Section 4 Russia

1. General Situation

Russia claims that under former President Putin it has overcome the crisis situation of the 1990s and returned to the international community as “a strong state” that others heed and that can stand up for itself, while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community, and has completely restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s.

One of the contributing factors to these developments was the economic recovery propelled by price hikes of crude oil, its major export product. Russia takes the stance, in pursuing military modernization, that the country will not be drawn into the arms race and jeopardize economic development\(^\text{106}\).

Dmitry Medvedev was inaugurated as the President of Russia in May 2008, and it appears that the Medvedev administration is essentially carrying on the policy stance of the Putin administration\(^\text{107}\). However, since it is considered that there are various sorts of factors that might restrain further social and economic development, such as excessive dependence on the energy resource sector, how the recent trend of crude oil price or the impact on economic development caused by global financial crisis will affect Russian policy development in the future will be a focus of attention\(^\text{108}\).

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture


The National Security Strategy views that Russia’s influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the creation of a multi-polar world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States’ plan to deploy a missile defense system in Europe as well as the approach of NATO’s military infrastructure to the Russian border. Furthermore, it does not rule out the possibility that the conflicts over resources will be resolved by force. In order to ensure strategic security, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use political, legal, economic, military and other instruments in order to uphold national sovereignty and interests.

As for the field of national defense, viewing as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems, Russia exemplifies, as challenges for strengthening defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units\(^\text{110}\) and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its
strategic nuclear forces.

In the meantime, there is the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation that was made in April 2000, which specifically outlines the principles of the military “Concept”. According to this document, the purpose of defense is to deter aggression or coercion by all means, including nuclear weapons, stating that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to retaliate against large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons. The modification of the Doctrine is currently scheduled, based on the formulation of the National Security Strategy.

2. Military Reform

Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its a military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: down-sizing, modernization and professionalization.

Currently, Russia is showing progress in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, and the development and introduction of new types of equipment, and in the improvement of combat readiness. The country’s troop reduction goal, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016.

In structural reforms, a shift to three services and three independent corps and the integration of military districts are nearing completion. Regarding the modernization of military forces, in October 2006 the president approved the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles (approximately 22.2 trillion yen) will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015.

At the same time, in addition to its efforts in the ongoing building of its permanent readiness units by converting all combat troops into permanent readiness units and by establishing an emergency response brigade in each military district by 2012, Russia is also implementing measures toward the introduction of a contract-based service under which soldiers are recruited not by conscription but by contract. This has been done in order to contribute to the improvement of the Russian military’s combat readiness, improve the quality of military personnel, and to maintain highly skilled forces. In so doing, Russia recognizes as a challenge the issues of securing personnel with technical knowledge and abilities through improving the treatment of soldiers. In addition, Russia has been improving the military unit command system, and it is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years. (See Fig. I-2-4-1)
3. Military Posture

1. Nuclear Forces

The Russian military emphasizes nuclear forces in order to supplement its conventional forces. In addition, it allots focus to nuclear forces to secure a global position in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, and as a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States. It is believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) following the United States in scale, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks).

Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005. In addition, flight trials for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-headed version of the Topol-M, started in 2007. In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN); however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is delayed in catching up with its initial schedule. Russia also started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which appears to mount Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2008 have been unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment.

According to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (better known as the Moscow Treaty), the United States and Russia shall reduce the number of their deployable operational nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012 (not including stored nuclear warheads). Continued attention should be paid to the progress of the disposal program. In addition, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive and legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) before it expires on December 5, 2009.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Conventional forces have concentrated their limited resources on specific units to maintain their combat readiness. The Russian military is working to recover the skill level of each of its forces and is conducting large-scale exercises using its conventional forces in Europe. Russia’s military operations are beginning to be active, as has been seen in its participation in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the visits of Tu-160 long range bombers and Navy ships to Central and South American countries for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

The development and procurement of equipment for conventional forces are implemented in accordance with the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015. However, as there are issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the population of young men as well as poor living conditions for military personnel, the modernization of conventional forces is not necessarily sufficient.

As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may influence Russia’s future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.
4. Russian Forces in the Far East Region

1. General Situation

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. The declining trend of exercise activities has ceased, and in recent years activities have revitalized in association with efforts for the recovery of its operational proficiency level. Since 2003, Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including “Vostok,” which is a biennial large-scale anti-terrorism exercise, and “Mobility 2004,” which was an exercise for the country’s permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region.

Furthermore, “Stability 2008”, a major strategic military exercise involving a launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, was conducted in 2008 throughout Russia and Belarus. As part of this exercise, a large exercise called “Bereg” was carried out in the Far East.

Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units, it is necessary to continue monitoring the positioning and trends of future Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind. (See Fig. I-2-4-2)
(1) Nuclear Forces
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian forces in the Far East region possess a variety of weapons, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea- (undersea) and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 80 Backfires are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and coastal areas, including the area across from Sakhalin.

(2) Ground Forces
Ground forces in the Far East region have continuously shrunk in scale since 1990 and currently consist of 15 divisions of approximately 90,000 personnel.

Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. (See Fig. 1-2-4-3)

(3) Naval Forces
The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down since 1990. (See Fig. 1-2-4-4)

(4) Air Forces
Russia deploys approximately 600 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy. This represents a drastic decrease compared with numbers at peak times, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities. (See Fig. 1-2-4-5 & 6)
2. Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan’s Northern Territories. These territories are illegally occupied by Russia although they are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region.

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain...
the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, in association with the recovery of troop skill levels.

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again.

With regard to naval vessels, there is a sign of increase in naval training and other activities\textsuperscript{126}. For example, long-term sea training by submarines and surface ships was conducted for the first time in several years, and nuclear submarines resumed their patrols.

Regarding aircraft, in an attempt to recover its operational proficiency level, a tendency of revitalization in such activities as flights close to Japan’s territorial airspace, exercises and training, can be seen. (See Fig. I-2-4-7)
5. External Relations

1. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(1) General Situation

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in July 2008, which sets out the basic foreign policy of Russia, presents the view that Russia’s international status has been elevated as one of the influential centers in the trend toward multipolarity and lists the following three basic foreign policies: (a) to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) to commit to resolving global issues multilaterally in accordance with the rule of international law, and (c) to form friendly relations with neighboring counties. Russia identifies the development of bilateral/multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the first priority of foreign policy, and it maintains the relationships including multi-lateral frameworks such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Russia has promoted military integration with CIS member countries, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS; Russia has dispatched its federal forces to remain in Ukraine, Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz; it has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system and joint border security treaties with CIS member countries. (See Fig. I-2-4-8)

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasia, Russia pursued military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Since the U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Russia has permitted U.S. assistance or U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan.
Kyrgyz, Tajikistan and Georgia\textsuperscript{133}. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force\textsuperscript{134}. Russia also had a division (approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and later made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004, securing a Russian military base in the country.

(2) Georgia Conflict

In August 2008, Georgia launched a military attack against South Ossetia and clashed with Russian troops stationed there\textsuperscript{135}, leading to a large-scale armed conflict as Russia reinforced its troops in South Ossetia.

With the mediation by France, who was at that time holding the presidency of the European Union, the armed conflict ended after five days. However, the relationship between Russia and Europe-U.S, which was appealing for a peaceful resolution based on the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity, deteriorated as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

South Ossetia, where the Georgia conflict began, has been seeking secession from Georgia, and in 1989 an armed conflict broke out with Georgia because it would not recognize the independence of South Ossetia.

Having envisioned a reintegration of Georgia since his inauguration in 2004, President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili has been suppressing the domestic movement for independence and promoting pro-U.S./Europe policy to facilitate Georgia’s accession to NATO. This led to tense relations with Russia, which adopts a hard-line stance against the U.S. and Europe, recognizing CIS member countries as the priority region in foreign diplomacy.

How Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will influence the movement of secession and independence within CIS, such as the Chechen Republic\textsuperscript{136} in the Russian territory, Nogorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transdniester in Moldova is worthy of attention.

2. Relations with the United States

The relationship between Russia and the United States has improved in various fields through cooperation in the fight against terrorism and other measures\textsuperscript{137}. The United States, however, has expressed concerns about Russian military operations during the Georgia Conflict in August 2008 and domestic affairs in Russia\textsuperscript{138}, while Russia has expressed concerns regarding U.S. foreign policy. Russia states that it must take countermeasures against the U.S. in response to such activities as the large investments by the U.S. into next-generation weapons development and deployment of U.S. military bases in Eastern European countries.

The United States, which has been developing its ballistic missile defense program, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. Russia criticized the U.S. decision as a mistake, but did not regard it as a threat to Russia’s security. However, when the United States agreed with the Czech Republic
Security Issues between the United States and Russia

After the Georgian conflict last year, relations between the United States and Russia deteriorated as Russia criticized the U.S. for its support of Georgia while the U.S. condemned Russia for its use of force and recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As a result, the momentum toward a dialogue between the two countries was lost and talks on issues, including that of security, between them stagnated.

U.S. President Obama, who took office in January this year, stated that he would “reset” the previous relationship with Russia and start a dialogue in a new relationship. He met Russian President Medvedev in April this year. The two leaders:

1. agreed to overcome differences and to cooperate in solving security issues
2. agreed to work toward the conclusion of a treaty to succeed START-I
3. discussed the possibility of mutual cooperation in missile defense (MD), and
4. agreed to cooperate in dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the stabilization of Afghanistan, etc.

Attention will be focused on how the two countries will cooperate to solve security issues.

1. Treaty succeeding START-I

Based on START-I and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), the United States and Russia have reduced their strategic nuclear force, which they built up during the cold war.

At the summit meeting in April this year, the heads of the two countries agreed that the new treaty which replaces START-I, which will expire at the end of this year, shall pursue a reduction of the number of operational strategic warheads to below the level stipulated in the Treaty of Moscow—1,700–2,200 by 2012—and shall include verification/inspection measures based on their experiences with START-I.

Attention will be focused on what kind of talks will be conducted on such issues as whether or not to include the reduction of non-operational nuclear warhead stockpiles in addition to the issues above.

2. Deployment of U.S. MD system in Eastern Europe

Assuming that Iran would develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that cover the continental United States by 2015, the United States planned to deploy an MD system in Eastern Europe as a defensive measure. Putin, then President of Russia, strongly criticized this plan in February 2007. Since then Russia has shown strong opposition to the plan, claiming that it could have a negative impact on the country’s nuclear deterrence.

Last year the United States carried forward the procedure toward deployment, including the signing of the arrangements concerning the deployment of the MD system with Poland and the Czech Republic. The Obama administration clearly indicated that they will not give priority to investment in the system until its technology is established and its cost-effectiveness is proven and that they will continue the deployment of the MD system as long as the Iranian threat continues. President Medvedev, on the other hand, referred to short-range missile deployment in Kaliningrad, Russia, which is adjacent to Poland, in November last year, showing that Russia’s stance of opposition to the deployment of the MD system in Eastern Europe basically remains the same.

With U.S.-Russia relations improving, how the U.S. and Russia will discuss and handle the MD issue, which touches upon the fundamentals of the security strategies of the two countries, is drawing international attention.
and Poland to start full-scale negotiations to deploy part of its missile defense system to these countries, Russia is strongly opposed to this, claiming that the system targets Russia and would negatively impact its nuclear deterrent capabilities. Furthermore, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive and legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace START I before it expires on December 5, 2009.

3. Relations with NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of former Soviet Union countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

However, Russia took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia participates in decision making to a certain degree and acts as an equal partner in areas of common interest. Meanwhile, Russia was dissatisfied that NATO countries would not ratify the Application Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) because Russian forces would not withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Thereafter, discussions were held in such forums as the NRC; however, Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in December 2007, halting inspections based on the treaty. Russia expressed concerns that Ukraine and Georgia reached an agreement with NATO about their future membership at the NATO summit meeting in April 2008. Such circumstances draw attention to the future developments of NATO-Russia consultations, which have been halted since the Georgia conflict.

4. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes the increasing significance of the Asia-Pacific region, which is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures and security. The country is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policy and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (See Section 3-3). Additionally, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. Furthermore, President Medvedev has engaged in active summit diplomacy with leaders in Asia; for instance, in May 2008, he visited China immediately after his inauguration and visited Japan to attend the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July 2008.

5. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation as part of its lasting efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG and Tupolev.

Russia has exported jet fighters and warships to countries including China, India, Algeria, Venezuela and ASEAN member countries. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.