Section 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-term Defense Program

1. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy

As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan’s security: to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan and to repel them, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that threats will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives by combining Japan’s own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community in an integrated manner.

1. Japan’s Own Efforts

Japan’s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that Japan will make its utmost efforts, utilizing all available means, to prevent threats from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts fail to prevent the threat from reaching the country, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making the appropriate decisions and bringing together all relevant organizations, such as the SDF, the police and the Japan Coast Guard, and ensuring adequate cooperation among them. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work together closely to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic and other activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment.

The guidelines prescribe that Japan’s defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and that the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities.

2. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to ensuring Japan’s security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan–U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues, as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, the close Japan–U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of international efforts to prevent and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies.

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements do not function simply because of the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make this agreement effective, it is essential to make continuous efforts in times of peace. From this perspective, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (Strategic Objectives, Role-sharing and Military Posture)

Based on the posture of Japan’s security and defense capabilities clarified in the 2004 NDPG, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize perceptions of the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements
The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various forms of operational cooperation and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

3. Cooperation with the International Community
The 2004 NDPG states that in order to improve the international security environment in cooperation with the international community and to help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of official development assistance (ODA). The guidelines also state that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region extending from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Therefore, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries concerned in order to deal with common security challenges. Japan will also actively engage in U.N. reforms, as well as promote efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF).

2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities

1. Role of Defense Capabilities
In recognition of the new security environment, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) define the role of defense capabilities as:
1) Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies
2) Preparation for response to a full-scale invasion
3) Proactive efforts, on Japan’s own initiative, to improve the international security environment. The guidelines state that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture deemed necessary to carry out missions effectively in each area.

The 1995 NDPG clearly stated the maintenance of the defense posture of each branch of the SDF. However, the current 2004 NDPG adopts the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operations being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on this concept, the guidelines specify in a comprehensive manner, the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of the SDF posture under “The Role of Defense Capabilities.”

(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies
New threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and have the potential to emerge suddenly. In order to effectively counter such situations, it is necessary for Japan to form and deploy highly ready and mobile defense force units in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan’s geographical characteristics. When contingencies do actually occur, the SDF will act quickly and appropriately in accordance with the characteristics of the situation. In that event, the SDF will work in close collaboration with the police, the Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant organizations in accordance with the situation’s development and the need for division of labor to respond to the situation in a seamless manner.

Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows.
Part II  The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
Japan will effectively deal with ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a system to counter such attacks, including a BMD system, to be established at an early date.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats through efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1)

b. Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces
In response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, Japan will maintain the necessary defense force structure to effectively deal with the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner, including swift and concentrated unit deployments. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands
Because of Japan’s geographical characteristics, featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands can be envisioned as one method of orchestrating an armed attack against Japan. In this regard, Japan must maintain a defense structure which is capable of dealing with precise guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

d. Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan’s Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and Other Vessels
Early detection is extremely important in order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies and to prevent said contingencies and the expansion of contingencies when they should occur. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains a key role of the SDF. For this reason, Japan will maintain warships, aircraft, and other equipment necessary to achieve this aim. Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond swiftly and appropriately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning armed North Korean special operation vessels and submerged navigation within Japanese territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will maintain a structure to take appropriate actions against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan’s territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and Special Disasters
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster or a special disaster such as a nuclear disaster, it is of extreme importance that Japan utilizes the capabilities of the SDF to ensure the security of the people. For situations in which protection of life or property are necessary, Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and personnel with specialized abilities and expertise with the ability to undertake disaster relief operations throughout Japan. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5)

(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion
While the likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. Proactive engagement is also required of Japan, on its own initiative, aimed at improving the international security environment.

In recognition of this security environment, the 2004 NDPG states that Japan will depart from the previous defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare and implement a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for responding to full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing numbers.
Current Defense Situation of the Nansei Islands

Geographically, Japan is home to a vast number of offshore islands. Therefore, it is necessary for Japan to take every measure possible so that this geographical characteristic does not become a vulnerability in the instance that one of such islands is invaded.

The Ministry of Defense and SDF continuously patrol the sea and airspace of the Nansei Islands and surrounding areas during times of peace, and conduct various different activities such as collecting information necessary for national defense and working to detect signs of a contingency in the early stages. In addition, the SDF maintains preparedness that allows for flexibly transferring and deploying forces to effectively handle invasions of Japanese islands.

Amidst these circumstances, Japan has advanced the development of the defense structure in the Nansei Islands, such as by reorganizing the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 1st Combined Brigade into the GSDF 15th Brigade and enhancing it in March 2010.
In addition, Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) vessels and aircraft are monitoring the surrounding waters of the Nansei Islands as of recent, and these monitoring forces have been strengthened in recent years.

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) fielded a F-15 fighter aircraft squadron at Naha Air Base by March 2009 in order to prepare for the phase out of F-4 fighters and to sustain effective defense posture for air threats.

On the other hand, currently there are no SDF units deployed to the west of Miyako Island, where an ASDF radar site is stationed, making this area a sort of “vacuum” in terms of defense. Considering the security environment around Japan, the Ministry of Defense is examining the role of the defense of the Nansei Islands including deployment of a new unit.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up will require time, the 2004 NDPG states that Japan will secure the most fundamental element of its defense capabilities in order to prepare for full-scale invasion.
(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3)

(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan’s Own Initiative to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities
It is stated in the 2004 NDPG that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative with the objective of further ensuring the peace and security of Japan, rather than simply “making a contribution,” as was stated in the previous version of the guidelines.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is extremely broad, and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country’s unified efforts. Within the framework of the Government’s overall policy, the SDF must be appropriately engaged in international peace cooperation activities drawing on its self-sustainability and organizational capabilities. For this reason, the SDF plans to establish the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining a highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities.

In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, Japan maintains that necessary arrangements will be made including efforts to properly prioritize these activities within the SDF’s overall missions.
(See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1)

b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges
Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts contribute to the effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, activities which contribute to the peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the area of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations.
(See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 and 3)
2. Fundamental Elements of Japan's Defense Capabilities

The following are fundamental elements of Japan's defense capabilities that are included in the 2004 NDPG, which are necessary to fulfill the defense roles described earlier.

(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture so that all SDF services can operate in a unified manner in such situations from the moment they arise.

For this reason, the Joint Staff was established and the infrastructure for joint operations was put in place in such areas as education and training, and information and communications, and the SDF reexamined its existing organizations for joint operations capabilities so as to enhance their efficiency.

(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4)

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order for defense capabilities to function effectively with multi-functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to build and fully utilize advanced intelligence capabilities, including the ability to detect contingencies as early as possible and to consolidate and share intelligence accurately and in a timely manner.

Therefore, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, considering the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen its intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which will play a role in supporting these capabilities, and in this regard, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-6)

(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan's Defense Capabilities

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations resulting from progress in information science and technology should be adequately reflected. In particular, advanced command and communications systems as well as information communication networks that can respond even to cyber attacks shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems while the rapid intelligence-sharing systems that are indispensable to the SDF's joint operations described above will be enhanced in line with the advanced information and communication technologies available in Japan and abroad.

(See this Chapter, Section 6-2)

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to achieve greater outcomes with limited human resources, the 2004 NDPG notes the necessity to recruit human resources with high potential and train and educate them to adequately respond to increasingly diverse and international SDF missions and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment.

Research and education on security issues will be promoted together with a reinforcement of the manpower foundation for promoting such research.

(See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)
Establishment of the Branch of Service of Military Intelligence

Previously there had been 14* branches in the GSDF. Although exhibiting their own individual characteristics, they have developed a flexible response with respect to all kinds of circumstances. Meanwhile, in recent years, the importance of information has been mounting in the defense sector, and accordingly, the branch of service of Military Intelligence was newly established in March 2010 in order to develop personnel who will retain highly specialized skills, and to strengthen the intelligence functions of the GSDF. This is the first new branch of service established since the foundation of the GSDF itself.

Due to the establishment of the Military Intelligence Command, not only will personnel who specialize in intelligence be stably and sustainably secured, it is also thought that gradual and systematic human resource development will become possible over a long-term perspective, and the human foundation with respect to information strengthened.

The Military-Intelligence GSDF units include the Military Intelligence Command, the Army Military Intelligence Units and the Army Intelligence Analysis, working on such tasks as information and data gathering and processing.

[Origin of service badge]
The golden bird on the badge is a golden crow called Yatagarasu, which according to Kojiki and other writings led the forces of Emperor Jinmu — who would become the founding emperor of Japan — to victory around 3,000 years ago. This crow is frequently used in Japan as a symbol of information and victory in battle.

The items held in each of the bird’s three feet are a “telescope” which symbolizes information gathering, a “key” which symbolizes the key of preserving and analyzing information, and the “Japanese sword” which symbolizes the intangible fighting strength of information, and the sharp edge of its incisive analysis.

* Infantry, Armored, Artillery, Aviation, Engineer, Signal, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, Chemical, Military Police, Finance, Medics, and Military Band.
3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability

The attached table of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) clarifies the specific posture for the defense capabilities needed to fulfill the missions described above. The following provides an overview.

1. Ground Self-Defense Force
   (1) Establishing a More Effective System
   a. Basic Strategic Units

Divisions and brigades are the basic units that possess combat functions such as infantry and tank units, combat service support functions such as airborne and communications units, and logistic support functions such as supply units, in order to execute their various missions independently. Due to these characteristics, divisions and brigades are referred to as basic strategic units.

In order to effectively respond to new threats and contingencies that are difficult to predict and require prompt response, in peacetime, regionally deployed units (basic strategic units) comprising eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed. The units will be stationed with consideration given to Japan’s geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers, and straits, and one armored division (7th Division) will be maintained as a mobile operation unit.

(See Fig. II-2-2-1)
b. Formation of the Central Readiness Force

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies should they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be maintained, for the unified control of Mobile Operation Units (Central Readiness Regiment, etc.) and various other specialized units (Central NBC Unit, etc.), as a unit which will be provided to each area in the case of contingencies. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be maintained to conduct the necessary education, training and research with the aim of swiftly dispatching personnel for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Transition to Personnel-oriented System in Response to the New Security Environment

The transition will be made from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept to a personnel (manpower)-oriented system in order to respond quickly to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, and large-scale disasters by deploying units across the country and enhance participation in international peace cooperation activities.

Specifically, the amount of primary equipment, tanks and artilleries, will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively. At the same time, personnel (manpower) will be reduced from the 160,000 authorized number of personnel in the 1995 NDPG to 155,000, while the fixed number of full-time SDF personnel will be increased from the 1995 NDPG figure of 145,000 to 148,000 in order to guarantee effective response. (See Fig. II-2-2-2)
Opening of New (Vice) Camps, etc.

In March 2010, a new facility was constructed at Camp Kochi, which is located in Konan City, Kochi Prefecture, and Vice-Camp Kitakushima was opened in Matsushigecho, Itano-gun, Tokushima Prefecture.

Both the camp and vice-camp were constructed not only from the perspective of defense and security as a part of the reorganization of the 2nd Combined Brigade into the 14th Brigade, which is in charge of policing the Shikoku region, implemented in March 2006, but also with the aim of providing an effective response to various natural disasters such as Tonankai and Nankai earthquakes.

Camp Kochi is a new facility developed in accordance with the transfer of the GSDF 50th Infantry Regiment from GSDF Camp Zentsuji (Zentsuji City, Kagawa Prefecture) where it used to be stationed. The GSDF 50th Infantry Regiment is the major unit of the 14th Brigade, which is equipped with light armored vehicles, and 120-mm mortars.

Vice-Camp Kitakushima is the first camp or vice-camp of the GSDF to be constructed in Tokushima Prefecture. It was constructed within MSDF Tokushima Air Base, where the GSDF 14th Squadron was newly stationed and deployed. The said Squadron is the first air GSDF unit in Shikoku and is equipped with utility helicopters and observation helicopters.

The GSDF currently has 157 camps and vice-camps nationwide. This was the first vice-camp newly constructed in 16 years since the construction of the Vice-Camp Ashoro (Ashorocho, Ashoro-gun, Hokkaido) in 1994.

The understanding and cooperation of local residents are essential in constructing camps and vice camps. This project was carried out with proactive cooperation and support from the community, after providing a thorough explanation about the construction to relevant municipalities, including Kochi Prefecture and Tokushima Prefecture, as well as local residents. The newly deployed units will work to ensure the safety and peace of mind of the local residents through various activities, and at the same time strive for mutual coexistence with the people through social contribution efforts.

(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response
In order to secure a large number of well-trained destroyers within the limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed according to the level of readiness rather than the conventional fixed formation.

Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (one division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be modified so that one unit is deployed in each of five patrol districts in view of the current security environment.

(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies
Submarines will be deployed in important maritime traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for information gathering and other purposes in order to allow for detecting signs of new threats and diverse contingencies as early as possible and to enable a flexible response.

For this reason, submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (units are to be consolidated, from six divisions with two or three vessels per division to four divisions with four vessels each).

(3) Streamlining of Combat Aircraft Units
In regard to combat aircraft numbers, such as for patrol aircraft, while ensuring the continued surveillance posture of the surrounding waters, as well as its readiness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 as a result of consolidation of units and improvements in efficiency.

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for increased efficiency. From the viewpoint of increasing operational efficiency, patrol helicopter units will be consolidated from eight squadrons to four, and will be ship-based, in principle.

3. Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units
While fighter aircraft units will continue to be major units in order to permit appropriate action in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, in light of the decreased probability of a full-scale invasion of Japan, the number of aircraft will be reduced from approximately 300 to 260 by means of improvements in operational efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft, including fighters, will be reduced from approximately 400 to 350 in line with such developments as the downsizing of air reconnaissance units.
(See Fig. II-2-2-3)

(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities
In order to allow Japan to effectively respond to an invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established.
(See Fig. II-2-2-4)

(3) Division of Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups
The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized from the single group described in NDPG 1995 into two groups: E-767 early-warning and control aircraft units and E-2C early-warning aircraft units.
4. Major Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The 2004 NDPG states that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles. In particular, it has been deemed important for Japan to obtain understanding of its BMD system both domestically and abroad by explaining the system as specifically as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines in the attached table denote the concrete system for BMD as being, “major equipment and major units also available for ballistic missile defense.”

(See Fig. II-2-2-5)
Fig. II-2-2-5
National Defense Program Guidelines Appendix and Structure of the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program at Time of Completion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1976 NDPG</th>
<th>1995 NDPG</th>
<th>2004 NDPG</th>
<th>2005 Mid-Term Defense Program at Time of Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>About 161,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready reserve</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>About 152,000¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionally deployed units in peacetime</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile operation units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 armored division</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 artillery brigade</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 combined training brigade</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
<td>8 anti-aircraft artillery groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Main artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyer units</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
<td>4 escort flotillas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(for mobile operations)</td>
<td>(Regional units) 10 units</td>
<td>(Regional units) 7 units</td>
<td>(8 divisions)</td>
<td>(8 divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer units</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(regional district units)</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla (Land-based)13 squadrons</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla 9 squadrons</td>
<td>1 minesweeper flotilla 9 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrol aircraft units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>About 60 ships</td>
<td>About 50 ships</td>
<td>47 ships</td>
<td>48 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>About 16 ships</td>
<td>About 16 ships</td>
<td>16 ships</td>
<td>16 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
<td>28 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
<td>20 warning groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighter-interceptor units</td>
<td>10 squadrons</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>12 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Support fighter units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Reconnaissance Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air refueling/transport units</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided Missle Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)</td>
<td>About 430 aircraft</td>
<td>About 400 aircraft</td>
<td>About 350 aircraft</td>
<td>About 350 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ships</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aegis-equipped destroyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft control &amp; warning units</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Note 1: In regards to the increase of full-time SDF personnel as outlined in the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program, in order to effectively respond to new threats, and diverse contingencies, and for Japan to proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative, current levels will be maintained, increases to make up for vacant spots will be around 146,000.
First Flight of the Next-Generation Transport Plane (XC-2)

On January 26, 2010, the first flight for the first test model of the next-generation transport plane, the XC-2, was conducted at ASDF Gifu Air Base. The result of the test was favorable and on March 30, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a manufacturing company, delivered the planes to the Ministry of Defense.

The XC-2 — which was developed based on the concept of combining large-quantity loads, long cruising distance, and high-speed cruise — is the largest plane developed independently by Japan in history, and is the second domestically developed transport plane in Japan, following the current C-1 transport plane.

In terms of cruising distance, while the C-1 cruises around 1,700 km (with a disposable load of 2.6 t) and the C-130H cruises about 4,000 km (with a disposable load of 5.0 t), the XC-2 can cruise up to approximately 6,500 km (with a disposable load of 12.0 t). The introduction of this plane has allowed for a significant expansion in air transport capabilities for the ASDF.

As a comparison of the load capacity of transport planes possessed by the ASDF, the XC-2 can load large size trailers while the C-1 can transport standard-size RVs and the C-130H can transport mid-size trucks. If the XC-2 was used in unit deployments, Patriot units would be able to be transported by air.

This expansion in cruising distance and load streamlines the number of flights, necessary time, and number of planes used to achieve a single transport mission, and improves the ASDF’s transport capabilities.

It is expected that the development of the XC-2 will be completed by the end of 2013, and when it commences operations, it will be sent around the world, assigned to air transport missions in contingencies and in peacetime to disaster relief missions or international peace cooperation activities.
4. Additional Elements for Consideration

The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) state that the following elements shall be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining, and operating defense capabilities.


In light of severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures must be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining of defense forces. In addition, effort will be made to harmonize expenditures with other government policies and overall defense capability will be made to function smoothly and efficiently.

In addition, the Government will make the following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the lifecycle cost² (LCC) for equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources focused on core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation.

In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan’s defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to promote more harmonious coexistence between these facilities and the local communities.

2. Time Frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review

The 2004 NDPG provides a vision for Japan’s defense capabilities for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to set a concrete timeline for achieving the goals of defense capabilities more clearly.

However, the guidelines indicate that necessary revisions will be made either after five years or in the instance that there is a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

5. Mid-term Defense Program

National defense is vital to a country’s existence. And defense build-up for it is realized finally in accordance with the budget of each fiscal year. At the same time, however, defense capabilities should be built-up continuously, systematically and steadily based on the security environment surrounding Japan and the role of defense capability in line with a concrete medium-term outlook because research and development of defense equipment, its adoption, improvement of facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in the short term.

Therefore, since FY1986 the Government of Japan has formulated mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, and has built-up the nation’s defense capabilities each fiscal year based on these programs.

The “Mid-term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)” is a plan that defines Japan’s policy regarding the build-up of its defense capabilities and the main projects for the five-year period between FY2005 and FY2009. (See Fig. II-2-2-6 and 7) (See Reference 8 and 10).

Meanwhile, it has been decided that, in response to the regime change, the next Mid-term Defense Program will be drafted in consideration of the conclusion of revisions made to the 2004 Nation Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which will take place in 2010. Amidst these circumstances, in December 2009 policy that will serve as reference for forming the FY2010 defense budget was approved by the Cabinet, clarifying such factors as the relationship between the FY2010 defense budget and the 2004 NDPG as well as a policy for properly developing defense capabilities without a Mid-term Defense Program⁴⁰.
### Fig. II-2-2-6
Number of Major Equipment Increases in the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Equipment</th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Post-Revision¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>49 tanks</td>
<td>49 tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (excluding mortars)</td>
<td>38 vehicles</td>
<td>38 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>104 pieces</td>
<td>96 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat helicopters (AH-64D)</td>
<td>7 units</td>
<td>4 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport helicopters (CH-7JA)</td>
<td>11 units</td>
<td>9 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles</td>
<td>8 companies</td>
<td>7 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve capabilities of Aegis system-equipped destroyers</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>5 vessels</td>
<td>5 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
<td>4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11 vessels</td>
<td>8 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fixed-wing patrol aircraft</td>
<td>4 units</td>
<td>4 crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)</td>
<td>23 units</td>
<td>17 crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)</td>
<td>3 units</td>
<td>3 crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance capabilities of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles</td>
<td>2 groups &amp; required training, etc.</td>
<td>2 groups &amp; required training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernize fighter aircraft (F-15)</td>
<td>26 planes</td>
<td>48 planes²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter aircraft (F-2)</td>
<td>22 planes</td>
<td>18 planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New fighter aircraft¹</td>
<td>7 planes</td>
<td>0 planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New transport aircraft¹</td>
<td>8 planes</td>
<td>0 planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport helicopters (CH-47J)</td>
<td>4 units</td>
<td>3 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767)</td>
<td>1 plane</td>
<td>1 plane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Revisions, such as the modernization of fighter aircraft (F-15) and revisions of how much equipment to develop, were conducted according to Regarding the Revision of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) (Decision by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 20 December 2008).
2. The composition of equipment required for such activities as training differs from equipment used for outfitting units.
3. In addition to the build-up amount listed above, radar parts for 38 aircraft were acquired for the modernization and renovation of fighters (F-15).
4. The development of new fighter aircraft has not commenced as it was determined that, due to the progress of information gathering on the surveyed fighter models as well as further streamlining of cruising times, it is possible to regulate the phase-out of F-4 fighters.
5. The development of new fighter aircraft has not commenced as efforts are being made to further streamline cruising times for currently possessed C-1. This is due to delays in development resulting from the belated delivery of test flight prototypes spawning from airframe strength problems.

### Fig. II-2-2-7  Necessary Expenses for the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Post-Revision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Value²</td>
<td>¥ 24.24 trillion</td>
<td>¥ 23.64 trillion³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and provisions expenses</td>
<td>¥ 10.61 trillion</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-personnel expenses¹</td>
<td>¥ 13.63 trillion</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. In view of the need for the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to show a ceiling on the amount of defense-related expenses for the period covered by the program, necessary expenses under the program are shown on a spending basis, which covers expenditures both for already concluded contracts and new contracts for the period. Figures for the 2005 MTDP are shown in FY2004 prices.
2. Moreover, in the event that it is determined particularly necessary in light of future events that are difficult to foresee, it is possible to acquire the permission of the Security Council to receive up to ¥100 billion in special measures.
3. Moreover, the required amount during the plan for U.S. base relocation costs (reduced amount from the local burden) that were not predicted during the draft of the 2005 MTDP is ¥90 billion in FY2008 prices.
4. The contract amount for non-personnel expenses during the 2005 MTDP is ¥13.65 trillion in FY2004 prices.
6. Three Principles on Arms Exports

A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) addressed issues related to arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related provisions, on the condition that those items would be subject to strict export control.\(^5\)\(^6\)

(See Reference 9 and 12)

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counterterrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the NDPG, it mentioned that the Government would decide whether to take any actions in the future on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts.\(^5\)\(^6\)

The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms export control in light of the country’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.