Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The primary role of the National Defense Program Guidelines is to provide an effective defense response to new threats and diverse contingencies.

This section explains the ideal role of the SDF in response to new threats and diverse contingencies under the joint operations posture as well as issues on which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been working on to date. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

While various efforts have been made by the international community in recent years for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation still continues. Further, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles reconfirming that the threat from ballistic missiles is a reality.

Against this background, Japan began developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY 2004 in order to improve readiness in response to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in 2005. In December of the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced BMD interceptor missiles.

Furthermore, on December 18, 2007 (Japan time) a test was conducted in the sea off Hawaii’s Kauai Island where a standard missile (SM-3) was fired by the Kongo, an Aegis destroyer. The fired imitated ballistic missile target was successfully intercepted outside the atmosphere.

With assignment of ballistic missile capability to the Kongo class Aegis destroyers, in addition to the already deployed PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3), although limited, Japan built its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks. (See Fig. III-1-2-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Started the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001- FY 2005) with a decision to continue the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of the joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of build-up to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet approved a Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Started the deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) General Situation of BMD System Development

a. Basic Concept

The BMD system has been developed by Japan following the Cabinet decision of December 2003 and serves to improve the capability of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems currently maintained by the SDF. Furthermore, with incorporation of BMD functions to the automatic warning and control system JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), the basic concept is efficient execution of a multi-tier defense system with upper-tier interception by Aegis destroyers in coordination with lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3 missiles.

b. Configuration of the BMD System

Japan’s BMD system employs a multi-tier weapon system to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at either the mid-course phase or terminal phase using Aegis destroyers or Patriot PAC-3 missiles respectively. The entire system consists of the multi-tier weapon system, the sensors which detect and track ballistic missiles flying toward Japan, and the command, control, battle management and communications systems to systematically counter ballistic missiles by effectively coordinating weapons and sensors. (See Fig. III-1-2-2)
c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System

In developing the BMD system, existing equipment will be utilized from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing acquisition and maintenance costs. Beginning with capability improvements of the aforementioned Aegis destroyers and Patriot system, an improved model of the current ground radar system will also be employed in the area of sensors. In addition, the newly developed warning and control radar (FPS-5)\textsuperscript{27}, able to deal with both conventional airborne threats (aircraft and others) and ballistic missiles, has been introduced to be used concurrently with the improved ground radar. The same also applies in regards to JADGE as a command, control, battle management and communications system.

d. Development Status of the BMD System

By the end of FY 2007, Patriot PAC-3 missiles were deployed to four fire units of the 1st Air Missile Defense Group situated in the Tokyo area (Iruma, Narashino, Takeyama and Kasumigaura) and at the end of December 2007, the Kongo, an Aegis destroyer was equipped with SM-3. By way of continuing the development of the BMD system, the Ministry of Defense and SDF have the present objective of constructing a system by 2011 to link the various types of command, control, battle management and communications systems, starting with JADGE, four Aegis destroyers (with added BMD capability), 16 Patriot PAC-3 FUs\textsuperscript{28} (fire units), four FPS-5 radars and seven FPS-3 upgraded radars (improved model).

In this fiscal year’s budget, a total of approximately 93 billion yen (contract basis amount, excluding initial expenses) has been appropriated for BMD outlays for 1) enhancement and strengthening of the operational basis by developing radar and establishing a system for radar maintenance, etc., 2) continued development of intercept systems such as modifications to Aegis destroyers and acquisition of PAC-3 missiles.

(2) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues and the possibility remains that in the future, ballistic missiles possessed by various countries will be furnished with measures to avoid interception, such as the use of decoys to deceive intercepting warheads.

Furthermore, expansion of the defense coverage provided by a single system and improvement of interception probability are also required in response to conventional ballistic missiles. Thus, it is essential to improve the kinetic performance of interceptor missiles and undertake initiatives to advance the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system.

From this perspective, with regards to the state of capability improvements for Aegis destroyers and the Patriot system, from this fiscal year (after establishment of the structure provided for the schedule of the NDPG), the Mid-Term Defense Program states that necessary measures will be undertaken following consideration on the state of development in the United States. In addition, a Japan-U.S. joint development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced from 2006 based on results obtained from Japan-U.S. joint technical research carried out since 1999. Moreover, efforts to improve future capabilities are being made including Japan-U.S. joint research to improve the capabilities of radar and combat command systems. (See Fig. III-1-2-3-4)
A single vessel can protect. Protecting with two vessels.

**Fig. III-1-2-4** Images of Expanding Protected Areas through Future Improvement in Capabilities of BMD Missiles (Image Diagram)

- **Measures to avoid interceptions using decoys**
  -Interceptor hits the decoy and the warhead itself avoids a shot-down.

- **Diversified flight trajectories**
  - Trajectories to make flights more efficient and to maximize ranges.
  - Higher trajectories to accelerate the fall.

**Fig. III-1-2-3** Future Measures to Avoid Intercepting Ballistic Missiles

- **Measures to avoid interceptions** (decoys etc.)
- Interceptor hits the decoy and the warhead itself avoids a shot-down.
2. Improvement in Legislation and Operations

(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles

In response to the event that ballistic missiles or other objects\(^9\) are launched toward Japan as armed attacks, defense operation orders for armed attack situations will be ordered and the missiles will be intercepted.

On the other hand, in the event ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and an armed attack situation is not acknowledged, and no defense operation orders are given, the SDF may take the following measures giving adequate consideration 1) to provide a prompt and appropriate response and 2) to ensure civilian control.

a. When the Minister of Defense determines, based on pre-indications, there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will come flying toward Japan, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister\(^30\).

b. Furthermore, in addition to the above, there may be cases where the situation changes suddenly, such as when almost no information is available concerning missile launches or when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally and there is no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain Prime Ministerial approval. In preparation for such events, the Minister of Defense may prepare emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister during peacetime. Then, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue advance orders for SDF units, within a specified period of time, to destroy ballistic missiles with Aegis destroyers etc. when they actually do fly toward Japan in order to protect lives and properties in Japanese territory. (See Fig. III-1-2-5)

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**Fig. III-1-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When the possibility that ballistic missiles may fly toward Japan is acknowledged</th>
<th>When the possibility of ballistic missiles flying toward Japan is not clearly acknowledged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If armed attack is recognized (Declared intent to attack, imminent missile launch)</td>
<td>Minister of Defense orders the SDF to take destruction measures in advance as provided in the emergency response procedure*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An armed attack situation is recognized and a defense operations order is issued</td>
<td>Minister of Defense drafts and the Prime Minister approves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missiles etc. fly toward Japan</td>
<td>When the possibility of ballistic missiles flying toward Japan is acknowledged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Ballistic missiles etc. fly toward Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF Law, Article 76 (Defense operation)</td>
<td>Ballistic missiles etc. fly toward Japan with sudden changes in the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response (Item 1)</td>
<td>Ballistic missiles etc. fly toward Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles)</td>
<td>Response (Item 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of Military

Responses against ballistic missiles require a response not only by the SDF but also action by the government as a whole, including alerting and evacuating the people for their protection, undertaking diplomatic activities, information gathering by the departments concerned and reinforcing readiness for emergencies. Furthermore, in the event ballistic missiles are actually flying toward Japan, destruction of these missiles by using interceptor missiles is necessary. The Japanese government must assess the possibility concerning missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances.

In view of the gravity of such incidents and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, Prime Ministerial approval (Cabinet decision) and individual orders by the Minister of Defense are required so that the Cabinet and Minister of Defense may sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of the Diet is also defined with a specification in the law on ex post facto reporting to the Diet.

Moreover, the Defense Minister drafted the aforementioned emergency response procedures when Japan’s initial Patriot PAC-3 was deployed in March 2007 and consequently amended the procedures when the Aegis destroyer Kongo was equipped with BMD capabilities in December of the same year, and Prime Ministerial consent was received for both. With this approval, Japan now has its own system necessary for conducting prompt and appropriate responses, including in the event of an emergency. (See Reference 27)

(3) Operational Efforts

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

The destruction of incoming ballistic missiles will be conducted by a full combination of MSDF Aegis destroyers, ASDF radar, the Patriot system as well as various command, control, battle management and communications systems such as JADGE. With regards to operation of the BMD system, effective responses are being considered, for example including the role of unified operations led by the Commander of the Air Defense Command, together with preparation for various contingencies. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Related measures were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in October 2005, May 2006 and May 2007 which indicated the direction for Japan-U.S. security cooperation.

Also, at the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting in November 2007, with progress in development of the BMD system, both Japan and the U.S. agreed to advance cooperation with a focus on operational aspects. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Chapter 3)
3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suited for each of the 1) boost phase, 2) mid-course phase and 3) terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path are combined for complementary missile defense. These systems are being deployed as they become available\(^32\).

(See Fig. III-1-2-6)

Japan and the U.S. have formed a close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and the missile defense capabilities of the U.S. are being deployed into our nation step by step.

To begin with, in June 2006, the USFJ deployed a transportable radar for BMD at the ASDF Shariki sub base (Aomori Prefecture) and in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 missiles were deployed\(^33\) at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. Furthermore, BMD capability equipped Aegis destroyers have been forward deployed to Japan and surrounding areas since August 2006.

The development of the U.S. missile defense capabilities into our country will serve to secure the safety of the people of Japan.

**Fig. III-1-2-6 Example of U.S. Multi-Tier Defense Against Ballistic Missiles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early detection of ballistic missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance by satellites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea and ground-based radars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boost phase</th>
<th>Mid-course phase</th>
<th>Terminal phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-entry vehicle (warhead)</td>
<td>Apex</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Laser (ABL)</td>
<td>Ground-based system (GMD)</td>
<td>Patriot PAC-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD: Sea-based Aegis system (SMD)</td>
<td>THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System</td>
<td>MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABL: Airborne Laser: Airborne deployed system for the interception of ballistic missiles at the boost phase

GMD: Ground-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for long range ballistic missiles at the mid-course phase from a fixed silo on the ground

SMD: Sea-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for intermediate range ballistic missiles from a sea-based Aegis-equipped destroyer

THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: An interception system for short- to medium-range ballistic missiles from a movable launcher at the terminal phase

MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System: A missile system under development by the U.S., Germany and Italy with the Patriot PAC-3 as its platform
(2) Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Improved Missiles
In 1998, the government received approval from the Security Council of Japan and decided to commence Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system (the current sea-based mid-course defense system) from FY 1999.

This joint technical research carries out design, prototype and necessary testing of interceptor missiles with higher capabilities than the sea-based mid-course defense system currently being deployed by Japan. So far, the design, prototypes and necessary testing of four major components have been conducted.

The Japan-U.S. joint technical research has completed verification of elementary technology and acquired prospects for solving technical issues. In December 2005 the Security Council and Cabinet decided to shift to joint development and to utilize the joint technical research results as the technological foundation for development of interceptor missiles with improved capabilities. In June 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments reached official agreement on this matter. In the budget for this fiscal year, approximately 20.2 billion yen was appropriated for the joint development of the future BMD system. (See Fig. III-1-2-7) (See Reference 26)

(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports
Japan’s BMD program consists of capability improvements to the Aegis destroyers and Patriot system possessed by Japan, and does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

On the other hand, with regard to the Japan-U.S. joint technical development, which is aimed for improved BMD capability for the future, it will be necessary to export arms concerned with BMD from Japan to the U.S., as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement made in December 2004, it was determined, when the transition to joint development was decided in December 2005, that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict controls are maintained and a framework for the
provision that arms required to be exported to the U.S. would be developed through coordination with the U.S.

In June 2006, letters concerning the provision of arms and arms-related technology to the U.S. were exchanged which established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight controls—for example, prohibiting use for other purposes and prohibiting the transfer to third countries without Japan’s agreement in advance. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

(4) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Cooperation on BMD
Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems to Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation.

As a policy for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the Mid-Term Defense Program states the Government of Japan will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the areas of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology. Furthermore, the Cabinet decided to exchange letters concerning BMD cooperation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Following the Cabinet decision, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between the (then) Japan Defense Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004.

Furthermore, in June 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged a letter concerning BMD cooperation which included cooperation on Japan-U.S. joint development.

2. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces
Since Japan is highly urbanized, relatively small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the country. Such attacks may take various forms including illegal actions by armed agents, which will be handled primarily by the police, and armed attacks such as destructive actions by guerillas and special operations forces which constitute a form of aggression on the territory of Japan.

1. Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept
In the event of an armed attack on Japan by guerillas or special operations forces, Japan will respond by means of defense operations. Forms of armed attacks on Japan include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerillas and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operation centers by regular forces such as special operations forces.

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces
In operations to respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations forces, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect guerillas or special operations forces at the earliest possible time to be captured or destroyed. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage from assault.
a. Search and Discovery of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces
Efforts will be made to detect transport modes of guerillas and special operations forces, including all types of vessels and submarines, at an early stage and interdict them at sea by means including submarines and destroyers and ASDF aircraft. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas. In the event of an infiltration, patrol and air units will search and detect the guerillas or special operations forces. Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities.

b. Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces
In the event that guerillas or special operations forces are detected, combat forces will be promptly assembled in the area to besiege them, upon which they will be captured or destroyed. (See Fig. III-1-2-8)
2. Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept
While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in principle as shown in Fig. III-1-2-9, in accordance with situational developments.

(2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Deal with Armed Agents
In 2001, the SDF Law was amended for the purpose of rapid and effective responses to armed agents with 1) new provisions established for intelligence gathering prior to orders for public security dispatches as well as the use of weapons in such cases, and 2) amendment of provisions for the use of weapons during public security operations. (See Reference 28-29)

(3) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police
a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation
For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the (then) JDA and National Public Safety Commission, to
provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised, enabling its application to illegal activities by armed agents. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

b. Joint Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and each prefectural police force, which are parties to the local agreements, had conducted joint map maneuver exercises to strengthen mutual cooperation at the local level in preparation for dealing with armed agents. Based on the results of these table-top exercises, in October 2005, the Northern Army and Hokkaido prefectural police conducted joint field exercises for the first time. Subsequently, joint field exercises were held in FY 2007 between the 12th Brigade and the prefectural police of Tochigi and Shiga Prefectures; the 10th Brigade and the prefectural police of Aichi, Gifu and Mie; the 14th Brigade and the prefectural police of Ehime and Kochi; the 1st Division and the prefectural police of Shizuoka, Kanagawa and Yamanashi; the 13th Brigade and the prefectural police of Hiroshima, Shimane, Okayama, Yamaguchi and Tottori; the 4th Division and the prefectural police of Nagasaki, Saga and Oita; the 8th Division and the prefectural police of Kumamoto, Kagoshima and Miyazaki; and the 7th Division and Hokkaido prefectural police. These exercises served to confirm cooperation guidelines in the event of a public security operation. (See Reference 70)

3. Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC weapon proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of a so-called NBC terrorist attack in Japan which corresponds to an external armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations and take all necessary action to defend the country and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of an NBC terrorist attack which does not correspond to an external armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the terrorists and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches to rescue victims and prevent damage from spreading; support related agencies to conduct intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage; decontamination activities; transport of the sick and injured; and medical activities led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF.
(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and SDF in Response to NBC Weapons
The Mid-Term Defense Program provides that the Ministry of Defense and SDF shall improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the GSDF, which will play a central role in various settings, has newly formed the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, under the Central Readiness Force able to operate nationwide. Also, there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, and improvement of all types of protection equipment including chemical protection vehicles, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment and chemical protection clothes. It also conducts research and development on subjects including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, portable automatic sensors for chemical agents as well as decontamination sets. Furthermore, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Response to Substances\(^9\) Related to Nuclear and Radiation Weapons
Substances related to nuclear weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them, even in the event they do not directly damage the body. Thus, appropriate protection and exposure control is required taking into consideration the characteristics of such substances.

To a certain degree, internal exposure\(^10\) from inhalation of radioactive substances can be prevented through the use of protective masks and clothing while external exposure\(^11\) from radiation can be prevented through the use of chemical protection vehicles. For this reason, although limited, activities by chemical protection units possessing such equipment are possible. In this event, the SDF will conduct operations in cooperation with related organizations including measurement of the contamination situation and transportation of the sick and injured.

(4) Response to Biological Weapons
a. Disaster Relief Dispatches in the Event of Biological Terrorism
Biological agents have certain incubation periods so it is difficult to determine whether a disease is caused by biological agents based on the initial symptoms alone. For this reason, in the event that biological agents are dispersed secretly, anthropogenic causes may be suspected only after damage has occurred and spread. Thus, it is anticipated that detecting biological terrorism before damage is caused will be extremely difficult.

In the event of an outbreak of such damage, medical institutions will assume primary responsibility for responding to the situation and the SDF will be responsible mainly for decontamination, transportation of patients and medical activities. (See Fig. III-1-2-10)

b. Initiatives for Biological Weapons Countermeasures
The Ministry of Defense and SDF are involved in all types of initiatives, including holding seminars for dealing with biological weapons, with the objective of improving response capability through operations research.

Furthermore, in March 2008, the Nuclear Biological Chemical Countermeasure Medical Unit was newly established in order to minimize damage caused by biological weapons. The unit is directly under the command of the Minister of Defense and makes decisions on early diagnosis and treatment policy by utilizing the biological agent medical laboratory units, and quarantining and accommodating patients suspected of infection.
(5) Response to Chemical Weapons

Unlike biological agents, the outbreak of injury with chemical agents is generally fast so a rapid initial response at the time of injury is exceedingly important.

With respect to chemical agents, the chemical protection units of the GSDF are equipped to respond to chemical agents through the use of their chemical protection clothes and vehicles. The chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF dispatched for disaster relief dispatches will detect the chemical agents using detective devices, transport and treat victims, and conduct decontamination and medical activities in contaminated areas. Even when the situation does not require SDF dispatch, as required, the SDF will lend chemical protection clothes and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officials to the relevant agencies.
3. Response to Aggression on Japan’s Offshore Islands

According to the NDPG, the geographical features of Japan are considered vulnerable from a security perspective, due to narrow lands, long coastlines and many islands. In particular, invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands

In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF including patrols and military information gathering. Response to this aggression has many points in common with the form of operations to deal with full-scale land invasions. However, if signs of aggressions are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent invasion of the enemy forces. When no signs of aggression are detected in advance and the islands in question are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy.

In carrying out these operations, the mobile transportation and deployment of forces through joint operations is essential. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate to swiftly concentrate troops to prevent and destroy enemy forces.

4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels

In order for the SDF to respond swiftly to not only a full-scale invasion situation but also new threats and diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to routinely conduct warning and surveillance activities in Japan’s territorial waters and airspace as well as gather and process information required for defense. For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly linked to ensuring the peace and security of Japan.

1. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea about once a day, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are conducted with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required, such as a surveillance to a possible missile launch. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

As an additional measure, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts conduct 24-hour warning and surveillance activities in the major sea straits.
2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace

The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of Japan’s territorial and adjacent airspace using nationwide radar, E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, some fighters are always kept on standby for immediate takeoff (scramble). When any aircraft suspected of violating Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, scrambled fighters will approach them to assess the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that an airspace violation does occur, an evacuation warning will be issued. In FY 2007, there were 307 scrambles by the ASDF with an increasing tendency.

On February 9, 2008, a Russian Air Force Tu-95 violated Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Sofugan in the southern Izu Islands and ASDF fighters were scrambled in response. (See Fig. III-1-2-11)

3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations will be issued according to the Cabinet decision of 1996, and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag. In the event that a submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave territorial waters.

(2) Measures in Relation to the Submerged Chinese Nuclear Submarine Operating in Japan’s Territorial Waters

In November 2004, a Chinese submarine navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Sakishima Islands was discovered. In response to this, an order for maritime security operations was issued according to procedures determined by Article 82 of the SDF Law and the Cabinet decision of 1996 to deal with the situation. However, it took a considerable amount of time for the Japanese government to issue an order for maritime security operations after receiving the order for maritime security operations.
information on the submarine entering territorial waters. Therefore, based on the lessons learned from this event, the government established the following response plan.

**a. Response Plan**

(a) With respect to submarines submerged in territorial waters, as a general rule, measures will be executed according to maritime security operations including requests to appear on the surface and requests to leave territorial waters.

(b) When an incident occurs, the Minister of Defense shall promptly issue an order for maritime security operations following the required procedures.

- For this purpose, when information is obtained on submarines approaching the territorial waters of Japan, it will be shared within the government in the early stages.
- In the event a submarine does enter the territorial waters of Japan, unless there is any particular reason, an order for maritime security operations shall be issued immediately.

(c) Even after the submarine leaves the territorial waters of Japan, maritime security operations shall be continued for actions such as ascertaining the possibility of reentry and identifying the nationality of the submarine.

(d) Contact shall be made with concerned nations while necessary measures are undertaken.

(e) While taking security aspects into account, the status of the submarine navigating underwater in territorial waters and actions taken by the government shall be explained to the public in an appropriate and timely manner, including the announcement of issuing an order for maritime security operations.

(f) Necessary manuals (response procedures) will be shared by relevant ministries and agencies to ensure implementation of the plan above.

**b. Enhancement and Improvement of Equipment for Responding to Submarines Navigating Underwater in Territorial Waters**

The MSDF is enhancing and improving capabilities for detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as making Japanese government intentions clear to submarines. It is also maintaining and improving capabilities for responding to submarines in shallow water areas.

**4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels**

**1) Basic Concept**

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to unidentified vessels. However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner and the SDF will respond in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

Taking into consideration lessons learned and reflecting on the unidentified vessel incident off the Noto Peninsula in 1999\(^46\) and the unidentified vessel incident in southwest Kyushu in 2001\(^47\), the government has taken all necessary precautionary measures in order for effective and safe measures to be taken against unidentified vessels, while the Ministry of Defense and SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies.
(2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Respond to Unidentified Vessels
The Self-Defense Forces Law was amended in 2001 to add provisions concerning the use of weapons in maritime security operations following a review including legislative aspect, which focused on the state of weapon usage authorization to stop unidentified vessels. (See Reference 28)

(3) Enhancement of Equipment for Responding to Unidentified Vessels
The MSDF took the following steps: 1) improved the speed of the new-type missile boats; 2) established a “special patrol unit”; 3) equipped destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnished forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells); and 5) improved the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

(4) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard
a. Development of a Framework for Strengthening Cooperation
In 1999, the (then) Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard jointly developed the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels which made stipulations concerning information liaison systems, initial response outlines and division of roles (joint response guidelines) before and after the announcement of maritime security operations in the event an unidentified vessel is discovered.

b. Joint Exercises with the Japan Coast Guard
The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard conduct periodic mutual training, information exchanges and joint exercises. Also, cooperation is strengthened through joint exercises between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard, based on the manual, in relation to pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communication between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

A joint training exercise was conducted on March 12, 2007, on the open sea off Sasebo. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters
The SDF conducts a variety of disaster relief activities when such disasters occur including search and rescue for disaster victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, prevention of epidemics, water supply and transportation of personnel and goods. Recently, the SDF has played a major role in responding not only to natural disasters but also to various other disasters.

1. Mechanism of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types of Disaster Relief Dispatches
a. Dispatches upon Request (General Form of Disaster Relief Dispatch)
In principle, the SDF dispatches units for disaster relief upon the request of prefectural governors and other officials in accordance with Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in a position to grasp the overall condition of the disaster. Therefore, it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request. Furthermore, in the event that a disaster has occurred or anticipated to occur in the near future, and it is
deemed necessary to take emergency measures, municipal mayors may ask governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF according to Article 68-2 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act; Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). Furthermore, in the event that mayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural governor, they can inform disaster conditions to the Minister of Defense, or those designated by the Minister. After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense can immediately dispatch units as necessary.

In exceptional circumstances when the situation is particularly urgent and a request must be made immediately, the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize a discretionary dispatch. In order to render discretionary dispatches even more effective, the (then) Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan was amended in 1995 to establish the basis for SDF unit commanders and other officials to order discretionary dispatches.

b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch

When an alert is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of an earthquake.

Fig. III-1-2-12 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal

Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be summoned by urgency.
2. Units are all withdrawn together.
3. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel.
c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Flow of the Request for the Withdrawal of a Disaster Dispatch

The flow of SDF disaster relief operations is shown in Fig. III-1-2-12.

(3) Authority of SDF Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

Under the Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation, officers of units requested for disaster relief dispatches, earthquake disaster prevention dispatches or nuclear disaster dispatches have the authority established in Fig. III-1-2-13 in order to efficiently conduct disaster relief activities.

2. Initial Operations Posture and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Initial Response to the Disaster

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have designated units able to provide an initial response to ensure disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. As of May 2008, the GSDF has designated approximately 2,700 personnel, 410 vehicles and 30 helicopters nationwide to be able to respond immediately to disaster relief operations. The MSDF has vessels designated for emergency dispatch at each base in addition to aircraft on standby alert and the ASDF is prepared with aircraft on standby alert.

Furthermore, in the event that information is received of the occurrence of a strong earthquake greater than level-5 on the Japanese seismic scale, the SDF will independently dispatch aircraft to gather site information and is in the position to transmit this information to the Prime Minister’s Office. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, liaison officers will be dispatched to the concerned local public authorities for information gathering purposes.

Life-saving activities can also be conducted employing various ASDF, GSDF and MSDF equipment. In October 2006, the ASDF established a new aeromedical evacuation squadron in the process of developing a system
(2) Implementation Status of Disaster Dispatches

a. Transportation of Emergency Patients
The SDF has traditionally used its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities. In FY 2007, out of a total of 679 cases of disaster relief operations, 467 cases were for transporting emergency patients with the large number of 435 cases being dispatches to such isolated islands as Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures) and the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture).

The breakdown of these cases indicates that elderly emergency patients were the most common, while there were also cases of emergency transportation related to childbirth and accidents. Furthermore, in the event that aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short endurance distance, emergency patient transport will be provided to vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland.

b. Firefighting Support
In FY 2007, there were 120 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients.

Within this category, dispatches for neighborhood firefighting were the highest in number, with 108 cases in FY 2007. The SDF units deployed throughout the country are actively involved in neighborhood firefighting in order to contribute to maintaining the security of local residents' lives.

Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducted aerial firefighting activities in locations where firefighting conditions were difficult, such as Japan’s offshore islands and mountain areas. (See Fig. III-1-2-14)
c. Response to Natural Disasters

On July 16, 2007, the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake (magnitude 6.8) (“Heisei 19 (2007) Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake”) struck in the Niigata region resulting in damage which included a fire of an electric transformer at Unit 3 of the Kashiwazakikariwa Nuclear Power Station, collapsed buildings, landslides and water outages. The GSDF 12th Brigade accepted the Niigata prefectural governor’s request issued on July 16, 2007 and in the period until August 29, 2007 carried out activities such as lifesaving, nursing casualties, water and food supply and bathing support. As of July 13, 2008, the scale of the dispatch was approximately 92,400 personnel, approximately 35,100 vehicles, 94 vessels and 1,184 aircraft.

Furthermore, the (then) Tokyo Defense Facilities Administration Agency provided technical support to U.S. forces in installing air conditioners gifted by the U.S. government to the area struck by the disaster.

On June 14, 2008, an earthquake occurred with the hypo center in the southern inland region of Iwate Prefecture, causing soil avalanche, blocked river channels, and water outage (estimated magnitude of 7.2) (“2008 Iwate Earthquake”). During the same day, the JGSDF 9th Artillery Regiment commander received a request from the Iwate prefectural governor, the JGSDF 6th division commander received a request from the Miyagi prefectural governor, and conducted the following activities: search for missing people, rescue of isolated people by helicopter, water supply, food service, bathing support, and others. As of July 13, 2008, the total numbers of personnel, vehicles and aircraft are approximately 23,990, 7,150 and 542, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of dispatches</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses to storm, flood and earthquake disasters</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>94,807</td>
<td>35,801</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transporting emergency patients</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3,378</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting firefighting</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>105,380</td>
<td>36,980</td>
<td>1,972</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. III-1-2-15 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY 2007)

GSDF water supply vehicle receiving water supply from MSDF destroyer during the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake

GSDF personnel and residents conducting food service during the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake
The Niigata Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake broke out on July 16, 2007, two weeks after I was posted to the disaster dispatch team of the Joint Staff. I was at home on that day, for it fell on a national holiday (Marine Day), but my long duty began when my daughter, looking at a TV subtitle, said to me, “Daddy, they say there was a big earthquake.”

Immediately after the disaster, SDF units voluntarily dispatched members to the affected areas. The Joint Staff was tasked with the coordination of these activities as an efficient set of the SDF’s disaster dispatch operations. To this end, the Joint Staff urgently summoned the required personnel and strengthened its operational capabilities. I, too, rushed to the office and began work at the Joint Staff Operations Room. Amongst the exchanges of loud voices, each member of the Staff pursed duties which transcended the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. Our operations proceeded to grasp the state of the disaster on the ground and the outline of the troops’ activities, as well as to coordinate each unit of the SDF troops in response to the needs of the affected areas, to ensure cooperation with other ministries and to report to the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister’s Office.

Various units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were dispatched during these disaster relief activities. Although I was an MSDF official, I was naturally required to seek cooperation with other forces. Only two weeks after being posted to the Joint Staff, I was unable to immediately identify the names of troops other than those of the MSDF, their locations and names of their equipment. In addition there were abbreviations I had never heard of, such as “kin-san team” (kinkyu-sanshu team: emergent assembly team), “kuronoro” (chronology: outline of the development) and “conference” (conference communication system of the Air Self-Defense Force). Before coordinating troops, I exhausted a huge amount of energy to
3. Efforts Made in Peacetime in Preparation for Disaster Relief

(1) Cooperation with Local Governments

It is important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations promptly and precisely. Examples which can be given include enhancing information liaison systems, integration of the respective disaster control plans and proactive participation in the disaster prevention practices of local governments.

Further, the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Citizen Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Regional Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring cooperation with local governments in peacetime. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

It is important to strengthen cooperation with local governments to enable human cooperation which utilizes SDF experience and knowledge in disaster prevention operations. As such, upon the request of local governments, the SDF recommends retired SDF personnel to share their experience and knowledge in this field.

As of March 31, 2008, the number of SDF personnel working at sections of local governments related to disaster prevention is 139 people in 44 prefectures and 77 municipalities across the country. In addition, current SDF personnel temporarily serve as staff in the Disaster Prevention Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Additionally, in April 2008 a mutual exchange of administrative officials was conducted from the Central GSDF Headquarters to Hyogo Prefecture’s Disaster Prevention Planning Office, and from Hyogo Prefecture to the Central GSDF Headquarters Regional Communication Coordination Division. (See Reference 32)

While collaboration with the SDF at the time of a disaster is described in regional disaster prevention plans prepared by prefectural governments, the following actions to be taken by local governments are important for the Ministry of Defense and SDF to conduct disaster relief activities more effectively.

a. Securing Assembly Areas and Heliports

Disaster relief operations units require an assembly area at the site as a base for activities to secure a command post, lodging, parking and to accumulate necessary materials. Furthermore, due to the fact that activities using vehicles may be restricted at the time of a disaster, it is necessary to establish heliports at and nearby the disaster site to enable transportation of emergency patients, transportation of materials and firefighting using helicopters. At this time, in order to ensure smooth take-off and arrival of helicopters, it is necessary to clearly designate evacuation centers and heliports as well as making these locations commonly known to the public in peacetime. In addition, as a project to subsidize welfare facilities, parks have been improved in case they are deemed necessary to facilitate evacuation and firefighting activities. For example, in the Regional Plan for Disaster Prevention for Joetsu City in Niigata Prefecture, parks which are scheduled to be improved are planned to be used as emergency heliports and assembly points for disaster relief units at the time of a disaster.

b. Marking Building Numbers

In order for aircraft to efficiently gather information and transport people and materials, it is useful to mark numbers on the rooftops of facilities to identify buildings important for disaster prevention, such as prefectural
c. Securing Facilities for Coordination and Communication

It is also essential for facilities to be established within prefectures for liaison and coordination with the SDF\(^7\). Further, it is important to develop a disaster prevention map for common use by all disaster prevention organizations which indicate the location of evacuation areas and heliports, etc. Furthermore, it is necessary to make coordination on a daily basis to secure water sources such as reservoirs, while maintaining firefighting equipment for aerial firefighting by helicopter.

(2) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

In order to respond more promptly and appropriately to disasters which occur in various forms, it is valid to clarify basic responses in advance and consolidate the recognition of parties concerned. For this purpose, in November 2000, the (then) Defense Agency and SDF developed a response manual\(^8\) for various types of disasters which compiled issues to be noted for each type of disaster. Copies of this manual were distributed to relevant organizations and local public bodies.

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**Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (GSDF)**

Sergeant Hiroyuki Fujita  
2nd Infantry Regiment, GSDF

On July 16, 2007, the advance platoon rushed to a site in Kashiwazaki city, Niigata Prefecture, to assist in the rescue of an 84-year-old woman who had been trapped in a collapsed house in the area. When we arrived, we saw a completely demolished warehouse: three-stories, with a tiled roof, built right next to a family house. We cut a hole with a chain saw designed to be used as lifesaving equipment and other tools to clear a path out of the rubble. However, there was no response to our calls and 30 minutes had passed since the operation started. When our hopes of finding any signs of life began to fade, we heard someone yell, “A voice!” The atmosphere of the site completely changed and we confirmed the exact position. Rescuers reached the trapped woman and shouted words of encouragement: “You can do it!” They gave her an oxygen mask and used a hydraulic lifter to remove a slab lying on her chest. At 15:30, we managed to rescue her safely. What was even more touching was the sight of her family, weeping with relief and happiness, as she was carried away on a stretcher. I fully realized the importance of human lives.
(3) Response to Nuclear Disasters

The Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted based on lessons learned from the critical accident which occurred at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999. In accordance with this, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially revised.

Following the critical nuclear accident at Tokaimura, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have provided transport support, assistance for evacuating residents and monitoring of airborne and seaborne radiation levels in comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercises conducted primarily by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2000. This serves to improve effectiveness including a review of cooperation guidelines between government agencies and local bodies at the time of a nuclear disaster.

Further, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that in addition to nuclear disasters, capabilities for responding to NBC will be strengthened in order to deal with other special disasters.

[COLUMN]

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (MSDF)

Chief Petty Officer, Katsuo Kaneko
Destroyer Mineyuki, MSDF

The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake occurred on July 16, 2007, when the destroyer Mineyuki was at Kanazawa Port for public tours of the vessel as part of public relations activities. We immediately set out for Kashiwazaki, the affected area, together with our consort vessels. Immediately after our arrival in the early morning of July 17, we began our supports for food and water supply and bathing service. All our crew members worked as one, with ingenuity to conduct the disaster relief activities, such as constructing temporary bathing facilities with lifesaving rafts. Under the sweltering midsummer heat, we quickly responded to the needs on the sites and made efforts to ensure a more sanitary environment for devastated Kashiwazaki residents and to reduce their mental stress. I had hardship, but got energy from the delighted faces of the residents which at the same time made us feel pride and a sense of mission. I truly believe that the delight of the citizens was the very source of energy for all team members.
On July 16, 2007, a holiday of Marine Day, I was relaxing at home, when strong tremors shook the ground. I knew immediately that the quake was large. As a TV bulletin reported that a quake measuring 6-plus had hit my local area of Niigata, I rushed to my base.

There I received an order to gather information such as the extent of damage from the sky. I operated a search and rescue helicopter (UH-60J) to the affected area from Niigata Airport. Near Kashiwazaki City, I confirmed areas with serious damage, roads and railways blocked by mudslides, and collapsed houses.

In addition to rescue activities for the affected people, the Niigata Rescue Team also maintained its readiness for the potential for a massive aftershock.

When the Governor of Niigata visited the affected sites, I was ordered to provide air transportation for him, since no conventional means of transport were available due to bad weather. I managed to complete the airlift mission amidst heavy rain, and thick low-hanging clouds, which hampered a route over land and forced us to fly along the coast in order to stay clear of the rain clouds.

Natural disasters are virtually impossible to predict. Therefore, it is crucial for rescue teams to maintain readiness and mobility to swiftly respond to any given situation. I was convinced that these factors are key to minimize the damage and provide prompt assistance to the affected people.

Through my experiences in the aftermath of the quake, I was able to renew my recognition of the noble mission to “protect our people” and was filled with a sense of fulfillment on account of the significant responsibilities associated with the mission. Going forward, I am determined to continue to develop myself on a daily basis.
Letters of Appreciation from Local People for Disaster Relief Efforts

Children of Haramachi Nursery School

GSDF personnel providing bathing support
6. Response to Other Events

1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

While police agencies have primary responsibility in dealing with incidents of terrorism, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to allow SDF units to be called upon to guard facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ, and to use weapons as necessary in regular guarding assignments of SDF facilities in order to ensure readiness for large-scale terrorist attacks such as those which occurred on September 11, 2001.

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities (Guarding Operations)

When there is a danger of a large-scale terrorist attack on facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and in the event it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas. Part of the authority given to police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials are applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law. (See Fig. III-1-2-16)

The Ministry of Defense and SDF exchange opinions concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations which are new duties for the SDF. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Weapons to Guard SDF Facilities in Normal Circumstances

The authority for use of weapons in the course of guarding SDF facilities within Japan has been stipulated.

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**Fig. III-1-2-16 Outline of Guarding Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Requirements for actions</th>
<th>Primary Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In cases where special measures are approved for preventing damage due to danger of destructive actions being carried out at the facilities of SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan</td>
<td>1) Authorized to order Prime Minister 2) Procedure The Prime Minister determines the facilities to be guarded as well as the duration after listening to the opinions of prefectural governors and having the Minister of Defense confer with the National Public Safety Commission 3) Withdrawal The Prime Minister must order the withdrawal of units without delay when it has been confirmed that operations of the units are no longer necessary, even when it is still within the designated period</td>
<td>1) Powers granted under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, mutatis mutandis, in questioning, *evacuation, *ingress, *the prevention and control of crimes, and the use of weapons 2) In addition to the above-mentioned use of weapons, the use of weapons is permitted in the event a facility being guarded in line with the SDF’s duty suffering large-scale destruction or the danger of infringement where there exists no other appropriate means to overcome it except with the use of weapons, within the scope of necessity reasonably judged from the situation. Consequently, even when a person is injured, even when it results in harm to people, the actions would be legally regarded as a lawful act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Limited to cases where no police officers are present
2. Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas

(1) Amendment of Self-Defense Forces Law
In addition to the currently utilized government aircraft and ASDF transport aircraft, in 1999, SDF ships and the helicopters onboard were added as a means of transport for transporting Japanese nationals overseas in the event of disasters, riots or other states of emergency in foreign countries. Further, SDF personnel became authorized to use the minimum necessary weapons in order to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and Japanese nationals and thus transportation conditions were reinforced. Furthermore, the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas became a primary SDF mission in January 2007 with stipulation in Article 84-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4)

(2) Postures of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF
In order to transfer Japanese nationals overseas from diplomatic establishments and transport them safely to local airports and harbors, the GSDF designates dispatch personnel for helicopter guidance units, the MSDF designates transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designates airlift units and personnel for the dispatch, in order to maintain posture for readiness.

Furthermore, missions to transport Japanese nationals overseas are conducted in close cooperation between the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF therefore integrated coordination is required. To meet this need, capability has been improved to fulfill such missions through joint exercises using transport aircraft and ships.

(3) Achievements in Transporting Japanese Nationals Overseas
On April 15, 2004, 10 Japanese journalists on assignment in Samawah, Iraq, to report on activities of the GSDF dispatched under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq were transported from Talil Airport in Iraq to Mubarak Air Force Base in Kuwait by ASDF transport aircraft (C-130H). This was the first transport of Japanese nationals overseas based on Article 84-3 (then Article 100-8) of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law.

Furthermore, rear area support was entrenched as a primary mission of the SDF as stipulated in Article 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law in January 2007. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4)

4. Military Intelligence Gathering
In order for effective operation of defense capabilities to initially deal with new threats and diverse situations, it is further required to detect signs of various situations in advance and gather, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately with the objective of responding sufficiently to such situations. From the perspective
of Japanese national security, broader scope and comprehensive intelligence capability are essential.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF comprehensively analyze and assess a variety of information and have diversified the means of gathering intelligence. Specific intelligence gathering activities include: 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves in relation to military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons bound for Japan from overseas; 2) collecting and analyzing high-resolution commercial satellite imagery data; 3) warning and surveillance of ships and aircraft; 4) collecting and organizing a variety of published information; 5) information exchanges with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities<sup>65</sup> such as those conducted by defense attachés and other officials<sup>66</sup>.

In order to enhance the capability of gathering a variety of intelligence and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information based on the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will improve human resource cultivation, equipment, and devices for intelligence gathering as well as enhance the organization of intelligence units which support such capability, starting with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters.

Further, the Principles for Strengthening Intelligence Functions (of the Prime Minister’s Office) was adopted at an Intelligence Capability Enhancement Review Committee of the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2008. In order to strengthen the Prime Minister’s Office control tower function in relation to national security, given the recognition of the extreme importance of strengthening intelligence functions in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Defense will cooperate to implement these policy measures such as linking with indicated policy areas, intelligence gathering, summary and analysis, and information conservation. Moreover, it will continue to provide timely and relevant information to the Prime Minister’s Office which is essential for national security.