Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

March 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Table of Contents

Introduction....................................................................................................................................1

1. Stability and Security in Iraq ..................................................................................................3
   1.1. Political Stability...........................................................................................................3
       1.1.1. Strong Democratic Institutions...................................................................3
       1.1.2. National Reconciliation...............................................................................3
       1.1.3. Transnational Issues .................................................................................... 3
       1.1.4. Rule of Law ................................................................................................. 5
   1.2. Economic Activity.........................................................................................................8
       1.2.1. Building the Iraqi Economy .......................................................................8
       1.2.2. Indicators of Economic Activity .................................................................9
   1.3. The Security Environment .........................................................................................14
       1.3.1. Overall Assessment of the Security Environment .....................................14
       1.3.2. Recent Developments in the Security Environment....................................15
       1.3.3. The Nature of the Conflict.........................................................................16
       1.3.4. Attack Trends and Violence .....................................................................18
       1.3.5. Infrastructure Attacks ...............................................................................20
       1.3.6. Public Perceptions of Security ..................................................................20
   1.4. Transferring Security Responsibility .........................................................................22
       1.4.1. Progress in Assuming Leadership in Counter-Insurgency Operations....22
       1.4.2. Process for Implementing Provincial Iraqi Control ..................................23
       1.4.3. MNF-I Basing Construct ..........................................................................24

2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance.................................................................25
   2.1. Assessed Capabilities.................................................................................................25
   2.2. Ministry of Interior ...................................................................................................29
       2.2.1. Ministry of Interior Capacity Development .............................................29
       2.2.2. Iraqi Police Service ...................................................................................32
       2.2.3. National Police ..........................................................................................34
       2.2.4. Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry ....35
       2.2.5. Facilities Protection Service .....................................................................36
   2.3. Ministry of Defense ..................................................................................................37
       2.3.1. Ministry of Defense Capacity Development ............................................37
       2.3.2. Army ........................................................................................................41
       2.3.3. Iraqi National Counter-Terror Capability ................................................41
       2.3.4. Special Operations Forces .......................................................................42
       2.3.5. Navy ........................................................................................................42
       2.3.6. Air Force ..................................................................................................42

Annex A List of Acronyms
Introduction

This report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, is being submitted pursuant to Section 9010 of the U.S. Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Public Law 109-289. The report includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as mandated in the above-referenced legislation. This is the seventh in a series of reports on this subject. The previous report was submitted in November 2006.

The strategic goal of the United States for Iraq remains a unified, democratic, federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and that is an ally in the war on terror. One year ago, as described in the February 2006 edition of this series of reports, the Iraqi people were on their way to achieving these goals. The national constitutional referendum and elections in 2005 were victories for the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, these positive events were followed by a series of attacks that initiated a cycle of sectarian violence, undermined political gains, and challenged the Government of Iraq (GOI). To regain the initiative, the GOI is working with the United States and its Coalition partners, embarking on a new approach to restore the confidence of the Iraqi people in their government; to build strong security institutions capable of securing domestic peace and defending Iraq from outside aggression; and to gain support for Iraq among its neighbors, the region, and the international community.

Improving the security situation in the capital city of Baghdad is a central component of the new approach. Baghdad is Iraq’s center of gravity and its conditions drive conditions in other parts of the country. As sectarian violence in the capital increases, for example, so does support for al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) among Sunnis and for the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) among Shi’a. AQI and JAM remain the key actors in fueling sectarian violence—which has become the greatest impediment to the establishment of security and effective governance in Iraq. Both groups are attempting to establish strongholds and expand their zones of influence in the capital, with ordinary Iraqis getting squeezed in the middle and often fleeing for other parts of the country or leaving Iraq altogether. Any strategy for success must be designed to turn this trajectory around.

The strategic review commissioned by the President in November found that prior efforts to stabilize Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: the lack of adequate Iraqi and Coalition forces to hold areas cleared of terrorists and extremists and restrictive Iraqi rules of engagement that allowed Iraqi political interference in operations. Reinforcing the capital is an essential part of this endeavor. The President’s new way forward extends beyond Baghdad and emphasizes a renewed diplomatic program, a better level of civilian and military integration, increased training of and embedding with Iraqi forces, and a commitment by Iraqi leaders to compromise on key components of reconciliation, including a new hydrocarbon law, genuine and credible local elections, constitutional review, and de-Ba’athification reform. All of these efforts must work in tandem and all relevant agencies in the U.S. Government must mobilize to do their part in order to maximize the chances for success. While the early signs are promising, it will be a period of months before we can measure with certainty whether the new approach is succeeding or requires further adjustments.
This report, like those preceding it, discusses measures of progress in political development, economic activity, and the security environment, noting the inextricable link between these areas and the Islamic, ethnic and tribal contexts that define Iraq as a state. This information predates the new approach and sets the frame around which the new approach was designed. The report should be read as a baseline from which to measure future progress, and indications of success must be heavily caveated given the dynamic situation in Iraq. The situation in Iraq cannot be measured by daily or weekly trends; it is trend lines over the course of months that help fill in a picture from isolated and anecdotal events.
1. Stability and Security in Iraq

1.1. Political Stability
The United States and its Coalition partners are working with the GOI to build strong democratic institutions that impartially serve all Iraqis; to support national reconciliation; and to gain support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community. Fundamental to all of this is security and the effective rule of law.

1.1.1. Strong Democratic Institutions
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has promised to reform his government, beginning with his cabinet and the ministries. This promise recognizes the poor performance of the ministries, and the reform is meant to redress their failure to counter corruption and reduce sectarianism. The majority of Prime Minister Maliki’s current cabinet reflects the results of the December 2005 election and is majority Shi’a with generally proportional representation from the other main ethnic and sectarian communities. Prime Minister Maliki has also promised that the GOI will engage all illegally armed groups, regardless of sectarian affiliation.

1.1.2. National Reconciliation
Since the last report, a series of high-casualty and high-profile attacks primarily against Shi’a civilians—likely perpetrated by AQI—have hampered efforts to demobilize militia groups and have set back the reconciliation process. Likewise, some Shi’a extremist groups have used “death squads” to kill and intimidate Sunni civilians. This type of sectarian violence in Baghdad and the failure to reliably apprehend and punish criminals and terrorists has hampered progress toward reconciliation.

The new approach adapts to new conditions by emphasizing the precondition of security in advancing meaningful reconciliation and setting realistic and achievable goals that are vital to stabilizing Iraq in the medium and long term. Whereas prior efforts had emphasized an all-encompassing “national compact” as the vehicle for political progress, the coming months will seek to advance four specific national reconciliation goals—a hydrocarbon law, local elections, constitutional review, and de-Ba’athification reform—while also focusing more on political accommodations at the provincial and local levels. There have already been some achievements, including passage of a framework hydrocarbon law by the Council of Ministers on February 26, 2007 to be presented for final passage by the Council of Representatives (CoR) when it returns to session in March.

The last two months of 2006, however, saw little progress on the reconciliation front. The first two of four planned reconciliation conferences were described in the last report (November 2006). These conferences laid solid groundwork for subsequent conferences, but there has been little progress since then and the conferences had no effect on quelling violence. On December 16–17, 2006, the Political Parties Conference was held in Baghdad. Speeches given by the Prime Minister and other Iraqi officials focused on political participation and national unity, and welcomed former Ba’athists into the political process, so long as they showed loyalty to the new national government. The Sadrist bloc, top Ba’athists, and many Sunni factions did not participate. A fourth conference of religious leaders has not yet been scheduled due to lack of financial support and attendance challenges.

1.1.3 Transnational Issues
Transnational issues addressed in the November report, including water-sharing agreements, drug trafficking, and negative foreign influence, continue to shape regional rela-
tions. The overall regional environment remains poor, and there is great suspicion among Sunni Arabs whether a Shi’a-majority government can act independent of Iran, advance the national interests of Iraq, and serve the interests of the region as a whole. Prime Minister Maliki has begun intensive efforts to correct these perceptions with envoys dispatched throughout the region in the past six weeks. Maliki’s government this year has also restored diplomatic relations with Syria for the first time in three decades and reopened an Iraqi Embassy in Saudi Arabia for the first time since the First Gulf War. Transnational issues that bear particular attention in the near term include the following.

- **Iranian and Syrian Influence.** The United States and Prime Minister Maliki have publicly noted the lethal Iranian support to Shi’a militias as well as the Syrian provision of safe haven to some Iraqi insurgents, especially former Saddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath party members. Iran and Syria are discussed in greater detail later in this report.

- **Tensions on the Border with Turkey.** The President’s new approach calls for increased efforts to counter the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a Kurdish terrorist organization with a history of terror activities in Turkey, often launched from northern Iraq. Countering the PKK is essential to accomplishing regional goals, preventing unilateral Turkish military action, and maintaining good U.S.-Turkish and Iraqi-Turkish relations. In 2006, General (ret.) Joseph Ralston was named Special Envoy for Countering the PKK in Northern Iraq. Both Turkey and Iraq have appointed counterparts to work with General Ralston to attempt to arrive at a diplomatic solution. While there has not yet been a tri-lateral meeting, there has been progress in breaking the hold of the PKK at the Makhmour refugee camp.

- **Refugees.** Significant population displacement, within Iraq and into neighboring countries, diminishes Iraq’s professional and entrepreneurial classes and strains the capacities of the countries to which they have relocated. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 2 million Iraqis are living outside of Iraq, with more than a million in Syria and Jordan. It is estimated that as many as 9,000 people are fleeing Iraq every month.

**International Compact**

The International Compact with Iraq provides a 5-year framework for economic reform commitments between Iraq and the international community. This is an important initiative and a key component of the diplomatic line of action under the new strategic framework. The Compact is a joint initiative of the GOI and the United Nations (UN) and will commit Iraq to reforming its oil and agriculture sectors, establishing new investment laws and regulations, building the institutions needed to combat corruption, ensuring good governance, and protecting human rights. In return, members of the international community will commit to providing financial, technical, and other forms of assistance needed to support Iraqi efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency. The main text of the Compact has been approved and finalized; background material can be found at www.iraqcompact.org. The GOI would like to conclude the Compact during a ministerial-level event in spring 2007. To facilitate that objective, Prime Minister Maliki has asked UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to host a sub-ministerial meeting in New York to finalize the Compact text and secure commitments from international partners.
1.1.4. Rule of Law

Stability and security depend on establishment of, and respect for, the rule of law by government institutions that represent the state and by the citizens whom the rule of law seeks to protect. The rule of law is founded on clear, understandable legislation that is applied equally to all, respect for and adherence to such laws by the public and governmental officials, governmental authority to enforce adherence to the law and to bring violators to justice, and the means to hold government officials accountable for the misuse of power.

Legislative Action

The Iraqi Constitution sets forth a list of rights and freedoms, but additional legislation is needed to implement these guarantees. Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee officially began work on November 15, 2006. The committee has another two months to complete its work and to recommend constitutional changes to the CoR. In accordance with Iraq’s Constitution, recommended amendments will be voted on in a national referendum within two months of CoR approval.

The CoR did not achieve a quorum from December 10, 2007 to January 6, 2007, due to significant absenteeism and a boycott by the Sadrist bloc, which holds about 10% of the CoR’s 275 seats. The speaker of the parliament has attempted to improve CoR attendance by threatening to fine members for each missed session. The Sadists have since returned to the CoR without having the demands met that they initially declared when announcing the boycott in November.

Legislative highlights of the last quarter include the following.

- The Constitutional Review Committee met on November 15, 2006, and formed three subcommittees with fair representation from all major party blocs. The committee is working with technical advisors from the UN to help ensure that the constitution is technically sound and improved upon where possible.

- On January 23, 2007, the CoR passed a law establishing the Independent Higher Election Commission. The CoR must now appoint commission members and pass legislation to set a date for provincial elections. Successful local elections and a possible constitutional referendum will require sufficient Iraqi and international resources, and the United States will be working through diplomatic channels to take the necessary steps to help ensure that these electoral events—like the electoral event in 2005—are genuine and credible.

- The CoR passed the Military Court Procedures Law on January 24, 2007, and the Military Punishment Law on February 5, 2007. Although Coalition Provisional Authority Order 23 promulgated a Code of Military Discipline for the Iraqi Army, it was not formally institutionalized. These new laws formally establish Iraq’s military justice system, which will include due process protections and judicial review. This is a major step toward institutionalizing the rule of law within the Iraqi military.

- The CoR passed the 2007 Federal Budget on February 8, 2007, before adjourning until March. The US$41 billion budget was a significant achievement for the GOI. The US$7.3 billion committed to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is evidence of the GOI commitment to the fight. This 35% increase over the 2006 budget is a sign of growing Iraqi self-sufficiency.

The CoR failed, however, to move forward on other critical pieces of legislation, including a law to reform the de-Ba’athification system and a law to clarify the powers of provinces that are not part of regions. On de-
Ba‘athification, there are currently three different proposals—one from the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, one from the cross-sectarian Iraqiyya Party, and one from the CoR De-Ba‘athification Committee. Iraqi leaders are working to synthesize these drafts and reach an agreeable compromise position, with the three-member Presidency Council taking a leading role on this issue. On the provincial powers legislation, a draft law has been read twice on the floor of the CoR and appears headed for passage, though key issues, such as a date and structure for local elections, remain unresolved. These pieces of legislation are among the most important steps toward meaningful national reconciliation, and the United States will continue to encourage the GOI to achieve agreement when the CoR returns to session this month.

Crime
Criminal activities remain elevated and are often difficult to distinguish from sectarian and other violence. White collar crime is an entrenched practice stemming from decades of nepotism and organized criminal activities by government institutions of the former regime; it will remain a serious obstacle for the GOI for years to come. The Board of Supreme Audit, the Commission on Public Integrity, and ministry inspectors general continue to work with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to promote transparency and to curb this entrenched practice.

Public Corruption
Budget execution and corruption problems continue to hamper the GOI’s ability to perform and turn good intentions into results. The United States is helping the GOI target and spend the US$10 billion in Iraqi funds dedicated to capital investment, reconstruction, and job creation programs through an effort headed by Ambassador Tim Carney, appointed by Secretary Rice in January to serve as an Economic Transition Coordinator in Baghdad. To be fully
effective, however, Iraq must also reform Saddam-era laws that allow cabinet ministers to shield government officials from prosecution, and all Iraqi leaders must commit to ensuring the neutral and independent application of the law. The United States is also working with the World Bank and other international institutions to support the three primary anti-corruption institutions in Iraq: the Commission on Public Integrity, the Supreme Board of Audit, and the inspectors general assigned to the government ministries. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad recently restructured its rule of law and law enforcement offices to improve their effectiveness in achieving civilian rule of law objectives in Iraq.

Police
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) views its primary role as that of providing security. An emphasis on tactical skills is understandable, considering the nature of the violence in Iraq, but little time is left for training in the conduct of criminal investigations. To address this shortcoming, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is strengthening the Iraqi Major Crimes Task Force and the Major Crimes Unit. Additionally, MNSTC-I and the MOI are working to improve Iraq’s forensic investigative capabilities by adding several thousand forensic specialists to the police forces. Militia infiltration of local police remains a problem and Prime Minister Maliki has demonstrated a commitment to retraining and reforming police units that are shown to be serving sectarian or parochial interests. Though improving, the lack of a fully functional justice system has led to unreliable detention practices, and police have often disregarded release orders signed by Iraqi judges. Security forces also remain prone to intimidation by or collusion with militias and criminal gangs, thereby decreasing the confidence among ordinary Iraqis in their legitimate security force.
Courts
As of January 2007, Iraq had approximately 870 investigative and trial judges (up 70 from the last report) and 100 criminal courts. The GOI recognizes the need to expand judicial capacity. To meet the growing demands of the judiciary, the number of judicial investigators is scheduled to reach 700 in 2007 and 1,000 in 2008. The MOJ now operates a Judicial Training Institute. The first class of 178 judges and prosecutors is scheduled to graduate in summer 2007. A second class of 60 trainees is scheduled to graduate in fall 2008. These are positive steps, but to meet the growing demand across the judicial sector, the MOJ needs to increase the system’s capacity.

Judges frequently face threats and attacks, and thus absenteeism and resignations undermine the workforce. Those who remain often fear handing down guilty verdicts against defendants with ties to insurgent groups or militias. In the provincial courts, judges often decline to investigate or try cases related to the insurgency and terrorism.

The United States has obligated roughly US$38 million since 2004 for judicial security. To counter judicial intimidation, secure criminal justice complexes are under development. A criminal justice complex may include a courthouse, detention facilities, forensic labs, and judicial housing—all located within the same secure perimeter. This concept provides enhanced security for the judges and staff and creates synergy among the judiciary, police, and detention officials. The first such complex will be located in the Rusafa district of Baghdad, outside the Green Zone. Investigative judges of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq will be housed there; it will also have detention facilities and housing for judicial and court personnel.

Prisons and Detainees
Concerns remain that the Iraqi Corrections Service is increasingly infiltrated by criminal organizations and militias. Detention facilities in Iraq do not meet incarceration needs. Pre-trial detention facilities in Iraq, administered by the MOI, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the MOJ, are reported to be overcrowded, substandard facilities with poor detainee accountability practices. Post-trial prisons, administered by the MOJ, generally meet international standards, but are at maximum capacity. To address this problem, Prime Minister Maliki and the Minister of Justice are demanding greater oversight of prison facilities, and U.S. advisors are encouraging the MOJ to increase the salaries of corrections officers to bring them more in line with those of police officers and thus to reduce the temptations of bribery. The Embassy and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are also working with the GOI to increase detention capacity in the near term through additional compounds with adequate oversight in Baghdad and in the long term through hardened facilities to be administered by the MOJ.
1.2. Economic Activity

1.2.1. Building the Iraqi Economy

The GOI has taken significant steps to improve its economy, although security concerns continue to restrain Iraq’s economic growth. In February 2007, the Iraqi Cabinet approved a framework hydrocarbon law that provides the structure and principles for foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector, decentralized management for the oil industry, and equitable distribution of oil revenues to provincial and regional governments. Very recent Cabinet approval of the oil law demonstrated the importance of this legislation in promoting the economic development and political unity of the country. It is anticipated the framework hydrocarbon law and related revenue-sharing legislation will be submitted to the CoR in March.

In 2006, the CoR passed the Foreign Investment Law and the Fuel Import Liberalization Law to facilitate the expansion of private sector activity. To become effective, these laws require promulgating regulations to provide a sufficient legal framework. The GOI is drafting these regulations, which should be implemented later this spring. An increase in foreign investment will be effective in stimulating growth, building trust, and strengthening the Iraqi dinar.

Stand-By Arrangement

The GOI met most of the performance criteria and benchmarks of the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2006. The GOI met again with the IMF in mid-December 2006 to discuss the combined third and fourth SBA reviews. A follow-up meeting was held in Paris on February 1, 2007. The participants agreed to schedule the Executive Board meeting, during which the reviews will be completed and the program extended for six months, dependent on the GOI implementing the next mandated fuel price hikes on March 5. Three years of satisfactory performance on an upper credit tranche IMF program are required for Iraq to receive the final 20% tranche of Paris Club debt relief. Therefore, if fuel prices are not raised and reviews are not completed by March 22, the IMF program may expire.

Diversification Issues

The Iraqi economy depends on the oil sector, which generates 67% of Iraq’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 95% of the government’s internal revenues. To reduce its reliance on oil, the United States is supporting Iraq’s economic diversification through increased agricultural exports and private sector development. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq aims to re-energize existing state-owned enterprises, with the ultimate intent of privatization to promote economic diversity. The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) agricultural development projects include increasing agricultural exports. Strengthening the growth of high-value crops, such as olives, has demonstrated increased export potential. USAID’s microlending project has been very successful at addressing private sector development.

Government of Iraq Budget Execution

The GOI has available assets, the product of last year’s under-spent budget and profits from higher-than-anticipated oil prices, but it does not yet have the mechanisms to spend them. The GOI will need to make significant investments in oil infrastructure, public works, and agriculture to expand the economy.

In the 2006 Iraqi budget, 9.3 trillion dinar (US$6.2 billion) was allocated to capital projects, but less than 40% was obligated. A number of factors contribute to the consistent under-spending of Iraq’s budget. The GOI lacks a public accounting framework and suffers from outdated procurement processes.
To address procurement problems, the United States is helping the GOI formulate simplified contracting procedures that will aid in budget execution.

In addition, the MOD and the MOI have taken steps to spend significant portions of their procurement budgets—anticipated to be in excess of US$2 billion in 2007—through U.S. Foreign Military Sales cases.

1.2.2. **Indicators of Economic Activity**

Economic indicators are collected and published regularly, largely by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and international organizations. The World Bank projects that 2006 GDP was US$48.5 billion, due largely to higher world oil prices, with a per capita GDP of US$1,687. Real GDP growth was projected to have been 3.0% in 2006, including 10.0% growth in the non-oil sector.

**Inflation**

Iraq’s high rate of inflation is a serious obstacle to economic stability. Inflation in 2006 averaged 50%, well above the IMF’s revised 2006 target of 30%. Because fuel shortages contributed to inflation in 2006, the GOI took nominal steps to remove obstacles to private fuel imports. However, the GOI’s inability to craft an adequate regulatory structure has so far prevented its efforts from yielding any results. Over the past three months, in an attempt to curb inflation, the CoR passed the Fuel Import Liberalization Law, approved a deal with Kuwait to increase the availability of refined fuel, and agreed to sell imported fuel at market prices. To reduce the rate of core (i.e., non-fuel) inflation, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) implemented 14% exchange rate appreciation between November 1, 2006 and February 1, 2007. As a signaling measure, the CBI also raised its benchmark policy interest rate from 12% to 16% in November and to 20% in December.

**GDP Estimates and Projections, 2004 – 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP (in USD billion)</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Oil Revenue (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (USD)</td>
<td>949.0</td>
<td>1,237.0</td>
<td>1,687.0</td>
<td>2,060.0</td>
<td>2,319.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP (% change)</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Fiscal Balance (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>-40.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Inflation (annual %)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank Estimates (e), January 2007
IMF Projections (p), August 2006*
has indicated its commitment to continued use of monetary policy measures to maintain price stability.

**Unemployment**

Estimates of unemployment vary from 13.4% to 60%. Underemployment may be a much more significant factor. For example, a January 2007 survey by Multi-National Division Baghdad indicated that only 16% of Baghdadis responded that their current income meets their basic needs.

The GOI must, with Coalition and international help, create an effective strategy to provide jobs. This program must be seen as fair and nonsectarian by ordinary Iraqis. It must produce tangible results for the majority of Iraqis or it will decrease the legitimacy of the GOI. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, new businesses have increased from 8,000 to more than 34,000. In addition, the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq is working to improve contingency contracting in Iraq and to reinvigorate operations at targeted state-owned enterprises by driving demand and establishing connections with international business executives. The Task Force has identified 10 state-owned factories that show the most promise to increase productivity and employ the idle labor force, with minimal investment by the GOI; the GOI’s 2007 budget includes 1.4 trillion dinars for revitalizing state-owned factories. The Task Force has estimated that reactivating these factories will create 11,000 full-time jobs within six months.

---

**Oil Production**

**November 2006 – February 2007**

- **November 15-19:** 2.20
- **November 20-26:** 2.21
- **November 27-December 3:** 2.18
- **December 4-10:** 2.05
- **December 11-17:** 2.14
- **December 18-24:** 2.17
- **December 25-31:** 2.23
- **January 1-7:** 1.99
- **January 8-14:** 1.72
- **January 15-21:** 1.70
- **January 22-28:** 1.99
- **February 1-7:** 2.05
- **February 8-14:** 2.09

*Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office*
Oil Production, Distribution, and Export
Damage to pipelines, fires, poor maintenance, and attacks have combined to slow production of refined products and crude oil for export, primarily in central and northern Iraq. Production and exports in the south remain the primary driving force of Iraq’s economy, although aging infrastructure and maintenance problems impede near-term increases in production and exports. Crude oil production for the October-December 2006 quarter was 2.2 million barrels per day (mbpd), and oil exports were 1.49 mbpd, short of the GOI’s 2006 goal of 1.65 mbpd. Fall and winter months generally have low production relative to the spring and summer. Other factors, such as high market prices for crude oil, overcame this shortfall and resulted in revenues of US$1.5 billion above that forecast for 2006.

Critical fuel shortages occurred throughout the fall and early winter, including gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and liquid petroleum gas, largely as a result of poor domestic production, reduced imports from Turkey, and continued distribution problems. The regulated price of regular gasoline (87 octane) in Iraq is currently about 250 dinars per liter (US$.72 per gallon); premium gasoline (92 octane) is about 350 dinars per liter (US$1.03 per gallon).

Gray marketeers continue to profit from the sale of stolen fuel, both within Iraq and in neighboring countries. Gray market prices in many central and northern provinces were reported at 100%–2,000% above official subsidized prices for key fuels.

Electricity Production and Distribution
Estimated peak daily demand for electricity between October and December 2006 was 9,091 megawatts (MW), an increase of 20% over the same period in 2005. During this quarter, the actual average daily peak generation output was 4,226 MW, an increase of 2% over the same period in 2005, and 51% of the average peak daily demand of 8,237 MW. Many Iraqi citizens have established private entrepreneurial generator arrangements to produce electricity on a neighborhood or building basis, therefore underestimating total electrical production. The gap between government-produced supply and consumer demand continues to increase due to the failure to add or rehabilitate capacity, as well as inadequate security, operations, and maintenance practices for the generation and transmission infrastructure. A surging demand is exacerbated by the fact that Iraqis pay very little, if anything, for electricity. Reform of electricity charges for consumers is key to the long-term viability of Iraq’s electricity sector.

Government-produced electricity averaged 10.7 hours per day over the reporting period (October-December 2006) and 9.1 hours per day for the month of December. Baghdad, however, averaged only 6.6 hours of power per day this quarter, falling to 6.3 hours in December—5.7 hours short of the target goal.
Electricity Supply and Demand 2003 to 2006

Average Peak Daily Supply (MW) - Average Peak Daily Demand (MW)

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency

Average Daily Hours of Electrical Power per Province January 2007

<8
9-11
12-16
>16

Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
Water and Sanitation

As of December 2006, Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)-funded water projects have added or restored potable water treatment for approximately 5.35 million Iraqis who did not have access to potable water in April 2003. This is an increase of 150,000 since the November 2006 report. To date, IRRF-funded projects have also restored sewage treatment capacity sufficient to serve around 5.1 million Iraqis, 100,000 short of the U.S. end state goal.

The agricultural sector uses approximately 90% of the water consumed, but has tremendous potential to improve the efficiency of water use. Toward this end, in 2005 and 2006, the U.S. Government funded Phase I of a new national water master plan for Iraq, which, once completed, will guide water resource development in Iraq for the next three decades.

Nutrition and Poverty

In 2006, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) continued to provide assistance through a 12-month operation targeting the most vulnerable groups in Iraq. The operation will continue in 2007, providing food assistance to more than 3.7 million malnourished children and their family members. WFP “safety net” activities include school feeding and supplementary feeding, which build alternative safety net mechanisms for the Public Distribution System.

Agriculture

To help revitalize Iraq’s agricultural sector, the U.S. Department of Agriculture initiated a program to enhance agricultural training at Iraqi universities. In addition, Department of Agriculture personnel are participating in provincial and ministerial capacity-building efforts as agricultural officers and advisors at Iraq’s Ministry of Agriculture and in the U.S. Embassy and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The Ministry of Agriculture and others associated with agriculture in Iraq have not made adequate progress in leveraging Iraq’s potential. Lack of modern seed and fertilizer, under-developed irrigation systems, and lack of pesticides have all contributed to under-achievement of potential. This, in turn, has caused Iraq to continue to be overly dependent on imported food and to fail to achieve a marked increase in employment for the agricultural sector.
1.3. The Security Environment

The conflict in Iraq has changed from a predominantly Sunni-led insurgency against foreign occupation to a struggle for the division of political and economic influence among sectarian groups and organized criminal activity. As described in the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence, al-Qaida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Some elements of the situation in Iraq are properly descriptive of a “civil war,” including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities and mobilization, the changing character of the violence, and population displacements. Illegally armed groups are engaged in a self-sustaining cycle of sectarian and politically motivated violence, using tactics that include indiscriminate bombing, murder, and indirect fire to intimidate people and stoke sectarian conflict. Much of the present violence is focused on local issues, such as sectarian, political, and economic control of Baghdad; Kurdish, Arab, and Turkomen aspirations for Kirkuk; and the political and economic control of Shi’a regions in the south. Although most attacks continue to be directed against Coalition forces, Iraqi civilians suffer the vast majority of casualties. Given the concentration of political power and population in Baghdad and the city’s ethnic and sectarian diversity, Baghdad security remains the key to stability in Iraq. An Iraqi-conceived and -led Baghdad Security Plan is the centerpiece for addressing the escalating violence.

1.3.1. Overall Assessment of the Security Environment

The level of violence in Iraq continued to rise during this reporting period as ethnic, tribal, sectarian, and political factions seek power over political and economic resources. Consistent with previous reports, more than 80% of the violence in Iraq is limited to four provinces centered around Baghdad, although it also exists in other population centers, such as Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basrah. Sectarian violence and insurgent attacks still involve a very small portion of the population, but public perception of violence is a significant factor in preventing reconciliation on key issues. The conflict in Iraq remains a mosaic and requires maximum flexibility on the part of the Coalition and the GOI to uproot the main drivers of violence in different areas of the country.

- The conflict in the north is characterized by sectarian tensions, insurgents and extremist attacks, and competition among ethnic groups (Kurd, Arab, Turkomen) for political and economic dominance, including control of the oilfields centered around Kirkuk. Violence remained focused primarily in and around the northern cities of Kirkuk, Mosul, and Tal’Afar, where ethnic competition for power is exacerbated by violence from Sunni extremists.

- Violence in Anbar is characterized by Sunni insurgents and AQI attacks against Coalition forces. AQI and affiliated Sunni extremists are attempting to intimidate the local population into supporting the creation of an Islamic state. However, in a positive development, these efforts are provoking a backlash among some tribal figures and Sunni insurgent leaders, who are encouraging local opposition to AQI, particularly in ar-Ramadi. Local Sunni sheikhs are leading this opposition and have strengthened recruiting efforts for local police forces.

- Violence in Baghdad, Diyala, and Balad is characterized by sectarian competition for power and influence between AQI and JAM, principally through murders, executions, and high-profile bombings. AQI and JAM elements rarely clash directly; most
of their reciprocal violence is against Shi’a and Sunni civilians through high-profile bombings or campaigns of sectarian cleansing.

- The conflict in the southern provinces is characterized by tribal rivalry; factional violence among the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr Organization, the Office of the Martyr Sadr/JAM, and smaller militias for political power; and attacks on Coalition forces.

1.3.2. Recent Developments in the Security Environment

As described above, the new way forward in Iraq focuses on security where violence is highest—in Baghdad and Anbar. While the overarching strategic goals remain unchanged, securing the population will assume a top priority to help set conditions for political and economic progress. We will increase our forces in Baghdad by 21,500 personnel to give our commanders an enhanced ability to hold previously cleared neighborhoods. The ISF are also reinforcing the capital with three additional brigades. Prime Minister Maliki has established a Baghdad Security Command with 10 Security Framework Districts, with an Iraqi brigade, partnered with a U.S. battalion, permanently located in each. More than 40 Joint Security Stations will be established to facilitate cooperation between Coalition and Iraqi forces and to build trust and confidence with the local population. In Anbar, U.S. Marines will be added to provide more forces to consolidate recent gains against AQI networks. Throughout Iraq, our embedded teams advising Iraq units are being substantially increased in size to improve ISF operational capabilities more rapidly. As security improves, economic reconstruction programs
enabled by Iraqi and Coalition funding and expanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams will move in to assist with basic services and improving economic opportunities for Iraqi citizens.

As of the end of 2006, the primary ending point of data collection for this report, Shi’a militias and Sunni insurgent groups were engaged in sectarian cleansing in Baghdad neighborhoods and forcibly displacing both Sunni and Shi’a Baghdad residents. The new approach is designed to help the Iraqis end this trend. In January 2007, Prime Minister Maliki announced that the ISF would renew their efforts to lead operations to secure Baghdad from insurgents and militias. Demonstrating support for the Prime Minister’s efforts, the CoR voted to support the principles of his Baghdad Security Plan on January 25, 2007. This newfound GOI willingness to challenge the militias, especially JAM, and the announcement that the ISF would pursue all illegally armed groups, regardless of affiliation, is a positive development—though ultimate success will require sustained and consistent commitments to action and even-handed application of the rule of law by all Iraqi leaders.

### 1.3.3. The Nature of the Conflict

Violent opposition to the GOI and Coalition forces comes from a variety of groups with political, religious, ethnic, or criminal objectives. Some groups receive support from outside Iraq. Although much of the violence is attributable to sectarian friction, each of the violent factions is driven by its own political power relationships, and the factions are often hostile to one another. Shi’a sectarian militias have differing objectives, which occasionally lead to violence. JAM, which is associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, conducts attacks and provides services in support of Sadr’s efforts to dominate the Shi’a areas of Baghdad and the south. The Badr Organization often works against JAM and in support of SCIRI and its political agenda of autonomy in the south. AQI and associated foreign fighters attack Coalition and GOI targets and both Shiites and Sunnis to further AQI’s goal of establishing an Islamic state in Iraq and to build a sanctuary to support operations against targets outside Iraq, while Sunni insurgents attack Coalition forces and the Shi’a-dominated GOI to promote a predominantly secular Sunni Arab agenda. This rivalry will be most evident during coming months as Maysan, Qadisiyah, and Wassit provinces assume Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).

### Goals of Key Destabilizing Elements in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Insurgents</td>
<td>• Expel U.S. and Coalition forces from Iraq&lt;br&gt;• Topple the “unity” government&lt;br&gt;• Re-establish Sunni governance in Anbar and Diyala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>• Force Coalition forces withdrawal&lt;br&gt;• Gain territory to export conflict&lt;br&gt;• Provoke clash between Islam and others&lt;br&gt;• Establish caliphate with Shari’a governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>• Force Coalition forces withdrawal&lt;br&gt;• Consolidate control over Baghdad and the GOI&lt;br&gt;• Exert control over security institutions&lt;br&gt;• Implement Shari’a governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iranian Support. Iranian lethal support for select groups of Shi’a militants intensifies the conflict in Iraq. Consistent with the National Intelligence Estimate, Iranian support to Shi’a militias, such as JAM and the Badr Organization, includes providing lethal weapons, training, financing, and technical support. This includes supplying some Shi’a extremist groups with explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), the most effective of the roadside bombs. Shi’a extremist groups have been implicated in direct attacks against Coalition forces, including with EFP technology. EFPs require advanced manufacturing processes and training for employment that clearly place them outside the category of “improvised explosive devices.”

Syrian Support. Although Iraq resumed diplomatic relations with Syria in November 2006, Damascus appears unwilling to cooperate fully with the GOI on bilateral security initiatives. Syria continues to provide safe haven, border transit, and limited logistical support to some Iraqi insurgents, especially former Saddam-era Iraqi Ba’ath Party elements. Syria also permits former regime elements to engage in organizational activities, such that Syria has emerged as an important organizational and coordination hub for elements of the former Iraqi regime. Although Syrian security and intelligence services continue to detain and deport Iraq-bound fighters, Syria remains the primary foreign fighter gateway into Iraq. Despite its heightened scrutiny of extremists and suspected insurgents, Damascus appears to want to appease Islamist extremist groups. Damascus also recognizes that Islamist extremists and elements of the former Iraqi regime share Syria’s desire to undermine Coalition efforts in Iraq.
1.3.4. Attack Trends and Violence

For this report, the term “attacks” refers to specific incidents reported in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Significant Activities Database. It includes known attacks on Coalition forces, the ISF, the civilian population, and infrastructure. Attacks typically involve improvised explosive devices; small arms, including sniper fire; and indirect fire weapons.

The total number of attacks on and casualties suffered by Coalition forces, the ISF, and Iraqi civilians for the October-December reporting period were the highest for any 3-month period since 2003. These attacks were concentrated in the provinces of Baghdad, Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, with Baghdad experiencing a record 45 attacks per day. The other 14 provinces of Iraq experience comparatively low levels of attacks.

Coalition forces continued to attract the majority of attacks, while the ISF and Iraqi civilians continued to suffer the majority of casualties. Casualties from these attacks decreased slightly in January, but remained troublingly high. In addition, as these data only include violence reported to or observed by Coalition forces, they only provide a partial picture of the violence experienced by Iraqis. The UN estimates civilian casualties based on the number of casualties reported by hospitals throughout the country. For the month of December, the UN estimated that more than 6,000 civilians were killed or wounded. This is about twice as many casualties as were recorded by Coalition forces.
**Average Weekly Attacks**

* April 1, 2004 – February 9, 2007

- Attacks Targeting Iraqi Civilians
- Attacks Targeting Iraqi Security Forces
- Attacks Targeting Coalition Forces

**Average Daily Casualties***

* April 1, 2004 – February 9, 2007

- Civilians
- Iraqi Security Forces
- Coalition

---

* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elements responding to an incident; the inconclusivity of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

*Source: MNC-I*
1.3.5. Infrastructure Attacks
This past quarter (October-December 2006) saw an average of 1.4 attacks per week on infrastructure providing essential services, such as electrical power, water, and fuel. The attack rate is down from an average of 6.7 attacks per week in the pre-sovereignty period of April-June 2004. However, the timing and location of more recent attacks resulted in greater disruption of service. In addition, weak ministerial oversight, ineffectual rapid-repair teams, and criminal harvesting of infrastructure assets (e.g., copper from power lines) have proved to be major impediments to improving the supply of essential services. Since poor delivery of essential services adversely affects the legitimacy of the government in the minds of the civilian population, Iraq’s infrastructure will remain a high-value target for insurgents and criminal elements.

1.3.6. Public Perceptions of Security
Surveys of the Iraqi people consistently demonstrate a rejection of violence, particularly violence against civilians. More than 80% of the population rejects violence against the government under any circumstance, and more than 90% rejects attacks against women and children. However, two-thirds of Iraqis express a sense that conditions for peace and stability are worsening, and the population is roughly split on whether the government is moving in the right or the wrong direction to quell the violence. This situation is consistent with polling data described in previous reports. Almost two-thirds of the population feel personally powerless to do anything to stop the violence. Nevertheless, the number of actionable tips—something individuals can do to improve the situation—continues to rise.

National Hotline Actionable Tips*
August 2006 – January 2007

Source: MNF-I (includes tips reported to multiple sources)

* Not all actionable tips result in the apprehension of enemy forces or the seizure of illegal weapons.
Many Iraqis feel more positive at the local level than they do at the national level. As noted above, the number of community watch groups is increasing, indicating Iraqis are taking personal responsibility for the security of their neighborhoods. However, efforts must be made to coordinate these groups with GOI security efforts and prevent them from acting as “mini-militias” outside ISF control. Almost 80% of Iraqis polled said that they thought militias should be dissolved, with more than half reporting that they thought militias make conditions more dangerous. Overall, confidence in the GOI to provide protection has improved nationally. Iraqis indicate a steady increase in confidence in their security forces, both Army and police. This national improvement is reflected in improvements in the confidence in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police to improve the situation. These aspects vary widely by province, with most support coming from the Shi’a-dominated south and the Kurdish-dominated north.
1.4. Transferring Security Responsibility

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iraq met in Amman, Jordan, in November 2006, to review the recommendations regarding the transfer of security responsibilities to the GOI. These recommendations included the establishment of nine committees focused on the following issues: MOD training and equipping, MOI training and equipping, transfer of operational control of Iraqi Army Divisions to the GOI, transfer of provincial control to the GOI, development of ministerial capacities, improved security coordination between MNF-I and the GOI, development of an Iraqi counter-terrorism capability, development of an Iraqi National Intelligence system, and development of a National Security Architecture. With the approval of the Iraqi Prime Minister, implementation of this effort is under way. The first series of reports from the nine committees was completed on February 19, 2007. The committees will continue their efforts toward acceleration and transfer of security responsibilities until completion. After the transfer of security responsibilities is complete, a long-term security relationship serving the interests of the United States, Iraq, the region, and the rest of the world can be established.

1.4.1. Progress in Assuming Leadership in Counter-Insurgency Operations

As part of the process of transferring security responsibility, an Iraqi unit assumes the lead once it has been assessed and demonstrated sufficient capability to plan and execute combat operations. As of February 13, 2007, 8 Division Headquarters, 31 Brigade Head-
quarters, and 93 Iraqi Army battalions had assumed the lead for counter-insurgency operations within their assigned areas of operations, and Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had assumed command and control of 6 of 10 Iraqi Army divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 10th). Although these units lead security in their respective areas of operations, most still require substantial logistics and sustainment support from Coalition forces.

The Coalition is focusing on improving the proficiency of all military and police units, primarily through the efforts of Transition Teams. These teams, composed of 6,000 advisors in more than 480 teams, are embedded at all levels of Iraqi units in all major subordinate commands.

1.4.2. Process for Implementing Provincial Iraqi Control

The transfer of security responsibility from Coalition forces to the GOI reflects Iraq’s ability to protect its citizens and safeguard its territory. As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces move into supporting roles, while maintaining sufficient forces on the ground to help Iraq consolidate and secure its gains.

The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) has developed criteria to guide the transfer of security responsibility to Iraq. Recommendations for transfer include an assessment of conditions in four categories: Threat Assessment, ISF Readiness, Local Governance Capability, and MNF-I Ability to Respond Quickly to Major Threats (if needed). The appropriate Multi-National Force division commander and

![Provincial Security Transition Assessment As of February 2007](image-url)
provincial governor, assisted by representatives of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense and U.S. and United Kingdom Embassies, conduct monthly assessments of provinces and provincial capitals. Once a decision is made to transfer security responsibilities, the JCTSR provides transition directives, develops a public affairs plan, and arranges a post-transfer security agreement between MNF-I and provincial governors.

In December 2006, responsibility for security in An Najaf Province was transferred from MNF-I to the provincial government and civilian-controlled Iraqi Police. An Najaf is the third of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be designated for transition to PIC. The joint decision of the GOI and MNF-I to hand over security responsibility is the result of the An Najaf civilian authorities’ demonstrated ability to manage their own security and governance duties at the provincial level.

Events in January 2007 validated the post-transfer security concept. When the local An Najaf police were unexpectedly fired upon, they assessed the situation to be beyond their means to control. The provincial governor then requested assistance from the National Command Center (NCC), which alerted and deployed additional units from outside the province. Once those units arrived, an additional call for support was sent. The NCC requested helicopter and airplane support from Coalition forces, which also sent a Quick Reaction Force to assist. The outcome was a decisive victory by the ISF.

On December 17, 2006, the Prime Minister and the Ministerial Committee for National Security approved the transfer of security responsibility for Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). These provinces will transition to PIC on completion of negotiations between the GOI and the KRG to resolve a national budgetary issue concerning the defense budget. These three provinces and three others—Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Ninewah—are expected to transition to PIC by the spring of 2007. The remaining provinces are expected to achieve PIC in 2007 except for Anbar, which is projected to transfer to PIC in early 2008.

1.4.3. MNF-I Basing Construct

MNF-I is consolidating its locations in Iraq to reduce its temporary basing requirements using a “bottom-up” conditions-based process to synchronize basing requirements with Coalition forces requirements and the projected command-and-control structure. The timeline for this process is being adjusted to support the short-term surge for the Baghdad Security Plan. However, MNF-I has already reduced its presence in major cities while developing the flexibility and maintaining the force level required to support other elements in Iraq, including Coalition partners, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Transition Teams, other supporting entities, and the Department of State. This process will maximize support through a minimum number of strategically located forward operating bases and convoy support centers. Because most of the ISF have been strategically based on former Coalition bases, MNF-I is actively engaging the Ministry of Finance and other entities in the GOI in order to identify future tenants to take possession of the remaining bases.
2. Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

By the end of 2006, the United States and its Coalition partners met their force generation targets, while continuing their efforts to expand the size and capability of the ISF to meet emergent requirements. As of February 19, 2007, approximately 328,700 forces (not including replenishments) have been trained. The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition. The police have also experienced significant attrition of personnel who have been through Coalition training, but provincial and local governments have hired additional police outside the train-and-equip program. Both the MOD and the MOI have assumed control of most force generation tasks and have developed a plan to continue routine replenishment of the force. The table on this page depicts the number of ISF trained by Coalition forces since 2003.

### 2.1. Assessed Capabilities

As of February 19, 2007, there were 112 Iraqi Army combat battalions. One hundred three are conducting operations at varying levels of capability; an additional nine battalions are being generated. There are two Special Operations Battalions, both conducting operations. Of the 17 planned Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs), 14 are assessed as conducting operations at various levels. Of the 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions conducting operations, 93 have the lead in counter-insurgency operations in their areas of responsibility. Additionally, 27 National Police battalions are operational, with 6 in the lead. All but one of the National Police brigades are currently conducting security operations in Baghdad. A brigade-sized operational reserve consisting of a mechanized battalion from the Army, a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th># Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>~135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>~24,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>~28,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>~500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI Forensics Unit</td>
<td>~4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>~192,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>~120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Forces</td>
<td>~12,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>~1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>~900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>~1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>~136,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Trained ISF</td>
<td>~328,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These numbers are not the same as those present for duty and do not include troops trained as individual replacements.

Data as of February 19, 2007

National Police battalion, and a Special Forces company has been established

### Logistics and Sustainment of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Forces

The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements. Factors underlying this deficiency include inadequate levels of sustainment stocks and limited capacity of the MOD and the MOI to execute the planning/acquisition/sustainment cycle. DoD is addressing the challenges to reduce Iraqi reliance on U.S. support. For example, the 13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) is partnered with Iraqi logistics units to assist in the development of Iraqi Army divisional support capabilities. Embedded civilian advisors are assisting senior MOD and MOI officials in developing their capacity to organize, train, equip, sustain, and upgrade their forces.
Current Manning Initiatives
The generation of the Objective Counter-Insurgency and Civil Security Forces is complete. The GOI, with Coalition support, is now executing several manning initiatives to replenish the force to allow units to be temporarily relieved to refit and retrain, and to increase present-for-duty levels in combat units. These initiatives will add more than 60,000 personnel to the ISF during 2007. MNF-I estimates that the MOI will require 32,000 new police annually to replenish the ranks. Training bases are established and fully functioning to achieve these replenishment goals.

- Replenishment of 30,000. MNSTC-I is funding the training and equipping of 30,000 soldiers to replace personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve present-for-duty strength.

- Prime Minister’s Army Expansion Initiative. In consultation with the U.S. Government, the GOI decided to increase the size of the Army by approximately 24,000 soldiers. The additional forces will increase the MOD’s ability to command and control its forces, enhance its operational and tactical flexibility, and allow battle-weary units to be pulled off-line to retrain and refit. This GOI initiative also came with fiscal resources from the MOD budget.

- Replenishment of National Police Brigades. The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) is working to replenish all National Police units with personnel and key pacing items of equipment in support of the Baghdad Security Plan and Phase II training at Numaniyah.

- Expansion of National Police to 10 Brigades. The CPATT is supporting the prime minister’s initiative to build a multi-component (Iraqi Army and National Police) division-sized force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. The team is generating a 10th National Police Brigade in support of this effort.

- Establishment of Three Emergency Response Unit Battalions in Anbar. The CPATT, in cooperation with the MOI and provincial authorities, is assisting with the training and equipping of three battalions of auxiliary policemen, to assist the Iraqi Police Service primarily in the greater Ramadi area. This is a very positive initiative to take advantage of increased Sunni participation in the police forces of Anbar Province.

Complexity of Personnel Management in Maturing Ministries
The security ministries continue to struggle with immature personnel management practices. Personnel strength reporting by Iraqi military and police units is assessed as weak. The primary shortfalls in the personnel management system are as follows.

- Lack of Confidence in Retirement and Death Benefit Payments. The GOI is formulating a Retirement/Pensions Law. Until this legislation is in place and effective, the security ministries will continue to pay pensions and martyr pay. The current system is based on an upfront lump sum payment and a pension of 80% of the total basic pay and allowances. This provided adequate financial support to families. These benefits have received significant attention from the MOI, and potential changes that would have undermined these initiatives have been strongly resisted. This effectively means that the MOI’s employment rolls are enlarged; this is currently seen as being the most effective means of “looking after their own.”

- Wounded Remaining on the Rolls. The MOI and the MOD are in the process of developing an effective system to care for severely wounded soldiers and policemen.
Like those killed in action, many wounded remain on the rolls in order to receive medical care and financial compensation. The MOD recently created medical “follow-up” units across the country. These units are holding companies to which severely wounded soldiers are assigned. This allows soldiers who are physically incapable of conducting their duties to be dropped from their unit rolls while still retaining pay and benefits. A similar plan will be implemented in the MOI.

**Corruption.** Corruption remains a factor at both the unit and ministerial level. In the personnel system, the Ministers of Defense and Interior are aware of “ghost” soldiers and policemen who exist only on the rolls. By maintaining these soldiers and policeman on their roles, units are able to receive additional resources based on per capita planning factors. Additionally, corrupt leaders often collect pay and other compensation designated for these soldiers and policemen. The ministries have made significant strides in reducing corruption within the personnel and pay systems and are well along in the automation of these systems to reduce corruption further and to tackle the absenteeism resulting from soldiers leaving their units to deliver their pay in cash to their families in their home districts.
2.2. Ministry of Interior

MOI forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, the Directorate of Border Enforcement, and other, smaller forces. MNSTC-I has completed its initial training and equipping goal for the Objective Civil Security Force (OCSF) of 188,300 MOI security forces and is in the process of expanding the MOI forces to 194,800. Although the MOI is implementing an automated personnel management system, there are currently no reliable data to indicate how many of the OCSF are still serving with the MOI. Additionally, the MOI has hired a significant number of police beyond those trained by MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I estimates attrition for the MOI as approximately 20% per year, with the Iraqi Police Service and the National Police attrition remaining higher than the Directorate of Border Enforcement and other personnel due to the variance of risks in the duties.

2.2.1. Ministry of Interior Capacity Development

Embedded transition teams continue to report modest improvements in the MOI’s ability to perform key ministry functions, such as developing and implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, communications, and budgeting. MNSTC-I assesses MOI as being partly effective. As was described in the November 2006 report, the CPATT’s MOI Transition Team works with the MOI on developing and assessing these capabilities. The MOI Transition Team is composed of slightly more than 100 advisors.

Life Support, Logistics, and Accountability

Ammunition. On January 15, 2007, the responsibility for ammunition procurement, storage, and distribution for MOI forces was transferred from Coalition forces to MOI headquarters. The first of three ammunition deliveries to the MOI headquarters has occurred. Storage space, material handling equipment, and request quantities continue to be challenges. Future ammunition purchases through Foreign Military Sales will potentially resolve quantity issues.

Warehousing. Three warehouses at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) transferred to the MOI Director of Logistics on January 13, 2007. One warehouse has the capability to be used as an armory, providing the MOI headquarters with additional storage space for weapons and ammunition. The Director of Logistics has a staff prepared to assume responsibility for warehouse operations.

Vehicles. The MOI is initiating actions for oversight and policy for maintenance and vehicles (acquisition and distribution). To offset MOI headquarters’ limited control over the provinces, the MOI plans to centralize the purchase of both vehicles and parts. Provincial independence; lack of trained mechanics, manuals, special tools, repair parts, and adequate maintenance facilities; and the current security situation have hampered this effort. The GOI is purchasing limited numbers of small non-American-manufactured vehicles with its own budget.

Fuel. Shortfalls of adequate fuel continue to hinder mission performance. To correct this, the MOI established a Fuel Management Office under the Director of Vehicles. This office continues to refine fuel allocation, request, and distribution issues.

Life Support. Life support contracts for eight Iraqi Police Academies transitioned to the MOI on December 31, 2006. This brings the total number of contracts transitioned to the GOI in 2006 to 18, valued at US$195 million. Efforts are under way to establish an MOI reporting mechanism to assess the quality of life support services at the academies following transition from the Coalition forces.
Personnel Management. The MOI does not yet have accurate personnel accountability and reporting procedures, and it is unknown how many of the more than 306,000 employees on the ministry’s payroll are present for duty on a given day. MNSTC-I estimates that, on an average day, less than 70% of MOI personnel are present for duty. This is a combination of authorized absences (leave, school, sickness) and unauthorized absences. The problem of personnel accountability is being addressed through the purchase of an automated human resources and payroll system. The equipment and software for this system were installed in January 2007, and training has begun. Full deployment of the system is expected to take 18 months. Once complete, the personnel management system will be integrated fully with employee biometrics, improving the accuracy of employment rosters and facilitating employee criminal background screening.

Equipment Accountability. Due to decentralized control and funding of elements that comprise the MOI, there is no standardized unit equipment accountability procedure. The responsibility for proper equipment accountability is delegated to the subordinate organizations, with most elements maintaining equipment accountability through the use of hand receipts and manual ledgers.

Financial Accountability. Certain functional areas of the MOI operate under an assortment of financial authorities intended for a command-and-control structure that no longer exists. In this uncertain regulatory environment, proper financial reporting is inconsistent and results in difficulty for the MOI to budget centrally and execute funds effectively and transparently. Nevertheless, budget execution under Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani is improving and the Foreign Military Sales program will mitigate some of the risk of mismanagement in this area.

Command and Control. The MOI Transition Team is focusing on developing the minister’s ability to delineate authority, responsibility, and accountability clearly throughout the MOI. The chain of command is relatively clear and effective for National Police and Border Forces. However, command and control for the provincial police is unclear. The decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often results in conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneously from the central ministry and the provincial government.

Internal Audit Functions

The Audit Department within the MOI falls under the Inspector General’s (IG) office. Per Coalition Provisional Authority Order 57, the Audit Department is responsible for audits of the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the ministry’s operations and facilities. Currently, audit functions conducted for the Iraqi Police Service and the National Police are done via a separate audit element that reports directly to the Minister of Interior. The Office of the Director General for Audits provides a person to fill the audit function with that element.

During the fourth quarter of 2006, the MOI IG focused on improving MOI’s internal capacity to identify, deter, and prevent corruption. Recent funding approval by the Ministry of Finance for increased force structure enabled the IG to embark on planning efforts to increase the number of employees by 1,000 individuals during 2007. These resources will significantly improve the IG’s ability to evaluate and report independently on the performance of MOI programs and operations throughout Iraq. For the first time, the IG has developed an Annual Inspection Plan aimed at formalizing the use of IG special inspection committees to conduct inspections of pre-selected MOI organizations throughout Iraq based on approved inspection checklists. Additionally, the IG
formalized a professional development program for serving IG employees and expanded the core Program of Instruction for basic training of IGs. During this period, the IG increased its number of trained investigators from 81 to 125, to include employees serving in outlying provinces.

From January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006, MOI Internal Affairs opened 3,403 corruption-related investigations. Of these, 775 (22%) resulted in disciplinary punishment, 312 (9%) were forwarded to the Commission of Public Integrity or to a court for subsequent adjudication, 49 (1.5%) were closed because of insufficient evidence, and 106 (3%) were handled as internal MOI discipline. The other 2,161 (63%) remain open pending judicial review, ministerial review, or the completion of further investigation by Internal Affairs.

The Internal Affairs Directorate conducted 249 human rights-related investigations. Of these, 76 (30%) resulted in disciplinary punishment and 10 (4%) were closed because of insufficient evidence. The other 163 (65%) remain open pending judicial review, ministerial review, or further investigation. In 2006, Internal Affairs initiated a specialized training curriculum tailored to the needs of the Internal Affairs investigators. Through December 31, 2006, 915 of 1,250 full-time employees (73%) had received specialized training. Training will continue until all Internal Affairs Officers have graduated from this training course. Additionally, the Automated Fingerprint Identification Project identified 3,371 cases of employees making a false application for employment to the MOI or having a criminal history. This resulted in 1,383 dismissals during 2006.
Sectarian Issues at the Ministry of Interior

The Iraqi Police Service is generally representative of the demographic makeup of its neighborhoods, although there are some neighborhoods in Baghdad and other cities where the percentage of Shi’a in the Iraqi Police Service is disproportionately high. Initial estimates, compiled during implementation of the National Police Transformation and Retraining program in late 2006, show that the National Police are disproportionately Shi’a. The U.S. Government is committed to helping the GOI create an MOI that reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people. The goal is to create ethnically integrated units at the national level, while still allowing local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the communities in which they serve. MNSTC-I continues to advocate recruiting initiatives targeting Sunnis to improve diversity and to provide a force that will impart even-handed law enforcement.

Foreign/Political/Militia Influence

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence constrain progress in developing MOI forces. Although the primary concern of the GOI remains the Sunni insurgency, tolerance of and influence exerted by Shi’a militia members within the MOI are troubling. Militia influence affects every component of the MOI, particularly in Baghdad and several other key cities. Recruits take an oath of office denouncing militia influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq’s constitution. Whenever actionable evidence is found, it is acted on by the MOI Internal Affairs Directorate and the minister.

2.2.2. Iraqi Police Service

The Iraqi Police Service is composed of patrol, traffic, station, and highway police, as well as specialists, such as forensic specialists, assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces. Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The Iraqi Police Service constitutes the majority of MOI forces.

Iraqi Police Service Training and Personnel

CPATT has met the nationwide OCSF goal of training 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel. However, distribution of that 135,000 has not been according to original program goals, leaving some provinces with more than their programmed allocation and some with less. Basic training continues in those provinces still working to meet their individual requirements. CPATT is working with the MOI to build institutional capacity and to identify annual requirements for force sustainment, reconciling anticipated annual requirements with institutional capacity.

To meet local needs and dynamic requirements, the MOI authorized provincial governors to hire additional Iraqi Police Service officers, but the MOI and the governors are responsible for the additional officers’ equipment and training. Every province, except Anbar, has more personnel than agreed. However, many of these additional police are put on the job with minimal or no training. As the Coalition transfers the institutional training base to MOI control, training of these “extra” local police will continue.

As of December 31, 2006, the majority of Iraqi Police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control. The two exceptions are the BPC and the Jordan International Police Training Center. For all academies, the administration and instruction functions transferred with relative ease. Operational control of the BPC was turned over to the MOI in 2006. Life support for the BPC will transition to the MOI this quarter. Because sufficient training capacity exists inside Iraq, the Jordan International Police Training Center is scheduled to cease basic-level training by March 2007, although the Department of State is looking at options to keep it open, to train limited numbers of Iraqi police officers in leadership and specialized courses, after DoD funding for the facility ends.
**Iraqi Police Service Equipment**

For Baghdad and nine other key cities, 100% of authorized vehicles and weapons have been delivered to the police. Overall, the Iraqi Police Service has received approximately 83% of authorized critical equipment and is expected to receive 100% by the summer of 2007.

Due to the immaturity of the MOI’s equipment accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of this equipment remains in service, nor is it known how much equipment the MOI has purchased for additional Iraqi Police Service staff and for staff authorized by provincial governors. The most accurate reports on equipment quantities and serviceability are provided by MNC-I through the Police Transition Teams (PTTs). MNSTC-I continues to work with the Iraqi Police Service to implement standardized reporting and tracking processes and mechanisms. In conjunction with MNSTC-I, the MOI is developing a comprehensive procurement plan to ensure that MNSTC-I funds and MOI equipping funds are spent coherently.

**Iraqi Police Service Operations and Mentoring**

There are 203 field-deployed PTTs (10 Provincial, 44 District, and 149 Station) assisting the development of the Iraqi Police Service. Each team has approximately 11–15 members; 3 or 4 members of each team are International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) hired as contractors by the Department of State, and the rest are typically military personnel, most of whom are Military Police. IPLOs provide civilian law enforcement expertise in technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management. To conduct their missions, PTTs travel to stations to coach the Iraqi police and to conduct joint patrols with them. These joint PTT/Iraqi Police Service patrols promote active community policing and work to improve the reputation of the police among the Iraqi people.

Each month, MNC-I uses PTTs to assess the operational readiness of a portion of the police forces using the Transition Readiness Assessment process. This process evaluates the ability of the police to perform core functions required for effective law enforcement and community policing. Key assessment criteria include manning, leadership, training level, equipment, facilities status, force protection measures, and station ability to conduct independent operations. Cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities described above. Continued PTT presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations are needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.

**Iraqi Police Service Recruiting and Vetting**

The Iraqi Police Service screened more than 280,000 MOI employees, checking fingerprints against Ba’ath Party and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these, 8,000 were reported as possible derogatory matches, 1,228 employees were dismissed, and 2,143 were identified in late December 2006 and are pending dismissal. More than 58,000 police candidates have been screened for literacy, 73% of whom passed and were allowed to enter basic training.

**Iraqi Police Service Quicklook Inspection Program**

A Coalition-initiated, MOI-led Iraqi Police Reform Program called Quicklook was launched in December 2006 to review all aspects of performance and effectiveness of Iraqi police stations, beginning in Baghdad. This program consists of stations visits by the MOI team, composed of representatives of
Police Affairs, Internal Affairs, Human Resource, Training, and Administrative directorates, and complemented by the local PTT, which provides both inspection preparation and on-site security. The team gauges the reliability of police forces as well as the more traditional readiness metrics involving manning, equipping, and facilities. As of February 1, 2007, the team had inspected nine stations. The Baghdad portion of the program will take 3–4 months and will lead to a joint report with recommendations for addressing identified shortfalls and deficiencies. Once completed in Baghdad, this program will be expanded to all of Iraq’s police stations. MNSTC-I assesses that the MOI team is doing a good job holding the station and station commanders to the inspection standards.

**Iraqi Police Service Leadership Training**

The Iraqi Police Service has three 2-week leadership courses to improve the quality of its leaders. The First Line Supervisor Course is designed for company-grade officers; the Intermediate-Level Course is designed for field-grade officers; and the Senior-Level Course is designed for general officers. Courses cover topics ranging from management to ethics to field training. To date, 691 officers have completed the First Line Supervisor Course; 690 officers have completed the Intermediate-Level Course; and 606 officers have completed the Senior-Level Course.

The MOI’s Intermediate Staff Officers Course, started in September 2006, teaches senior lieutenants and junior captains staff operational functions. To date, 14 officers have completed this course. The Advanced Staff Officers Course, which began in November 2006, teaches senior captains and majors field-grade staff functions. The Senior Staff Officers Course and the Executive Officers Course—designed for colonels and generals—are scheduled to begin in early 2007.

**2.2.3. National Police**

The National Police is a bridging force between the local police and the Iraqi Army, allowing the Minister of Interior to project police capabilities across provinces. The National Police is also charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed. Until October 2006, the National Police was trained and served primarily in a paramilitary role and had received little traditional police training. MNSTC-I is implementing a National Police Transformation and Retraining Program to reorient it toward police functions.

**National Police Training and Personnel**

As of February 19, 2007, 24,400 National Police have completed entry-level training, meeting the OCSF goal of 24,400. The prime minister has announced a plan to expand the National Police by three battalions. This will bring the authorized strength of the National Police to 26,900.

**National Police Equipment**

The National Police was issued all of its key authorized equipment by the end of December 2006. MNSTC-I tracks the end-items issued to the National Police and relies on National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) to report periodically on the status of that equipment. The MOI is responsible for equipping National Police hired in excess of the agreed authorization, although CPATT provides additional uniforms and key equipment to National Police units as they rotate through the Phase II program at Numaniyah.

During this reporting period, Iraqi and Coalition forces leadership emphasized National Police property and personnel accountability via the Quicklook program. The MOI Administration and Vehicles Directorates are making measurable improvements in property accountability policies and processes. The
Administration Directorate developed and staffed an electronic data repository to track and account for items issued. This database will continue to be backed up by hard copies of supply transactions until more robust and stable electronic media, such as the e-ministry program, are available. The Vehicles Directorate is initiating an electronic database to track vehicles. Both directorates are writing policies and documenting accountability processes to enable future compliance audits of their activities.

National Police Operations
Currently, all but one of the National Police brigades not enrolled in the National Police Transformation and Retraining program are conducting counter-insurgency operations to support the Baghdad Security Plan. Two National Police battalions were assigned security lead for their areas of responsibility within Baghdad. One battalion has been designated as part of the prime minister’s operational reserve, and an additional (10th) National Police brigade has been requested by the prime minister to provide security to the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. Thirty-nine NPTTs now support the development of National Police units by mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces. NPTTs assess the readiness and operational capability of the National Police, similar to the tasks performed by Military Transition Teams with Iraqi Army units.

National Police Recruiting and Vetting
The MOI is responsible for recruiting and vetting the National Police force, assisted by Coalition forces advisors. Extensive re-vetting of serving National Police is part of the Phase II program at Numaniyah. This incorporates identification checks, fingerprints, a literacy test, and criminal intelligence background checks. New recruits will be vetted in the manner described above and approved prior to undergoing any training. A vetting committee, consisting of senior National Police leaders and MOI officials, has been set up at Camp Solidarity.

2.2.4. Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports of Entry
The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the Directorate of Ports of Entry (POE) are charged collectively with controlling and protecting Iraq’s borders. The DBE is organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and 38 battalions, and includes forces that man 420 border posts and forts, of which the Coalition has funded 258. There are 17 land border Ports of Entry, 4 sea Ports of Entry, and 4 air Ports of Entry.

DBE Training and Personnel
MNSTC-I has trained 28,400 DBE and POE personnel, meeting the OCSF goal. As elsewhere in the MOI, Border Forces payroll exceeds its authorized initial training objective. Overstrength regional and brigade-level headquarters continue to divert personnel away from border forts and POEs. The DBE has begun cross-leveling of excess personnel, and current staffing levels at POEs are sufficient. Promotion opportunities across DBE and POE units are improving, and there have been fewer pay problems. There are still discrepancies between MOI payroll numbers and actual assigned strength. The Iraqi leadership is addressing these issues through official investigations.

DBE and POE Operations
The DBE is supported by 28 Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs). The 11-man BTTs mentor and support the development of the border units. Additionally, four 3-man Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Border Support Teams mentor and monitor Border Enforcement personnel at critical POEs. The BTTs and the Border Support Teams are essential to the development of the
DBE and POEs. The CPATT, in coordination with DHS and the Department of State, is developing a program to enhance transition teams at all DBE headquarters, academies, BTTs, and POEs, with contracted civilian subject matter experts.

The DBE is in the lead on Iraq’s borders, backed up by Iraqi Army units in accordance with an MOI/MOD Memorandum of Understanding that was signed in January 2007. All Coalition-planned border forts are completed. Refurbishing headquarters buildings and assignment of trained border police are complete. Seventy-nine percent of the authorized critical equipment for DBE and 61% for land POEs have been issued. Remaining issuance of equipment, logistics facilities, and other infrastructure will continue throughout 2007. The MOI has reduced the numbers of legal POEs in an effort to concentrate on the readiness for those border crossings that remain open, and, since the last report, DBE and POE units have improved in Transition Readiness Assessment progression.

2.2.5. Facilities Protection Service

The Facilities Protection Service (FPS) is a decentralized group of security guards who protect GOI buildings and act as personal security details to protect government ministry officials. Each ministry controls its own force of FPS personnel. Although they share the same name, FPS personnel are not a coherent force. More than 150,000 personnel work for 27 ministries and 8 independent directorates, with half of the FPS personnel working in Baghdad. The MOI’s FPS continues to have better regulation, training, and discipline than do FPS staff of other ministries, and a higher proportion of them—possibly half—have completed the FPS basic training course.

There continues to be evidence that FPS personnel are unreliable and, in some cases, responsible for violent crimes and other illegal activity. On December 27, 2006, the prime minister signed a consolidation directive that provided instructions placing all FPS personnel under the Minister of Interior and ordered the transfer of money for salaries to the MOI budget. The directive maintained the separation of the Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Electricity, and the Higher Juridical Council forces. The MOI has a plan to assess the current state of these forces and implement the consolidation, including standardizing training, equipment, uniforms, and procedures.
2.3. Ministry of Defense

The Iraqi MOD forces consist of the Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the IGFC, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy (including Marines). The Iraqi military has an authorized strength of approximately 175,000 personnel, and is centered on an Army with nine infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division, and associated combat support/combat support units. Two additional infantry divisions are in development as part of Prime Minister Maliki’s Expansion Plan. The Iraqi Air Force consists of six squadrons; the Navy has two squadrons and a Marine battalion. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters reached initial operating capability in July 2006 and will eventually command and control all Iraqi institutional training facilities. The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, under the direct command of the JHQ, consists of the Tactical Training Command and the National Defense University. The Tactical Training Command will begin to assume control of the institutional tactical training facilities—six Regional Training Centers and three Iraqi Training Battalions—in 2007. The National Defense University has reached initial operating capability and has started to operate institutions of professional development (e.g., Iraqi Staff Colleges, the National Defense College, and the Strategic Studies Institute).

As reported in November 2006, the JHQ assumed control of the IGFC, which, in turn, assumed operational control of five divisions from Coalition forces. Since November 2006, the IGFC has assumed operational control of three more divisions. By June 2007, it is expected that the IGFC will gain operational control of all divisions. Embedded Coalition advisors continue to assist in the development of JHQ and IGFC command-and-control capabilities.

The total number of trained-and-equipped MOD military personnel is about 136,400 (not including replacements), of which about 132,800 are in the Iraqi Army. For fielded units, about 65% of authorized personnel are present for duty at any time; this percentage varies widely among units. The greatest contributor to the difference between authorized strength and present-for-duty strength is a leave policy that places about one-quarter of all soldiers on leave at any time so that they can take their pay home to their families. This is driven by the lack of a nationwide banking system. In addition, since the first Iraqi Army combat units entered into service in November 2003, more than 20,000 personnel have been killed or severely wounded or have otherwise left the Army. The MOD is planning on replacing and expanding the overall force structure with a 30,000-person Replenishment Initiative, organized and implemented by the Iraqi JHQ. This initiative will add approximately 10,000 soldiers every two months over six months and will result in all combat units manned at 110%. The MOD has completed recruiting for this initiative, and the first training sessions began on October 1, 2006. About 44% of the 30,000-soldier expansion is complete.

2.3.1. Ministry of Defense Capacity Development

Embedded transition teams continue to provide monthly Transition Readiness Assessments. The assessments measure personnel manning, command and control, training, sustainment, logistics, equipping, and leadership of their partnered Iraqi units. These categories are assessed using both quantitative and qualitative metrics. Overall, the MOD is assessed as being partly effective at managing these functions.

The Minister of Defense has had some success in stabilizing the MOD, which suffered through a string of assassinations, widespread
intimidation and death threats against employees, and a major corruption scandal in the year following its establishment in March 2004. The current minister recognizes the importance of forging a close partnership with the Coalition and is emphasizing joint initiatives, such as force replenishment, generation, and deployability. MOD’s capacity to determine priorities and translate them into procurement requirements is improving. However, competence levels in certain parts of the MOD remain low. The MOD suffers from a lack of strategic policy development and implementation and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing and obligating funds very difficult. The Coalition’s MOD Transition Team is providing mentoring support to all senior MOD officials in developing their capacity to manage key ministerial functions, such as personnel management, budgeting, logistics, intelligence and security, acquisitions and contracting, plans and policies, communications, and inspections and investigations. The current MOD team consists of approximately 50 advisors as well as 6 U.S. military personnel advising MOD civilians and 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries. There are no U.S. Government civilian advisors at the MOD, which is problematic in that MOD civilians are not provided direct mentorship by their U.S. counterparts. A similarly scaled effort occurs at the JHQ, with U.S. military personnel comprising about half of the advisors and the rest roughly split between U.S. civilian contractors and military personnel from other Coalition countries.
Force Generation
Force generation of Iraqi Army units is increasingly focused on combat enablers and logistics. Three Iraqi Training Battalions are formed and fully operational. These battalions allow the Iraqis to train soldiers, independent of Coalition support, in sufficient quantities for force generation and replacement needs. New recruits attend a 13-week program of basic instruction. Upon graduation, soldiers receive additional training specific to their military occupation. Depending on their military skill, the length of training ranges from three to seven weeks. Other training institutions, such as the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School, contribute to the growing professionalism of the Iraqi Army by teaching diverse specialties necessary to execute counter-insurgency operations.

Logistics and Sustainment
MOD logistics and sustainment is still a relatively immature system that requires significant Coalition assistance, especially in warehouse/depot operations and transportation. Development and implementation of MOD strategic logistics policy is particularly immature. The Iraqi Army has been slow to support sustainment, and there is limited indigenous capability and capacity to replace battle-damaged equipment. MNSTC-I has oversight of approximately 60 transition teams (of the 400 total teams for the MOD and the MOI) assigned to assist in logistics and sustainment issues. Throughout 2007, the focus will be on developing the areas of fuel, maintenance, budget, sustainment, ammunition, medical equipment and supply accountability, and national warehouse. Coalition forces continue to provide Combat Service Support by backstopping life support and fuel during times of emergency. In April 2006, the MOD assumed management of life support and its contracts, but Coalition forces are still assisting in extremis. Overall, support to the Iraqi Army provided by Coalition forces has decreased dramatically.

Approximately 90% of the planned Headquarters and Service Companies have been formed and are at some level of operational capability. MNSTC-I has distributed all key equipment to the Headquarters and Service Companies. Although the Headquarters and Service Companies are gaining some capability, Coalition forces and MNC-I logistics units will continue partnering and mentoring them as they assume their roles and in case of emergency or failure within the new Iraqi logistics system.

Planning and Coordination
The MOD and the JHQ are developing processes to reduce the reliance on MNF-I to direct, support, and sustain MOD forces. The transition of Iraqi Army divisions and the IGFC to MOD control marks the first time since the removal of the former regime that any Iraqi Army combat forces are under complete Iraqi command and control.

The transition also means that the MOD, through the JHQ, has assumed responsibility for support and sustainment planning for these divisions as well as for forces transferring to JHQ command and control in the future. The JHQ planning and coordination processes are immature and are currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding, lack of experience with strategic planning, and dependence on Coalition support and funding.

Equipment Status
The focus of the Iraqi Army’s train-and-equip effort shifted during this reporting period toward building combat support and combat service support forces.
The Iraqi armed forces were issued 100% of individual authorized items by the end of 2006. However, there is a problem with cross-leveling between and within units that leads to shortages in some subordinate units. Equipment accountability is improving; however, it is still at a level below that desired by the Coalition or by the GOI. MNSTC-I and the GOI are now issuing other mission-critical items to the Iraqi armed forces, such as up-armored HMMWVs, wheeled APCs, heavy machine guns, and fuel trucks. MNSTC-I is currently working with the MOD to transfer maintenance capabilities to the Iraqi Army. The MOD will fund a contract through a Foreign Military Sales sustainment case planned to start on April 1, 2007. This contract will be monitored by a joint Iraqi/Coalition forces board that will determine when the transition requirements have been met. The MOD agreed, in principle, to fund the National Maintenance Contract from spring 2007 through March 2008 using a Foreign Military Sales case. Total cost of the maintenance support contracts to be assumed by the MOD is estimated to be US$160 million.

Training

The institutional training base accounts for basic and military occupational specialty training for soldier, squad leader, and platoon sergeant courses for non-commissioned officers, and initial-entry cadet and staff officer training for the officer corps. As these personnel move to their units, embedded transition teams and partner units directed by MNC-I oversee and mentor collective training in counter-insurgency-oriented mission-essential tasks. A unit’s ability to demonstrate proficiency in these mission-essential tasks contributes to its overall Transition Readiness Assessment, which is validated prior to the unit assuming lead in its area of responsibility. The high operational tempo faced by many units makes it difficult to sustain this initial training proficiency. This is particularly true in the area of logistics specialty training. Approximately 2,500 additional personnel are needed to allow both daily operations and focused training at the small-unit level.

Absenteeism

Across the Iraqi Army, Iraqi divisions facing sustained combat operations within their normal operational area report absent-without-leave rates to be between 5% and 8%. Passage of the Military Court Procedures Law on January 24, 2007, will provide Iraqi commanders with a tool to deal fairly and effectively with absenteeism and desertion.

Deployability

As a result of the inability of the Iraqi Army to deploy units to Baghdad in August 2006, the Minister of Defense formed a committee to determine how to improve the deployability of the Iraqi Army. The recommendation of the committee was to identify a battalion from each Iraqi Army Division to serve as the rapid deployment force for that division, and provide incentive pay for soldiers who volunteer to serve in this elite battalion. To increase the predictability of deployments for soldiers, the committee also recommended a four-phase, 150-day deployment cycle that all units complete prior to movement from their home base. In February, five of the seven battalions recently ordered to Baghdad were successfully deployed, with the rest expected within the month.

Sectarian Issues in Recruitment

The Coalition and the GOI are committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation, not to sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are deciding factors when selecting recruits and leaders, ISF units mirror the demographic
make-up of Iraq generally. The even-numbered divisions were assembled from former Iraqi National Guard battalions and tend to resemble the demographics of communities from which they were recruited. The odd-numbered divisions were nationally recruited and represent the national fabric. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, has used normal transitions to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi Army. There are, however, indications that political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation. MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Baghdad are working closely with the GOI to discourage sectarian influences in the senior ranks and to encourage a balanced representation in leadership. The GOI is considering other methods to balance representation across the entire Army, Navy, and Air Force.

2.3.2. Army
The Iraqi Army is central to MOD counter-insurgency operations and strategy. The Army component of the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force consists of 131,300 soldiers and officers in 36 brigades and 112 battalions. The Prime Minister’s Expansion Plan increases the Army by 2 division HQs, 6 brigade HQs, and 24 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs), 4 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 80 Garrison Support Units provide logistics and support for divisions, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and re-supply. Headquarters and Service Companies provide logistical and maintenance support for each battalion, brigade, and division. The Army also supports a Special Operations Forces Brigade and 3 Strategic Infrastructure Brigade headquarters commanding 17 SIBs. Efforts to improve the capability of these units are led by Military Transition Teams, with U.S. and other Coalition officers and soldiers embedded in each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters; at IGFC headquarters; and at JHQ.

By the end of 2006, the last two MTRs were generated and released to MNC-I. Although lack of trained maintenance personnel and equipment has delayed full capability, the MTRs provide mobility and sustainment for Iraqi forces.

2.3.3. Iraqi National Counter-Terror Capability
Implementation of the national counter-terrorism capability concept, approved by the prime minister on October 10, 2006, is on schedule for Initial Operational Capability in March 2007 and Full Operational Capability in December 2007. In March 2007, Iraqi personnel will occupy positions within each Counter-Terrorism headquarters and will begin operations and training.

Full Operational Capability consists of three complementary components:

- Development of a national Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, separate from the ministries, that serves as the principal advisor to the prime minister on counter-terrorism matters
- Establishment of a coherent, non-sectarian, counter-terrorism “tiering” strategy that determines the level of the terrorist threat, assigns appropriate responsibility for action, and defines approval authority for execution; this strategy was established as part of the overall counter-terrorism concept
- Establishment of a separate major command, equivalent to the ground, air, and naval forces commands, that provides support to the Bureau of Counter-Terrorism in intelligence and targeting areas
2.3.4. Special Operations Forces

The ISOF Brigade is the operational component of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Command and is composed of approximately 1,500 soldiers organized into a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit. A key component in developing an Iraqi counter-terrorism capability is the expansion of the ISOF Brigade. This expansion will include an additional commando battalion with forward-based commando companies in Basrah, Mosul, and Al Asad.

2.3.5. Navy

The Iraqi Navy has approximately 1,100 trained-and-equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and five Marine companies that are stationed for point defense of the offshore oil platforms together with Coalition forces. It will grow to 2,500 personnel as the acquisition program progresses. The expansion will include the procurement of 21 naval vessels, 2 offshore support vessels, and a number of small vessels. A contract for the purchase of the offshore vessels and several of the small vessels is complete, with an anticipated in-service date of February to December 2008. A contract for the four patrol ships has also been completed, with in-service dates starting in April 2007. Notably, all contracts were completed using Iraqi processes and money.

The Iraqi Navy faces significant challenges in meeting the individual and collective training needs for its ambitious acquisition program, including the leadership development of mid-grade officers and technical skills of sailors. Training efforts include mentorship conducted by the Naval Transition Team and active skills training conducted by Coalition Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard forces. Infrastructure development will remain the main effort throughout 2007. Naval planning is maturing and coherent across acquisition, training, and infrastructure lines of development out to 2010.

2.3.6. Air Force

The Iraqi Air Force is organized and equipped for counter-insurgency operations. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are currently located at Kirkuk Air Base (3rd Squadron with four SAMA CH-2000s) and Basrah Air Base (70th Squadron with four SAMA CH-2000s and two Sea Bird Seeker SB7L-360s). Each unit performs daily operational missions that collect intelligence for Iraqi and Coalition forces. The intelligence gathered during daily flights has provided timely evidence of perimeter security breaches and infiltration by insurgent forces. As described in the previous report, Iraq’s capabilities to conduct airborne ISR are being developed with procurements of interim and advanced aircraft platforms.

The fielding of rotary-wing aircraft continues. The first 10 of 28 Mi-17 helicopters that MOD procured were delivered to the Iraqi Air Force. The MOD is also modifying 16 UH-1s donated by Jordan to UH-IIs; delivery is expected to be completed by April. The squadron receiving these UH-IIs will primarily conduct casualty evacuation and is expected to reach initial operational capability by the third quarter of FY07.

The 23rd Squadron at New Al Muthanna Air Base has three C-130E aircraft. Consistent with the Coalition Air Force Transition Team’s force generation plan, the Iraqi Air Force intends to request an additional three Excess Defense Article C-130s from the U.S. Government to bring the squadron size to six.

There are currently more than 900 personnel in the Iraqi Air Force. Development plans call for a concentrated recruitment effort over the next 12 months, with an interim goal of 3,285 airmen by the end of 2007. Iraqi Air Force technicians have been performing routine maintenance, and Iraqi crews have been manning most missions without Coalition forces.
## Annex A. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AQI</td>
<td>Al-Qaida in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Baghdad Police College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTT</td>
<td>Border Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBI</td>
<td>Central Bank of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoR</td>
<td>Council of Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPATT</td>
<td>Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBE</td>
<td>Directorate of Border Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP</td>
<td>Explosively Formed Projectiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGFC</td>
<td>Iraqi Ground Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPLO</td>
<td>International Police Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISOF</td>
<td>Iraqi Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>Jaysh al-Mahdi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCTSR</td>
<td>Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHQ</td>
<td>Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBPD</td>
<td>Million Barrels Per Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR</td>
<td>Motorized Transportation Regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Megawatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPTT</td>
<td>National Police Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSF</td>
<td>Objective Civil Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>Directorate of Ports of Entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Provincial Iraqi Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Worker’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Police Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA</td>
<td>Stand-By Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIRI</td>
<td>Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIB</td>
<td>Strategic Infrastructure Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The information in this report has been made available with the assistance of many departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, and the Government of Iraq. The report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress, and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners, or Iraq.

In early November 2006, Prime Minister Maliki scolded lawmakers in a closed session of the Council of Representatives and promised sweeping reforms of his cabinet. He also renounced militias on national television, saying, “There cannot be a government and militias together. One of the two should rule. I personally will not be in a government based on militias.”

Ibid.


As of October 2006, of the 999 known MOI detention centers, 794 were reporting data on prisoners. On average, the reporting facilities were at 79% capacity. However, 51 of these jails were overcrowded, with the Attica jail in Qadisiyah being the most overcrowded, housing more than three detainees for every one bed it was designed to hold.


Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, violence is never justified even if the government does not meet your needs.” 81% agree and 11% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Agree or disagree, it is wrong to kill women and children even in jihad.” 94% agree and 3% disagree. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Do you think the government of Iraq’s current policies to improve the security situation in Iraq are a step in the right or wrong direction?” Right direction: 44% Wrong direction: 42%. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, December 2006: “Over the past three months would you say that conditions for peace and stability in Iraq have improved, worsened, or stayed the same?” Improved: 7% Worsened: 67% Stayed the same: 24%. Sample size: ~8,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, November-December 2006: “Agree or disagree, I personally can do nothing to stop the sectarian violence.” 65% agreed and 29% disagreed. Sample size: ~5,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, January 2007: “On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being high and 1 being low, how much do you blame militias for the violence in Iraq today?” 42% answered 10, 10% answered 9, and 8% answered 8. Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

Nationwide poll, October and December 2006: “In general, do you have confidence in the ability of the Iraqi government to protect you and your family from threat?” Yes, 36% and 48%, respectively. Sample size: ~8,000 (nationwide). Margin of error: < 1.5% (nationwide) and 2%-8% (provincial).

Nationwide poll, October and December 2006: “How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation: [Iraqi Army/Iraqi Police].” Percent answering a great deal or some for the Iraqi Army: Oct. 63% and Dec. 66%, for the Iraqi Police: Oct. 67% and Dec. 69%. Sample size: ~8,000. Margin of error: < 1.5%.

20 This report and future reports will not discuss the Center for Dignitary Protection. MNSTC-I has completed its training goal and no longer has visibility on whether these personnel are serving. MNSTC-I continues to assist in training bodyguards for high-ranking GOI personnel.

21 This estimate is based on worldwide averages for police attrition with adjustment factors for conditions in Iraq. As described in the section on personnel accountability, no reliable data currently exist to validate present-for-duty strength.

22 This includes the approximately 137,000 authorization for the Objective Counter-Insurgency Force, approximately 12,000 authorization for the 10% manning increase for the Iraqi Army, and approximately 26,000 for the prime minister’s initiative to expand the military with new units.

23 This is based on a total authorization support personnel of 14,673. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report SIGIR-06-032, ISF: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities notes that, “... we calculated that between 37,800 and 44,500 personnel will be required for the total number of logistics units required by the Concept to support the Iraqi Army. . . . After reviewing a draft of this report, MNSTC-I officials provided information documenting that, as of September 30, 2006, a total of 42,900 ‘support forces’ have been trained since 2004. This total includes not only logistics personnel but also military police and communications and administrative personnel.”