Chapter 2

National Defense Policies of Countries

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Chinese naval vessel refueling in the Philippine Sea.
Section 1. The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies
For a long time, the defense policy of the United States—a continental state shielded by two oceans—was based on the assumption that war would not be fought on the country’s soil. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (the 9/11 attacks) made the United States recognize that its geographic advantage could not make its territory free from a direct attack. As a result, the United States has decided to give top priority in its national security to homeland defense.

The National Security Strategy released in March 2006 states that the United States can protect its nation by leading an effort of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. The United States, however, cannot achieve such idealistic goals alone, and so the United States is committed to taking a realistic approach that relies on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in February 2006 states that the United States is in a “long war” against the terrorist networks and needs to reorient the capabilities of U.S. forces to address the new security challenges on the basis of the lessons learned from the recent operational experiences and to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges (see 1 below) while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

Furthermore, the QDR repeatedly stresses that, as the Department of Defense cannot independently win the “long war” that the United States faces today, it is essential to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.

1. Assessment of Security Environment
The United States considers that the security environment of today is different from that of the Cold War era in that it is difficult to predict who, where, and when will pose threats to and attack the United States, while during the Cold war the Soviet Union was clearly recognized as an enemy. The National Defense Strategy identifies four challenges that the United States is expected to face in today’s uncertain security environment:

1) Traditional challenges: Threats of military conflicts among nations employing conventional forces. Although the United States takes advantage over other countries in this area, the possibility that enemies pose threats to the United States cannot be ruled out.

2) Irregular challenges: Challenges employing such irregular methods as terrorism and insurgency to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular challenges have been intensified by the rise of political, ethnic, and religious extremism and the ineffective control over the territories, which creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents in some countries.

3) Catastrophic challenges: Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. In case rogue states or transnational terrorists seek to acquire WMD, the threat to the United States will particularly increase.

4) Disruptive challenges: Threats coming from adversaries who are seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities by means of breakthrough technologies to offset the current advantages of the United States.
breakthroughs, including advances in biotechnology, cyber operations, and space weapons could endanger the security of the United States.

2. Defense Strategy

The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the security environment as follows: 1) securing the United States from direct attack; 2) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action; 3) strengthening alliances and partnerships; and 4) establishing favorable security conditions. In addition, the National Defense Strategy describes the following four measures to accomplish these strategic objectives:

1) Assure allies and friends by fulfilling alliance and other defense commitments.
2) Dissuade potential enemies from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions by sustaining and developing the military advantage of the United States.
3) Deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the strong will to resolve conflicts.
4) Defeat adversaries by employing military power, as necessary, together with other instruments when deterrence fails.

Furthermore, the National Defense Strategy shows the following four implementation guidelines to be followed in pursuing the aforementioned strategic goals:

1) Active, layered defense: it is necessary to defeat challenges to the United States early and at a safe distance. Therefore, preventive actions such as security cooperation, forward deterrence, and nonproliferation initiatives are critical. As these actions cannot be implemented solely by the United States, cooperation with allies and friends is essential. It is also necessary to improve the capabilities to defend homeland by strengthening missile defense and other defensive measures.
2) Continuous transformation: In order that the United States ensures its advantage, it is necessary to continuously transform U.S. forces by changing long-standing business processes within the Department of Defense and its relationship with interagency and international partners as well as methods of fight (concepts of warfare, definition of threat, operation style, organization, and composition of weapons).
3) “Capabilities-based” approach: In current security environment, it is difficult to predict when and where threats to the United States will emerge. However, it is possible to predict the capabilities that enemies will employ to attack the United States. Therefore, the United States continues to adopt the “capabilities-based” approach proposed in the QDR 2001 and focuses on what capabilities are needed to counter enemy capabilities.
4) Managing risks: Based on the concept of risk management proposed in the QDR 2001, the United States identifies various risks that many arise in pursuing the strategic objectives with limited resources, and controls them properly.

3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR states that it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges on the basis of the security environment and the defense strategy described above. Specifically, it lists the following four priority areas for capability development:

1) Defeating terrorist networks: In order to win the war on terror, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking them relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing intelligence collection capabilities and special operation capabilities, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a ballet of arms, U.S. forces will strengthen their strategic communication and improve language and cultural awareness.
2) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defensive measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies.

3) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that will affect the future security to become constructive partners by expanding it security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail by strengthening the capabilities of allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, and maintaining its military primacy in key areas.

4) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: the United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures. (See Fig. I-2-1-1)

![The Four Challenges and Priority Areas of QDR2006](image)

### Fig. I-2-1-1 The Four Challenges and Priority Areas of QDR2006

Shifting the portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while maintaining capabilities to deal with traditional challenges

- **Irregular challenges**
  - Threats of unconventional methods, such as terrorism

- **Catastrophic challenges**
  - Threats posed by terrorism or rogue states employing WMD and other weapons

- **Defeating terrorist networks**

- **Preventing acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction**

- **Defending homeland**

- **Shaping choices of countries at strategic crossroads**

- **Traditional challenges**
  - Military conflict by means of conventional military capabilities

- **Disruptive challenges**
  - Threats posed by competitors using technology or means to counter or cancel U.S. military advantages

**4. Force Planning**

The 2001 QDR described that the United States adopted an approach to construct its forces for the following four objectives: 1) to defend the United states; 2) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia; 3) to defeat adversaries
swiftly in two threats of operation in overlapping timeframes and to defeat an adversary decisively in one of the two theaters, and 4) to conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies.

However, since the lessons learned from experiences in the war on terror suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four critical regions and that “swiftly defeating” or “winning decisively” against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, such as a long-duration, irregular warfare campaign, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: 1) homeland defense; 2) war on terror/irregular (asymmetric) warfare; and 3) conventional campaigns:

1) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and provide necessary supports to interagency partners by conducting joint trainings and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD and other weapons, and also take measures to minimize the damage from them.

2) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counterinsurgency operations. In surge, they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations presently conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. (See Fig. I-2-1-2)

The United States is currently working on the review of its global defense posture. The Bush administration explained in August 2004 that, over the next ten years, the plan “will bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees.” By reviewing the posture of its forces, the United States will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have stationed forward to cope with threats in the Cold War era to homeland, and strengthening its cooperation with allies and others, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations. Also, by capitalizing on force transformation, the United States aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed force, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed aboard back to the United States. (See Fig. I-2-1-3)

One of the reasons for this review is the change in the security environment. In the Cold War era, the United States deployed its heavy forces forward with the certainty that it knew adversaries and where potential battles would be fought. In the security environment after the end of the Cold War, however, it is difficult to predict who would be enemies and where the battles would occur. In addition, as the transformation of U.S. forces exploiting innovation in military technologies in recent years have improved their fighting capabilities and mobility, it is no longer appropriate to evaluate the capability of the forward-deployed forces by the number of military personnel. Another reason of this posture review is that as stresses on U.S. military personnel and their family members increased with frequent overseas operations after the end of the Cold war, there have grown greater concerns about the morale and readiness of the military forces.

As specific measures in this posture review, the United States will send two army divisions deployed in Europe back to the homeland while organizing more expeditionary forces by deploying Striker Brigade Combat Teams, reinforcing the airborne brigade, and creating a joint task force as well as building new bases.
and training facilities in East European countries. Also, the United States aims to introduce the missile defense (MD) system to Europe by around 2011 and 2012. Accordingly, the United States agreed with Czech and Poland to start formal negotiations on the deployment of a part of the MD system in the countries.

As for Asia, the United States announced to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in the region through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: 1) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific; 2) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific; 3) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia, (see Section 2.3 and Part III, Chapter 2); 4) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Northeast Asia.

As for Africa, the United States announced in February 2007 that the United States Africa Command would be created by September 2008 as a new Unified Combatant Command of the U.S. forces that would have an area of responsibility covering Africa. Prior to the creation of this new Command, three Unified Commands have divided responsibility for U.S. military operations in Africa. Through the creation of the new Command, the United States aims to enhance its effort to bring peace and security to Africa and to promote development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in the region.

6. Nuclear Strategy
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an approach based on threats of Russia: the United States should maintain the minimum required nuclear forces for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense). The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); 2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and 3) strategic bombers to a new triad of 1) non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; 2) active and passive defense system; and 3) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, and others). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The 2006 QDR follows the concept of the new triad defined in the NPR and declares that the United States holds a wider range of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense capabilities, while maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

7. FY 2008 Budget
The Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Message of the President, regarding the Department of Defense Base Budget, excluding the budget for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), attaches importance to 1) ensuring a high state of military readiness and ground force strength; 2) enhancing the combat capabilities of the United States Armed Forces; 3) continuing the development of capabilities that will maintain traditional U.S. superiority against potential threats; and 4) continuing the Department of Defense’s strong support for service members and their families. The budget amounts to $481.4 billion.

The budget for the GWOT, which had previously been included in a supplementary budget, is included in the FY 2008 Department of Defense Base Budget in accordance with the direction of the Congress. In the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Message of the President, as much as $141.7 billion is appropriated to continue the fight and reconstitute the force against terrorism. (See Fig. I-2-1-4)
2. Military Posture

Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed the reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 550 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBMs, 114 strategic bombers, and 5,966 nuclear warheads. In addition, the United States intends to decrease the number of its nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“Moscow Treaty”).

The U.S. ground forces consist of 10 Army divisions (approximately 510,000 soldiers) and three Marine Corps divisions (about 180,000 marines). U.S. ground forces are forward-deployed in Germany (two army divisions), the ROK (one Army division), and Japan (one Marine Corps division). To cope with the war on terror, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the war on terror and in military operations in Iraq. It newly established Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) in February 2006, thereby improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare. The U.S. government is proposing to the Congress that Army permanent end strength be increased to 547,000 and Marine Corps permanent end strength to 202,000 in order to enhance the military capabilities and to reduce stress imposed on troops and soldiers deployed in global war against terrorism.

The U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 950 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines), totaling about 5.68 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific, and the 7th Fleet to the
western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific in order to increase its military presence in the ocean. In addition, in March 2007, the United States announced that it would move the home port of an aircraft carrier from the Atlantic Ocean side to San Diego facing the Pacific in early 2010.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,840 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK. In the 2006 QDR, it is assured that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel.

As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft and modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces, and prepositioning equipment at various theaters.

The U.S. forces are increasingly depending on the space system for intelligence collection and communications. The country announced the U.S. National Space Policy in 2006, in which it states that space capabilities are vital to its national interests and that it will preserve its freedom of action in space, deter others from impeding its space system, take those actions necessary to protect its space system, and deny, if necessary, the use of space that is hostile to the United States.

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys a total of approximately 22,000 personnel in the region: the 2nd Infantry Division, the 19th Sustainment Command, and others totaling about 20,000 in the ROK and the 9th Theater Support Command and others totaling about 2,000 in Japan.

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the east Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii. The 7th Fleet locates its main bases in Japan and Guam and deploys one aircraft carrier and other ships with about 15,000 personnel. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet include carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force, the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft is deployed in Japan, with about 15,000 personnel including the forces afloat. In addition, maritime prepositioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16, C-130 fighters in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force Stationed in the ROK, with about 22,000 personnel in total.