Chapter 2  Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1  The United States

1 Security and Defense Policies

The Obama administration was formed in January 2009 and announced its national security policy and defense policy in 2010 by releasing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) in May. In February 2011, the National Military Strategy (NMS), based on the NSS and QDR, was released.\(^1\)

The NSS points out that national interests which the United States pursues are 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, 2) the prosperity through a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy, 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world, 4) an international order that promotes peace, security and opportunity. The NSS emphasizes the necessity of using and integrating all elements of American power, such as military, diplomacy and development, and of cooperating with allies, international organizations and so on, for the purpose of achieving the above national interests.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) notes that the role of the Department of Defense is to protect the United States and its allies, and to maintain and use its military capabilities in order to promote its national interests. The review goes on to indicate that the United States and its allies have the will and ability to exercise the use of force if necessary, and the United States possesses the capacity to act unilaterally if appropriate. In addition, the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

In his speech given in April 2011, President Obama called for pushing harder to not only review the security spending,
but conduct a fundamental review of the United States’ missions, capabilities, and role in a changing world amidst the worsening fiscal conditions of the U.S. government.2

1 Assessment of the Security Environment

The QDR indicates that the security environment is complex and uncertain due to such factors as wars that the United States is currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of emerging countries such as China and India3, the increase in influence of non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and infringements on the global commons —sea, air, space, and cyberspace. In addition, conflicts are becoming hybrid in that they are composed of complex characteristics, as the diverse actors that participate in these conflicts use various different means. Fragile states also face concerns of becoming hotbeds for extremism and radicalism, which are causes of conflict.

2 Defense Strategy

In the QDR the United States lists four priority objectives tailored for this security environment and notes the necessity to balance risk and resources among these objectives.

1) Prevail in today’s wars: The greatest priority is prevailing in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan.

2) Prevent and deter conflict: The United States shall defend itself from direct attack, deter potential adversaries, and foster regional stability while assuring access to the global commons. For this purpose, the United States will work to develop the capabilities of partners and develop the necessary level of forces for itself as well. Moreover, the United States will maintain the lowest level of safe and effective nuclear weapons consistent with the interests of the United States and its allies to deter attacks on the United States, its allies, and partners until a world free of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

3) Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: It is necessary for the United States to prepare to respond to diverse contingencies in the event that deterence fails and adversaries challenge its national interests.

4) Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force: It is necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force over the long-term in order to prevail in the current wars and to prepare for the future.

3 Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR indicates the need to enhance military potential in the following six key mission areas in order to implement the four priority objectives.

1) Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home: It is necessary to enhance the necessary posture at home to respond to potential attacks on U.S. soil, as well as to strengthen the cooperative relationships between domestic government-related institutions. For this reason, the United States must take measures such as reorganizing and developing consequence management response forces and enhancing its domain awareness capabilities for land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

2) Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations: The United States will enhance the necessary capabilities for prevailing in the wars that it is currently fighting. For this reason, the United States will take measures that include increasing its number of rotary wing aircraft, expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and augmenting major equipment for special operation forces.

3) Build the security capacity of partner states: In order to maintain a peaceful and stable international order, it is important to support the development of capabilities of security forces in partner countries. For this reason, it is necessary to improve language abilities, deepen knowledge on different regions and cultures, etc.

4) Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: Countries that possess capabilities such as a wide range of sophisticated weaponry are able to demonstrate anti-access capabilities that hinder the deployment of United States forces.4 It is necessary for the United States to

---

2 Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said at a press conference held in May 2011 that the comprehensive review directed by President Obama will be guided by the NSS, the NDS, the NMS, the Chairman’s Risk Assessment, and the QDR to ensure appropriate focus on strategic policy choices first and corresponding changes in the budget of the Department of Defense second.

3 The QDR indicates that the rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. In addition, the rise of China is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays larger role in the world.

4 The QDR points out that North Korea and Iran are developing and deploying new ballistic missile systems, and that these systems pose a threat to United States forces deployed forward. China, also, is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (CM), new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. However, China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization program, raising a number of questions regarding its long-term intentions. Therefore, U.S.–China relations must be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. Both countries should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements.
possess the capabilities to protect itself and its allies even amidst these environments. For this reason, the United States must work to improve long-range strike capabilities and to increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture.\(^5\)

5) Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The United States will establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters in sight of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the United States will enhance nuclear forensics, while also ensuring the protection of all nuclear materials in order to prevent the transfer of said materials to the hands of terrorists.

6) Operate effectively in cyberspace: The Department of Defense will build an environment in which cyber security is viewed as one of its priority items by developing a comprehensive approach to the cyberspace operations. In addition, the United States will train cyberspace experts and centralize command of the Department of Defense cyberspace operations in the newly established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

### Force Planning

Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts. However, the QDR indicates that the current security environment is more complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the United States to determine its military’s force structure based on these ideas as the United States must address diverse contingencies. The QDR points out that the United States military force structure is led by the previously mentioned four priority objectives and six mission areas, and, while the United States must possess the capacity to address two capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations.\(^6\) For that reason, the United States must rebalance its forces.

### Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: 1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required, 2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, etc., 3) the United States will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication, 4) America’s defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation, and 5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Furthermore, the new QDR will emphasize the following four priorities in adapting and developing its global defense posture over the next five-year period.

1) Reaffirm its commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development of European missile defense capabilities;
2) Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;
3) Balance ongoing operations, crisis response, and prevent-and-deter activities in the development of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia; and
4) Support partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.

In Europe, in revising its military posture in this way the United States has constructed a forward military posture that is lighter, more flexible, and more deployable. The QDR states that it will 1) serve to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners, 2) promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions, 3) demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, 4) build trust and goodwill among host countries, and 5) facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. Based on this policy, on the European continent the U.S. military will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters, while also beginning the deployment of a missile defense system and enhancement of its forward-deployed naval presence.\(^7\)

In the Asia-Pacific, the new QDR states that the United

---

\(^5\) In order to defeat adversaries possessing sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, the Air Force and Navy are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept. According to the QDR, this concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains. It will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. In an address given in December 2010, General Norton Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, pointed out the necessity of establishing a more permanent, more strategic relationship between the Air Force and Navy across the following three dimensions: system, strategic concept, and equipment, in order to contribute to the development of this concept.

\(^6\) At a press conference on February 1, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, “one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s.”

\(^7\) In April 2011, the Department of Defense reviewed its plan, and announced that it would retain three brigade combat teams (BCTs). By maintaining a flexible and rapidly deployable ground force, the United States can fulfill its commitment to NATO, engage effectively with its allies and partners, and meet the broad range of the 21st century challenges.
States will place importance on forward-stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces as U.S. bases and infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific are sparse. In addition, the United States will sustain and strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region. Specifically, the QDR lays down the following policies.

1) The United States will continue to adapt its defense posture as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and build the capacity of its Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

2) With Japan, the United States will continue to implement the bilateral Realignement Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a hub for security activities in the region.

3) The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities. The United States will also transfer the wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012.

4) The United States will improve the resiliency of U.S. forces and facilities in the region in order to safeguard U.S., allied, and partner interests in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In addition, the United States will explore opportunities for a more forward-deployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

5) The United States will seek additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.

In regards to the Middle East, the QDR indicates that while the United States had prioritized a defense posture necessary for the near-term operational capabilities in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is now time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests through the medium to long term. Moreover, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure partners of a long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter attacks while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. The United States will also strengthen defense capabilities and posture networks as efforts related to security in the Middle East for promoting regional stability and security.

In Africa, in October 2008, the United States Africa Command (headquarters: Germany) became an independent unified command. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African countries to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc. In addition, the QDR indicates that the United States will continue to maintain a limited military presence in Africa to help build partner security capacity.

In the North and South Americas, the QDR states that while the region does not require a robust forward presence, the United States will retain a limited presence and seek to improve relationships with the region’s countries. In addition, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

It is necessary to continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the QDR, are implemented in the future.

### 6 Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment...
is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment.

1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: In order to bolster the non-nuclear proliferation regime, the United States will reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran and create an environment that subjects parties not compliant with the NPT to heavy sanctions. In addition, in order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States will secure the safety of all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years and take measures such as expanding the budget of the Department of Energy nuclear non-proliferation programs. Furthermore, in order to promote arms control and disarmament, the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia and seeks the ratification and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy: The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons when deterring attacks via non-nuclear means, the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance). In response to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attacks, the United States will answer with a devastating conventional weapon response, but also reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy with consideration to advancements in biotechnology. In the case of addressing states that possess nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states that do not comply with the NPT, there remains a narrow range of possibilities in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack. Therefore, the United States is not prepared at present to limit the role of nuclear weapons to deterring a nuclear attack as its sole purpose. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies, and partners.

3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels: Under the New START, which was signed with Russia, the United States will maintain deterrence via its nuclear Triad of intercontinental ballistic
Part I  Security Environment Surrounding Japan

missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers while also reducing accountable deployed strategic warheads and delivery platforms. With regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons, these should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States and Russia, but the United States will retain a dual-capable fighter that can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Also, the United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) as it is possible to substitute these missiles by other means.

4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners: The United States will enhance bilateral and regional security ties and closely cooperate with its allies and partner countries. The United States will also enhance its regional security architectures, which are composed of missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and others. The United States will reassure its allies and partners that U.S.-extended deterrence is credible and effective.

5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. In order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of warheads, the United States will implement Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and enhance scientific, technical, and engineering infrastructures needed for implementing LEPs.

Chapter 2  Defense Policies of Countries

7  Space Policy

The United States has come to rely on space-based systems for a great deal of its intelligence gathering and communications. In 2010, the United States announced its “National Space Policy.” The sustainability, stability, free access and use of outer space are considered vital for the interests of the United States, and goals such as increasing the stability of outer space are the objectives of the nation’s space policy.

The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) issued in February 2011 indicates recognition of three trends in both the current and future space environment, namely that 1) space is increasingly congested with man-made objects such as satellites, 2) space is increasingly contested by potential adversaries, and 3) space is increasingly competitive. Based on this understanding, the national security space objectives of the United States are 1) to strengthen safety, stability, and security in space, 2) to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space, and 3) to energize the space industrial base that supports the national security of the United States. In order to attain these goals, a number of strategic approaches have been pursued, namely 1) to promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space, 2) to provide partners with improved U.S. space capabilities, 3) to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms, 4) to prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports the national security of the United States, and 5) to prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.

8  FY2012 Budget

Although the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening, the budget of the Department of Defense has increased more than two times over the past ten-year period. Against this background, since May 2010, the Department of Defense has been conducting the Defense Efficiencies Initiative in order to make savings in expenditure under the leadership of then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Although the defense budget will be increased in the coming years, a plan was announced in January 2011, which will curtail the rate of

![Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (at that time) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen announcing efforts for the Defense Efficiencies Initiative (U.S. Department of Defense)](image)

Note: Expenses are shown in the Department of Defense Budget based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2012; the amount for FY2011 is an estimate.
increase to below the original plan, by reviewing more than 150 billion dollars of expenditure across the whole of the Department, over the coming five-year period.\textsuperscript{10}

The principal objectives of the Defense Department’s fiscal 2012 budget proposal, announced in the meantime, are 1) taking care of military personnel, 2) balancing the capabilities to prevail in current and future wars, 3) supporting troops in the field, and 4) reforming the ways the Department of Defense does business. Based on efforts in the Defense Efficiencies Initiative, the budget increased by 4.2 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 553.1 billion dollars, and based on factors such as the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, the budget for overseas contingency operations\textsuperscript{11} decreased by 41.5 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 117.8 billion dollars. The total therefore fell by 37.3 billion dollars from the level requested in FY2011 to 670.9 billion dollars.

Furthermore, President Obama pointed out the necessity for deeper reductions in security spending in order to reduce the budget deficit in April 2011, although the Department of Defense had already saved 400 billion dollars through efforts made in the past two years. On top of that, he also set out the goal of cutting expenditure by 400 billion dollars by 2023, through holding the growth in base security spending below inflation.

\section*{Military Posture}

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, in February 2011, a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace START I came into force. The new treaty indicates that the two countries are reining their numbers of deployed strategic warheads\textsuperscript{2} to 1,550 and deployed delivery platforms to 700 in seven years following the entry into force of the treaty. In June 2011, the United States announced that its current deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,800, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 882.\textsuperscript{3}

The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The concept consists of utilizing highly precise non-nuclear weapons to penetrate the anti-access capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be.\textsuperscript{4}

In regards to missile defense (MD), in September 2009 the Obama administration reviewed the Bush administration’s plan to deploy portions of its MD system to the Czech Republic and Poland, and announced a new plan to improve BMD capabilities in Europe in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)\textsuperscript{5} as well. As reasons for the revision, the Obama administration has voiced that while the threat from Iran’s short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved.\textsuperscript{6} In February 2010 the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review noted that, while it would be difficult to accurately predict the threat of an ICBM fired at the United States, it is still important to watch the trends in North Korea and Iran. The report also mentioned that the development of SRBMs and IRBMs that

\textsuperscript{10} In the coming five-year period, there is a planned saving of 29.0 billion dollars for the Army, 35.0 billion dollars for the Navy, and 34.0 billion dollars for the Air Force, and a total saving of 54.0 billion dollars across the Department and agencies. The saving of approximately 100.0 billion dollars in total across all the military forces will be allocated to investment in high-priority military capabilities. The proposed budget plan will reduce real growth in the department's top line in FY2013 and FY2014, and then provide zero real growth in FY2015 and FY2016. In all, this budget proposal anticipates a total reduction of roughly 78 billion dollars to the original plan. Efforts announced for this reduction in expenditure include a reduction of the number of personnel in the Army and Marine Corps starting in FY2015 (a reduction of 27,000 in the Army and between 15,000 and 20,000 in the Marine Corps), a reduction in the number of high-ranking officer posts, disestablishment of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), two years of probation of the F-35B used by the U.S. Marine Corps experiencing significant testing problems (if the problems are not fixed during this time frame, the program should be canceled), and cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) which is a marine amphibious assault vehicle.

\textsuperscript{11} This corresponds to expenses associated with the War on Terror during the Bush administration and includes the cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{2} Conventional Strike Missiles (CSMs) are the leading part of the developmental plan guiding this initiative. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a depressed trajectory that is clearly different from ballistic missiles. Weapons from that concept would count against the new START treaty’s limit of delivery vehicles and warheads.

\textsuperscript{3} Briefing by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright (September 17, 2009).

\textsuperscript{4} While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve BMD capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020. Based on this plan, the United States will deploy a ground-based missile defense system in Romania by 2015 and in Poland by 2018. In July 2010, the United States and Poland revised the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement concluded during the times of the Bush administration, and the two nations agreed to deploy U.S. missile defense systems to the northern part of Poland. In addition, in May 2011, the United States and Romania agreed to deploy U.S. missile defense systems to the southern part of Romania.
can be used to attack U.S. troops stationed in other regions as well as allied countries is advancing and that these are a clear threat. Furthermore, in defending United States homeland, the review notes that the United States will use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to defense in other regions, the United States will expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the BMD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 570,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. The QDR indicates that the U.S. ground forces are to maintain capabilities to respond to all types of contingencies while focusing on counterinsurgency operations, stabilization operations, and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in operations in recent years, improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,070 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.14 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Northwest Atlantic Ocean; the 6th Fleet to the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,786 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

Moreover, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to address the increasing threats in cyberspace, by overseeing operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operation Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November of the same year.

---

6 The 2nd Fleet headquarters are planned to be abolished under efforts aimed at streamlining annual expenditure.

7 The defense budget proposal for FY2012 includes a budget to start development of next-generation long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The option exists to have the next-generation long-range bombers unmanned.

8 As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed.
Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 3,000 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan.\(^1\)

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 17,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-16, C-130 in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

---

\(^1\) The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2009), and it could change according to unit deployment.