Section 2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two – north and south – for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan. (See Fig. I-2-2-1)

1. North Korea

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas – ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy – and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea’s military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement made at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year’s national budget is 15.8%, but it is estimated that the official defense budget represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by making efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces.

North Korea’s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

1. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of non-proliferation of WMD.

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for extending the range and for putting solid fuel to use. Also, it continues to be pointed out that North Korea is proliferating ballistic missiles.
Fig. I-2-2-1  Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces in ROK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total armed forces</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 1,100,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 880,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 25,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 560,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 17,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle tanks</td>
<td>T-62, T-54/55, etc.</td>
<td>88, M-47, M-48, etc.</td>
<td>M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>Approx. 2,330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 650, 107,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 190, 154,000 tons</td>
<td>Supporting corps only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 580</td>
<td>Approx. 530</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3rd and 4th generation fighters</strong></td>
<td>Mig-23x56</td>
<td>F-4x70</td>
<td>F-15x40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-29x35</td>
<td>F-16x165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-25x34</td>
<td>F-15x39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 23,500,000</td>
<td>Approx. 49,200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military service</strong></td>
<td>Army: 5-12 years</td>
<td>Army: 18-24 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy: 5-10 years</td>
<td>Navy: 20-26 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force: 3-4 years</td>
<td>Air Force: 21-27 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Military Balance 2009, etc.
Combined with the nuclear issue, North Korea’s missile issue constitutes a destabilizing factor for the entire international community, as well as for the Asia-Pacific region, and such moves are of great concern.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful solution to this problem and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which stated the verifiable abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. Subsequently, however, North Korea strongly reacted to the United States’ designation of a bank in Macao dealing with North Korea as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern,” suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and, in 2006, launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had implemented a nuclear test. Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. Finally, in December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the initial actions including shutting down of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon had been implemented, in October 2007, the “Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed. In the meantime, in response to North Korea’s missile launch of April 5, 2009, the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s launch, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718, and demanding that North Korea not conduct any further launch. North Korea suggested boycotting the six-party talks and announced restarting the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rod, and then announced that it would take steps unless the Security Council apologizes, including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles as self-defensive measures, and that the second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009. On June 13, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council resolution 1874, condemning North Korea’s nuclear test in the strongest terms and, imposing additional measures against North Korea. In response to the UNSC resolution, North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc.

Regarding North Korea’s response to the nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension to receive some compensation, while others argue that North Korea’s ultimate objective is to possess nuclear weapons. Considering that the ultimate goal of North Korea is said to be the maintenance of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible with each other.

In light of the series of North Korea’s words and deeds as well as the fact that the status of North Korea’s nuclear development so far is not yet elucidated, the possibility cannot be excluded that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. In addition, the fact that North Korea announced in May 2009 that it had conducted a nuclear test following the one in 2006 implies that there is a high possibility that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. When taken together with North Korea’s enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, it is totally unacceptable as it constitutes a grave threat to Japan’s security as well as seriously undermines the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community.

In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is
difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads\(^4\). It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons
Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, which facilitates camouflage, details of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stocks of such agents. It has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention\(^4\).

(3) Ballistic Missiles
It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C\(^4\), a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. North Korea is considered to have begun developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, such as Nodong, and it is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. In 1998, North Korea used a ballistic missile based on Taepodong-1 in the launch over Japan. In the 2006 launch, which constituted a complete lifting of the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced by North Korea in 1999, North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles in total, the third of which was assessed to have been Taepodong-2 and others to be Scud and Nodong missiles\(^4\). North Korea appears to have used either a Taepodong-2 or a variant\(^4\) in the launch of April 5, 2009.

North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and many of details of its ballistic missiles are still unclear. It, however, appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in terms of political and diplomatic consideration, and earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities\(^4\). And at present, North Korea is believed to be developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new solid propellant.

Fig. I-2-2-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles Possessed by North Korea

![Diagram of ballistic missile range](image_url)

The figure above shows the distance each missile can reach from Taepodong.
short-range ballistic missile in addition to existing inventory of ballistic missiles. Also, it is necessary to pay attention to the possibility that North Korea is making efforts for the improvement of existing Scuds and Nodongs, such as extending their ranges. (See Fig. 1-2-2-2)

It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan. Nodong specifications have not been confirmed in detail, but, as it is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems, for example, not to have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations.

Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the territory, and that Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is believed to be difficult to detect concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing.

Also, North Korea has been developing Taepodong-1 with an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500km. The Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has a longer range: Taepodong-1 might have been a transitory product to develop Taepodong-2.

In July 2006, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area. The missile is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, and with a range of approximately 6,000km. The missile is believed to have been damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site.

In the launch of April 5, 2009, it is thought that North Korea used Taepodong-2 or a variant from the Taepodong district again. Since it is estimated that it crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3000km before impacting in the Pacific Ocean, it is thought that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles compared to its 2006 failed launch of the Taepodong-2. Through the April 5 launch, it is believed that North Korea might have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of multi-staged propulsion devices and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will further develop ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile can contribute to extending the range, payload capability and CEP improvement, and the April 5 launch may lead to the performance improvement of other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea, such as the Nodong. (See Fig. I-2-2-3) (See Fig.I-2-2-4)

As the background of North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation. In light of this, it is necessary to remain watchful of North Korea’s ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to development and deployment.

2. Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).
Fig. I-2-2-3 Flight Image of the Missile Launched by North Korea

11:30  
Missile Launch

Approx. 370km

Danger Area 1

Approx. 320km

Japan

Approx. 540km

Over 3000km

Approx. 11:37

An object appearing to be the first-stage booster

Approx. 400km

The remaining parts

Approx. 11:46

Distance from the Taepodong district

Fig. I-2-2-4 Outline of Flight of the Launch on April 5

It is assessed that it was launched at 11:30 am on April 5 and flew over the Tohoku region to the Pacific Ocean at an altitude of about 370 to 400 kilometers after separating an object appearing to be the first-stage booster.

It is assessed that at around 11:37 am the object appearing to be the first-stage booster fell into the sea about 320 kilometers west of Akita Prefecture (about 540 kilometers from the Taepodong district), which is within the danger area North Korea had designated in the Sea of Japan (Note 1).

The remaining parts are assumed to have flown more than 3,000km from the Taepodong district and fell at around 11:46am in the vicinity of the western end of the danger area North Korea had designated in the Pacific Ocean (Note 2).

Note 1: The area bounded by the following four points
1. 40 - 41 - 40 N and 135 - 34 - 49 E
2. 40 - 27 - 22 N and 138 - 30 - 40 E
3. 40 - 16 - 34 N and 138 - 30 - 22 E
4. 40 - 30 - 52 N and 135 - 34 - 26 E

Note 2: The area bounded by the following four points
1. 34 - 35 - 42 N and 164 - 40 - 42 E
2. 31 - 22 - 22 N and 172 - 18 - 36 E
3. 29 - 55 - 53 N and 172 - 13 - 47 E
4. 33 - 9 - 16 N and 164 - 35 - 42 E
North Korea’s armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration exercises. However, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities
The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 130 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has about 580 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.

North Korea’s military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.

3. Domestic Affairs
Some point out that in recent years North Korea’s regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner, the regime based around Kim Jong II, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on the right track. On the other hand, there have been persistent rumors of his ailing health since he failed to appear at the military parade of the Worker/Peasant Red Guard celebrating North Korea’s 60th anniversary. Considering his age of 67, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the regime will become unstable upon the possible change in power structure in the near future.

On the economic front, North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy-food shortages in recent years as a result of a number of factors including fragility of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War.
Wernher von Braun (1912-1977), who is called the “father of modern rocketry,” had nurtured dreams of outer space since his childhood. He went to work for the German Army to fulfill his desire of building a large and capable rocket, and he developed the V-2 ballistic missile, which is said to have established modern rocket technology during the Second World War.

After the war he moved to the U.S. and it is said that he led the first satellite launch of the U.S. to success by taking advantage of the technology he cultivated through the development of the V-2.

As the career of this scientist plainly suggests, the technology required for ballistic missiles and that for satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) have much in common.

It is believed that the U.S. and the USSR obtained V-2 technology and developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) based on the technology and developed SLVs by using the technologies obtained in the development of the missiles.

Examples of converting a ballistic missile to an SLV include: Atlas and Titan, early ballistic missiles of the U.S.; the SS-25, a Russian ballistic missile; and Dong Feng 5, a Chinese ballistic missile. They are believed to have been converted or partially remodeled for satellite launching.

Both ballistic missiles and SLVs basically consist of (1) an engine section (including a propellant tank), (2) an interstage section (for separation), (3) mounted equipment (storing guidance equipment, radio equipment and electronics for attitude control) and (4) a payload section. Though there is a difference, in that SLVs load satellites in the payload section while ballistic missiles load warheads, they have a virtually common structure. Consequently, the requisite technologies, such as those for increasing the size of propulsion, separation of multi-stage propulsion equipments, attitude control and propulsion control are the same. Therefore, it is possible to test by launching satellites these technological challenges that have to be met for the improvement of ballistic missile capabilities.

In general, there is a difference in their trajectories. A ballistic missile has a parabolic trajectory and guides warheads to the objective points, whereas an SLV has a flat-shaped trajectory after reaching a certain altitude and injects satellites into earth orbit by giving them a certain speed (e.g. 7.8 km per second for an orbit at an altitude of about 200 km, and 7.5 km per second for an orbit at an altitude of about 700 km).
In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries. It is also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined.

In response to these various economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited but realistic reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that, since July 2002, North Korea has raised wages and commodity prices and devaluated exchange rates. However, as North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that could damage its current regime, North Korea would face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation.

4. External Relations

Although North Korea has made efforts to improve its external relations, its activities related to nuclear and missile issues have raised international concerns.

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the “dying wish” of Kim Il Sung and promised to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” North Korea, however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its “hostile policy” toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two parties’ stances.

In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

In addition, although the United States pointed out in its country reports on terrorism that the abduction issue of Japanese citizens is yet to be solved and that the hijackers of Yodo are still living in North Korea, in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on the grounds that North Korea had agreed to a series of verification measures related to a declaration of its nuclear programs submitted in June 2008.

While international concerns over North Korea have been increasing with regard to nuclear and other issues, North Korea and the ROK have continued talks as well as economic and human exchanges. However, following the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK, no further progress has been made in North-South dialogue or exchange. Particularly, the dialogue between authorities, including in the military area, is stagnant.

Concerning relations between North Korea and China, the “China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” concluded in 1961 is still effective. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, North Korea’s relations with China have seen a change from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War. Subsequently, however, the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits and the relationship has improved. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue, China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and has played an active role in resolving this issue by, for example, acting as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and contributing to the conclusion of agreements. Some, however, point out that the relationship between China and North Korea seems not to be as close as it was.

Although relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in February 2000, which lacked the articles on military alliance that were included in the previous treaty. Subsequently, Relations between North Korea and Russia have been improved in recent years, with the heads of both countries making mutual visits.

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea’s nuclear
and other issues.

In order to solve North Korea’s nuclear issue, it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to work together. At the same time, other nations such as China and Russia, which are also participants in the Six-Party Talks, and international organizations including the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), play important roles in this regard.

It is quite natural that it is intolerable for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. However, we also have to pay attention to other security concerns regarding North Korea: it is necessary to closely monitor military antagonism on the Korean Peninsula and the development, deployment and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Because North Korea is a closed regime, it is difficult to verify the trends of its policies and activities. It is, however, necessary to continue to pay close attention to such trends to discern the true intentions of North Korea.

2. The ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution. The administration of President Lee Myung Bak is showing its intention to promote its policy to pursue “co-existence and co-prosperity” with regard to North Korea, and upholds a policy of “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” which aims to offer gradual economic assistance to North Korea in accordance with the progress of the abandonment of its nuclear program.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving the issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime over ROK forces to the ROK. As for the realignment of U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area in the south of Seoul and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is being delayed. As for the transition of the operational control authority in wartime, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed at their meeting in February 2007 that the two sides would disestablish the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition to the ROK on April 17, 2012. In talks between the leaders of the U.S. and ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a new “supporting-supported” command relationship between the U.S. and ROK forces will be implemented.

In response to the request from the United States, the ROK dispatched its troops to Iraq, but in December 2008 it put an end to the mission and withdrew its troops. Since April 2009, the ROK has been sending naval vessels to the Somali coast where they have been engaged in escorting South Korean-flag ships and Maritime Security Operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces.

Between the ROK and China, efforts have been made to promote military exchanges between the countries, including mutual visits of naval vessels and air force planes. In November 2008, hotlines between the naval and air forces of the two countries were established. At the ROK-China summit meeting held in May 2008, it was agreed for the two countries to upgrade the “all-around cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Their relations in the security area, however, remain primitive compared with ones in the other
areas, including the economic area.

Between the ROK and Russia, military exchanges have been made in recent years, including exchanges between senior military officers and mutual visits of naval vessels, and the two countries have also concluded agreements on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and war materials. At the ROK-Russia summit meeting in September 2008, it was agreed to upgrade the relationship between the two countries to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In addition, the ROK has been importing tanks and armored vehicles from Russia since 1995 as a part of redemption of debt.

2. Military Affairs

(1) Defense Policies
The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK had designated North Korea as its “main enemy,” but, since the Defense White Paper 2004, North Korea has no longer been described as such. In addition to the defense objectives, the ROK has identified “fostering an elite, advanced, robust military” as its defense vision and the following eight items have been set as the defense policy focus to achieve these goals and the vision.

(1) Establish defense posture to realize comprehensive security
(2) Creative development of ROK-U.S. alliance
(3) Strengthen advanced defense capability
(4) Military support for creating a peaceful structure on the Korean Peninsula
(5) Professional military development that plays its role in a given position
(6) Establish pragmatic, advanced defense management system
(7) Improve barracks and environment and welfare in accordance with the national development
(8) Military of the people

The ROK intends to promote “National Defense Reform 2020” to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces, elimination of inefficiency, and build-up of barracks culture in accordance with social trends. The bill on the National Defense Reform incorporating the main ideas was enacted in December 2006.

(2) Trends in Defense Build-up
As for the ROK military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 154,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy together) of approximately 530 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been trying to modernize its Navy and Air Force with the introduction of submarines, large transportation ships, multi-role helicopters, and F-15Ks. Also, the ROK plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012. The ROK is introducing domestically manufactured destroyers, and a KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) was put into service in December 2008. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles.

The 2009 defense budget amounts to approximately 29,130 billion won, approximately 9.3% over that of the previous fiscal year. (See Fig. I-2-2-5)
3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK

Combined with the ROK’s own defense efforts, U.S. forces stationed in the country play a vital role in preserving the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and providing a deterrent against large-scale armed conflicts on the peninsula.

The United States has been changing the posture of its forces stationed in the ROK based on the agreement in June 2003 to reposition them to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the agreement in October 2004 to reduce the number of its stationed military personnel, approximately 37,500, by 12,500. As for the personnel reduction, at the U.S.-ROK leaders’ meeting in April 2008, it was agreed to retain the current level of 28,500 personnel as an appropriate size. In the course of these changes, the United States has invested in modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and made efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrence capabilities of U.S.-ROK allied forces based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. (See Fig. I-2-2-6)

The United States and the ROK have engaged in joint exercises in order to increase their combined defense capabilities in dealing with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Among these is the “Foal Eagle” exercise, a large-scale joint logistics support field exercise, which was staged in March 2009 concurrently with the “Key Resolve” joint wartime reinforcing exercise.
Fig. I-2-2-6  Agreement on the Transfer and Relocation of the U.S. Forces in ROK

43 bases dotted all over the country (241,560,000 m²)

After the completion of transfer and relocation

Two strategic points
16 bases (82,995,000 m²)

Joint Exercise Center

Central part

Southern part

Note: ROK Defense White Paper 2006