

Section 2

Contents of the 2010 NDPG

This section explains the concept of the defense force described in the 2010 NDPG and the posture and structure of the SDF.

1

Basic Concept – Developing a Dynamic Defense Force

In order to react to the changing security environment, a major characteristic of the 2010 NDPG is the principle of developing a “Dynamic Defense Force.”

In the regions surrounding Japan, there still exist large-scale military forces including nuclear forces, and many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. Under these conditions, not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also “dynamic deterrence”, which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation’s will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions, is important. Additionally, warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important.

Since many of security issues currently exist around the world may spread across national boundaries, international coordination and cooperation are becoming important. Under such circumstances, roles of military forces are tending to be increasingly diversified and becoming more involved in various everyday operations such as humanitarian aids and disaster relief, peace keeping, and providing countermeasures against piracy. The SDF has contributed to many international peace cooperation activities, and their activities abroad have been becoming routine. It is important for the SDF to be capable of continuing and supporting such activities.

Given these conditions, it is necessary that Japan’s future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively perform various

types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force without basing on the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that place priority on “the existence of the defense force.” To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of “Dynamic Defense Force” that has readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of this “Dynamic Defense Force” focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.

In order to handle an increasingly challenging security environment, Japan needs to steadily build an appropriate-size defense force. In doing so, and in light of the difficult financial circumstances, the 2010 NDPG state that Japan will carry out “selection and concentration” to selectively concentrate resources on truly necessary functions and bring about structural reform to the defense force to produce increased outcome with limited resources after carrying out drastic optimization and streamlining the SDF overall through fundamental review of the equipment, personnel, organization, and force disposition. Through a fundamental review of personnel management system, it is also stated that Japan will curve personnel costs and improve its efficiency and increasing the SDF strength by lowering its average age, in order to improve the structure of the defense budget, which has a high promotion of personnel cost that currently suppresses the expenditure of SDF activities. One of the characteristics of the 2010 NDPG is that it touches upon structural reform to the defense force and personnel structure reforms as above.

2

Basic Principles of Japan’s Security

The 2010 NDPG begin by defining the basic security principles from the standpoint of clarifying the most basic items for national security of Japan.

Specifically, the following three items are presented: (1) the prevention and elimination of potential threats to Japan and the minimization of the damages thereof; (2) the further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and the prevention of the occurrence of threats through the improvement of the global security environment; and (3) contribution to world

peace and stability and establishing security for people.

To achieve these goals, Japan is committed to make efforts, cooperate with its allies, and promote multi-layered security cooperation in the international community in a comprehensive manner.

Also, under the Constitution, and in line with basic principles such as maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military powers that poses a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold its basic defense

policies such as securing civilian control, maintaining the three non-nuclear principles, and building a modest defense force. At the same time, to address the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will play a constructive and active role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world without nuclear weapons. At the same

time, as long as nuclear weapons do exist, Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and improve the credibility of the extended deterrence¹, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element and also appropriately implement its own efforts including ballistic missile defense and civil protection.



Column

VOICE

Commentary

Q&A

7th Division Joint Long-distance Mobilization Exercise & Logistical Support Arrangements

7th Division Joint Long-distance Mobilization Exercise

From October 29 to December 2, 2011, the 7th Division (Higashi-Chitose) conducted a long-distance mobilization exercise involving their transfer to the Western Army's territory, with the objective of improving the control and coordination abilities required for long-distance mobilization and increasing unit readiness through exercises in partnership with the Western Army.

This was the first time that the 7th Division had conducted a joint long-distance mobilization exercise; during the mobilization stage, 410 troops and approximately 120 heavy vehicles, including Type 90 tanks and armored cars, were moved swiftly from Hokkaido all the way to Kyushu using various means of transport, including a civilian vessel (high-speed transport ship) and by rail.

This kind of long-distance mobilization exercise is one of the important initiatives aimed at building a dynamic defense force set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, and we will continue to prioritize such exercises in our future endeavors.



Armored cars being transported by rail in the course of their duties

Logistical Support Arrangements for Island Defense (Including Long-distance Mobilization)

In mobilization for defense purposes or disaster relief operations, when the Self-Defense Forces carry out their duties, movement over long distances is required, along with large quantities of supplies, including fuel, ammunition and provisions. Securing the transport capacity required for units to operate, preparing and distributing supplies, and putting in place the requisite vehicles is called logistical support.

In particular, in island defense involving long-distance mobilization, logistical support plays an extremely important role in securing transport capacity using both the Self-Defense Forces and the civilian sector, as well as in refueling and supplying various equipment; accordingly, it is necessary to strive to enhance logistical support arrangements for active units, while reflecting the lessons learned from large-scale disasters and international peace cooperation activities.



Type 90 tank transported using a high-speed transport ship

¹ This is the U.S. deterrence against attacks on allies and friendly nations of the U. S. such as Japan. Deterrence against attacks on the U. S. itself is called the basic deterrence.

1 Japan's own efforts

Based on the understanding that Japan's own efforts are the first and foremost factor in achieving the three goals presented in "2. Basic Principles of Japan's Security," the 2010 NDPG state that Japan will constantly utilize all means to ensure its security under the basic defense policies, and in cooperation with the ally, partners and other countries concerned. In the event of various contingencies arising from security challenges and destabilizing factors facing Japan (hereinafter referred to as "various contingencies"), the nation will seamlessly deal with the situation as it holds.

Furthermore, the Guidelines state that the nation will conduct integrated and strategic activities as follows:

- a. The improvement of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the government ministries and agencies, a strengthened cross-governmental information security system, the promotion of space development and use of outer space from the perspective of information gathering, communications, and comprehensive strengthening of the posture and response capability to deal with cyber attacks.
- b. Cooperation among government organizations under normal conditions; integrated response by the government in the occurrence of various contingencies; examination of functions and systems related to governmental decision-making and response through initiatives such as regular simulations and comprehensive training and exercises; and consideration of necessary actions including legal measures.
- c. Establishment of a body in the Prime Minister's Office which will be responsible for national security policy coordination among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister after examination of organization, functions, and structure of the cabinet regarding security issues, including the Security Council.
- d. Improvement of systems for responding to various disasters and for civil protection; and close cooperation between national and local governments to ensure an appropriate response.
- e. Cooperation among governmental organizations in the efforts to improve the global security environment; participation in international peace cooperation activities in an efficient and effective manner through collaboration and cooperation with non-governmental organization and other entities; review and consideration of the five principles for participation in peacekeeping operations¹ and other policies regarding Japan's participation in consideration of actual situation of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
- f. Efforts to make Japan's security and defense policies easier to understand; and strengthened overseas information dissemination to further deepen international community's understanding of Japan's security and defense policies.

Regarding the defense force, the ultimate guarantee of Japan's national security, Japan will develop "Dynamic Defense Force" as explained in 1. of this section, based on the recognition that represents Japan's will and capability to prevent direct threats to Japan from reaching the country and to eliminate any threat that reached it.

2 Cooperation with its ally

To ensure Japan's peace and security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is vital and the military presence of the U.S. armed forces in Japan allow countries in the Asia-Pacific region to have a strong sense of security by functioning as deterrence against and response to contingencies in this region. In addition, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is also important for Japan to participate in multilateral security cooperation and effectively respond to global security challenges.

In light of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance as described above, Japan will further deepen and develop the Alliance to adapt to the evolving security environment, specifically through the following:

- (1) Continuous engagement in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordination with the United States, including bilateral assessment of the security environment and bilateral consultations on common strategic objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities.
- (2) The promotion of cooperation in existing fields, including intelligence cooperation, deepening of bilateral contingency planning, various operational cooperation including that upon situations in areas surrounding Japan, ballistic missile defense and equipment and technology cooperation, as well as consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security.
- (3) Studying measures to enhance Japan-U.S. cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen the U.S. forces' deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies.
- (4) Strengthening various regular cooperation, such as joint training and joint/shared usage of facilities, and promote regional and global cooperation through international peace cooperation activities, maintenance and enhancement of global commons such as outer space, cyberspace and sea lanes, as well as in the field of climate change.

¹ This is the basic policy for participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 4; Fig. III-3-4-3)

Along with these measures, the new NDPG states that Japan will steadily implement specific measures to review the posture of the U.S. forces in Japan to reduce the burden on local communities such as Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. forces, and it will also take active measures for smoother and more effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan including Host Nation Support.

3 Multilayered security cooperation with the international community

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

Forming a security network through a multilayered combination of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, together with the Japan-U.S. Alliance, is essential for engaging in efforts for the further stabilization of the security environment of the region effectively.

In light of this point, Japan will strengthen cooperation particular with South Korea and Australia through bilateral initiatives and multilateral cooperation involving the United States. Japan also will maintain and strengthen security cooperation with the nations of ASEAN, and cooperation with India and other nations that share common interest in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia.

Furthermore, Japan will promote mutual trust and establish and develop cooperative relationships with China and Russia, both of which have a significant influence on the security of the region. Specifically with China, in line with efforts to establish a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” and recognizing that the reinforcement of a constructive and cooperative relations with China in numerous fields is extremely important, it calls for active engagement, together with the ally and other countries, in encouraging China

to take responsible actions in the international community.

Regarding multilateral security cooperation, the new NDPG state that Japan will play an appropriate role in efforts toward establishment of regional order, norms, and practical cooperative relationships, particularly through such frameworks as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense-Military Meetings Plus (ADMM Plus).

(2) Cooperation as a member of the international community

Japan will actively promote such diplomatic efforts as the strategic and effective use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving root causes of conflicts and terrorism, and active engagement in international peace cooperation activities along with those diplomatic efforts, in order to improve the global security environment and contributing Japan's security and prosperity. In doing so, Japan will strive to provide assistance that makes use of Japan's knowledge and experience and carrying out these activities strategically with a comprehensive consideration of the various conditions facing Japan.

With regard to efforts toward global security issues, the new NDPG state that Japan will cooperate with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European nations, and for playing an active role in international activities to maintain and strengthen international public goods including the stable use of the maritime domain, outer space, and cyberspace, and in international community's efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and other means of delivery. Additionally, it is stated that Japan will actively participate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of a large-scale natural disaster or pandemic² and in the reform of the United Nations.

4 The Roles of Defense Forces

Japan plays the roles of “effective deterrence and response,” “further stabilization of the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region,” and “improvement of the global security environment”, while ensuring regular cooperation with relevant organizations, under the concept of “Dynamic Defense Force.”

1 Effective deterrence and response

The SDF ensures information supremacy through continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities to closely

follow trends in military activities of neighboring countries and to detect indications of various contingencies early, and will quickly and seamlessly respond as a situation unfolds.

With regard to this role, priorities are placed on (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, (2) response to attacks on offshore island, (3) response to cyber attacks, (4) response to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, (5) response to ballistic missile attacks, (6) response to complex contingencies, and (7) response to large-scale and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters.

² A phenomenon in which an infectious disease spreads throughout the world in a short period of time.

2 Efforts to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region

Japan will aim to stabilize the security environment in surrounding areas by carrying out various activities such as continuous ISR, and training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner.

In order to maintain the stability in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will conduct the following:

- Promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as well as joint training and exercises in a multi-layered manner.
- In the field of non-traditional security, Japan will promote practical cooperation by utilizing SDF capabilities including disposal of land mines and unexploded shells.
- Development and strengthening of regional cooperation practice and capacity building support¹ for nations in the region.



F-2 fighters in flight in peripheral airspace

3 Improvement of the global security environment

In order to “improve the global security environment”, Japan will conduct the following:

- International peace cooperation activities, including peace building such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and ceasefire monitoring
- Arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation, and capacity building support.
- Tackling international terrorism, securing the safety of maritime traffic, and maintaining maritime order.



Ise (foreground) and *Hyuga* (rear) destroyers during a deployment at sea



Airborne unit etc. carrying out air maneuver

¹ See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3

5 Specific Details of Defense Forces

1 SDF Posture

In order to properly perform the role of the defense force, the SDF should possess as follows while retaining the necessary posture for responses to various contingencies.

(1) Readiness posture

The SDF should be able to carry out speedy and effective operations through maintaining a readiness posture, enhancing mobility, and sustaining and improving skills and operations tempo. Furthermore, fuel and ammunition supplies (including training ammunition) should be secured as well as securing the durable base functions, and ensuring the maintenance of equipment.

(2) Joint operations posture

In addition to maintaining the intelligence collection posture required for quick and effective response, there should be a command and control functions utilizing advanced information networks including satellite communications, as well as an information sharing system and cyber attack response posture.

(3) Posture for international peace cooperation activities

Efforts should be made to enhance capabilities and posture to handle diverse missions, rapid deployment, and long-term operations.

2 SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

(1) Basic concept

The SDF maintains a posture that was explained in “1. SDF Posture” while efficiently maintaining the organization that enable it to play the role of the defense force effectively. In doing so, from the standpoint of effective and efficient buildup of defense capabilities, it calls for the prioritized buildup of functions usable for responding to various contingencies and in international peace cooperation activities, functions allowing asymmetrical response capability, and non-replaceable functions¹. Specifically, it calls for drawing down Cold War-type equipment and organization such as reducing tanks and artillery acquired during the Cold War period and reviewing the geographical distribution of units and unit operations, while enhancing the defense posture by placing emphasis on building

up the functions of warning and surveillance, maritime patrol, air defense, ballistic missile defense, transportation, and command communications in other regions including the southwest region. Regarding the budget allocation to support this, according to changes of the security environment, the 2010 NDPG calls for drastic review from a comprehensive viewpoint, removing compartmentalization without adherence to precedent.

Furthermore, from the standpoint of promoting joint operations and the formation of a joint Japan-U.S. response posture, it calls for overall review of the state of GSDF basic operational units (divisions, brigades) and five Regional Armies, with consideration for improving the efficiency of command and control functions.

Note that based on the understanding that a full-scale invasion is unlikely to occur, the total number of tanks and artillery of the GSDF that were arranged in preparation for an amphibious landing invasion will be reduced and the organization of units which held them will be reviewed. However, it is inappropriate to deny the possibility that a full-scale invasion could occur in the future that could only be handled by tanks and artillery. For that reason, with regard to preparations against full-scale invasion, the 2010 NDPG calls for maintaining relevant knowledge and expertise at a minimum level to respond to uncertain future conditions. With regard to tanks and artillery, recent advances in the military technology such as network technology should be adopted to make them usable in diverse contingencies such as responding to special operations forces and in urban combat, and a minimum scope of expertise will be maintained with regard to combat using the mobile strike capabilities led by tanks to prevent and eliminate invasion by the enemy and combat using artillery to strike enemy territory.

(2) Priorities in strengthening SDF organization, equipment and force disposition

The following are priorities in strengthening the organization, equipment and force disposition.

a. Strengthening of joint operation

The SDF will enhance the basis for joint operations, including the functions of the Joint Staff, command and control system, information-collecting capability and education and training. The SDF will also develop effective and efficient systems applicable to joint operations² by reorganizing, merging, centralizing and creating hubs for functions that extend across all three services of the SDF, such as transportation, medical service, anti-aircraft

¹ Although there is no fixed definition, “functions with asymmetrical response capabilities” refer to functions that can respond to hostile activities while efficiently and effectively maintaining advantage over the enemy, such as watch and surveillance carried out by a highly stealthy submarine against an enemy surface vessel. “Non-replaceable functions” refer to functions that, if they did not exist, the ability to respond to attacks by the enemy capable of causing severe damage would be lost completely, such as a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.

² Joint GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units under the direct control of the Minister of Defense when unified joint operation is necessary to carry out the mission smoothly.

artillery, search and rescue, procurement, supply and maintenance of equipment, and management of camps and bases.

b. Enhancing capabilities to respond to attacks on offshore islands

The SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed. Also, the SDF will enhance its capability to respond to attacks on those islands and ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space by securing bases, mobility, transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against such attacks.

c. Strengthening capabilities for international peace cooperation activities

The SDF will tackle on upgrading equipment, strengthening maritime and air transport capability, enhancing its logistical support posture and enhancing its engineering and medical functions, and reinforcing its education and training systems.

d. Enhancement of intelligence functions

In order to detect indications of various contingencies promptly and collect, analyze and share information appropriately, the SDF will strengthen its diverse information-collecting capabilities utilizing advanced technology, including space technology, and the all-source analysis and assessment capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and other organizations. Additionally, the SDF will strengthen the information sharing system among sections responsible for information collection, operations and policy making. Furthermore, the SDF will improve the system for providing appropriate intelligence support for activities conducted by SDF units dispatched abroad in remote areas through such measures as strengthening capabilities to collect geospatial information, the SDF will make efforts to expand and enhance intelligence cooperation and exchanges with countries concerned.

e. Incorporating progress in science and technology into defense forces

In order to develop defense forces underpinned by advanced technology and information capabilities, the SDF will appropriately exploit the achievements of technological innovation. In particular, the SDF will ensure reliable command and control and quick information sharing by developing an advanced command communications system and information and communications network, as well as develop a system for responding to cyber attacks in an integrated manner.

f. Efficient and effective build up of defense forces

Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will

control defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining its defense forces. At the same time, Japan will make sure its defense forces smoothly and successfully perform their missions while harmonizing other measures taken by the Government. To that end, Japan will clearly prioritize among its defense projects, concentrate resources on selected projects and promote efforts put forth in “VI. Basic Foundations to Maximize Defense Capability.”

(3) Organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the SDF

The following clarifies the approach to the organization, equipment and disposition of each service of the SDF.

a. Ground Self-Defense Force

In principle, the GSDF will achieve appropriate force disposition of highly mobile units with ISR capabilities according to geographical characteristics in order to integrally intertwine various functions and effectively respond to various contingencies. These units can be rapidly deployed to various locations, and are capable of performing diverse missions, including international peace cooperation activities. In so doing, priority will be placed on the defense of off-shore islands where SDF units are not currently stationed, and the organization and personnel structure of units will be reviewed so as to ensure thorough rationalization and streamlining of the defense forces.

Furthermore, the GSDF will continue to maintain the Central Readiness Force in order to effectively handle air transportation, airborne operations, defense against NBC weapons, special operations and international peace cooperation activities. Also, in order to provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, seven surface-to-air guided missile units will be maintained, reducing one unit from the current eight units while adopting more advanced surface-to-air guided missiles for these units.

As a result, compared to the 2004 NDPG, the 2010 NDPG calls for the following:

- (1) The authorized number of active duty personnel will be changed from 148,000 to 147,000, while total authorized personnel will be changed from 155,000 to 154,000;
- (2) Tanks will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400 vehicles, while artillery pieces (main artillery³ in the 2004 NDPG) will be reduced from approximately 600 to approximately 400 pieces; and
- (3) Surface-to-air missile units will be optimized/rationalized from eight anti-aircraft artillery groups to seven anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments (six anti-aircraft artillery groups and one anti-aircraft artillery regiment).

The basic tactical unit structure of eight divisions, six brigades, and one armored division will be maintained.

³ In the 2004 NDPG, howitzers, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and surface-to-ship missiles were categorized as “main artillery” whereas the 2010 NDPG categorizes these, with the exception of surface-to-air missiles, as “howitzers and rockets.”

(See Figs. II-2-2-1 and II-2-2-2)

Fig. II —2—2—1 Changes in the Target Authorized Number of Personnel and Main Equipment Numbers





Fig. II-2-2-2 Structure of Major Units (at the Formulation of the 2010 NDPG)



b. Maritime Self-Defense Force

The principal aims of the Maritime Self-Defense Force include defense of the seas surrounding Japan, ensuring the security of sea lanes, and international peace cooperation activities through regularly conducting such operations as ISR, and anti-submarine operations.

- (1) The Destroyer unit was initially expected to consist of mobile operations units (32 ships), which respond swiftly to various contingencies and in international peace cooperation activities, and area deployment units (3 ships in 5 guard zones, 15 ships in all), which conduct watch and defence operations in coastal waters. However, in light of growing demand for mobile operations squadron due to the expansion of international peace cooperation activities and other developments, the 2010 NDPG provides that area deployment units change their structure to function efficiently beyond guard zones, and to operate in watch and

surveillance in the southwestern area and in international peace cooperation activities. As a result, the Escort Ship Squadron is restructuring its forces to maintain four-unit Escort Corps (16 ships) whose basic unit consists of four escort ships, in addition to the four-unit Escort Group (32 ships) whose basic unit consists of eight escort ships. The squadron now comprises 48 escort ships in all.

(See Fig. II-2-2-3)

- (2) As the geographical relationship between strategic sea areas and military bases is taken into account in the 2010 NDPG, the submarine units increase the number of vessels to 22 to reinforce the posture to deploy submarines in key sea traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, to regularly conduct ISR over a wide range of waters surrounding Japan including the southwestern area, and to ensure the superiority of information and swiftly detect indications of security.

(See Fig. II-2-2-4)

(3) The Patrol aircraft units continue to maintain a nine-unit aviation corps consisting of four-unit fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and a five-unit patrol helicopter units. The squadron's capabilities are aimed at regularly conducting ISR over a broad range of seas surrounding Japan and to be effective in patrolling these seas and in ensuring the

security of sea lanes.

(4) The Minesweeping units continue to maintain one-unit mine-sweeping group aimed at performing effectively in minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in order to ensure the safety of the lives of citizens which rely on marine transportation.

Fig. II-2-2-3 Changes in the Structure of Units Deployed in the Region





Fig. II-2-2-4 Structure of Submarine Units



c. Air Self-Defense Force


The primary focus of the Air Self-Defense Force is conducting continuous ISR in the seas and airspace surrounding Japan, general air defense, and air defense of key areas using a full range of capabilities.

- (1) The Aircraft control warning units, which conduct continuous ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, have maintained an eight-unit warning group and a 20-unit warning corps. In view of limits on human resources, however, the units have been reorganized in

order to achieve comprehensive air defense capabilities as effectively as possible, with the eight-unit warning group reduced by four units. The squadron now maintains a four-unit warning group and a 24-unit warning corps⁴. In addition, the Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Squadron continues to maintain a six-unit Air Defense Missile Group which provides air defense in key political, economic and defense areas.

(See Fig. II-2-2-5)

Fig. II-2-2-5 Structure of the Air Warning and Control Unit (at the formulation of the 2010 NDPG)



⁴ Although the level of authorized strength has been reduced as a result of incorporating the warning group into the warning squadron, the personnel cuts have been redirected into efforts such as strengthening fighter interceptors, which conduct such operations as interceptor control based on information obtained from radar sites, in an effort to strengthen warning and control functions comprehensively.

(2) To provide a full range of capabilities for use in the defense of Japan's airspace, the Air Self-Defense Force maintains a 12-squadron fighter unit (including a squadron that maintains new fighter aircraft with advanced capabilities), a one-squadron air reconnaissance unit that performs air reconnaissance, a three-squadron air transport unit which swiftly transports troops in a variety of situations and which is actively involved in international peace cooperation activities, and a one-unit flight corps consisting of an air refueling and transport squadron that has air refueling functions and transport functions that can also be used in international peace cooperation activities.

In light of the security environment surrounding Japan, the Government's severe financial situation, and other pertinent factors, the Air Self-Defense Force has sought efficiency relating to major equipment, reducing the number of strategic combat aircraft from approximately 350 to 340. However, it still maintains approximately 260 fighter aircraft.

(See Fig. II-2-2-6)


d. Principal equipment and core units used in ballistic missile defense

Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) has adopted a multi-tier defense system consisting of an upper-tier defense through the SM-3-equipped Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defense through the Patriot PAC-3 for base protection.

(1) Under the four-ship structure for Aegis destroyers specified in the 2004 NDPG, if the necessity for regular maintenance, replenishment, recreation, and training is taken into account, basically two Aegis destroyers would be able at all times to execute their missions, and thus there would be limitations on maintaining a continuous readiness. In addition, in order to ensure the country's defense against the threat of ballistic missiles, including response to the future threat of ballistic missiles equipped with capabilities to avoid interceptor missiles, Aegis destroyers would have to be equipped with an Aegis BMD system, which, in case advanced interceptor missiles are developed in the future, could operate them.

In view of these circumstances, the 2010 NDPG, taking into account factors such as the Government's

Fig. II-2-2-6 Deployment of Fighter Units (at the formulation of the 2010 NDPG)




severe financial circumstances and the need for rapid improvement of anti-ballistic missile defense capabilities, provides a total of six Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense capabilities, including two Aegis destroyers equipped with Aegis BMD systems capable of operating the advanced interceptor missiles mentioned above⁵. In addition, the 2010 NDPG states that additional acquisition of BMD-capable Aegis destroyers, if to be provided separately, will be allowed within the number of destroyers after consideration of development of BMD-related technologies and fiscal conditions in the future, among other factors.

- (2) As a result of the reorganization of units described in (1) above, the air warning and control unit capable of ballistic

missile defense are to be reformed into a 11-unit warning group/squadrons from a seven-unit warning group and a four-unit warning squadrons. While three anti-aircraft groups used to possess Patriot PAC-3, the entire six anti-aircraft groups will be equipped with PAC-3, in order to make quick responses across the nation possible. On this occasion, the newly introduced PAC-3 will be limited to a one-unit FU⁶ under the 2010 NDPG in view of the severe financial circumstances, and together with the existing 16-unit FU (for anti-aircraft squadrons and that required for education), 17-unit FU are to be stationed uniformly throughout the country, creating the most efficient system possible.

(See Figs. II-2-2-7 and II-2-2-8)

Fig. II-2-2-7 System of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles



⁵ Renovations are scheduled for the existing Aegis destroyers Atago and Ashigara so that they can be equipped with Aegis BMD system and other hardware.

⁶ Fire Unit (smallest firing unit of the surface-to-air guided missile units)

Fig. II-2-2-8 NDPG Comparison Tables

Category			1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004NDPG	2010 NDPG
GSDF	Authorized personnel		180,000	160,000	155,000	154,000
	Regular			145,000	148,000	147,000
	Ready reserve			15,000	7,000	7,000
	Major units	Regionally deployed unitsinpeacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operation units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 combined training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division
		Ground-to-air guided missile units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups
Main equipment	Tanks Artillery (Main artillery) ¹	(About 1,200) ² (About 1,000/vehicle) ²	About 900 (About 900/vehicle)	About 600 (About 600/vehicle)	About 400 (About 400/vehicle)	
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units				4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 4 destroyer units
		(for mobile operations) (regional district units)	4 escort flotillas (Regional units) 10 units	4 escort flotillas (Regional units) 7 units	4 escort flotillas(8 ivisions) 5 divisions	
		Submarine units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	6 submarine units
Minesweeping units		2 minesweeper flotillas	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	
Patrol aircraft units		(Land-based)16 squadrons	(Land-based)13 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 flight squadrons	
Main equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	About 60 ships 16 ships About 220 aircraft	About 50 ships 16 ships About 170 aircraf	47 ships 16 ships About 150 aircraft	48 ships 22 ships About 150 aircraft	
ASDF	Major units	Aircraft control & warning units	28 warning groups 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)
		Fighter units (Fighter-interceptor units) (Support fighter units)	10 squadrons 3 squadrons	9 squadrons 3 squadrons	12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units Air refueling/transport units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons 1 squadron	3 squadrons 1 squadron
		Surface-to-air guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups
		Main equipment	Combat aircraft	About 430 aircraft	About 400 aircraft	About 350 aircraft
	(fighter aircraft)		(About 360 aircraft) ²	About 300 aircraft	About 260 aircraft	About 260 aircraft
	Main equipment & major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense ³	Aegis-equipped destroyers		—	—	4 ships
Aircraft control & warning units		—	—	7 groups 4 squadrons	11 surveillance groups/ units	
Surface-to-air guided missile units		—	—	3 groups	6 groups	

Notes: 1. Categorized as main artillery up till 2004 NDPG, but categorized in the 2010 NDPG as artillery except for surface-to-air guided missile units.

2. Although not stated in the 1976 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG table after 1995.

3. "Main equipment and major units that can also be used in defense against ballistic missiles" refers to the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF.

4. According to the 2012 NDPG, additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.

In order to organize, maintain, and operate a defense force efficiently and effectively, the following were focused:

1 Effective utilization of human resources

- (1) Maintain high morale and rigorous discipline among SDF personnel
 - Acquisition and training of high-quality personnel (take proper measures to deal with society of fewer children, popularization of higher education, and diversification of SDF missions).
 - Maintenance of health infrastructure (maintaining well-being of personnel).
 - Promotion of studies and educations on security issues, and enhancement and strengthening of intellectual infrastructure.
 - Ensuring proper treatment regarding execution of harsh and dangerous missions.
- (2) Appropriately manage the total number and structure of SDF personnel so as to maintain the strength of the forces
 - Review the rank and age structure.
 - Reform SDF personnel management system, so as to give precedence to young personnel to be assigned to front-line units while applying an optimum level of salaries and else to personnel engaged in other duties.
 - Streamline logistical operations through effective utilization of private-sector resources and capabilities, which will lead to further rationalization of personnel and curbing of personnel costs. These measures will secure effective defense capability amid Japan's severe fiscal conditions.
 - Promote effective use of retired SDF personnel in the society, implement measures to support their re-employment including reemployment not only in the private sector but also in the public sector, and ensure they receive adequate post-retirement treatment, along with introducing an early retirement system.

2 Measures for improving and strengthening the material foundation

- (1) Enhancement of the basis for operating equipment
 - Enhance the operational basis of defense devices by keeping device maintenance efficient and effective and by maintaining high levels of operational availabilities.
- (2) Enhancing cost-efficient acquisition of equipments
 - Improve cost-effectiveness through enhancement of overall system related to contracts and adopting more efficient procurement systems that contribute to reduction of lifecycle costs including equipment procurement costs.
- (3) Development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases
 - Through selection and concentration, develop and maintain defense forces in a stable manner from the medium- to long-term perspective by concentrating resources on the development and maintenance of defense production capability and technological bases.
- (4) Consideration of measures in response to changes in the international environment regarding defense equipment
 - Japan will study measures to respond to major changes in activities regarding peace-contribution, international cooperation, and cooperative international joint development and production.

3 Relationship between defense facilities and local communities

- In order to promote efficient maintenance and improvement of defense facilities, Japan will implement various measures to reconcile interests between defense facilities and the surrounding local communities in close cooperation with relevant local governments.

The 2010 NDPG provide the vision of Japan's defense forces for the next decade or so, to promote innovation of the defense forces. In case there are significant changes in circumstances, Japan will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment and technological trends at that time, among other things. The new Guidelines do not specify the time for the review, unlike the 2004 NDPG, which prescribed to review five years later.

Japan will conduct systematic transition management through Mid-Term Defense Programs and annual budgets so as to ensure smooth, swift and appropriate transition to the defense forces outlined in the 2010 NDPG, in consideration of relevant factors such as fiscal condition, maintenance of unit readiness, influence on morale, impact on local communities and defense production and technological bases. In addition, Japan will conduct ex-post verification and constant study on the future of its defense forces.