

Section 4. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

In recent years, the international community has firmly recognized the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials in the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For this reason, efforts toward non-proliferation, which regulate and strictly control their export, have become pressing tasks for the peace and stability of today's international community.

From a humanitarian point of view, international public opinion demanding regulation of certain conventional weapons has also been rising. For this reason, responding to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons, while continuing to consider the balance between such humanitarian demands and defense necessity, has become an important challenge for each country.

As an effort to address these challenges, a regime dealing with arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation is being developed with the cooperation of all nations.

(See Fig. III-3-4-1)

Based on the above, Japan plays an active role in efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic and step-by-step measures for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as in international efforts related to the disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and furthermore in those related to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons.

Fig. III-3-4-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles, and Related Materials

Item	Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Chemical Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Means (Missiles)	
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation-related treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) The Convention of Cluster Munitions Restriction on Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons U.N. Register of Conventional Arms
Export control system for non-proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New international efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540				

This section will explain the measures of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF toward efforts concerning arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation carried out by international organizations including the United Nations.

1. Efforts on Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Nuclear Weapons

(1) Related Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are shown in Reference 64.

(2) Japan's Efforts

From the perspective of reinforcing the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, Japan has been proactively participating in discussions for better implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in addition to continuing its work aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and efforts for the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

2. Biological Weapons/Chemical Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons are shown in Reference 65.

(2) Japan's Efforts

a. Since 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have dispatched chemical protection specialists to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. As members of the Japanese delegation they assisted to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to The Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. There is currently one GSDF officer serving in this capacity.

(See Reference 64)

At the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), small quantities of chemical substances which are subject to regulation in the convention, are synthesized for the purpose of protection research. Therefore, in accordance with the stipulations of the convention, inspections have been implemented a total of seven times since the initial establishment of the organization.

In addition, the government as a whole is working on projects to dispose of abandoned chemical weapons in China, according to the CWC. Based on results of investigations so far, it is estimated that even now up to approximately 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons of the former (Imperial) Japanese Army remain buried in Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have sent six personnel including GSDF officers on loan to the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC. Since 2000, GSDF chemical and ammunition specialists have been dispatched to the location for excavation and recovery projects a total of nine times. From August through September 2009, seven SDF personnel participated in excavation and recovery projects in Lianhuapao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China, conducted by the Cabinet Office, and carried out the

identification of shells, checked for the presence of pollution, and provided guidance for the safety, etc., of workers.

- b. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), cooperation is being given to efforts to strengthen it by sending SDF officers who are pharmaceutical and medical specialists, to relevant meetings.
- c. Personnel have been dispatched to the Australia Group (AG) Meeting every year since 1994, and they are collaborating to help make the group's regulations and agreements effective.

3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

(1) Relevant Agreements

International political agreements and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of means of delivery (missiles) are shown in Reference 67.

(2) Japan's Efforts

The Ministry of Defense has been dispatching personnel to the assembly of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) every year since 1992, and they are collaborating to help increase the effectiveness of the MTCR's regulations and agreements.

2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Related Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons recognized as being inhumane, are shown in Reference 68.

2. Japan's Efforts

(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been conducted to reduce the humanitarian risks that may be brought about by explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as unexploded ordnance.

In the 2003 Conference of the State Parties to the CCW, the protocol related to ERW (called Protocol V) was adopted and came into effect in November 2006.

However, discussion regarding ERW continued, due to the necessity of responding to the problems brought about in particular by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that have multiple sub-munitions in themselves). At the Conference of the State Parties in November 2007, it was decided to carry out negotiations for responding promptly to the humanitarian concern of cluster munitions. However, a final consensus has yet to be reached as of present.

With regard to the issue of cluster munitions regulations, Japan believes that in addition to contributing to the convention on cluster munitions, it is important for a protocol on cluster munitions to be established under the CCW framework in which major producers and possessors of cluster munitions, including the United States, China, and Russia, are participants. Japan therefore engages in active discussions with relevant countries by dispatching a delegation, including personnel from the Ministry of Defense, to the conferences of the State Parties and group of governmental experts, where discussion and negotiations are taking place for the purpose of the addition of the protocol.

(2) Convention on Cluster Munitions

Regarding the cluster munitions issue, the prohibition of cluster munitions outside the CCW framework has gained momentum. Later, as a result of negotiations (Oslo Process)²⁸ at a series of international conferences, the Convention on Cluster Munitions²⁹ was adopted by 107 countries, including Japan, at the Dublin Conference in May 2008. The Convention was signed by 94 states (including Japan) in Oslo in December 2008 and Japan submitted the acceptance of the treaty in July 2009.

In February 2010, the 30th ratification, which is required to make the convention effective, was received by the United Nations Secretary-General and the convention will go into effect on August 1 of the same year. Meanwhile, however, major producers and possessors of cluster munitions such as the United States, China, and Russia have not signed the convention to date.

The use of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF will immediately be banned once the Convention enters into force in Japan in August 2010. Thus, from the viewpoint of national security, the Ministry of Defense and SDF are promoting the introduction of precision-guided equipment that immediately supplements part of the functions of cluster munitions.

Moreover, as a rule all cluster munitions that Japan possesses must be discarded within eight years of the treaty entering into force. Therefore, Japan plans to work safely and steadily to discard all cluster munitions.

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)

International interest in anti-personnel mines skyrocketed at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1999, the Ottawa Treaty went into force and as of present the signatories of the treaty have climbed to 156.

As of February 2003, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines was completed by the Ministry of Defense and SDF, excluding the minimum necessary amount retained as an exception, recognized in the convention for the purpose of developing technology and training in landmine detection and clearance.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain the security of Japan, as an alternative that poses no danger of causing harm to civilians and does not fall into the category of anti-personnel mines banned in the convention, the acquisition of an anti-personnel obstacle system, which includes directional fragmentation charges³⁰, is proceeding.

Only 13 out of 26 ARF participating nations have concluded this convention. For this reason, until now the Ministry of Defense has been encouraging ARF participating nations who have not yet done so to conclude the convention.

What is more, the Ministry of Defense has been submitting annual reports to the United Nations on data such as exceptional possession, while also actively cooperating in international efforts on the issue of anti-personnel mines, by dispatching its staff from time to time to relevant international conferences where necessary³¹.

(4) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

Every year, the Ministry of Defense registers data on the amount of imported defense equipment with the United Nations, while also voluntarily providing information related to its holdings, domestic procurement of such equipment, and its domestic procurement of small arms and light weapons. It also dispatches its staff to expert meetings and so on where necessary, which are carried out to improve and strengthen this system.

3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of WMD

1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

(1) Launch of the PSI

The United States was deeply concerned that countries such as North Korea and Iran were engaged in the development of WMD and missiles. Therefore, in December 2002 it announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and advocated the comprehensive three-pillared approach consisting of “non-proliferation,” “counter-proliferation,” and “dealing with the use of WMD.”

As a part of this, the United States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)³² in May 2003, and called out to other nations to endorse it. As a result the PSI has developed into an international effort endorsed by over 90 countries, as of May this year, including Japan.

In support of this effort, there have been undertakings to improve the capability to prevent WMD proliferation. By the end of May 2010, PSI interdiction exercises were conducted 35 times, while meetings were held to discuss policy and legal challenges.

(2) Efforts by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF regard participation in PSI efforts as important and necessary to make efficient use of SDF capabilities in support of the PSI while working in harmony with relevant organizations and countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense began to send delegations consisting of MOD officials including uniforms to various PSI meetings as well as to take part in overseas PSI interdiction exercises in observer status in order to gather necessary information about PSI efforts after the third Paris Plenary Meeting (September 2003). Since 2004, the SDF has fully participated in PSI exercises continuously.

To date, Japan hosted PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercises on two occasions and the Ministry of Defense made commitments along with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and the Japan Coast Guard. Moreover in October 2009, the Ministry dispatched a MSDF destroyer and P-3C aircraft to the PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise in Singapore.

Given the current situation of proliferation around Japan, the Ministry of Defense considers that the PSI should be seen as a security issue which involves a wide range of domains including defense, diplomacy, law enforcement, and export control and it is necessary to constantly engage in prevention of the proliferation of WMD. Because of the necessity to improve SDF capability to deal with proliferation challenges, the Ministry will continue participating in or hosting various exercises and meetings, as well as commitment to activities to strengthen the comprehensive nonproliferation mechanisms, including the PSI.

(See Fig. III-3-4-2)

Fig. III-3-4-2 Defense Ministry Participation in PSI Interdiction Exercises (Since Last Year)

Date	Exercises	Exercise Location	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
October 2009	PSI Maritime Interception Exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	One destroyer vessel and two patrol aircraft (P-3C) participated

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which aims to take appropriate and effective action because the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery pose a threat to the peace and stability of the international community. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its details include: 1) to refrain from providing support of any kind to non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 2) to adopt and execute appropriate and effective legislation to prohibit the production, etc., of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular; and 3) to establish border controls and export control measures for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Based on the danger imposed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the peace and stability of the international community, which includes Japan, the prevention of proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists, is an urgent task for the international community. Based on the recognition of this fact, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, and hopes that all United Nations members will observe the resolution.

Notes:

- 1) Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions.
- 2) Missions defined in Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities.
- 3) The Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations.
See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/law/law_data02.html>.
- 4) The Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anpo/houan/tero/index.html>>.
- 5) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/kyuuyu_sinpou.pdf>
- 6) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>
- 7) This is a system adopted by the United Nations in 1994 in order to make mobilized deployment possible for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The system aims for swift and smooth decision making by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the event of an actual peacekeeping operation deployment by having United Nations member nations inform the Department beforehand of their available scope of contribution to said operations.
- 8) Tires that allow vehicles to maintain mobility, even when punctured and deflated.
- 9) Conflict related activities carried out under the jurisdiction of the United Nations based on a U.N. Resolution to maintain international peace and stability including ensuring the observance of agreements between combatants regarding the prevention of the recurrence of armed conflict, support for the establishment of governing bodies through democratic means carried out following the end of conflict, and others.
- 10) Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations, or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- 11) A general term that refers to functions that support combat, and that maintain and enhance the fighting capabilities of units, such as supply, equipment, retrieval, transport, hygiene, construction, real estate, labor and staff work.
- 12) The Law concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams.
See <<http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S62/S62HO093.html>>
- 13) As of April, 2010, 46 countries are participating in ISAF in support of the Afghanistan government by maintaining public security in Afghanistan to prevent it from becoming a nest for terrorism again.
- 14) Japan is pursuing various anti-terrorism measures with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls; collection and analysis of intelligence; measures to prevent hijackings and similar acts; measures against attacks using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; security of important domestic facilities; and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action

Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks” containing 16 specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as the international exchange of information concerning lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verification of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.

- 15) Since January 2008, based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, support was limited to replenishment of military vessels of the countries performing anti-terrorist duties to stop terrorism on the ocean. Counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations are activities undertaken by international militaries such as inspections, verifications, and other necessary measures to ships navigating the Indian Ocean in order to interdict and deter the transportation of terrorists, weapons, etc., through concerted efforts by the international community, as part of the activities contributing to the achievement of U.N. Charter objectives.
- 16) In November 2009, the government prepared the “New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism” (a new Japanese aid package for Afghanistan and Pakistan) in which it determined to provide up to US\$ 5 billion over five years beginning in 2009 depending on future conditions in Afghanistan to replace the already promised total of US\$2 billion in aid, while also providing ¥80 billion in urgently needed aid.
- 17) The results of replenishment support activities under the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law were reported to the Diet on April 2, 2010, based on the law.
- 18) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member states to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq, and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
- 19) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>>
- 20) Official title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force
- 21) This is a multilateral meeting that gathers defense-minister-level officials from the Asia-Pacific region and it is held with the objective of discussing defense issues and regional defense cooperation. It began under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research facility in the United Kingdom. Since the first meeting in 2002 it has been referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue, after the name of the hotel where it is held every year in Singapore. See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/iiss.html>>.
- 22) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/m/update/youjin/2009/04/23b.html>>.
- 23) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/09.html>>.
- 24) Aside from Japan, the United States and India also participated.
- 25) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/cn_kr_06/china_kpress.html>.
- 26) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/27b.html>>.
- 27) The 27 ARF members include the 10 member countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (from 1995), Myanmar (from 1996)), as well as Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (from 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, ROK, Russia, United States, Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (from 2000), Pakistan (from 2004), Timor-Leste (from 2005), Bangladesh (from 2006), Sri Lanka (from 2007), and the European Union.

- 28) Participating countries include Norway and other sponsors (Peru, Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, etc.) and many developing countries such as Latin American and African countries which were included in the NGO-centered process.
- 29) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/shomei_37.pdf>.
- 30) Explosives for use in anti-infantry combat, which obstruct the approach of enemy soldiers. So that civilians do not get indiscriminately hurt, personnel operate them with their target in sight. They are not designed to detonate in the presence, approach, or contact of people.
- 31) The Ministry of Defense recommended retired SDF members to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) between 1999 and December 2006, to provide support for anti-personnel mine removal activities in Cambodia. These retired SDF members were dispatched as maintenance and transport advisors for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the JICA framework of long-term dispatched specialists.
- 32) The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an initiative to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials in accordance with existing international and domestic laws and at the same time considers steps which participating nations can take together. It also works toward the legislation of stricter related domestic laws wherever possible for each country.