

## Reference 1. Number of Deployed Nuclear Warheads by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery

		United States		Russia		United Kingdom	France	China	
Missiles	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)	450	Minuteman III: 450	385	SS-18: 68 SS-19: 72 SS-25: 180 SS-27: 65	—	—	56	DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-9): 36
	IRBM MRBM	—	—	—	—	—	—	92	DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 DF-4 (CSS-3): 10 DF-21 (CSS-5): 80
	Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)	336	Trident D-5: 336	236	SS-N-18: 80 SS-N-20: 60 SS-N-23: 96	48	Trident D-5: 48 M-45: 48	12	JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles		14	—	14	—	4	3	4	—
Aircraft		94	B-2: 18 B-52: 76	79	Tu-25 (Bear): 63 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16	—	84	Mirage-2000N: 60 Super Etendard: 24	—
Number of warheads		2,702 (including 500 strategic)		4,834 (including 2,047 strategic)		160	300	186	

Notes: 1. Data is based on Military Balance 2010, the SIPRI YEARBOOK 2009, and the NPR in the United States (2010).

2. In May 2010, the United States reported the total number of nuclear warheads possessed, including deployed, non deployed, strategic, and non strategic, as 5,113 warheads (as of September 30, 2009).

3. In May 2010, U.K. First Secretary of State Hague announced a policy to set the upper limit of nuclear warheads in the country's possession at 225 warheads, and to maintain a deployment of a maximum of 160 warheads.

## Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Item	Country	Name	Maximum range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
ICBM	U.S.	Minuteman III	13,000	MIRV (170 KT, 335–350 KT or 300–475 KT × 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
		Peacekeeper	9,600	MIRV (300–475 KT × 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-18	10,500–16,000	MIRV (400 KT–20 MT × 4–10) or Single	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-19	9,000–10,000	MIRV (500 KT × 6 or 500–750 KT × 6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-25	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + Computer control	Three-stage solid
		SS-27	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + GLONASS	Three-stage solid
	China	DF-5 (CSS-4)	12,000–13,000	Single (1–3 MT) or MIRV (150–350 KT × 4–6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-31 (CSS-9)	8,000–14,000	Single (1 MT) or MIRV (20–150 KT × 3–5)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT or 475 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-N-18	6,500–8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (200 KT × 3 or 100 KT × 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT × 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT × 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
	U.K.	Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100–120 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	France	M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT × 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
	China	JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150–2,500	Single (20–500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid

Item	Country	Name	Maximum range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
IRBM MRBM	China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,400–2,800	Single (1–3 MT)	Inertial	One-stage liquid
		DF-4 (CSS-3)	4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-21 (CSS-5)	2,150–2,500	Single (20–500 KT), HE, chemical, sub munition, EMP	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280–530	Single (2–20 KT), HE, sub munition, FAE, chemical	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT), HE, sub munition, EMP, chemical	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched
Cruise missile (long-range)	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500–3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched

Sources: Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 2009, etc.

### Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
China	160	United States	602.7	1,009	United States	3,470
India	113	Russia	210.9	986	Russia	2,160
North Korea	95	China	134.2	951	China	1,950
United States	66	United Kingdom	78.7	240	India	670
Republic of Korea	56	France	39.9	255	North Korea	590
Pakistan	55	India	35.0	158	Syria	560
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	25.4	205	Turkey	540
Turkey	40	Turkey	21.9	197	Republic of Korea	530
Russia	40	Germany	21.2	128	Taiwan	530
Myanmar	38	Taiwan	20.7	327	Egypt	530
Iran	35	Spain	19.6	110	Israel	470
Egypt	34	Republic of Korea	18.0	191	France	450
Colombia	24	Italy	17.7	173	Pakistan	400
Indonesia	23	Brazil	16.8	93	Brazil	390
Taiwan	20	Australia	15.9	82	Libya	380
Japan	14.1	Japan	44.9	14.9	Japan	430

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2009 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2009–2010 and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2009, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).

3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.




#### Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	158		86
Russia	Volunteer	103		2,000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	18		20
France	Volunteer	35		7
Germany	Conscription	25		16
Italy	Volunteer	29		4
India	Volunteer	133		156
China	Conscription	229		51
North Korea	Conscription	111		470
Republic of Korea	Conscription	69		450
Egypt	Conscription	47		48
Israel	Conscription	18		57
Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14.1	3.2 (0.6)
		Maritime	4.2	0.08
		Air	4.4	0.07

- Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2010 and other sources.  
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2009. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.  
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.

#### Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan



Note: Data take from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

## Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

- (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
- (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

## Reference 7. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005–

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond are included in the reference.

Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1995 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on November 28, 1994) are discontinued as of the end of FY2004.

**(See reference)**

### **National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond**

- I. Purpose**
- II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan**
- III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy**
- IV. Future Defense Forces**
- V. Additional Elements for Consideration**

#### **I. Purpose**

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond. The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures."

#### **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan**

1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment. Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear

in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain. North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea.

We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.
4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

### **III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy**

#### **1. Basic Principles**

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve

these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

## 2. Japan's Own Efforts

### (1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner — the United States — Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

### (2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

### (3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense

Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”).

In developing Japan’s defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

### 3. Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in “situations in areas surrounding Japan”; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

### 4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization — the United Nations — to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

#### IV. Future Defense Forces

##### 1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

##### (1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

##### a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

##### b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

##### c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

##### d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

##### e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters



To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have the three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in

tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train, and educate high-quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issues, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

## V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.

- (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.
- (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing lifecycle costs, including purchase price of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resources in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological bases, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.
- (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.

2. The National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade.

However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.



**(Attached Table)**

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel Regular Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)		155,000 148,000 7,000
	Major Units	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armed division Central Readiness Force
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Major Equipment	Tanks Main Artillery	Approx. 600 Approx. 600
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) Destroyer Units (regional district units) Submarine Units Minesweeper Unit Patrol Aircraft Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 16 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units  Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 350 Approx. 260
Major Equipment and Major Units that can be used for Ballistic Missile Defense		Aegis-equipped Destroyers	4
		Air Warning and Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Note: The numbers of units and equipment are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

## Reference 8. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

Stipulations regarding the Mid-Term Defense Program covering the period of FY2005 through FY2009 are presented in the reference in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (authorized by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004).

Accordingly, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–2005) authorized by the Cabinet on December 15, 2000, is discontinued as of the end of FY2004.

(See reference)

### I. Policies for the Program

From FY2005 to FY2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build-up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004; hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that contribute to the world peace and stability, and to contribute to the international

security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multipurpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion.

2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.
3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the United States based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

## **II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF**

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform its five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, converting one Division and two Combined Brigades into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Force that administrates and operates units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of FY2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY2009.
4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of the Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ will also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four, and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.

5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into one composed of two squadrons as well as establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

### **III. Major Plans Related to SDF Capabilities**

#### **1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations**

##### **(1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks**

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the United States, and take necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles. The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

##### **(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units**

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, the GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

##### **(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands**

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment, and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker transport aircraft (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircraft that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircraft, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

##### **(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels**

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH- 60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircraft (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new patrol aircraft that will replace P-3Cs; and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircraft (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

##### **(5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters**

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

#### **2. Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan**

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify the current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a

large scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters, and so on.

### 3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

#### (1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activities

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

#### (2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co-Training/Exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bilateral or multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and joint exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.).

### 4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

#### (1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to creating a new joint staff organization and reorganizing each service Staff Office as mentioned in section II above, the GOJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercises, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

#### (2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence sections such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of the F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircraft.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles of high altitude and endurance.

#### (3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

##### a. Strengthening Command and Control Capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence at the unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

##### b. Promoting Research and Development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial

vehicles, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the meantime, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the United States and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Enhancement of Measures for Personnel, Education and Training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of personnel.

The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increasing young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhancing education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective ways of utilizing retired personnel in society, and take necessary measures.

b. Promotion of Research and Education Regarding Security Issues

The GOJ will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

5. Measures to Support Defense Capability

(1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb the lifecycle cost of equipments including cost of procurement, setting concrete targets. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing an efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis, the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.

(2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Communities

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as the police, fire department, and Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local communities with the Civil Protection Law as its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

#### **IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements**

1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and maintain strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

2. **Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training**  
Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.
3. **Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**  
The GOJ will strengthen Japan–U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the United States in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.
4. **Equipment and Technology Exchanges**  
The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the United States in the area of equipment and technology.
5. **Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective**  
The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the United States regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
6. **Enhancement of Japan–U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security**  
The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the United States and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as the fight against terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

## **V. Size of Procurement**

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

## **VI. Expenses Required**

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yen at the prices of FY2005.
2. In the annual budget formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond to an unforeseeable situation in the future, extra budget, besides the defense-related expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yen on the condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve. The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the “Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability” (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987).
3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in technology such as information and communication technology and Japan’s fiscal condition.

## **VII. Others**

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account the security environment and technological trends at the time.



- The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

**(Attached Table)**

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 aircraft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of Aegis system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	11 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (tonnage)	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 aircraft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 aircraft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 aircraft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	26 aircraft
	Fighters (F-2)	22 aircraft
	New fighters	7 aircraft
	New transport aircraft	8 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 aircraft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 aircraft

## Reference 9. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

- The Government of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (the new NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009), at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
- In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today's security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan's future security and defense.
- The new NDPG spell out both Japan's vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place.

The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea lines of communication.

The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

- In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them

cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces — the ultimate guarantee of its national security — should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. In our judgment, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion, and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress. In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.
6. We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.



If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counterpiracy.

Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan’s vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan’s security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces’ mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately 24,240 billion yen under FY2004 prices.
10. The Government of Japan will report today’s decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

## **Reference 10. About the Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)**

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 20, 2008)

### **Content of the Review**

In order to improve equipment more efficiently while adequately responding to the development, etc., of the technology level of foreign countries, the scale of modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15) and improvement of other equipment/material indicated in the appendix of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) shall be as shown in this appendix.

### **Expense Account**

With the review of the improvement scale of the major equipments and other measures, the limit of the total defense-related cost of the plan shall be about 28,640 billion yen at the prices of FY2004.

### **Other**

In addition to the above, the expense for measures to reduce the local burden concerning the realignment of U.S. Forces during the period of the plan is about 90 billion yen at the prices of FY2004. We shall continue to implement the measures adequately and swiftly in accordance with the “government efforts concerning the realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan, etc.” (Approved by the Cabinet on June 30, 2006)

(Attachment Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	96 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	4 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	9 aircraft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	7 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of Aegis system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	8 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	17 ships (Approx. 57,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 aircraft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	17 aircraft
Air Self-Defense Force	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 aircraft
	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	48 aircraft
	Fighters (F-2)	18 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	3 aircraft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 aircraft

Note: For the modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15), radar components, etc., for 38 fighters shall be (have been) obtained in addition to the improvement described above. How to improve the airframes using these components in concrete terms will be decided in the Mid-Term Defense Program after FY2010.

## Reference 11. FY2010 Defense Capability Arrangements, etc.

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2009)

### Regarding a revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond

#### 1. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004; hereinafter referred to as the "current guidelines") express the guidelines regarding the state of security and defense capability for Japan. They were prepared with the understanding that any necessary changes would be made in five years taking into account the security environment and technological trends at that time. As the revision of the current guidelines is an important issue for national security, and it is necessary, following the historic change in government, for the new government to make adequate deliberations, a conclusion shall be reached during 2010. The revisions will work toward the efficient preparation of effective defense capability while preparing Japan's basic security policy after analyzing and evaluating trends in international affairs, the security environment surrounding Japan, and the current state of Japan's defensive capability and the current conditions of the SDF.

Further, while the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–2009) (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004) stipulates the midterm development plans to achieve the level of defense capability established in the current guidelines and the limit for the total amount for defense related expenditure, the next midterm defense capability development plan will be prepared based on the conclusions of the revision of the current guidelines.

#### 2. The Policy Forming the Basis for Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget

As the conclusions of the revisions, etc., of the current guidelines will take effect from FY2011, the policy forming the basis for the formulation of the FY2010 defense budget will be stipulated in a separate document to

clarify the relationship between the FY2010 defense budget and the current guidelines and policies to develop defense capability appropriately where a midterm defense capability development plan does not exist.

## **(Attachment)**

### **The Policy Forming the Basis for the Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget**

#### **1. Environment Requiring Consideration**

With regard to the security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to consider the new trends which can effect Japan's security such as the worsening of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile problem and the expansion, modernization, and increased activity in military power in surrounding nations, balanced by the advancements in security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and efforts for peace and stability in the international community, as well as deepening security cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Further, with regard to financial conditions, it is important to understand that the Policy Forming the Basis for the Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget (approved by the Cabinet on September 29, 2009) stipulates that "to realize new measures under the Manifest, all budgets must be redesigned and new financial resources generated".

#### **2. Basic Understanding**

In FY2010, defense capability will be developed based on the policies of the current guidelines so that the role of defense capability stipulated in the current guidelines can be carried out effectively.

In that process, and with consideration for the security environment surrounding Japan, the general rule will be the efficient development of defense capability focusing on upgrading aging equipment and equipment that is growing obsolete, placing importance on the following items, while handling immediate pressing issues. Further, regarding the actual number of SDF personnel, optimization will be carried out as much as possible while improving the sufficiency of front line units as well as readiness and strength.

- (1) Securing Deterrence against Various Contingencies as well as Ready and Effective Response Capability

The equipment necessary to handle ballistic missile attacks, special forces attacks, and incidents in island areas, for sustained surveillance operations and intelligence gathering under normal conditions, and to handle large scale or special disasters will be developed, and response capability for these contingencies will be secured.

- (2) Further Stabilization of the Regional Security Environment

Various areas of cooperation such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief and bilateral and multilateral dialogues will be further advanced to make possible the further stability of the security in the Asia-Pacific region.

- (3) Advancement of Efforts toward Improving the Global Security Environment

Participation in various exercises will be promoted and equipment required for use in international peace cooperation activities will be prepared in order to participate actively and with initiative in the various operations carried out through the cooperation of the international community such as the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, antiterrorism and antipiracy, and U.N. peacekeeping operations.

- (4) Efforts toward Optimization and Streamlining

In order to carry out effective and efficient defense capability development under severe economic conditions, the priority of projects will be clarified and efforts will be promoted for the effective and efficient use of human resources and the efficient procurement of equipment, etc.

### 3. Responding to Ballistic Missile Attacks

In FY2010, under the arrangements stipulated in the current guidelines, ballistic missile defense capability will be improved among the ASDF surface-to-air missile air defense units that can be used in ballistic missile defense. Further, the system improvements necessary to maintain existing capabilities will be carried out for air defense units without ballistic missile defense capabilities.

### 4. Points for Consideration

In order to handle new trends in the security environment surrounding Japan, the following items will be given particular consideration.

- (1) The state of Japan's long term defense production and technology foundation will be considered while strengthening effective and efficient cost performance based equipment procurement efforts through the promotion of the use of equipment lifecycle cost management.
- (2) In addition to outsourcing operations that can be outsourced, efforts will be made to secure and train high quality personnel and improve training in order to make use of personnel effectively and efficiently, and personnel rank and age conditions capable of handling more diverse missions against the backdrop of a declining birth rate and rising education level will be considered.
- (3) Unit optimization and streamlining will be considered from the standpoint of aiming for a structure in which the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces can exercise their capabilities effectively and efficiently as part of the whole, with consideration made for deepening relationships with the local populace and society.
- (4) The joint operations structure will be strengthened so that the SDF may carry out its mission effectively with consideration made for operational performance record since the move to a joint operations structure.

### 5. Status of Expenses

The amount of expenditure and future obligation will be kept down as much as possible in consideration of the increasingly difficult economic conditions while maintaining the understanding that defense is one of the most fundamental activities for the nation.

## Reference 12. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

The export of arms needs a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)\* and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

\* Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

### 1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- (1) Communist Bloc countries
- (2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions
- (3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

### 2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

#### (1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

- (i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.
- (ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
- (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."

#### (2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No.197 to No.205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.
- (ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc., for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms." Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No.109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No.197 to No.205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No.1"

## **Reference 13. Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation (Summary)**

This report is written by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era. It proposes that Japan be a nation that contributes to the peace and security of the region and the world, while accomplishing its prime objectives to secure peace, promote prosperity and ensure the safety of Japan. In other words, the report propounds a proactive “Peace-Creating Japan.”

### **CHAPTER ONE: Security Strategies**

#### **Section 1. Objectives**

Japan's security objectives are: to ensure its safety and prosperity; to promote the stability and prosperity of the area surrounding Japan as well as the world; and to maintain a free and open international system. For Japan's safety and prosperity, it requires the maintenance and development of its economic capability, freedom to undertake economic activities, and freedom of movement. The safety of Japan includes that of Japanese nationals who live or stay abroad, ensured through international coordination. As for promoting the stability and prosperity of the area surrounding Japan and the world, maintaining access to markets and safety of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are common interests of both Japan and the world. To maintain a free and open international system, it is necessary for Japan to deepen cooperation with major powers in the interest of maintaining the world order and abiding by international norms. Universal and basic values such as freedom and dignity of the individuals should be upheld.

#### **Section 2. Security Environment Surrounding Japan**

The following trends can be discerned in the current global security environment: 1) economic and social globalization which created transnational security challenges and increased conflicts in the “gray zones” between peace and crisis; 2) the rise of emerging powers such as China, India and Russia and the relative decline in overwhelming superiority of the United States, resulting in a global shift in balance of power and deterioration of international public goods; 3) increasing risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means; and 4) continuing regional conflicts, failed states, international terrorism and international crimes.

In line with these broader trends, important issues for the areas surrounding Japan and Japan itself include challenges such as changing U.S. deterrence, continuing uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula, shifting regional balance of power brought about by the rising China, and continuing instabilities on SLOCs from Middle East and Africa to Japan and in the coastal states.

#### **Section 3. Strategies and Instruments**

Considering the above-mentioned trends and characteristics of Japan's economy and defense posture as well as geographic and historical constraints, Japan's identity, which should be translated into its foreign and security policies, can best be expressed as a “Peace-Creating Japan.” Its basic idea is that the way to achieve Japan's own safety is by contributing to global peace and stability, and by adopting a basic posture of active participation in international peace cooperation, non-traditional security and human security.

A Peace-Creating Japan's security objectives can be attained by its own efforts and by cooperation with its ally as well as multi-layered security cooperation. Its strategies and instruments include: utilizing various diplomatic tools; building defense capability; enhancing interagency cooperation and cooperation between public and private sectors; achieving common strategic objectives with the ally; securing safety of global commons; upholding U.S. extended deterrence; promoting cooperation and engagement with partners and emerging powers,



and promoting cooperation within multilateral security frameworks, among others.

With the role of the military becoming diversified, the “Basic Defense Force” (BDF) concept, which has limited Japan’s defense capabilities only for the purpose of rejection of external invasion, is no longer valid. Based on recognition that defense equipment cooperation or defense assistance could be effective tools for improving the security environment and international relations, defense cooperation and assistance should be carried out on the basis of a new set of principles, superseding the de facto export prohibition policy under the “Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.”

## **CHAPTER TWO: Modality of Defense Capabilities**

### **Section 1. Basic Concepts**

Recent developments in military science and technology and decreased warning time before contingency, among others, have contributed to a change in characteristics of defense capabilities. These developments have increased the importance of “dynamic deterrence” through which a defense force demonstrates high operational performance in normal circumstances by conducting timely and appropriate operations, such as surveillance and preparation against airspace violation, in contrast to the traditional “static deterrence” focused on quantities and size of weapons and troops. It is time for Japan to depart from the BDF concept and to achieve necessary and in-depth reform of its defense posture that can adequately respond to complex contingencies in which various events may break out simultaneously. Although the SDF needs to prepare for various changes in the future and to consider maintaining minimum essential know-how in responding against major armed invasion, the SDF must not use the BDF concept as an excuse for preserving units or weapons of lesser importance in light of future trends in security environment.

Japan should be more attentive to the formation of credible dynamic deterrence, endorsed by response capabilities to various contingencies, while sustaining the target of “multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities” stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines on and after FY2005.

### **Section 2. Response to Various Contingencies**

The SDF will be likely to face various contingencies such as: 1) ballistic and/or cruise missile strikes; 2) attacks by special operations forces, terrorists, or cyber-attacks; 3) operations to maintain security of territorial waters/airspace and remote islands; 4) emergency evacuation operations of Japanese nationals; 5) armed conflicts in areas surrounding Japan; 6) a combination of the above contingencies (contingency complex); and 7) major disasters and pandemics.

### **Section 3. Securing Stability in the Areas Surrounding Japan**

With the premise of close cooperation with the U.S. forces under the Japan–U.S. security arrangements, the MOD/SDF needs the following efforts, among others, for stability of the areas surrounding Japan: 1) enhancing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities; 2) promoting defense cooperation with the ROK and Australia and multilateral cooperation, and fostering defense exchanges and security dialogues with China and Russia; and 3) active engagement to regional security frameworks such as the ARF and ADMM Plus.

### **Section 4. Improving Global Security Environment**

The SDF should display Japan’s presence in the world through international peace cooperation activities. In collaboration with other agencies and organizations in Japan and overseas, the SDF should be involved in activities to improve global security environment such as: 1) assisting failed/fragile states and increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations; 2) countering international crimes including terrorism and piracy; 3) responding to major disasters; 4) dealing with proliferation of WMD/ballistic missiles, especially

enhancing collaboration in PSI arena; and 5) promoting global defense cooperation/exchange. Also, defense assistance funded by Japan should be made available as an option.

## **Section 5. Function and Arrangements of Defense Capabilities**

With the above roles and missions in mind, Japan's building of defense capabilities should specifically aim at obtaining capabilities for: stabilization of regional/global order; effective response to a contingency complex in cooperation with the United States; and seamless reaction to an event that develops from peace time to emergency. To these ends, each of the SDF service branch should work together to enhance capabilities such as ISR capability, responsiveness, mobility, and Japan–U.S. interoperability, sustained by advanced technologies and information. Future building of defense capabilities should not concentrate solely on upgrade of weapons, but aim at an optimum combination of options based on an objective assessment of capabilities the SDF has of its own.

In light of a proper roles and missions sharing within the context of the Japan–U.S. alliance, the SDF should aim to enhance complementary capabilities vis-à-vis those of U.S. forces. It is also important for the SDF to expand the scope of missions that it carries out by its own capacity to include those requested in peacekeeping operations.

To appropriately respond to various and complex contingencies, the SDF needs to strengthen and expand its jointness. Each tri-service needs “selection and concentration,” by enhancing required capabilities such as ISR, while reviewing less urgent weapons or arrangements. The SDF should also reinforce capabilities applicable to international missions such as long-distance mobility, as well as ensuring operational arrangements for unit rotation and logistic support that enable the SDF operations to be sustainable.

## **CHAPTER THREE: Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force**

### **Section 1. Personnel Infrastructure**

The MOD should promptly design a new system that will address the SDF's challenges in personnel infrastructure of the SDF in a time of declining birth rates and long-life expectancy, and start building it. The design should be based on sufficient evaluation through comparisons of multiple options via simulation and other methods, and answer the purpose of securing personnel with needed skills, and providing incentives to SDF personnel. In doing so, special attentions should be paid to such aspects as: rebalancing of rank and age structure; effective outsourcing; and proper recruitment and fully-cared retirement and reemployment of SDF personnel.

### **Section 2. Materiel Infrastructure**

Japan's domestic defense production and technology infrastructure are trapped in a vicious cycle of small-scale procurement, high-cost production, and decreased investment. To remedy this, the Japanese Government, in consultation with the private sectors, should promote selection and concentration in the fields of production and technology that are to be sustained in Japan. Hence, the Japanese Government must present a defense industrial and technology strategy.

At the same time, to save Japanese defense enterprises from being left behind in international technology innovation, the Japanese Government should allow these enterprises to participate in international joint development and/or production projects. With a careful design to contribute to international peace and improvement of Japan's security environment, it should revise current arms export prohibition policy.

For the MOD to acquire and maintain equipment while keeping the costs within a reasonable range, it should carry on its comprehensive reforms of defense acquisition. Especially, at the procurement stage, it should try harder to make long-term contracts that the defense enterprises also deem advantageous.



### **Section 3. Social Infrastructure**

Neither the SDF nor the Japan–U.S. alliance can function effectively without the support of the Japanese public and the understanding and assistance of local residents in areas where defense facilities are situated. The Japanese Government is responsible for providing accurate information and appropriate explanation to the Japanese public. It must also undertake to communicate critical information in a contingency, making much of info-communication technology evolution.

The stationing of the SDF units must be reviewed constantly in consideration of defense requirement. At the same time, the importance of the SDF meeting expectations of local people should not be neglected. Because the existence of defense facilities could affect living conditions of locals, the Japanese Government needs to solicit their understanding and cooperation. Above all, it should pay particular attention to excessive burdens on Okinawa residents, and work on mitigating these burdens while cooperating with the U.S. Government. Both Governments should examine shared use of defense facilities which is tangible as a way of reducing burdens.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: Infrastructure that Bolsters Japan’s Security Strategy**

### **Section 1. Constructing Infrastructure for National Security Planning and Crisis Management at the Cabinet**

Security organs subordinate to the Cabinet have augmented their functions through a series of structural reforms. One of remaining challenges is to conduct a government-wide extensive exercise bearing in mind a national emergency such as an “Armed Attack Situation” so as to verify whether the current security organs are functioning adequately and to make additional preparations. Another is to put into place an effective system that enables them to develop a security strategy.

Intelligence organs of the Cabinet have also made progress. Much needs to be improved, however, in such fields as: all-source analysis that makes full use of information gathered from all government organs; and efforts of rotating intelligence cycle of the cabinet-level more effectively. Other intelligence capabilities that should be strengthened include outer and cyber-space situational awareness and HUMINT (human intelligence), while envisioning a satellite system aiming at security and maritime domain awareness as mid- and long-term targets for improvement. Information security should be further enhanced to protect Japan’s own intelligence and to work with foreign counterparts. It leads to a necessity of legislation of a secret protection law.

Important government policy guidelines such as the “National Defense Program Guidelines” require constant review. Though our council was formed to present a blue-ribbon-panel report to the Government, this format should be abandoned. Instead, we propose, as an option, that the Cabinet Secretariat or other organs establish a permanent council composed of experts from private sectors, who will continuously work on the security and defense policy through discussion. With this proposed change in format, we expect a security strategy will be further defined in a broader sense.

### **Section 2. Constructing Infrastructure for Integrated and Cooperative Relations among Domestic and International Actors**

Inter-agency cooperation among government agencies, central and local government cooperation, and Government and private sector cooperation should be actively promoted to tackle agendas both domestic and international. A new forum for inter-agency cooperation needs to be created for the purpose of reconstructing failed states. In light of the increasing importance of private-sector exchanges in confidence-building, the Government should consider cooperative relations with the private sector in this field. In the field of international peace cooperation activities, the Government should promote civil-military cooperation with the NGOs in concrete terms, thereby promoting peace-building capabilities of Japan as a whole.

Agendas for a better-functioning Japan–U.S. alliance include those which relate to the Japanese Government’s conventional interpretation of the Constitution concerning the exercise of the right of self-defense. The current official interpretation of Japan’s Constitution does not allow Japanese defense forces to defend U.S. vessels against attack or to intercept ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. territory if such attacks were to occur prior to an armed attack situation against Japan. To prevent damage to the Japan–U.S. alliance arising from this situation, the Japanese Government must squarely tackle this issue responsibly. Of crucial importance is the question of the Government’s political will concerning what Japan should do; reviewing the above official interpretation needs to be done with this question of political will foremost in mind.

As international peace cooperation activities are evolving into multi-functional ones, Japan’s system to execute peace cooperation activities, which was formed just after the end of the Cold-War, is now partly outdated. The so-called “Five Principles on Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations” should therefore be revised constructively. Moreover, the SDF as their own mission should be authorized to conduct protection of foreign personnel and logistic support to units from other countries as its own missions since they have nothing to do with use of force which the Constitution prohibits. If necessary, the Government should change its interpretation of the Constitution. In addition, it is of great importance that Japan possesses a permanent law regarding international peace cooperation activities which should serve as a basic law for that area.

### **Section 3. Broadening and Strengthening Intellectual Infrastructure**

While the field of security is widening its scope, scholars will have more opportunities of joining Government’s decision making process related to security issue. At the same time, it is indispensable to improve international security environment with a range of expertise that are exchanged and shared among scholars and NGO activists as well as military and security officials. Japan should actively nurture people who can operate internationally in the field of security. Given the increasing importance of internal and international networks of think-tanks dedicated to security affairs, the modality of Japanese think-tanks and other non-profit organizations should be reconsidered so as to enable them to operate in financially stable conditions.

The Prime Minister must explain the Government’s position and measures on security issues clearly and in a timely manner, even at a time of crisis. Structures that assist the Prime Minister for strategic communication should be reinforced. The outbound communication of the Government including via websites should also be improved. So far, Japanese private sector has exerted stronger communication power. Maintenance and enrichment of the Japanese intellectual infrastructure will be the key to strengthening Japan’s communication power.

## Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY2010

### 1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY2009	Budget for FY2010	Notes
1. Securing Japan's defense and safety through the deterrence of and effective response to contingencies			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Further improvement and strengthening of ballistic missile defense systems</li> <li>• Equipment capable of handling special weapon attacks, large scale and special disasters, and massive outbreaks of communicable diseases</li> <li>• Surveillance and guarding of important defense facilities in the event of attacks by special forces</li> <li>• Research and development of advanced equipment to deal with future threats</li> <li>• Improved fighter aircraft capability to secure air superiority</li> <li>• Strengthening anti-submarine capabilities, etc.</li> </ul>
(1) Responding to ballistic missile launches	111,199	53,813	
(2) Responding to special weapon attacks and large scale or special disasters	85,397	65,755	
(3) Responding to attacks by special forces	95,383	91,244	
(4) Responding to cruise missile attacks	—	8,305	
(5) Securing air superiority	89,182	16,126	
(6) Securing maritime traffic security	213,660	205,697	
2. Further stabilization of the regional environment and order			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving a system to establish an intelligence advantage through intelligence gathering and surveillance operations</li> </ul>
Expanded surveillance operations under normal conditions	20,665	104,225	
3. Improving the global security environment	16,993	10,926	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reform and improvement of equipment related to international operations</li> </ul>
4. Efforts toward space related projects and handling cyber attacks			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotion of the use of space in the defense domain, improvement of C4ISR capabilities, and carrying out research and development for advanced equipment</li> </ul>
(1) The promotion of space related projects	63,281	51,189	
(2) Improved C4ISR capability	3,154	6,979	
(3) The promotion of advanced research and development	—	4,048	
5. Steady improvement of defense force (major equipment, materials, etc.)	684,984	626,083	
6. Efforts for U.S. Forces Realignment (measures for maintaining deterrence, etc.)	23,756	12,824	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Command to Camp Zama, relocation of the ASDF Command to Yokota Air Facility, and other relocations</li> </ul>
7. Promotion of base provision, etc.	435,405	434,621	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expense of measures for adjustment of the surroundings of bases, cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, rent for facilities, compensation cost, etc.</li> </ul>
SACO related expenses	11,384	11,244	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Land return projects, exercise revision projects, noise reduction projects, projects for smooth SACO activities</li> </ul>
Efforts toward U.S. Military restructuring (measures to reduce the local burden, etc.)	96,390	127,218	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transfer of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam, transfer of Futenma Air Station, the relocation of the carrier air wing, realignment grants, etc.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Amounts are contract-based (The same applies hereafter).

2. Excluding initial expenses concerning the manufacture of equipment, materials, etc. (The same applies hereafter)

### 2. Enhancement of Equipment

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2010 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-10 tank	13	12,372		12,372
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	17	2,118		2,118
Type-99 155mm self-propelled howitzer	9	7,882		7,882
Type-87 reconnaissance vehicle	3	784		784
NBC reconnaissance vehicle	3	1,896	0	1,896
Light armored mobile vehicle	119	3,562	5	3,562
Other		8,304	66	8,238
Total		36,918	71	36,847

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2010 Budget	Future Obligation
<b>Guided Missiles</b>				
Equipment and material for improvement of surface-to-air missile (Hawk)	—	2,082		2,082
Surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	8,160	37	8,122
Patriot system upgrade	6 units	61,860	37	61,823
Improving capabilities for surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	7,508	24	7,483
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	1 company	19,475		19,475
Equipment for improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	—	945		945
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	—	569		569
Type-91 man-portable surface-to-air missile (B)	22 sets	995		995
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile	—	2,025		2,025
Type-96 multi-purpose missile	1 set	2,149		2,149
Mid-range multi-purpose missile	13 sets	5,226		5,226
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	39 sets	2,868		2,868
Other		2,325		2,325
<b>Total</b>		<b>116,187</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>116,088</b>
<b>Aircraft</b>				
<b>GSDF</b>				
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	4	7,840		7,840
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	3	9,487	1	9,486
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	1	6,802	0	6,801
New trainer helicopter	1	300		300
Subtotal	9	24,429		24,427
<b>MSDF</b>				
Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1)	1	21,090	4	21,085
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	3	17,911	90	17,821
Primary trainer (T-5)	4	957		957
Helicopter trainer (TH-135)	3	1,733		1,733
Subtotal	11	41,691	95	41,596
<b>ASDF</b>				
Modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15)	(2) (—)	3,625	35	3,590
Improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability	(2) (1)	6,427		6,427
Improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability	(4) (—)	1,310		1,310
Addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2)	(35)	4,668	60	4,608
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	1	4,123	1	4,121
Improvement of early warning aircraft (E-2C)	(1)	809	81	728
Enhancement of the radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	(3)	11,139	557	10,582
Subtotal	1	32,101	734	31,366
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>98,220</b>	<b>830</b>	<b>97,390</b>
<b>Vessels</b>				
Destroyer (DDH)	1	113,855	337	113,518
Submarine (SS)	1	52,842	66	52,776
Replacement of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	(1)	83	25	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>166,780</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>166,352</b>

Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.

2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.

3. The amount for the surface-to-air missile (Patriot), type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile, and type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile is the expense required for procuring training missiles.

4. The Patriot System upgrade refers to activities related to upgrading existing equipment.

5. As the modernizing/upgrading of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability, improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the improvement of early warning aircraft (E-2C), and enhancement of the radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767) are activities related to the improvement of existing aircraft, these are not included in the total number of aircraft.
6. Regarding the numbers for the modernizing/upgrading of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, and the addition of the JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the upper figure represents the number of improved aircraft while the lower number is improved equipment.
7. The replacement of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers is a project involving the upgrading of existing vessels and is thus not included in the total number of vessels.
8. Initial manufacturing costs, etc., for equipment, etc., is not included.

## Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY2010

Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
		FY2009	FY2010
Type-89 rifle	Gun	—	10,012
5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	405	195
12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	123
81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	10	5
120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	4	4
Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	8	9
Type-90 tank	Vehicle	8	—
Type-10 tank	Vehicle	—	13
Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	180	93
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	16	17
Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	1	3
Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	4	2
Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	2	1
Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1
Type-78 snow mobile	Vehicle	12	—
Type-10 snow mobile	Vehicle	—	12
Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	4	—
NBC reconnaissance vehicle	Vehicle	—	3
Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	159	105
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	4
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	1	3
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	4	1
New trainer helicopter	Aircraft	1	1
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	2	1
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	—	—
Type-91 man-portable surface-to-air missile (B)	Set	19	22
Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	1	1
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	43	39
Mid-range multi-purpose missile	Set	10	13

Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
		FY2009	FY2010
5,000-ton destroyer	Vessel	2	—
19,500-ton destroyer	Vessel	—	1
2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	—	1
570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	1	—
Cable repairing/laying ship (ARC)	Vessel	1	—
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	Aircraft	2	3
Rescue amphibian (US-2)	Aircraft	1	—
Helicopter trainer (P-1)	Aircraft	—	1
Primary trainer (T-5)	Aircraft	5	4
Next helicopter trainer (TH-X)	Aircraft	3	3
Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	Vessel	1	1
Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	(22) (60)	(2) (—)
Improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability	Aircraft	—	(2)
Improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability	Aircraft	—	(1) (4)
Addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2)	Aircraft	(—) (12)	(—) (35)
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	Aircraft	—	1
Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)	Aircraft	(1)	(1)
Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	Aircraft	(1)	(3)
Patriot system upgrade		—	(6)
Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot	Group of items	—	—
Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	23	26

Note: Regarding the numbers for modernization of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, and the addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the upper line shows aircraft to be upgraded while the lower line shows equipment with improved capability.

## Reference 16. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Type	Recoilless guns	Mortars	Field artillery	Rocket launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft machine guns	Tanks	Armored vehicles
Approximate number owned	3,100	2,050	620	1,590	110	830	980

Note: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

### Performance Specifications and Data

Type	Item	Artillery	Total Weight (ton)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity/No. of Operators (people)
Tanks	Type-90 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx. 50	70	3
Armed vehicles	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher	Approx. 15	100	10
	Type-89 armored combat vehicle	35-mm machine gun	Approx. 27	70	10
	Type-82 command and communication vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Approx. 14	100	8
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	25-mm machine gun	Approx. 15	100	5
Field artillery	155-mm howitzer FH70	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 9.6	16	9
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 40	49	4
	203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203-mm howitzer	Approx. 28	54	5
Anti-aircraft machine guns	Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35-mm anti-aircraft machine gun	Approx. 38	53	3

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit. The maximum speed indicated above is the maximum speed of the howitzer with the supplementary power unit activated.

## Reference 17. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	4	290	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	6	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	73	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	108	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	30	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H/J	Utility	148	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	55	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	29	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		AH-64D	Combat	9	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	90	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, four-engines
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	60	150	3	15	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	32	140	4	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	9	150	7	22	6	Turboshaft, triple engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Combat	202	2.5 mach	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-4EJ	Combat	70	2.2 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		F-2A/B	Combat	89	2 mach	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, one-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	13	2.2 mach/ 1.8 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		C-1	Transport	26	440	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	16	340	5 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, four-engines
		KC-767	Aerial refueling Transport	4	460	4–8 (200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
		E-2C	Transport	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	16	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2010.  
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.  
3. F-4EJs include 63 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

## Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data

### Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2010)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	52	220
Submarine	16	44
Mine warfare ship	30	27
Patrol combatant craft	7	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	31	127
Total	149	449

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.



## Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry		
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Atago	7,750	30	5-inch gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hyuuga	13,950	30	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set	ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
	Souryu	2,950	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
Minesweeper	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
	Hirashima	570	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1	SSM system × 1 set	
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2	

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.



## Reference 19. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Anti-ballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx. 300	Approx. 5.2	Approx. 26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx. 1,500	Approx. 6.6	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + Image + IR homing
Anti-aircraft	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx. 630	Approx. 4.5	Approx. 34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx. 710	Approx. 4.7	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx. 300	Approx. 3.8	Approx. 25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx. 89	Approx. 2.9	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx. 91	Approx. 3.0	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx. 220	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)		Approx. 95	Approx. 3.1	Approx. 13	IR homing
Anti-ship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx. 520	Approx. 3.9	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)	ASDF	Approx. 510	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)		Approx. 600	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx. 530	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Anti-tank	Type-87 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.1	Approx. 11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx. 11	Approx. 0.9	Approx. 12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx. 18	Approx. 1.2	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Anti-landing craft and anti-tank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 33	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx. 59	Approx. 2.0	Approx. 16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx. 48	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 18	Laser homing

## Reference 20. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal Year	Item	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955		75,590	9,915	- 0.8	8,107	- 2.8	1,349	- 3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965		281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975		1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985		3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	- 0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995		4,928,000	709,871	- 2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
1996		4,960,000	751,049	5.8	431,409	2.4	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45	11.2
1997		5,158,000	773,900	3.0	438,067	1.5	49,414 49,475	1.98 2.1	0.958 0.959	6.39 6.39	11.3 11.3
1998		5,197,000	776,692	0.4	445,362	1.7	49,290 49,397	- 0.3 - 0.2	0.948 0.950	6.35 6.36	11.1 11.1
1999		4,963,000	818,601	5.4	468,878	5.3	49,201 49,322	- 0.2 - 0.2	0.991 0.994	6.01 6.03	10.5 10.5
2000		4,989,000	849,871	3.8	480,914	2.6	49,218 49,358	0.0 0.1	0.987 0.989	5.79 5.81	10.2 10.3
2001		5,186,000	826,524	- 2.7	486,589	1.2	49,388 49,553	0.3 0.4	0.952 0.956	5.98 6.00	10.1 10.2
2002		4,962,000	812,300	- 1.7	475,472	- 2.3	49,395 49,560	0.0 0.0	0.995 0.999	6.08 6.10	10.4 10.4
2003		4,986,000	817,891	0.7	475,922	0.1	49,265 49,530	- 0.3 - 0.1	0.988 0.993	6.02 6.06	10.4 10.4
2004		5,006,000	821,109	0.4	476,320	0.1	48,764 49,030	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.974 0.979	5.94 5.97	10.2 10.3
2005		5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	- 0.7	48,301 48,564	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.944 0.949	5.88 5.91	10.2 10.3
2006		5,139,000	796,860	- 3.0	463,660	- 1.9	47,906 48,139	- 0.8 - 0.9	0.932 0.937	6.01 6.04	10.3 10.4
2007		5,219,000	829,088	4.0	469,784	1.3	47,818 48,016	- 0.2 - 0.3	0.916 0.916	5.77 5.79	10.2 10.2
2008		5,269,000	830,613	0.2	472,845	0.7	47,426 47,796	- 0.8 - 0.5	0.900 0.907	5.71 5.75	10.0 10.1
2009		5,102,000	885,480	6.6	517,310	9.4	47,028 47,741	- 0.8 - 0.1	0.922 0.936	5.31 5.39	9.1 9.2
2010		4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826 47,903	- 0.4 0.3	0.985 1.008	5.07 5.19	8.76 8.96

- Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14.0 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.
3. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

## Reference 21. Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal Year	Item	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
2005		821,829	48,301 48,564	5.9 5.9	203,808	24.8	57,235	7.0	75,310	9.2
2006		796,860	47,906 48,139	6.0 6.0	205,739	25.8	52,671	6.6	72,015	9.0
2007		829,088	47,818 48,016	5.8 5.8	211,409	25.5	52,743	6.4	69,473	8.4
2008		830,613	47,426 47,796	5.7 5.8	217,824	26.2	53,122	6.4	67,352	8.1
2009		885,480	47,028 47,741	5.3 5.4	248,344	28.0	53,104	6.0	70,701	8.0
2010		922,992	46,826 47,903	5.1 5.2	272,686	29.5	55,860	6.1	57,731	6.3

- Notes: 1. Public works expenses for FY1995 and thereafter include the amount of money from revenues other than the sale of relevant stocks for loan financed public construction projects implemented by FY1991 under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital," and also the amount of money to be paid or subsidized by the Government at the time of repayment of loans for public construction projects under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital."
2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.
3. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

## Reference 22. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

Item	Fiscal Year	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		22,269	45.1 44.9	22,273	45.1 44.9	22,188	45.0 44.8	21,654	44.4 44.2	21,562	44.6 44.4
Materials		27,119 27,284	54.9 55.1	27,122 27,287	54.9 55.1	27,077 27,342	55.0 55.2	27,110 27,376	55.6 55.8	26,739 27,002	55.4 55.6
Equipment acquisition		9,178	18.6 18.5	9,206	18.6 18.6	9,028	18.3 18.2	8,806	18.1 18.0	9,000	18.6 18.5
R&D		1,353	2.7 2.7	1,277	2.6 2.6	1,470	3.0 3.0	1,707	3.5 3.5	1,316	2.7 2.7
Facility improvement		1,598	3.2 3.2	1,570	3.2 3.2	1,528	3.1 3.1	1,442	3.0 2.9	1,386	2.9 2.9
Maintenance		8,865	18.0 17.9	9,065	18.4 18.3	9,075	18.4 18.3	9,175	18.8 18.7	9,177	19.0 18.9
Base countermeasures		5,326	10.8 10.7	5,189	10.5 10.5	5,151	10.5 10.4	5,094	10.4 10.4	4,973	10.3 10.2
The cost for SACO-related projects		165	0 0.3	165	0 0.3	265	0 0.5	266	0 0.5	263	0 0.5
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others		798	1.6 1.6	815	1.6 1.6	825	1.7 1.7	885	1.8 1.8	887	1.8 1.8
Total		49,388 49,553	100.0	49,395 49,560	100.0	49,265 49,530	100.0	48,764 49,030	100.0	48,301 48,564	100.0

Item	Fiscal Year	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		21,337	44.6 44.3	21,018	44.0 43.8	20,940	44.2 43.8	20,773	44.2 43.5	20,850	44.5 43.5
Materials		26,570	55.5	26,801	56.0	26,486	55.8	26,255	55.8	25,975	55.5
		26,803	55.7	26,999	56.2	26,856	56.2	26,969	56.5	27,059	56.5
Equipment acquisition		8,594	17.9 17.9	8,663	18.1 18.0	8,125	17.1 17.0	8,252	17.5 17.3	7,738	16.5 16.1
R&D		1,714	3.6 3.6	1,445	3.0 3.0	1,728	3.6 3.6	1,198	2.5 2.5	1,588	3.4 3.3
Facility improvement		1,150	2.4 2.4	1,099	2.3 2.3	933	2.0 2.0	1,325	2.8 2.8	1,343	2.9 2.8
Maintenance		9,405	19.6 19.5	10,222	21.4 21.3	10,382	21.9 21.7	10,336	22.0 21.7	10,181	21.8 21.3
Base countermeasures		4,879	10.2 10.1	4,618	9.7 9.6	4,535	9.6 9.5	4,399	9.4 9.2	4,365	9.3 9.1
The cost for SACO-related projects		233	0 0.5	126	0 0.3	180	0 0.4	112	0 0.2	169	0 0.4
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)		—	—	72	0 0.2	191	0 0.4	602	0 1.3	909	0 1.9
Others		827	1.7 1.7	754	1.6 1.6	783	1.7 1.6	746	1.3 1.3	760	1.6 1.6
Total		47,906 48,139	100.0	47,818 48,016	100.0	47,426 47,796	100.0	47,028 47,741	100.0	46,825 47,903	100.0

- Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.  
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.  
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.  
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.  
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.  
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.  
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.  
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.  
9. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

## Reference 23. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	Fiscal Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Japan (100 million yen)		47,906	47,818	47,426	47,028	46,826
		48,139	48,016	47,796	47,741	47,903
		- 0.8%	- 0.2%	- 0.8%	- 0.8%	- 0.4%
		- 0.9%	- 0.3%	- 0.5%	- 0.1%	0.3%
U.S. (US\$1 million)		499,297	528,548	594,632	636,742	692,032 (estimate)
		5.3%	5.9%	12.5%	7.1%	8.7% (estimate)
U.K. (GBP 1 million)		34,045	37,387	38,579	35,165	36,702
		2.7%	9.8%	3.2%	- 8.8%	4.4%
Germany (€1 million)		27,870	28,783	29,450	31,179	31,111
		15.9%	3.3%	2.3%	5.9%	- 0.2%
France (€1 million)		36,061	36,285	36,780	37,394	39,178
		9.5%	0.6%	1.4%	1.7%	4.8%
Russia (RR 100 million)		6,660.266	8,220.360	9,596.000	12,160.356	12,570.141
		25.4%	23.4%	16.7%	26.7%	3.4%
China (100 million yuan)		2,807	3,472	4,099	4,729	5,191
		14.7%	23.7%	18.1%	15.4%	9.8%

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.

3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY2011. Figures for FY2010 are estimated values.

4. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2009 are based on U.K. Defense Statistics published by Ministry of Defence. The figure for FY2010 and 2009 is the expected amount announced in the budget message.

5. The German defense expenditures rose sharply in FY2006 because the data began to include pension expenditures. The defense expenditures actually decreased by 0.7% in comparison with FY2005 when the pension expenditures are excluded.

6. Data for China is based on the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress.

7. As for Japan, the upper figures exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

## Reference 24. Basic Principles for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

Situations, etc.	Basic Principles
General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ National and local government and specified public institutions must mutually cooperate to take thorough measures, while obtaining cooperation of citizens</li> <li>○ Citizens' freedom and rights guaranteed by the Japan Constitution must be respected, and even if these are restricted, such restrictions are limited to the minimum required to respond to the armed attack situations, and must be expected through fair and proper procedures<sup>1</sup></li> <li>○ Citizens must be informed in a timely and proper manner of the armed attack situations and situation concerning responses.</li> <li>○ While closely cooperating with the United States based on the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, must work to obtain understanding and cooperative action of the United Nations and the international community</li> </ul>
Expected Armed Attack Situations	Must work to avoid occurrence of a military attack
Armed Attack Situations	Prepare for the military attack. If the military attack occurs, must work to bring it to an end while repelling the attack. However, if the military attack occurs, when repelling the attack, military force must be used within limits judged reasonably necessary corresponding to the contingency.

Note 1: In this situation, the Japan Constitution, Articles 14, 18, 19, 21, and other provisions concerning basic human rights must receive the maximum compliance.

## Reference 25. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan

Basic Response Plan		
Armed attack situation	Situation where an armed attack is anticipated	Recognition of armed attack situation or situation where an armed attack is anticipated, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition
		Overall plan for the response to the armed attack situation
		Important items regarding response measures
		Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense call-up order for SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel for defense operations
		Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense operation alert order
		Approval for the Minister of Defense to order defense facility construction
		Approval for the Minister of Defense to order the offer of service as action related measures provided in the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law
		Approval for the Minister of Defense to order detention inspections and cruising as provided in the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law
		Request for Diet approval on issuing a defense operations order
		Ordering defense operations

Note: The matter described to the Basic Response Plan may change according to situations, including armed attacks.

## Reference 26. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

### 1. Basic Concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack situations, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

### 2. Implementation Framework

- a. An intra-ministry coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.
- b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Defense Minister shall instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, a system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others.

In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.).

### 3. Implementation Procedures for Civil Protection Measures

- a. If the Defense Minister is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures.
- b. If the Minister of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes that it is required, the Defense Minister orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures.



#### 4. Contents of Civil Protection Measures Executed by the SDF

##### a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF's posts and bases or on the premises of U.S. military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation.

##### b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of relief.

##### c. Responses to armed attack situations

The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and firefighting), and removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch).

#### 5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content.

#### Reference 27. Participation in Civil Protection-Related Joint Exercises by the National Government and the Local Public Entity (FY2009)

Types of Exercise	Date	Location
Field exercise	November 8, 2009	Ishikawa prefecture
	November 30, 2009	Hyogo prefecture
	December 22, 2009	Fukushima prefecture
	February 6, 2010	Tokushima prefecture
Simulation exercise	October 26, 2009	Tochigi prefecture
	November 5, 2009	Iwate prefecture
	November 10, 2009	Tokyo
	November 17, 2009	Yamanashi prefecture
	November 26, 2009	Akita prefecture
	November 27, 2009	Gunma prefecture
	January 20, 2010	Okinawa prefecture
	January 22, 2010	Fukui prefecture
	February 10, 2010	Kagawa prefecture
	February 16, 2010	Kochi prefecture

Note: Implemented in 5 prefectures in FY2005.  
Implemented in 10 prefectures in FY2006.  
Implemented in 15 prefectures in FY2007.  
Implemented in 18 prefectures in FY2008.

## Prefectures where Exercises were Implemented Multiple Times

Number of Times	Location
Twice	Ibaraki prefecture (2006, 2007) Saitama prefecture (2005, 2006) Nagano prefecture (2007, 2008) Yamaguchi prefecture (2007, 2008) Saga prefecture (2005, 2006)
Three times	Fukui prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008) Tottori prefecture (2005, 2006, 2007) Ehime prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008)
Four times	Fukui prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009)

## Reference 28. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.

(Adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

### (Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)

- On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001 to FY2005) (hereinafter “MTDP”), which was adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that “necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility.” As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and joint operation of the existing Aegis system equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air Patriot guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with Japan’s exclusively defense oriented policy. Consequently, the Government of Japan is determined to equip the nation with the same system.

### (Review of Japan’s Defense Capabilities)

- Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter “the new threats, etc.”) has been urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc., through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to the conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

To this end, we will take effective measures against the new threats that, according to the specific specifics of each of them, while maintaining close cooperation with the United States and local cities, further strengthen the cooperative relationship with the United States and the United States Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. And, promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and international organizations and organizations concerned, the Government of Japan will review Japan’s whole defense capabilities, defense capacities of Japan for proactive and affirmative actions and affirmative actions to be taken to protect

the peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belongs. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self-Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multipurpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical and intelligence capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipment and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

- (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Defense Minister, necessary for the operation of the Self-Defense Forces that centers on joint operation, will be formed.
- (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may be taken in the event of new threats, etc.
- (3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take actions that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.
- (4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.
  - a. Regarding the Ground Self-Defense Force, a defense build-up concept focused on anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can promptly respond to the new threats, etc., will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.
  - b. Regarding the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc., will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.
  - c. Regarding the Air Self-Defense Force, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

### **(Defense-related Expenditures)**

3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures taking into consideration the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new Mid-Term Defense Program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

**(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)**

4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, the Government of Japan will formulate new National Defense Program Guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new Guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for Japan's defense forces, including the position of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in activities to maintain the peace and stability of the international community.

**Reference 29. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures"**

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" at the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of a BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan's defense force review taking into account the introduction of a BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of a BMD system is high, and noting that a BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defense-oriented policy, decided to introduce the multi-tier defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has been confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the United States as well as with the Japan's original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of such systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the United States on the primary deployment.
4. A BMD system is the only purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of our exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at the defense of Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted as a defense operation that is undertaken in situations regarded as an armed attack against Japan. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missiles and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.

7. The joint Japan–U.S. technical research currently underway is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptors. It remains important to carry on the research in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

### **Reference 30. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law**

(Cabinet Decision on July 14, 2009)

In line with Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (No. 165 of 1954 law and hereinafter called the Law) and Article 104-2 of the Ordinance to Execute the SDF Law (No. 179 of 1954 ordinance and hereinafter called the Ordinance), emergency-response procedures concerning measures to destroy ballistic missiles and others (as stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-3 of the Law) are stipulated as follows.

These procedures are stipulated based on the current defense capability Japan has against ballistic missiles, arising from the deployment of a PAC-3 Patriot missile at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group of the Central Air Defense Force of the Air Defense Command of the ASDF (hereinafter called the 1st Air Defense Missile Group).

The procedures will be revised in the future if a revision is deemed necessary due to reasons including the enhancement of Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability.

#### **1. Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency” as stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-1 of the Ordinance)**

##### **(1) Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2**

If either of the conditions shown below is met, the Defense Minister will issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2.

- a. When a ballistic missile is suspected of having been launched in a foreign country or there is a possibility that one will be launched in a foreign country, but it cannot be recognized at that time that the missile is expected to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the purpose of a possible launch of the missile, its capability, and other factors
- b. When there is a possibility that a satellite launch rocket or other objects besides aircraft launched in a foreign country, whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property, may fall due to an accident and other reasons, but it cannot be recognized at that time that the rocket or other objects may fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the location of the accident, the situation of the accident, and other factors

##### **(2) Conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency”**

It can be certified that the situation is a state of “emergency” if Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system recognizes that a ballistic missile or other objects are flying toward Japan.

## **2. Scope of Ballistic Missiles and Other Objects Which Become Subject to Measures Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and Means to Destroy the Missiles or Others (Related to Article 104-2-2 of the Ordinance)**

### **(1) Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects**

Any of the objects listed below that is recognized to be flying toward Japan, using its BMD system

- a. Ballistic missile
- b. Satellite launch rocket
- c. Artificial satellite
- d. Other objects besides aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property

### **(2) Means to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects**

Based on provisions stipulated under Article 93-3 of the Law, a PAC-3 Patriot missile deployed at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group will be launched with the aim of destroying an incoming ballistic missile or other objects over Japanese territory or over international waters in the vicinity of Japan (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea).

## **3. Areas Where SDF Units Undertake Activities to Implement Measures Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (Related to Article 104-2-3 of the Ordinance)**

Areas where SDF units undertake activities following the issuance of an order by the Defense Ministry to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law are in Japanese territory, international waters in the vicinity of Japan and over such waters.

Areas where SDF personnel belonging to the 1st Air Defense Missile Group undertake activities are limited to places where their activities are deemed necessary to prevent a possible fall of a ballistic missile or other objects from causing damage in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Such areas will be designated under an order to be issued by the Defense Minister based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

## **4. Matters Concerning Command of SDF Units Which Implement Measures Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (Related to Article 104-2-4 of the Ordinance)**

SDF units which implement these measures are the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and other units whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations. SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be placed under the Commander of the Air Defense Command.

The command of the Defense Minister with regard to operations of SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be conducted via the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. A Defense Minister's order regarding this matter will be executed by the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office.

## **5. Matters Concerning Cooperation with Relevant Government Organizations (Related to Article 104-2-5 of the Ordinance)**

When the Defense Ministry recognizes the flight of a ballistic missile or other objects toward Japan using its BMD system, it will immediately inform relevant government organizations (the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fisheries Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and other administrative organizations whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under



certain situations) of the detection of the missile or objects, areas where they are forecast to fall and an estimated arrival time.

When SDF units in charge of implementing measures to destroy the missile or other objects have taken such measures, the Defense Ministry will immediately inform the relevant government organizations of the situation regarding its destruction.

In addition, the Defense Ministry will conduct necessary cooperation with the relevant government organizations in response to their requests.

**6. Matters Concerning Measures to be Taken When It is Recognized that a Ballistic Missile or Other Objects Stipulated Under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are Possibly Flying Toward Japan While an Order Issued Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in Place (Related to Article 104-2-6)**

When it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are possibly flying toward Japan while an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place, the Defense Minister, based on Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law, will order SDF units to take the measures to destroy the missile or objects after receiving approval from the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister will then withdraw the order which has been in place based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

### **Reference 31. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary “Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense”**

(December 24, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today’s meetings of the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet, decided to initiate Japan–U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and promoted Japan–U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system since 1999 with the understanding that a BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research is not for the BMD system which Japan started to introduce in FY2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan’s national defense.
3. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–2009)” states “the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.” Based on the results of Japan–U.S. joint technical research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal constraint, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan–U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missiles efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to the deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the joint development.
4. Regarding the relation with the Three Principles on Arms Export, “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary” for National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states “if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles on Arms Exports will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.” We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the United States for the Japan–U.S. joint development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting cooperation in the areas of policy, operation, and equipment/technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

## Reference 32. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense)</li> <li>○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)</li> <li>○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)</li> </ul>
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup> (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies —Minister of Defense or person— delegated authority by the Minister; services— Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies —not required; services— required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law</li> <li>○ Provision of services as an action measure</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents provided for in the Civil Protection Law, emergent measures, traffic control, etc.</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons)<sup>2</sup></li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> <li>○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard</li> </ul>
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ○ Use of weapons
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counter-piracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters <sup>3</sup>	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Same as in disaster dispatch
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	○ The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspections Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (in accordance with the implementation guidelines formulated based on the Basic Plan)	○ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	○ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement so-called core operations of the peacekeeping force (prior consent required in principle) (3) Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the above table is prescribed by applicable law)

- Notes: 1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.
3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.
4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."



### Reference 33. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.
		If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan. <sup>1</sup>

Note: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions”



Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese and foreign nationals to be evacuated. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Panel Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

## Reference 34. Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)

FY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Number of Dispatches	892	812	679	606	559
Personnel	34,026	24,275	105,380	41,191	33,700
Vehicles	5,660	4,130	36,980	9,585	3,909
Aircraft	1,271	1,009	1,972	1,410	885
Vessels	5	86	117	26	126

# Reference 35. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of June 2008)

(As of April 30, 2010)

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government	Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	Obihiro City Government	Kanto	Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government	Ushiku City Government
			Chitose City Government (two persons)		Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government (two persons)	Utsunomiya City Government
			Bibai City Government				Ohtawara City Government
			Sapporo City Government (two persons)		Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government	Maebashi City Government
			Hakodate City Government		Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government	Soka City Government (two persons)
			Shikabe Town Government				Saitama City Government
			Bihoro Town Government		Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government	Urayasu City Government
			Tomakomai City Government		Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons)	Shinagawa Ward Office
			Hokuto City Government				Itabashi Ward Office (two persons)
			Iwamizawa City Government (two persons)				Arakawa Ward Office (two persons)
			Asahikawa City Government				Adachi Ward Office
			Eniwa City Government (two persons)	Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government	Yokohama City Government (five persons) Kawasaki City Government Fujisawa City Government	
			Kushiro City Government				
			Kushiro Town Government				
			Nayori City Government	Chubu	Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government	Joetsu City Government
			Kitami City Government		Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government	Toyama City Government
			Rumoi City Government		Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government	Wajima City Government
			Nanae Town Government				Komatsu City Government
							Kanazawa City Government
Tohoku	Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government	Hachinohe City Government		Fukui		Fukui City Government
			Aomori City Government		Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government	
			Hirosaki City Government		Nagano		Ina City Government
	Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government	Shiwa Town Government		Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government	
			Takizawa Village Office		Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government	Ito City Government
	Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government	Sendai City Government (three persons)				Gotenba City Government
			Ishinomaki City Government				Hamamatsu City Government
	Akita	Akita Prefectural Government	Daisen City Government		Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government	Oyama Town Government
							Seto Town Government
	Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government	Higashine City Government				Kitanagoya City Government
	Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government	Tsuruoka City Government				Miyoshi City Government

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Kinki	Mie	Mie Prefectural Government	Ise City Government
			Kameyama City Government
			Nabari City Government
			Owase City Government
	Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government	Kusatsu City Government
			Takashima City Government
	Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government	
	Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government	Sakai City Government
			Ikeda City Government
			Osaka City Government
			Kawachinagano City Government
			Izumi City Government
			Shijonawate City Government
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government	Minoh City Government	
		Akashi City Government	
		Toyooka City Government	
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government	Miki City Government	
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government	Wakayama City Government	
Chugoku	Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government	Tottori City Government
	Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government	Matsue City Government
	Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government	Kurashiki City Government
	Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (five persons)	
	Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government	Yamaguchi City Government
			Iwakuni City Government
Shimonoseki City Government			
		Shunan City Government	
		Hohu City Government	

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Shikoku	Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Komatsushima City Government (two persons)
			Anan City Government
			Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons)
	Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government	Marugame City Government
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons)	Matsuyama City Government	
		Saijyo City Government	
		Imabari City Government	
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government		
Kyushu	Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government	Iizuka City Government
			Tagawa City Government
			Nogata City Government
			Kasuga City Government
			Dazaifu City Government
	Nakagawa	Nakagawa Town Government	
	Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons)	Karatsu City Government
	Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons)	Sasebo City Government (two persons)
			Omura City Government
	Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government	Kumamoto City Government
			Uki City Government
	Oita	Oita Prefectural Government	
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons)	Miyazaki City Government	
		Miyakonojo City Government	
		Nobeoka City Government	
Saito	Saito City Government		
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (three persons)	Satsuma-Sendai City Government	
		Kirishima City Government	
Tarumizu	Tarumizu City Government		
Okinawa			

\* Part-time personnel included

\* Part-time personnel included

## Reference 36. Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy

### 1. Purpose of the Legislation

To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people's lives.

### 2. Definition of Acts of Piracy

Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan's territorial waters, etc:

(1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons

### 3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy

A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:

- (1) 2 (1)–(4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.
- (2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years
- (3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years

### 4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy

- (1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy.
- (2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

### 5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy

- (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).
- (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.
- (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded.
- (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.

## **Reference 37. Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century**

(Tokyo, April 17, 1996)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the United States helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the United States are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.

2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan–U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

### **The Regional Outlook**

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.

### **The Japan–U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security**

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan–U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

- (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination

of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan’s security.

- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan–U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the United States.

The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan’s contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

### **Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan–U.S. Security Relationship**

5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

- (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.
- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.
- (d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter support (F-2).
- (e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means



of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

### **Regional Cooperation**

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the Japan–U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the United States and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

### **Global Cooperation**

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the United Nations and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the United Nations and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear

problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

## Conclusion

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three pillars of the Japan–U.S. relationship —security, political, and economic— are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

## Reference 38. Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

(New York, September 23, 1997)

### I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

### II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan–U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the United States will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

### III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline.” In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

#### **IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan**

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

# 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

# 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

## (1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

- (a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.
- (b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.
- (c) The United States will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

## (2) Concept of Operations

### (a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

### (b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations. U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

### (c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

- (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.
- (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command and control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan. The United States

will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required.

Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

## **V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)**

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

### **1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated**

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

### **2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan**

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

#### **(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government**

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

##### **(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees**

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.



The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a low of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the low; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the

peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

## **VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines**

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the United States to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

### **1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures**

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

#### **(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning**

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

#### **(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations**

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative

measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved.

They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

## **VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines**

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan–U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The schedule omitted: See Reference 47)

## **Reference 39. Joint Statement U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee**

(Washington, DC February 19, 2005)

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

## **Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today**

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.
3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East — efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries

in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.

4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.
5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.–Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

### **Common Strategic Objectives**

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.
7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.
8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.
9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.–Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
  - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
  - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
  - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
  - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
  - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
  - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
  - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
  - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
  - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.

- Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
  - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
  - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.
11. Global common strategic objectives include
- Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
  - Further consolidate U.S.–Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
  - Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
  - Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
  - Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan’s aspiration to become a permanent member.
  - Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

### **Strengthening of U.S.–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation**

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other’s efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan’s capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan’s active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan’s NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan’s security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

## **Reference 40. U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future**

(Washington, DC, October 29, 2005)

### **I. Overview**

The U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.–Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance’s capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

### **II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities**

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan’s December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan’s legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF’s planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

#### **1. Primary Areas**

In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:



- Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;
  - Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.
2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities
- Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:
- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
  - Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
  - The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
  - U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
  - Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.
  - U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.
  - Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:
  - Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
  - Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.–Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
  - The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.
  - In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.
3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved
- Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through

their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

#### 4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

- Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

- Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for

such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- **Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.**

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

- **Improving Interoperability.**

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S. forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

- **Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.**

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.

- In particular, the U.S. plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.

- Additionally, both sides recognized that U.S. forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.

- **Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.**

Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations (see section below).

- **Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).**

Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defense operations.

Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

### III. Force Posture Realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

#### 1. Guiding Precepts

In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

- The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
- Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.
- Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
- Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
- Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
- Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
- Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

#### 2. Recommendations for Realignment

Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

- Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination

Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this center will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF.

- Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

The capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defense of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to U.S. facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored.

- Collocation of Air Command and Control

Japan's Air Defense Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defense command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and joint operations coordination center described above.

- Yokota Air Base and Air Space

Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota air space will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the air space under U.S. control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.

- Missile Defense

The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.

- Regional Realignment of U.S. Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response

As part of its global posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

- Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options



to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

- Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:
  - Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel.
  - Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.
  - Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.
  - Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.
  - Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents.
- Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an “L”-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.)
- Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments:
  - With regards to the KC-130's, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.
  - Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for U.S. forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.
  - Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for U.S. forces.



- Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.
- Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Division.
- The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the U.S. Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.
- Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The U.S. stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete program for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.
- Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the U.S. also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.
- Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.
- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station  
 To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier and its airwing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.
  - Relocation of Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.
  - Adjustment of training airspace for all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.
  - Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for U.S. naval aviation forces.

- Development of necessary facilities at the Maritime SDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft. These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or U.S. C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase alliance capabilities and flexibility.
- Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.
- Training Relocation
 

Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from U.S. air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.
- Efficient Use of Capacity at U.S. Facilities in Japan
 

Opportunities to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at U.S. facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

## Reference 41. United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

### Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

### Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

### Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa
  - (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
  - In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
  - Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
  - Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
  - Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
  - Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
  - In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
  - The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.
- (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam
- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
  - The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
  - The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
  - Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.
- (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities
- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
  - Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
    - Camp Kuwae: Total return.

- Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
  - All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
  - While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
  - Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
  - ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.
- (d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
  - Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
  - The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
  - Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
  - In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
    - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
    - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
    - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.

- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems.
  - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
    - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
    - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
    - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
    - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
  - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
    - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
    - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
  - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
  - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
  - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
  - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
  - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.

- Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
  - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
  - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
  - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
  - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities —Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni— will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
  - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
  - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
  - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
  - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
  - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.



## Reference 42. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others

(May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision)

1. The Governments of Japan and the United States had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues (hereinafter "realignment related measures") was approved.
2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured.

Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on the living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

3. The final report includes the following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makimino Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for BMD at ASDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings.

These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on the timeframe for implementation presented in the final report.

4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government; therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan.

In addition, the Government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas.

5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.
6. Based on such recognition, the Government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance,

the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY2005 to FY2009)” (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others.

7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner.

The government shall establish a consultative body together with the Government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measures and regional development.

In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished.

However, in FY2006, the projects based on the “II Regional Development” stipulated in the above-mentioned government policy shall be implemented.

## **Reference 43. Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State**

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2007)

### **Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation**

#### **I. Overview**

The U.S.–Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan’s defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) welcomed recent advances in bilateral security and defense cooperation, consistent with the vision laid out in SCC meetings and statements over the past two years. The North Korean provocations, including missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming the U.S.–Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness in an ever-changing security environment.

The SCC members recognized that, just as today’s expanding U.S.–Japan cooperation was enabled by previous efforts to update and consolidate the alliance that began years ago, so too will investments that the two countries make in the alliance today enable and ensure effective alliance responses to future challenges to peace and security.

Additionally, the SCC members stressed the importance of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has enabled a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan while providing U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities — both nuclear

and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities — form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.

In this context, the SCC members emphasized the need to expand and deepen bilateral intelligence cooperation and information sharing in order to respond more effectively to emerging security challenges. They also decided to strengthen mechanisms to protect classified materials.

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met on November 18, 2006 and called for a review of U.S.–Japan bilateral security cooperation, especially in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD), reiterating its importance during their April 27, 2007 summit meeting. The SCC members focused on this agenda today in the context of common strategic objectives and alliance transformation.

The SCC members also welcomed the elevation of Japan’s defense organization from agency to ministry status and the redefinition of the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) international peace cooperation activities as part of their primary missions.

## **II. Common Strategic Objectives**

The U.S. and Japan are committed to promoting fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community. On February 19, 2005, the SCC members identified common strategic objectives that provide a broad basis for advancing bilateral cooperation.

At today’s meeting, the SCC members reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives, taking the current international security environment into account. In this context, they welcomed the “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” adopted at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, and urged North Korea to expeditiously meet its commitments described in the statement.

During their discussions, the SCC members highlighted the following strategic objectives that advance the interests of both countries:

- Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, which envisions progress in other areas, including: the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, respectively; resolution of humanitarian issues, such as the matter of abductions; and commitment by all Six Parties to join efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
- Achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, noting that all United Nations Member States remain obligated to comply with the provisions of that Chapter VII resolution.
- Recognizing the importance of China’s contributions to regional and global security, further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions.
- Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region.
- Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia, and building regional capacity and cooperation on critical non-traditional and transnational security issues bilaterally and through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
- Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense, based on shared democratic values and interests.
- Continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation,

recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region.

- Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization, which is essential to securing broader regional security and to defeating terrorism. To that end, the United States and Japan are both committed to supporting Afghanistan's transition, which requires reconstruction, development, and security.
- Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, while remaining an ally in the War on Terror.
- Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. Noting the international community's continuing concerns regarding Iran's activities in the Middle East, both countries share the view that Iran must play a more positive role in the international community by demonstrating responsible behavior on the issue of terrorism.
- Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation, recognizing that NATO's global contributions to peace and security and the common strategic objectives of the U.S.–Japan Alliance are consistent and complementary.

### **III. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities**

On October 29, 2005, the SCC approved the document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” which outlined initiatives on roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces. Following through on the security agenda laid out in that SCC document is imperative to the alliance's ability to respond to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment.

The SCC members reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with this alliance transformation vision and highlighted:

- The redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, which reflects growing attention to the importance of Japan's contributions to improving the international security environment. In this context, the SCC members discussed the SDF's assistance for Iraq's reconstruction efforts as well as its support to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.
- Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture our two forces to operate together in a regional crisis. Because such planning requires further coordination in a wide range of functions and fields, active participation of relevant ministries and agencies in the bilateral planning process will remain vital.
- Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The GSOMIA will facilitate information exchange and establish a common basis of information security contributing to sharing of intelligence and defense program and operational information.
- Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group to make steady progress in improving readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces against CBRN weapons, ensuring sustained operational capability in the event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction.
- Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations.
- Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

The SCC members, recognizing the growing importance of the U.S. force presence to Japanese and regional security, stressed the requirement for appropriate resources to ensure the success of the alliance transformation

agenda. Both allies will also make best efforts to secure resources to improve alliance capabilities and to sustain the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

#### **IV. Implementation of the Realignment Roadmap**

The SCC members reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement the realignment initiatives described in the May 2006 SCC document, “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” These initiatives, when implemented, will enhance U.S. and Japanese public support for the security alliance.

The SCC members reviewed and appreciated the progress made thus far with the initiatives described in the “Roadmap” including:

- The creation of a bilateral coordination mechanism in June 2006 providing implementation oversight for the realignment initiatives;
- Japanese Diet action on legislation and funding required to facilitate early implementation of realignment initiatives;
- Elaboration of the engineering and technical design for the Futenma Replacement Facility and the initiation of surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab;
- Significant cooperation toward relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including: The U.S. creation and funding of a Joint Guam Program Office to oversee planning and development of the facilities in Guam; The launch of the U.S. environmental impact assessment process, including Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam; and Submission of the above-mentioned legislation to the Japanese Diet authorizing the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to take appropriate measures under the direction of the Japanese government to fulfill a portion of Japan’s financial commitments related to the relocation of III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- Commencement of the aircraft training relocation program in March 2007;
- Implementation of flexible-use of Yokota airspace measures in September 2006, and agreement in October 2006 for return of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008, and for collocation of SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (RAPCON). These measures will help facilitate the movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements; and
- October 2006 launching of the Study Group on the specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, as specified in the “Roadmap.”

The SCC members reaffirmed that completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, in accordance with the “Roadmap” by the target date of 2014, is the key to successful and timely implementation of the overall realignment plan for Okinawa, including the III MEF relocation to Guam and subsequent consolidation of remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa. The SCC members acknowledged the significant progress on a detailed consolidation plan and directed their staffs to continue close consultations toward its completion.

The SCC members also appreciated continued progress in implementation of commitments under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, including return of the Senaha Communications Facility in September 2006, and the Sobe Communications Facility and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in December 2006, totaling more than 300 hectares/750 acres.

#### **V. Strengthening BMD and Operational Cooperation**

Alliance BMD capabilities, which contribute to the alliance’s overall deterrence posture, are strengthened to the extent that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together effectively. The SCC members confirmed that, as both countries develop and deploy capabilities, every effort must be made to ensure tactical, operational,



and strategic coordination. In that light, the United States and Japan will take appropriate measures, in close coordination, in response to ballistic missile threats against alliance interests.

In this context, the SCC members highlighted the following areas of operational cooperation:

- To strengthen operational cooperation, bilateral planning efforts must take into account missile defense capabilities, today and in the foreseeable future. To that end, the two sides' forces will clarify concepts, roles, and missions for each side in the conduct of missile defense and related operations in response to ballistic missile threats. At the same time, a policy-level forum will ensure that policy guidance for BMD operations is unambiguous and current.
- On October 29, 2005, the SCC directed the creation of a bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC). During the North Korean missile provocations of June–July 2006, the United States and Japan exchanged information in a timely manner, including through an interim coordination facility at Yokota Air Base with SDF liaisons. The success of this facility in ensuring that both sides had a common awareness of the evolving situation validated the importance of continuous enhancement of bilateral policy/operational coordination including through establishment of the BJOCC at Yokota Air Base.
- Recognizing the importance of improving the situational awareness of U.S. forces and the SDF, the two sides are committed to the routine sharing of BMD and related operational information directly with each other on a real-time, continuous basis. The two sides will also develop a bilateral common operational picture (COP).
- The two sides will establish a comprehensive information-sharing roadmap to identify broader operational information and data to be shared in support of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

## VI. Enhancing BMD System Capabilities

The SCC members noted with satisfaction that past alliance decisions about missile defense, coupled with recent accelerated cooperation, have strengthened BMD capabilities in the region.

They highlighted key advances, including:

- The operational deployment of a U.S. X-Band radar system to ASDF Shariki Base, Japan, with associated U.S. delivery of radar data to Japanese forces.
- The operational deployment of a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Kadena Air Base, Japan.
- The recent and continuing addition of Standard Missile (SM-3) defense capabilities to the forward-deployed naval forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
- Japan's decision to accelerate modification of its Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities. Japan will complete modification of DDG Kongo by the end of 2007, and will expedite modification of DDGs Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima.
- Japan's decision to expedite the deployment of PAC-3, which resulted in deployment of the first PAC-3 fire unit in March 2007 and its goal to deploy 16 PAC-3 capable fire units by early 2010.
- Priority focus on U.S.–Japan cooperative development of the next generation SM-3 interceptor. The basic agreement on a framework for technology transfer reached by the two sides will facilitate progress on this project as well as in future U.S.–Japan technology cooperation projects.

The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance transformation agenda for security and defense cooperation will contribute to regional and global peace and security.



**Reference 44. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam**

(Signed on February 17, 2009)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan–United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives.

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance.

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena.

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self-Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam.

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar (\$10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars (\$6,090,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly.

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam—estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars (\$3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars (\$1,000,000,000) for a road.

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to Paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.
2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”).

#### Article 2

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of this Agreement.

#### Article 3

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

#### Article 4

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

#### Article 5

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

#### Article 6

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in Paragraph 1.(a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

#### Article 7

1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.  
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United

States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.

2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars).
3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 3.(b) of this Article.  
(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 4.(b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.  
(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

#### Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

#### Article 9

1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in Paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
2. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

#### Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

## Article 11

This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

**Reference 45. Statement by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America**

(January 19, 2010)

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America was signed in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 1960 by delegates of Japan and the United States. Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of that day.

The U.S.–Japan security arrangements have greatly contributed to not only to the security of Japan but also the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the U.S.–Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic development in that environment since the end of the last World War to this day.

Over the last half-century, the global security environment has changed dramatically, as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the September 11th attacks. Nonetheless, the security environment surrounding Japan remains difficult, as can be seen by the nuclear and missile testing by North Korea. Under such circumstances, for Japan, which has declared not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to become a military power, the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces based on the U.S.–Japan security arrangements, together with Japan’s Self Defense Forces, serves, and will continue to serve, an essential role in the foreseeable future to maintain Japan’s peace and security.

The U.S.–Japan security arrangements continue to be indispensable not only for the defense of Japan alone, but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Under a security environment in which there still exist uncertainty and unpredictability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Treaty will continue to function as a public good by creating a strong sense of security to the countries in the region.

Based on the aforementioned recognition, in this memorable year commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the revision of the Treaty, we intend to work jointly with the US Government to further deepen the U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the twenty-first century. I would like to present the people of Japan with the results of this work before the end of this year.

#### **Reference 46. Statement by the President on the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security**

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan was signed here in Washington fifty years ago today. On that day, President Dwight Eisenhower pledged to establish an indestructible partnership based on equality and mutual understanding. The enduring partnership between the United States of America and Japan has helped bring unprecedented prosperity and peace in freedom to our nations. Our alliance has secured extraordinary benefits for the entire Asia Pacific region and made possible the unparalleled progress of the past five decades.

Today, we commemorate the first half-century of this important alliance, which was founded on our shared values and our common interest in peace and security, and reflects the abiding ties between our citizens and institutions. America's commitment to Japan's security is unshakable, and our cooperation to meet common challenges is a critical part of our engagement with the world. And just as we honor the countless Americans and Japanese who have built the ties that bind our nations, we also look to the future with a determination to build upon the foundation of their progress.

As we celebrate the anniversary of the treaty, we pay tribute to its role in supporting regional security and prosperity, and strengthening our two democracies. Let us now undertake to renew our alliance for the 21st century and enhance the bonds of friendship and common purpose that unite our nations.

#### **Reference 47. Joint Statement of The U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security**

(January 19, 2010)

On this the Fiftieth Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the Members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) affirm that the U.S.–Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights, rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century and the Ministers are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The U.S.–Japan security arrangements underpin cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues as well as foster prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers are committed to building on these arrangements and expanding into new areas of cooperation.

In the last half century, the global security environment has changed dramatically as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the rise of transnational threats. Unpredictability and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region continue, with new threats emerging in the international community as a whole, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery systems. Given such a security environment, the U.S.–Japan security arrangements will continue to play an essential role in maintaining both the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers place particular importance on sustaining the high degree of public support for the Alliance. They endorse ongoing efforts to maintain our deterrent capabilities in a changing strategic landscape, including appropriate stationing of U.S. forces, while reducing the impact of bases on local communities, including Okinawa, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

The Alliance provides a context of peace and stability for East Asia that has enabled all nations of the region to develop and prosper. The Alliance will remain alert, flexible and responsive in the face of the full range of emerging twenty-first century threats and persistent regional and global challenges. The most important common strategic objectives within the region are to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain peace and stability in the region. The United States and Japan will continue to strengthen their ability to respond to contingencies that could threaten those objectives. The United States and Japan are working closely together and cooperating with their partners through various international fora including the Six-Party Talks to deal with the threat from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as well as to address humanitarian issues. The Ministers stress that the United States and Japan will work to advance cooperative relations with China, welcoming it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena. The United States and Japan also will enhance regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. The United States and Japan will work together to respond to natural disasters and to provide humanitarian relief in the region and beyond. The United States and Japan will continue to deepen their cooperation, including that between U.S. forces and Japan's Self Defense Forces, in wide-ranging areas of common interest in the changing security environment.

Recognizing the significance of the Alliance in the global context, the Ministers reaffirm their commitment to closely cooperate in responding to global threats. The United States and Japan will strengthen their efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, while maintaining necessary deterrence. The United States and Japan are committed to cooperating closely to combat global terrorism. The United States and Japan's ongoing efforts and cooperation in combating piracy are vital for the continued maintenance of freedom of navigation and safety of mariners.

As the Treaty marks its Fiftieth Anniversary, the Ministers commit themselves to further building an unshakeable U.S.–Japan Alliance to adapt to the evolving environment of the twenty-first century, learning from the challenges the Alliance has faced in the past. For this purpose, the Ministers will intensify the dialogue which is underway to further promote and deepen security cooperation in wide-ranging areas.

The United States and Japan recommit themselves to internationally recognized standards of human rights, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the objectives of the Treaty, namely to promote mutual cooperation and security, to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship that exist between them and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.



## Reference 48. Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Tokyo, May 28, 2010)

On May 28, 2010, the members of the United States–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reconfirmed that, in this 50th anniversary year of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U.S.–Japan Alliance remains indispensable not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Recent developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the significance of the Alliance. In this regard, the United States reiterated its unwavering commitment to Japan’s security. Japan reconfirmed its commitment to playing a positive role in contributing to the peace and stability of the region. Furthermore, the SCC members recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability. The SCC members committed to promote and deepen security cooperation in wide-ranging areas to enable the Alliance to adapt to the evolving challenges of the 21st century.

The Ministers reaffirmed the commitment to reduce the impact on local communities, including in Okinawa, thereby preserving a sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan. In this context, the SCC members expressed their shared commitments to relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and return the base to Japan as part of the Alliance transformation and realignment process.

The Ministers confirmed their commitment to implement steadily the realignment initiatives described in the May 1, 2006, SCC Document, “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” as supplemented by this SCC Statement.

The Ministers reaffirmed that, as provided for in the Guam Agreement of February 17, 2009, the relocation of approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on tangible progress toward the completion of the replacement facility. The relocation to Guam will realize the consolidation and return of most of the facilities south of Kadena.

Bearing this in mind, the two sides intend to verify and validate that this Futenma relocation plan appropriately considers factors such as safety, operational requirements, noise impact, environmental concerns, and effects on the local community.

Both sides confirmed the intention to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, with the runway portion(s) of the facility to be 1,800 meters long, inclusive of overruns, exclusive of seawalls.

In order to achieve the earliest possible return of MCAS Futenma, the Ministers decided that a study by experts regarding the replacement facility’s location, configuration and construction method would be completed promptly (in any event no later than the end of August, 2010), and that the verification and validation would be completed by the time of the next SCC.

Both sides confirmed the intention to locate, configure, and construct the replacement facility in such a manner as to ensure that environmental impact assessment procedures and construction of the replacement facility can be completed without significant delay.

The Ministers recognized the importance of responding to the concerns of the people of Okinawa that they bear a disproportionate burden related to the presence of U.S. forces, and also recognized that the more equitable distribution of shared alliance responsibilities is essential for sustainable development of the Alliance. Based on the aforementioned recognition, the Ministers directed that, as progress is made toward the replacement facility, concrete measures should be taken expeditiously in the following areas:

- **Training Relocation**

The two sides committed to expand the relocation of the U.S. forces activities, to include both bilateral and unilateral training, outside of Okinawa. In this regard, utilization of Tokunoshima will be considered, subject

to development of appropriate facilities. Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) facilities and areas in mainland Japan may also be utilized. Both sides also committed to examine the relocation of training outside of Japan, such as to Guam.

- **Environment**

In view of shared responsibilities on environmental stewardship, the Ministers instructed their staffs to discuss the potential for the United States and Japan to take a “Green Alliance” approach to our bases and the environment. U.S.–Japanese collaboration on a “Green Alliance” would consider ways to introduce renewable energy technology into U.S. bases in Japan and under development in Guam, including as a component of Host Nation Support. The Ministers instructed their staffs to consider promptly and seriously an agreement on the environment, including reasonable access to U.S. facilities and areas in cases of environmental incidents, and reasonable access to U.S. facilities and areas for environmental surveys prior to land returns.

- **Shared Use of Facilities**

The two sides intend to study opportunities to expand the shared use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF, which would contribute to closer bilateral operational coordination, improved interoperability, and stronger relations with local communities.

- **Training Areas**

The two sides decided on the partial lift of restrictions on the use of the “Hotel/Hotel training area” and committed to continue to consult on other measures.

- **Guam Relocation**

The two sides confirmed that, in accordance with the Guam Agreement of February 17, 2009, the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam will be steadily implemented. The relocation to Guam is dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward completion of the replacement facility. The U.S. side will examine the unit composition of III MEF personnel remaining on Okinawa in the context of overall theater security, including deterrence, while accounting for the concerns of local communities.

- **Facilitation of the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena**

The two sides confirmed that the return of facilities and areas south of Kadena will be steadily implemented in accordance with the Realignment Roadmap. In addition, the two sides decided that the “Industrial Corridor” of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) and a part of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) are priority areas for early return.

- **Noise Reduction at Kadena**

The two sides affirmed their commitment to further noise reduction at Kadena through such measures as expansion of both bilateral and unilateral training outside of Okinawa, including improvements to the aviation training relocation program, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report.

- **Communication and Cooperation with Communities in Okinawa**

The two sides affirmed their intention to intensify communication with communities in Okinawa on issues of concern related to the presence of U.S. forces. The two sides committed to explore cooperation in such areas as information technology initiatives, cultural exchanges, education programs and research partnerships.

As part of the effort to deepen security cooperation, the SCC members emphasized the importance of ensuring a shared understanding of the regional security environment and the role of the U.S.–Japan Alliance in advancing common strategic objectives. Toward this end, the SCC members committed to intensify the ongoing bilateral security dialogue. This security dialogue will address traditional security threats, as well as focus on new areas for cooperation.

## **Reference 49. Current Government Efforts Pertaining to the Items Approved by the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010**

(May 28, 2010, Cabinet Decision)

1. The governments of Japan and the United States will study the relocation to the Futenma Replacement Facility indicated in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereinafter called “Roadmap”) approved by the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, and make partial additions and supplementation to the Roadmap, and reconfirmed steady implementation of practical measures for the realignment of the structure of U.S. Forces in Japan as indicated in the Roadmap.

Accordingly, the May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision, “Government Efforts Pertaining to Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan” is to be reviewed.

2. It has been 50 years since the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, but reflection on recent developments in the security situation, particularly in Northeast Asia, shows that the Japan–U.S. alliance continues to be essential not just to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. We must maintain and deepen cooperation for security in a broad range of fields in a manner that is appropriate for the Japan–U.S. alliance to meet the new issues of the 21st century. At the same time, it is important to lighten the burden on local communities, including Okinawa.

For that purpose at the same time that the governments of both Japan and the United States move forward with necessary tasks to establish facilities in the area of Camp Schwab, Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas in order to relocate and return Futenma Air Station at an early date, from the perspective of the importance of balanced burdens of the responsibility for the alliance within Japan, along with the development of replacement facilities, the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee issued a joint statement that included the requirement to quickly find concrete measures to relocate training outside of Okinawa, environmental measures, and joint use of facilities between U.S. Forces and the JSDF.

3. Based on the above joint statement, the Government is moving forward to verify and confirm Futenma Air Station relocation plans. Furthermore, at the same time that Japan as a whole takes responsibility for the alliance to lighten the burden of bases that is concentrated in Okinawa, in order to further deepen the Japan–U.S. alliance, efforts will continue to reorganize or reduce bases of U.S. Forces to disperse the burden of bases in Japan from Okinawa, or outside Japan. Furthermore, concrete measures to relocate training outside of Okinawa, environmental measures, and joint use of facilities by U.S. forces and the JSDF will be implemented quickly. At that time additional effort will be made to obtain the understanding of related local public organizations, including in Okinawa.

## Reference 50. Outline of 23 Issues

(As of March 31, 2010)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(21. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(21. Waste incineration facility site (Kurahama))	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(21. Area currently used by the GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
	16 facilities, 18 issues	765	6	7	2	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendment agreed on April 22, 1999 and December 21, 2001 (to be returned upon formulation of the land utilization plan or reversion of the southern part, whichever comes first)
Camp Zukeran	20. Awase Golf Course	47			◎		Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (Construction of the new site completed and furnishing agreed on in order to return the land after the golf course is relocated to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	21. Former Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Futenma Air Station	22. A strip of land along the east side (Nakahara-Ginowan)	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendments agreed on April 22, 1999; February 12, 2004; and January 15, 2010 (Release term was extended until the end of 2011 without relocation condition.)
	5 facilities, 5 issues	256	3	1	1	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the Area column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle mark in the Classification column expediently indicates that a scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the Scope column were assigned only for classification purpose of 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the Classification column indicates issues in which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues in which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues in which release of facilities and areas was requested to the U.S. government by then Governor Nishime of Okinawa. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

## Reference 51. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

**Return Land:**

- Futenma Air Station — See attached.
- Northern Training Area  
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
  - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
  - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area  
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area  
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site  
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield  
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae  
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station  
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area  
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port  
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)  
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).



**Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104  
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training  
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads  
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

**Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station  
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft  
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base  
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base  
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station  
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

**Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**

- Accident reports  
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.  
In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements  
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas  
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles  
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered

plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

## **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)**

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

### **1. Introduction**

- a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
- a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
  - b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
  - c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
  - d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
  - e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
- a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
  - b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
  - c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
  - d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables.

Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

- e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
  - f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
- Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
- a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
  - b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
  - c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
- a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
  - b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
  - c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

## Reference 52. Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

Operations		Operations of Self-Defense Forces	Operations of U.S. Forces
	Operations to counter air attack against Japan	○ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations for air defense	○ Will support SDF operations ○ Will conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities
	Operations to defend surrounding waters and protect sea lines of communication	○ Will have primary responsibilities for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters and for other operations	○ Will support SDF operations ○ Will conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities
	Operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan	○ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions	○ Will primarily conduct operations to supplement SDF capabilities (The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of invasion, and will support SDF operations)
Responses to other threats	Guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration of Japanese territory	○ Will have primary responsibilities to check and repel such attacks at the earliest possible stage. In its operations, the SDF will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies	○ Will support the SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation
	Ballistic missile attacks	○ Will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to such attacks	○ Will provide Japan with necessary intelligence ○ Will consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power

### Reference 53. Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields		Examples of Items for Cooperation
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area</li> <li>○ Medical services, communications and, transportation in the affected area</li> <li>○ Relief and transfer operations for refugees and provision of emergency materials to refugees</li> </ul>
	Search and rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and in waters around Japan, and information sharing related to such operations</li> </ul>
	Noncombatant evacuation operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Information sharing and communication with, and assembly and transportation of noncombatants</li> <li>○ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants</li> <li>○ Customs, immigration, and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan</li> <li>○ Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation, and medical services in Japan</li> </ul>
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections</li> <li>○ Intelligence sharing</li> </ul>
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Use of facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels</li> <li>○ Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○ Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels</li> <li>○ Use of SDF facilities by U.S. aircraft</li> <li>○ Provisions of training and exercise areas</li> <li>○ Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas</li> </ul>
	Supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. facilities and areas</li> </ul>
	Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Land, sea, and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan</li> <li>○ Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas</li> <li>○ Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL</li> </ul>
	Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles</li> <li>○ Provision of repair parts</li> <li>○ Temporary provision of tools and materials for maintenance</li> </ul>
	Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Medical treatment of casualties inside Japan</li> <li>○ Transportation of casualties inside Japan</li> <li>○ Provision of medical supply</li> </ul>
	Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Security of U.S. facilities and areas</li> <li>○ Maritime surveillance around U.S. facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○ Security of transportation routes inside Japan</li> <li>○ Intelligence sharing</li> </ul>
	Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies</li> </ul>
	Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Support for port entry/exist by U.S. vessels</li> <li>○ Loading/unloading of materials at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○ Sewage disposal, water supply and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas</li> <li>○ Temporary increase of workers at U.S. facilities and areas</li> </ul>
Japan-U.S. operational cooperation	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Intelligence sharing</li> </ul>
	Minesweeping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas round Japan, and intelligence sharing on mines</li> </ul>
	Sea and airspace management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic</li> <li>○ Air traffic and airspace management in and around Japan</li> </ul>



## Reference 54. Record of Japan–U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2007

### Joint Exercise

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Japan–U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	January 13–29, 2010	Camp Ichigaya, USFJ Yokota Base, locations, etc., of other units participating in the exercise	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Central Readiness Force, Regional Armies, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, Self Defense Fleet, Regional District Units, Communications Commands, MSDF Maritime Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, JASDF Air Communication and System Wing, Air Material Command, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, etc. Approx 1,400 personnel	Joint Staff Office, US Army Japan, US Naval Force Japan, U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, etc.  Approx. 500 personnel	Training for bilateral actions

### GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Japan–U.S. Joint Army Command Post Exercise (U.S.)	July 10–17, 2009	Fort Shafter in Hawaii, United States	GSDF Staff Offices, North Army, etc. Approx. 130 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, U.S. Army Japan Approx. 100 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Field exercise with U.S. Army in the United States	September 8–25, 2009	Yakima Training Center, etc., in Washington, United States	11th Division, etc. Approx. 350 personnel	Washington State, 593rd Sustainment Brigade Approx. 100 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Army	October 9–18, 2008	Aibano maneuver area, etc.	3rd Division Approx. 680 personnel	42nd Infantry Brigade Approx. 200 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Marine Corps	October 19–November 1, 2009	JGSDF Sekiyama Training Area and JGSDF Camp Takada	1st Division Approx. 300 personnel	3rd Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 250 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Japan–U.S. Joint Army Command Post Exercise (Japan)	December 1–14, 2009	JGSDF Camp Higashi-Chitose, etc.	GSDF Staff Offices, North Army, etc. Approx. 4,500 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Headquarters, U.S. Army in Japan, etc. Approx 1200 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Field exercise with the U.S. Army	January 19–February 25, 2010	Camp Pendleton in California, United States	Western Army infantry Regiment Approx. 180 personnel	1st Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 200 personnel	Training for response to outlier invasion
Field training with U.S. Army	February 10–18, 2010	Ojojihara Training Area, etc.	6th Division Approx. 150 personnel	218th Brigade Approx. 150 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Marine Corps	February 21–March 7, 2010	Nihonbara Training Area, etc.	10th Division Approx. 300 personnel	3rd Marine Division Approx. 120 personnel	Training for bilateral actions

**MSDF**

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Special minesweeping training	Jul. 17–29, 2009	Mutsu Bay	Vessels: 25 Aircraft: approx. 11	Minesweeping personnel, etc. Approx: 10 Aircraft: 1	Mine sweeping training
Special training for case security	Nov. 17–19, 2009	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base and Yokosuka Port	Yokosuka Regional Headquarters, etc. Approx: 170	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base Military Police Approx. 40	Training for cooperation for base security
Special medical training	Nov. 18, 2009	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base	Yokosuka District Unit Approx: 170	Yokosuka Naval Hospital, etc. Approx. 70	Medical training
Special minesweeping training	Nov. 21 – Dec. 1, 2009	Hyuganada	Vessels: 28 Aircraft: a few	Minesweeping personnel: 5	Mine sweeping training
Anti-submarine special training	Dec. 3–6, 2009	Ocean area around Okinawa	Vessels: 4 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 6 Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training
Transport special training	Jan. 26–28, 2010	Ocean area around Sasebo and Western Kyushu	Vessels: 2	Vessels: 1	Transport special training
Anti-submarine special training	Jan. 26 – Feb. 2, 2010	Ocean area from off Tokai to off Shikoku	Vessels: 13 Aircraft: approx. 20	Vessels: 1	Anti-submarine training
Command post experience	Feb. 16–26, 2010	Naval War College (U.S.)	MSDF staff, etc. Approx. 30	Command Headquarters, U.S. Naval Force Japan Approx. 50	Training in coordinate training

## ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Fighter combat training	Apr. 20–23, 2009	Western Hokkaido airspace and Easter Misawa airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Jul. 25–31, 2009	Western Akita airspace and Easter Misawa airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training Base air defense training	Sep. 23–Oct. 22, 2009	Airspace around Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, U.S.	Aircraft: 7	Aircraft: —	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Oct. 2–10, 2009	Airspace off Hyakuri	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 5	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Nov. 14–20, 2009	Airspace off Komatsu	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 12	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training, Air to ground attack training	Jan. 26–Mar. 2, 2010	Airspace around Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, U.S., and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: 14	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Jan. 26–Feb. 10, 2010	Airspace off Hyakuri	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 6	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Feb. 27–Mar. 12, 2010	Airspace off Misawa	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 8	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Mar. 5–12, 2010	Airspace off Tsuiki	Aircraft: 12	Aircraft: 5	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills

## Reference 55. Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Time of Conclusion, Agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. Governments, on the Implementation of Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects	Time of Completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid liquid fuel through the injection of air from an external source	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines and others	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engine using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Radar	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot-restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor, and nose cone) for the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System)	August 1999	March 2008
Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow-on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	September 2006
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	March 2007
Advanced Full Material/Structural Technology	Research into full system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	August 2010
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that apply high-power semiconductor devices	April 2006	November 2009
Combat System for Ship	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying open architecture technology to the combat system for ships	April 2006	November 2009
New Guided Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense	Development of new ship-based guided missiles for ballistic missile defense to improve the existing capability to counter threats caused by ballistic missiles and to deal with diversification of ballistic missiles with higher performance	June 2006	Ongoing
Effect on People by Aircraft Fuel and/or Engine Emission	Research on the effects aircraft fuel (JP-4 and/or JP-8) and/or engine emission on people	March 2007	Ongoing
Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector	Research on palm-sized automated chemical agent detector with simplified control and treating methods, and quick and accurate detection, and its test evaluation technique	March 2008	Ongoing
Image gyro for airborne applications	Research on Image-based positioning and navigation technology which will complement and enhance current navigation system and GPS	February 2010	Ongoing

## Reference 56. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

### (1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(As of June 30, 2010)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	January 2004 – July 2006	About 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	June–September 2006	About 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	February 20 – April 8, 2004	About 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	December 2003 – February 2009	About 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

### (2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	November 2001 – November 2007	About 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.	—	—	• Transportation of materials

### (3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	January 2008 – January 2010	About 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

### (4) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	September 1992 – September 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992 – September 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 – January 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 – January 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September–December 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September–December 1994	118		• Airlift member of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996 – February 2009	2	32	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
		February 2009–	3		
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	1,247	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	November 1999–February 2000	113		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR</li> <li>Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel</li> </ul>
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001	138		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR</li> </ul>
United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIS) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	February 2002–June 2004	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</li> </ul>
	Engineering unit	March 2002–June 2004	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities</li> <li>Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations</li> <li>Civic assistance</li> </ul>
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April 2003	50		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR</li> </ul>
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August 2003	98		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims</li> </ul>
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	March 2007–	6	24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force</li> </ul>
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	October 2008–	2	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector</li> <li>Database management</li> </ul>
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	February 2010–	2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Facilities related administrative planning coordination including deciding priorities for engineering activities for military and civilian departments in the MINUSTAH headquarters, and overall logistical planning for acquisition and shipping of materials for military departments</li> </ul>
	Engineering unit	February 2010–	Approx. 350		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).  
2. And advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

## (5) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	Nov. 13–Dec. 9, 1998	80		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics in the Republic of Honduras</li> </ul>
	Air transport unit		105		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc., between Japan and Honduras</li> <li>Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras</li> </ul>
Transportation of Materials for International Disaster Relief Activities Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	Sep. 23–Nov. 22, 1999	426		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g., temporary dwellings)</li> </ul>
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	Feb. 5–11, 2001	16		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials</li> </ul>
	Air transport unit		78		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.</li> </ul>



		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake, tsunami)	Air transport unit	Dec. 30, 2003 –Jan. 6, 2004	31		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 28, 2004 –Jan. 1, 2005	590		• Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan. 6–Mar. 23, 2005	22		• Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with relevant organizations and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		• Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		• Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport and aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 5–10, 2005	346		• Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	Oct. 12–Dec. 2, 2005	147		• Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical support unit	Jun. 1–22, 2006	149		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Oct. 5–17, 2009	12		• Medical treatment
	Joint liaison office		21		• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Jan. 18–Feb. 16, 2010	104		• Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		97		• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Joint liaison office		33		• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.  
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

## Reference 57. Results of the Replenishment Activities

This report is being made based on the provisions of Article 7 of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, and the report to the Diet pertaining to replenishment activities based on the provisions of Article 3 of the same law. A summary of the report follows below.

### 1. Results of replenishment activities

- MSDF vessels replenished military vessels of 8 foreign nations engaged in maritime anti-terrorist activities in the Indian Ocean from January 17, 2008 to January 15, 2010, providing fuel for ships, for helicopters based on those ships, and water. In all, 14 ships (including ships to escort the replenishment vessels) and approximately 2,400 crewmembers were assigned to the task.

Ship fuel: Replenished 145 times, providing approximately 27,005 kilolitres

Helicopter fuel: 18 times, approximately 210 kilolitres

Water: 67 times, approximately 4,195 tons

- Areas where replenishment was conducted

Replenishment was conducted 122 times in Sea of Oman, 19 times in the North Arabian Sea, 3 times in the Gulf of Aden, once in the Persian Gulf.

- Expenses of the activities

The total expenses incurred for the replenishment activities were approximately ¥10.5 billion.

### 2. Evaluation of the replenishment activities

#### (1) Evaluation of the replenishment activities

- Confirmed the reliability of MSDF replenishment technology.
- Know-how and understanding of all types of tasks were accumulated and shared, improving capability to conduct maritime replenishment over the long term.

#### (2) Notes for the future

- When implementing international peace cooperation activities in the future, it is necessary to examine constancy and appropriate response pertaining to international cooperation, while utilizing JSDF capabilities and technology.
- Full implementation of information collection capabilities pertaining to local situations, etc., and fundamental training and equipment are necessary.
- It is necessary to consider measures for the welfare and mental health of the crewmembers and their families left behind.

## Reference 58. The Prime Minister's Address at the Ceremony for the Return of the Maritime Replenishment Support Unit

(February 6, 2010)

Address at the homecoming ceremony for the 7th Replenishment Support Unit.

I appreciate the work of Captain Ryo Sakai, Commander of the Replenishment Unit, Captain Takashi Shinagawa, commanding officer of the replenishment ship Mashuu, Commander Tokihiko Umezaki, commanding officer of the destroyer Ikazuchi, and the approximately 340 crewmembers.

I hear that at sea the temperature rose to 40 degrees in the daytime, and it was sometimes 70 degrees on the metal decks. The tough and proud looks on the crews' faces tell me how well you performed your duties in that severe environment.

Throughout the period of the activities, the dispatched units showed their high operational abilities to the foreign navies. The logistical support for the dispatched units was also outstanding. As Prime Minister, I am proud of this kind of professionalism of the SDF and the Ministry of Defense. I also want to express my deep gratitude to the families and all related people of the dispatched personnel.

Replenishment activities have continued for 8 years since 2001, with a brief break, and achieved results including anti-terrorist measures. I would like to express my appreciation to the approximately 13,000 personnel who were dispatched for those activities during that time.

The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law expired on January 15.

In the future the Government will actively play an appropriate role, naturally in the defense of Japan, and in such activities as international peacekeeping activities, anti-terrorist activities, and humanitarian assistance.

The experiences you have accumulated over the past eight years will certainly be used in Japan's foreign relations and to guarantee Japan's security in the future. Today's homecoming is linked to the start of Japan's tomorrow. I would like you to believe in that with me, and push even further in your daily military service.

## Reference 59. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (expired July 31, 2009), and Their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities From February 2004–July 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital</li> <li>• Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy</li> <li>• Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan</li> <li>○ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province</li> <li>○ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses</li> </ul>	Medical technique support provided a total of 277 times	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>★ Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure</li> <li>★ Improved ability of emergency medical services</li> </ul>
Water Supply Activities From March 2004–July 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp</li> <li>Water supply activities by GSDF completed with start-up of water purification facilities installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005</li> </ul>	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>★ Stable access to clean water made possible</li> </ul>
Public Facility Restoration and Construction From March 2004–July 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits, and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province</li> </ul>	Completion of 36 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>★ Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improved educational environment</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens</li> </ul>	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Repair works for other facilities</li> <li>• Medical clinic (Primary Health Center)</li> <li>• Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah</li> <li>• Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha</li> <li>• Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium, and other cultural facilities</li> </ul>	Completion of 66 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>★ Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province</li> </ul>
Local Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Local business mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities</li> <li>○ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp</li> </ul>	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

## Reference 60. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2005–August 20, 2010)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Australia	Minister of Defense (May 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05, May 08)	Minster for Defence (Jun. 07, Dec. 08, May 10) Chief of Defence Force (Jun. 07) Chief of Army (Mar. 07) Chief of Navy (May 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Air Force (Sep. 06, Apr. 10)	Japan–Australia politico-military consultations (Aug. 06, Feb. 08, Mar. 10) Japan–Australia military-military consultations (Sep. 05, May 06, Aug. 06, May 07, Sep. 08, Oct. 09)
ROK	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jun. 09) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Mar. 07, Feb. 10) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Jul. 05, Nov. 09) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Oct. 08, Apr. 10) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 09, Oct. 09)	Minister of National Defense (Feb. 07, Apr. 09) Joint Chief of Staff Chairman (Apr. 08) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 08, Aug. 09) Chief of Naval Staff (Jun. 07) Chief of Air Staff (Apr. 08)	Japan–ROK security dialogue (May 07, Oct. 07, Nov. 08, Dec. 09) Japan–ROK military-military consultations (Aug. 05, Dec. 06, Jul. 07, Jul 08, Oct. 09, Jul 10) Japan–ROK military-military working group (Dec. 07, Dec. 08, Oct. 09)
India	Minster of Defense (Aug. 07, Apr. 10) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 05, Aug. 07) Administrative Vice-Minster of Defense (Jul. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Minister of Defence (May 06, Nov. 09) Vice Minister of Defence (Apr. 07) Chief of General Staff, Army (Apr. 07, Aug. 09) Chief of General Staff, Navy (Oct. 05, Aug. 08) Chief of Staff, Air Force (Jan. 07)	Japan–India politico-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08, Feb. 09, Apr. 10) Japan–India military-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08, Feb. 09, Apr. 10)
China	Minister of Defense (Mar. 09) Administrative Vice-Minster of Defense (Mar. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Feb. 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Feb. 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jul. 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 09)	National Defense Minister (Aug. 07, Nov. 09) Deputy Chief of General Staff for the PLA (Feb. 09) Commander of the PLA Navy (Oct. 08) Commander of the PLA Air Force (Sep. 08)	Japan–China security dialogue (Jul. 06, Mar. 09) Joint working group between the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities for establishing a maritime communication mechanism (April 2008, July 2010)
Russia	Minister of Defense (Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May. 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (May 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jun. 07)	Chief of Staff (Oct. 06) Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief (Mar. 08) Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Jun. 10)	Japan–Russia defense official consultations (Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 07, May 08) Japan–Russia security talks (Apr. 08, Jul. 10) Japan–Russia annual meeting based on the Japan–Russia Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents (May 06, Apr. 07, Apr. 08, Jun. 09, Jun. 10) Japan–Russia working group meeting (Apr. 05, Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 06, May 07, Dec. 07, May 08, Dec. 08, Jun. 09)
Southeast Asian Nations	• Cambodia Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Aug. 07, May 10)	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (Mar. 08) Secretary of State for National Defence, Ministry of National Defence (Mar. 09, Mar. 10) Vice Minister of National Defence and Army Chief of Staff (Aug. 09)	Japan–Cambodia politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Jun. 10)
	• Indonesia Minister of Defense (Aug. 06) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07)	Vice Minister of Defense (Mar. 10) Vice Minister of Defense (Nov. 06, Mar. 09) Military Commander (Aug. 06, Nov. 06) Chief of Army Staff (Aug. 09) Chief of Naval Staff (Feb. 08)	Japan–Indonesia military-military consultations (Mar. 07)
	• Laos (May 10)	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Defence (Mar. 09, Mar. 10)	
	• Malaysia Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 08, Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Nov. 06)	Minister of Defence (Mar. 07) Undersecretary for Defence (Mar. 10) Chief of Army Staff (Aug. 09) Navy Commander (Aug. 09)	
	• Philippines Minister of Defense (May 05) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May. 09) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Nov. 05) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May 08)	Undersecretary for Defense (Mar. 09, Mar. 10) Army Commander (Aug. 09) Air Force Commander (Dec. 08)	Japan–Philippines politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Apr. 06, Dec. 07, Aug. 10)
	• Singapore Minster of Defense (Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08, May 09, Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jun. 07, May 08, May 09) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 10)	Minister of Defence (Nov. 07, Dec. 09) Permanent Secretary (Defense) (Apr. 08, Nov. 09) Chief of Defence Force (Sep. 09) Chief of Army (Aug. 09) Chief of Navy (Aug. 05) Chief of Air Force (Dec. 07)	Japan–Singapore military-military consultations (Aug. 05, Mar. 07, Sep. 08, Sep. 09)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Southeast Asian Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Thailand Minister of Defense (Jan. 07) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Dec. 09) Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense (May 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 05)</li> </ul>	Supreme Commander (Jul. 05, Jun. 08) Army Commander (Aug. 09) Air Force Commander (Jul. 05)	Japan–Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Mar. 06, Oct. 07, Sep. 09)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Timor-Leste Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 10)</li> </ul>	Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Security (Mar. 09) Secretary of State for Defence (Feb. 09)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Viet Nam Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May 09) Administrative Vice-Minister (Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 07) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 10)</li> </ul>	Vice Minister of National Defence (May 09, Mar. 10) People's Army Vice Chief of Staff (Aug. 09)	Japan–Viet Nam politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Dec. 07, Nov. 08, Apr. 10)
United Kingdom	Minister of Defense (Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05, May 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 07, May 10)	Defence Junior Minister (Oct. 09) Defence Ministerial Aide (Oct. 09) Chief of Army Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Naval Staff (Jan. 07) Chief of Air Staff (Oct. 05, Mar. 08)	Japan–U.K. politico-military consultations (Aug. 06, Jun. 07, Nov. 09) Japan–U.K. military-military consultations (Feb. 06, Jun. 07, Oct. 08, Nov. 09)
France	Ministerial Aide (May 10) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Sep. 06) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05, May 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 05, May 10)	Minister for Defense (Mar. 07) Secretary General of National Defense (Nov. 06, Jul. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Nov. 10) Chief of Air Staff (Jun. 08)	Japan–France politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Feb. 06, Feb. 07, Apr. 08, Jun. 09)
Germany	Minister of Defense (Feb. 09)	Minister for Defense (Apr. 07) Chief of Staff Army (Mar. 09) Naval Inspector-General (Dec. 05)	Japan–Germany politico-military consultations (Jun. 06, Jul. 08, Jun. 10) Japan–Germany military-military consultations (Jun. 06, Jul. 08)
Pakistan	Minister of Defense (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (Jun. 06)	Japan–Pakistan politico-military consultations (Sep. 06, Feb. 09, May 10) Japan–Pakistan military-military consultations (Sep. 06, Aug. 07, Feb. 09, May 10)
New Zealand	Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05)	Minister of Defence (Jun. 05, Oct. 06, May 08) Chief of Defence Force (Mar. 08) Chief of Army (Aug. 09) Chief of Navy (Oct. 08) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04)	Japan–New Zealand military-military consultations (Dec. 05, May 06, Oct. 07, Dec. 08, Oct. 09)
Canada	Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 06)	Minister of National Defence (Sep. 06) Deputy Minister of National Defence (Jun. 09) Chief of the Land Staff (Aug. 09) Chief of Air Staff (Mar. 06)	Japan–Canada politico-military consultations (Nov. 08, Mar. 10) Japan–Canada military-military consultations (Nov. 06, May 09)

Note: Politico-military consultation: Security talks among diplomatic and defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level Military-military consultation: Talks among defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level, "Minister of Defense" and "Senior Vice-Minister of Defense" on the Japanese side were called "Minister of State for Defense and "Senior Vice-Minister of Defense," respectively, until January 9, 2007. Likewise, "Chief of Staff, Joint Staff" was called "Chairman of Joint Staff Council" until March 27, 2006.

# Reference 61. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(Apr. 1, 2005 – Aug. 20, 2010)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministerial Meeting</li> <li>• Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM)</li> <li>• Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	(Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Aug. 07, Jul. 08, Jul. 09, Jul. 10) (May 05, May 06, May 07, May 08, May 09, May 10) (Oct. 05, Mar. 06, Nov. 06, Mar. 07, Nov. 07, Apr. 08, Oct. 08, Apr. 09, Nov. 09, Mar. 10)
	Hosted by the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IISS Asia Security Conference</li> </ul>	(Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08, May 09, Jun. 10)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	○ Meeting of senior defense officials on common security challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region		(Mar. 09, Mar. 10)
	○ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges		(Mar. 09, Mar. 10)
	○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)		(Jun. 05, Oct. 06, Sep. 07, Oct. 08, Oct. 09, Sep. 10)
	○ Subcommittee of Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)		(Jan. 06, Jan. 07, Feb. 08, Jul. 09)
	○ International Seminar for Military Science		(Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Jul. 07, Jul. 08, Jul. 09, Jul. 10)
	○ International Conference of Cadets		(Mar. 06, Mar. 07, Mar. 08, Mar. 09, Mar. 10)



## Reference 62. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others		
	Meeting between Senior Defense Officials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this meeting has been held since 2009. Defense authorities at the vice ministerial level from ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	The second meeting was held in March 2010 and the participants were 10 countries in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN Secretariat. Frank and constructive views were exchanged over shared regional security issues, such as nontraditional security issues and a security framework and cooperation for the Asia-Pacific region.
	Tokyo seminar on common security challenges	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this seminar has been held since 2009. It is a seminar that is held open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as policies for promoting regional cooperation over shared regional security issues.	Discussions were held in March 2010 with the participation of experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas over climate change and the role of defense authorities, as well as security frameworks and cooperation for the Asia-Pacific region. This played a part in initiatives for improving the security environment, and contributed to promoting dialogue and cooperation in the region.
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote attention paid to each country's national defense policy.	The 15th forum was held in September 2010 and the participants were 22 ARF member countries (including Japan), the EU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Opinions were exchanged over the role of major countries in security cooperation and the role of defense authorities in the region. The participants presented the view that regional security environment and the future direction of defense cooperation should be discussed continuously in the Forum.
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with Director (colonel)-level working officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on defense issues including diversified military roles.	The 8th subcommittee was held in July 2009 and the participants were 24 ARF member countries (including Japan), the EU, the International Maritime Organization, and the Japanese Shipowners' Association. Opinions were exchanged over military functions, roles, and authority for organizational crosscutting initiatives for piracy and armed robbery at sea. The participants hoped that the awareness and discussions shared at the subcommittee will contribute to each countries' initiatives and international initiatives against piracy.
GSDF	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting government officials in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 13th MLST meeting was held in December last year and the participants were working-level officials in charge of logistics support, sent from the armies of Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States, and those from the U.S. Marines. Participation in international disaster relief operations.
	Army Command and General Staff College seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	The 9th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held in August last year and the participants were students, etc., of army colleges from eleven Asia-Pacific countries. Participants exchanged views over the theme of modalities for coordination between various countries' armies to accurately implement initiatives for large-scale disaster dispatches and international disaster relief activities.

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	MSDF	Seminar of Naval Colleges in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.	The 13th seminar was held in February 2010 with participants from 14 countries. Participants exchanged views on the themes of modalities for information transmission concerning naval activities pertaining to maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), as well as the qualities required of high-ranking officers in order to realize this. As part of cooperation between ministries and agencies, observers from the Japan Coast Guard took part.
		Navy Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (WPNS SONG))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2000 with junior naval men from countries of the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide security and naval leadership with the aim of promoting the understanding among participants and helping them develop a clear understanding of the current state of MSDF and Japanese history, culture, etc.	The 9th seminar was held in October last year with junior naval men from 20 Asia-Pacific countries as the main participants. Participants exchanged views on naval leadership and how to evaluate such leadership, and recognitions of situations of each country regarding maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.
	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with officials related to air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education.	The 14th seminar was held in December 2009 by inviting six countries. Participants exchanged views over the main theme of leadership education at various countries' air force academies.
		Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating.	The 9th seminar was held in October 2009 and the participants were the students from air force academies in eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Participants exchanged views over the main theme of initiatives for and challenges of international peace cooperation activities by various countries' air forces.
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with instructors of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchanged views on cadet education.	The 13th seminar was held in July 2008 and 13 countries were invited. Participants exchanged views on the "Expansion of the Role of Military Affairs in International Security and Education."
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchanged views on militaries in the 21st century.	The 12th seminar was held in March 2009 and 16 countries were invited. Participants exchanged views on the "International Security Situation and its Changes in the 21st Century."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold public debates and release reports on security for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.	In December 2007, eminent scholars were invited from the U.S., U.K., Australia, Germany and France, and views were exchanged on "Peace Building and Military Organization—Exploring the Model of Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century."
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studied, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to hear advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	In January 2009, scholars were invited from the U.S., U.K., Australia, Germany, and France. Together with experts from Japan, they exchanged views under the agenda of "Stabilization Operation and Contribution by Allied Countries" and the "Contribution of Allied Countries to Security Sector Reform."
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	This forum was held in September 2008 and featured domestic scholars as well as scholars from the U.S., U.K., Australia, China, and Holland. The participants exchanged views on the "War in the Pacific and Allies' Strategy against Japan—Focusing on the Developments Leading to the Outbreak of the War."

## Reference 63. Other Multilateral Security Dialogue

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This seminar is hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every year (held twice in 1996 and 1997). Air force strategy-formulation chiefs from Pacific Rim countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 1995.
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-la Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
	Munich Security Conference		Started in 1962, this is one of the most authoritative international conferences concerning security in the West. Participants are: senior government officials, including ministers, diet members and top officials of the defense authority from NATO members, including the U.S., the U.K., and France, Russia and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Germany, which is the host country. The Japanese Minister of Defense attended the 45th meeting held in 2009 as the first Defense Minister of Japan to do so.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants —private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States)— to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

# Reference 64. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear non-proliferation The NPT recognizes five countries — the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France and China — as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear arms by non-nuclear weapon states.</li> <li>• Nuclear disarmament The NPT obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith.</li> <li>• Peaceful use of nuclear energy The NPT recognizes the “inalienable” right of signatory to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article 4-1). The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safe-guards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)<sup>2</sup> to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies (Article 3).</li> <li>• The NPT entered into force in 1970</li> <li>• There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT</li> <li>• Major non-member countries: India, Pakistan, Israel</li> </ul>
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and under ground</li> <li>• The CTBT has been signed by 182 states and ratified by 151 states (Of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty's enforcement, 35 countries have ratified it)</li> <li>• All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force.</li> <li>• Major non-member countries: United States, China, Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of nuclear arms</li> <li>• The NSG was formed in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974</li> <li>• The group consists of 46 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>>2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>>3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>>4. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>>

## Reference 65. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (Biological and chemical weapons)

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The BWC aims to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibit development, production and stockpiling of such weapons</li> <li>The BWC entered into force in 1975</li> <li>State parties: 163 countries</li> <li>Major non-member countries: Israel</li> </ul>
	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The CWC aims to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective.</li> <li>The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in The Hague, the Netherlands in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement</li> <li>The CWC entered into force in 1997</li> <li>State parties: 188 countries</li> <li>Major non-member countries: North Korea, Syria, Israel, Myanmar</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Australia Group (AG) <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons</li> <li>The first meeting took place in 1985</li> <li>Participating states: 40 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index/html>>  
2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index/html>>  
3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index/html>>

## Reference 66. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(Last five years)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997–Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004–Aug. 1, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) <sup>1</sup>
Oct. 1, 2002–Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005–Jul. 11, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Dec. 2, 2002–Jun. 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005–Nov. 27, 2008	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Note 1: The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007

**Reference 67. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)**

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles, and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states</li> <li>• The HCOC was adopted in 2002</li> <li>• Participating states: 131 countries</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MTCR aims to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development</li> <li>• The MTCR was established in 1987</li> <li>• Participating states: 34 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/index.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/mtcr.html>>



## Reference 68. Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Convention on Prohibitions or Relations on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protocol I: Protocol on non-detectable fragments; 110 state parties.</li> <li>• Protocol II: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; 93 state parties.</li> <li>• Amended Protocol II: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; 94 state parties.</li> <li>• Protocol III: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons; 106 state parties.</li> <li>• Protocol IV: Protocol on blinding laser weapons; 97 state parties</li> <li>• Protocol V: Protocol on explosive remnants of war; 68 state parties</li> <li>• Japan has signed Protocols I–IV.</li> <li>• (State parties are as of August 20, 2010)</li> <li>• The CCW entered into force in 1983</li> <li>• State parties: 112 countries</li> <li>• Major non-member countries: North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Syria</li> </ul>
	Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The convention categorically prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines while obligating state parties to destruct stockpiled mines within 4 years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulated international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance for mine victims.</li> <li>• The convention entered into force in 1999</li> <li>• State parties: 156 countries</li> <li>• Major non-member countries: United States, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt</li> </ul>
	Restriction on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons	The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.
	The U.N. Register of Conventional Arms	This register system has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories <sup>3</sup> and the countries to which such equipment is imported or exported.
	Conventions on Cluster Munitions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The conventions totally prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, transfer, etc., of cluster munitions, requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions remnant, etc., within 10 years in principle and stipulates international cooperation/aid concerning removal of cluster munitions and the support of victims.</li> <li>• Signed by 108 countries and ratified by 38 countries (Went into effect on August 1, 2010)</li> <li>• Major non-member countries: United States, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Brazil</li> </ul>
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Wassenaar Arrangement <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This arrangement is an international export control regime aimed at achieving the following objectives               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) To contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and grater responsibility in transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations</li> <li>(2) To prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations as part of global efforts in the fight against terrorism</li> </ol> </li> <li>• The arrangement was established in 1996</li> <li>• Participating states: 40 countries</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>>

3. The seven are 1) battle tanks, 2) armored combat vehicles, 3) large-caliber artillery systems, 4) combat aircraft, 5) attack helicopters, 6) warships, and 7) missiles and missile launchers. As a result of an institutional review in 2003, Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems was newly registered as equipment under a subcategory of the "missiles and missile launchers" category.

4. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>>

**Reference 69. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown)**

(As of March 31, 2010)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense	Special Service	Minister of Defense	
		Senior Vice-Minister of Defense	
		Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense (2)	
		Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense (Up to Three People)	
		Authorized Strength	Private Secretary to the Minister of Defense
			Administrative Vice-Ministers of Defense
			Director General, and others 566
			Administrative Officials, and Others 21,869
			SDF Regular Personnel 247,746
			Candidate for SDF Personnel <sup>1</sup>
		Non-Authorized Strength	Reserve Personnel 47,900
			Ready Reserve Personnel 8,467
			Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,260
			National Defense Academy students
			National Defense Medical College students
			GSDF High Technical School students <sup>2</sup>
			Part-Time Officials
	Regular Service	Authorized Strength	Administrative Officials, and Others 32
		Non-Authorized Strength	Part-Time Officials

Notes: 1. Implementation for Candidate for enlisted began on July 1, 2010.

2. Implementation for GSDF High Technical School students began on April 1, 2010.

**Reference 70. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel**

(As of March 31, 2010)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff, etc.	Total
Authorized	151,641	45,550	47,128	3,427	247,746
Actual	140,536	42,131	43,506	3,184	229,357
Staffing Rate (%)	92.7	92.5	92.3	92.9	92.6

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel				Fixed-Term Personnel
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)	Enlisted (lower)
Authorized	45,287	5,027	139,667	57,765	
Actual	42,283 (1,784)	4,694 (17)	138,506 (6,022)	21,316 (1,318)	22,558 (2,673)
Staffing Rate (%)	93.4	93.4	99.2	76.0	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

2. Numbers of the authorized personnel are based on the budget.

## Reference 71. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel

<Rank>

General (GSDF, ASDF),  
Admiral (MSDF) to Second  
Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF),  
Ensign (MSDF)

Officer

Warrant Officer

Warrant Officer

Sergeant Major (GSDF),  
Chief Petty Officer (MSDF),  
Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)

Master Sergeant (GSDF)  
Petty Officer First Class (MSDF)  
Master Sergeant (ASDF)  
Sergeant First Class (MSDF)  
Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF)  
Technical Sergeant (ASDF)  
Sergeant (GSDF)  
Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF)  
Staff Sergeant (ASDF)


Enlisted (upper)

Leading Private (GSDF)  
Leading Seaman (MSDF)  
Airman First Class (ASDF)

Private First Class (GSDF)  
Seaman (MSDF)  
Airman Second Class (ASDF)

Private (GSDF)  
Seaman Apprentice (MSDF)  
Airman Third Class (ASDF)

Recruit (GSDF)  
Seaman Recruit (MSDF)  
Airman Basic (ASDF)



**Reference 72. Status of Recruiting and Employing SDF Regular Personnel (FY2009)**

Classification			Number Recruited	Number Employed	Multiple	
Candidates for general, technical staff			GSDF	3,700 (510)	164 (16)	22.6 (31.9)
			MSDF	1,145 (150)	113 (14)	10.1 (10.7)
			ASDF	1,728 (270)	89 (7)	19.4 (38.6)
			Total	6,573 (930)	366 (37)	18.0 (25.1)
Non-commissioned officer	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	162 (26)	18 (5)	9.0 (5.2)	
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	18 (3)	3 (2)	6.0 (1.5)	
	GSDF personnel (Nursing)	GSDF	19 (15)	6 (5)	3.2 (3.0)	
Aviation Students			MSDF	745 (60)	85 (5)	8.8 (12.0)
			ASDF	2,615 (175)	59	44.3
			Total	3,360 (235)	144 (5)	23.3 (47.0)
Nursing Students			GSDF	3,364 (2,512)	60 (57)	56.1 (44.1)
Candidates for Non-commissioned Officers			GSDF	27,451 (3,791)	2,777 (121)	9.9 (31.3)
			MSDF	5,957 (957)	627 (72)	9.5 (13.3)
			ASDF	10,231 (1,487)	772 (77)	13.3 (19.3)
			Total	43,639 (6,235)	4,176 (270)	10.4 (23.1)
Privates			GSDF	14,640 (2,131)	1,119 (250)	13.1 (8.5)
			MSDF	2,966 (503)	637 (79)	4.7 (6.4)
			ASDF	3,449 (602)	565 (57)	6.1 (10.6)
			Total	21,055 (3,236)	2,321 (386)	9.1 (8.4)
National Defense Academy students	Recommended	Social sciences	138 (44)	33 (5)	4.2 (8.8)	
		Science and engineering	229 (24)	103 (4)	2.2 (6.0)	
		Total	367 (68)	136 (9)	2.7 (7.6)	
	General	Social sciences	5,719 (2,120)	73 (6)	78.3 (353.3)	
		Science and engineering	8,923 (1,607)	329 (25)	27.1 (64.3)	
		Total	14,642 (3,727)	402 (31)	36.4 (120.2)	
National Defense Medical College students			5,791 (1,682)	82 (26)	70.6 (64.7)	
Technical High School students		GSDF	4,689	310	15.1	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate number of females.

2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2009.

### Reference 73. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	54
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	53
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	—
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	
Recruit (GSDF), Seaman Recruit (MSDF), Airman Basic (ASDF)	Sanshi	

- Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, or musician, security officer, information analyst, display geography or communications specialist, is 60.
3. The ranks of Recruit, Seaman Recruit and Airman Basic are to be eliminated as of October 1, 2010.


## Reference 74. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

	SDF Reserve Personnel	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	○ When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel	○ When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a predestinated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability	○ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	○ Former Regular Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	○ Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	(Same for General and Technical) ○ Inexperienced SDF Personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)
Age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years above the retirement age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years below the retirement age for each rank	○ General: 18–33 years old ○ Technical: From 18 years old to 53–54 years old, depending on technical qualifications
Employment	○ Employment on screening, based on application ○ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training	○ Employment on screening, based on application	○ General: Employment on examination, based on application ○ Technical: Employment on screening, based on application
Rank	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Current specified rank ○ Former Reserve Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement ○ Candidate for Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Assignment based on skills	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement	○ Not designated
Term of service	○ Three Years/One term	○ Three years/One term	○ General: Maximum of three years ○ Technical: Maximum of two years
Education/ Training	○ Although the law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year	○ 30 days per year	○ General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (and equivalent to new recruitment education course (first term)) ○ Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as an SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)
Promotion	○ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	○ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	○ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	○ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ○ SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month	○ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ○ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ○ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ○ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	○ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ○ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them
Call-up duty and other duties	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Education and training call-up




## Reference 75. Outline of the SDF Educational System

### 1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



## 2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



## Reference 76. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY2009)

(Unit: persons)

Country	United States	Thailand	Republic of Korea	France	Indonesia	China	Singapore	Viet Nam	Cambodia	India	Germany	Philippines	Pakistan	Mongolia	Sub total
Institution															
National Institute for Defense Studies	3		1		1	1				1	1				8
National Defense Academy	6	7	7	4	3			3	2			1		2	35
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	1	2				1		1				4	1	11
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		2	1							2					5
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		4	3												7
Joint Staff College		1	1							1					3
Total	10	15	15	5	4	1	1	3	3	4	1	1	4	3	69

## Reference 77. Record of the Main Exercise of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY2009)

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces, etc.		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Outside Related Institutions	
Joint	Aug. 29 –Sep. 1, 2009	Camp Ichigaya, locations for forces conducting exercises, etc., Higashi Ogishima training grounds, Kanagawa Pref., and surrounding sea and airspace	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Military Police Unit, Aviation School, Signal School, GSDF Medical School, GSDF Ground Material Control Command, Self Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District Unit, Communications Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development and Test Command, ASDFAir Communications and System Wing, Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron, SDF Central Hospital, Yokosuka SDF Hospital, Gifu SDF Hospital, and SDF Command and Communication Squadron Personnel: approx. 6,300 Vehicles: approx. 570 Vessels: 1 Aircraft: 33	Cabinet Office, Fire Department, National Police Agency, Japan Coast Guard, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba Prefectural Governments, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama, Chiba City Governments, etc.	Exercise to sustain and improve joint disaster response capability in the event of an earthquake directly underneath Tokyo, by practicing in joint SDF operations with organizations in the affected region, and to test the SDF Tokyo earthquake response plan.
	Nov. 5–11, 2009	Japan's ports, airports, maneuver areas and surrounding sea area and air spaces	Joint Staff Office, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, SDF Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, and Air Training Command, etc. Personnel: approx. 41,800 Vehicles: approx. 1,170 Vessels: 6 Aircraft: approx. 300		Exercise to sustain and improve joint operation capability of the SDF by exercising integrated SDF operation in preparation for armed attacks, and similar situations
	Dec. 10, 2009	Camp Ichigaya	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Internal Bureau, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force Command, Central Transportation Management Command, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Maritime Material Command, Air Support Command, and Air Material Command Headquarters Personnel: approx. 70		Tabletop exercise (TTX) conducting international emergency relief activities in the Republic of Indonesia to clarify results and identify areas for improvement or review, in order to improve the SDF joint operations capabilities and to review the basic plan.
	Jan. 13–29, 2010	Camp Ichigaya	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Regional District Units, Communications Command, Maritime Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Communication and System Wing, Air Material Command Headquarters, and SDF Command and Communication Squadron, etc. Personnel: approx. 1,400	Headquarters of USFJ, U.S. Army in Japan, U.S. Navy in Japan, U.S. Air Force in Japan, U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, etc.	Exercise to sustain and improve combined joint operation capability by exercising U.S.–Japan cooperation and SDF responses to various situations in areas surrounding Japan, and U.S.–Japan joint responses for the defense of Japan

Exercise		Period	Location	Main Participating Forces, etc.		Remarks
				Ministry of Defense/SDF	Outside Related Institutions	
Joint	SDF joint disaster prevention exercise (command post exercise)	Feb 2–18, 2010	Camp Ichigaya, location for forces conducting exercises, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Internal Bureau, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Office, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Military Police, Central Transportation Management Command, Central Air Traffic Control and Weather Service, Aviation School, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Yokosuka District Unit, Communications Command, Staff College, 2nd Technical School, Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, ASDF Communications Command, Material Command, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, North Kanto Defense Bureau, South Kanto Defense Bureau, National Defense Academy, and National Defense Medical College	Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, National Police Agency, Fire Department, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Kanagawa, Chiba Prefectural Governments	Exercise to sustain and improve disaster response capabilities by practicing command activities for SDF joint operations in the event of a major disaster, and to test the SDF Tokyo earthquake response plan.
GSDF	Cooperative Long-Distance Mobility Exercise (1st cooperative long-distance mobility)	Jun. 15 – Aug. 7, 2009	Middle Army District-North Army District (Yausubetsu Maneuver Area)	10th Division, Major Unit  Personnel: Approx. 4,150 Vehicles: Approx. 1,400		Exercise to improve distance mobility using various transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with the MSDF and ASDF
	Cooperative Long-Distance Mobility Exercise (2nd cooperative long-distance mobility)	Aug. 24 – Sep. 24, 2009	Middle Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver)	14th Division, Major Unit  Personnel: Approx. 1,400 Vehicles: Approx. 560		Exercise to improve distance mobility using various transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with the MSDF and ASDF
MSDF	MSDF Exercise	Actual exercise (Nov. 10–18, 2009)		1. Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District Units  2. Vessels: Approx. 30 Aircraft: 60		Exercise of situational judgment, unit operations, cooperation and coordination for commanders at all levels in maritime operations
ASDF	Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise	Command Post Training (Sep 8–11, 2009)	Air Defense Command (ADC) (Fuchu), etc.	Air Defense Commands, etc.  Personnel: Approx. 450		Exercise of situational judgment, unit operations, cooperation and coordination for commanders at all levels in air operations

## Reference 78. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2009)

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sep. 7 –Nov. 18, 2009	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.A.	17 anti-aircraft companies
	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Sep. 25 –Nov. 18, 2009	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.A.	6 surface-to-surface missile regiments and artillery training unit
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others	Jun. 9 –Jul. 30, 2009	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, U.S.A.	1 destroyer
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of fixed-wing patrol aircraft	Jun. 15 –July 19, 2009	Mid-Pacific areas surrounding Hawaii, U.S.A.	4 P-3Cs * Including participating Rim Pack 2008 (Jun. 29–Jul. 31, 2008)
	Training in the area near Guam by dispatch of mine-laying ship	Oct. 16 –Dec. 8, 2009	Guam, U.S.A. area	1 mine-laying ship
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Aug. 27 –Dec. 8, 2009	Area near Hawaii and Guam, U.S.A.	1 submarine
ASDF	Annual practice by anti-aircraft units	Sep. 14 –Nov. 25, 2009	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.A.	11 anti-aircraft/anti-aircraft training units
	Tactical Airlift Training	Dec. 27, 2009 –Jan. 15, 2010	Sierra Vista (Libby Army Airfield), Arizona, U.S.A., and surrounding airspace	1 C-130H

## Reference 79. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Fiscal Year	Procurement Type	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E=A+D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
			Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D=B+C)		
1994		17,349	1,195	1,056	2,251	19,600	88.5
1995		18,131	914	598	1,512	19,642	92.3
1996		18,725	938	541	1,478	20,204	92.7
1997		18,479	1,173	376	1,548	20,027	92.3
1998		17,344	1,127	348	1,474	18,818	92.2
1999		17,704	1,185	390	1,575	19,280	91.8
2000		17,685	1,249	439	1,687	19,372	91.3
2001		17,971	1,156	489	1,646	19,617	91.6
2002		17,218	1,326	1,101	2,427	19,645	87.6
2003		17,598	1,292	1,006	2,298	19,896	88.4
2004		18,233	1,334	979	2,313	20,546	88.7
2005		18,917	1,525	937	2,462	21,379	88.5
2006		18,818	1,158	1,047	2,205	21,022	89.1
2007		18,649	1,327	856	2,183	20,831	89.5
2008		19,382	1,153	642	1,795	21,177	91.5

- Notes: 1. Figures for "Domestic Procurement," "Commercial Imports," and "Foreign Military Sales" are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.  
2. "Foreign Military Sales" refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.  
3. Figures are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

## Reference 80. Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,668 disposal operations (average of 25 operations per week), weighing about 65.6 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled about 37.2 tons, (accounting for 37.2 % of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Removal of Mines <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II.</li> <li>○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing and disposing of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in the last fiscal year: a total 2,441 units were disposed of, weighing about 25.5 tons in total. (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Medical Activities <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (five out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.</li> <li>○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide emergency medical services and work for the prevention of epidemics.</li> <li>○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.</li> </ul>
Cooperation for Supporting Athletic Meetings <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ In response to support requests from concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of athletic competitions such as the Olympic games and Asian games being held in Japan and national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services and emergency medical services.</li> <li>○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and <i>ekiden</i> road relays.</li> </ul>
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities.</li> <li>○ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.

4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.



## Reference 81. Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel</li> <li>○ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on chemical disasters response, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.</li> </ul>
Transportation Work <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister.</li> <li>○ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)</li> </ul>
Ceremonial Work at National Events <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard<sup>4</sup> forming a line for guests<sup>5</sup> and firing a gun salute for them<sup>6</sup></li> <li>○ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration <sup>7</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Since the seventh observation in 1965 Japan has lent its cooperation such as through the use of icebreaking ships. Japan has contributed significantly to South Pole observation projects, which mark their 50th anniversary in FY2009, and will continue to provide support for such projects in the future through the launch of the new <i>Shirase</i> in 2011.</li> <li>○ In terms of support for the 51st year of observations in the South Pole region, from November 2009 Japan has delivered observation team members and approximately 1,100 tons worth of supplies and provided support for the maritime observations planned by the observation teams through the <i>Shirase</i>, which sailed to the South Pole for the first time.</li> </ul>
Other Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Acting on requests from the Japan Meteorological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions.</li> <li>○ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps.</li> <li>○ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)<sup>8</sup></li> <li>○ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support of flights of private chartered aircraft, and transportation of music bands to Iwoto.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.


5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.

6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.

7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

## Reference 82. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area

Areas around bases are classified according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise, as follows:

Class 1 Area: WECPNL is 75 or more

Class 2 Area: Area within Class 1 Areas in which WECPNL is 90 or more

Class 3 Area: Area within Class 2 Areas in which WECPNL is 95 or more

(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.

2. In terms of loss sustained in running agricultural, fisheries, and forestry businesses resulting from USFJ activities, the Government of Japan compensates for loss based on the Law Concerning Compensation for Special Damages Incurred by Acts of the United States Forces Stationed in Japan (established in 1953).


## Reference 83. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

New Measures	Description of Projects
Initiative to Integrate Various Projects Undertaken in Areas Surrounded by Defense Facilities	Various livelihood-improvement projects being planned separately by municipalities in designated areas where serious problems are caused due to installation and operations of defense facilities will be integrated with certain discretion given to concerned municipalities for project implementation.
Subsidies for Installation of Solar Power Systems	Monitoring will be conducted to study whether it is advisable to provide subsidies to households which have installed a solar power system as part of sound-insulation work so as to reduce their financial burden of electricity charges for air-conditioning equipment which has been also installed for sound insulation.
Promotion of Housing-Exterior Work for Sound Insulation	In order to improve the livelihood of affected households, sound insulation work covering the entire part of their houses will be promoted instead of room-based work as being applied previously.
Community-Building Support Projects	Subsidies and other support will be provided for an initiative by municipalities to promote community-building using surrounding assets (nearby airfields). Such support is meant to significantly contribute to the development of local communities as well as reducing negative effects of defense facilities to minimal levels.
Renovation of Existing Public Facilities	When public halls and other public facilities become unable to meet needs of local people because such facilities have become outmoded with the passage of time or the aging of the population, these facilities will be renovated using subsidies so that they are made barrier free with their safety being enhanced.
Active Use of Assets Near Airfields	The state will promote the use by the general public of surrounding assets it has established and managed, such as green zones, by installing benched and rest facilities and permitting municipalities to use them. The state will also permit municipalities to use farm areas so that they are open to citizens.

## Reference 84. “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009)


Outline of the survey    Period: January 15–25, 2009  
 Respondents: 3,000 people aged 20 years or over throughout Japan  
 Valid responses (rate): 1,781 (59.4%)  
 Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel  
 For details, refer to <<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-bouei/index.html>>

### 1. Interest in the SDF and defense issues



Note 1: Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” until the survey of November 1984.


### 2. Impression about the SDF




Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “not bad impression” until the survey of February 2006.

2. Total of “not good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006.

### 3. Anti-piracy measures



### 4. Necessity of education to nurture feelings of defending the country



**Reference 85. Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2008)**

	Ministry of Defense	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches
1. Number of disclosure requests	1,333	311
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure	1,494	339
Requests accepted	856	113
Requests partially accepted	475	209
Requests declined	163	17
3. Number of administrative protests	256	4
4. Number of lawsuits	1	1

**Reference 86. Outline of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense****I. Introduction**

1. The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was set up at the Prime Minister's Office in December 2007 in response to the frequent occurrence of incidents of misconduct in the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.
2. The Council will conduct continued examination to throw light on individual cases and the organizational problems that allowed them occur and indicate measures to prevent recurrence and a direction for reform. Functioning of the principles of the reform and effective action in line with the duties of the organization requires reconstruction of the organization and decision-making system of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.
3. The Self-Defense Forces now face an era when multi-functional, flexible, and effective action is required. In addition to further enhancement of "safety from armed organizations" emphasized after the war, we need the perspective of "safety provided by an armed organization" in the future.
4. The council proposes a reform of the system so that it can effectively fulfill the security function while securing civilian control.

**II. Cases of misconduct — Defining the problem**

1. Confusion of the amount of fuel provided (breach of reporting duty): Press conferences by the Chairperson of the Joint Staff Council and the statement of the Defense Agency Director and the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the amount of fuel provided to the U.S. Navy vessels were held based on the erroneous figure reported by the Maritime Staff Office (MSO) Operations and Plans Department Director. Not correcting the error after the recognition thereof is a breach of reporting duty and indicates the lack of professionalism and is counter to civilian control. The organizational problem of ill-definition of the responsibility to correct errors shall be corrected.
2. Information Leakage case (communication information revolution and information security): Cases of leaking to the outside business data that included confidential information through file-sharing software installed in private PCs occurred one after another up until 2006. The cause was: (1) recognition by the Self Defense Forces failed to keep pace with the rapid evolution of communication information and; (2) their awareness of security concerning confidential information was not at a sufficient level.
3. Aegis information leakage case (learning of advanced technologies and information security): Case where Aegis information, which falls under the category of Special Defense Secrets, was used as a teaching material, without the regular procedure being followed, and it spread throughout the MSDF. This occurred

as a result of the combination of the willingness to learn about advanced technologies and the lack of awareness of information security.

4. Atago Collision case (Slackening of basic action discipline): MSDF destroyer Atago collided with a fishing ship. The case provided a lesson on what terrible consequences can follow the slackening of basic discipline, an epidemic disregard for rules across the organization and a lack of navigation skills. In addition, it revealed the problem in communications between the staff and the Internal Bureau in an emergency after the occurrence of the accident.
5. Betrayal by the former Vice-Minister of Defense, Moriya: The case where the former Vice-Minister of Defense is accused of receiving entertainment, money, and presents, and of using his influence for the procurement of defense equipment and materials. The pursuit of private profit in procurement is a hideous betrayal that is farthest from the professionalism expected from an official of the Internal Bureau. There is a problem also in the organizational environment that allowed such a grave transgression by a top-ranking officer to continue unchecked.
6. Comprehensive examination of the cases  
In order to control misconduct it is essential to make continual efforts to minimize errors while clarifying goals and mission awareness across the organization.

### **III. Reform recommendation (1)**

#### **—Reform of the thinking of the SDF personnel and organizational culture**

1. Principle of reform  
Based on the examination/analysis of the misconduct cases, we propose the reform principles of: (1) complete compliance with rules, (2) Establishment of professionalism, (3) establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization.
2. Complete compliance with rules  
It is necessary to establish unprompted compliance awareness as an organizational climate. It is also necessary to organize rules to clearly define items to be conformed with.
  - (1) Staff personnel themselves should understand the need for rules and show example by leadership.
  - (2) Workplace education on compliance with rules, focused on necessity rather than formality
  - (3) Rigid adherence to the rules concerning confidentiality and strict punishment for violation
  - (4) Clarification of where the responsibility lies and creation/disclosure of proceedings records to ensure transparency in defense procurement
  - (5) Strengthening of audit/inspection functions, including short-notice inspections
  - (6) Examination and review of the need for rules
3. Establishment of professionalism  
Leadership of superior officers who have a strong commitment to professionalism shall nurture high ethical standards and a sense of mission.
  - (1) Review education programs and how to build administrative experience in order to develop staff personnel with a wider vision.
  - (2) Review the balance between the work load and personnel positioning at individual SDF departments and enhance basic workplace education, while reducing undue burden on the workplace.
  - (3) Fostering professionalism in communication/information security that is essential for modern security guarantee
4. Establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization  
In addition to raising the awareness of individual personnel, units, etc., it is necessary to create an organizational culture that pursues total optimization focused on execution of duties.

- (1) Establishment of a cooperation system by nurturing a sense of unity of civilian and SDF personnel and that of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces
- (2) Establishment of an autonomous PDCA (Plan Do Check Act) cycle
- (3) Improvement efforts shared by subordinates and their commanders, who lead basic units of the SDF, while taking reference to best practices in the private sector
- (4) Expeditious response to policy issues through policy planning based on the IPT (Integrated Project Team) system
- (5) Fully-fledged introduction of the IPT method to defense procurement
- (6) Further promotion of the joint operations system led by Joint Staff
- (7) Implementation of public relations keeping consistency among various interviews as well as between headquarters and individual units in order to prevent public distrust

#### **IV. Reform recommendation (2) —Organizational reform for modern civilian control**

##### **1. Need for organizational reform**

Organizational reform is necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to implement the three reform principles described above more reliably and effectively.

##### **2. Strategy level —Enhancement of the command tower function of the Prime Minister’s Office**

The command tower function of the Prime Minister’s Office as well as that of the Ministry of Defense needs to be enhanced.

- (1) Expressly provide a security strategy for the entire country on which defense policies should be based.
- (2) Enhance meetings where cabinet members, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Minister discuss major issues concerning security routinely and expeditiously.
- (3) Set up a meeting of related ministers for discussion of the government policies etc. concerning improvement of defense capabilities. Set up a permanent organ to support the meeting.
- (4) Reinforce the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat to enhance the system to assist the Prime Minister with regard to security.

##### **3. Organizational reform to enhance the command tower function at the Self-Defense Forces**

###### **(1) Enhancement of the policy decision mechanism that is led by the Minister of Defense**

- (i) Abolish the Defense Counselor System and set up the position of Advisor to the Minister of Defense.
- (ii) Clearly position the Defense Council by law to assist policy decision and emergency response by the Defense Minister through deliberation of three parties: 1. statespersons, including the Senior Vice-Minister, the Vice-Minister and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, 2. civilian personnel, and 3. SDF personnel.
- (iii) Set up a center for consolidation of information and crisis management of the Ministry.

###### **(2) Enhancement of the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy**

Enhance the functions of planning, drawing up and publicizing defense policies. Enhance the functions based on the actual condition of operations by employing SDF personnel.

###### **(3) Enhancement of the function of the Joint Staff**

Abolish the Bureau of Operational Policy and implement operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, on orders from the Minister. Important matters, such as operations by units and defense planning, shall be submitted for the approval of the Minister of Defense after deliberation at the Defense Council. Enhance the functions by employing civilian personnel.



- (4) Unification of the defense capability improvement divisions
  - (i) For total optimization of defense capability improvement, an improvement division shall be established that handles improvement projects, etc., in an integrated fashion by sorting out and restructuring defense capability improvement divisions of the Internal Bureau, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices. Its specific role shall be discussed further. The new system shall allow full fledged implementation of IPT-based procurement.
  - (ii) Conduct a review to change local procurement to central procurement as far as possible. Strengthen a highly independent third-party check system.
- (5) Measures in other priority areas
  - (i) For administration staff, actively use uniformed SDF personnel who are familiar with the unit concerned while advancing integration as much as possible.
  - (ii) Personnel affairs and education/training of uniformed SDF personnel shall be the responsibility of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices, but the Internal Bureau shall also assist the Minister of Defense in these matters in system and policy aspects.

## V. Closing Remarks

Execution plan of the reform recommended here should be promptly put together and implemented. In addition, multidimensional simulations should be conducted before the organizational reform. The Council raised various issues, such as how to facilitate a closer relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces on one hand and the Police and Japan Coast Guard on the other while ensuring the function of the entire country.

The Council expects the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to recreate themselves as proud professionals.

## Reference 87. Minister's Instructions on the Reform of the Ministry of Defense (Pillars of Examination)

(June 3, 2010)

A certain measure of results have come from the examinations to date on the reform of the Ministry of Defense, and hereafter reforms should be implemented in a continuous manner. In light of the change in administration, the decision has been made to reassess the examinations undertaken so far once again from the perspective of the new administration, which has received a mandate from the public.

The new administration accepts a viewpoint of preventing the reoccurrence of misconduct as a matter of course. Not only that, but its objective is to promote reform of the Ministry of Defense from the perspective of effectively and efficiently promoting defense administration that responds to the environment surrounding the Ministry of Defense, while ensuring the effectiveness of civilian control. The specific course of the reappraisals is as follows.

For the promotion of reforms, the necessary examinations must be conducted by creating a ministry-wide promotion structure and then quickly implementing reforms starting with what is feasible.

### 1. Central Organizational Reforms

- Civilian control is the basis of our defense policy. In order to ensure this, it is essential to have an advisory structure for the Minister of Defense, a politician who is the main agent in this, which fully capitalizes on the respective specialties of uniformed and civilian personnel. For this reason, an arrangement in which the Internal Bureau will work to gather the opinions of the ministry, while at the

same time enabling the Defense Minister to hear the organizational opinions which capitalize on the respective specialties of uniformed and civilian personnel is thought to be valid.

From this perspective, the unification and intermixing of uniformed and civilian personnel into the internal bureaus within the Bureau of Operational Policy and the Bureau of Defense Policy, as well as the Staff Offices, will be reexamined.

- Conversely, defects deriving from the dual organizational structure in the Bureau of Operational Policy and the Bureau of Defense Policy have been pointed out, and so examinations for correcting these must be undertaken.
  - It is necessary to examine work modalities while carrying out simulations for each state of affairs in the aim of avoiding duplication between the work of the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff, as well as to facilitate decision-making while securing the cooperation of uniformed and civilian personnel.
  - For the Bureau of Defense Policy, it is necessary to examine work modalities in order to create truly effective defense capabilities while focusing on avoiding inflexibility in budgetary allocations and improving the efficiency of the maintenance of defense capabilities.
  - A defense council comprised of the Ministry's top three politicians, civil officials, and uniformed personnel which serves as an advisory organ for the Minister of Defense will play a vital role when it comes to unifying the purpose of the Ministry of Defense, including the decision making within these two bureaus. But examinations are necessary on installing such a council with a view toward facilitating and improving the efficiency of this unification of purpose.
  - In order to foster unity between uniformed and civilian personnel, examinations on uniformed and civilian personnel exchanges and training are necessary, focusing mainly on those who are still young.

## 2. Reform of Acquisitions

With regard to reform of acquisitions, we must pay thorough attention to ensuring fairness and transparency in our contracts. Not only that, but we must also comprehensively examine reforms in the areas of maintaining and improving equipment, as well as ensuring defense industries and technology bases.

## 3. Securing and Fostering Human Resources

With regard to securing and fostering uniformed and civilian human resources, we must secure superior group members, while also examining policies to foster group members who maintain excellent discipline while keeping an ethical mindset and a broad outlook. When it comes to making the nurse training course into a four-year program in particular, we must carry out ministry-wide initiatives in order to achieve this.

## 4. Handling of Policies for Preventing the Reoccurrence of Misconduct Implemented To Date

The decision has been made to continue implementing policies for preventing the reoccurrence of misconduct that have been implemented pursuant to the report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. In light of recent cases of misconduct (inappropriate remarks by SDF top brass officials, case of collusion with ASDF suppliers, etc.), we must firmly examine whether or not additional countermeasures are required.