5 divisions	6 submarine units	
Minesweeping units		1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	
Patrol aircraft units		9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 flight squadrons	
	Main equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	47 ships 16 ships About 150 aircraft	About 48 ships 16 ships About 170 aircraft	47 ships 20 ships About 150 aircraft	48 ships 22 ships About 150 aircraft
ASDF	Major units	Aircraft control & warning units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)
		Fighter units	12 squadrons	12 squadrons	12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport UnitsAir refueling/transport units	3 squadrons 1 squadron	3 squadrons 1 squadron	3 squadrons 1 squadron	3 squadrons 1 squadron
		Surface-to-air guided missile units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups
	Main equipment	Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)	About 350 aircraft About 260 aircraft	About 340 aircraft About 260 aircraft	About 340 aircraft About 260 aircraft	About 340 aircraft About 260 aircraft
Main equipment & Main equipment & major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense <sup>2</sup>	Aegis-equipped destroyers		4 ships	4 ships	6 ships	6 ships <sup>3</sup>
	Aircraft control & warning units		7 groups 4 squadrons	6 groups 4 squadrons	11 surveillance groups/units	11 surveillance groups/units
	Surface-to-air guided Missile Units		3 groups	3 groups	3 groups	6 groups

Notes: 1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.

2. "Main equipment and major units that can also be used in defense against ballistic missiles" refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.

3. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.

### 3 Major Programs Regarding SDF Capabilities

#### 1 Effective Deterrence and Response

Various operations such as the improvement of the equipment used by each of the three Self-Defense Forces, etc., are carried out in response to situations that are important considerations as indicated as the role of defense capabilities in the 2010 NDPG. (See Fig. II-3-1-2)

##### (1) Ensuring Security of Sea and Air space Surrounding Japan

The SDF will provide continuous ISR activities of the land, sea and air space around Japan, in order to gain early warning of all types of signs.

##### (2) Response to attacks on offshore islands

###### a. ISR capabilities

The SDF will develop a necessary system for establishing regular ISR and responding swiftly.

###### b. Improvement in Rapid Deployment and Response Capabilities

The SDF will ensure rapid deployment and attempt to improve effective response capabilities.

###### c. Improvement in Air Defense Capabilities

The SDF will attempt to improve its air defense capabilities including response to cruise missile attacks.

###### d. Security of Sea-lanes

The SDF will develop a system to ensure the security of sea-lanes in areas including southwestern Japan through reinforcing ISR activities and capabilities of various military operations.

##### (3) Response to Cyber Attacks

The SDF will improve security functions of its information networks by strengthening its joint network protection system, contributing to the government's overall response.

##### (4) Response to attacks by guerillas and special operation forces

The SDF will further increase unit readiness and mobility, etc, to respond rapidly and effectively to guerilla and special operation force attacks.

##### (5) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with ballistic missile attacks.

Moreover, in order to take all possible measures to ensure its national defense and steadily improve the capabilities of interceptor missiles, the MOD will continue to promote the



Type 11 short-range surface-to-air missile



Zuiryu submarine at its launching ceremony



Modernized F-15 fighters

**Fig. II-3-1-2** Projects that Come under “Effective Deterrence and Response”

Classification		Projects described in the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program
Security of the seas surrounding Japan		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Development of Destroyer-Carrying Helicopters (DDH), generic destroyers (DD), and submarines and fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), and prolonging the lifespan of existing destroyers, submarines and fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) (MSDF)</li> <li>○ Development of fixed three-dimensional radar devices, and improving early warning and control aircraft (E-767) (ASDF)</li> </ul>
Response to attacks against Japan's offshore islands	Enhancement of information collection and warning and surveillance systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Deployment of coastal surveillance units to the offshore islands in the Southwestern region, and implementation of projects toward the restructuring of units in charge of first operations (GSDF)</li> <li>○ Deployment of mobile warning radars to the offshore islands in the Southwestern region (ASDF)</li> <li>○ Development of infrastructure for early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) in the Southwestern region (ASDF)</li> </ul>
	Speedy deployment and improving response capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Development of new transportation aircraft to succeed the transportation helicopters (CH-47JA) (GSDF) and transportation aircraft (C-1)</li> <li>○ Development of Helicopter Equipped Destroyers (DDH) (MSDF)</li> <li>○ Development of surface-to-surface missiles, and training for mobile deployment aimed at deploying troops speedily to the offshore islands (GSDF)</li> </ul>
	Enhancing air defense capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Establishing a structure of two flight squadrons for fighter units at the Naha Air Base (ASDF)</li> <li>○ Development of new fighter aircraft to take over older fighters (F-4), improvements and modernization of fighters (F-15) and enhancement of self-defense capabilities, improvement of surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missiles (ASDF), development of medium-range surface-to-air missiles (GSDF)</li> <li>○ Adding electronic warfare functions to fighters (F-15), improving air-to-air capabilities and network functions for fighters (F-2)</li> <li>○ Development of new rescue helicopters, addition of mid-air oil replenishing functions from transportation aircraft (C-130H) to rescue helicopters (ASDF)</li> </ul>
	Ensuring the security of sea lanes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Development of Helicopter Equipped Destroyers (DDH), generic destroyers (DD), and submarines and fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-1, and prolonging the lifespan of existing destroyers, submarines and fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) (MSDF)</li> <li>○ Development of patrol helicopters (SH-60K), minesweeping submarines, minesweeping and transportation helicopters (MCH-101), and prolonging the lifespan of patrol helicopters (SH-60J) (MSDF)</li> <li>○ Making rescue systems more effective, developing rescue amphibians (US-2) (MSDF)</li> </ul>
Response to cyber attacks		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Strengthen structure to comprehensively respond to cyber attacks, enhancing training and exercises to respond to cyber attacks, and nurturing personnel with advanced knowledge in cyber attack response (Joint Staff)</li> </ul>
Response to attacks by guerrilla or special troops		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Strengthen infantry units, development of light armored vehicles, multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA), and combat helicopters (AH-64D) (GSDF)</li> </ul>
Response to ballistic missiles		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Enhancing the capability of Destroyers equipped with Aegis systems (MSDF), and surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missiles (ASDF)</li> <li>○ Japan U.S. joint development of advanced interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (TRDI)</li> </ul>
Response to large-scale and special-type disasters		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Promotion of various measures such as the formulation of various training programs and plans</li> </ul>

Japan-US cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor, study the possibility of transition to the production and deployment phase, and take necessary measures.

#### (6) Response to “Complex” Situations

The SDF will establish command and control system and logistic support system to respond promptly and appropriately to multiple contingencies occurring successively and simultaneously.

#### (7) Response to large-scale and /or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters

The SDF will respond promptly and appropriately to various large-scale or special disasters including a major earthquake and a nuclear accident, and to protect citizens' lives and property

## 2 Efforts to Further Stabilize the Security Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

Japan will take the following measures in order to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

- Promote bilateral and multilateral security dialogues, defense cooperation and exchanges, and joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner,
- Promote development and strengthening of the regional cooperative architecture.
- Capacity building assistance<sup>1</sup> (in the areas such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)). Japan will support countries in the region to improve their response capability and human resources development by utilizing the expertise and experience of the SDF in the military medicine and disposal of landmines and unexploded shells.

## 3 Efforts to Improve the Global Security Environment

In order to improve global security environment, Japan takes the following measures:

- Actively engage in international peace cooperation activities.
- Review the 5 principles of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) participation and discuss how Japan will be involved in PKO.
- Actively engage in capacity building assistance, international counter-terrorism measures, ensuring maritime security, and the maintenance of maritime order.
- Conduct research on the impact of climate change and resource constraints on the security operational environments.
- Provide education at Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center.
- Japan will actively cooperate with arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations including the U.N.

## 4 Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

Regarding the system maintenance of the SDF, the following points are considered important: 1) strengthening of jointness, 2) strengthening capabilities for international cooperation activities, 3) enhancement of intelligence functions, 4) incorporating advancing science and technology into defense capability, and 5) enhancement of medical functions.

## 5 Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability

The following initiatives shall be carried out to maximize Japan's defense capability, in order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability efficiently and effectively.

### (1) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

#### a. Recruiting, retaining and developing SDF personnel

- Recruit, retain and develop high-quality human resources who can adapt to changes in social situations, and diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. Improve the foundation for training and educational training programs.

#### b. Reform of the SDF personnel management system including review of its personnel management policy

- Implement systematic management of authorized and actual personnel numbers, by establishing basic principles such as rank-based quota management.
- Design and introduce a system which provides precedence to young personnel to be assigned to front-line units, and apply optimum treatments to others engaged in various other duties.
- Implement measures to invigorate all ranks (officers, warrant officers, sergeants and privates).
- Promote effective use of retired SDF personnel in society, implement measures to support their re-employment, and introduce an early retirement system that go with the above measures.

#### c. Rationalizing and streamlining logistical operations

- With regard to garrison and base services, further advance streamlining of personnel and curb personnel costs, for example, by utilizing the private-sector to improve quality of services, thereby acquiring front-line unit personnel.

#### d. Utilizing the Research and Education Functions of the National Institute for Defense Studies

- Pursue more organized, efficient and effective management in order to conduct research and educational functions regarding security and military history

### (2) Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases

- Identify, maintain, and develop defense production capability and technological bases that are important to be kept in the country.
- Formulate strategies related to defense production capability and technological bases.

<sup>1</sup> See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-3



### (3) Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment

- Consider measures to respond to changes associated with improving performance of defense equipments and dealing with rising costs of equipments that are commonly seen among developed countries.

### (4) Promoting further effectiveness and efficiency in the procurement of equipment

- Establish and strengthen cost management procedures and systems concerning acquisition of equipment.
- Introduce procurement procedures that effectively capitalize on private business initiatives, and improve systems related to contracts.

### (5) Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment

- Secure fuel and parts essential to the operation of equipment.
- Introduce a new contract method, “Performance Based Logistics,” for maintenance and service of equipment.

### (6) Promoting cooperation with related organizations and local communities

- Strengthen coordination with relevant organizations such as the police, fire departments, and the Japan Coast Guard
- Promote cooperation with local governments and local community.
- Verify the functions and systems related to government decision-making and handling, and discuss necessary measures to deal with legal and other matters
- Maintain and improve defense facilities efficiently and promote countermeasures in areas near the bases.

## 4

## Measures to Strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The following measures are taken in order to strengthen Japan-U.S. security cooperation and achieve smoother and more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan:

### 1 Strategic Dialogues and Policy Coordination

- Continue, with the U.S., to conduct security environment assessments, and examine common strategic objectives, roles, missions, and capabilities.

### 2 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

- Strengthen intelligence cooperation and bilateral contingency planning.
- Cooperate in various operations including handling situations in areas surrounding Japan.
- Cooperate in ballistic missile defense.
- Cooperate in matters related to equipment and technology
- Conduct bilateral consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security.

- Consider measures to enhance bilateral cooperation.
- Strengthen regular cooperation in such matters as surveillance operations, and expansion of joint training facilities and areas.
- Strengthen regional and global cooperation with the U.S. in areas such as international peace cooperation activities.
- Promote cooperative Japan-U.S. relationships through coordination and discussions held between relevant ministries and agencies on global issues such as space and cyber-space.

### 3 Measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

- From the viewpoint of securing smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, Japan will ensure a stable Host Nation Support, while further promoting its efficiency and transparency.

**See** Part III, Chapter 2

## 5 Scale of Deployment and Required Expenditures

### 1 Scale of Deployment

See Fig. II-3-1-3 for a list of the major procurements described in 3 above.

### 2 Required Expenditures

The ceiling on total expenditures necessary for the implementation of 2011 MTDP is approximately ¥23,490 billion, in FY2010 valuation, which represents an average rate of increase of 0.1% in comparison with the FY2010 budget figure. These expenditures include expenses approved by the Security Council, which are

needed to deal with unexpected incidences that may occur in the future.

The annual defense budgets will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,390 billion over the next five years, in harmony with other measures of Japan and striving for further streamlining and rationalization.

Also, the 2011 MTDP will be reviewed after three years and revised as necessary, taking into consideration the international security environment, technological trends including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. Total expenditure of the revised program would not exceed ¥23,490 billion.

(See Fig. II-3-1-4)

## 6 Other

- 1) The MOD will set up a system to collect and evaluate information on the status of the SDF's equipment and personnel in order to conduct continuous review of the modality of the defense force, as well as a system for planning and programming pertaining to the developments of the defense force.
- 2) While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. forces, Japan will steadily implement concrete measures for force posture review of U.S. forces in Japan, etc., and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related projects to reduce the burden on local communities including that on Okinawa<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Although these measures need to be carried out steadily, GOJ and USG are still engaged in consultation in details and project plans should be formulated based on coordination with local communities. Therefore, it is difficult to forecast definite scale of the budget over the five-year period, and the expenditures for these items are not included in the required expenditures for the 2011 MTDP.

**Fig. II - 3 - 1 - 3** Number of Major Equipment Increases in the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program

Major Equipment		2005 Mid-Term Defense Program (Initial)	2005 Mid-Term Defense Program (Revised) <sup>1</sup>	2011 Mid-Term Defense Program
GSDF	Tanks	49 tanks	49 tanks	68 tanks
	Howitzers and rockets (excluding mortars)	38 vehicles	38 vehicles	32 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 pieces	96 pieces	75 pieces
	Surface-to-surface missile	—	—	18 pieces
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 units	4 units	3 units
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 units	9 units	5 units
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 companies	7 companies	4 companies
MSDF	Improve capabilities of Aegis destroyers	3 ships	3 ships	2 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships	5 ships	3 ships
	Submarines	4 ships	4 ships	5 ships
	Others	11 ships	8 ships	5 ships
	(Number of tons)			Approx. 51,000 tons
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft/Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1)	4 planes	4 planes	10 planes
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 units	17 units	26 units
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 units	3 units	5 units
ASDF	Enhance capabilities of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles <sup>2</sup>	2 groups & required training, etc.	2 groups & required training, etc.	1 air defense missile group
	Modernization of fighter aircraft (F-15)	26 planes	48 planes <sup>3</sup>	16 planes
	Fighter aircraft (F-2)	22 planes	18 planes	—
	New fighter aircraft	7 planes	0 planes <sup>4</sup>	12 planes
	New transport aircraft	8 planes	0 planes <sup>5</sup>	10 planes
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 units	3 units	—
	Aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 plane	1 plane	—

- Notes: 1. According to the "Review of the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2005 to FY2009)" (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 20, 2008), revisions, such as the improvement and modernization of fighters (F-15) and development scale of other equipment and supplies, were incorporated.
2. The composition of supplies for educational purposes are different from those used in troop operations.
3. Other than the development quantity listed above, the improvement and modernization of fighters (F-15) includes the acquisition of radar parts for 38 radars.
4. Through greater efficiency in marking the flight times and progress status of information collection for target aircraft, it would be possible to reduce the scale of management for current F-4. In view of that, development was not carried out.
5. Due to the delay in development arising from delays in the delivery of test aircraft, due to problems with aircraft body strength, efforts were made toward greater efficiency with regard to flight times for existing C-1. As such, development was not carried out.

**Fig. II - 3 - 1 - 4** Necessary Expenses for the 2011 Mid-Term Defense Program

Classification	2005 MTDP (revised) (FY2004 prices)	2011 MTDP (FY2010 prices)	(Unit: billion yen)[0.1%]	
Total	23,640 billion yen	23,490 billion yen	Classification	2011 Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015) (FY2010 prices)
Personnel and food	10,630 billion yen	10,562 billion yen	Total defense-related expenses [Average growth rate]	<b>234,900</b> (Including adjustment ceiling (100 billion)) [0.1%]
Facilities	13,010 billion yen	12,828 billion yen	(Reference)	<b>FY2010 levels</b> (FY2010 budget × 5)
Others	—	100 billion yen		<b>234,128</b>

- Notes: 1. From the view of the need for the Mid-Term Defense Program to show the ceiling on the amount of defense-related expenses for the period covered by the program, necessary expenses under the program are shown on a spending basis, which covers expenditures both for already concluded contracts and new contracts.
2. Personnel and food expenses (10,562 billion yen) and facilities (12,828 billion yen) for the new MTDP are estimated as a part of the total sum.
3. The sum of expenses for the new NDPG includes an upper limit of 1 billion yen for expenses that can be appropriated in circumstances where special needs are needed, with authorization from the Security Council. These circumstances includes responses to future events that are difficult to foretell. With regard to the composition of the budget for each fiscal year during the period of the new NDPG, it will be established within the limit of approximately 23,039 billion yen, and be decided based on harmony with other national budgets as well as efforts toward greater efficiency and rationalization.