Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and

United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

April 2011
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the last Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made tangible progress, arresting the insurgents’ momentum in much of the country and reversing it in a number of important areas. The coalition’s efforts have wrested major safe havens from the insurgents’ control, disrupted their leadership networks, and removed many of the weapons caches and tactical supplies they left behind at the end of the previous fighting season. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to increase in quantity, quality, and capability, and have taken an ever-increasing role in security operations. Progress in governance and development was slower than security gains in this reporting period, but there were notable improvements nonetheless, particularly in the south and southwest. Overall, the progress across Afghanistan remains fragile and reversible, but the momentum generated over the last six months has established the necessary conditions for the commencement of the transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces in seven areas this summer.

KEY EVENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

The most significant event in this reporting period was President Karzai’s March 2011 announcement of seven geographic areas that would begin the transition to Afghan lead for security later this year. Other key events during this reporting period included the NATO Lisbon Summit (which culminated in the Afghan-NATO Enduring Partnership Declaration in November 2010), the U.S.-Afghanistan Security Consultations Forum in February 2011, and the NATO Defense Ministerial in March 2011. Additional important developments included: the seating of the lower house of the Afghan Parliament in January 2011; the meeting of the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board in February 2011; and the commencement, in March 2011, of U.S.-Afghan bilateral negotiations on a long-term, strategic partnership.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review also took place during this reporting period. Conducted in November and December 2010, the review included inputs from across the U.S. Government and from commanders in the field. The review assessed that the United States has made progress on its strategic objectives of denying safe haven to al-Qaeda and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. The ANSF, in cooperation with the United States and its partners, are degrading the insurgency and providing time and space to allow Afghanistan to build sufficient capacity to secure and govern the Afghan people.

NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2011, to September 30, 2011.

1 This report is submitted consistent with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the seventh in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2012 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of March 31, 2011. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers progress in Afghanistan from October 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011. The next report will include an analysis of progress toward security and stability from April 1, 2011, to September 30, 2011.

2 On March 22, 2011, President Karzai publicly announced that transition would begin in July 2011 for the provinces of Kabul (excluding Sarobi District), Panjshir, Bamyan, Balkh (beginning in the municipal district of Mazar-e Sharif), Helmand (beginning in the municipal district of Lashkar Gah), Laghman (beginning in the municipal district of Mehtar Lam), and Herat (beginning in the municipal district of Herat City).

3 The Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review laid out the following priorities for 2011: intensify regional diplomacy to enable a political process that will promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, and exploit the momentum created by recent security improvements to complete transition by 2014 as agreed at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit.
THE SURGE HAS LED TO TANGIBLE SECURITY PROGRESS

The surge in U.S. and coalition forces that arrived in Afghanistan throughout 2010 is responsible for much of the progress seen over the last six months. The final component of that surge (the arrival of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division Headquarters, which assumed responsibility for Regional Command – South) occurred in November 2010. Complemented by an additional 70,000 Afghan security forces, the arrival of 10,000 additional coalition forces, and a tripling of U.S. civilians serving in Afghanistan to over 1,100 personnel, the United States and coalition partners put into place, for the first time, the necessary resources to achieve the objectives set forth in the comprehensive, civil-military campaign plan.

The surge in conventional forces and special operations forces, the increased pace and scope of operations, and the expansion of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program and Village Stability Operations have, together, placed unprecedented pressure on the insurgency. Together, these efforts have driven insurgents out of key population centers in the south, cleared safe havens that the enemy possessed for years, and disrupted its networks and plans. The additional forces have also allowed the coalition to expand operations, particularly into 34 districts that now have ALP units – a four-fold increase from September 2010, when only eight districts had ALP sites. These efforts have allowed coalition and Afghan forces to expand and deepen operations in key areas and to maintain an increased operational tempo throughout the winter months.

There has been security progress in each of the six regional commands in Afghanistan. In Regional Command – East, ISAF and ANSF partnered operations, along with improved cross-border coordination with Pakistan, led to the increased interdiction of insurgents and their supply lines along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In Regional Command – Capital, where Afghans are already in the lead for security on most operations, Kabul continued to enjoy a relatively high level of security, which has enabled economic development and improved governance. The surge also allowed ISAF to increase force levels in Regional Commands North and West, where economy-of-force operations are yielding expanded security and improved freedom of movement in major population centers.

In Regional Commands South and Southwest, ISAF and ANSF continued to focus their efforts on securing the population centers in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, the traditional heartland of the Taliban. Although there has been an increase in security incidents in these two provinces, this was to be expected as coalition and Afghan operations have taken away long-held insurgent safe havens while the insurgents have fought hard to retain these areas. Noticeable security gains are evident in Kandahar City and several critical surrounding districts, in Uruzgan Province, and in several districts in Helmand Province.

TALIBAN INFLUENCE IS DECREASING

The surge in forces and an increased operational tempo have enabled ISAF to disrupt and degrade the insurgency’s capabilities, contributing to a loss of Taliban influence in key areas across the country. The Taliban remained enormously unpopular in Afghanistan during this period, with 75 percent of the population believing it would be bad for the country if the Taliban
returned to power (compared to 68 percent at the end of the last reporting period). Insurgent capabilities appear to be declining as well: the proportion of complex attacks (attacks conducted by multiple elements involving at least two types of weapon systems) this reporting period was one-half as high as in the previous six months, and the proportion of effective attacks declined as well. As a result of coalition operations, hundreds of low- and mid-level insurgent commanders have been removed from the battlefield, the insurgents’ freedom of movement is more restricted, and their logistics and plans are increasingly disrupted.

Additionally, several indicators suggest that ISAF operations are steadily eroding insurgent morale. Recent reports point to increased friction between rank-and-file insurgents in Afghanistan and their senior leadership in Pakistan. Moreover, the progress made by Afghan Government-led initiatives, such as the High Peace Council and the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), in drawing insurgents away from the battlefield suggests that discord within the insurgency may be increasing. Since the APRP became operational in July 2010, more than 700 former Taliban have officially reintegrated into Afghan society, another 2,000 insurgents are in various stages of formal reintegration, and still others have put down their weapons and informally rejoined Afghan society.

**THE ANSF ARE KEY TO LONG-TERM AFGHAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY**

Capable, professional ANSF are perhaps the most critical precondition for a stable, secure Afghanistan; this reporting period saw significant gains in improving the quantity and quality of those forces. Since September 30, 2010, Afghanistan has added 36,229 new recruits to the ANSF – 21,199 to the Afghan National Army and 15,030 to the ranks of the Afghan National Police. An additional 30,000 ANSF have completed literacy training and roughly 60,000 others are in literacy training on any given day. Two new branch schools opened in the past six months – the armor and signals schools – bringing the total number of branch schools to eleven (of twelve planned). The Ministries of Interior and Defense have also instituted a series of reforms, which are expected to free up leadership billets and encourage merit-based promotions throughout the ranks.

In addition to increasing their numbers, army and police units have also grown more capable and effective. By the end of the reporting period, 75 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts were rated as either “Effective with Advisors” or “Effective with Assistance,” although none were yet rated as independent. In the ANA, 74 percent of battalion-sized units were now rated as “Effective with Advisors” or “Effective with Assistance,” compared to just 51 percent at the end of the last reporting period.

More ANSF units are now operating alongside ISAF partners and mentors as well. As of March 2011, 95 percent of all ANA units and 89 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts were partnered with ISAF troops, and 95 percent of all ISAF operations are conducted side-by-side with the ANSF. ANSF units also comprise a larger percentage of the force in major operations. In early 2010, the ANSF comprised just 30 percent of committed forces in Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province; six months later, in Operation Hamkari in Kandahar Province, the ANSF comprised approximately 60 percent of overall forces. This greater participation by ANSF in

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4 Afghanistan National Quarterly Assessment Research, Wave 10, January 5, 2011. Question: “If the Taliban were to return to power, would it be a good thing for the people and the country?”
security operations has allowed Afghan forces to assume greater security responsibilities in several areas of the country, including Kabul, where they are already in the lead for security operations.

Even with this progress, challenges remain. NTM-A is currently facing a significant shortfall of ANSF trainers and mentors, which, if not adequately addressed, poses a strategic risk to ANSF growth and an increased risk to transition. Beyond the need for additional trainers, ANSF attrition levels continue to present challenges to force generation. To mitigate attrition, ISAF has expanded incentive programs, including expeditionary pay and a leave transport program for ANSF personnel.

**Efforts to Improve Governance and Development Continue**

Governance and development are progressing, as may be expected, more slowly than security in most places; nevertheless, some concrete gains have been made in the last six months. At the end of this reporting period, an assessment of 138 of Afghanistan’s 403 districts showed that 49 percent of the Afghan population lived in areas rated as having “emerging” governance or “full authority” – up from 38 percent reported in September 2010. The Afghan Civil Service Institute graduated 16,000 civil servants during this reporting period and instituted an internship program that placed 3,000 college graduates in national and sub-national civil-service positions across the country. In March 2011, residents of Marjah District – the one-time hub of narcotics trafficking in Helmand Province – held elections for a community council in which nearly 75 percent of registered voters participated.

Although progress in development has been uneven, there have been some notable gains. During this reporting period, the Afghan public’s perception of the provision of basic services has improved, numerous important infrastructure projects have progressed, and efforts to bolster the agriculture sector have been yielding results. A new railway link from Mazar-e Sharif to Uzbekistan has been completed, as has a power transmission line to supply electricity to Kabul, a runway extension at Herat Airport, and extensive renovations to the country’s highway network. Other notable achievements in development included progress in streamlining customs collections via automated systems and ongoing efforts to improve the agricultural sector by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Although Afghanistan is currently reliant on international aid, economic growth is steady, and there is great future potential to generate revenue through mineral extraction and through new regional economic trade agreements. Nonetheless, external support will continue to be critical in the near and medium term to help mitigate shortfalls in infrastructure, human capacity, security, and anticipated government revenue.

**Difficult Work Still Lies Ahead**

Despite the gains in security and in ANSF growth and development, the Afghan Government faces significant political challenges at the national and sub-national levels, which could potentially threaten the progress made in the last six months. At the provincial and district levels, slow development of governance capacity continues to hamper both the reach of the Afghan Government and its effectiveness. Corruption and criminal patronage networks continue to undermine state institutions, and allegations of voter fraud in the September 2010 elections
and delays in seating the newly-elected parliament until January 2011 undermined perceptions of legitimacy. Issues of Afghan capacity, including a lack of human capital that impedes budget execution and service delivery, are exacerbated by extensive bureaucracy and areas of corruption that continue to present serious challenges.

Civilian casualties remain a serious concern, despite the fact that a March 2011 United Nations study showed that civilian casualties caused by ISAF and Afghan forces decreased by 20 percent in 2010, even as coalition and ANSF numbers surged and combat operations intensified. In contrast, casualties attributed to the insurgents accounted for 75 percent of all casualties and increased by 24 percent over the previous year. Nonetheless, several incidents in the first quarter of 2011 led to some friction between ISAF and the Afghan Government, which prompted ISAF to establish a civilian casualty mitigation working group to review further the tactical directives governing the use of force. Even as the coalition does its utmost to avoid civilian casualties, it will not impose overly-restrictive rules of engagement that prevent troops from defending themselves.

**SUMMARY**

The 2010 surge of ISAF forces and civilian personnel, and the ongoing surge of ANSF, has allowed ISAF to get the inputs right in Afghanistan for the first time. As a result, security gains have been made, as have improvements in governance and development. The Taliban’s momentum has been halted and much of their tactical infrastructure and popular support removed, although hard fighting is expected through the spring, summer, and fall of 2011. Key insurgent safe havens have been eliminated, hundreds of insurgent leaders have been captured or killed, and more than 2,000 insurgents have begun re-integrating into Afghan society. The ANSF continue to translate training into operational capacity, and are now regularly operating side-by-side with ISAF troops and proving themselves increasingly capable in combat. Overall, a sound strategy and sufficient resources have given the coalition sufficient momentum to capitalize on these gains through the summer and, in July 2011, to begin the process of transitioning security to the Afghan Government. Nonetheless, the months ahead will see setbacks as well as successes. There will be difficult fighting and tough losses as the enemy tries to regain momentum and key areas lost in the past six months.
SECTION 1 – STRATEGY

1.1: U.S. STRATEGY

In the December 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual Review, President Obama reaffirmed the core goal of the U.S. strategy: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and U.S. Allies in the future. The specific objectives in Afghanistan are to deny safe haven to al-Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. To support these objectives, U.S. and coalition forces will continue to degrade the Taliban insurgency in order to provide time and space to increase the capacity of the ANSF and the Afghan Government so they can assume the lead for Afghanistan’s security by the end of 2014.

1.2: NATO STRATEGY, ISAF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The NATO strategy is based on the NATO Comprehensive Strategic and Political-Military Plan and is implemented through the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10302 (Revision 2), Joint Forces Command Brunssum OPLAN 30302, and ISAF OPLAN 38302.5 The mission in the current ISAF OPLAN states:

*ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government and the international community, conducts comprehensive, population-centric counterinsurgency operations in order to: protect the Afghan people; neutralize insurgent networks; develop Afghan National Security Forces; and support the establishment of legitimate governance and sustainable socio-economic institutions.*

ISAF operations seek to increase security for the Afghan population and are focused on key terrain districts and area of interest districts where the majority of the population live. Effective partnered operations between ISAF and the ANSF are the most efficient way to improve ANSF capacity and are critical to sustaining current progress.

The execution of ISAF OPLAN 38302 focuses on a “clear-hold-build” strategy that will create the conditions to complete a responsible transition to Afghan lead for security throughout the country by the end of 2014. ISAF seeks to solidify security gains while building Afghan capacity through six lines of operation: 1) protect the population; 2) develop the ANSF; 3) neutralize insurgent networks; 4) neutralize criminal patronage networks; 5) support development of legitimate governance; and 6) support sustainable socio-economic development.

To advance these priorities, Commander ISAF (COMISAF) General David H. Petraeus has overseen revision of the ISAF campaign plan; issued clarifying tactical directives and guidance; participated in the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB) to set goals and priorities; worked closely with the NATO Senior Civilian Representative Ambassador Mark Sedwill to align civilian-military effects; and has developed, in conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador, a U.S. Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan.

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5 ISAF OPLAN 38302, Revision 5, dated December 31, 2010.
6 COMISAF-approved mission statement from the ISAF OPLAN 38302, Revision 5.
**ISAF Command and Control**

The ISAF command and control structure remained largely unchanged during the reporting period. Core elements of the structure include: ISAF Joint Command (IJC) as ISAF’s operational-level headquarters; NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to manage ANSF generation and institutional capacity; and the ISAF Special Operations Forces headquarters.

**Figure 2: ISAF Command and Control Structure (as of March 31, 2011)**

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**NATO Commitments to ISAF**

Three NATO events during the reporting period underscored the strong commitment of NATO Allies and partners to Afghanistan: the NATO Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial in October 2010; the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010; and the NATO Defense Ministerial in March 2011.

During the first NATO Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial in October 2010, NATO members and ISAF troop-contributing nations reiterated their support for the mission in Afghanistan and pledged to improve and expand capabilities (such as counter-improvised explosive device support and information sharing) that will further enable NATO-ISAF operations in Afghanistan.
The NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010 was a key event for this reporting period. NATO Allies and partners made three key announcements at the Summit: 1) to reaffirm NATO’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan through the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership Declaration; 2) to uphold commitments by NATO Allies and partners to fill outstanding trainer requirements; and 3) to begin a transition process in early 2011 that will transition the lead for security responsibilities to the ANSF by the end of 2014.

A key product of the NATO Lisbon Summit, the Enduring Partnership Declaration, recognizes that the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan and preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven for transnational terrorists and extremists are the strategic objectives of NATO.

The March 2011 NATO Defense Ministerial built upon the progress made at the Lisbon Summit. Notably, NATO and ISAF Defense Ministers endorsed the recommendations of the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal7 Board (JANIB) for the first set of geographic areas to transition to Afghan lead. At the March Ministerial, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reinforced the message that NATO and troop-contributing nations must remain committed to the effort in Afghanistan. While many nations face financial and political pressure to reduce their commitment to Afghanistan, a premature drawdown of forces threatens the gains that have been made to date.8 Considerations about any drawdown must be driven by security conditions and operational needs on the ground, rather than by mathematical calculation shaped by political concerns.

NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is a multinational command that trains, mentors, and equips the ANSF with the goal of creating a professional and sustainable security force capable of providing security to the Afghan people. Lieutenant General William Caldwell serves as both Commander NTM-A and Commander Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Through NTM-A, coalition partners provide institutional trainers to develop the ANSF with training in basic military and police skills, logistics, and literacy.

During its first year of operation, NTM-A focused on growing the ANA and the ANP. In its second year, NTM-A is placing greater emphasis on improving the quality and professionalism of the ANSF, developing leadership capacity, developing ANSF stewardship, and reducing attrition. Several factors contribute to improving the quality of the ANSF, most notably an adequate supply of trainers and mentors from ISAF Allies and partners. The United States engaged extensively with coalition partners throughout 2010 and early 2011 to increase their commitments of trainers, which are essential to a successful transition process.

NATO SENIOR CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO AFGHANISTAN

Since January 2010, Ambassador Mark Sedwill has served as the top-ranking civilian of the NATO effort and the counterpart to COMISAF as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). Reporting to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and under the political

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7 Dari for “transition.”
8 Secretary Gates also emphasized the importance of funding at the March Ministerial, highlighting the need for an additional €1B in funding annually from U.S. Allies and partners to support the Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
guidance of NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC), Ambassador Sedwill served as co-chair of the JANIB and the lead interlocutor with the Afghan Government on transition. He also served on the JCMB and coordinated the delivery of civil support to the ISAF campaign pursuant to NATO’s strategic objectives. The SCR completes his tenure in April 2011, and will be succeeded by UK Ambassador Simon Gass.

Under Ambassador Sedwill’s leadership, the SCR’s office: briefed ambassadors from other troop-contributing nations; regularly briefed the NAC on civilian reconstruction efforts; prepared monthly joint transition reports with COMISAF for the NAC; actively supported the UN’s Special Representative of the Secretary General to develop guidelines for the 2010 Parliamentary elections; implemented high-level strategic review boards to ensure that operational planning effectively supports NATO’s political objectives; and co-chaired Regional Command Boards to better coordinate the efforts of the SCR, ISAF, and troop-contributing nations in supporting the ISAF campaign plan.

**CAVEATS**

National caveats for ISAF troops require that coalition partners and international troops operate in a manner consistent with their national laws and policies. Regardless of national caveats, all ISAF coalition partners within Afghanistan operate according to the ISAF Rules of Engagement.

While progress has been made with some Allies and partners to reduce these caveats, they constrain ISAF operations by limiting the types of missions a given country’s forces are authorized to undertake in Afghanistan. Senior U.S. leadership, to include Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, consistently emphasize the need for a reduction of caveats to allow for the greatest operational effect.

**NATO – ISAF FORCE LEVELS AND PLEDGES**

The United States and 47 other countries currently have troops deployed to Afghanistan. As of March 31, 2011, this included approximately 99,199 U.S. military personnel. International force levels and pledged contributions leveled off during the last six months at approximately 47,000 personnel. NATO Allies command three of the six regional commands, including Germany (Regional Command – North), Italy (Regional Command – West), and Turkey (Regional Command – Capital). Allied forces are deployed at all NATO headquarters, including the IJC and NTM-A.

Despite previously announcing their intention to end their missions in Afghanistan, both Canada and the Netherlands have reconsidered how they can provide a commitment to the ANSF training effort. Canada will contribute approximately 950 personnel in a non-combat training role following the end of its combat mission in July 2011. The Netherlands has already redeployed 1,600 military personnel; however, it will contribute approximately 545 more personnel.

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9 The number of U.S. Forces as of March 31, 2011 reflects the force management level number, utilizing the Secretary of Defense Business Rules for Managing Afghanistan Forces, which does not include the overlap of transitioning forces, short-duration temporary duty personnel, U.S. forces assigned to DoD combat support agencies, and other forces not operationally assigned and therefore unavailable to the commanding general. The current force level of 99,199 personnel reflects an estimate per current theatre calculations. The confirmed boots-on-the-ground (BOG) total for March 31, 2011 will be released in the monthly Congressional BOG report in early May 2011, after validation and confirmation through the Combatant Commander, services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
personnel in an Integrated Police Training Mission. This is the type of reinvestment of forces the U.S. Government and ISAF will encourage Allies and partners to consider throughout the transition process as the ANSF begins to take responsibility for combat operations.
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SECTION 2 – UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

During the reporting period, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) continued to make significant progress, increasing in quantity, quality, and operational capacity. They have exceeded their growth goals due to increased recruiting and improved retention, and remain on schedule to meet their October 2011 goals of 171,600 and 134,000, respectively (Figure 3). As of March 2011, the Afghan National Army (ANA) force levels reached 159,363 soldiers – 4,375 ahead of the goal of 154,998. The Afghan National Police (ANP) also exceeded its growth goals, reaching 125,589 police – 3,589 ahead of its goal of 122,000. Notably, both the ANA and the ANP continue to reach and exceed growth benchmarks despite recent attrition rates above target levels.

Marked increases in the size of the ANSF have been paralleled by significant quality improvements, as U.S. and coalition forces in key terrain districts continue to live, train and operate shoulder-to-shoulder with the ANA and ANP. Currently, 96 percent of ANA and 83 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts are partnered with ISAF units, and 95 percent of all operations are conducted with partnered forces. In fact, in the major operations west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised nearly 60 percent of the overall force.

Figure 3: ANSF Growth Chart (Actual and Expected)

This section is submitted consistent with Section 1231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended. In accordance with subsection (a), the section includes a description of the long-term plan for sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that the ANSF will be able to conduct operations independently and effectively and maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan. The section generally describes a comprehensive strategy with defined objectives; mechanisms for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided to the ANSF; and any actions necessary to assist the Afghan Government to achieve a number of specified goals and the results of such actions. Consistent with Section 1231, this section has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This assessment complements other reports and information provided to Congress regarding Afghanistan; however, it is not intended as a single source of information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its international partners, or Afghanistan. NOTE: This is a historical document that covers the United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces from April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011.
This unparalleled growth and development, combined with the ongoing ISAF-ANSF partnership, has provided Afghanistan with a surge of increasingly capable soldiers and police that has reinforced the surge of U.S. and coalition forces – a collective surge that has directly contributed to the security progress achieved during the reporting period. In the coming year, ISAF and its coalition partners will continue to support this growth and development to ensure that the ANSF is prepared to assume the security lead throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

2.1: ANSF WAY AHEAD

There are 92,000 more Afghan soldiers and police than there were in November 2009. While ANSF numbers have increased significantly, the effort to improve their quality and capacity is increasing as well.

Literacy training has become a force multiplier, helping to provide a more capable force and providing an incentive for improved recruitment and retention. Officer and non-commissioned officer training remains a priority as NTM-A and CSTC-A continue to address ongoing leadership shortfalls. In order to make the ANSF more self-sufficient, NTM-A/CSTC-A efforts continue to focus on the development of key enablers, such as intelligence, logistics, fire support, airlift, and engineer units. Finally, efforts to professionalize the ANSF have led to creation of a corps of select Afghan trainers who will gradually take the training lead. All of these efforts are intended to move Afghanistan closer to a professional, sustainable ANSF that is subject to civilian control and is capable of independently providing security to the Afghan people.

To achieve this vision, NTM-A/CSTC-A will focus on five critical areas in 2011: training Afghan trainers and instructors; accelerating leader development; building literacy and vocational skills; inculcating an ethos of stewardship; and developing enduring institutions, systems, and enablers. Three key challenges will also be addressed: losses through attrition, leadership shortfalls, and literacy. Building on these institutional and special skill training efforts, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) forces will continue to partner in the field with the ANSF and will focus on improving ANSF leadership, operational effectiveness, accountability, professionalism, command and control, joint planning, and combat support capabilities, while providing the steady presence necessary to allow the ANSF to continue to grow in both quality and maturity.

2.2: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD), with advice from NTM-A/CSTC-A, is developing systems and institutions required to grow and professionalize the ANA. Ministerial development is supported by a variety of advising groups, working groups, key leader engagements, inter-ministerial coordination, and the Ministerial Development Board (MDB). Coalition government civilians, alongside military and contract advisors, build enduring ministerial capability and capacity by supporting development of the core management and operational systems essential to enable the MoD to plan, program, manage, and sustain the ANA. Approximately 272 military personnel, government civilians and contractors from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada participate in this effort, developing capacity in horizontal integration and strategic
management; support to operations; personnel management; and national logistics above the corps-level.

Figure 4: Capability Milestone Ratings Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM-4</th>
<th>The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CM-3</td>
<td>Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-2B</td>
<td>Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-2A</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-1B</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-1A</td>
<td>Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NTM-A/CSTC-A continue to use the Capability Milestone (CM) Rating System to assess the progress of both the MoD and the MoI. (Figure 4). CM rating assessments are conditions-based, and departments are evaluated each quarter using specific objectives and milestones. Overall, the MoD is assessed as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish its mission, resulting in a rating of CM-2B, a status it achieved in October 2010.

In May 2009, all of the assessed departments within MoD and the General Staff were rated as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-3) except for two (Inspector General and Budget & Finance) rated as requiring some coalition assistance to accomplish their missions (CM-2B); and one (Reserve Affairs) rated as existing but unable to accomplish its mission (CM-4). As of the end of the CM reporting period in January 2011, three departments were rated CM-4, four were new and not assessed, eleven had achieved a CM-3 rating, nineteen had achieved a CM-2B rating, eight had achieved a CM-2A rating, and one had achieved a CM-1B rating (the CM-1B rating is pending final Commander NTM-A transition decision approval) (Figure 5).
The Minister of Defense signed the Solar Year 1390 *tashkil*\(^{11}\) (March 21, 2011 to March 20, 2012) in February 2011, five months earlier than last year, demonstrating the Ministry’s growing ability to plan, forecast and manage the fielded forces. A significant milestone occurred when the Afghan High Defense Council endorsed the new MoD Manual of Organization and Functions in February 2011. President Karzai, as the Commander-in-Chief of the ANA, signed a decree endorsing the manual on March 22, 2011. Once the Minister of Defense signs an implementation directive, the manual will be distributed to the ANA.

This landmark document provides a doctrinal framework that outlines the roles, missions, and tasks for both the MoD and Afghan General Staff (GS). Once implemented, it will strengthen the independent nature, accountability, self-sufficiency, and professionalism of the ANA. The Afghan-written document provides for significant restructuring of the MoD and GS as well as detailed command and control and logistics architecture for the ANA. It also highlights the President of Afghanistan’s role as Commander-in-Chief and includes specific responsibilities and cross-coordination mechanisms for both MoD and the General Staff.

In the coming year, ministerial development experts from the U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative will work with the MoD/GS to develop a Master Ministerial Development Plan that

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\(^{11}\) Dari for “manning document.”
will synchronize NTM-A partnering and advising efforts both within the MoD/GS and throughout the fielded force.

**ASSESSMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR**

Overall, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is assessed as requiring significant coalition assistance to accomplish its mission, resulting in a rating of CM-3; the MoI achieved this status in 2009. During the reporting period, the majority of departments remained static in CM ratings, while some improved and some regressed.

With the retirement of the Parliamentary Affairs Department, and the addition of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) departments, there are now 26 ministerial development plans. The March 2011 Ministerial Development Review Board rated 14 departments as CM-3, six as CM-2B, three as CM-2A (Public Affairs, Policy Development, and Operations Planning), and one as CM-4 (Facilities). (Figure 6). The ALP and APPF remain unassessed. Finally, the Review Board approved the addition of a Civil Service Ministry Development Plan.

Since his appointment in June 2010, Minister of Interior Bismillah Kahn Mohammadi has taken proactive measures to attack corruption, introduce efficiencies, improve security, increase accountability and transparency, eliminate waste, and decentralize and delegate authority to trustworthy leaders. He championed both the Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs and the ANSF Retirement Act, which were published as law in March 2011. Introduction of retirement regulations and their enforcement led to the retirement of 57 general officers, and replacement of over 30 top ministerial and provincial leaders including three of four deputy ministers and the chief of staff. He has also introduced and promoted core values, a system of discipline and rewards, mandatory basic education, and a robust literacy program. All of these efforts have had a significant positive impact on the professional development and progress of the MoI.
2.3: INSTITUTIONAL ADVISOR PROGRAMS

NTM-A/CSTC-A has continued to support the MoI by emphasizing advisor programs designed to increase capacity and capability.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE COORDINATION BOARD

The International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) remains the main forum by which the international community supports Afghan Police development and identifies shortfalls and potential areas of duplication in police development activity that may require international focus.

The IPCB key areas of operation during this reporting period have been specialist input to the Afghan National Police Strategy (NPS) and the Afghan National Police Plan (NPP). The NPS covers a four year period until 2016, and has been updated to reflect the status of key initiatives and new Ministerial priorities. The strategy is consistent with Afghan Police Law, the Constitution, National Security Policy, and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

Joint Force Command – Brunssum hosted the Strategic International ANP Development Symposium in January 2011. The Symposium fostered a better common understanding of the current MoI and ANP capacity and challenges, confirmed the significant progress achieved in developing the ANP, and recognized the ongoing need to increase the numbers of qualified instructors, mentors and advisors to meet ANP and ministerial development expansion. However, there remains a need to balance immediate security imperatives with the enduring requirements necessary for a responsive, accountable and capable policing institution once stability has been restored.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION CELL

The MoI International Coordination Cell (MICC) was established in October 2010 to facilitate coordination of MoI advisor and donor assistance. The cell comprises personnel from MoI, NTM-A/CSTC-A, and the international community. The MICC has the lead on collaborating with partners to support production of the NPS and NPP, has acted as a critical conduit for the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) process, and continues to build trusted partner relationships between the MoI and its international partners. The MICC director has been appointed as the Deputy Chair for the IPCB, fostering increasing unity of effort among MoI, NTM-A/CSTC-A and the international community.

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADVISOR PROGRAM

The Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Program office uses a rigorous selection process to identify and train senior DoD civilian employees to serve a 12-24 month tour in Afghanistan as advisors to the MoD and MoI. Thirty-three DoD civilians from the MoDA program have successfully integrated into NTM-A/CSTC-A; 17 as advisors to the MoD and ANA GS, 10 as advisors to the MoI, and six advising in both ministries. As U.S. Government civilians, the MoDA advisors provide unique skills to improve Afghan institutional capacity, budget development, installation management, finance, logistics, acquisition, healthcare administration, personnel, education, and defense policy and strategy.
Since June 2010, two MoDA advisors have been working to develop and implement the Ministerial Development Board 2.0 assessment process that will be ongoing until transition of all MoD/GS departments has occurred. Other advisors have made significant contributions to improvements in MoD logistics, MoD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and MoD budget and finance. Forty-three additional MoDA advisors have been requested for 2011. This will increase their overall number to 60 with an eventual goal of 100 advisors. NTM-A/CSTC-A expects that these experts in institutional systems will have an increasingly positive impact on Afghan institutional capacity by bringing to bear their many years of experience in the U.S. national security bureaucracy.

**AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN HANDS PROGRAM**

In order to generate and maintain mission continuity and focus in the COIN environment, United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) leadership in 2009 sought a cadre of military and civilian Afghanistan experts who speak local languages and can persistently engage the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghan populace. In September 2009, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program to provide this capability. Of the 223 “Hands” billets supporting theatre operations in Afghanistan, 32 civilian and military personnel work on ANSF development matters, ten of whom are working for NTM-A advising key leaders in the MoD. Their special language skills and cultural training provide ISAF with a unique asset that has the ability to help build stronger, more effective relationships with their principals.

**2.4: BUILDING THE FORCE**

**INSTITUTIONAL TRAINER AND MENTOR STATUS**

The manning resources necessary to grow the ANSF are identified in part two of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), NATO’s capabilities-based document used to identify the forces required to execute the campaign. Following the November 2010 Lisbon Summit and associated NATO Global Force Generation Conference, troop-contributing nations confirmed pledges for 104 additional institutional trainers, decreasing the trainer shortfall to 770. NATO subsequently released CJSOR v10.1 to capture adjustments in trainer requirements, containing a total requirement of 2,778 institutional trainers. However, shortfalls still exist. The current shortfall in institutional trainers is 740, with 1,371 deployed trainers in-place and 667 confirmed pledges. (Figure 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>In-Place</th>
<th>Pledged</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the remaining 740 unfilled institutional trainer positions, Figure 8 summarizes the departments that are affected by the shortage. While NTM-A/CSTC-A has made great progress in training the ANSF, the continued shortage of required trainers will delay both institutional transition and professionalization of the ANSF.
The United States currently sources 1,166 non-CJSOR trainer positions. In order to temporarily address the NATO CJSOR shortfall, and fill the U.S.-sourced, non-CJSOR requirements as quickly as possible, the United States deployed entire units. The United States also provides an additional 963 personnel to provide skills not found in the deployed units. This brings the total U.S. sourcing to 2,129.

**ANSF LITERACY TRAINING**

Literacy is an important enabler to professionalize security forces, reduce corruption, increase stewardship and increase recruiting. Over the last year, NTM-A/CSTC-A has dramatically increased its literacy training for the ANA and ANP, and the number of ANSF personnel in literacy training has increased by 136 percent. In March 2011, there were over 60,000 ANSF in literacy training compared to just 27,855 in March 2010. Figure 9 shows the total number of ANA and ANP who have achieved a 1st, 2nd or 3rd grade level of literacy as of March 2011, and the estimated number who will achieve these levels in the next six months given the growing emphasis on this training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Completed Literacy Level</th>
<th>NOV 09 - OCT 10</th>
<th>NOV 10 - MAR 11</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Projected by OCT 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Grade</td>
<td>18,219</td>
<td>19,638</td>
<td>38,857</td>
<td>114,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Grade</td>
<td>9,102</td>
<td>4,935</td>
<td>14,037</td>
<td>22,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Grade</td>
<td>6,191</td>
<td>4,498</td>
<td>10,639</td>
<td>14,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>33,512</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,021</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,533</strong></td>
<td><strong>151,063</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data as of 10 Mar 11, 60,387 are currently in training

Literacy training is now mandatory in every initial entry training course, with the goal to graduate each new trainee at a 1st grade level. Additional literacy training is provided in every professional development course, as well as in the fielded force. In mid-March 2011, there were over 1,800 Afghan instructors teaching literacy to over 60,000 Afghan soldiers and police. NTM-A/CSTC-A estimates that the 1st grade literacy level of enlisted soldiers and policemen will rise from 14 percent to over 50 percent in the next ten months.

NTM-A/CSTC-A will build on this foundation to develop more advanced levels of curriculum that will enhance the education level of ANSF and support more difficult training requirements.
of the enabler force, such as medical and logistics. In conjunction with IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A will continue to expand the literacy training opportunities provided to fielded units.

The fielded force illiterate (i.e., “legacy” illiterate) recruited prior to mandatory literacy training present the most challenging target for literacy training. Teachers are deployed to more than 500 district headquarters, precincts, and village stations at any one time to help address this deficiency.

ANA recruits undergo 64 hours of literacy training as part of initial training, which provides the fundamentals of literacy and numeracy to the 1st grade level. On average, this training has a pass rate of approximately 90 percent. Even so, Level 1 represents only a very elementary grasp of literacy (numbers, letters, and some simple words). Additionally, an eight-week literacy program has been developed for those progressing to the more demanding ANA Branch School courses. All Branch Schools will deliver literacy training by the end of 2011. Literacy training is also conducted during the 7-week collective training phase of units fielded at the Consolidated Fielding Center where all ANA battalions and companies conduct collective training prior to deployment to the fielded force.

While ANP recruits receive the same literacy training as the ANA, the length of training depends on their assignment. For example, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) recruits receive 1st grade training at the collection centers prior to the start of the formal training program. Once they begin training, ANCOP trainees will progress through 2nd and 3rd grade levels prior to graduation primarily because the ANCOP enlisted force is comprised of NCOs.

### 2.5: AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY CAPACITY AND GROWTH

NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to execute the MoD and GS development program to synchronize MoD organizational, management, and operational systems development. For example, the MoD continues to implement new policies and processes in personnel and logistics systems. In September 2010, the Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) policy, aligned with the Inherent Law for Officers and NCOs (ILON), codified three, five, and ten-year service obligations for enlisted personnel, NCOs, and officers respectively. The ADSO also mandates a 3:1 service obligation for education and training abroad. Implementation of this policy is a key advisor focus area to ensure processes are in place to record, monitor, and enforce ADSOs across the Army. The ANSF Retirement Act, also published in March 2011, was recently implemented resulting in the retirement of 18 ANA General Officers. This is seen as a positive impact as it will allow for upward movement and advancement.

The fielding of the ANA’s first generation electronic Personnel Information Management System (PIMS) continues, and the majority of combat corps and support elements have enrolled their personnel. The second generation, Afghan Human Resources Information Management System (AHRIMS), will enhance and simplify data collection, retrieval and management. Moreover, AHRIMS will be used by both the MoD and MoI, enhancing commonality and efficiency between the two ministries.

To support the infantry-centric security forces, a surge in enabling and logistics forces is now being generated to provide essential support capabilities in the ANA. Two significant contracts
have been awarded that will enhance NTM-A/CSTC-A’s ability to build the capacity of the ANA while sustaining a continued growth trajectory. The Afghan MoD Program Support contract was updated to increase the numbers of advisers in keeping with the growth of the two ministerial programs. This is currently operational and applies to both ministerial and system development. Also, the Afghan MoD Program Support contract, which transitioned to DynCorp International in November 2010, notably shifts the emphasis from system establishment to systems development and capacity building.

**ANA MANNING**

The ANA continues to meet its overall growth goals due to strong recruiting and retention. In October 2010, the ANA exceeded its goal of 134,000 personnel by 10,638 and is ahead of its goal to meet its 171,600 objective by the end of October 2011. However, during the past 12 months, 70 percent of those eligible either re-enlisted at the end of their term of service or rejoined having previously left the ANA.

**Figure 10: Afghan National Army End Strength (March 2010 – March 2011)**

Although recruiting and retention are continuing at a strong pace, attrition is a concern. If the levels of attrition seen throughout the last five months continue, there is a significant risk to projected ANA growth. Recent studies show that the core causes of attrition in the ANA are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against AWOL. However, a  

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12 Attrition is defined as “Unanticipated losses, Dropped From Rolls, Killed in Action, Deaths (non-combat), Captured and Permanently Disabled (Exempted).”

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number of ANA-led initiatives are aimed at reducing attrition during the next quarter by addressing these core causes (Figure 10 depicts ANA end strength in relation to attrition, recruiting, and retention).

In September 2010, Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak published an AWOL mitigation plan, and in November 2010 he published policies that declared AWOL “a shameful and traitorous action.” He ordered increased efforts to find and recall AWOL soldiers, and delegated “Dropped From Rolls” authority to Corps Commanders. Moreover, the Minister also created commissions that meet with Corps and intermediate-level commanders to address AWOL and attrition. The commissions examine units with high AWOL rates and assess leadership effectiveness in those units. In February, they recommended the removal of ten ineffective unit commanders. All ten have been removed from command and placed in staff billets or lower positions of authority.

Figure 11: Afghan National Army Officer Strength Goal and Actual (November 2009 – November 2011)

**ANA Leadership Development**

The ANA has begun to improve the balance between leaders and soldiers in the fielded force. Initial efforts at building the ANA focused on quickly fielding an infantry-centric force to secure the population. This effort has largely been successful, and emphasis has shifted to the professionalization and leadership development of the force. The development of a professional officer and NCO corps that can lead the ANA effectively in the field will take time as leaders mature by experience. Maintaining the balance of quality and quantity during this period of growth is a priority. At current training and production rates, NTM-A/CSTC-A estimates that officer and NCO shortfalls should be eliminated by October 2012.
Officer production has started to increase with two additional Officer Candidates’ School (OCS) companies commencing in December 2010 and two more scheduled to start in April 2011. In March 2011, 299 cadets graduated from the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA). Located in Kabul, NMAA grants degrees to its graduates. For the first time, ANA officer cadets began their officer careers by attending professional branch school officer basic training. This was the third class to graduate from the modern academy. This year’s incoming class of 2015 includes 604 candidates, which, along with the current enrollment of 586 among the class of 2014, represents a substantial increase in future leaders. Applications to OCS and NMAA have grown tenfold over the past six years, which has resulted in thousands of young company-grade officers leading soldiers in the field. Nearly 2,600 new second lieutenants have been commissioned in the past year from OCS and NMAA.

The other pillar of ANA leadership, the NCO corps, has also seen accelerated growth. Increased training capacity has led to an increase in NCO production. Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) Darulaman has now shifted from the Basic Warrior Course to become a center for NCO leadership and multiple concurrent Direct Entry NCO and Team Leader Courses. Two of three direct-entry classes underwent training in the United Arab Emirates, graduating in January and March 2011 respectively. The third class began training in the UAE in March. The course consists of 12 weeks of training followed by two additional weeks upon return to Afghanistan. Students are promoted to Staff Sergeant after completion of training. Feedback from the fielded force has been very positive on the direct entry course graduates; although they lack experience, they are literate and better educated than any other NCO cohort.

In January 2011, the ANA assumed the lead at the Sergeants Major Academy. This class includes six ANP senior NCO students, which represent the first cross-ministerial class at the Sergeants Major Academy. The RMTC in Shorabak in RC-SW is scheduled to open in April 2011. Classes will consist of Basic Warrior Training (BWT) with a capacity of 1,400 and Team Leader Course with a capacity of 200. This new facility and training will enable the 215th Corps to train and develop NCOs locally and will aid in closing the NCO leadership gap within the Corps.

Directly related to increased NCO production is the development of professional instructors through the Train the Instructor and Military Skills Instructor Course. Numbers of Afghan instructors assigned to the schools are being increased, with an end of FY11 goal of filling 80 percent of authorized positions, up from the current average of 62 percent. As ANA NCO numbers increase, more candidates will be available to assume training and instructor billets. Over time, this will mean more Afghans training Afghans as coalition trainers assume more of an oversight role.
Because leadership is a key factor to reducing AWOL, the ANA is striving to address leadership development by improving training quality and expanding training capacities. Increased access to literacy programs is beginning to show promise in growing the pool of future NCOs. Additionally, in September 2010, the MoD established the Special ANSF Leave Transportation Program (SALT-P). SALT-P provides free air travel for soldiers to and from their units to Kabul, enabling them to travel home while on authorized leave. Initial feedback from ANA partners is that the SALT-P program is having a positive impact on ANA attrition. The MoD has already established incentive pay for hazardous duty and specialty skills, has fielded mobile pay teams to address soldier pay problems and, in April 2011, will implement expeditionary pay. ISAF’s program of partnering coalition forces with ANA units is also a proven method of strengthening unit leadership, thereby mitigating attrition.

Maintaining an appropriate ethnic balance in the ANA remains a priority for the MoD, especially with southern Pashtuns. The MoD Southern Recruiting Delegation returned from the southern provinces (i.e., Daykundi, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Uruzgan, Zabul) in October 2010 and stationed representatives from the Recruiting Command and Provincial Councils in each southern province to identify and recruit eligible candidates. In March 2011, 201 southern Pashtuns were recruited – a slight decrease from the 211 that were recruited in February, and just over 80 percent of the goal. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to monitor southern Pashtun recruitment data to determine appropriate goals, measure progress, and assess the impact of the initiative.
**ANA Training**

To meet growth objectives, Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) is currently at maximum capacity with over 10,000 soldiers in training. The five RMTCs are also operating at full capacity; the sixth center at Shorabak will begin training in April 2011, six months earlier than predicted. Total ANA training capacity is approximately 26,000 soldiers, with more than 23,000 soldiers in training daily. The Shorabak RMTC will increase training capacity to over 27,000.

In the past six months, the Armor and Signals Branch Schools opened, increasing the number of branch schools to eleven. These schools train ANA soldiers in specialty skills that will support the force. All branch schools are in temporary locations, with the exception of the Logistics Schools. Not all of them are at full capacity. Factors limiting full capacity include temporary infrastructure limitations, the MoD personnel system, and the lack of a full complement of CJSOR v10.1 trainers. All branch schools are projected to be in operation by June 2011 when the Military Police School will open.

The branch schools have been working closely with NTM-A/CSTC-A to better support the 2011 fielding plan, including improved alignment of branch specific courses with the fielding requirements. The plan to move the Armor, Infantry, and Artillery Schools to Kandahar in 2013 has been approved, and preliminary work is now underway to establish the new location. All other training establishments will relocate to their permanent sites by the end of 2012.

One example of branch school progress is the Artillery School. In October 2010, from a standing start and with limited resources, instructors and doctrine, the Artillery School began training ANA artillerymen. The school has progressed rapidly in less than six months, and Afghans are now training Afghans in the complexities of indirect fire support with coalition advisors in an over-watch role. ANA artillery units are now reaping the benefits of this branch school as trained soldiers arrive to the newly fielded combat support kandaks.

The ANA is on track to have 100 percent of its 171,600 personnel force structure fielded by October 2011. The ANA fielding plan has led to the generation of more specialized kandaks and companies required to sustain the force, including route clearance companies, combat support kandaks, and corps logistics battalions. These units will provide a significant enhancement to the ANA’s combat power, endurance and sustainability.

**ANA Women Training**

The ANA’s second female Officer Cadet School class began in December 2010. Currently, there are 19 Afghan women cadets in the course. The Program of Instruction has been redesigned to include four new career modules, giving cadets the opportunity to specialize in Human Resources, Logistics, Finance or Signals. A joint training team, consisting of UK, Jordanian, U.S., and Afghan instructors, continues to monitor the program.

On December 30, 2010, Afghan Air Force (AAF) Lieutenant Masooma Hussaini was selected as one of three U.S. Embassy Kabul nominees for the U.S. Secretary of State’s International Women of Courage Award. She is currently assigned to the English-immersion “Thunder Lab.”

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13 Dari for “battalion.”
The award recognizes women around the globe who have shown “exceptional courage and leadership in advocating for women’s rights and advancement.” Her award nomination package cites her determination to overcome Afghanistan’s cultural stereotypes and to serve in the military “as long as my country needs me.”

In January 2011, 21 ANA female officer candidates executed their oath of loyalty. While cultural difficulties remain with the role and place of females in the ANA, the ceremony was well-attended by ANA leadership and received positive coverage in the Afghan press.

**ANA Equipping**

Building a sustainable combat capacity in the ANA depends on the acquisition and fielding of equipment that allows ANA soldiers to “shoot, move, and communicate.” Individual weapons are U.S. standard issue, while crew-served weapons include a mix of U.S. standard and former Warsaw Pact weapons. The dynamics of the Afghan COIN battle and terrain necessitate sustainable and reliable vehicles. As a result, U.S. vehicles are the basic issue for ANA rolling stock. To date, 26,964 items of rolling stock in 40 variants have been delivered to the ANA. The Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH), light tactical vehicles (LTV), and medium tactical vehicles (MTV) are primary mobility assets of the fleet. Logistics and transportation elements are equipped with heavy equipment transport tractors, as well as M915 and M916 tractors with trailers. Engineer units operate bulldozers, cranes, excavators, road graders, and scrapers. UAHs have been fielded at 70 percent of authorization, LTVs at 60 percent, and MTVs at 100 percent. Additional vehicles are being procured to backfill future shortfalls.

U.S. radios and night vision devices are issued under the category of communications equipment. There are 14 different types of communications equipment and night vision devices consist of ATN 7-21s, PVS-7s and AVS-9s.

The ANA has a requirement for a variety of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED), and personnel protective equipment (PPE). This equipment includes IED jammers, mine rollers, EOD kits, and mine detectors. As the IED threat has increased, the ANA has increased its requirement for mine rollers and detectors; however, the majority of this new requirement cannot be met until late in 2011. For individual soldiers, helmets and body armor vests and plates have been designated for issue. While the majority of this equipment has been ordered, further PPE deliveries will arrive later in 2011 to meet shortfalls.

**ANA Logistics Capability**

The ANA logistics system remains heavily reliant on coalition support. Because of this, ANA logistics capability is a major focus for 2011. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoD are working on a

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14 Individual weapons include M9 pistols, M16 rifles, M4 carbines, M203 grenade launchers, and M249 squad automatic weapons; crew served weapons include M240B machine guns, M2 heavy machine guns, SPG-9 recoilless rifles and 82-mm, 81-mm and 60-mm mortars.

15 These include HF base stations and vehicle mounted RT7000s; HF man pack PRC 1099s; VHF base stations; vehicle mounted and man pack PRC1077s; VHF hand-held and retransmission radio sets; RF310 hand-helds, base stations and vehicle mounted radios; and SB22 switch boards and TA312 telephones.
logistics strategy that addresses structure, policy, training, acquisition/procurement, supply, maintenance, distribution, and logistics automation. The intent is for the ANA to progressively assume responsibility for national logistics and materiel maintenance requirements.

The ANA is transitioning from a completely-contracted maintenance and repair parts system to one that is Afghan-led and supported by contractors. Each ANA brigade has a combat service support *kandak* that has an organic maintenance capability. These units will now begin to perform organizational level maintenance, a task previously done by contractors. Additionally, repair parts will now begin to flow from the ANA depot in Kabul, through the Forward Supply Depot and to the unit. While supply issues and a lack of trained mechanics persist, contractors will be available to advise the ANA at both the organizational level and at the corps-level contracted maintenance facility.

One result of the new Manual of Organization and Functions will be the establishment of the Army Support Command, which will control new Regional Logistics Support Commands (RLSC). RLSCs will combine functions of the current Forward Support Depots and associated Corps Logistics Battalions, and will increase capability and efficiency by combining parts, maintenance, and delivery under a single regional support command for all ANA units and organizations.

**AFGHAN AIR FORCE**

In June 2010, President Karzai redesignated the Afghan National Army Air Corps as the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Although the name change does not currently make the AAF independent from the ANA, the move affirms Afghan intent to eventually return the air force to its former independent status.

The AAF’s long-term development strategy envisions an air force that can support the needs of the ANSF and the Afghan Government by 2016 – capable of Presidential airlift, air mobility, rotary and fixed-wing close air support, casualty evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance. The AAF also plans to be able to sustain its capacity through indigenous training institutions, including a complete education and training infrastructure. The air fleet will consist of a mix of Russian and Western airframes. Afghan airmen will operate in accordance with NATO procedures, and will be able to support the Afghan Government effectively by employing all of the instruments of COIN airpower. This plan is ambitious and belies a continuing tension between aspirations and affordability.

**BUILDING AFGHAN AIR FORCE CAPABILITY**

In January 2011, the AAF had 56 of its planned fleet of 146 aircraft, including 35 Mi-17 helicopters, nine Mi-35 attack helicopters, nine C-27 airlifters, and three An-32 airlifters. The AAF fleet reflects the Afghan Government’s COIN airpower priorities. The Mi-17 is an effective rotary-wing airframe due to its durable structure and lift capacity at high altitude. The Mi-35 provides an indigenous, albeit limited, close air support capability for the ANSF. The C-27 is the AAF’s first modern, all-weather-capable aircraft.

In conjunction with the AAF, NTM-A/CSTC-A has planned and requested funding for a comprehensive aircraft acquisition and modernization plan. By 2016, the Mi-17 fleet will grow
Discussions are under way to extend the service life of the Mi-35, which will allow this airframe to remain in the AAF inventory through 2016. Finally, key acquisitions include:

- Replacement of the AAF’s Antonov An-32 by the 20 C-27A aircraft, a turboprop, fixed-wing airlifter. Nine C-27A’s are currently on-hand, and 11 will be delivered by 2012.
- Procurement of six initial flight training rotary wing aircraft with expected delivery by October 2011.
- Procurement of up to 32 “Cessna-like” fixed-wing aircraft for initial flight and basic fixed-wing screening with expected delivery beginning in October 2011 and completion by FY2013.
- Potential procurement of up to 20 aircraft for fixed-wing close air support.

Assembling an experienced, professional AAF, including an instructor cadre that can provide pilot and technical training, is the focus of NTM-A/CSTC-A’s “Airmen Build” line of operation. By the end of March 2011, AAF manning should reach 4,728 Airmen – an increase of 630 airmen over the December 2010 strength. The Afghans and NTM-A/CSTC-A continue to research opportunities to bolster both the AAF NCO and Officer Corps in an effort to develop the force in both quantity and quality as it grows to the proposed 2011 end strength of 8,017 personnel (March 2012). Attrition stands near 1.4 percent per month, which is an acceptable level to maintain professional and technical skills. Factors limiting growth include education levels, English language requirements, and pilot training – factors that also limit the AAF’s ability to produce personnel who are able to perform the technically advanced specialties required for aircraft maintenance and airfield support.

During the final quarter of 2010, NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) completed the initial stage of the AAF’s Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI). The second stage will run from February to April 2011. This effort has three purposes. First, the PAI establishes a true quantitative baseline for AAF personnel strength. Each AAF member provides personal data integral to identifying and calculating the AAF’s total force and technical proficiency levels. Second, the PAI collects biometric data from each airman, allowing the MoI criminal investigation division to cross-reference the national databases to identify airmen with criminal histories. Finally, the PAI gathers electronic funds transfer (EFT) information from each airman. NATC-A then incorporates the EFT data and the remaining PAI information into the Afghan Personnel Information Management System (PIMS). Using this financial information, officials can identify and correct AAF pay irregularities and the “shadow” accounts sometimes used to collect these payments. In sum, the PAI supports efforts to build a transparent, professional, and sustainable AAF.

**AAF ASSESSMENT**

On March 3, 2011, the Presidential Airlift Squadron completed its first move of President Karzai by an all-Afghan crew. One air advisor remained in the formation to provide assistance, if required, but was not on the President’s aircraft.

Kabul Air Wing is assessed as CM4 (exists but cannot accomplish its mission) as a result of manning and training process shortfalls. Equipment deliveries are on-going, but the Wing is waiting on additional deliveries of Mi-17 and light attack aircraft. Kandahar Air Wing (KAW) is
assessed as CM4 with shortages in equipment, personnel, and facilities. Facility construction will continue into late 2011. KAW is about 50 percent capable for the Mi-17 and not yet capable for the C-27, Light Lift Aircraft, and the Light Air Support aircraft missions. Shindand Air Wing is currently assessed as CM4.

The AAF is not expected to reach CM-1B (capable of executing functions with coalition oversight only) until 2015 or later.

2.6: AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CAPACITY AND GROWTH

ANP MANNING

In late October 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A discovered a procedural discrepancy in the personnel accounting process for ANP resulting in some double-counting. As a result, the end-strength numbers for August-October 2010 were restated. NTM-A/CSTC-A subsequently sponsored an assessment team that validated current accounting processes and corrective actions. They validated both the ANP end-strength and the accuracy of the November and December 2010 strengths. As of March 31, 2011, the ANP reached an end-strength of 125,589, exceeding by 3,589 the expected March position of 122,000.

High attrition continues to challenge the Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police, which experienced attrition rates of 1.5 percent and 2.9 percent respectively in March 2011. It is noteworthy that the ANCOP rate decreased modestly from a high of 6.5 percent in February 2010. The MoI is taking measures to implement policies to address the contributing
factors to AWOL and attrition. For example, the Minister signed the ADSO procedure in
December, which implements the Presidential Order establishing the ADSO for ANP personnel
who graduate from schools and military training courses. The ADSO obligates officers to serve
10 years and NCOs to serve five years, and is intended to help prevent high AWOL rates.

The Convergence decree signed in December 2010 implements the use of common definitions in
MoI and MoD personnel status reporting. MoI used these common definitions for the first time
in reporting its February personnel status. The current model of attrition has nine categories and
reports both anticipated and unanticipated losses to the ANP. The new attrition reporting model
(derived from the ANA model) only reports unanticipated losses. Under the new model, 
patrolmen, NCOs, and officers will be reported as AWOL after 24 hours, and will be designated
as “Dropped from Rolls” after 20 days of AWOL for officers and NCOs, and after 30 days of
AWOL for patrolmen. The new model will assist in increasing the level of accuracy and
reporting, especially as the MoI/ANP continues to enforce the Dropped From Rolls criteria,
which accounted for 92 percent of March 2011 attrition throughout the ANP.

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

The Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) continues to be the premiere police force in
Afghanistan and has improved substantively since the last reporting cycle. ANCOP is meeting
its growth objectives through increased recruiting, reduced attrition, and a predictable
deployment schedule. The March 2011 total strength for ANCOP exceeds 9,348 personnel,
including students in training. Officer and NCO development increased with attendance at
commander and staff courses, logistics and specialty training, and literacy training at all levels.
Increased unit leadership capabilities, a dedicated training cycle prior to deployments, and
command emphasis on quality of life improvements are largely responsible for ANCOP
progress.

AFGHAN BORDER POLICE

As of March 2011, the ABP end strength was 19,865. ABP is on track to meet all growth
objectives for officers and ABP patrolman, but remains short of non-commissioned officer
objectives (3.3K of 4K assigned). NTM-A/CSTC-A is considering options to reallocate training
space to close this gap. ABP attrition has consistently remained below 2.5 percent per month
over the last 12 months, and was at a 12-month low of 1.5 percent in March 2011.

AFGHAN UNIFORM POLICE

As of March 2011, the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) end strength is 66,927. AUP is on track to
meet all growth objectives for officers and AUP patrolman, and is capable of achieving 98
percent of its 2011 NCO objectives under current training fill rates. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MOI
continue to push the recruiting base to ensure all available training seats are used. AUP attrition
remains the lowest of all police pillars at 0.7 percent in March 2011. It has averaged 1.1 percent
attrition since October 2009, which is below the attrition objective of 1.4 percent.

16 The nine previous categories were: non-hostile death, absent, AWOL with weapon, AWOL without weapon, disappeared / captured, injured,
killed in action, separated, and retired. The new categories are: killed in action, non-hostile death, disappeared/captured, disabled, and dropped
from rolls.
ANP TRAINING

Overall, ANP training capacity is evolving to meet current and future ANP training requirements. NTM-A/CSTC-A is continuing to expand training sites in order to grow the size of the ANP and develop the capacity to professionalize the force. Between October 2010 and March 2011, training capacity increased from 11,252 to nearly 15,000, and will exceed 19,000 by December 2011. Across all police pillars, 11,395 students have graduated since the beginning of October 2010, and there will likely be an additional output of over 24,000 by the end of October 2011. There are 36 active sites as of March 2011, expanding to 38 active training sites by the end of September 2011.

In addition, significant strides have been made in professionalizing the ANP. In February 2011, the Afghan National Police Professional Development Board approved standardized programs of instruction for the Basic Patrolman Course and a Train the Instructor Course. These programs of instruction will be used nationally and are the first time that a single course curriculum will be used across all training sites. Significantly, this establishes a baseline system for producing and certifying high quality ANP instructors. Professionalization is also supported by a EUPOL 5-week district commander’s course, which will build upon this work by approving common curriculum for NCO training and other leadership and core policing courses.

The establishment and transformation of the Training and Education Department from MoI to the Afghan National Police Training Group Command was scheduled to be completed by May 2010; however, delays in selection of a commander, site location, and tashkil approval delayed establishment until December 2011. A critical part of achieving initial operating capability is a reorganization of the 2011 ANP Training Group Command tashkil and the addition of 1,000 more positions. In order to create a functional organization and command structure, an effective logistics support component must be incorporated to execute all assigned responsibilities and missions necessary to enable and sustain training output.

WOMEN’S POLICE INITIATIVES

Women account for 1 percent of the total ANP force. The majority of women serve in Family Response Units (FRU), which are established in all 34 provinces, and in MoI positions, such as planning officers, call center operators, and chief of gender affairs.

MoI Decree 55, signed in September 2010, aimed to increase the number of women serving in the ANP to 5,000 over the next 5 years, establishing an annual goal of 1,000 additional women per year until 2014. Since April 2010, 413 women have been recruited. Currently, there are 1,241 women serving in the MoI.

Although recruiting women into service remains a challenge, ANP Recruiting Command now has a female recruiting branch, formed specifically to focus on the recruitment, retention, and career advancement of women in the ANP. Female recruiting initiatives include running a focused female-centric advertising and media campaign, and hosting several Female Recruiter Conferences and workshops to discuss employment of women in the ANP.

Additionally, MoI, EUPOL, and NTM-A/CSTC-A have modified the ANP Basic Patrolman Course to meet the requirements of female students more effectively. The basic six-week course
was extended to eight weeks to accommodate women returning home in the evenings for traditional household roles. MoI has approved the new course together with a pilot course starting at RTC Jalalabad in April 2011. Further regional training is also planned.

**ANP EQUIPPING**

Building a sustainable capacity depends on acquiring the capability to “shoot, move, and communicate” in a police force of 134,000 personnel. The great majority of equipment has been ordered for the ANP to meet this force structure, though some will not be delivered to Afghanistan until the end of 2011 due to procurement timelines and production rates.

The ANP has a requirement for a variety of EOD/C-IED and personnel protective equipment items that have been ordered and are awaiting delivery. The ANP also requires both armored and unarmored vehicles. NTM-A/CSTC-A is awaiting deliveries of pickup trucks, cargo MTVs, 24-passenger buses, cargo vans, Up-Armored HMMWVs, and all-terrain vehicles (used primarily by border police) to meet requirements of current fielded units. These requirements should be filled by the end of 2011.

To enable command and control, fielding of high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF) and communications equipment continues throughout the ANP. To date, over 40,000 handheld, mobile and base station radios and networking equipment have been delivered in support of the police. Computer networks have been fielded to all five operational regional headquarters, as well as to 24 of 34 provincial headquarters. Continued thickening of networks to the district-level will continue under a network expansion contract that began in the summer of 2010.

For the first time, night vision devices and other high-tech equipment have been issued to the special police forces. These police forces conduct high-end counter-terrorism missions and the addition of this special equipment will dramatically increase their capability.

For the ALP, NTM-A/CSTC-A is providing each member a complete set of uniforms, as well as distributing MoI AMD-65 assault rifles (AK-47 similar variants). NTM-A/CSTC-A is also coordinating with MoI to procure motorcycles and pickup trucks for ALP districts. Each pickup truck is equipped with one radio, while an additional 25 hand-held radios have been fielded to the first 17 ALP districts. The ANP use former Warsaw Pact weapons, mostly AK-47 variants supplied by international donations or transfers from the ANA.

**ANP LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES**

In December 2010, the MoI and MoD approved a Cross Ministerial Agreement creating an integrated National Logistics System. The agreement specifies sixteen areas in which ANA and ANP will provide assistance to each other. Despite this, the ANP logistics system remains incomplete and will not be fully self-sufficient for several years. Operationally, over the past several years a deliberate decision was made to place the force generation focus on producing patrolmen, with risk accepted in enablers such as logistics. This year NTM-A/CSTC-A is beginning to put the emphasis on logistics which will be the focus in 2012.
The ANP is generally short in equipment areas that support the capability to “shoot, move, and communicate.” Due to these shortages, the MoI has developed fielding priorities based on operational requirements. Given the current level of logistical development, the ANP is experiencing difficulties requisitioning supplies. The current courier requisition system takes upwards of 180 days to process requests. Steps are being taken to address these challenges. In February 2011, the MoI Material Management Center established the Customer Care Center and Regional Logistic Center processing center. This new facility allows the Regional Logistic Commands to submit requisitions directly from the Regions to Kabul via fax or e-mail, reducing response time. The Material Management Center is also assisting the Regional Logistic Centers (RLC) with developing document registers for tracking requisitions.

The MoI and ANP must account for all acquired property. Asset visibility is established through the use of stock records and property books. All materiel is recorded in stock records and property books, assigned to individuals or organizations by hand receipts, and inventoried quarterly. Each month the ANP conducts a 100 percent serial number inventory for all weapon types. This policy took effect on March 1, 2009. The Logistics Department of the MoI reconciles the on-hand weapons serial numbers of each unit with their receipt records and the property book.

Logistics accountability is progressing but significant challenges remain, particularly in accounting for vehicles. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) audit team is expected to arrive in Kabul in early May, and is expected to audit MoI vehicle accountability procedures.

The ANP Logistic system lacks maturity in facility development and in assigned and trained personnel. The biggest challenges in developing logistic support to the ANP are training and hiring civilian personnel. The National Logistic System comprises the National Logistic Center (NLC), RLCs, and Provisional Supply Points (PSP). The NLC, currently under construction in Wardak, is composed of the MoI Support Command, Material Management Command, Transportation Brigade (one of three kandaks is operational and the remaining two will become operational in April 2011), and the NLC Warehouse (currently named the Intermediate Logistic Facility). Of the eight Regional Logistics Centers, four are at IOC and one is being transitioned from a PSP to an RLC. When fully manned, the MoI Logistic system will make up less than 3 percent of the Afghan Police Force but will execute sustainment for the entire force.

Finally, the MoI Transportation kandak was expanded to a Transportation Brigade. The Brigade Headquarters and one kandak are operational and two more kandaks will become operational by mid-2011. The new capability will allow MoI to reduce its reliance on commercially contracted vehicles and rely on its own capacity to sustain the ANP force. This has the additional benefit of reducing transportation costs.

2.7: FIelded force partnering, operations, and assessment

ANA and ANP partnering

While Commander NTM-A focuses on training the initial recruit and building ANSF institutional training capability, the development of Afghan soldiers and policemen once they get
into the field is the responsibility of Commander ISAF Joint Command (IJC). Partnering and mentoring teams from IJC provide a bridge from the individual and collective training received in recruit training and various ANSF schools to the practical requirements of the field. There, partnering and mentoring teams coach, teach, mentor and, when appropriate, support the operational planning and employment of the ANA/ANP unit with which they are partnered.

Partnering allows ISAF and ANSF to build relationships, strengthen shared accountability, build Afghan capacity, and execute assigned missions more efficiently and effectively. It is a key component of ISAF’s campaign plan for ANSF development because it allows the inexperienced Afghan soldier or policeman to learn tactics, techniques, and procedures through application, both formally and informally, from an ISAF soldier or civilian law enforcement professional.

Furthermore, coalition forces are more tactically-effective when they have an Afghan squad, platoon, or company with them. No coalition member has a better understanding of the human terrain in Afghanistan than their Afghan counterpart. In addition to knowing the language, the native soldier or policeman understands the culture and will notice threats long before they become apparent to the ISAF trooper. In return, the Afghan soldier or policeman has the opportunity to learn from and emulate their ISAF partner. Moreover, the ANA or ANP can rely on combat enablers that ISAF forces bring with them, such as mortars, artillery, and aircraft.

There are three descriptive terms used to describe the various types of partnering and mentorship. “Embedded partnering” is the most intensive form of partnering, where the ANA or ANP share the same battle space with their ISAF partners and live on the same installation. Embedded partnering results in a unified, combined force with Afghans often in the lead; builds trusting relationships quickly based on shared risks and responsibilities; capitalizes on the combined team’s strengths and offsets each other’s weaknesses; and allows the population to see coalition forces as supporting (not leading) ANSF. Embedded partnering is arguably the most effective training approach; however, it requires a greater number of ISAF troops to support and is typically leveraged for Afghan units that require additional training assistance. Ideally, as Afghan units become more capable, independent, and effective, the intensity of partnering relationships is not as critical, and the same objectives can be achieved through regular partnering or mentoring.

“Partnering” describes a specific form of combined operations. Specifically, a “partnered” unit describes an assigned relationship between an ISAF unit and an ANSF unit where both share the same battle space but do not live together. The ISAF partner unit shares the goal of building capacity and capability of the ANSF unit, but also works together with the ANSF to defeat the insurgency. The ISAF partner unit shares comprehensive operations guidance, strategy, information, and intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Partnership includes an active mentoring role and primary oversight responsibility. Proximity enables partnered units to establish a deeper personal and working relationship that allows them to plan, train, and coordinate operations, and to support one another in accomplishing assigned tasks.

“Mentoring” refers to an assigned relationship between an Afghan unit and an ISAF advisory team – typically called an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) for ANA units and a Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) for ANP units. The ISAF partner
unit shares no operations guidance, strategy, information or intelligence with its ANSF counterpart. Still, while not as focused as partnering or embedded partnering, the mentoring relationship is still extremely valuable. It is normally applied for Afghan units that, while capable, still require advanced professional development and advice in the field, as well as enabler support. Each POMLT and OMLT is normally deployed with an Afghan unit for a minimum of six months. POMLTs are typically composed of 15-20 personnel and OMLTs are typically composed of 11-28 personnel (depending on the type and function of the partnered ANA unit).

Figure 14: Afghan National Police Partnering Status (March 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP Priority Units</th>
<th>Embedded</th>
<th>Partnered</th>
<th>Mentored</th>
<th>Uncovered</th>
<th>Total Partnered ANP Units</th>
<th>Total Units in KTD</th>
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<td>AUP District Units in KTD</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Response Companies (PRC)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>225</strong></td>
<td><strong>268</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANA & ANP Fielded Force Effectiveness 1 MAR 2011
Date: 1 March 2011

In March 2011, 225 out of 268 (83 percent) priority ANP units across Afghanistan were partnered (Figure 14); and 173 out of 180 (96 percent) ANA units were partnered (Figure 15). Moreover, ANSF and ISAF partnered units are also increasingly conducting operations together. From April 2010 to March 2011, the number of major operations that were partnered rose from 54 percent to 95 percent across all the regional commands. Interestingly, reports from the field suggest that a partnership ratio of greater than three ISAF troopers to one ANSF trooper reduces the effectiveness of the ANSF’s participation. Anecdotally, it appears that ANSF are more motivated and, hence, more effective when the partnership ratio is closer to even. This is a promising indicator as the transition process begins.

Figure 15: Afghan National Army Partnering Status (March 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Command</th>
<th>Embedded Kandaks</th>
<th>Partnered Kandaks</th>
<th>Mentored Kandaks</th>
<th>Uncovered Kandaks</th>
<th>Total Partnered Kandaks</th>
<th>Total Reported Kandaks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC Capital</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC East</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC North</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Southwest</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC South</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IJC CUOPS Security Partnering
Date: 8 March 2011

Partnered operations continue to improve the effectiveness of the ANSF fielded force. ANA and ANP partnered units have shown improvements in the number of ANA soldiers and ANP policemen who are available for duty. Unfortunately, the large number of ANP units at
dispersed locations throughout Afghanistan precludes extensive partnering of ANP units. The gap between the mentors available and the goal of a completely partnered ANP remains a challenge.

There is a current shortage of 226 POMLTs. As a result of this, Commander IJC prioritizes units for partnering. Currently, partnering of AUP units is focused on the 94 key terrain districts and 44 area of interest districts. Beyond that, ANCOP and ABP units are all considered a priority, so their partnering is not dependent upon their location within the country. As of the end of the reporting period, the AUP is short 29 POMLTs, ANCOP is short 21 POMLTs, and the ABP is short 34 POMLTs.

**ANA OPERATIONS AND ASSESSMENT**

During the first quarter of 2011, Commander IJC assessed that the ANA overall continues to show steady improvement in the field. ANA units are conducting more independent operations, are becoming increasingly proficient, and are gaining the trust of the people. Recently, they have shown noticeable improvement in their AWOL and Present for Duty rates. Increases in the number of personnel available for duty have positively impacted operational effectiveness. Units are beginning to implement their own measures to limit AWOL soldiers, such as personnel tracking. Coalition and ANA forces control much more territory than they did a year ago, and ANA units (and their ANP counterparts) have been a significant contributor to the combined team success.

Nonetheless, key challenges remain. ANA units are still too dependent on coalition forces for operations, and specifically logistical support. The ANA lacks a sufficient number of personnel trained in the specialized skill sets of intelligence, maintenance, and medical support. A lack of literacy is a particular limitation to personnel assigned to these specialized-skill areas. In some cases, a lack of understanding by Afghan commanders of how best to utilize personnel trained in these specialized skills sets leads them to divert them to infantry duties. ISAF continues to work with the Afghans to address these concerns by providing additional specialized training and literacy education.

Operational effectiveness of individual ANSF units is assessed through the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). The CUAT collects both quantitative data and a qualitative assessment of a unit’s operations, personnel, leadership, maintenance, supply, equipment readiness and accountability, and other aspects of its functioning. Each area receives a rating, known as a Rating Definition Level (RDL), and the unit receives an overall rating for its operational effectiveness. The RDL range currently includes Not Assessed, Established, Developing, Effective with Assistance, Effective with Advisors, and Independent.17

Units are evaluated by their partners/mentors every six weeks. Typically, unpartnered units are not assessed; however, on occasion, a Regional Command may choose to send an assessment team to an unpartnered ANSF unit to complete an assessment.

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17 “Independent” denotes a unit that is capable of the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from Coalition Forces. “Effective with Advisors” means that the partnered coalition unit does not exceed a limited guidance role. Units that are “Effective with Assistance” are those that are capable of executing operations and providing regional security with varied partnered unit assistance. A “Developing” unit is one whose capability is dependent on partnered unit presence and assistance. Finally, an “Established” unit is one which is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered assistance.
From September 2010 through February 2011, the number of fielded ANA *kandaks* and *kandak*-equivalents grew from 136 to 157, an increase of 15 percent over the reporting period. The ANA also improved in quality. The number of *kandak*-equivalent formations rated as “Effective with Advisors,” the second highest rating, grew from 32 to 52 during this period, and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 39 to 64, increases of 63 percent and 64 percent, respectively. Through the end of this reporting period, 74 percent of ANA *kandaks* were rated as effective with assistance or better, up from 52 percent during the previous reporting period. Moreover, from September 2010 to February 2011, the total number of *kandaks*, headquarters, and general support units rated as “Effective with Advisors” rose from 42 to 61; and those rated as “Effective with Assistance” rose from 49 to 85. Currently, no units have been validated as “Independent.”

**Figure 16: Afghan National Army Rating Definition Levels (February 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Definition Level (RDL)</th>
<th>Corps HQ</th>
<th>DIV HQ</th>
<th>BDE HQ</th>
<th>Unit Types</th>
<th>Total Kandak Equivalents</th>
<th>Total Units and HQs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Advisors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44 8 0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Assistance</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57 7 3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23 4 0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 2 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 2 6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>134 23 11</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GSUs: General Support Unit. Kandaks plus GSUs equals Total Kandak Equivalents.
Kandaks include all warfighting kandaks, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Commando Kandaks.
Source: IJC AAG - CUAT
Date: 23 February 2011

Specific examples of the improvement in the ANA fielded force abound. During the major floods in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan last summer, the AAF flew 400 missions and transported over 188 tons of supplies. During the 2010 parliamentary elections, it recorded 225 flight hours and transported over 67,000 kgs of supplies to remote locations. It also rescued survivors of the Salang Pass avalanche, supported search and recovery operations following an airliner crash, and delivered generators and supplies to schools. In January, the AAF flew the first training sorties at Shindand Air Base in Herat Province, the new home for AAF training.

The ANA took a lead role in security efforts in and around Kabul during the January inauguration of Afghanistan’s new parliament. Despite being an obvious target for insurgent attack – and numerous schedule changes to which the ANA had to react – the events proceeded without incident.

In Regional Command – Capital, ANA in early January deployed to the first in a series of forward operating bases (FOBs) outside the Kabul metropolitan area. These FOBs will form the basis for an enduring ANSF security framework designed to preserve and expand the Kabul security bubble. In February 2011, ANSF took over security responsibility for Kabul’s “TV Hill” – which contains most of Kabul’s broadcasting towers. In January 2011, the ANA occupied a series of patrol bases that U.S. Marines had used in Nawah District in Helmand Province, which enabled the Marines to be reassigned to further expand the Helmand security bubble.
ANSF commandos are also active across the country and are achieving notable success. In December 2010, a combination of commandos and Afghan counternarcotics forces conducted an independent cordon and search operation in the east that interdicted tons of narcotics with a street value worth millions of dollars. And in the south, ANSF commandos have recently conducted a number of air assaults behind insurgent lines that have helped ISAF forces squeeze the enemy from multiple directions.

Key challenges still remain. Not all ANA units and leaders are sufficiently mature, experienced, or professional – qualities that take time and discipline to develop. As well, the ANA’s ability to sustain itself and to improve its combat enablers requires focus and effort. There can be no doubt, however, that the force is indeed growing in quality, quantity, and capacity. With continued persistence on the part of ISAF and its Afghan partners, the ANA will continue to progress.

**ANP Operations and Assessment**

The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). Generally, the AUP train and perform traditional community policing functions. In contrast, ANCOP undergo more intense training, are better armed, are deployable around the country, and have a paramilitary capability that makes them uniquely well-suited for COIN operations. Finally, ABP perform border control and customs functions.

The number of assessed AUP units has increased. Of the priority AUP field units assessed (those that are not headquarters), 52 of 152 were rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 65 were rated as “Effective with Assistance” (Figure 17). During the most recent CUAT cycle, there was only one unassessed partnered unit because it was new.

The overall trend in effectiveness for ANCOP *kandaks* is improving with fewer unassessed units and more units rated “Effective with Advisors.” The number of units with this rating has increased from three to ten since September 2010 (Figure 17). Moreover, this year over 20 additional ANCOP units will thicken as personnel now in the training pipeline join their assigned units.

**Figure 17: Afghanistan National Police Rating Definition Levels (February 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Definition Level (RDL)*</th>
<th>AUP</th>
<th>ABP</th>
<th>ANCOP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Advisors</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective with Assistance</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Assessed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes AUP field units (no HQs) in Key Terrain Districts, all ANCOP and all ABP.
Source: JIC AAG • CUAT
Date: 23 February 2011
The trends are also positive within the ABP, with more units reporting via the CUAT. Eight out of 34 ABP *kandaks* are currently rated as “Effective with Advisors”; and 14 are rated as “Effective with Assistance.” There are currently four unassessed ABP units from RC-South. Partners should join these units in summer 2011.

ANP Partnering will become more challenging later this year as the ANP *tashkil* increases to 134,000 by October 2011. Because of this, IJC anticipates possibly reducing partnering ratios in ANP units that are performing above average, and also leveraging contractors – Embedded Police Mentors and Law Enforcement Professionals – to cover partnering shortfalls or thicken smaller formations so they can continue in-the-field development without ISAF mentors.

As with the ANA, the ANP have achieved some notable successes in the last year. Since the February 2010 launch of Operation Moshtarak in Marjah, for example the Afghan Government has established an increasingly capable AUP force in Marjah – having recruited, trained, and deployed almost 300 police officers there. This has contributed to an 80 percent reduction in insurgent activity and has allowed Marjah’s five main bazaars in Balikino, Loy Chareh, Choor Chareh, Karo Chareh, and Kim neighborhoods to thrive.

In early February 2011, Afghan forces in Sar-e-Pul Province successfully repelled an insurgent attack against a group of reintegrees. Upon notification of the attack, the district chief of police independently organized a counter-attack force comprised of both AUP and ANA elements. In repelling the attack and securing the village, Afghan forces suffered no losses and killed several insurgents.

ANP partnered with embedded ISAF military police investigative training teams in Kandahar City and Arghandab District have also improved. ANP routinely gather witness statements and evidence at crime scenes, enabling investigators and prosecutors to investigate more effectively. As of December 2010, the number of suspects released without formal investigations dropped by almost 80 percent.

The ABP too have made progress. In the span of four days in October 2010, separate ABP units based in eastern, southern, and southwest Afghanistan conducted a series of five operations that netted 7,000 kg of ammonium nitrate, 20 finished IEDs waiting for emplacement, 1,000 kg of home-made explosives, other IED making equipment, and two significant caches of foreign made weapons.

Finally, there has been important progress in coordination among ANP and ANA elements. In November 2010, 370 ABP and ANA Commandos led an operation in southern Afghanistan that, within hours, led to the discovery of a cache containing 5,000 kg of ammonium nitrate, 3,500 kg of ammonium chloride, 18 finished IEDs, heavy machine guns and other assorted small arms. The operation also led to the destruction of two drug labs. And, in a true combined team approach, partnered Afghan intelligence personnel detained a number of suspects.

While challenges remain, the ANP are making progress. Continued ISAF partnering and mentoring, combined with further leadership and literacy training, will build on the progress
achieved through the reporting period and position the ANP for further growth in the coming months.

2.8: BUDGETING

**AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND**

The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) directly supports funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. For FY 2010, Congress appropriated $9.2B for the ASFF, which is available through the end of FY2011. As of March 31, 2011, CSTC-A had obligated 85 percent of this amount. In addition, NATO contributions into the ASFF totaled $100M.

In February 2011, President Obama requested $12.8B in the FY2012 budget to continue to equip and sustain the ANSF. These funds are essential to the building, training, equipping, and fielding of the security forces. ASFF funds are allocated for the ANA, ANP, and related activities, and then are further broken down into infrastructure, equipment, training, and sustainment. As the ANSF grow, NTM-A/CSTC-A will focus its attention on investment accounts (infrastructure and equipment). Going forward, though, operation accounts (training and sustainment) will become increasingly more important.

As part of the transparency effort associated with these funds, the Government Accountability Office, DoD Inspector General, and the SIGAR currently have 20 audits ongoing that are in various states of completion.

**INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FUNDING FOR THE ANSF**

The international community also provides funding for the ANSF. In September 2009, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand the NATO ANA Trust Fund beyond the limitations of ANA development to include funding for sustainment costs. Several nations have provided significant contributions to the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund, totaling approximately $312M. Funds are transferred from the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for execution. As of March 31, 2011, $0.1B has been transferred from NATO into the ASFF.

Funding for police salaries, as well as other police development programs is supported by the United Nations Development Program, which oversees the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). From 2002-2010, the international community donated approximately $1.74B to LOTFA – $620M was contributed by the United States. The United States is currently working with NATO to expand the NATO ANA Sustainment Trust Fund to also include donations for police and for ANSF literacy programs.

The United States continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage allies and partners to help sustain the ANSF.
INTERNATIONAL DONATIONS

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s office of the Deputy Commanding General for International Security Cooperation (ISC) evaluates all infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations to the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that each satisfies a valid ANA or ANP requirement and is sustainable. The MoD or MoI subsequently evaluates, approves and accepts each donation. NTM-A/CSTC-A also evaluates equipment or munitions offered by a donor nation to verify technical specifications and quality. NTM-A/CSTC-A also works with the Government of Afghanistan to coordinate shipping, receipt, and accountability for all equipment, materials, and munitions.

Nations sometimes approach the Afghan Government directly to negotiate a bilateral donation, which may or may not come to NTM-A/CSTC-A’s attention. When the Afghan Government and the donor nation advise NTM-A/CSTC-A early in the process, NTM-A/CSTC-A is able to track these cases and provide assistance, as necessary. NTM-A/CSTC-A solicits and tracks these infrastructure, equipment, and weapon donations and, in conjunction with other staff elements, tracks overall international monetary donations, including bilateral donations in support of the ANSF. Since 2002, nearly fifty nations, NATO, and six international funding agencies have contributed more than $2.58B to the ANSF.18

2.9: CONTRACT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

NTM-A/CSTC-A has taken several steps to increase internal controls and oversight capacity of U.S. Government.

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18 For example, in December 2010, Germany donated €39.9M into the NATO Trust Fund for use by the ANA Engineering and Logistics School; and Albania concluded an offer to donate 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles to the ANP; delivery is expected in April 2011.
First, in late 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A requested an additional 272 personnel on an urgent Request for Forces to bolster its acquisition, logistics, resource management, communications, and engineering oversight functions. These personnel will be placed around the country to oversee contractors and provide increased end use monitoring of equipment provided to the ANA and ANP. To date, 159 of these personnel have been sourced.

Second, NTM-A/CSTC-A requested an additional 35 military communications specialists. A lack of network capacity makes it extremely difficult to emplace accountability, maintenance, or personnel/pay systems. NTM-A/CSTC-A had contracts in place that, with current on-hand oversight capacity, would have brought network connectivity to district police stations over a five year period. Adding these additional 35 specialists will allow NTM-A/CSTC-A to deploy the network in half the time, greatly enhancing stewardship and accelerating progress towards transition.

Finally, deployment of pay teams now provides oversight of ANA and ANP payroll across the country. Although NTM-A/CSTC-A has been successful in placing more than 95 percent of the ANA and almost 80 percent of the ANP on Electronic Fund Payroll, challenges remain in ensuring MoD and MoI effectively process payrolls. In Uruzgan Province, the police remain on a cash payroll system, and the pay teams have detected significant irregularities. NTM-A/CSTC-A and MoI have jointly sent a team into this province to improve the integrity of the payroll process, as well as ensure the police are paid appropriately. The request for nine additional military finance personnel that will arrive this summer will allow NTM-A/CSTC-A to deploy an additional nine pay teams, providing additional oversight and reducing financial irregularities.

**Contract Management Office**

In 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A established a contract management oversight (CMO) activity to establish a networked oversight system including Primary and Assistant Contracting Officer Representatives and Technical Oversight Representatives. CMO implements the command’s contract oversight functions for ASFF, which includes pseudo-foreign Military Sales cases and local acquisition with an emphasis on local procurement. Full time Contracting Officer Representatives provide oversight on vehicle/weapons maintenance, ANA/ANP training, ANSF construction, and operations and maintenance contracts. Since NTM-A/CSTC-A established this activity, contract oversight coverage has improved to over 90 percent for over 350 ASFF contracts with a value exceeding $3.5B.

**Defense Contract Management Agency**

NTM-A/CSTC-A has entered into a partnership with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to provide expertise in quality assurance, quality control, and contract management for major contracts. Additionally, DCMA will provide industrial specialists over the next several months that will assist the NTM-A/CSTC-A Afghan First program. These specialists will help develop Afghan industrial partners who support the MoI and MoD with equipment. Although this partnership was only forged in February 2011, it is already having a positive impact.
AFGHANISTAN – TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

In December 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A awarded three contracts, bringing together maintenance training with vehicle and equipment maintenance support for both the ANA and ANP. The total potential program value (over five years) is $530M, with each contract consisting of a base period plus four, one-year options. The contracts are the ANA Maintenance contract ($37M/year); the ANP Maintenance contract ($63M/year); and the ANSF Maintenance Training contract ($6M/year).

The ANA Maintenance contract signifies a dramatic change in the approach to maintenance as the ANA will be responsible for organizational maintenance and for repair parts supply chain management. This transition is ongoing and NTM-A/CSTC-A anticipates that some ANA brigades will be challenged by this new approach. To mitigate risk, the contract includes a contractor supported maintenance site for each Corps and mentor/trainer teams in each brigade combat service support unit.

The ANP Maintenance contract will continue to provide contractor supported maintenance and supply chain management at 23 different sites. The ANSF Maintenance Training contract provides both centralized training, and the ability to conduct on-site training via mobile training teams at various locations throughout the country. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are providing over 30 contractor oversight representatives, two project managers, and one DCMA representative to supervise this contract.

AFGHANISTAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY

In August 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A awarded a contract to DynCorp International to provide mentors and trainers to assist in developing the MoD and ANA. This contract has a two-year base period valued at $157M with a total potential contract value of $232M if the one-year option period is exercised. DynCorp provides dedicated in-depth mentoring, training, subject matter expertise, and programmatic support to assist the MoD and ANA in assuming responsibility for their own security needs. DynCorp will provide an estimated 275 qualified personnel. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are providing over 40 contractor oversight representatives, two project managers, and two DCMA representatives to supervise this contract.

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE MENTORING, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Previously, the U.S. Embassy maintained contract oversight and administration responsibility for contracted civilian mentors through a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS). In August 2009, the two departments agreed that DoD would assume contractual responsibility for the ANP training program, mentoring within the Afghan MoI, and oversight of the DoD police mentor teams embedded in ANP units throughout Afghanistan.

In December 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A awarded a cost-plus, fixed-fee contract to DynCorp International to assist in the building, development, and sustainment of the MoI and ANP. The length of the contract includes a four month transition-in and a two-year base period with a one-year option period. The total value of the contract if all option years are exercised is over $1B.
The contract changeover began on 30 December 2010 and consolidates four separate contract vehicles into one. NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC are providing over 100 contractor oversight representatives, three project managers, and three DCMA representatives to supervise this contract.

2.10: INFRASTRUCTURE

Over the past six months, NTM-A/CSTC-A has continued to execute the $6.7B released through March 31, 2011 for the FY2005 through FY2011 infrastructure program to support ANA and ANP fielding with an emphasis on building a sustainable facilities maintenance program. For the actual construction, program management and contract awards were made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Air Force Center for Engineering and Environment, and USCENTCOM Contracting Command. Working with these execution agents, NTM-A/CSTC-A has initiated several programs to improve construction execution. Included in those initiatives are quarterly conferences that are conducted with each Regional Command engineer to discuss specific issues within the battle space with local ANA and ANP leaders in attendance. Additionally, monthly facility shuras are also held with MoD and MoI to discuss national-level concerns and issues.

Over the past year, NTM-A/CSTC-A has significantly improved its facilities planning capability. For example, in November 2009, there were only 33 engineers assigned to NTM-A/CSTC-A. Today there are over 150. Additionally, processes are in place to ensure that disciplined planning principles are met for every funded project – things like site assessments, security, land ownership, and alternative facilities. For each installation, NTM-A/CSTC-A has a master plan that describes the intended purpose of each facility and its intended location.

FACILITIES MAINTENANCE

Perhaps the most important recent facility initiative is the formation of the Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG). This facilities maintenance assistance team was approved for implementation by NTM-A/CSTC-A in January 2010. By December 2010, it gained its initial 22 person cell that will enable the organization to mentor, advise, train, and oversee the development of the ANA and ANP facilities maintenance capability. These 22 military engineers are now at six different installations facilitating the integration between three important components: contracted maintenance; training of Afghan facilities engineers to build the long term capacity for Afghans to care for their own facilities; and development of the garrison management structure that will be responsible on a day-to-day basis.

While these 22 people are only able to affect six installations, an additional 100 military engineers have been requested to replicate this effort immediately across dozens of garrisons. Over the next several years, NTM-A/CSTC-A expects this effort to grow to more than 300 personnel to build capacity and stewardship within the ANA and ANP.

By December 2010, the 22 person ITAG team deployed to six primary sites: Kabul Military Training Center; National Military Hospital; Camp Morehead; Darulaman; Farah; and Camp Hero. The plan is to increase by another thirteen sites, to include the National Police Training Center, as soon as possible.
On January 23, 2011, the Afghan Army opened the facility maintenance school house. Costing only $300,000, it is a simple, sustainable investment to start producing the first 60 MoD and MoI facility engineers. There is currently a class with 60 students attending this six month course.

**Facility Management Ministerial Development**

NTM-A/CSTC-A enabled a monthly facilities *shura* with the ANA Construction and Property Management Department, and the MoD Vice Chief of General Staff (GS). The facilities *shura* gives the opportunity to communicate and coordinate facility development and sustainment topics country-wide to the ANA GS, to present ANA infrastructure and basing issues that need high-level strategic guidance or decisions, and to inform ANA GS of the effects of coalition forces initiatives. Examples of topics discussed include local interference of de-mining contractors, encroachment of residents onto military property, and finalizing locations of Army garrisons.

**ANA Infrastructure**

NTM-A/CSTC-A continued construction to field the 171,600-soldier Army, focusing on projects that will provide facilities for brigade-sized formations (approximately 5,000 soldiers). NTM-A/CSTC-A has 37 ANA projects under construction (Figure 19). From October 2010 through March 2011, 46 projects worth $629M were estimated to be awarded, and 12 projects worth $112M were completed. Another 301 projects are actively being planned. During the period, master plans for all major ANA installations were completed. This planning included provisions for the potential growth to 195,000 soldiers. The ANA will have approximately 100 installations when construction is complete. In conjunction with the master planning, utility studies of a dozen bases were completed to make sure that construction did not outrun available infrastructure.

In order to speed construction, increase commonality, and simplify maintenance, a variety of initiatives were undertaken to improve the infrastructure planning and construction process. New standard designs using K-Spans were commissioned that will replace the concrete block designs currently used, reducing construction time significantly. The first test case of government furnished material has been ordered by Defense Logistics Agency to be used on K-Spans beginning in summer 2011. This will eliminate delays caused by contractors’ inability to import material. Additionally, new construction standards were approved for use on ANSF facilities. These standards simplify the design and construction process, producing more uniform facilities that are faster to construct and simpler to maintain.

**Figure 19: ANSF Infrastructure Projects (October 2010 – March 2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type</th>
<th>ANP</th>
<th>ANA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2010 to March 2011 Completed</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010 to March 2011 Awards</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Construction in March 2011</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects Planned but Not Yet Started</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed Projects Since 2003</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Projects</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Projects for 2012</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANP INFRASTRUCTURE

NTM-A/CSTC-A continued the programming and execution of the $4.5B ANP infrastructure program. NTM-A/CSTC-A is currently constructing more than 140 projects worth more than $800M to support all police pillars. From October 2010 to March 2011, 39 projects worth $221M were estimated to be awarded and 41 projects worth $111M were completed. It is expected that more than 100 of the projects will be completed in the next year, greatly increasing the ability of the ANP to provide security and stability.

NTM-A/CSTC-A is planning an additional 276 projects to support the ANP. Locations and requirements are being determined in a collaborative process with NTM-A/CSTC-A, MoI, and IJC. The resulting construction will provide facilities for a force of 134,000 police personnel.

NTM-A/CSTC-A supported expansions in ANP training by planning the first four Regional Police Training Centers (RPTC). By adapting the Regional Military Training Center design, NTM-A/CSTC-A reduced design time by six months, allowing NTM-A/CSTC-A to meet training goals ahead of schedule. NTM-A/CSTC-A continues to support construction efforts at numerous smaller ANP Regional Training Centers throughout Afghanistan. The National Police Training Center (NPTC) in Wardak is expected to be complete in July 2011. When complete, NPTC will have the capacity to train 3,000 students simultaneously. Logistically, the National Logistics Center in Wardak will complete construction in the summer of 2011, and Regional Logistics Centers are under construction, planned or programmed throughout Afghanistan.

2.11: PROCUREMENT

LOCAL ACQUISITION – AFGHAN FIRST

In 2010, CSTC-A established a Local Acquisitions Office to be responsible for buying locally-procured products for the ANSF, including uniforms, boots, organizational clothing and individual equipment (except for Kevlar and armor plates), tents, temporary buildings, generators, force protection materials, office supplies, cleaning supplies, kitchen supplies, and furniture.

Before 2010, although NTM-A/CSTC-A bought these items from Afghan companies, very few were actually made in Afghanistan. Currently NTM-A/CSTC-A funds contracts with three companies making boots, five companies making uniforms, and three women-owned companies to make 23 Office of Compliance Inspection and Evaluation items. NTM-A/CSTC-A also funds simple pricing agreements with four Afghan companies making Connex container-based temporary buildings, two Afghan companies making tents, and two Afghan companies making furniture in the Kabul area. It is estimated that more than 5,000 Afghans are directly employed through these contracts.

In addition to providing jobs, the Afghan First Program results in a cost savings. Not only do the Afghan firms produce high quality products at reduced cost, the program also reduces transportation costs. The Afghan First program also has the potential to reduce corruption by implementing COMISAF COIN contracting guidance through regular visits to the factories;
getting to know the owners, workforce, suppliers, and business processes; understanding cost structures and fair pricing; and vetting through NGOs such as Peace Dividend Trust.

**JOINT VENTURES**

In December 2010, NTM-A/CSTC-A hosted another significant event in its “Afghan First” program: the signing of the first international Joint Venture facilitated to support ANSF requirements. An Afghan firm and Austrian firm signed a $5M joint venture agreement to produce and certify transformers and other electrical equipment. The goal is for the transformers to meet UL standards and have over 50 percent of its parts locally procured. This is a promising event with significant implications for investment and job creation. While modest, it is noteworthy, and may create interest for other joint venture opportunities.

This was followed in March 2011 by a second joint venture for fire rated doors and windows involving two Afghan firms and an Indian company. Similar to the transformer joint venture, the firm will have to meet UL standards, have women in skilled positions, and require the foreign firm to make both a monetary and intellectual property investment.

**PROCUREMENT MINISTERIAL ADVISING**

In 2010, the Ministerial Procurement Advising office was formed to mentor and assist the MoD Acquisition Agency and MoI Procurement Department in procurement resources for ANSF. The MoD and MoI are starting to monitor funding disbursements of contracts for products, services, commitments, and obligations. This is a critical step in viewing acquisition as a system-of-systems consisting of integrated requirements, contracting, and budgeting processes.

Since then, significant progress has been made in several key procurement areas. In the fourth quarter of 2010, both ministries released their first internet solicitations. This is a significant accomplishment. Internet solicitations increase competition, transparency, and efficiency. The MoD is now using the internet for 100 percent of its Acquisition Agency Headquarters advertisements.

**END-USE MONITORING**

End-Use Monitoring (EUM) is a core function conducted worldwide with countries that receive defense articles through security cooperation programs and U.S. direct commercial sales. It is conducted in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, Foreign Assistance Act, and applicable DoD statutes. EUM ensures the Afghan government properly uses transferred U.S. defense articles. Defense article registration, conducted in accordance with Section 1228 of Public Law 110-181 and Section 1225 of Public Law 111-184, is a program unique to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq that requires detailed records be kept of all transferred U.S. defense articles.

NTM-A/CSTC-A has partnered with the MoD and MoI to accomplish this mission more effectively. This partnership has enabled both ministries to improve property accountability. To best accomplish this, the command is preparing to double the size of the EUM teams in order to deploy them to each of the six regional commands.
SECTION 3 – TRANSITION

3.1: THE TRANSITION PROCESS

In January 2010, participants at the London Conference pledged to develop a plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead. NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers endorsed the Joint Framework for Inteqal (Transition) at Talinn in April 2010, and President Obama and President Karzai committed to the process in a May 2010 joint statement. At the Kabul Conference in July 2010, the international community expressed its support for President Karzai’s objective that the ANSF should lead and conduct all military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014, support that was later re-affirmed by NATO and ISAF member nations at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010.

Inteqal is intended to be a conditions-based, irreversible process. It is governed by eight core principles:

- **Conditions-based**: Transition recommendations shall be based on an assessment of conditions on the ground. Transition is a process, not an event.
- **Bottom-up assessments**: Transition recommendations will be informed by local assessments, as well as by assessments from mentors of key Afghan Government institutions at the local level.
- **Start at the district, progress to the province**: Transfer of security will take place at the district level and progress to the provincial level.
- **“Thin-out”**: As ANSF capabilities develop, ISAF will thin its forces in certain locations as conditions allow, and progressively shift from a partnering to a mentoring relationship that supports continued ANSF professionalization.
- **Retain headquarters elements**: Headquarters elements will be retained, even as combat elements thin-out, to facilitate and enable ANSF operations.
- **Reinvest some of the transition dividend**: As ISAF forces thin-out in one district or area, some of that “transition dividend” should be reinvested in other contiguous geographic areas or in the training effort to accelerate and/or enhance transition.
- **Transition institutions and functions as well as geographic areas**: Transition does not simply apply to geographic areas – it will also apply to key Afghan Government institutions, and functions such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
- **Ensure transition will be irreversible**: A successful transition of security responsibility requires that ANSF, under effective Afghan civilian control, will be capable of addressing security challenges on a sustainable and irreversible basis – albeit with some level of continued support.

The decision to begin security transition in a geographic area is determined by four conditions. First, the ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance. Second, the security in the given area must be at a threat level that permits the population to pursue routine daily activities. Third, local governance must be sufficiently developed to provide a complementary layer of stability as ISAF assistance is gradually reduced.
Fourth, ISAF must be properly postured to reduce its presence as ANSF capacity and capabilities increase and the security environment improves.

3.2: JOINT AFGHAN-NATO INTEQAL BOARD PROGRESS

In November 2010, the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) convened for the first time. Under the leadership of Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (appointed by President Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan Transition Coordination Commission) and co-chaired by COMISAF General Petraeus and NATO SCR Mark Sedwill, the JANIB confirmed the 2011-2014 transition timeline and emphasized stability and self-sufficiency as goals of transition.

In February 2011, the JANIB recommended to the North Atlantic Council and the Afghan Government the geographic areas assessed as prepared to begin the transition process. Following endorsement by the Afghan Cabinet and NATO Defense Ministers, President Karzai announced in his March 22, 2011 Nowruz19 speech the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts to begin transition in July 2011.

The seven areas that will begin the transition process include the provinces of Kabul (excluding Sarobi District), Panjshir, and Bamyan; the municipal districts of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh Province), Lashkar Gah (Helmand Province), and Herat (Herat Province); and the Mehtar Lam Municipality not including the rest of the capital district (Laghman Province).20 In all, the areas announced include approximately 20-25 percent of Afghanistan’s population and reflects both a geographic and an ethnic balance.

3.3: THE WAY FORWARD ON TRANSITION

In his Nowruz remarks, President Karzai linked peace, transition, and sovereignty in a tone that suggested cooperation with the international community. In his speech, he also listed certain prerequisites for transition, although he emphasized that transition was inevitable and irreversible. Those prerequisites included: adherence to Kabul Conference international aid commitments; a “one UN system” that is coordinated with the Afghan government; continued international support for major infrastructure projects; transformation of PRTs into contributing agencies for transition; preparation of proposals and plans to enhance good governance in the provinces and cities involved in transition; and legal and judicial reform. Dr. Ghani has actively engaged with ISAF and the international community on transition implementation planning, including the evolution of PRTs. This dialogue between Afghan, ISAF, and international community leaders will facilitate the transition process and will enable a transition of security to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014.

In addition to continued assistance from the United States and the international community throughout and beyond transition, the continued growth of the ANSF in quantity, quality, and capacity is essential to ensuring that Afghanistan is capable of meeting existing and future needs.

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19 Afghan New Year
20 Mehtar Lam was a late addition by President Karzai, not included in the original JANIB recommendation but introduced after soliciting NATO/ISAF advice. The municipal district was originally recommended for transition in six months’ time, but having evaluated the ensuing risk, its inclusion in the first tranche was considered to be manageable. This was an appropriate decision to be made by President Karzai and allowed him to meet his objective for an ethnically- and regionally-balanced first tranche.
security challenges. Continued ANSF growth to a force of 352,000, complemented by the expansion of the Afghan Local Police from 10,000 to 30,000 personnel, will allow transition to proceed at an acceptable level of risk, and will allow the ANSF to successfully take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Work is underway to understand the implications of the transition with respect to the CJSOR process and with a view to identifying opportunities that might exist for force reinvestment. However, there are not expected to be any significant force reinvestment opportunities or redeployment dividends arising from the first or second tranches of transitioning provinces, as they will largely include areas that are already largely uncontested and therefore have minimal ISAF or USFOR-A force presence. Thus, there will remain a need to fulfill the outstanding requirements for trainers within the existing CJSOR.
SECTION 4 – SECURITY

4.1: THE INSURGENCY

Over the past six months, ANSF and ISAF operations have broadly arrested the momentum of the insurgency in much of the country and have reversed it in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past six months is significant, it is also fragile and reversible.

The cumulative impact of ISAF’s comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy has placed the insurgency under unprecedented pressure, including: persistent clear, hold, and build operations by ISAF and ANSF conventional forces; precision-targeted ISAF and Afghan special forces operations; local defense programs such as Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Village Stability Operations (VSO); and reintegration opportunities enabled by the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). Pressure has been applied to virtually all aspects of insurgent operations, including command and control elements, facilitation networks, and their Afghan safe havens.

The Taliban-led insurgency’s strategic goals remain unchanged: control the population and expand insurgent influence and support bases; drive out coalition forces; defeat the ANSF; and undermine the Afghan Government.

Insurgent information operations attempt to portray the insurgency as the true defenders of the population. They continue to exploit civilian casualties from ISAF operations, whether real or not. The insurgency’s strategic narrative also attempts to discredit the Government of Afghanistan and convince Afghans that ISAF withdrawal is imminent, and the Taliban's return to power is inevitable. However, the commitment of ISAF troop contributing nations to an enduring presence has begun to erode insurgent morale.

In addition to the propaganda campaign, the insurgency continues its operational efforts to target coalition forces, to undermine the ability of the ANSF to provide security, and to subvert ISAF’s COIN campaign. Further, insurgents intend to intimidate the Afghan Government and populace by targeting and assassinating government officials, powerbrokers, and local leaders supporting the government.

Insurgent leadership views ISAF local security programs, such as the ALP and VSO, as significant threats, as they empower the local populace to reject the insurgency and connect them to the government. These local security programs also deny the insurgency access to terrain while providing time and space for the Government of Afghanistan to build capacity. Attacks against the ALP and VSOs have so far been largely ineffective. In some areas, the attacks are even having the opposite effect, strengthening ALP cohesion and spurring locals to join the ALP.

The Taliban developed a code of conduct in 2009 to serve as a guide for insurgents in Afghanistan, particularly in areas of strong government influence, in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the population. Insurgents have been setting up local commissions to collect taxes and attempt to provide more attractive governance options, such as providing conflict resolution
via shadow governors and judges trained in sharia law. In spite of this guidance, ISAF and ANSF security gains and operational tempo have forced the insurgency to change its approach by shifting to more intimidation and assassination tactics. Insurgents employ these tactics to create the perception of deteriorating security and to demonstrate to local residents, as well as the media, that the Afghan Government and ISAF are incapable of providing security.

The insurgency continues to generate sufficient funds to meet its requirements. Insurgents raise funds primarily through taxes, extortion, smuggling, drug trafficking, and foreign donations. Lower-level commanders tax and extort money from local populations, keeping most of the money for local operations. A substantial external funding system of foreign donations supports the insurgency's senior leadership. Any reported shortages are likely a result of local distribution challenges and seasonal shortages, rather than a reflection of significant disruption in revenue-generating efforts.

The insurgency continues to evolve its operations based on experiences from previous fighting. Due to their increased losses, insurgents are attempting to minimize their exposure to direct ISAF engagement through the use of IEDs, assassinations, infiltration of ANSF, and suicide attacks. These trends have led to increased insurgent-caused civilian casualties. Despite recent high-profile suicide attacks, the total number of suicide attacks for this reporting period, 45, falls below the 51 suicide attacks during the same time period last year.

4.2: STATE OF THE INSURGENCY

The ISAF and ANSF Winter Campaign built on the successes of the summer and fall of 2010. The campaign was marked by ISAF and Afghan partnered operations, Special Operations targeting, and Afghan local security initiatives, and has driven insurgents out of many of their traditional operating areas in Afghanistan. The denial of safe havens has limited insurgent access to support infrastructure such as safe houses, caches, medical support, and IED-making facilities, and has also constrained their freedom of movement.

The pressure from recent ISAF and ANSF operations is felt most acutely by the lower and middle levels of the insurgency living and operating in Afghanistan. This winter, senior insurgent leadership was increasingly challenged to keep subordinates committed to the fight. The majority of fighters and sub-commanders, operating in or near their home districts and villages, have reportedly felt removed from senior insurgent leaders who are perceived as living in relative safety outside the major conflict areas and who are benefitting financially from the fighting. The dissonance between Pakistan-based senior leadership and the rank-and-file insurgents located in Afghanistan should not be overstated, but does suggest that seams within the insurgency may be widening. Despite this, senior Taliban leaders continue to voice confidence in their ultimate success.

The Taliban's main objective for 2011 is to regain momentum lost as a result of the U.S. surge and expanded ISAF and ANSF operations. It is assessed that their operational main effort will be to reclaim safe havens in southern Afghanistan in order to regain influence and dominance over the local population centers. They will likely focus on the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan as these areas are economically, socially, and psychologically important to the Taliban.
Insurgents in Helmand Province will continue to try to regain lost safe havens by undermining reintegration efforts, intimidating the local population, and weakening government credibility. Insurgents have similar goals in Kandahar Province, where assassinations and intimidation are their tactics of choice. The insurgency is also resorting to suicide attacks in Kandahar City in order to undermine and degrade ANSF capabilities. The insurgency is also attempting to re-establish a more effective presence in Uruzgan Province, where ALP sites have reduced their influence and disrupted their freedom of movement. Throughout these areas, Taliban senior leaders are focused on undermining local defense initiatives.

In the east, the Haqqani Network (HQN) remains the most significant threat. HQN continues its efforts to increase influence and control in traditional operating areas in Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya Provinces, and to expand its influence in Kabul and its environs in order to conduct attacks in the capital. A series of high-profile attacks during this reporting period demonstrate HQN’s continued capabilities.

In the north, insurgents have attempted to expand operations to increase influence over the population and create the impression of a nation-wide insurgency while diverting ISAF and ANSF focus and resources away from their main operations in the south and east. However, insurgent capabilities have been degraded by ISAF and ANSF operations in Kunduz and Takhar Provinces, and the effort by the Taliban to expand the insurgency to the north has achieved limited effects.

Finally, in the west, the insurgents' priority is to divert Afghan Government and ISAF attention away from the main focus areas of Regional Commands South and Southwest by conducting targeted attacks on ANSF and government officials in Herat and Farah Provinces. The ALP
program is also of particular concern to insurgent leaders in Farah, Badghis, and Herat Provinces, as it has been successful in limiting their freedom of movement.

ISAF still does not fully understand the regenerative capacity of the insurgency. Although the death or detention of thousands of insurgents, in addition to the formal re-integration of hundreds of others over the past six months has had a disruptive effect, the insurgency has demonstrated a high degree of resilience in the past. The cumulative impact of ISAF operations on the insurgency will not be apparent until well into the 2011 traditional insurgency campaign season.

4.3: ISAF CONCEPT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

During ISAF’s Winter Campaign, operational efforts focused on consolidating the gains made against the insurgency in the fall of 2010 in the following critical areas: 1) the Central Helmand River Valley in RC-SW, where comprehensive civil-military efforts were aimed at expanding Afghan Government security bubbles while bringing improved governance, development, and security to the more than 500,000 Afghans in the region; 2) Kandahar City and its environs, where the Taliban-led insurgency originated; 3) Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan, where the insurgency continues to benefit from neighboring sanctuaries; 4) Baghlan and Kunduz, where ISAF is clearing insurgent areas of operation; and 5) Badghis, where ISAF continued expansion of the security bubble.

Figure 21: Concept of Military Operations (October 2010 – March 2011)

The 2010-2011 Winter Campaign was executed within the existing key terrain and area of interest strategic framework. To prioritize coalition efforts, 80 key terrain districts (KTDs) and 41 area of interest (AOIs) districts were initially identified with Afghan Government agreement. Last quarter, the number of KTDs and AOIs was revised upward to 94 and 44, respectively, for a total of 138. Key terrain is defined as areas the control of which provides a marked advantage to either the Government of Afghanistan or the insurgents. AOIs are defined similarly, but are of
secondary importance to KTDs. They are areas in which ISAF and the ANSF operate in order to positively impact KTDs and meet operational objectives. The purpose of KTDs and AOIs is to ensure that limited resources are applied to areas where they will realize the greatest advantage.

4.4: OPERATIONS

Figure 22: Map of Regional Command Area of Operations

REGIONAL COMMAND – EAST

Forces in RC-E continued offensive operations against insurgent networks during the reporting period, while simultaneously reinforcing and expanding security gains in 21 priority districts. These operations were essential in expanding security outward from Kabul and the key provincial capitals. The tempo of operations remains high in order to sustain momentum achieved during the Winter Campaign and to further increase security gains during the pivotal spring months.

In order to expand the Kabul security zone, ISAF forces in RC-E have concentrated their main operational efforts in eastern Wardak and Logar Provinces, and they are conducting key supporting operations to disrupt HQN in Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces. Operations are synchronized across seven maneuver brigade combat teams and with adjacent regional
commands in close partnership with the ANSF and special operation forces. In particular, the partnership between ISAF and ANSF forces has been strengthened to near one-to-one levels.

Operations in RC-E continue to focus on the disruption of insurgent lines of communications, and the neutralization and defeat of critical insurgent support bases, staging areas, and operational areas. The expansion of the ALP into 13 districts in RC-E complemented ISAF and ANSF operations and expanded security at the local and community level.

Complementary border operations between ISAF, the ANSF, and the Pakistani military are improving, with on-going operations astride the border with Pakistan’s Mohmand and Bajaur Agencies. Operations there aim to disrupt the insurgents’ freedom of movement from their Pakistan sanctuaries into Afghanistan and to prevent unrestricted movement for insurgents through the area to the Ring Road and Kabul. RC-E has seen an 18 percent reduction in indirect fire attacks, which is the most common insurgent tactic along the border. Deliberate targeting operations have also removed mid-level insurgent commanders, degrading their ability to attack coalition and Afghan forces successfully. Tactical gains in RC-E are translating into strategically-significant progress, as two provinces, Bamyan and Panjshir, and one provincial capital, Mehtar Lam, have met the security, governance, and development conditions sufficient for the initiation of the transition process, which will begin July 2011.

Despite this progress, it remains clear that the insurgency continues to enjoy sanctuary in the Pakistan border region, from where they can regenerate insurgent command and control and operational capacity.

**Regional Command – South**

During late 2010 and early 2011, operations in RC-S continued to shift momentum from the insurgency to the Afghan Government and the coalition. The U.S. 10th Mountain Division headquarters assumed command of RC-S in November 2010 as the first U.S. division headquarters dedicated to RC-S. At the same time, the ANSF has seen an even more substantial uplift as a result of improved recruiting, force development, and professionalization. ANSF capabilities continue to increase through effective training and operational partnering with coalition forces. The surge in ISAF and ANSF forces, coupled with an increased operational focus and tempo, has resulted in important security gains throughout the Regional Command.

Following Operation Hamkari in late 2010, Afghan and coalition partners engaged in operations to consolidate, reinforce, and expand areas where hard-earned security gains were made. The ANSF have made important strides in their ability to plan and execute independent operations, and have become a significant threat to the insurgency’s ability to operate in the key terrain of RC-S.

Security gains in RC-S have been reinforced by the establishment of the Afghan Local Police, which has empowered communities in several locations. They contribute directly to security in partnership with the ANSF, district and provincial government, and the Afghan Ministry of Interior.
REGIONAL COMMAND – SOUTHWEST
The current level of security in the Central Helmand River Valley (where the majority of the populace resides) requires a formidable security presence, a responsibility shared by ISAF and the ANSF.

There have been significant improvements in the overall security situation in Helmand and Nimruz Provinces since the previous reporting period. Forces in RC-SW continued to assist the Afghan Government in protecting the population, executing comprehensive COIN operations, enabling civilian partners, and disrupting the insurgency’s ability to harm the Afghan people.

The expansion of security into areas previously controlled by the insurgency in northern Helmand Province has proven challenging but achievable, as the increased tempo of operations and the surge of ISAF and ANSF forces have expanded security gains and provided the time and space necessary for local governance to expand and develop. The ANSF expansion has also permitted more counter-narcotics operations.

In the Lower Helmand River Valley, the ANSF and the coalition have reduced insurgent threats to local Afghan bazaars, allowing commerce to improve and the delivery of aid via District Development Plans to increase. Security gains, paralleled by improvements in governance and development throughout both Helmand and Nimruz Provinces, have enabled Lashkar Gah to be included among the first tranche of areas to transition to Afghan security lead in July 2011.

REGIONAL COMMAND – WEST
During this period, operations in RC-W focused on consolidating security gains made throughout the winter campaign, providing security to key population centers and commercial routes, and expanding security to allow for further socio-economic development and institution building. Security conditions in the major cities of Bala Murghab, Qala-e-Naw, Herat, and Farah have improved. Freedom of movement along Highway 1 has also improved, as well as the security along routes connecting the Iran-Afghanistan border crossing points of Islam Qalah and Torah Goudney with Herat City.

As recently announced by President Karzai, Herat City in RC-W is one of seven geographic areas that will be the first to begin the transition process in July 2011.

REGIONAL COMMAND – NORTH
During the reporting period, operations in RC-N focused on securing key terrain and protecting Afghans in the Pul-e Khumri and Baghlan-e Jadid Districts of Baghlan Province. This effort is central to the overall objective in RC-N: to expand the secured area along Highway 1 from the Salang Tunnel to Mazar-e Sharif and along Highway 3 to Kunduz City in order to create a stable and secure environment in the most densely populated districts. Improvements in security will allow the Afghan people to extend governance and foster development by opening up key commerce routes to unimpeded traffic.

Forces in RC-N also conducted operations to achieve two secondary objectives: maintain freedom of movement along Highway 1 from Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province to Maimanah in
Faryab Province; and improve security in the Ghormach, Almar and Qaisar Districts of Faryab Province in preparation for the construction of the final section of Highway 1. ISAF forces, partnered with the ANSF, have made progress towards achieving these objectives. Attacks along Highway 1 between Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah have been reduced and insurgent presence and freedom of movement remains limited.

The biggest remaining challenges are to ensure that recent gains are sustained and expanded in the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor, a vital effort to encourage the Afghan people to support the government and security forces. To accomplish this, RC-N will stress partnering and focus on building the capacity of newly-fielded ANSF units.

REGионаL CoMMAnD – CаЬLisaL

Operations in RC-C focused on neutralizing insurgent networks through a robust partnering strategy with the ANSF and ALP. Partnered operations have successfully reinforced security around the capital, disrupted insurgent staging areas in outer districts, and blocked insurgent infiltration from neighbouring provinces. Sensational attacks in the capital have also been limited, which is particularly notable given that several high-profile events took place during this reporting period, including: Ashura in December 2010, the Parliamentary Inauguration in January 2011, the Liberation Day in February 2011, and the Afghan Nowruz Celebration in March 2011.

The public in RC-C has a positive perception of security throughout the province, and positive views of the national and local government’s provision of security are manifested in increased commerce and development in the region.

4.5: AFGHANISTAN – PАКISTАN CoОPeRAТioN

Operational and tactical coordination between ISAF, ANSF, and Pakistan’s security forces has improved in quality and quantity over the past two years; however, significant challenges remain in building mutual trust and cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, given the complex historical relationship between the two countries. Insurgent capacity continues to be supported by sanctuaries and logistical support originating in Pakistan, and insurgents will likely retain operational momentum in areas where these support structures exist. Consolidating security gains made during the reporting period requires more progress with Pakistan to eliminate these sanctuaries. Although putting pressure on insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan would not be sufficient to end the Afghanistan conflict in the near-term, it would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the conflict in favor of ISAF and the Afghan Government.

Pakistan’s military leadership has improved cross-border coordination with ISAF and the ANSF. Since October 2010, a series of high-level meetings between Afghan and Pakistan military leaders have gradually improved communication and cooperation, particularly in the border region. At the most recent high-level meeting, the 33rd Tripartite Commission in March 2011, ISAF and ANSF leaders met with Pakistani Army leaders in Pakistan for discussions on increasing cooperation and communication along the border.
4.6: Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) is designed to enable U.S. military commanders in both Iraq and Afghanistan to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements and urgent reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility. CERP has proven to be especially critical to supporting military commanders in executing COIN operations in support of President Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan.

Commanders use CERP funds to provide a rapid response that complements formal economic development and reconstruction efforts, especially in non-permissive areas. Commanders continue to consider CERP vital for improving security and implementing COIN operations.

4.7: Local Security Programs

Local security programs supporting the Afghan Government have been successful in protecting remote area populations, preventing their exploitation by the insurgency, and expanding government influence. These programs integrate bottom-up village and district defense systems, and serve as a complement to top-down, national-level ANSF development. U.S. Special Operations Forces launched the VSO initiative in early 2010, and in September 2010, the Ministry of Interior assumed control of the ALP initiative. The two programs are complementary, and the insurgency increasingly views them as a significant threat to their ability to influence the population.

Village Stability Operations

The VSO initiative is a bottom-up Afghan Ministry of Interior program that facilitates local security and development at the village level, connecting the local population to district governance. VSO is grounded in the tradition of rural Afghan villages providing for their own security, and focuses on Afghan communities with the will but not the means to resist the insurgency through grass-roots initiatives, especially in areas that have limited ANSF and ISAF presence.

The VSO model uses Afghan and ISAF personnel living in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan. The VSO initiative follows a four-phase process: shape, hold, build, and transition. The shape phase begins with an assessment of the village and surrounding area and ends with the establishment of a U.S. special operations force VSO site within the village. This phase is characterized by the building of rapport, trust, and relationships. During the hold phase, VSO personnel focus on protecting the population and laying the foundation for follow-on development and governance efforts. The build phase links villages to district and provincial governments through institutional arrangements, such as district and provincial shuras and carefully-designed and managed development projects using CERP funds and other resources. Finally, the transition phase expands the influence of village stability to other areas throughout the district, while transitioning responsibility for security, development, and governance to the Afghan Government.
**AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE**

President Karzai established the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program under the Afghan Ministry of Interior in August 2010. The program incorporated previous village-level defensive programs, e.g., the Community Defense and Local Defense Initiatives. The ALP program is a village-focused program that enhances COIN efforts by enabling rural areas with limited or no ANSF presence to provide for their own local security.

The ALP program is a complement to the VSO program. Although not all VSO sites have ALP programs, all current ALP sites are part of an existing VSO. The U.S. Government supports the ALP through ASFF funding to the Ministry of Interior and through training and technical assistance. The program is overseen by the Afghan Government and jointly executed by U.S. and Afghan Special Forces.

District ALP sites fall under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and thus are under the authority of the given district’s chief of police, who oversees both the ALP site training and validation process in addition to the formal ALP member screening process. ALP members are nominated by a representative local *shura*, are vetted by the Afghan intelligence service, and are trained by and partnered with designated U.S. forces. Currently, the Afghan Government has a *tashkil* authority for 10,000 personnel for the ALP. As of March 31, 2011, there are 34 validated/operational districts, 29 districts pending validation, and 14 pending MoI approval for ALP elements.  

Figure 23: Afghan Local Police Sites (as of March 31, 2011)

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21 Typical validation visits include provincial and district governors and chiefs of police, Kabul officials (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, National Directorate of Security, and Independent Directorate of Local Governance), and local elders.
Continued expansion and success of the ALP program faces several challenges. The Taliban and other insurgent groups have attempted to counter ALP growth and success with a campaign that includes targeted assassinations, night letters, intimidation, and kidnappings. There are also several areas where intra-tribal and inter-tribal tensions have prevented expansion of the ALP.

Even so, the impact of ALP on promoting local security and eroding insurgent influence is significant. Recognizing this, COMISAF, in December 2010, placed a conventional U.S. Army infantry battalion, 1-16 Infantry, under the operational control of Combined Forces Special Operations Command Center – Afghanistan to expand the ALP program rapidly. The increase of the ALP authorization from 10,000 to 30,000 is an integral part of the COIN campaign, complements the gains made by conventional ISAF and ANSF forces and will help facilitate irreversible transition.

4.8: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

Private security companies (PSC) in Afghanistan have been responsible for securing ISAF sites and convoys, diplomatic and NGO personnel, and development projects, freeing ISAF troops to perform COIN operations. However, by 2009-2010, the performance of many PSCs did not comply with Afghan law and customs, nor U.S. Government requirements, and was often marked by poor discipline and safety.

As early as 2008, President Karzai emphasized his intention to disband or prohibit all Afghan and non-Afghan PSCs and delegate their duties to Afghan Government security entities. With a backdrop of mounting international pressure to reduce corruption, President Karzai focused on PSCs as a key problem and, in August 2010, issued Presidential Decree 62 directing many PSCs to disband within four months. Although the decree included exceptions for embassies and diplomatic personnel, it soon became clear that Afghan Government security forces could not adequately replace PSCs in such a short time period.

In the fall of 2010, the MoI disbanded some PSCs, allowed some licenses to expire, and stopped registering new PSCs/contracts. In February 2011, the international community and the Government of Afghanistan negotiated a twelve-month bridging strategy, which the Afghan Government approved in March 2011. The agreement allows for the continued use of PSCs for one year, while concurrently developing the capabilities and capacity of an existing, MoI-run guard force – the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The strategy incorporates a reduction in, but not elimination of, coalition force reliance on PSCs and an acceptable use of PSCs for diplomatic entities, and international organizations until the Afghan Government can enlarge the APPF.

As part of this plan, NTM-A and USAID will assist the APPF to build the capacity needed to meet the needs of ISAF and the international community. To support these efforts, the APPF is currently building a recruit training center with a projected training capacity of 1,000 guards per month. While it will take time to develop an Afghan Government security solution to replace a 50,000-personnel PSC industry, which spans static, convoy, and construction security, President

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22 The APPF is part of the Afghan Government’s Department of Public Protection (DPP). DPP police are guards, not soldiers, so they are intended for defensive purposes only. The APPF currently employs more than 7,000 guards on infrastructure projects such as the new rail program, ring road projects, and the Afghan Wireless Communications Company (AWCC) internet project.
Karzai has agreed to certain exceptions, such as allowing individual PSCs to exceed personnel limits if they are willing to recruit, train, and equip guards for later use by the APPF.

As the Afghan Government builds the APPF’s capacity and capability, ISAF will reduce its reliance on PSCs and begin transitioning this responsibility to the APPF. Toward this end, USFOR-A is developing an international agreement relying on certain Title 10 authorities to serve as the mechanism to procure APPF services. The Afghan Government is considering converting the APPF into a state-owned enterprise which will increase its ability to respond to the needs of the international community while increasing transparency. Although demand for PSCs may continue, increased compliance by PSCs with U.S. requirements (and adherence to the Swiss Code for PSCs) will improve transparency of PSC operations and contribute to, rather than detract from, Afghanistan’s security and stability.

4.9: POPULATION SECURITY

Since October 2010, Afghan perceptions of security improved slightly despite an increase in overall violence levels.23 At the end of the previous reporting period in September 2010, approximately 84 percent of Afghans polled described security as either “fair” or “good.” As of March 2011, this percentage increased to 87 percent. Further, the percentage of Afghans that describe their security environment as “bad” remained relatively consistent with seasonal trends, despite an increase in the insurgency’s operational tempo during the winter months, declining from roughly 15 percent in September 2010 to nearly 10 percent in March 2011.

The positive security perceptions by Afghans is likely attributable to the surge in U.S., international, and Afghan forces throughout 2010, and the expansion of ANSF and ISAF operations, as well as improved professionalization in the ANSF. These operations have successfully disrupted insurgent access to population centers, expanded existing security bubbles, pushed insurgents into periphery areas, and increased the population’s freedom of movement.

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23 Afghan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Review, March 2011. This survey, conducted quarterly since September 2008, polls about 10,000 respondents in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Positive perceptions of security in the March 2011 Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Review decreased 10 percent from the previous quarter (December 2010) to 41 percent, the lowest “Good” rating since December 2008. However, respondents answering “Fair” increased by the same amount suggesting that there was no substantial change in security perceptions of the Afghan people. Negative perceptions of security decreased slightly and are at their lowest levels since the survey began in September 2008.
4.10: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Increasing security for the Afghan population is a key tenet of ISAF's mission. In 2010, ISAF re-emphasized the tactical directives governing the use of force to minimize the loss of civilian life. Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) caused by ISAF and Afghan forces decreased by 20 percent during 2010 (558 in 2010; 697 in 2009) even though violence increased by 80 percent and ISAF force levels increased by 53 percent. Coalition-caused CIVCAS pose strategic risks that undermine ISAF’s mission, jeopardize the coalition’s credibility, and alienate the Afghan population; thus NATO and ISAF continue to proactively manage CIVCAS incidents to mitigate the occurrences and effects of these unfortunate events.

Casualties caused by ISAF close combat aviation (CCA) and close air support (CAS) were reduced during 2010, despite an increase in ISAF operations. These events comprised less than 4 percent of all CIVCAS in 2010. However, recent ISAF operations resulting in high-profile CIVCAS incidents reinforce the need for continued vigilance in CCA and CAS operations.

Insurgents were responsible for approximately 88 percent of civilian casualties, primarily a result of IED activity. The number of civilians wounded or killed by insurgent activity increased by 2.2 percent in 2010 from 2009 (2,597 in 2010; 2,567 in 2009), trends that were supported in a March 2011 report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Recent high-profile IED attacks by insurgents in Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, Paktika, and Nangarhar Provinces caused significant numbers of civilian casualties in the first quarter of 2011.

Figure 24: Weekly Civilians Wounded or Killed (April 2009 – March 2011)

25 Data from ISAF CIVCAS Tracking Cell (CCTC) Database, as of March 24, 2011. Numbers reflect only confirmed civilian casualties.
4.11: VIOLENCE AND SECURITY INCIDENTS

In Afghanistan, violence and security incidents tend to increase in the spring and summer months and decrease during the fall and winter months. Thus, comparing data season-to-season, as opposed to consecutive time periods, offers the most accurate basis for sound assessments of violence trends.

TOTAL SECURITY INCIDENTS

Total security incidents were higher from October 2010 through March 2011 compared to the corresponding period in 2009-2010. ISAF assesses that this was primarily the result of: 1) the increased ISAF and ANSF troop presence; 2) the higher operations tempo challenging insurgent safe havens in southern and eastern Afghanistan; and 3) mild winter weather combined with Taliban leadership guidance ordering insurgents to continue operations throughout the winter. Direct fire and IED events continued to dominate the overall types of security incidents.

Figure 25: Total Weekly Security Incidents (April 2009 – March 2011)

26 Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs that were found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines that were found and cleared.

27 Data from Afghanistan Mission Network CIDNE, as of March 24, 2011.
**ENEMY ATTACKS**

Enemy attacks decreased during the winter consistent with seasonal trends. They declined at a slightly greater rate than the decline in overall security incidents. At the end of March 2011, enemy attacks comprised approximately 70 percent of all security incidents. This is lower than the first quarter of 2010 (75 percent), a possible indication of ISAF and ANSF effects on insurgent operations.

Figure 26: Enemy Attacks (April 2009 – March 2011)  

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28 Data from Afghanistan Mission Network CIDNE, as of March 24, 2011.
SECURITY INCIDENTS BY REGIONAL COMMAND

RC-SW had the highest level of violent activity among regional commands; however, in the first quarter of 2011, its relative share of overall violence was slightly reduced due to on-going operations in Regional Commands South and East. Surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) events have been reduced to minimal levels in RC-S and RC-SW, and indirect fire events have not had a significant impact. RC-C remains a predominately secure environment, with only 15 events taking place in the first quarter 2011, the lowest levels since 2006. Seasonal security incidents by regional command remained relatively consistent.

Figure 27: Monthly Security Incidents by Regional Command (October 2010 – March 2011)

Figure 28: Seasonal Security Incidents by Regional Command
**IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE EVENTS**

Overall, IED activity remained elevated during the reporting period. Elevated IED activity suggests that ISAF and ANSF operations have eroded insurgent capacity to conduct effective direct fire attacks. IED “found-and-cleared” rates currently remain above 60 percent, a level not seen since reporting began in 2007. ISAF assesses that this is attributable to several factors:

- Increased local national assistance turning-in devices primarily in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces;
- Improved detection technologies employed by ISAF;
- Hasty emplacement of IEDs by insurgents due to increased ISAF and ANSF presence, as well as improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets;
- Increased ANSF capability and capacity;
- Increased and improved ISAF and ANSF partnering; and
- Better IED awareness training for ISAF forces.

RC-SW continues to experience the highest levels of IED activity (40 percent overall), though this is slightly less than its overall share of national violence (45 percent). RC-S experiences disproportionately high IED activity compared with its share of overall violence (33 percent vs. 20 percent). However, IED found-and-cleared rates in RC-S are the highest among regional commands (70 percent).

Figure 29: IED Events (April 2009 – March 2011)
CACHES FOUND

The surge of ISAF and ANSF troops has enabled increased combined team presence in key areas resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of caches found during the reporting period. The 12-week average of caches found and subsequently cleared is currently at its highest level since reporting began in August 2009. These finds may potentially impact security trends and enemy-initiated attacks by depriving the insurgency of valuable resources that would otherwise be used in attacks on ISAF and ANSF forces.

Figure 30: Caches Found (April 2009 – March 2011)
SECTION 5 – GOVERNANCE

Events during this reporting period demonstrated progress in national and sub-national governance, although significant challenges remain. The Government of Afghanistan instituted a merit-based system for hiring senior civil servants and finalized plans for a major infrastructure initiative to create justice service centers across Afghanistan. Progress in the areas of rule of law, civil servant hiring, and coordination between national and provincial officials has led to modest improvements in governance. However, as noted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen in his February testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “improvements in sub-national governance and reconstruction have not kept pace with progress in improving security. This has impeded our ability to hold, build, and transfer.” Security gains must be underpinned by improvements in governance and development to ensure recent progress is durable and sustainable.

5.1: ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE

An important indicator of progress in governance is the population’s perception of it. The December 2010 nation-wide survey, which polled 10,000 Afghans, demonstrated that Afghans were overall more optimistic about their government. Although perception generally lags behind actual gains, the percentage of Afghans who think the government has more influence than the insurgents (74 percent) was the highest it has been since the survey began two years ago, as is the percentage of those who feel safe traveling outside of their village (45 percent). The most impressive shifts in opinion over the reporting period occurred in RC-SW, where clear, hold, and build operations were primarily focused. There, 76 percent of those polled now feel that the government has more influence in their villages than the insurgents do – versus 59 percent in September – and 71 percent believe it would be bad if the Taliban returned to power (up from 53 percent). The polling also suggested, however, that Afghans are more pessimistic about corruption and unemployment. Nonetheless, this may be an indicator that Afghans are increasingly focused on investing in their future.

Governance capacity-building efforts continue. At the end of October 2010, the Afghan ministries developed action plans to achieve key benchmarks agreed upon at the Kabul Conference in 2010. In November, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, responsible for coordinating ISAF and international community support for the Afghan Government, noted progress toward refining these goals and developing a series of action plans. These action plans propose either building on existing programs or creating new programs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governance at national- and sub-national levels. Specific attention is focused on improving the population’s access to justice, and increasing transparency and accountability.

The Governance Cluster of ministries, under the leadership of Senior Minister Hedayat Amin Arsala, continues to grow and develop. It has played a valuable inter-ministerial role overseeing institutional action plans and consulting with key donors on National Priority Programs for governance.

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While the Government of Afghanistan has made measured progress toward its Kabul Conference commitments, progress towards developing and enacting critical legislation remains mixed. Nevertheless, challenges in formulating mature national policy should be expected in any developing democracy, and work continues towards these critical reform commitments.

5.2: ASSESSMENT OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

An important indicator of the Afghan Government's progress towards self-sufficiency is the ability of local officials to plan for and deliver basic governance. Sub-national governance plays a critical role in supporting village and district-level bodies that link the population with the Afghan Government. Toward this end, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) are moving forward with Kabul Conference benchmarks and are coordinating and planning across the many capacity-building and development initiatives under the framework provided by the Sub-National Governance Policy. These efforts are steadily making progress. An important indicator of this progress is that the proportion of the population living in districts that are assessed as having satisfactory governance continues to increase. At the end of this reporting period, an assessment of the 138 focus districts shows that 49 percent of the population lives in areas rated as having “emerging” or “full authority” (this is up from 38 percent reported in September 2010).

In particular, there have been important developments in sub-national governance in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, which are historically among the most contested parts of Afghanistan. Local shuras have reported noticeable improvements in the performance of district governors, police chiefs, and mediators. These improvements in the quality of governance have distinctly increased opportunities for legitimate mediation and justice services, which replaced those previously offered by parallel Taliban structures less than a year ago. Additionally, government structures in these areas are becoming increasingly representative of the population. District elections in Marjah District, Helmand Province, illustrate how sub-national governance is taking root in former insurgent safe havens. There, in March 2011, nearly 75 percent of registered voters took part in elections, undisturbed by violence. The expansion of governance has created new opportunities for economic development. A recently held regional development conference in Kandahar Province, which included representatives from six provinces and national ministries, discussed methods to improve infrastructure and the provision of public services, and to debate critical governance issues such as reintegration and reconciliation.

A critical mechanism to link national and sub-national entities is through nationally-managed budgeting. The Afghan Government’s first sub-national budget support program, the Performance-Based Governor’s Fund, ended a successful pilot year this March, with plans to renew and to expand funding for a second year. This past year, all provinces received $25,000 per month to support operational expenditures and to implement small projects. To strengthen accountability and oversight, provincial governors were evaluated quarterly for their management of these funds (with high-performing provinces receiving substantial increases to their budget this year). These initiatives enable provincial leaders to meet operational and community needs, enhance relationships with the population, and improve their overall management capacity. This program not only encourages more effective management practices
at the provincial level, but also supports the shifting of international donor contributions from off-budget to distribution through the national budget.

5.3: CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

The Afghan Government continues to make measured progress in building the human capital necessary for improvements in governance. During this reporting period, merit-based appointments of key government positions resumed, and newly developed training programs for provincial and district government officials are steadily adding a layer of quality to the ranks of public service.

In October 2010, President Karzai announced an end to political appointments for senior civil servants, who must now meet merit-based standards to secure a Presidential appointment. Additionally, in February 2011, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Services Commission (IARCSC) Appointments Board assessed and selected candidates for 14 Deputy Provincial Governor vacancies based on merit for the provinces of Nangarhar, Ghazni, Bamyan, Herat, Laghman, Ghor, Helmand, Nuristan, Daykundi, Khost, Sar-e-Pul, Parwan, Kapisa, and Zabul.

With USAID support, the IARCSC initiated an ambitious program to recruit civil servants for service in provinces where security conditions make hiring and retaining government officials challenging. Starting in early December 2010, the IARCSC, in cooperation with multiple line ministries and agencies, conducted a number of civil service job fairs in the Dand, Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai districts of Kandahar Province. After hiring, recruits will attend civil servant training administered by the IARCSC’s training arm, the Afghan Civil Service Institute (ACSI). The ACSI is an important Afghan-led program to improve the quality of civil servants throughout the country. Last year, the ACSI exceeded its 2010 goal by training over 16,000 civil servants in 23 of 34 provinces. ACSI also instituted a highly successful internship program for college graduates who lack work experience, placing approximately 1,000 interns in national civil service positions and more than 2,000 interns across the provinces in sub-national offices.

Capacity building initiatives continue to be matched by efforts to reform and improve the public service system. Progress continued during the reporting period on public administration reform efforts, particularly “pay and grade” salary reform of civil servant positions in all ministries and agencies. Converting civil servant positions to a standardized eight-grade pay scale and filling these positions with qualified candidates based on merit, provides an opportunity to offer equitable and adequate compensation and to recruit and retain qualified personnel. Seventeen ministries and agencies have completed the IARCSC’s pay and grade reform process. Reform of five ministries and agencies is currently underway, and the IARCSC is on path to meet its goal of completing all ministries and agencies by September 2013.

Although Afghan and international community efforts are steadily improving the quality of the public service personnel, there are many areas where there is room for improvement. Low pay scales still affect the Afghan Government’s ability to fill civil service positions, especially in highly skilled positions such as air traffic control. Additionally, it remains a substantial challenge to recruit suitable candidates for positions in more remote districts, or districts where the security situation is unstable. Government officials are increasingly targeted by the
insurgency, further hampering recruiting efforts. Continued emphasis on civil service reform is needed in order to overcome these obstacles, and to ensure that the Afghan Government generates and sustains the necessary human capital to govern and provide for the Afghan people.

5.4: RULE OF LAW

Progress continues to be slow in the justice sector, although renewed efforts by the Afghan Government and the international community have had an effect. There is still extensive work needed to improve the Afghan Government’s ability to provide rule of law and justice to the Afghan people; however, the latest perception survey shows that 45 percent of respondents would seek out a government official to help resolve a dispute, up almost 6 percent from September 2010. Additionally, efforts to link traditional and formal justice systems are ongoing, which will improve opportunities for legitimate conflict resolution at the local level.

The United States conducts a broad range of programs that promote the rule of law, including: justice sector capacity building by DoS and the Department of Justice (DoJ); development work of USAID; and the DoD’s national security-related efforts. In cases where civilians cannot operate independently due to an insecure or unstable environment, they regularly partner with military counterparts to promote and implement rule of law missions and other forms of host nation support, such as teaching criminal investigation and prosecutorial techniques. Although much remains to be done, the United States has also made progress in improving the criminal justice system – from police officers through the post-conviction prison system and rehabilitation programs – which is an important component of ISAF’s overall strategy.

THE JUSTICE SECTOR

Afghanistan’s justice sector is the combined responsibility of the Afghan Supreme Court, Ministries of Justice and the Interior, the Central Prisons Directorate, the Attorney General, and the National Directorate of Security. National capacity-building initiatives are progressing slowly, limited by a lack of infrastructure and the inability to offer salaries sufficient to attract and retain trained legal personnel. At the working level, security for judicial authorities remains the highest priority. The Justice Police Unit, intended to secure justice system authorities, is underfunded and undermanned, leaving judges and others without adequate security.

To date, the Government of Afghanistan has yet to enact any of the 37 key laws agreed upon at the Kabul Conference. These delays are due, in part, to internal political and policy disagreements; although early deadlines have not been met, work on the reform commitments continues with the goal of eventually enacting the laws.

The U.S. Government reorganized its rule of law activities in July 2010, and U.S. Embassy Kabul created the position of Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement. The Director, Ambassador Hans Klemm, is the lead for policy development and program implementation for all U.S. rule of law activities in Afghanistan. DoS and DoJ (including the DEA, FBI, U.S. Marshall Service, and experienced U.S. prosecutors) implement rule of law programs that support the Afghan justice system through capacity building, infrastructure, legal resources, public awareness, and case management. DoD funds some rule of law projects through the work

of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. All rule of law development activities are coordinated in close partnership with the Government of Afghanistan.

In support of these objectives, USFOR-A established the Rule of Law Field Force –Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) in 2010. ROLFF-A regularly partners with members of the U.S. interagency and Afghan officials to build and maintain security for justice centers, thereby facilitating an Afghan Government-led rule of law presence. All ROLFF-A operations are undertaken with Afghan Government approval and follow policy guidance from Embassy Kabul.

ROLFF-A’s main project at this time is the development of provincial justice centers, which provide the nascent formal justice system with critical infrastructure to carry out its duties. These centers will combine courts, police barracks, and corrections facilities in one organization, and will increase formal justice capacity in key population centers.

Also during this reporting period, ROLFF-A began standing up the Chel Zeena Criminal Investigative Center in Kandahar. In addition to the Criminal Investigative Center, Chel Zeena will centralize investigative functions in one geographic location, bringing together state-funded justice sector support programs, FBI-funded contracted police and law enforcement professionals, and DoD-funded policemen and investigators. This centralization will give investigators access to the tools and expertise they need to build a case within the time frame that Afghan law allows the Afghan Government to hold insurgents. It includes billeting for the guard force, judges, and legal staff, as well as sustainable infrastructure support and security, in order to make it harder for the Taliban to monopolize justice in the region.

Several other rule of law development initiatives made progress during the reporting period. First, USAID initiatives continued to increase the capacity of the formal justice system, training judges throughout the country. Further, the Afghan Supreme Court began sending inspection teams to assess the needs of the provincial and district courts to increase discipline and transparency and to reduce the opportunities and incentives for corruption. USAID also continues to promote development in Afghanistan’s law schools by developing a uniform curriculum and more interactive teaching methodologies, expanding libraries and computer capacity, and supporting moot court competitions; however, progress remains mixed. Efforts to overhaul the legal curriculum and the expansion of libraries and computer capacity are hindered by both a lack of funding and available electrical power.

Capacity building efforts in Afghanistan’s formal justice system are complemented by efforts to support Afghanistan’s informal justice system. Since most disputes in Afghanistan are resolved by councils of village elders and not the formal court system, USAID successfully launched a pilot program assisting these councils to improve their functionality within their traditional role in Afghan society. To date, USAID has supported councils in four pilot districts, helping them to establish a system to transmit their decisions in writing to the district level, which enables information sharing and promotes an improved understanding of Afghan law.

Grassroots development efforts are also being paired with leadership mentoring. With the support of DoS, DoJ has increased the numbers of U.S. prosecutors assigned to rule of law projects in Afghanistan. By the end of January 2011, the number of DoJ attorneys serving one-
year tours Afghanistan doubled from seven to 14. DoJ attorneys continue to train and advise Afghan prosecutors in counter narcotics, anti-corruption, and counterterrorism. Further, DoJ deployed attorneys to support CJITF-435 and the Interagency Planning and Implementation Team. They have also helped the Afghans complete an enabling law for Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, which is awaiting enactment by the Afghan Government.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

The Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) – 435 is responsible for U.S. Government detention operations in Afghanistan. U.S. detention operations are authorized under the Law of Armed Conflict. This legal framework is distinct from the Afghan criminal justice system. U.S. Government detention operations are not properly within the realm of the Afghan rule of law system; however, the transition of U.S. detention operations to Afghan authority will entail the transfer of U.S. detainees to the Afghan criminal justice system and will require some level of judicial sector capacity building. Thus, Afghan rule of law efforts and U.S. detention operations, while distinct, are related and mutually-supporting.

CJIATF-435 continues progress along four primary lines of operations: 1) transitioning U.S. detention operations; 2) improving Afghan corrections facilities and processes; 3) implementing biometrics programs; and 4) improving rule of law institutions in conjunction with Embassy Kabul. CJIATF-435 only had the capacity to conduct a single Detainee Review Board (DRB) at a time. Now, it has the capacity to hold two review boards simultaneously, with plans to increase the number of concurrent review boards to three this year. CJIATF-435’s Legal Operations Directorate has undertaken two additional missions beyond conducting DRBs, namely supporting evidence-based Afghan Government criminal prosecutions and capacity-building with the Ministry of the Interior, the National Directorate of Security, the Attorney General's Office, and the Supreme Court.

The Detention Facility in Parwan continues to see growth in detainee numbers due to the surge in U.S., NATO, and Afghan security forces, and the accelerated pace of operations throughout Afghanistan. Since implementing the original DRB cell in September 2009, the detainee population in the Parwan facility has increased 46 percent. Meanwhile, the transition process for guard force operations began in January 2011 and continues to make progress. ANA or ANP now man the majority of the duty positions in two detention housing units under the mentorship of U.S. military police. The transition of command and control and support areas remains on track.

The CJIATF-435 Reintegration Directorate at the Parwan facility continued to expand its capability to provide rehabilitation programs that prepare detainees for potential reintegration into their communities. Rehabilitation activities led by the Reintegration Directorate include life skills workshops, vocational training opportunities, and Afghan Ministry of Education-endorsed literacy programs in basic and advanced Pashto, Dari, and English.

5.5: ELECTIONS

The months following the September 2010 parliamentary elections saw multiple allegations of electoral fraud, including: disenfranchisement, especially among Pashtuns, due to closed polling centers (for security reasons); manipulation of candidate slots and insufficient candidate vetting;
fraud in the conduct of elections; manipulation of the electoral complaints process; and susceptibility of election workers to local powerbroker influence. These allegations prompted a flood of formal and informal election complaints.

According to Afghan electoral law, final election results are declared by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), while the ultimate arbiter of fraud disputes is the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The IEC announced the final results in December 2010 (two months later than anticipated), once the ECC had concluded its investigations. However, the Attorney General’s Office continued to investigate more than 300 claims of fraud, and the Supreme Court later convened a Special Elections Tribunal to pursue the investigations.

Following a number of weeks of uncertainty and continuing investigations, President Karzai inaugurated the Wolesi Jirga in January 2011. However, in February, the special elections tribunal began a recount of the votes in all 34 provinces and continued to investigate allegations of fraud. No results of the recounts have been released to date, and the ultimate goal of the recount remains unclear.

In the meantime, the Wolesi Jirga elected Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi as speaker on February 27, 2011, which brought about the resolution of an impasse that included seven rounds of voting. Members and chairmen of all 18 permanent standing committees have also been elected. With an elected speaker and an administration board now in place, the Wolesi Jirga is expected to proceed with legislative issues, including finalizing the budget for FY2011-2012 and drafting a strategy for electoral reform in accordance with Kabul Conference benchmarks.

5.6: ANTI-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY

Addressing corruption that fuels the insurgency and poses a threat to the Afghan state is important to advancing the core U.S. goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten the United States and its allies in the future. Corruption of any type erodes the legitimacy of the Afghan Government, undermines the international community’s objectives in Afghanistan, and drives Afghans away from their government and into the hands of the insurgency. U.S. anti-corruption efforts focus on corruption that directly supports terrorism, political violence, or the insurgency.

Corruption results from a number of factors, including a lack of institutional capacity, a lack of transparency and oversight, overly complex administrative procedures, an ineffective legal framework, a lack of political will, and a patronage system resulting from decades of war. The international community’s occasional lack of oversight for its funds and contracts has a tendency to exacerbate this situation. In order for anti-corruption efforts to have a genuine effect, the Afghan Government must improve the transparency and accountability of its institutions and personnel. Measurable steps against corruption are necessary before external economic investment and subsequent internal economic growth can occur.

The United States has implemented a number of programs and activities to ensure U.S. goals and taxpayer dollars are protected, while helping reduce the likelihood that U.S. contracting practices and development assistance are subject to corruption. These programs and activities include capacity building and technical training; working to improve public financial management;
increasing transparency; providing legal assistance and investigative leads to Afghan authorities and “vetted” units such as the Major Crimes Task Force; and, in certain cases, taking unilateral action. Examples of unilateral action include implementing economic sanctions, suspending or debarring contracting companies from receiving U.S. Government contracts, and prosecuting corrupt individuals under U.S. law, when applicable.

**COMBINED JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE – SHAFAFIYAT**

Established in August 2010 and fully operational in October 2010, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) – *Shafafiyat* is intended to neutralize criminal patronage networks (CPNs) in Afghanistan. CJIATF-*Shafafiyat* coordinates anti-corruption efforts and facilitates anti-corruption unity of effort with ISAF, USFOR-A, the Government of Afghanistan, and the international community. It does this by fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and coordinating ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anti-corruption activities with the efforts of key partners.

There are three subordinate task forces that support CJIATF-*Shafafiyat's* mission: Task Force Spotlight, Task Force 2010, and CJIATF-Nexus. Through the efforts of these organizations, ISAF and USFOR-A have gained a better understanding of the depth and breadth of corruption in Afghanistan, and have begun to establish mechanisms that address and mitigate the effects of this corruption.

**TASK FORCE – SPOTLIGHT**

USCENTCOM established Task Force – Spotlight to investigate the issue of ground supply line pilferage, which has resulted in the loss of military equipment worth millions of dollars. Comprised of representatives from U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, U.S. law enforcement agencies, civilian contractors, and Afghan and Pakistani partners, the Task Force is also responsible for developing programs and initiatives to improve private security company accountability and performance, to minimize negative actor influence in support of the ISAF mission, and to facilitate the Afghan Government's capability for self-sustaining security.

**TASK FORCE – 2010**

Task Force-2010's mission is to develop greater visibility of the flow of contracting funds within Afghanistan at and below the prime contractor level to better employ contracting in support of COIN operations. Task Force-2010 fuses, augments, and drives existing efforts to provide the operational commander with actionable information regarding key contracting networks, money flows, and linkages to negative actors within their operating space.

Since August 2010, Task Force-2010 has reviewed more than 700 contracts, contract modifications, and cooperative agreements valued at more than $1.7B. Of these, 44 contracts were cancelled after having been found to have a connection to criminal or insurgent networks.

**COMBINED JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE – NEXUS**

The mission of CJIATF-Nexus is to identify and analyze the confluence of narcotics, corruption, the insurgency, threat finance, and power brokers in Regional Commands South and Southwest
to produce operational data that enables synchronized military, law enforcement, and engagement effects. CJTF-Nexus' mission focuses on drug-related targets connected to the Taliban and on corrupt Afghan Government officials and power brokers who jeopardize the stability and legitimacy of the Government. CJTF-Nexus identifies and analyzes the narcotics-insurgency-corruption convergence, and partners with other organizations to produce information to enable synchronized military and law enforcement effects.

**GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES**

The Afghan Government has established the High Office for Oversight of Anti-Corruption (HOO), the Anti-Corruption Tribunal, the Major Crimes Task Force, and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee to combat corruption. The HOO was created in June 2008 to lead Afghan anticorruption efforts in the country, including both prevention and enforcement activities. The HOO’s powers, as decreed by President Karzai, enable it to conduct preliminary inquiries into corruption allegations. Similarly, in late November 2010, U.S. Embassy Kabul rule of law office, DoJ, DoS, and USAID, in coordination with international partners, began supporting the Anti-Corruption Tribunal, a new initiative of President Karzai since his most recent election.

**ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRESS**

Currently, more than 11,000 companies contract with NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan. While concerns persist that funds from these contracts are being diverted to support criminal networks or the insurgency, progress has been made in addressing these concerns through the implementation of COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance and other initiatives. For example, ISAF and CJTF-Shafafiyat implemented a prioritization process to identify, coordinate, and plan actions to neutralize networks and individuals that threaten the ISAF mission and the viability of the Afghan state. Similarly, in an effort to reduce the threat of CPNs, ISAF and CJTF-Shafafiyat focus their collective efforts isolating and disrupting CPNs by identifying top power brokers and their associates. CJTF-Shafafiyat has also established partnerships with the United Kingdom, the United States, NATO partners, and civilian specialists to create reach-back networks to expand intelligence capacity. Future programs include creation of a common vendor database and vendor vetting processes that will help improve contractor selection.

As a result of these and other initiatives, some notable progress has been made. In August 2010, DoD vetted 233 companies, rejecting contracts and discontinuing relationships with 19 of those vendors. DoD also suspended and debarred nine companies and 30 individuals from contracting with the United States in Afghanistan and has debarred 10 prime contractors.

In December 2010, the Army Suspension and Debarment Agency suspended Watan Risk Management (WRM) – a 16 company consortium – from entering into any new contracts with the U.S. Government. WRM’s ban from all U.S. Government work in December 2010 was based on numerous violations of U.S. contract law and Afghan law, and is the first of a number of multi-million dollar contract actions focused on denying insurgent and criminal networks access to NATO and NATO member funds. By law and NATO policy, ISAF partners are also obligated to consider suspending any contracts with WRM.

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In February 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, under the Kingpin Act, designated several individuals and entities associated with narcotics trafficking and money laundering. USCENTCOM Contracting Command concurrently debarred an affiliated organization, AFCO International, in conjunction with the designations. As a result, a contract potentially worth up to $11M was cancelled.

On the Afghan side, in mid-December, President Karzai relieved the ANA Surgeon General, the National Military Hospital Commander, the Deputy Commander, and 19 other senior staff officers after receiving a brief on corruption occurring at the National Military Hospital. Of note, since the recent appointment of the new Surgeon General and hospital staff, 12 doctors and physician’s assistants have asked to rejoin the ANA, including much needed orthopedic and neurosurgeons.

The June 2010 appointment of Bismullah Khan Mohammadi as Minister of the Interior has begun to change the reputed culture of corruption existing within the ANP. Since his appointment, Minister Mohammadi has instituted training reform, pay increases, transparency and accountability in promotions and assignments, and developed an institutional reform working group to further professionalize the police corps.

These examples of progress must be balanced against other cases where corrupt officials were moved to other duties rather than being penalized, or were sanctioned only to be granted relief from their penalties. Similarly, the continued appointment of officials previously accused of fraud brings into question the ability of the HOO and other Afghan anti-corruption institutions to enforce their mission. Nevertheless, there are increasing signs that the Afghan Government is beginning to realize the impact that corruption has on its legitimacy. ISAF and the international community continue to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to address corruption.

**Kabul Bank**

Kabul Bank is Afghanistan’s most systemically important bank. It remains the largest Afghan commercial bank in terms of assets, deposits, and branch network, and it processes payments to about half of all Afghan Government employees, including soldiers, police, and civil servants.

A combination of poor and corrupt management practices (including insider lending to the shareholders), fraud, and ineffective supervision by the Central Bank of Afghanistan (DAB), led to a loan portfolio that was largely non-performing. In August 2010, DAB regulators forced Kabul Bank to remove its senior management, triggering a run on the bank’s deposits. In early September, the DAB placed Kabul Bank under conservatorship. Under conservatorship, the bank is no longer in imminent danger of collapse, although it still has a significant negative net worth.

In late October 2010, the IMF started a series of negotiations with the Afghan Government to renew the existing IMF program. As of the end of March 2011, the IMF has required that the program address the Kabul Bank issues and strengthen bank supervision.

With its network of branches around Afghanistan, Kabul Bank is able to provide an electronic funds transfer (EFT) payment system for Afghan National Security Forces’ and Afghan
Government civilian employees salaries in many areas of the country not served by other institutions. The EFT payment system mitigates the opportunity for corrupt officials to skim the cash salary payments. As the Kabul Bank situation evolves, the Afghan authorities will need to take measures to maintain the uninterrupted functioning of Kabul Bank’s salary payments system, pending the development of alternative EFT payroll service providers.

5.7: RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), established by President Karzai in July 2010, continues to make progress towards removing insurgents from the battlefield. As of March 31, 2011, the APRP has formally registered 699 insurgents enrolled in the peace process; formal reintegration is also emerging in the strategically important eastern and southern provinces, the critical areas where most coalition forces are operating. In addition to those who formally enter the APRP, reporting indicates that many insurgents, particularly in the south, have informally reintegrated by quietly opting to end their armed opposition and return to their families and communities.

The APRP Joint Secretariat’s efforts to build capacity to manage reintegration at the provincial level is proceeding with the establishment of Provincial Peace Committees in most provinces, and the organization of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) in six provinces (with an additional five PJSTs being set up currently). Procedures have been established and training is underway to activate provincial reintegration accounts in 80 percent of Afghanistan’s provinces by April 15, 2010.

During the reporting period, the High Peace Council (HPC) continued its domestic outreach through conferences and events throughout the country with six high-profile gatherings. Planning is underway for HPC and Joint Secretariat teams to visit more provinces in order to meet with governors and their staff, Provincial Peace Committees, and other local leaders to discuss APRP implementation.

The HPC has also expanded its regional contacts in order to build international support and cooperation for reconciliation. HPC representatives have traveled to Pakistan and Turkey to meet with government officials there. The HPC was also represented at a March 2011 meeting of the International Contact Group on Afghanistan held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The meeting focused on achieving a durable resolution in Afghanistan based upon Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration efforts, vigorous diplomatic support for the region, and civilian aspects of the transition to ANSF lead security responsibility.
SECTION 6 – RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

6.1: OVERVIEW

The Afghan Government has made some progress in improving its capacity to address key reconstruction and economic development issues, although support and technical assistance from the international community is still needed. During this reporting period, the public perception of the provision of basic services has improved, several infrastructure projects have progressed, and efforts to bolster the agriculture sector are yielding results. Other notable development progress in Afghanistan includes efforts to streamline customs collections via automated systems, and increases in capacity in both primary and secondary education.

The Afghan Government continues to make limited progress implementing Kabul Conference benchmarks. The Kabul Process is Afghan-led, marking the beginning of transition to full Afghan ownership. Recognizing the singular importance of each component in the Infrastructure and Economic Development Cluster, the Afghan Government’s decision to establish separate Infrastructure and Private Sector Development Clusters was endorsed by the JCMB in November 2010.

Despite many advances, development continues to improve slowly in the face of uncertainty due to the dissolution of private security companies, inadequate Afghan Government capacity, and security concerns.

6.2: UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a political mission established at the request of the Afghan Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. UNAMA has worked hand-in-hand with several UN agencies, funds and programs providing a wide range of humanitarian support to the Afghan people, as well as policy and program support to various Government Ministries on development matters. The mission is responsible for a wide range of support activities including political affairs, relief, recovery and reconstruction, and human rights.

UNAMA currently operates 23 field offices throughout Afghanistan (eight regional offices and 15 provincial offices). UN Security Council Resolution 1917 (2010) reaffirms the importance of strengthening and expanding the presence of UNAMA and other UN agencies, funds, and programs in the provinces. Eight regional offices typically oversee UNAMA’s work in several provinces, while provincial offices ensure action and follow-up at provincial and district level.

On October 23, 2010, an attack took place on the UNAMA compound in Herat Province that was strongly condemned by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. Since then, UNAMA has continued its efforts to support the local population of western Afghanistan.

31 Agencies the UN Country Team (Afghanistan) has collaborated with include the Asian Development Bank, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Development Program, UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN World Food Program, UN World Health Organization, and the World Bank, among others.
On March 22, 2011, the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1974 (2011) renewing UNAMA’s mandate until March 2012. Prior to the most recent extension, UN Security Council Resolution 1917 (2010) provided UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, with a mandate to support the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve critical areas, including security, governance and economic development, and regional cooperation, as well as to support the full implementation of mutual commitments made on these issues at the London conference in January 2010 and the subsequent Kabul Conference in July 2010.

Discussions regarding the 2012 mandate are ongoing, and UNAMA is conscious of a growing desire on the part of senior Afghan leadership to scale back the scope of the mission as the Afghan Government continues to take the leading role on governance and development.

6.3: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan continue to promote the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan Government at local, district, and provincial levels; integrate and coordinate the combined multinational civil-military efforts; increase stability and security for the citizens of Afghanistan; develop local, provincial, and national infrastructure; and promote national unity by diminishing the influence of warlords.

Figure 31: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Lead Nations
In general, PRTs throughout the six regional commands confront similar strategic challenges: a lack of financial capital; difficulty funding maintenance of infrastructure projects; long-term sustainability of projects; shortfalls in Afghan human capacity; lack of Afghan expertise in engineering, budget planning and proposal writing; and a challenging security situation.

In a recent development, President Karzai expressed his concern that PRTs are “parallel structures” competing with the Afghan Government and undermining its sovereignty and authority. Although PRTs continue to pursue their mission in support of ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan, the international community is paying heed to President Karzai’s concerns and is now including PRT evolution as an element of the overall transition discussion.

6.4: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Although Afghanistan currently receives substantial international aid, economic growth is steady, and there is great future potential to generate revenue through mineral extraction and through regional economic trade agreements. External support will likely continue to be critical in the near and medium-term to help mitigate shortfalls in infrastructure, human capacity, and security concerns.

**Economic Development**

As the prospects for improved security conditions improve, the Afghan Government is increasingly brokering international deals to foster economic development with regional neighbors on a variety of trade issues. Along these lines, the Afghan Government recently signed an 18-point memorandum of understanding with Iran to facilitate increased trade and the transit of goods over their shared border. As part of the agreement, Afghan and Iranian customs officials have agreed to meet regularly to resolve any future disputes.

In support of initiatives like this, Afghanistan is taking steps to improve its ability to trade in international commerce. On March 30, 2011, the Afghan National Standards Authority launched its strategic plan, unveiling how it will build Afghanistan’s quality infrastructure over the next five years. Standards and technical regulations are an important part of international trade because they assure consumers in domestic and international markets that Afghan goods are of sufficient quality. Afghanistan’s compliance with internationally recognized quality and safety standards is expected to make it easier for Afghan producers to export their products.

The USAID-financed Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFA) project ($63M over five years) supports efforts to streamline and simplify the customs clearance process, limiting the opportunities for corruption by reducing the time and payments for trading across borders. In November 2010, all of the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) Directors approved the streamlined procedures for imports and exports. In December 2010, a joint TAFA / ACD team implemented the new import procedures at Kabul International Airport, which eliminated 10 steps in the import process, reducing the time needed for clearance by 45 percent and eliminating numerous opportunities for corruption. Overall, TAFA’s assistance is increasing the predictability and transparency of the customs processes and the collection of government revenue.
Afghanistan’s ratification of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) was an important milestone that will promote cross-border trade and commerce. APTTA has the potential to increase Afghan revenue from $1.3B to approximately $2B per year. Although ratification was a great success, serious work lies ahead. Implementation of the APTTA has been delayed due to differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the delay continues, both sides are optimistic that this issue will be resolved within the four month extension.

In March 2011, Afghanistan’s Minister of Finance announced a proposal to establish a computer-based money tracking system that, when implemented, will be the Afghan Government’s first formal initiative to combat cash smuggling. The Bulk Cash Flow Action Plan is an effort to identify corrupt practices, to build capacity to track bulk cash flow, to more effectively verify declared funds, and to stem the transfer of large amounts of cash out of the country.

**AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND**

The multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was set up in May 2002 to support the recurrent costs of the government, such as the salaries, operations and maintenance expenditures; bulk purchases of essential goods for the government; and to support investment projects, capacity building, feasibility studies, technical assistance, and the return of expatriate Afghans.

The ARTF is administered by the World Bank and managed jointly by the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the Government of Afghanistan, which was added as a full member of the ARTF Management Committee in February 2011. In addition to being the primary channel for non-U.S. donor contributions, the ARTF is also the primary channel for U.S. on-budget assistance.

As of early February 2011, 31 donors have contributed $4.18B since 2002. Just under $2.18B has been disbursed to the Afghan Government to help cover recurrent costs, such as civil servants’ salaries, and over $1.2B had been made available for priority investment projects.

The major share of ARTF investment financing – for roads, schools, and local infrastructure – is channeled through the Afghan Government to benefit rural communities across Afghanistan, where over 80 percent of the population lives. Donor contributions have supported the construction of over 11,000 kms of rural access roads built with local labor under the National Rural Access Program (NRAP). NRAP has helped connect over 27,000 villages to markets and has generated significant employment.

Afghan communities are also the focus of the National Solidarity Program. Through the ARTF, donors have provided the NSP with over $600M to date, including $528M of U.S. funding through October 2010, helping roughly 22,500 villages in 361 districts rebuild vital local infrastructure according to local needs and priorities.

ARTF contributions are also used to finance Afghanistan’s education program. The Education Quick Impact Program (EQUIP) provides funds for basic education, school construction, school upgrades, and also supports approximately 9,500 school management committees across all
provinces of Afghanistan. The committees, which are made up of local community members, forge partnerships with local government to manage basic education needs. The support helps provide needed resources to improve school infrastructure and teaching standards.

The Afghan Government has increasingly requested that donors align 80 percent of their activities to Afghanistan’s national priorities and progressively increase on-budget foreign economic development assistance to 50 percent over the next two years. Although the ARTF is an efficient mechanism to move international donor funds on-budget, the current uncertainty surrounding Afghanistan’s ability to meet IMF benchmarks for an extended credit facility may impede progress. Several major international donors have said that without an IMF program, they will have to reduce or suspend the amount of assistance funds they provide the ARTF.

**GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE**

Domestic revenue collection continued to improve between March 2010 and March 2011, during which the Afghan Government collected revenue of 80B Afghanis (Afs), a year-over-year increase of 26 percent. Improved tax and customs administration and the introduction of an ad-valorem tax on imports have been the major drivers of revenue growth.

Revenues, while showing significant progress over the last three years, continue to be outpaced by operating expenditures, as a result of increased security costs, hiring of teachers, and pay and grading reforms. Afghanistan still collects revenue equal to only 10.9 percent of GDP, up from 6.9 percent in Afghan FY2008-2009. The Afghan Government is able to cover only 54 percent of its operating costs, and the Afghan Government will continue to require donor funding to meet its remaining expenditures.

Budget execution is also a major challenge for the Afghan Government. In the fiscal year ending in March 2011, the Afghan Government was on track to place just 33 percent of development funds on budget – approximately $743M out of a total budget of $2.2B. The Afghan Government’s ability to execute a budget is a key element necessary for transition and efforts are ongoing through the U.S. Embassy and the international community to enable the ministries to build capacity.

**BORDER CONTROL**

Afghanistan’s 5,529 km border is both a strategic vulnerability as well as a potential economic engine. The Afghan Government has made some progress in addressing its border issues and *tashkils*, as shown by an overall increase of 26 percent in assigned personnel. The number of ABP authorized, however, decreased by a total of 15 percent over the reporting period. Border control continues to face challenges, including shortfalls in manning and infrastructure limitations, that degrade the effectiveness of the four key border crossing points (BCP).

Border control infrastructure improved during this reporting period. New barracks and office buildings were built at the Isam Qalah BCP and flood repairs were made at the Torah Ghundi BCP in Herat Province. Construction continues at the Weesh BCP, which involved expanding

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32 Afghanistan Ministry of Finance estimate, March 17, 2011.
33 The four key border control points for 2010 are Torkham Gate, Islam Qal’ah, Hairaton, and Weesh-Chaman.
the current BCP footprint and improving traffic flow. Additionally, the Afghan Advanced Border Management Academy which graduated its first class in Kabul in February 2011, held the ribbon cutting ceremony for its new facilities in Sheberghan District, Jowzjan Province in late March.

The Automated System for Custom Data (ASYCUDA), currently operating on eight of the major trade axes in Afghanistan, accounts for over 85 percent of the annual customs revenue. ASYCUDA automates most of the steps in the customs process, limits opportunities for corruption, and accelerates the process of moving goods through BCPs and Inland Customs Depots in an efficient manner. ASYCUDA can be used to help target shipments of illicit goods as well as smuggled licit goods to help reduce illegal trade and increase revenues to the Government of Afghanistan.

The Government of Afghanistan also made progress in Border Area Management policy during this reporting period. Following a Civil-Military Rehearsal of Concept Drill in October 2010, Presidential Karzai issued a presidential decree making the Ministry of Finance the lead ministry for all border management and customs. This model for border management will consolidate all licit customs traffic under one ministry and thus increase efficiency and improve revenue collection procedures.

Following the President’s decree, the Ministry of Finance established a Border Management Steering Group, which had its first meeting in mid January 2011. After this initial meeting, the Ministry of Finance drafted a business model for border management known as Integrated Border Management (IBM), which reduces the number of ministries at the border involved in customs in order to reduce opportunities for corruption and speed clearance of goods. In mid-March, President Karzai approved the IBM model. The final step is for the Ministers to sign the MoU and implement it. The initial implementation is scheduled to take place as a pilot program next quarter at the Hairatan BCP in Balkh Province.

In support of the Afghan Government’s effort to gain greater control over its borders, DoD funded the Customs and Border Protection/Border Management Task Force (BMTF). BMTF is a contracted group of former U.S. and international customs and border protection officers with the aim of reducing the flow of narcotics precursors into and narcotic materials out of Afghanistan. This aim is achieved through mentoring and advising the Afghan Customs Department and the ABP in proper management and port procedures, as well as training in the use of technical equipment to both reduce the flow of smuggled goods, and increase legitimate revenue to the Afghan Government. To have the greatest effect, BMTF advisors and mentors are placed at key customs and border protection nodes.

**AGRICULTURE**

The Afghan Government continues to focus efforts on improving the agricultural sector, as the majority of the economy is agriculturally-based. In late February 2011, Afghanistan showcased its high-quality produce at the Gulfood 2011 Exhibition in Dubai, the Middle East’s largest food-and-drink industry event. With produce ranging from pomegranates and apples to nuts and saffron, the Afghan delegation (consisting of 30 suppliers including seven women’s groups) sought to generate business deals, expand market share, and boost international recognition of
the country’s agricultural products. Initiatives like these are particularly important since agriculture makes up 31 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP and employs 79 percent of the country’s workforce.

Due to the importance it plays in the economy, the agricultural sector is a significant area of U.S. and international assistance. The United States Agricultural Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan has two fronts: promoting the confidence of Afghans in their government by increasing the capacity of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) to deliver services; and increasing agricultural sector jobs and incomes through increased agricultural productivity, regenerating agribusiness, rehabilitating watersheds, and improving irrigation infrastructure. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken numerous steps to assist MAIL to be a fully-functioning and efficient organization that is able to address the nation’s agriculture and aligns with both the agricultural strategy of the Government of Afghanistan and the U.S. Agricultural Assistance Strategy.

A U.S. Embassy-sponsored Agriculture Conference and an agricultural shura in November 2010 produced a list of priority technical areas for MAIL including: a Kuchi (the nomadic population) policy, water and land management, crop and livestock productivity, export certification, forestry and community-based natural resource management, and change management. Meeting these priorities will enable MAIL to render services to and create jobs for its rural citizens, who constitute over 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population.

In order to support these priority technical areas and in conjunction with the U.S. Government’s broader civilian up-lift efforts, USDA increased its civilian presence in Afghanistan from 13 agriculture experts in October 2009 to 52 experts in March 2011. Additionally, USDA has three employees serving in Afghanistan under the DoD, 10 Kabul-based staff, and 42 employees embedded within the civilian-military structure at the district, provincial, task force, regional command, and national levels. A Senior Agriculture Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator position were also created in 2010 to better coordinate the U.S. Government’s agricultural efforts. USDA technical experts are chosen for their ability to directly impact agricultural productivity and farmer income in areas such as agronomic practices, water utilization, post-harvest handling techniques, and plant and animal health practices.

Of the 52 USDA experts noted above, three are embedded in MAIL headquarters in Kabul to assist with the Ministry-identified priorities of natural resource management, change management, and sanitary and phytosanitary issues. Further, USDA implemented a long-term project to help MAIL strengthen its administrative and financial functions, such as grants management, internal audits, procurement, and accounting. This 4-year USDA program, initiated late-November 2010, has been well received. This project specifically focuses on establishing a Grants Management and Contract Services unit at MAIL, and enabling MAIL to directly receive and manage program funding from USDA, USAID, and other donor organizations. This function will be operational by June 2011 for simple procurements up to $10M, and will be completely transitioned to MAIL within two years.

Another critical objective for MAIL is to build its capacity at provincial and district levels in order to provide key services to Afghan farmers and rural citizens. USDA experts estimated that
they have trained more than 500 MAIL provincial and district Directors of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, and extension agents, during the reporting period, covering at least 84 districts throughout Afghanistan. The development of leadership capacity at the sub-national level continues to improve the Afghan Government’s overall agricultural sector.

Wheat is a key staple in Afghanistan, accounting for over one-half of the caloric intake of the population and grown on roughly 70 percent of cultivated land area. Given wheat’s importance to Afghanistan, the current tight global supply could affect the country’s food security. Afghanistan’s wheat production routine does not meet demand and is subject to sizable weather, pest, and disease-induced fluctuations. To date, the irrigation supply for this year’s wheat crop has generally been below normal in most major wheat producing areas. By late March 2011, satellite imagery confirmed that the wheat crop was well-established in Afghanistan’s irrigated wheat regions, though this imagery also showed that the density and vigor of the crop vegetation (and thus yield potential) was generally below average.

USDA has taken steps to secure Afghanistan’s wheat harvest. The country suffers from antiquated seed technology that has lost resistance to many plant diseases and pests - for example, stem rust (particularly the Ug99 strain). In response, USDA has donated 150 tons of Egyptian-grown Ug99 stem rust resistant wheat breeder seed to MAIL, which will be released to farmers for commercial planting in fall 2011.

Poppy yields decreased significantly in 2010, primarily due to a poppy blight which halved the production of poppy in Afghanistan during this period. The decreased production, however, caused the price of opium to increase considerably in 2010 and prices are likely to remain high in 2011. However, the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes in its January 2011 report predicts a slight decrease in poppy cultivation in 2011 due to licit crop substitution programs designed to foster licit production and income growth as a poppy alternative.

A significant component of U.S. agricultural efforts in Afghanistan relates to reduction of illicit poppy cultivation. USAID supports a wide range of activities including alternative livelihood programs. Unfortunately, Afghanistan continues to account for about two-thirds of all global opium cultivation.

**AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT TEAMS**

Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) provide training and advice to Afghan universities, provincial ministries, district government officials and private farmers in order to enhance government services, increase crop yield, expand lines of commerce, and increase job opportunities. They strengthen Afghan Government influence with the populace, increase stability, and improve opportunities for Afghanistan’s re-emerging agribusiness sector. They are self-contained, volunteer units composed of U.S. Army and Air National Guard personnel with expertise in the agribusiness field. There are currently nine ADTs operating in 14 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Eight teams are in RC-E and one in RC-S.

The unique nature of the U.S. National Guard enables military units to fulfill development roles generally conducted by civilians. ADTs are intended to bridge development efforts between U.S. Government agencies and the Afghan Government in areas that are inaccessible to
traditional civilian development organizations, and are a key tool in infrastructure and capacity-building efforts. ADTs look to transition provinces to USAID/USDA lead, thereby freeing these forces to be repositioned to other areas of greater need.

Since the program began in 2007, 27 ADT deployments have provided support to 14 provinces and contributed to over 488 sustainable agriculture projects, generating more than $25M in revenue for Afghanistan. ADTs have created or strengthened existing relationships between Afghan Universities and U.S. Universities (including New Mexico State University, Purdue University, Texas A&M University, and University of California – Davis) and provide advanced education to more than 2,000 Afghan University students. Additionally, ADTs implemented Agricultural Extension Agent training programs that have produced hundreds of knowledgeable extension agents who provide direct services to the populace from the Afghan Government.

**TRANSPORTATION AND ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE**

The Afghan Government is increasingly focused on building the necessary infrastructure to facilitate regional trade, to stimulate economic development, and to encourage international investment. For example, given its dependence on agriculture, the need to be able to transport produce rapidly from farm to market is a critical component to economic development. Such infrastructure will also be critical to mining and other natural resources extraction. There are a number of ongoing initiatives to help Afghanistan increase freedom of movement.

On February 7, 2011, Herat’s provincial governor and other government officials marked the completion of a runway extension at Herat’s airport which will give large commercial aircraft direct access to this economically vibrant region. The improved access to Herat should provide more markets for agricultural exports from western Afghanistan and contribute more generally to regional economic development.

March 2011 marked the completion of the Asian Development Bank-funded 75km long railway connecting the Hairaton Border Crossing in Balkh Province with Mazar-e-Sharif. The rail line, expected to be operational in summer 2011, will significantly increase the capacity of freight passing through the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border, where approximately 80 percent of Afghanistan’s fuel and 50 percent of its imports arrive.

Another railway from the Iranian border at Islam Qalah to Herat is planned, with additional railways planned to connect Afghan mineral deposits – such as gold, iron ore, and copper – with regional rail networks. Overall, the plan is to construct an industrial railway network that will link resource-rich Central Asia with resource-hungry South Asia – making Afghanistan, in President Karzai’s words, the “Central Asian Roundabout.”

Complementing rail development is progress on Afghanistan’s road network. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ISAF, and USAID continue to work with the Afghan Government to improve Afghanistan’s road network. The Asian Development Bank is providing over $353.5M in funding to the Ministry of Finance for construction of the remaining 255km of the Ring Road stretching across Badghis into Faryab provinces. Further, there has been some progress on the Salang Bypass Road connecting Dushi to Charikar via Bamyan, although security issues have slowed construction of the Khost to Gardez Road.
AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Section 1217 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2011 authorized the creation of the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) to develop and carry out infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. Section 1217 recognizes that such projects are strategic in nature, and require a unique authority to pursue them.

AIF infrastructure projects will be jointly formulated and agreed to by both the DoS and DoD. In accordance with the NDAA, the Secretary of Defense may use up to $400M in operations and maintenance funds for this program. DoS will use its existing authorities to allocate foreign assistance funds, as appropriate, to AIF projects.

The AIF provides the means for DoS and DoD to apply capabilities in a coordinated manner to support infrastructure projects, including water, power, and transportation, as well as related maintenance and sustainment costs. These infrastructure projects are critical to the U.S. near-term COIN objectives in Afghanistan.

ENERGY

Energy is a major catalyst for economic development. In Afghanistan, the demand for energy far exceeds its current supply. Large scale projects are currently in progress to increase Afghanistan’s capacity to produce enough electricity to meet the demand and to more efficiently distribute the electricity to the population. While economic progress is being made, the lack of energy will continue to limit development.

The Kandahar Power Initiative, an interim plan to provide additional generators to increase electricity in Kandahar City, was successfully launched in February 2011 to deliver additional electricity to the population and to stimulate economic development. These generators are providing 20MW of additional capacity and will serve as a bridging solution until more sustainable power is provided from the Kajaki Dam and Northeast Power System projects. Additionally, USAID expects to augment the power supply at the Kandahar Industrial Park with an additional 10 diesel generators, currently being repaired in Kabul. When these generators are returned in the next few months, they will boost power generation by an additional 6.5MW for Kandahar City.

USAID has also tendered a contract to improve the current power distribution system in order to reach a larger segment of the local population. Improvements would provide a more reliable source of electricity, encouraging private sector development, promoting economic growth, and creating additional job opportunities in Kandahar. Several other USAID energy development initiatives made significant progress during this reporting period, including the groundbreaking of over 40 renewable energy projects and the execution of robust training programs provided to nearly 5,000 Afghans working in the energy sector.

MINING

The mining sector continues to show great potential to promote economic development and to generate revenue for the Afghan Government. The Afghan Government continues to develop the mineral sector with the long-term goal of leveraging mineral wealth as a platform for
infrastructure development and GDP growth. Over the past two years, the mining industry has grown nearly 30 percent, with an estimate by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) of up to $3T of untapped mineral resources.

In FY2011, USAID will support the Ministry of Mines through an $8.7M program with USGS to perform mineral assessments, data collection, analysis, and investor presentations over a period of 18 months. This builds on a previous 2006-2008 effort with USGS that was successful in identifying significant deposits of heavy metal ores, precious metals, and rare earths.

To manage and promote the responsible development of such significant natural resources, the Government of Afghanistan is conducting an aggressive campaign to restructure the Ministry of Mines and improve its overall capacity. To this end, the Ministry of Mines continues to recruit qualified personnel with technical skills and to amend the 2009 Minerals Law to promote private investment. A November 2010 review of the Ministry of Mines by Transparency International and Global Witness determined what support the ministry would need to achieve minimum global standards, which has informed the development of a six-year plan to meet these standards. All of these activities are critical steps to meet the benchmarks set forth for the Ministry of Mines in the Kabul Conference of early 2010.

In December 2010, Afghan leaders showcased mining, infrastructure, and agriculture projects to more than 700 diplomats and prominent businessmen at the first Afghan International Investment Conference, demonstrating that the country is ripe for investment. The Ministry of Mines is partnering with donors, such as the Asian Development Bank and World Bank, to plan and implement proof of concept projects. One example is the proposed Angot oil field, which will be used to attract large-scale investment to develop the nearby Kasha Kari Oil Block. The Sheberghan Northern Fertilizer and Power Plant in Jowzjan is also under development and is expected to promote commerce, to provide employment opportunities for the local population, and to increase power generation for business development and household use in the area.

Additionally, the Ministry of Mines is accepting bids for the Hajigak iron ore deposit in Bamyan Province and is also promoting gold mining investment. In December 2010, 10 multi-million-dollar mining contracts were awarded to international investors. One such gold-mining deal backed by Morgan Stanley was finalized in mid-December and will provide jobs for hundreds of Afghans in Baghlan Province.

**Telecommunications**

Afghanistan has made significant progress on developing its core telecommunications infrastructure, particularly its fiber optic network, and the Government of Afghanistan plans to connect all major cities via fiber optic cable by 2011. The primary purpose of the fiber optic network is to increase data capacity, eliminate the need for high-cost satellite connections and to provide connectivity to the major global fiber systems via neighboring countries. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology predicts this project will reduce the cost of internet access by 100-fold, making it possible for average citizens to benefit from access to the World Wide Web. This will also provide the broadband wireless connectivity required to expand cellular services and provide 3G and 4G capability.
Afghanistan’s mobile phone coverage is estimated to reach nearly 85 percent of the population and is growing quickly. There are approximately 15 million cell phone accounts in Afghanistan, a country of almost 29 million people. Mobile phones account for 99 percent of all lines and the mobile phone market also serves as the country’s largest taxpayer, employing more than 100,000 people. Additionally, it has generated approximately in $1.56B in foreign direct investment and generates as much as $1B revenue annually for the country’s five mobile phone service providers.

Afghan Telecom, the 100 percent Government of Afghanistan-owned telecommunications company, operates a national fiber optic network, a CDMA mobile telephony network in all 34 provincial capitals, landlines in the major cities, and a network of voice satellite-based public call offices in rural districts and villages. The Afghan Government considered an effort to privatize the company as early as 2008. Recent increases in profitability have re-ignited the Afghan Government’s interest in privatization, with the support of the international donor community. This will likely move forward more aggressively after approval of the Minister of Communications and Information Technology by the Afghan Parliament.

**Civil Society & Media**

An active and informed civil society and independent media are essential to expanding government accountability. Two primary lines of effort to promote a more active and informed citizenry are civil society organizations (CSOs) and media initiatives. CSOs are voluntary civic and social organizations, distinct from government and for-profit organizations, which form a basis for an active and functional citizenry. These organizations include social movements, small membership organizations, professional NGOs, village associations, farmer federations, and business and professional interest groups (e.g. bar associations).

The U.S. Government has strengthened the role and viability of civil society in Afghanistan by providing technical assistance, capacity building training, and grant support to CSOs nationwide. USAID reached 364,050 beneficiaries through training and $9.7M of grants to Afghan CSOs. These efforts included building capacity and providing training at 247 CSOs, which included training 393 CSO staff. These trained staff will form a cadre enabled to train new local national hires. Among these 247 CSOs that received capacity-building support, 121 were managed by women.

USAID also awarded the new Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP) on November 1, 2010, which will increase public access to reliable news and information. AMDEP will increase the reach and professional skills of independent media by: providing regional broadcast media support to stations and training centers; empowering individual and/or amateur voices through increased access to technology; improving media sector networking, coordination, and the legal environment; and building the sustainability of private media outlets and capacity of public regulatory bodies.

Additionally, USAID made progress establishing a more-robust broadcasting system. USAID established Salam Watandar, a national network of 38 independent local radio stations and three repeaters. This network airs independent and locally produced news, current affairs, educational, and cultural programs for a target audience of over seven million Afghans. To augment this
national network, USAID built or refurbished 43 community-based, independent FM radio stations and repeaters across Afghanistan, and helped 38 stations with program funding and technical support. Over 3,000 male and female media professionals received training, and USAID assisted in updating the journalism curriculum at six universities comprising 350 students.

**HEALTH**

The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) continues to coordinate with the U.S. Government and international community to build ministerial capacity, expand the range of health services, and improve accessibility and delivery to the Afghan people. Overall, Afghanistan’s health system continues to advance slowly. Further progress requires significant improvements in preventive measures such as sanitation, hygiene, clean potable water, and indoor air pollution. MoPH is also concentrating its efforts on increasing the number of nurses, midwives, and other female health providers to further increase the proportion of deliveries assisted by a skilled birth attendant.

MoPH has also improved access to basic health services throughout Afghanistan. In 2002, only 9 percent of the population had access to basic health services within the MoPH benchmark of two hours walking distance. As of 2006, 58.5 percent of the Afghan population had access to basic health care within the MoPH benchmark. The MoPH continues its efforts to expand the availability of health services to the Afghan people; nearly 84 percent of the population now has access to basic healthcare services, and MoPH aims to achieve 90 percent national coverage by 2013. The third revision of the Basic Package of Health Services, approved in 2010, provides additional recommendations on how to increase access to services, specifically for isolated populations, including nomads and prisoners.

In coordination with the World Health Organization, the MoPH completed polio vaccines this spring to vaccinate Afghan children below the age of five in five of Afghanistan’s southern provinces. Although the World Health Organization figures classify Afghanistan as one of four countries where polio is endemic, there is now access to areas previously inaccessible to aid workers as a result of hard-fought security gains. Child immunizations have decreased the number of polio cases country-wide from 37 recorded cases in 2009 to 24 in 2010 – a 35 percent decrease.

**EDUCATION**

Education remains one of the bright spots within development. The total number of children enrolled in school increased by 13 percent from 6.5 million students in 2009 to 7.4 million students in 2010, including 2.7 million girls. The Ministry of Education reports that almost half of schools previously closed (311 of 673) have re-opened due to improving security, and public satisfaction with education has increased by 9 percent over the last year. Although the total number of advanced schools that provide technical and vocational education and training only increased from 60 to 62 during 2010, the total enrollment increased by 50 percent from 20,000 to 30,000. Of note, the enrollment of female students increased by 75 percent from 3,000 to 5,249.
**LOCAL PROCUREMENT**

With proper oversight, “Afghan First” contracting – a local procurement initiative – helps to create jobs and to strengthen Afghan self-sustainability. On November 11, 2010, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, joined by USFOR-A, UNAMA, and Peace Dividend Trust representatives, launched the Afghan First policy. The policy deems that, consistent with applicable U.S. law governing U.S. Government procurement, U.S. officials making procurement decisions for goods and services in support of U.S. Government operations in Afghanistan will actively solicit Afghan suppliers who can immediately or prospectively meet requirements of price, quantity, and quality on a competitive basis. The Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, whose membership includes more than 35,000 private sector businesses, hosted the event. Media coverage for the event included more than 20 local Afghan TV, radio, and news agencies plus three international press representatives.

The Afghan First policy encourages local procurement of Afghan products to benefit and improve the well-being of the Afghan people. Procuring goods and services from Afghan companies promotes economic development, supports the growth of a modern and competitive business sector, and boosts Afghan employment. Coalition forces and U.S. and international development agencies are significant players in the Afghan economy; their influence will be more positive to the extent that they actively partner with Afghans and Afghan companies to create jobs.

Local procurement also makes good business sense. Afghan firms know the terrain and can often provide goods and services with comparable quality at competitive prices. With a shorter supply chain, local procurement is often the best way for the buyer to maximize value and timely delivery of needed goods and services. Such business engagement can broaden Afghan support for our mutual strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Most importantly, it helps local businesses to grow, gain experience, and generate jobs in the industrial, commercial, and agriculture sectors.

As a part of the Afghan First policy, the U.S. Government is facilitating the local procurement of Afghan agricultural produce for use by U.S. and ISAF military and civilian installations. The policy is being implemented with a target of facilitating local procurement of Afghan produce by the end of March 2011 in a way that increases jobs and income on the local economy, while increasing competitive supply channels for U.S. and ISAF installations. The initiative will also build capacity of farmers, processors, and traders to meet international quality and food safety standards, allowing them to increase export opportunities.

**LAND REFORM**

Disputes over land rights are one of the most persistent and continuing sources of violence in Afghanistan. Two years ago, the Afghan Government established the Afghan Land Authority to consolidate the technical and management authorities necessary to develop and implement a coherent, long-term national land management program.

In February 2011 USAID awarded the Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) project. Valued at up to $95M over three years, this project aims to reduce corruption in land transactions by informing citizens of land processes and procedures, by eliminating unnecessary steps and delays in land transactions, and by establishing a legal and regulatory framework to land administration.
LARA will also provide technical assistance to help Afghan Land Authority identify, manage, lease and derive revenue from Afghan Government lands by establishing a transparent and quick process, and will support the other activities of Afghan Land Authority through targeted technical assistance.

**WOMEN’S ISSUES**

Women continue to make progress in Afghanistan, playing an ever-increasing role at all levels of Afghan society, particularly in the public and political arenas.

During the September Parliamentary elections, women earned 27 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and 25 percent of the seats in Provincial Councils. In the 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* election, 406 out of 2556 candidates were women, which is a 24 percent increase from the 2005 election. Some unique results this year included two female winners in Nimruz Province who outscored all male candidates in their province taking two of two provincial seats. In addition, 11 women had enough votes to enter the Parliament independent of the reserved seats. This year’s results ended with 69 women in elected seats, which is one seat above the reserved number of 68.

Women have also secured increased presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program, and constitute 24 percent of the participation in the local Community Development Councils. In the health arena, nearly 50 percent of all Afghans in the medical profession are women. Of the more than seven million students enrolled in school, approximately 30 percent are girls. This is almost two million more than in 2001 when very few girls were allowed to pursue education. The number of girls attending basic education is approaching international goals. Finally, in the economic sector, the number of registered, women-owned businesses increased nearly 100 percent in 2010 to a total of 281.

The promotion of women’s rights is integrated into the overall U.S. strategy and all key programs, including education and literacy, health care, security, rule of law, political participation, and economic development; these programs are described in the DoS Stabilization Plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While DoS and USAID administer the majority of women’s initiatives, the Department of Defense also oversees several programs focusing on women. For example, personnel support local Afghan women’s groups through mentorship, coordination and funding for special projects. These groups include the Department of Women’s Affairs in Kandahar and the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs in Parwan District.

Some units also use Female Engagement Teams (FETs) which were first established by the U.S. Marine Corps. In this role, female Marines accompany Marine patrols in order to engage local Afghan women and communities in open communication, thus facilitating civil-military interactions and building trust, cooperation, and security.

Recently, the Ministry of Defense Advisors’ program assigned two senior gender integration advisors to NTM-A, who are responsible for mentoring the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on gender integration and human rights. The advisors provide oversight for the
development of long-range strategic plans to improve gender integration, human rights/dignity, and equality-related matters within the ANSF.

DoD further supports Afghan women’s participation in the security sector. Female participation in the ANA and ANP increased to 1,400 women, and in September 2010 the first female soldiers graduated from the ANA’s Female Officer Candidate School. Twenty-nine women have completed the formal 20-week training course, receiving instruction and mentorship by U.S. and Afghan officers.

To reduce discrimination and violence against women, the Afghan Government has enacted The Law Eliminating Violence Against Women and the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. The Government of Afghanistan is also a state party to the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women. However, implementation of these agreements remains slow and violence against women and girls is endemic. Of particular concern are recent reports of proposed changes to Afghanistan’s regulation of NGO-run women’s shelters, which may result in the shelters coming under government control. However, President Karzai recently clarified that the shelters would not be shut down or put under direct government control. Although the Afghan Government needs to monitor such shelters, it is important that civil society be allowed to operate these facilities independently.

Despite advances, the problems of poverty, illiteracy, and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and, as with so many issues in Afghanistan, solutions will require long-term and sustained effort.
SECTION 7 – COUNTERNARCOTICS

7.1: STRATEGY AND PRIORITIES

Proceeds from the narcotics trade are a critical source of internal funding for the insurgency. According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates, at least $100M of the insurgency’s funding is derived from the opium trade each year. The narcotics industry undermines licit economic development, erodes government legitimacy, and threatens security and stability, both in Afghanistan and across the region.

DoD continues to support the U.S. Government’s strategic counternarcotics (CN) goals for Afghanistan, which aim to: reinforce the CN capacity of the Afghan Government, reduce the financial support the insurgency receives from the narcotics industry, and address the narcotics-corruption-insurgency nexus.

Partnering with other U.S. Government agencies, DoD continues to prioritize efforts to counter this nexus in order to support overall campaign objectives. RC-S and RC-SW are the primary focus as they contain the majority of Afghan poppy fields. The Afghan Government maintains the lead for all CN operations and partners with U.S. and international forces to target narcotics traffickers and facilities supporting the insurgency.

7.2: PROGRESS TO DATE

According to the UNODC, the total area devoted to opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2010 was unchanged from 2009, and the number of poppy-free provinces remained static at 20. However, there was an overall decline by almost 50 percent in both total opium yielded and total opium produced – a decline that resulted primarily from disease that affected opium plant development.

As part of the overall CN effort to reduce poppy production and narcotrafficking, ANSF and ISAF CN components maintained the high pace of CN operations from the previous reporting period, a result of effective collaboration between ISAF and the ANSF.

During the reporting period, the ANSF, ISAF, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) – Nexus, and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), conducted a robust campaign of law enforcement and CN operations, resulting in the seizures of: 38,184 kilograms (kg) of opium; 4,776 kg of morphine; 6,749 kg of heroin; 124,574 kg of hashish; 8,102 kg of solid precursor chemicals; 13,924 liters of liquid precursor chemicals; and the arrest of 267 suspects.
This reporting period saw an 82 percent increase in seized opium, a 156 percent increase in seized morphine, a 5 percent decrease in seized heroin, a 423 percent increase in seized hashish, a 5 percent increase in seized solid precursor chemicals, a 196 percent increase in seized liquid precursor chemicals, and a 29 percent decrease (a total of 111 individuals) in the total number of suspects arrested. Of note, while heroin seizures are down, targeted seizures tied to on-going narcotics trafficking investigations are up. This upward trend is the outcome of an effective strategy to combat both drug flow and broader narcotics networks.

7.3: INTERAGENCY COUNTERNARCOTICS SUPPORT

DoD supports a number of CN programs in Afghanistan in close coordination with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. These programs are designed to develop Afghan Government capacity and harmonize its efforts with international law enforcement agencies in the conduct of CN operations and in support of ISAF’s comprehensive COIN strategy. DoD’s CN authorities are used to provide training, infrastructure, intelligence, operations, and maintenance support. The following paragraphs provide examples of DoD-supported programs and their progress during the reporting period.

CJIATF-Nexus, an ISAF organization with representatives from the international law enforcement community, supports interdiction operations to counter the narcotics-corruption-insurgent nexus. It specifically targets network functions (i.e. safe havens, movement, communications, and finance) rather than individual narcotraffickers to disrupt network resiliency. CJIATF-Nexus improved and expanded its narcotics targeting support during this reporting period, providing critical support for law enforcement investigations and military operations by analyzing key trafficking networks and by improving visibility on powerbroker corruption in Regional Commands South, Southwest, West, and East. CJIATF-Nexus has enabled the coalition to confront the insurgency, corruption, and the drug trade, while supporting pro-Afghan Government actors.
In addition to CJATF-Nexus, DoD and the U.S. Army provided funding and training for the Ministry of Interior Air Interdiction Unit (AIU), an Afghan helicopter unit that provides aerial support for CN operations. The AIU allows CN forces to conduct missions in areas of Afghanistan that are otherwise inaccessible. The AIU supports CN interdiction missions with U.S. Army, U.S. contractors, and Afghan crews while also improving the training of Afghan personnel. Since October 1, 2010, the AIU has flown in support of 29 CN interdiction missions for DEA and Afghan Special Narcotics Forces. These missions resulted in the seizure of: 2,828 kg of opium, 2,845 kg of heroin, 5,630 kg of morphine, 5,698 kg of hashish, and 40,450 kg of cannabis. Precursor chemicals, weapons, and ammunition have also been confiscated on AIU-supported missions.

In December 2010, the AIU planned and executed their first CN mission with all Afghan crews. The mission supported the Afghan Special Narcotics Forces and required three Mi-17s and six hours of flight time. During the mission, 40,000 kg of cannabis and 1,500 kg of refined hashish were recovered, and one person was taken into custody. This is an important milestone in the AIU’s development and transition to an independent self-sustaining organization.

Also during the reporting period, DoD completed the construction of a forward operating base for the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) in Herat Province. The forward operating base will be utilized for law enforcement training investigations, housing, and operations support. It will enable operational CN units to conduct interdiction operations in western Afghanistan. DoD and DoS/INL will provide support for maintaining the base.

7.4: EFFORTS TO IMPROVE AFGHAN CAPACITY

The Counternarcotics Training Academy (CNTA) in Kabul continues to provide a standard course of instruction for all CNPA officers in CN investigation techniques. All CNPA officers must attend the five week CN training course prior to being certified. During the reporting period, the CNTA trained 190 officers. A total of 1,868 CNPA officers have been trained since 2007.

To improve the overall capacity of the CNPA, DoD is also providing support for the CNPA Development Unit (CDU), which was established to coordinate the development of CNPA under CSTC-A and NTM-A. With the opening of the new CNPA Headquarters north of Kabul, the CDU was embedded on a full-time basis, which enables daily contact with CNPA leadership and other international community actors that support CNPA development. In support of CNPA professional development, the CDU supports a variety of efforts to improve the leadership and management capacity of the CNPA.

The CDU held a CNPA management workshop to enhance CNPA management problem solving, planning, and decision-making skills. The CDU also mentors CNPA personnel to manage a two-tier management and decision-making structure. This effort provides a framework for structured and accountable organization planning and improved management. CNPA, supported by CDU, also designed a leadership certificate program to build Afghan leadership capacity. The program, which began in November 2010 and was endorsed by the Afghan Deputy Minister of Interior, seeks to develop and enable senior CNPA leaders to realize their strategic leadership potential.
The CDU also supported CNPA managers in the conduct of an anti-corruption workshop with 34 CNPA provincial commanders to define corruption and to discuss cause and effect, prevention, and enforcement measures. The CNPA initiated a CNPA Anti-Corruption Strategy, developed jointly with NTM-A, to include a draft whistle-blowing policy. This project was coordinated with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, CJIATF-Shafafiyat, and the IOCC.

Additionally, a CDU-mentored CNPA Planning Action Team developed and established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at the new CNPA Headquarters north of Kabul. The TOC provides a much needed command and control system and will serve as a model for similar CNPA development efforts in the future.

In addition to the CDU, the IOCC continues to provide support to law enforcement and interface with ISAF and the ANSF for law enforcement entities, and has also synchronized its operations with CJIATF-Shafafiyat. The IOCC also works with the CNPA to improve the flow of information, to build capacity, and to develop an IOCC-like capability within the CNPA. DoD will continue to provide support for IOCC’s efforts to build Afghan CN capacity.

**Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan Specialized Units**

DEA, with DoD and DoS contractor support, continues to support, train, and equip three specialized units within the CNPA: the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), and the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU). The 442-member NIU – established by the DEA as a specialized, tactical element of the CNPA – is capable of conducting interdiction operations and seizures, and of serving arrest and search warrants in a high-threat environment, much like a U.S. SWAT team.

The Afghan NIU works with the SIU, a 78-person, specially-vetted and-trained Afghan law enforcement unit. The SIU carries out complex CN investigations using intelligence developed by the TIU, which is comprised of eight specially-vetted officers who perform court-authorized judicial wire intercepts. In January 2011, DEA began training 46 members of the SIU in Quantico, Virginia. These members graduated in February 2011 and are currently being integrated into the SIU.

In order to provide basic, advanced, and sustainment training to the NIU and SIU, DEA has established an Afghan Regional Training Team. Since October 2010, the Regional Training Team has conducted 30 seminars for 900 Afghans. Training seminars include firearms instruction, basic and advanced drug investigation techniques, and map reading techniques.

Under DoD and international community mentorship, the CNPA’s specialized units continue to improve. Established to investigate high-value narcotics traffickers and complement traditional CNPA units, specialized unit personnel are carefully vetted and operate with the mentorship of the international law enforcement community. In particular, the NIU and the SIU are specialized units mentored by DEA, and the Intelligence Investigations Unit (IIU) is mentored by the United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency. The specialized units work with conventional CNPA units to support and conduct CN investigations throughout Afghanistan.
7.5: Afghan Threat Finance Cell

The Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) identifies and disrupts the sources of funding that support insurgent and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. It is led by the DEA and comprises personnel from DoD, Treasury, Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Personnel from the United Kingdom’s (UK) Serious Organized Crime Agency are also assigned to work with the ATFC.

ATFC works closely with vetted Afghan personnel from the DEA-mentored SIU, the Public Prosecutors’ Office, and vetted judges to undertake investigations and operations, focused on prosecuting individuals, either in the United States or Afghanistan, who provide financial support to insurgents. Additionally, the ATFC identifies financial networks of insurgents that are linked to narcotics, corruption, and other illicit activities. During this reporting period, the ATFC continued to identify and disrupt sources of insurgent funding, as well as assist the Afghan Government in identifying corruption in its financial sector that degraded public confidence in the government and damaged the country’s fiscal integrity.

The ATFC works closely with the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) and has several OFAC sanction investigators assigned to the ATFC. These sanction investigators collaborate with the ATFC’s law enforcement component, along with DEA, FBI, and DHS special agents, to develop information to identify and target narcotics traffickers who support the insurgency.

As a result of information developed by the ATFC, DEA, and OFAC in February 2011, nine individuals and seven businesses associated with the New Ansari Network were designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (1999) for money laundering activities. The vast majority of the intelligence that supported these designations, including links between New Ansari Network and the insurgency, came as a result of the teamwork between the ATFC and OFAC.

7.6: International Coordination

The U.S. and UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC) perform strategic level analysis and provide operational reach-back support for the IOCC. CJIAATF-Nexus will continue to work with international law enforcement elements and ISAF to continue interdiction efforts against trafficking organizations. The CDU continued efforts to promote unity and collaboration with key external stakeholders. In this regard, U.S. and UK representatives from Washington, London, and Kabul met in the United States in December 2010 to synchronize efforts and discuss future plans. Representatives agreed to continue ongoing programs and to collaborate on future efforts.

In October 2010, the CNPA’s SIU and NIU, working in concert with the DEA Kabul Country Office, conducted a joint counternarcotics operation resulting in the seizure of four clandestine labs in Nangarhar Province. The operation was based in part on intelligence information previously developed by DEA and the Russian Federal Drug Control Service. Two
representatives from the Russian Federal Drug Control Service accompanied the interdiction forces as observers.

DEA continues to engage its regional counterparts on CN investigations, specifically through the Northern Route Working Group. This working group is comprised of DEA representatives serving in the Dunshabe, Kabul, and Moscow DEA Country Offices, as well as members of the CNPA SIU, the Russian Federal Drug Control Service, and the Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service. The Northern Route Working Group coordinates narcotics trafficking investigations along the Northern Route in Afghanistan.
SECTION 8 – REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The long-term stability and security of Afghanistan is influenced by the dynamics of the region and the continuing influence, both positive and negative, of Afghanistan’s neighbors.

8.1: PAKISTAN

Within its borders, Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates; to help bring about and ensure a durable political solution in Afghanistan; and to promote and sustain long-term regional stability so the United States does not again face a region that is home to terrorist sanctuaries.

Pursuing a long-term U.S.-Pakistani strategic partnership based on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust guides a whole-of-government, civilian-military effort. The long-term goal is for the U.S. strategy to lead to enduring linkages between the United States and Pakistan; stronger trade and investment ties; continued and deepened military and intelligence relations that support regional stability; and a secure Pakistan linked to its neighbors through a growing economy enabled by improved security.

There are significant hurdles to reaching that vision. The history of U.S.-Pakistani relations is fraught with negative perceptions on both sides, leading many in both countries to see the others’ pursuit of strategic objectives as being driven by transitory national security interests. To date, efforts on both sides have yielded some progress in improving this relationship. However, it will take a long-term relationship to overcome years of mistrust in order to achieve a long-term strategic partnership based on mutual interests.

The U.S. approach with Pakistan is to build an effective partnership that advances both U.S. and Pakistani interests – while also demonstrating to Pakistan that the United States will remain a strong and long-term supporter of Pakistani security and prosperity. Central to this effort is aligning both U.S. and Pakistani interests in the near-term with respect to denying safe haven to all violent extremist organizations. Although great strides have been made in the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship over the past two years, heightened sensitivities regarding Pakistani sovereignty can set back this progress.

8.2: INDIA

India remains committed to diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan. India continues to be one of Afghanistan’s largest assistance donors, providing $1.3B for major infrastructure projects such as electricity generation and transmission, road construction, and the construction of the Afghan parliament building in Kabul. India is largely responsible for bringing more consistent electricity to Kabul. Work on the Salma hydroelectric dam in Herat Province continues with funding from India, with a planned completion date of September 2011.

Additionally, India provides a variety of smaller-scale projects and initiatives, like the Indian Medical Missions in Afghanistan’s major cities that serve tens of thousands of Afghans yearly. Such projects provide critical social services and build goodwill among the Afghan people.
India also focuses its assistance on building Afghan human capital through scholarship programs in India (more than 1000 per year), agriculture training programs, and other vocational training activities. Public opinion surveys show that Afghans view India’s involvement in their country favorably.

8.3: CENTRAL ASIAN STATES – KAZAKHSTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, AND TURKMENISTAN

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) provides multiple transportation routes into and out of Afghanistan for commercial vendors. The NDN is also an important ground line of communication (LOC) to sustain U.S. and ISAF forces, evidenced in its use in supporting U.S. force increases in 2010. Officials from some Central Asian countries have supported U.S. efforts to diversify the LOCs into and out of Afghanistan. These LOCs include over-flight permissions and ground transit agreements.

Uzbekistan is nearing completion of the operations and maintenance contract to support a 75 km railway line from Hairatan to Mazar-e-Sharif. As security and governance transition to Afghan leadership, this road, rail, and air network will facilitate commercial activity among Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. In addition Kazakhstan has brought the first group of Afghan students to study in Kazakh universities under a five year, $50M program to develop Afghan professionals.

8.4: IRAN

Iran continues active attempts to influence events in Afghanistan through overt support for the Karzai government; economic and cultural outreach to the Afghan population, particularly to minority populations; and covert support for various insurgent and political opposition groups, including weapons and training. Iran seeks a withdrawal of foreign military forces and aims to play a dominant, long-term role in Afghanistan and the region.

At the highest political levels, Iran seeks to maintain positive relations with the Afghan Government. Various pro-Iranian Afghan officials continue to welcome and seek further Iranian support despite allegations about Tehran’s overt support to insurgents. In addition to maintaining a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, Tehran often uses high-level visits and key leadership engagements to publicly criticize the presence of the international community in Afghanistan and call for the withdrawal of ISAF. Since 2001, Iran has pledged more than $1B in aid to Afghanistan and given roughly more than $500M.

Iran’s reconstruction and development efforts continue in western Afghanistan. Iran’s aim is to increase its influence with the local population in order to create an Iran-friendly environment. Iran also wants to expand its sphere of influence beyond border regions into other parts of Afghanistan, particularly in Kabul. Iran currently maintains consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sharif, and may open another in Bamyan.

Iran continues to provide lethal assistance – including weapons and training – to elements of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. On February 5, 2011, coalition and Afghan forces intercepted a shipment of 49 122MM Rockets (effective range of 13 miles) in Nimruz Province.
Forensics teams examined the rockets and confirmed an Iranian point of origin. Tehran’s support to the Taliban is inconsistent with its past relationship; however, Tehran’s actions support its overall strategy of backing multiple groups to ensure positive relations with various factions as a hedge against a foreign presence.

As reported by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in 2010, more than one million registered Afghan refugees live in Iran. There continue to be discussions between both governments about their status, living conditions, and repatriation.

8.5: CHINA

China has two primary interests in Afghanistan: security and trade. Beijing's interest in Afghanistan is likely to deepen, particularly if the security situation continues to improve.

Since 2002, China donated a total of $130M in aid to the Government of Afghanistan. In 2009, China announced it would provide an additional $75M over the next five years. Chinese companies are investing in Afghanistan, but progress is slow on the largest project, the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province. The deal, signed in May 2008, also includes construction of a 400-megawatt coal-fired power plant, a freight railway running through Tajikistan to Afghanistan, a hospital, and a mosque. However, security, archeological, customs, and other concerns have stalled progress on these projects and have put a damper on other investments.

China is concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking, and the safety of Chinese workers in the country. Although China has helped train Afghan security personnel, there is no indication that it is willing to increase the level of assistance provided to Afghanistan.

8.6: RUSSIA

President Dmitry Medvedev recognizes that Afghanistan remains a “common cause” between Russia and NATO-ISAF partners. For Russia, minimizing the threat an unstable Afghanistan poses to Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus is linked to ISAF's mission success, with the prospect that a stable and secure Afghanistan will stem the spread of extremism and the flow of narcotics into Central Asia and Russia.

At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Russia agreed to expand the types of cargo shipped by rail via the NDN and also allow reverse transit. Approximately 45 percent of DoD sustainment cargo goes through the NDN, and over 60 percent of supplies transiting the NDN flow across Russia. Since April 2010, over 26,300 U.S. containers have been delivered to Afghanistan via the NDN. The United States continues to explore surface transit cooperation agreements with Russia and other countries in the region.

Since the U.S.-Russia-Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement entered into effect in July 2009, 956 flights have transited Russian airspace ferrying 145,804 U.S. personnel to and from Afghanistan. The Air Transit Agreement allows for up to 4,500 military flights and unlimited commercial flights to transit Russian airspace en route to Afghanistan each year. This agreement significantly reduces aircraft transit times and fuel usage.
The NATO-Russia Council will also expand its Central Asian counternarcotics program, which trains counternarcotics personnel from Central Asia, Afghanistan, and now Pakistan, in Russia, Turkey, and via mobile training teams. The establishment of a helicopter maintenance trust fund will also assist in maintaining Afghanistan’s fleet of helicopters.

President Karzai made his first official visit to Russia in January 2011, where he and President Medvedev discussed the possibility of increased economic and diplomatic cooperation. President Medvedev pledged Russian assistance in rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure, including the construction of several power plants and work on the Soviet-era Salang Tunnel. President Karzai also delivered a list of ANSF equipment requirements to the Russian Government, seeking to expand military-technical cooperation between the two countries.

8.7: GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) continue to support the international community’s effort in Afghanistan. In addition to military and financial contributions, members of the GCC provide key basing facilities and access for forces operating in Afghanistan. Also, several GCC countries provide critical air bases, port trans-load facilities, and over-flight and transit rights for operations in Afghanistan, as well as logistical support for these operations. For example, Qatar continues to host the Coalition Air Operations Center, which provides airpower command and control for Afghanistan. Qatar also hosts USCENTCOM’s forward headquarters, which is an important command and control node for U.S. contingency operations.

Additionally, Bahrain hosts NAVCENT Headquarters, the U.S. Naval component of USCENTCOM, which is a key supporting effort for Afghan operations. Other GCC countries host key air and naval facilities and provide staging capability for combat, ISR, and logistics operations in support of the Afghan mission. There is no indication at this time that the recent civil unrest in Bahrain and other GCC member nations will affect the U.S. ability to support operations in Afghanistan.

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34 GCC members include the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
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<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<td>ADSO</td>
<td>Active Duty Service Obligation</td>
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<td>ADT</td>
<td>Agribusiness Development Team</td>
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<td>AGO</td>
<td>Afghan Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>AHRIMS</td>
<td>Afghan Human Resources Information Management System</td>
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<td>Air Interdiction Unit</td>
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<td>Automated System for Custom Data</td>
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<td>Close-Air Support</td>
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<td>CIVCAS</td>
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<td>Counternarcotics Training Academy</td>
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<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>Commander – International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>CUAT</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>Force Reintegration Cell</td>
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<td>FY</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Afghan General Staff</td>
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<td>HOO</td>
<td>High Office of Oversight</td>
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<td>Haqqani Network</td>
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<td>IARCS</td>
<td>Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Services Commission</td>
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<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
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<td>ITAG</td>
<td>Infrastructure Training Advisory Group</td>
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<td>JCMB</td>
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<td>Kandahar Air Wing</td>
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<td>LARA</td>
<td>Land Reform in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Lines of Communication</td>
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<td>LOTFA</td>
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</table>
LTV  Light Tactical Vehicle
MAIL  Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MDB  Ministerial Development Board
MICC  Ministry of Interior International Coordination Cell
MoD  Ministry of Defense
MoDA  Ministry of Defense Advisory Program
MoE  Ministry of Education
MoI  Ministry of Interior
MoPH  Ministry of Public Health
MMC  Material Management Command
MRRD  Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MTV  Medium Tactical Vehicles
MW  Megawatt
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATC-A  NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
NDN  Northern Distribution Network
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIU  Narcotics National Interdiction Unit
NLC  National Logistics Center
NPP  National Police Plan
NPS  National Police Strategy
NPTC  National Police Training Center
NSP  National Solidarity Program
NTM-A  NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
OCS  Officer Candidate’s School
OFAC  Office of Foreign Asset Control
OPLAN  Operations Plan
OMLT  Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
PAI  Personnel Asset Inventory
PJST  Provincial Joint Secretariat Team
POMLT  Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
PRT  Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC  Private Security Company
RC  Regional Command
RDL  Ratings Definition Level
RMTC  Regional Military Training Center
RLC  Regional Logistics Center
RLSC  Regional Logistics Support Commands
ROLFF-A  Rule of Law Field Force – Afghanistan
SAFIRE  Surface-to-Air Fire
SALT-P  Special ANSF Leave Transportation Program
SCR  NATO Senior Civilian Representative
SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
<table>
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<tr>
<td>SIU</td>
<td>Sensitive Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>TAFA</td>
<td>Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Technical Investigation Unit</td>
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<td>TPSO</td>
<td>Training Program Support Office</td>
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<td>UAH</td>
<td>Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>U.S. Geological Survey</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>United States Forces – Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USGS</td>
<td>United States Geological Survey</td>
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<td>VSO</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations</td>
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<td>WRM</td>
<td>Watan Risk Management</td>
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ANNEX C – CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION

FY2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 1230 – REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.— Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) COORDINATION.— The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the head of any other department or agency of the Government of the United States involved with activities relating to security and stability in Afghanistan.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.— The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of a comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. The description of such strategy shall consist of a general overview and a separate detailed section for each of the following:

1. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE.—A description of the following:

   (A) Efforts of the United States to work with countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries’’).

   (B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to strengthening the NATO ISAF, and the results of such actions:

   (i) Encourage NATO ISAF countries to fulfill commitments to the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and ensure adequate contributions to efforts to build the capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics efforts, and reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan.

   (ii) Remove national caveats on the use of forces deployed as part of the NATO ISAF.
(iii) Reduce the number of civilian casualties resulting from military operations of NATO ISAF countries and mitigate the impact of such casualties on the Afghan people.

(2) AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for activities relating to strengthening the resources, capabilities, and effectiveness of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the ANSF, with the goal of ensuring that a strong and fully-capable ANSF is able to independently and effectively conduct operations and maintain security and stability in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals relating to building the capacity of the ANSF, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.

(ii) Improve ANSF recruitment and retention, including through improved vetting and salaries for the ANSF.

(iii) Increase and improve ANSF training and mentoring.

(iv) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(3) PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS AND OTHER RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, including a long-term strategy with a mission and objectives for each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.

(B) Any actions by the United States to achieve the following goals with respect to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, and the results of such actions:

(i) Improve coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners.
(ii) Clarify the chain of command, and operations plans for United States-led PRTs that are appropriate to meet the needs of the relevant local communities.

(iii) Promote coordination among PRTs.

(iv) Ensure that each PRT is adequately staffed, particularly with civilian specialists, and that such staff receive appropriate training.

(v) Expand the ability of the Afghan people to assume greater responsibility for their own reconstruction and development projects.

(vi) Strengthen the partnership between the Government of the United States and the Government of Afghanistan.

(vii) Ensure proper reconstruction and development oversight activities, including implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations of any United States inspectors general, including the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction appointed pursuant to section 1229.

(4) COUNTER-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.—A description of the following:

(A) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined objectives, for the activities of the Department of Defense relating to counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, including—

   (i) roles and missions of the Department of Defense within the overall counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan of the Government of the United States, including a statement of priorities;

   (ii) a detailed, comprehensive, and effective strategy with defined one-year, three-year, and five-year objectives and a description of the accompanying allocation of resources of the Department of Defense to accomplish such objectives;

   (iii) in furtherance of the strategy described in clause (i), actions that the Department of Defense is taking and has planned to take to—

      (I) improve coordination within the Department of Defense and with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States;

      (II) strengthen significantly the Afghanistan National Counter-narcotics Police;
(III) build the capacity of local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan to assume greater responsibility for counter-narcotics-related activities, including interdiction; and

(IV) improve counter-narcotics-related intelligence capabilities and tactical use of such capabilities by the Department of Defense and other appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States; and

(iv) the impact, if any, including the disadvantages and advantages, if any, on the primary counter-terrorism mission of the United States military of providing enhanced logistical support to departments and agencies of the Government of the United States and counter-narcotics partners of the United States in their interdiction efforts, including apprehending or eliminating major drug traffickers in Afghanistan.

(B) The counter-narcotics roles and missions assumed by the local and provincial governments of Afghanistan and the national Government of Afghanistan, appropriate departments and agencies of the Government of the United States (other than the Department of Defense), the NATO ISAF, and the governments of other countries.

(C) The plan and efforts to coordinate the counternarcotics strategy and activities of the Department of Defense with the counter-narcotics strategy and activities of the Government of Afghanistan, the NATO-led interdiction and security forces, other appropriate countries, and other counter-narcotics partners of the United States, and the results of such efforts.

(D) The progress made by the governments, organizations, and entities specified in subparagraph (B) in executing designated roles and missions, and in coordinating and implementing counternarcotics plans and activities, and based on the results of this progress whether, and to what extent, roles and missions for the Department of Defense should be altered in the future, or should remain unaltered.

(5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW.—A description of any actions, and the results of such actions, to help the Government of Afghanistan fight public corruption and strengthen governance and the rule of law at the local, provincial, and national levels.

(6) REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.—A description of any actions and the results of such actions to increase cooperation with countries geographically located around Afghanistan’s border, with a particular focus on improving security and stability in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.
(d) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS TOWARD SUSTAINABLE LONG TERM SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.—

(1) IN GENERAL.— The report required under subsection (a) shall set forth a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward sustainable long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, as specified in paragraph (2), and shall include performance standards and progress goals, together with a notional timetable for achieving such goals.

(2) PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND MEASURES OF PROGRESS SPECIFIED.— The performance indicators and measures of progress specified in this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(A) With respect to the NATO ISAF, an assessment of unfulfilled NATO ISAF mission requirements and contributions from individual NATO ISAF countries, including levels of troops and equipment, the effect of contributions on operations, and unfulfilled commitments.

(B) An assessment of military operations of the NATO ISAF, including of NATO ISAF countries, and an assessment of separate military operations by United States forces. Such assessments shall include—

(i) indicators of a stable security environment in Afghanistan, such as number of engagements per day, and trends relating to the numbers and types of hostile encounters; and

(ii) the effects of national caveats that limit operations, geographic location of operations, and estimated number of civilian casualties.

(C) For the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and separately for the Afghanistan National Police (ANP), of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) an assessment of the following:

(i) Recruitment and retention numbers, rates of absenteeism, vetting procedures, and salary scale.

(ii) Numbers trained, numbers receiving mentoring, the type of training and mentoring, and number of trainers, mentors, and advisers needed to support the ANA and ANP and associated ministries.

(iii) Type of equipment used.

(iv) Operational readiness status of ANSF units, including the type, number, size, and organizational structure of ANA and ANP units that are—
(I) capable of conducting operations independently;

(II) capable of conducting operations with the support of the United States, NATO ISAF forces, or other coalition forces; or

(III) not ready to conduct operations.

(v) Effectiveness of ANA and ANP officers and the ANA and ANP chain of command.

(vi) Extent to which insurgents have infiltrated the ANA and ANP.

(vii) Estimated number and capability level of the ANA and ANP needed to perform duties now undertaken by NATO ISAF countries, separate United States forces and other coalition forces, including defending the borders of Afghanistan and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Afghanistan.

(D) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Afghanistan and the extent to which it is composed of non-Afghan fighters and utilizing weapons or weapons-related materials from countries other than Afghanistan.

(E) A description of all terrorist and insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and any efforts to disarm or reintegrate each such group.

(F) An assessment of security and stability, including terrorist and insurgent activity, in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas and in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

(G) An assessment of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, for the twelve-month period following the date of the report required under subsection (a).

(H) For reconstruction and development, an assessment of the following:

(i) The location, funding (including the sources of funding), staffing requirements, current staffing levels, and activities of each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team.

(ii) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Afghanistan, including—

(I) the indicators set forth in the Afghanistan Compact, which consist of roads, education, health, agriculture, and electricity; and
(II) unemployment and poverty levels.

(I) For counter-narcotics efforts, an assessment of the activities of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, as described in subsection (c)(4), and the effectiveness of such activities.

(J) Key measures of political stability relating to both central and local Afghan governance.

(K) For public corruption and rule of law, an assessment of anti-corruption and law enforcement activities at the local, provincial, and national levels and the effectiveness of such activities.

(e) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.

(f) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—The Secretary of Defense shall supplement the report required under subsection (a) with regular briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on the subject matter of the report.

(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
FY2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 1231 – UNITED
STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2010, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the
Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) of the
Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the objective of ensuring that a strong and
fully-capable ANSF will be able to independently and effectively conduct operations and
maintain long-term security and stability in Afghanistan.

(b) COORDINATION.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be prepared in
coordination with the Secretary of State.

(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection

(a) shall include a description of the following matters relating to the plan for sustaining
the ANSF:

(1) A comprehensive and effective long-term strategy and budget, with defined
objectives.

(2) A mechanism for tracking funding, equipment, training, and services provided
for the ANSF by the United States, countries participating in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan (hereafter in this section referred to as “NATO ISAF countries”),
and other coalition forces that are not part of the NATO ISAF.

(3) Any actions to assist the Government of Afghanistan achieve the following
goals, and the results of such actions:

(A) Build and sustain effective Afghan security institutions with fully-
capable leadership and staff, including a reformed Ministry of Interior, a
fully-established Ministry of Defense, and logistics, intelligence, medical,
and recruiting units (hereafter in this section referred to as “ANSF-
sustaining institutions”).

(B) Train and equip fully-capable ANSF that are capable of conducting
operations independently and in sufficient numbers.

(C) Establish strong ANSF-readiness assessment tools and metrics.

(D) Build and sustain strong, professional ANSF officers at the junior-,
mid-, and senior-levels.
(E) Develop strong ANSF communication and control between central command and regions, provinces, and districts.

(F) Establish a robust mentoring and advising program, and a strong professional military training and education program, for all ANSF officials.

(G) Establish effective merit-based salary, rank, promotion, and incentive structures for the ANSF.

(H) Develop mechanisms for incorporating lessons learned and best practices into ANSF operations.

(I) Establish an ANSF personnel accountability system with effective internal discipline procedures and mechanisms, and a system for addressing ANSF personnel complaints.

(J) Ensure effective ANSF oversight mechanisms, including a strong record-keeping system to track ANSF equipment and personnel.

(4) Coordination with all relevant departments and agencies of the Government of the United States, as well as NATO ISAF countries and other international partners, including on—

(A) funding;

(B) reform and establishment of ANSF-sustaining institutions; and

(C) efforts to ensure that progress on sustaining the ANSF is reinforced with progress in other pillars of the Afghan security sector, particularly progress on building an effective judiciary, curbing production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating militia fighters.

(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.— In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.