

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

The main mission of the SDF is to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression in order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan as well as to maintain national security.

In the region surrounding Japan, even today, unpredictable and uncertain factors remain. Considering the devastating loss of lives and property of the people that full-scale invasions could cause, readiness for such invasions is essential.

Japan's SDF has consistently been committed to improving and maintaining readiness and defense capabilities, developing necessary equipment as well as continuing its warning and surveillance activities in surrounding sea areas and airspaces; Japan is thus prepared for a full-scale invasion. Demonstrating the readiness of the SDF in this way helps to prevent aggression.

In the event of full-scale aggression against Japan, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will respond promptly and effectively by means of a joint operational structure to act in a coordinated and integrated manner. Operations to be employed in response to full-scale aggression are classified as follows according to function: 1) operations for air defense, 2) operations for guarding the waters surrounding Japan, 3) operations for land defense, and 4) operations for securing the safety of maritime traffic. In implementing these operations, U.S. forces will support operations employed by the SDF and conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF, including operations which employ strike capabilities in accordance with the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation."

This section explains the outline of typical operations which may be conducted by the SDF to defend the nation in the event that full-scale aggression occurs. (See Chapter 2, Section 3-2)

1. Air Defense Operations

Japan has the geographical characteristics of being surrounded by water and because of modern warfare trends⁶⁸, in the event of an armed attack on Japan, such attacks are therefore likely to begin with surprise air attacks using aircraft and missiles.

Air defense operations are characterized by adequacy of the initial response having a significant effect on the overall operation. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a prompt response posture in peacetime, continuously collect relevant information, and exhibit combat strength promptly and comprehensively from the initial stage of operations.


Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations led by the ASDF, and local air defense operations conducted by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to defend their respective bases and units.

In terms of overall air defense, efforts will be made promptly in response to enemy air strikes to intercept enemy aircraft as far from Japanese territory as possible to prevent the enemy from acquiring air superiority⁶⁹, to prevent damage to the Japanese people and territory, to inflict heavy damage on the enemy and to deter serial air assaults. (See Fig. III-1-3-1)



ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft in flight

Fig. III-1-3-1 Example of Air Defense Operations



Notes: 1. Aircraft with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments, with early warning and control functions in distant sea from national land.
 2. Keeping armed fighters on stand-by in order to immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

(1) Detecting Intruding Enemy Aircraft

The entire airspace surrounding Japan is under constant surveillance by means of air warning and control unit radar and early warning and control aircraft so as to detect intruding enemy aircraft as early as possible.

(2) Identifying the Detected Aircraft

Detected aircraft are identified as enemy or friend according to the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE)⁷⁰ system.

(3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy's Aircraft

In the event that an aircraft is identified as an enemy aircraft, the air warning and control unit assigns destruction targets to aircraft standing-by on the ground or in the air, as well as to surface-to-air missile units of the GSDF or ASDF. The enemy aircraft is then destroyed by guided and controlled fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.



ASDF F-15 fighter launching an air-to-air missile

2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas

Armed attacks on Japan can be made by vessels against Japanese ships and land, as well as by aircraft due to the island geography of Japan. Operations of transport vessels are also predicted to enable large-scale ground forces to land on Japanese territory.

Operations for defending sea areas surrounding Japan will be led by the MSDF in cooperation with the GSDF and the ASDF to execute various combined strategies including anti-surface ships, anti-submarines and anti-air warfare (local) operations. The cumulative result of these operations provides protection to surrounding sea areas by obstructing enemy advances and exhausting the enemy's military strength. (See Fig. III-1-3-2)

(1) Defense on the Sea

The MSDF patrols vast sea areas using patrol aircraft and patrols navigation sea areas with destroyers. In the event that an enemy surface ship or submarine attempting to attack Japanese ships is detected, it will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations), supported by fighters and others as the situation requires.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF patrols the vicinity of major ports and harbors using destroyers, patrol aircraft and minesweepers for the early detection of enemy offensives. Depending on the situation, in order to ensure the safety of ships and coastal areas, support will be provided by fighter aircraft and GSDF surface-to-ship guided missile units, and MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations), will destroy enemy vessels.

Further, the MSDF will remove mines laid by the enemy using minesweepers (anti-mine operations).

(3) Defense in Main Straits

MSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft patrol major straits and detect and destroy enemy surface ships or submarines attempting to pass the sea areas (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). As the situation requires, mines will be laid in main sea areas using minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (mine-laying operations).

(4) Air Defense in Surrounding Waters

Air defense for ships in surrounding waters will be performed by destroyers (anti-air operations) and will receive support from fighters as necessary.




Firing a 127mm cannon from an MSDF destroyer



MSDF SH-60K patrol helicopter launching an air-to-ship missile

Fig. III-1-3-2 Strategy for Defense in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan



3. Operations for Land Defense

In the event of an attempt to occupy the island nation of Japan, the invading country will acquire air and sea superiority on the invading fronts and then land ground troops, etc., on Japanese territory by ship or aircraft.

However, it will be difficult for invading ground troops to demonstrate a systematic fighting force during movements by ship and aircraft, and before and after landing. Land defense operations must take advantage of this weakness to destroy enemy forces as early as possible by countering them between the sea and coastal areas, as well as at landing sites, etc. (See Fig. III-1-3-3)

(1) Defense in the Nearshore Waters


The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will endeavor, as much as possible, to destroy enemy ships transporting ground troops and such, whilst at sea using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters and surface-to-surface missiles to force the enemy to abandon its intention of landing or to reduce its strength.

Further, the ASDF and GSDF will endeavor to destroy enemy aircraft transporting ground troops in the air using fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF will use minesweeping mother ships to lay sea mines and the GSDF will use amphibious mine-laying equipment to lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the mobilization of landing enemy forces.

Fig. III-1-3-3 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces



Shooting by GSDF surface-to-ship missile



GSDF personnel engaged in airborne operations

The GSDF will play the primary role in response to enemy forces planning a landing by concentrating the use of tanks, anti-tanks and special artillery⁷¹, etc. deployed close to the coast. In the event that an enemy lands, the enemy invasion will be obstructed and destroyed through mobile striking ability provided predominantly by special artillery of the units, anti-tank missiles and tanks. The ASDF will support the GSDF with fighters during these operations.

Enemy airborne assaults⁷² and helicopter borne assaults⁷³ conducted in coordination with the landing of ground troops will be destroyed in the early stages mainly through special artillery of the units and mobile striking ability.

Further, the GSDF will conduct anti-air warfare (local) using anti-aircraft firepower starting with surface-to-air missiles.

(3) Inland Defense

In the event that the SDF is not able to destroy enemy ground troops immediately after their landing, an enemy advance will be prevented by pre-deployed units in inland areas with the support of fighters (holding operations). In the meantime, to the utmost extent, units will be assembled from other areas to launch counterattacks to eliminate advancing enemy ground troops.

(4) Countermeasures to be Implemented throughout the Stages of Operations

Throughout each of these stages, efforts will be made by the MSDF using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft, and by the ASDF using fighters to obstruct ocean transport ships providing reinforcements to enemy ground troops and to cut off maritime logistical support lines.

Furthermore, throughout land defense operations, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will carry out air defense, reconnaissance, and transport of units and supplies, etc., required for the execution of operations.

4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic

The sea lane is the lifeline of Japan, a country that relies on imports for most of its food and resources. Operations to ensure maritime traffic safety are important not only to sustain the country's fighting ability and foundation for survival, but also for enabling the support of U.S. forces to the SDF.

The MSDF ensures the safety of maritime traffic by patrolling, escorting ships and making defensive preparations for straits and harbors through a combination of various operations including anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations, anti-air warfare (local) and minesweeping operations. These operations are conducted in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan and also generally around 1,000 nautical miles in the event of establishing sea lanes⁷⁴.

Operations conducted in waters surrounding Japan will be almost the same as those for defending the waters surrounding Japan as described previously.

In the event of operations following the establishment of sea lanes, the sea lane will be patrolled continuously to quickly detect and respond to disturbances from enemy surface ships or submarines, etc. In addition, Japanese vessels will be escorted as necessary.

Air defense of Japanese ships traveling in maritime traffic routes will be conducted by destroyers (anti-air warfare). In this case, depending on the circumstances, support will be provided by fighters.



MSDF destroyer *Samidare* (rear) and *Sazanami* during counter-piracy operations

Notes:

- 1) In Japan, the term “emergency legislation” has no fixed concept; it is rather ambiguous. For example, in the past, a study on legislation concerning operations of SDR, in which defense operation order shall be delivered pursuant to Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, was conducted as “Emergency Legislation Study.” This White Paper regards emergency legislations as legislations for responses to situations that have been developed since 2003.
- 2) A situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.
- 3) A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected.
- 4) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations etc.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>
- 5) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services.
- 6) An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state.) Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.
- 7) Law concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>>
- 8) The Law concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situations.
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/law/yuji/houritu/002b.htm>>
- 9) The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/beigun.html>>
- 10) The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/acsa/acsa_gaiyo.html>
- 11) The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/koukyou.html>>
- 12) The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_4.pdf>
- 13) The Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_5.pdf>
- 14) There are four Geneva Conventions:
 - 1) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Convention I);
 - 2) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Convention II);
 - 3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III);

- 4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV).
- 15) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/treaty159_11a.pdf>
- 16) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/pdfs/giteisho_02.pdf>
- 17) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>>
- 18) The Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/kokumin_hogo.pdf>
- 19) The Prime Minister will assume the position of the Director of the Countermeasures Headquarters, although these positions will be legally prescribed as separate entities.
- 20) Police officers, coast guard officers or assistant coast guard officers.
- 21) Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of members of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.
- 22) GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on.
- 23) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems which automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification and attack using high performance computers.
- 24) Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
- 25) Developed since FY 1999, radar which enables the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles (formerly referred to as FPS-XX).
- 26) Fire Unit (the minimum fire unit of surface-to-air fire units).
- 27) These refer to objects other than aircraft which are recognized to cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to earth such as ballistic missiles.
- 28) A specific example of SDF activity is deployment, upon receipt of the appropriate directive from the Minister of Defense, of Patriot PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF in order to respond to ballistic missiles and prepare for ballistic missiles launched toward Japan. In the event missiles are launched toward Japan, based on the aforementioned directive, these can be destroyed.
- 29) The U.S. is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems with research and development while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is referred to as the evolutionary spiral development method.
- 30) The radar was later on moved to the U.S. Forces Shariki Communication Site.
- 31) A ballistic missile information processing system.
- 32) The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.
- 33) On the day before the actual launch, incorrect information pertaining to the launch was released due to inefficient handling of information by the Ministry of Defense/SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted via a multiple checking system for the Shared Early Warning (SEW), including a check by the Chief of Joint Staff.

See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/bmd/20090515-1.html>>

- 34) For further information about the North Korean missile launch.
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/bmd/20090515.html>>
- 35) Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.
- 36) To systematically patrol a specific area for purposes such as prevention of surprise attack and information collection.
- 37) The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.
- 38) An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations of the trains and stations.
- 39) Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax has been delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.
- 40) Ratio by country of emergency scramble subject aircraft: Russia, approximately 81%; China, approximately 13%; Taiwan, 3% and others, 3%.
- 41) Including territorial waters and inland waters.
- 42) Maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law) refer to actions taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need to protect lives or property or maintain peace and order. Prime Ministerial approval is required.
- 43) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered two unidentified vessels in a surveillance operation in Japanese territorial waters east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. These were suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing vessels. The two vessels were pursued around the clock by patrol vessels, destroyers and aircraft but fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ). They are presumed to have reached a port in the northern part of North Korea.
- 44) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in a surveillance operation and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The vessel did not stop despite repeated orders by the Japan Coast Guard. As a result, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the vessel. However, the vessel continued to make its getaway and made an armed attack on the patrol ship which fired shots in self-defense. The vessel subsequently exploded from possible self-destruction and sunk. Based on facts revealed in the investigation process the vessel was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Further, in 2002 a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in waters approximately 400km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic zone of Japan) in a surveillance operation. The vessel was tracked and observed by patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard, destroyers and aircraft.
- 45) Six vessels have been commissioned since March 2004 with the following main improvements: 1) Speed improved from 40 knots to 44 knots, 2) fitted with 12.7mm machine guns, 3) bullet-proof measures implemented on the bridge and 4) fitted with night vision devices.
- 46) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm and immobilize unidentified vessels in the event of on-board inspections under maritime security operations.
- 47) A non-bursting shell launched from 76mm artillery fitted on destroyers whereby the flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering.
- 48) The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch.
- 49) The Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan.
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>>
- 50) Unit commanders may make a dispatch in the event that 1) intelligence gathering is necessary in order to

provide information to relevant organizations and bodies, 2) it is deemed impossible for the prefectural governor to make a dispatch request and immediate rescue measures are required, 3) life saving rescue operations occur or a fire or disaster occurs in the vicinity of Ministry of Defense facilities.

- 51) The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.
- 52) See <<http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/014-1.html>>
- 53) See <<http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/002-1.html>>
- 54) Parks and playgrounds close to the disaster site are suitable for assembly areas. For example, for lodging and the activities of forces on the scale of one GSDF regiment, approximately 15,000m² is required (an area approximately one-third the size of the Tokyo Dome) and a division requires in excess of approximately 140,000m² (an area approximately three times the size of the Tokyo Dome).
- 55) While heliport sizes differ according to the type of helicopter and the nature of activities, as a rough estimate, each helicopter requires a circle area with a radius of 50 to 100m.
- 56) Manual for Responses to Disasters in Urban Areas, Hilly and Mountainous Areas, Islands and Special Disasters.
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>>
- 57) 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon a request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief may exercise necessary authority, 3) special units may be temporarily formed when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches, and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.
- 58) Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
- 59) Limited to the case where there are no police officials at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.
- 60) Facilities and equipment for the storage, accommodation or maintenance of SDF weapons, ammunition, explosives, ships, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels, barracks, harbors and airports.
- 61) SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within applicable facilities in the event it is considered the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.
- 62) Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft and ships) to guide and protect Japanese nationals overseas on site.
- 63) See <<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ful/kettei/090217keikaku.pdf>>
- 64) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2009/03/17b-02.pdf>>
- 65) Domestic birds such as chickens, ducks and quails.
- 66) In order to enhance Japan's capability for gathering image data, the third and four intelligence-gathering satellites have now been launched The Ministry of Defense has properly utilized the information provided by the satellites.
- 67) As of the end of May 2009, 49 defense attachés (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were dispatched to diplomatic establishments overseas in 38 locations. Utilizing their experience as SDF personnel, these attachés are engaged in military information gathering through exchange with defense-related personnel of the country to which they have been dispatched, as well as military attachés from other nations.

- 68) In modern warfare, air operations play a vital role in determining the success or failure of an operation. Therefore, it is essential to secure air superiority ahead of, or concurrently with, land and sea operations.
- 69) A state in which various strategies can be executed without incurring damage from the enemy due to the security of air superiority.
- 70) An automated nationwide command and communications system to deliver and process commands, and track information.
- 71) Long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets will be used to destroy or intercept infantry, light armored vehicles and facilities.
- 72) Assault units which parachute to the ground from transport aircraft in the vicinity of important terrain to conduct offensives. These units are specially formed, equipped and trained to be able to move quickly by air over long distances.
- 73) Assault units which are delivered to the vicinity of important terrain by transport helicopters to conduct offensives. Compared to airborne offensives, the attack criteria are simply and easily executed.
- 74) Relatively safe sea areas established to enable maritime traffic. The area and width of sea lanes vary according to the threat aspect.