

# Chapter 1

# Defense Policies of Countries

## Section 1

## The United States

### 1 Security and Defense Policies

Even as the comparative influence of the United States changes, the country continues to play the greatest role in the peace and stability of the world and the trends of its security and defense policy have a great impact on many states including Japan. The Obama administration that was formed in 2009 has announced its national security policy and defense policy by releasing documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)<sup>1</sup>.

In January 2012, the Obama administration released a new defense strategic guidance<sup>2</sup>. Based on the understanding that the U.S. is at an inflection point due to factors both outside and inside the country, that is, the U.S. forces' drawing down from Iraq and Afghanistan<sup>3</sup> after a decade of war, and the demand for deep cuts in the government spending including defense spending under the serious fiscal circumstances of the government, the guidance was released to review the defense priorities and show a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020.

The defense strategic guidance indicates that the U.S. seeks the security of the Nation, allies and partners; the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system; and a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld. It also states that future U.S. forces will be smaller and leaner, but



Defense Secretary Panetta giving a speech at the ceremony to mark the end of the U.S. military's mission in Iraq (Baghdad) [U.S. Department of Defense]

will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced, and that it will have global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, while still ensuring the ability to maintain its commitment to Europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.

<sup>1</sup> NSS released in May 2010 states that national interests which the U.S. pursues are: (1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; (2) the prosperity through a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy; (3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; and (4) an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity. Based on them the NSS emphasizes the necessity of using and integrating all elements of American power, such as military, diplomacy and development, and of cooperating with allies, international organizations, and so on, for the purpose of achieving the above national interests.

The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress every four years according to U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 118. The document clarifies policies for national defense strategy, military composition, plans to modernize forces, national defense infrastructure, budget plans, etc., in view of the security environment over the ensuing 20 years. The QDR issued in February 2010 indicates that the role of the Department of Defense is to maintain and use its military capabilities in order to promote its national interests. The review goes on to indicate that the U.S. and its allies have the will and ability to exercise the use of force if necessary, and the U.S. possesses the capacity to act unilaterally if appropriate. In addition, the U.S. will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

<sup>2</sup> The formal title of the document is "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense".

<sup>3</sup> U.S. forces in Iraq completed withdrawal from Iraq on December 18, 2011.

## 1 Assessment of the Security Environment

The defense strategic guidance indicates that the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges (e.g. the rise of emerging countries like China, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), infringement on the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace) and opportunities (e.g. development of the Asia-Pacific region, the Arab Awakening in the Middle East) to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied.

## 2 Direction of Response

In light of this security environment, the defense strategic guidance shows the direction of the response by the U.S.

As for the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, the guidance indicates that because U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, the U.S. will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, and emphasize its existing alliances in the region and expand its networks of cooperation with emerging partners.

In addition, the U.S. will continue to take an active approach to countering the threats of al-Qaeda and violent extremists, encourage the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation, seek to assure access to and use of the global commons, and enhance its capabilities to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.

As specific efforts in each region, the guidance lists investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India, maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula by deterring and defending against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program, continuing engagement with Europe and Russia, and developing innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve its security objectives elsewhere in the world.

## 3 Priorities for Capability Development

The defense strategic guidance states that, to protect U.S. national interests and achieve the security objectives of the 2010 NSS in the current security environment, the U.S. forces will need to maintain and enhance its capabilities to succeed in the following primary missions:

- (1) Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare: U.S. military forces must continue the efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again, and will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.
- (2) Deter and Defeat Aggression: The United States' military planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains—land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.
- (3) Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)<sup>4</sup> Challenges: States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter the United States' power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in A2/AD environments<sup>5</sup>.
- (4) Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In partnership with other elements of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, should preventive measures fail.
- (5) Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space: The DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space.

<sup>4</sup> Anti-Access (A2) refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force's freedom of action within the operational area.

<sup>5</sup> QDR indicates that in order to defeat adversaries possessing sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, the U.S. is developing a new joint air-sea battle concept. According to the QDR, this concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains. It will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. In November 2011, the Department of Defense announced that it had set up the Air-Sea Battle Office to work toward implementation of the concept. Then in January 2012, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey released "Joint Operational Access Concept", a document that outlines how U.S. forces counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The concept is indicated to be an overarching concept, under which can nest other concepts dealing with more specific aspects of anti-access/area-denial challenges, such as the joint air-sea battle concept focused on the integration of air and sea capabilities. Further in March of the same year, the Director of the Army Capability Integration Center and the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command signed "Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept" that falls under the Joint Operational Access Concept and explains the contribution of Army and Marine Corps toward defeating area-denial capabilities.

- (6) **Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent:** As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in its inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.
- (7) **Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities:** U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack. They will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters.
- (8) **Provide a Stabilizing Presence:** A reduction in resources such as defense expenditure will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain U.S. support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location of deployment and the frequency of multilateral training exercises.
- (9) **Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations:** In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
- (10) **Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations:** The DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis.

The guidance states that these missions will largely determine the shape of the future U.S. forces, but their overall capacity will be based on requirements demanded by the missions (1), (2), (6), and (7).

## 4 Force Planning

Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of “fighting and winning two major regional conflicts.” However, the QDR released in 2010 indicates that the current security environment is more

complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the U.S. to determine its military’s force structure based on these ideas as the U.S. must address diverse contingencies. The QDR points out that, while the U.S. must possess the capacity to address two capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations<sup>6</sup>.

The defense strategic guidance indicates that even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. Secretary of Defense Panetta and other senior officials of the DoD said that U.S. forces continue to have capabilities to confront and defeat more than one adversary at a time<sup>7</sup>.

## 5 Military Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: (1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required; (2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, etc.; (3) the U.S. will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication; (4) the U.S. defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation; and (5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

In addition, The defense strategic guidance indicates that U.S. forces’ presence abroad reinforces deterrence, helps to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces, strengthens alliance cohesion, and increases U.S. influence.

In November 2011, President Obama delivered a speech at the Australian Parliament, clearly stated that he will give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region and indicated that the U.S. will enhance its presence in Southeast Asia while maintaining the presence in Japan and the Republic of Korea<sup>8</sup>. This policy of the U.S. is reaffirmed in the defense strategic guidance.

<sup>6</sup> At a press conference on February 1, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, “one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex than when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s.”

<sup>7</sup> At a press briefing on January 5, 2012, Secretary of Defense Panetta said “we will have the capability to confront and defeat more than one adversary at a time.”

<sup>8</sup> Since fall of 2011, Obama administration has shown its intention to place a premium on the Asia-Pacific region in various occasions. Secretary of State Clinton, for example, stated in her contribution to Foreign Policy (2011 November issue) titled “America’s Pacific Century” that one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade would be to lock in a substantially increased investment diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, at a joint press conference after the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting on October 25, 2011, Secretary of Defense Panetta said that the Pacific would remain a key priority for the U.S. and that he would strengthen its forces in the region.

Concrete examples of the enhancement of U.S. forces' presence in the Asia-Pacific region include enhanced presence of U.S. forces in Australia. In November 2011, President Obama and Australian Prime Minister Gillard jointly announced U.S.-Australia force posture initiatives, which include: (1) the rotational deployment of U.S. marines to Darwin and Northern Australia for around six months at a time where they will conduct exercises and training with Australian Defence Force<sup>9</sup>; and (2) increased rotations of aircraft of the U.S. Air Force through northern Australia, which will offer greater opportunities for combined training and exercises with the Royal Australian Air Force. The joint initiatives are described as part of the efforts to embody the basic concept of the U.S. forces presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which intends to pursue "a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military presence."<sup>10</sup>

Concerning the Middle East, after expressing particular concern about the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD, the defense strategic guidance indicates that U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council<sup>11</sup> countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran's development of a nuclear weapon capability. The guidance also states that the U.S. will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in, and support of, partner nations in and around this region.

Regarding Europe, the guidance states that the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities, and that in keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, U.S. forces' posture in Europe must also evolve. Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget request of the DoD, which was formulated in light of the strategic guidance and submitted to Congress in February 2012, indicates that while reducing the U.S. Army's four brigade combat teams in Europe by two<sup>12</sup>, the DoD will rotate U.S.-based units to Europe for training and exercises, and maintain the investment in missile defense systems in Europe.

For other regions, the guidance indicates that building partnerships remain important and that the U.S. will pursue new

partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America—who share common interests and viewpoints with the U.S. It also states that, whenever possible, it will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve its security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.

It is necessary to continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the QDR and the defense strategic guidance, are implemented in the future<sup>13</sup>.

## 6 Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons<sup>14</sup>; (3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability

<sup>9</sup> The initial deployment would consist of a company of 250 U.S. marines and aims to eventually establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air-Ground Task Force including aircraft, ground vehicles, and artilleries over a few years. On April 3, 2012, about 200 U.S. Marine Corps personnel arrived in Darwin as the first rotation.

<sup>10</sup> This basic concept was presented by then Secretary of Defense Gates in his speech on June 5, 2010 and also by Secretary of State Clinton in her paper mentioned above. Other concrete examples of the efforts to strengthen U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific region include the announcement to deploy Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore (announced in a speech given by then Secretary of Defense Gates on June 3, 2011) and the provision of 24 F-16 fighters to Indonesia (announced on November 18, 2011).


<sup>11</sup> Regional organization established in 1981 for the purpose of coordination, integration, etc. among member states. Its six members are the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.

<sup>12</sup> As for the reduction of brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe, 2010 QDR stated to maintain four BCTs in Europe, but the DoD reviewed its plan in April 2011 and announced that it would retain three BCTs.


<sup>13</sup> The DoD is, at present, conducting its Global Posture Review (GPR).

<sup>14</sup> In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attacks, the U.S. says that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance.) The U.S. also says that it will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies and partners.



**Fig. I-1-1-1** U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region


Notes: 1. Materials are taken from published documents of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2011) and others.  
2. The number of personnel deployed in Asia-Pacific Region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.



at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.


## 7 Space Policy

The U.S. relies on space-based systems for a great deal of its intelligence gathering and communications.

The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) issued in February 2011 indicates recognition of three trends in both the current and future space environment, namely that: 1) space is increasingly congested with man-made objects such as satellites; 2) space is increasingly contested by potential adversaries; and 3) space is increasingly competitive. Based on this understanding, the national security space objectives of the U.S. are: 1) to strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; 2) to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the U.S. by space; and 3) to energize the space industrial base that supports the national security of the U.S. In order to attain these goals, a number of strategic approaches have been pursued, namely: 1) to promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; 2) to provide partners with improved U.S. space capabilities; 3) to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; 4) to prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports the national security of the U.S.; and 5) to prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.

**Fig. I-1-1-2**

Change in Budget Estimates for the U.S. Department of Defense in the Next 5 Years



Source: U.S. Department of Defense, "FY2012 budget request" and "FY2013 budget request"


## 8 FY2013 Budget

As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established the increase in the government's debt limit in return for the deep cut of the government spending by FY2021. In January 2012 the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act will amount to approximately 487 billion dollars in 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (approximately 259 billion dollars in five years from FY2013 to FY2017)<sup>15</sup>.

The future defense spending cut mentioned above is one of the factors of the development of the defense strategic guidance, which presents the following principles: to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred while retaining the ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including evolutions in the strategic and technological spheres; to maintain a ready and capable force, even with reduced overall capacity; and to continue to reduce the "cost of doing business" of the DoD.

The principal objectives of the DoD's FY2013 budget request, announced in the meantime, are as follows: 1) making more disciplined use of defense dollars; 2) applying strategic guidance to force structure and investment; 3) ensuring the quality of the all-volunteer force; and 4) fully supporting deployed warfighters. The budget decreased by 5.2 billion dollars from the level of FY2011 budget to 525.4 billion dollars, and based on factors such as the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the budget for overseas contingency operations<sup>16</sup> decreased by

**Fig. I-1-1-3** U.S. Defense Budget



Notes: Expenses are shown in the Department of Defense Budget based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013; the amount for FY2012 is an estimate.

<sup>15</sup> According to the document published by the DoD concerning the FY2013 budget request that was submitted to Congress in February 2012, "the amount of reduction" here means the difference between the total DoD base budget for 10 (5) years estimated at the time of FY2012 budget request (submitted to Congress in February 2011) and the total DoD base budget for 10 (5) years estimated at the time of FY2013 budget request. The Budget Control Act provides that, if the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction of Congress cannot develop an additional deficit reduction proposal by November 23, 2011, the government spending will be mandatorily reduced ("sequestered") by 1.2 trillion dollars for the period from January 2013 to 2021. The Committee announced on November 21, 2011 that it would not be possible to make any bipartisan agreement of a deficit reduction proposal before the deadline. As a result, defense spending may be further reduced mandatorily after 2013, and the size of the reduction is pointed out to be about 500 billion dollars.

<sup>16</sup> This corresponds to expenses associated with the War on Terror during the Bush administration and includes the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

26.6 billion dollars from the level of FY2011 budget to 88.5 billion dollars. The total therefore fell by 31.8 billion dollars from the level of the FY2011 budget to 613.9 billion dollars. Concrete content of the budget includes a reduction of defense

spending by 259.4 billion dollars in five years from FY2013 to FY2017, postponement of a part of the procurement of F-35 fighters, and reduction in active end strength of U.S. forces by 102,400<sup>17</sup> in five years<sup>18</sup>.

## 2 Military Posture

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, the U.S. is moving ahead with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In April 2012, it announced that its current deployed strategic warheads<sup>1</sup> stood at 1,737, while its deployed delivery platforms<sup>2</sup> stood at 812.

The U.S. is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation's ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The concept consists of utilizing highly precise non-nuclear weapons to penetrate the anti-access (A2) capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be<sup>3</sup>.

In regards to missile defense (MD), the Obama administration is advancing a plan to improve MD capabilities in Europe in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well<sup>4</sup>, under the recognition that while the threat from Iran's short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved.

In February 2010 the U.S. announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). On homeland defense, the review noted that the U.S. would use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to regional defense, the U.S. would expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is

tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. In January 2012, the U.S. announced that it will continue investments into MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 560,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the defense strategy guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct the full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable to respond to any threat as a "middleweight force" bridging a seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. In January 2012, the DoD announced that it will reduce the active Army end strength to 490,000 and the active Marine Corps end strength to 182,000 in the future.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,080 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.40 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed to the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,500 combat aircraft

<sup>1</sup> - <sup>17</sup> Breakdown of the personnel reduction is; 72,000 in Army, 6,200 in Navy, 4,200 in Air Force, and 20,000 in Marine Corps.

<sup>18</sup> The U.S. will sustain the force structure of its Army and Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacific region. A part of the content of the FY2013 budget request had been released in advance as a major budget decision on future DoD budget on January 26, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> - <sup>1</sup> Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers.

<sup>2</sup> The figure as of March 1, 2012.

<sup>3</sup> Conventional Strike Missiles (CSMs) are the leading part of the developmental plan guiding this initiative. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a depressed trajectory that is clearly different from ballistic missiles.

<sup>4</sup> While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve MD capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020. Based on this plan, the U.S. will deploy a ground-based missile defense system in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018. In September 2011, the U.S. and Romania signed an agreement to deploy U.S. land-based SM-3 ballistic missile defense system in Romania. In the same month, the U.S. and Poland jointly announced official entering into force of the agreement to deploy U.S. land-based SM-3 system in Poland. In the same month, Turkey decided to host a U.S. missile defense radar in the country, and the radar has been already deployed. In October of the same year, the U.S. and Spain announced that four U.S. Aegis ships will be based at Naval Station Rota in southwestern Spain (first two ships are scheduled to arrive in 2014 and the remaining two ships in 2015).

across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

Moreover, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to address the increasing threats in cyberspace, by overseeing operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November of the same year<sup>5</sup>.

## 3

## Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 2,500 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan<sup>1</sup>.

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and

other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 15,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-16 fighters, C-130 transport aircraft in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

<sup>5</sup> As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed.

<sup>3-1</sup> The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2011), and it could change according to unit deployment.