Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

In recent years, the international community has firmly recognized the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials falling into the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For this reason, efforts toward non-proliferation which regulate and strictly control their export have become pressing tasks for the peace and stability of today’s international community.

From a humanitarian point of view, international public opinion demanding regulation of certain conventional weapons has also been rising. Responding to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons, while continuing to consider the balance between such humanitarian demands and defense necessity, has become an important challenge for all countries.

As an effort to address these challenges, a system concerned with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is being developed with the cooperation of all nations worldwide. (See Fig. III-3-3-1)

Based on the above, Japan will play an active role in efforts creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as in international efforts related to the disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and furthermore in those related to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons.

This section will explain the measures of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces toward efforts concerning arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation carried out by international organizations including the United Nations.

Fig. III-3-3-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials

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1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Nuclear Weapons

(1) Related Treaties
Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are shown in Reference 54.

(2) Japan’s Efforts
From the perspective of reinforcing systems for disarmament and non-proliferation, Japan has been proactively participating in discussions for better implementation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in addition to continuing its work aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and efforts for the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

2. Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties
Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, are shown in Reference 55.

(2) Japan’s Efforts
a. Since 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have dispatched chemical protection specialists from the GSDF to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. As members of the Japanese delegation they assisted to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. (See Reference 56)

At the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), small quantities of chemical substances, which are the target of regulation in the convention, are synthesized for the purpose of protection research. Therefore, in accordance with the stipulations of the convention, inspections have been implemented a total of six times since the initial establishment of the organization.

In addition, the government as a whole is working on projects to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China, based on the CWC. Based on results of investigations so far, it is estimated that even now up to approximately 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons of the former (Imperial) Japanese Army remain buried in Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have relocated five personnel, including GSDF officers to the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons. In addition, collaboration is being given in areas such as the dispatch of GSDF officials who are specialists in chemistry and ammunition disposal, to excavation and recovery operations for abandoned chemical weapons, carried out in China.

Since 2000, GSDF officers have been dispatched to the location for excavation and recovery projects a total of seven times. From August through September last year, eight SDF officers participated in excavation and recovery projects in Lianhuapao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China conducted by the Cabinet Office, and carried out measures such as the identification and emergency disarmament of shells.

b. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), cooperation is being given to efforts to strengthen
it. This is in areas such as the dispatch of SDF officers who are pharmaceutical and medical specialists, to relevant meetings such as multinational negotiations related to the introduction of BWC verification measures.

c. Personnel have been dispatched to the Australia Group (AG) Meeting every year since 1994, and they are collaborating to help make the group’s regulations and agreements effective.

3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

(1) Relevant Agreements
International political agreements and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of means of delivery (missiles) are shown in Reference 57.

(2) Japan’s Efforts
The Ministry of Defense has been dispatching personnel to the assembly of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) every year since 1992, and they are collaborating to help make the MTCR’s regulations and agreements effective.

2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Related Treaties
Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons recognized as being inhumane, are shown in Reference 58.

2. Japan’s Efforts

(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been conducted to reduce the humanitarian risks that may be brought about by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) such as unexploded ordnance.

In the 2003 Conference of the State Parties, Protocol V, related to post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minimize the danger of post-conflict ERW was adopted (coming into effect in November 2006). However, discussion regarding ERW continued, due to the necessity of responding to the problems brought about in particular by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that have multiple sub-munitions in themselves), and at the Conference of the State Parties in November last year, it was decided to carry out negotiations at meetings of State governmental experts this year, for the purpose of responding promptly to the humanitarian concern of cluster munitions.

Regarding the issue of cluster munitions regulation, Japan contributes actively to these issues from the perspective of striking a balance between the humanitarian concern and its security necessity, as well as gaining the participation of major producers and possessors of them. Japan engages in active discussions with relevant countries by dispatching a delegation, including personnel from the Ministry of Defense, to the conferences of the State Parties and group of governmental experts, where discussion and negotiations are taking place for the purpose of the addition of protocol.

(2) The Oslo Process
Regarding the cluster munitions issue, momentum was gained for the restriction of cluster munitions out of
the CCW, and the international conference was held in Oslo in February 2007 where the Oslo Declaration was adopted, claiming to conclude an international agreement by 2008 to ban cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians. As a result of negotiations in the series of international conferences that followed, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by 111 countries, including Japan, at the Dublin Conference in May 2008.

As for the convention of the Oslo Process, Japan is seriously considering concrete steps to follow the signing of the Convention, while studying necessary security measure. The Defense Ministry is also appropriately debating while following its own policies.

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF began disposing of anti-personnel mines in January 2000. In February 2003, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines was completed excluding the minimum necessary amount retained as an exception, recognized in the convention for the purpose of developing technology and training in landmine detection and clearance.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain the security of Japan, as an alternative that poses no danger of causing harm to civilians and does not correspond to the anti-personnel landmines banned in the convention, the acquisition of an anti-personnel obstacle system, which includes directional fragmentation charges, is proceeding.

As of November last year, 156 nations have concluded this convention, but only 12 out of 26 ARF participating nations have done so. For this reason, until now the Ministry of Defense has encouraged ARF participating nations who have not yet concluded this convention to do so.

What is more, the Ministry of Defense has been submitting annual reports to the United Nations on data such as exceptional possession, while also actively cooperating in the international efforts on the issue of anti-personnel mines, by dispatching its staff from time to time to relevant international conferences.

(4) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

Every year, the Ministry of Defense registers data on import amount of defense equipment with the United Nations, while also voluntarily providing information related to its possession, domestic procurement and the transfer of small weapons. It also dispatches its staff from time to time to expert meetings and so on, for the purpose of reviews, which are carried out to improve and strengthen this system.

3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others

1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

(1) Background Behind Adoption of the PSI

The Bush administration was deeply concerned that countries of proliferation concern such as North Korea and Iran are engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In December 2002 it announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and advocated the comprehensive three-pillared approach of “non-proliferation,” “counter-proliferation,” and “responding to the effects of WMD use.”

As a part of this President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in June 2003, and as a result of his request for the participation of nations in the effort, as of May this year, it has developed into an international approach with the support of over 90 countries, including Japan.
(2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan’s Efforts
Participating nations have agreed to the Statement of Interdiction Principles\(^1\) which declared the objectives of PSI up until now and principles for the purpose of interdiction. Interdiction training is carried out in all fields of ground, maritime and air transportation etc., in order to increase WMD proliferation interdiction capabilities. As of March of this year, various kinds of PSI interdiction training (only field training exercises) have been carried out a total of 31 times.

In addition to this training, meetings have been held by the PSI participating nations, and discussions are being held to tackle the policy and legislative challenges faced.

As a result of such activities, there have been some success stories in actual operations, such as the BBC China Incident\(^2\) which validated the effectiveness of PSI.

The objective of PSI is to contribute to the improvement of the national security environment, and as such Japan has been continuing to play an important role since the start of PSI in June 2003.

(3) Efforts by the Defense Ministry and SDF
It has been thought necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to continue to make maximum use of the SDF’s capabilities in these kinds of Japanese efforts, to cooperate with relevant organizations and countries and to proactively contribute to PSI. After the third Paris Plenary Meeting, in addition to dispatching Ministry of Defense personnel including SDF personnel to a variety of meetings, Japan dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas, and gathered related information.

In October last year, along with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, Japan hosted the second PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Pacific Shield 07)\(^3\), following the previous exercise in 2004. The SDF has conducted a joint exercise and played a proactive role on its own initiative in a number of joint exercises. This exercise included carrying out exhibition training related to search, identification and tracking at sea by the MSDF and ASDF, boarding and on-the-spot inspections by the MSDF, and decontamination of suspicious substances in ports by the GSDF.

Through these proactive efforts, for example in the case of PSI maritime interdiction activities, the relevant information obtained through information gathering activities (such as surveillance by ships of the MSDF and by aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF) is provided to relevant organizations and countries. Furthermore, it is thought that the MSDF will be able to carry out effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships, with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard in the event that maritime security operations are ordered. When cargo inspection is carried out in harbors and so on, it is believed that the decontamination capabilities of the GSDF will be able to effectively assist in PSI activities, if by some chance harmful substances such as chemical agents are spilt.

Also, as a part of the proactive approach (outreach activities) for the purpose of strengthening comprehensive non-proliferation systems including PSI, Japan has been actively providing information and knowledge gained through past training to the national defense authorities of other Asian countries, and has been taking advantage of opportunities such as defense exchanges to work on promoting understanding toward PSI. (See Fig. III-3-3-2)
(4) Future Efforts

Bearing in mind examples of proliferation in the area around Japan, grasping PSI as a security issue that widely includes factors such as defense, diplomacy, law enforcement and export management, is necessary to concentrate the combined efforts of Japan, and to ensure that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is prevented, through constant voluntary and proactive efforts.

For this reason, Japan will positively contribute to PSI in the future as well, and give consideration toward the systems within the government, while continuing to closely cooperate with relevant organizations and so on.

Also, from the perspective of increasing the capability of the SDF, Japan has been considering participating in and hosting interdiction exercises.

2. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which aims to take appropriate and effective action toward the threat that proliferation of NBC (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological) weapons, and their means of delivery poses to the peace and security of the international community. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its details include: 1) to refrain from providing support of any kind to non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 2) to adopt and execute appropriate and effective legislation to prohibit the manufacture etc., of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular, and 3) to establish border controls and export control measures for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Based on the danger imposed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the peace and stability of the international community, which includes Japan, the prevention of proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists, is an urgent task for the international community. Based on the recognition of this fact, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, and hopes that all United Nations members will observe the resolution.
Notes:
1) The formal name is the “Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations.” (Law 79 of 1992)
2) The formal name is the “Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.” (Law 113 of 2001)
3) The formal name is the “Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities.” (Law 1 of 2008)
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anpo/kakugi/080116keikaku.html>
   See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>
5) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as occupying powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member countries to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq, and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
6) Liaison officers etc. are dispatched to carry out communications and coordination operations such as collecting information on site conditions in the area of operations, accepting personnel and materials, and procuring and transporting materials, and thereby contribute to the smooth and efficient operation of units at the site. At present, the Joint Staff Council has dispatched liaison officers to the U.S. Central Command and the ASDF has dispatched a liaison team to the Multinational Command in Baghdad.
7) Bali (October 2005); Amman, Jordan (November 2005); Algiers (December 2007).
8) As of February 2008, 40 countries were participating in the ISAD, which is designed to support the Afghanistan Government by maintaining its public security, so as to prevent Afghanistan from reverting into a hotbed of terrorism.
9) Japan is pursuing various anti-terrorism measures with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, collection and analysis of counterintelligence, countermeasures to prevent hijackings and similar acts, measures for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), security of important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks” containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as an international exchange of the information concerning lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verification of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.
10) The Security Council reached a resolution focusing mainly on the extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), adapted on September 19, 2007, to October 13, 2008. In this resolution, evaluation of each country’s contribution to the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was expressed.
11) Counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities are the conduct of inspections, verification, and other necessary measures to ships navigating the Indian Ocean in order to interdict and deter transportation of
terrorist, weapons, through international cooperation, which is one of the activities contributing to the achievement of U.N. Charter objectives, by making effort in the elimination of threat by terrorist attacks by foreign militaries.

12) Activities related to the supply of goods and services of the SDF to foreign marine vessels that are engaged in SDF counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities (Limited to water supply and fuel for marine vessels or rotary wing aircraft mounted on marine vessels), in order to contribute to the smooth and effective operation of counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities.

13) An act of combat points to any actions taken as a part of international armed conflicts to kill and injure people or destroy properties.

14) E/N was signed with five countries (U.S., U.K., Pakistan, France and Germany) in February 2008. Another was signed with Canada in March, and an additional is planned with New Zealand in April.

15) Activities conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the jurisdiction of the U.N. for the maintenance of peace and security in the international community to deal with the outbreak of conflicts, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties.

16) Activities being conducted by the U.N., other international organizations or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR.

17) Japan defines core operations of the PKF as: 1) monitoring activities in connection with the observance of a ceasefire agreement, relocation of military forces, withdrawal and disarmament of forces; 2) stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; 3) inspection and check of weapons entering or exiting the site; 4) recovery, storage and disposal of discarded weapons; 5) assistance in the establishment of a ceasefire line between conflicting parties; and 6) assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war between conflicting parties.

18) The principal mission of UNMIN includes the following:
   (1) Monitoring the management of weapons and soldiers in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
   (2) Support concerning the performance of the agreement concerning the management of weapons and soldiers through the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee
   (3) Support concerning the monitoring of ceasefire agreements
   (4) Provision of technical support for planning, preparation and implementation of constituent assembly elections
   (5) Study of all technical viewpoints involved in the election process and provision of a small election-monitoring team for evaluation of election behavior.

19) The period of UNMIN operations as established in Security Council Resolution 1740 was extended to July 23, 2008 in accordance with a request from the Nepalese Government and a recommendation of the Secretary-General.

20) This refers to a study panel established in response to a request from then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000 for recommendations concerning measures for strengthening the capabilities of the U.N. concerning peace activities.


22) Including dialogue directly tied to sharing awareness on issues and policy coordination, joint exercises that are directly linked to facilitating the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities, etc.

23) Including reciprocal unit inspections and dispatch of observers to exercises, various types of forums, symposiums, and seminars, information sharing, equipment and technology exchanges, providing SDF
expertise in the disaster sector, etc.

24) This is a multilateral meeting that gathers defense minister class officials from the Asia-Pacific region and is held with the objective of discussing defense issues and regional defense cooperation. It began under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research facility in the United Kingdom.

25) The Second Army was reorganized into the Second Operations Command on November 1, 2007.

26) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0704_gai.html>

27) Specific examples following PKOs in Cambodia include cooperation in Samawah, Iraq and humanitarian assistance in response to disasters caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami.
   See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/australia/visit/0703_qs.html>


29) In addition to Japan, participation was also seen by the United States, India, Australia, and Singapore.


31) 26 countries including 10 member countries of ASEAN (Indonesia, Cambodia (from 1995), Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Beirut, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos), North Korea (from 2000), ROK, China, the United States, Japan, India (from 1996), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan (from 2004), Papua New Guinea, East Timor (from 2005), Mongolia (since 1998), Russia, Bangladesh (from 2006), Sri Lanka (from 2007) and the EU.

32) CBM: Confidence Building Measure: Efforts for military intelligence exposure, fixed military activity regulations, and promoting military exchange from a perspective of strengthening trust among nations, while preventing accidental military clashes. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs World Index)

33) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first western Pacific submarine rescue training hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy in 2000.
   Also, at the second training in 2002, 10 vessels from 5 countries including three MSDF vessels conducted an exhibition of submarine rescue technology in the Western Kyushu waters.

34) Nine countries of Japan, India, Australia, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France, and Russia, in the Southern Kanto Waters, practiced the common process and steps in search and rescue with participants countries vessels while simulating MSDF vessels as distressed merchant ships.

35) Participating countries include Norway and other sponsors (Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland etc.) and many developing countries such as Latin America and Africa which were included in the NGO-centered process. The major producing and possessing countries, including the U.S., China, and Russia, did not participate.

36) Explosives for use in anti-infantry combat, which obstruct the approach of enemy soldiers. In order that civilians do not get indiscriminately hurt, personnel will be made to operate them with their objective in sight. Detonation in the presence, approach or contact of civilians is not planned.

37) The Ministry of Defense referred retired SDF members to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) between 1999 and December 2006, to provide support to anti-personnel landmine removal activities in Cambodia. These retired SDF members were dispatched as maintenance and transport advisors for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the JICA framework of long-term dispatched specialists.

38) PSI is an initiative which continues to work in accordance with existing international and domestic laws to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials, and consider steps which participating nations are able to take together. At the same time, it attempts to work toward the strengthening of related domestic laws within the range possible for each country.
41) The Statement of Interdiction Principles refers to the fact that the PSI participating countries will share the effort aimed at halting the flow of weapons of mass destruction to countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors, and from countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors. At the same time, it refers to all interested countries which are concerned about proliferation, supporting PSI and working together with current PSI participant countries to take steps that are possible and intended to be implemented. With the statement, each country is taking concrete action for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of the freight of weapons of mass destruction, within the allowable range of international and domestic law.

42) In September 2003, the German Foreign Office obtained information that the Antigua and Barbuda (an island nation in the Caribbean Sea) ship BBC China was transporting nuclear-related items and materials to Libya. The German government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and carried out inspections with the cooperation of Italy and the U.S. Navy. They discovered counterfeiting of container numbers, brought the ship to Taranto, Italy and seized the nuclear-related items and materials (aluminum tubes which could be used in a centrifuge). As a result of this incident, the nuclear development of Libya was tied to the exposure of the Khan Network, and the effectiveness of PSI was demonstrated.

43) Under the sponsorship of Japan, the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training was held in Izu-Oshima Eastern Sea, Yokosuka New Port and Yokohama Port, with the main objectives of showing the strong intention of the international community aimed at strengthening non-proliferation systems, increasing the skill of participating nations and relevant organizations, strengthening mutual cooperation, and promoting PSI understanding among non-PSI participating countries. Ships, aircraft, units and so on from the SDF took part. Ships, aircraft, customs officials etc., from Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, the U.S., and the United Kingdom participated in the training, and observers from 40 nations including these countries were dispatched to the event.