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## SUMMARY OF U.S. OVERSIGHT IN IRAQ

This appendix contains a list of completed audits, reports, and testimonies on Iraq Reconstruction activities, as of March 31, 2006, released by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and these six agencies:

- (1) U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
- (2) Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)
- (3) Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG)
- (4) Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- (5) U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)
- (6) Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General (Treasury OIG)

The audits from this list are further categorized according to the sector of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) that they cover and the types of recommendations made.

This appendix does not include the SIGIR audits released after March 31, 2006. For the most recent SIGIR audits, see the SIGIR audits section of this report.

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
1	DoD-OIG D-2004-057	03/18/2004	Contracts Awarded for Coalition Provisional Authority by Defense Contracting Command - Washington	01. Examine contracting procedures used by DCC-W to award selected contracts for CPA.	01. We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense designate an office within the Department of Defense to study existing DoD post-war strategy and establish responsibilities, policies, and procedures for the rapid acquisition of necessary goods and services in support of any future post-war occupation or relief operations. 02. We recommend that the Commander, Defense Contracting Command-Washington: a. Analyze the seven ongoing contracts for subject matter experts and determine the liability to the Government if the contracts are terminated. For contracts having no or limited liability to the Government terminate immediately. Terminate all contracts at the end of current contract period. 03. We recommend that the Commander, Defense Contracting Command-Washington: b. Complete the documentation of contracts awarded for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance/Coalition Provisional Authority required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations and ensure that each future contract is awarded in accordance to applicable regulations and that all contract documentation is prepared. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. DoD did not adequately plan for the acquisition support required by ORHA/CPA to perform its mission. a. Did not establish firm contract requirements. b. Misused GSA schedules. c. Awarded personal services contracts prohibited by FAR. d. Allowed out-of-scope activity. e. Did not perform or support price reasonableness determinations. f. Conducted inadequate surveillance of awarded contracts.
2	DoD-OIG D-2005-045	05/09/2005	Operations and Maintenance Funds for the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Allocated to the Defense Logistics Agency	01. To evaluate accounting controls and procedures, as well as the validation and oversight of contingency operation costs incurred by the DoD agencies supporting the Global War on Terrorism.	Not Available (FOUO)	Not Available (FOUO)
3	DoD-OIG D-2005-053	04/29/2005	Operations and Maintenance Funds for the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Allocated to the Defense Information Systems Agency	01. To evaluate accounting controls and procedures, as well as the validation and oversight of contingency operation costs incurred by DoD agencies supporting the Global War on Terrorism.	Not Available (FOUO)	Not Available (FOUO)
4	DoD-OIG D-2006-010	10/28/2005	Contract Surveillance for Service Contracts	01. Our overall audit objective was to evaluate whether the Government provided sufficient contract oversight for service contracts to ensure that contractors performed in accordance with the contract. Specifically, we examined whether personnel were appointed to monitor contractors' performance, contractors' work was adequately monitored, contractors performed in accordance with contractual obligations, and contractor performance was properly documented for future use. We also evaluated the management control programs as they applied to the overall objective.	01. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: a. Emphasize to senior contracting officials and program managers the requirement to develop quality assurance surveillance plans for monitoring contractor performance and costs of service contracts. The plans must be prepared in conjunction with the preparation of the statement of work and must specify all work requiring surveillance. The plan should include coordination with DCAA to ensure surveillance activities involving contract costs, such as floor checks, will be performed to the extent and frequency deemed necessary. b. Ensure that program office officials are sufficiently trained on the preparation of quality assurance surveillance plans for service contracts that emphasize the use of metrics for measuring contractor performance. c. To avoid any duplication of effort, ensure that contract and program office personnel coordinate with the DCAA office that has responsibility for voucher review for all. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. Contracting officials and requiring activity personnel did not provide sufficient oversight for service contracts to ensure that contractors were performing in accordance with contract specifications.

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
DoD-OIG	IE-2005-002/ISP-IQO-05-72	07/15/2005	DoS/DoD Interagency Evaluation of Iraqi Police Training	01. Evaluate the U.S. government funded (appropriated funds) programs in accomplishing the training and equipping of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 02. Examine the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation between Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) activities for developing, implementing, and conducting training for the IPS.	01. Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPS. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action: MNF-I in coordination with MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.) 02. Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC-I and Embassy Baghdad.) 03. A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of in-service IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after Iraqi agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC-I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.) 04. Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and 4 provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC-I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.) (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )	01. Although the IPS is not yet capable of single-handedly meeting the security challenges, relevant Coalition training efforts have resulted in a qualified success. 02. Recruitment and vetting procedures are faulty. 03. Most of the IPS training programs have been designed and executed by the Coalition with insufficient input from Iraqi leaders. 04. Emphasis on numbers overshadows the attention that should be given to the qualitative performance of those trained. 05. Within present budget constraints, the Iraqi MOI cannot fund the ministry's existing staff of about 170,000, let alone the additional numbers projected for training. 06. MOI officials are not enthusiastic about training Iraqis at the JIPTC. 07. Iraqi officials, notably to include the Minister of Interior, are adamant that henceforth training of raw recruits should be suspended in favor of in-service training. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoD IG website: <a href="http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html">http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/index.html</a> )
DoS-OIG	03311-2005D1790009	05/01/2005	Audit of Cost-Plus Contract for Police Training	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	04141-2005B17900005	08/01/2005	Billed Costs Under Task Orders Submitted By RONCO (Demining)	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	3311-2005K17900015	07/22/2005	Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures to Calculate Daily Life Support Rates Under LOGCAP T0100	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	AUD/CG/06-20		Independent Accountant's Report on the Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures on Indirect Cost Rates Proposed by Scholastic, Inc.	01. To determine whether the rates and cost principles were in compliance with OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations	01. Harris reported that Scholastic's general ledger system did not capture direct and indirect expenses in a manner that effectively identified appropriate indirect cost pools as required by OMB Circular A-122. However, Scholastic maintained comprehensive and detailed support for its program expenses, which enabled Harris to compute the corporation's indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The independent accountant recommended that ALM/AQM require Scholastic to develop an Indirect Cost Allocation Plan in conformance with OMB Circular A-122 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31.2 and maintain a Job Cost Accounting System.	01. Harris reported that Scholastic's general ledger system did not capture direct and indirect expenses in a manner that effectively identified appropriate indirect cost pools as required by OMB Circular A-122. However, Scholastic maintained comprehensive and detailed support for its program expenses, which enabled Harris to compute the corporation's indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The independent accountant recommended that ALM/AQM require Scholastic to develop an Indirect Cost Allocation Plan in conformance with OMB Circular A-122 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31.2 and maintain a Job Cost Accounting System.
DoS-OIG	AUD/CG-04-41	07/01/2004	Fact Sheet on Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation	N/A	None	N/A

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
DoS-OIG	AUD/CG-05-18	02/15/2005	Survey of Department of State's Funding for Iraq	01. Identify and quantify funding received by DoS earmarked for Iraq. Ascertain methods or instruments used to convey funds, and compile inventory of auditable entities.	None	None
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-04-47	09/01/2004	Review of Department of State Procurement Competitions to Support the Iraqi Police Training Program	01. Review compliance w/contract competition and award procedures associated with the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) procurement actions supporting training Iraqi police.	None	01. Contracting personnel followed applicable regulations and procedures. 02. However, SOW for initial action did not accurately describe services required.
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-04-48	09/01/2004	Review of Cashiering Operations at Embassy Baghdad	01. Review Embassy's limited cashiering operations and specifically evaluate internal controls related to cashiering operation at US Embassy, Baghdad including adequacy of funds advanced to cashier.	None	01. No formal agreement w/DoD for services currently being performed by US Army. 02. No policies/procedures for Embassy Baghdad/Iraqi Support Unit Amman coordination/support. 03. No full-time IM specialist dedicated to providing support to offices in chancery.
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-05-13	01/01/2005	Agreed-Upon Procedures of Daily Direct Labor, Aerial Support Equipment & Indirect Expense Rates Proposed by Blackwater Security Consultants, Contractor's Accounting System & Timekeeping Procedures	01. Definitization support to contract number S-AQMPD-04-D-0061 (BWSC).	None	01. Lack of time sheets, employee certification and approval. 02. Lack of written procedures for timesheets. 03. Allocation of Indirect Costs. 04. Costs by Contract Lin Item - ODCs. 05. Payroll and Labor Recording. 06. Inadequate/unreliable data. 07. Inconsistencies between the Proposal and Accounting System
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-05-16	03/01/2005	Review of Agreed-Upon Procedures for the Verification of Excessive Fuel Charges in Support of JIPTC	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-05-24	03/28/2005	Agreed-Upon Procedures Review of Indirect Rates, and Equipment Delivery Charge Proposed by [a Department Contractor] and Review of Accounting System	01. At the request of the Department, the DoS OIG performed this review.	None	01. The DoS OIG did not take exception to the proposed indirect rates or equipment delivery charge, but had reservations as to whether the equipment delivery charge was properly treated as an indirect expense. 02. The DoS OIG had similar reservations about treating the project management office as an indirect expense because the proposed staffing might not be consistent with the level of effort needed, which was not known at the time of the review. 03. The DoS OIG also found that the contractor did not have a contract cost accounting system in place.
DoS-OIG	AUD/QO-06-16		Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures of Department of State Procurement Competitions to Support Armored Vehicles in Iraq	01. To determine whether acquisition plans were prepared and whether the procurements, which totaled about \$43.4 million, were adequately competed and performed in accordance with the provisions of the FAR and DOSAR.		01. With regard to the vehicle armoring services, the Department executed the justifications for less than full and open competition in accordance with the provisions of FAR and DOSAR. 02. With regard to the procurements for ballistic glass, the Department identified adequate competition.

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
DoS-OIG	AUD/IOO-06-17		Application of Agreed-Upon Procedures Relating to DECO, Inc., Task Order No. SALMEC-04-F-0996	01. Whether DECO's loaded hourly rates on Task Order No. SALMEC-04-F-0996 duplicated what the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) paid as direct travel reimbursement for the period August 2, 2004, to May 31, 2005. 02. Whether DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate complied with FAR, Part 31. Under the terms of the task order, DECO was to provide construction site security monitoring services in Baghdad, Iraq.	None	01. OIG found that DECO's loaded hourly rates did not duplicate what OBO paid as direct travel reimbursement. However, DECO's policies for including costs in the hourly rate did not always comply with FAR, Part 31. As a result, OIG questioned costs totaling \$13,458. Of that amount, OIG classified \$12,808 as unallowable and \$650 as unsupported because of either inadequate or a lack of documentation. OIG recommended that AML/AQM require DECO to reimburse the Department for unallowable costs and provide additional documentation for the unsupported costs. 02. In response to a request from the Department of State's Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management (AML/AQM), The Department's Office of Inspector General contracted with L.F. Harris & Associates, an independent public accounting firm, to perform certain agreed-upon procedures on Scholastic, Inc.'s, indirect cost rates for its fiscal years ended May 31, 2005, and 2004. The objective of the engagement was to determine whether the rates and cost principles were in compliance with OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. The cooperative agreement with Scholastic provided for the distribution of books and teacher training in Iraq and other countries of the Middle East. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoS IG website: <a href="http://www.state.gov">http://www.state.gov</a> )
DoS-OIG	IBO/IOO-A-05-02	10/01/2004	Review of Radio Sawa Support to Transition in Post-Saddam Iraq	01. Determine if USAID funds used effectively to enhance dissemination of humanitarian information. 02. Determine if BBG successfully launched 3 program components of interagency agreement: establishing stringer network, airing programs addressing humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, and conducting audience research.	01. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad establish a memorandum of agreement with the U.S. Army to ensure that it continues to provide the embassy with cashing services as needed 02. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad develop and publish post-specific policies and procedures that cover all cashing operations, including accommodation exchange, cash advances, Foreign Service national payroll, and other cashing services. 03. We recommend that Embassy Baghdad establish a system for providing coverage by an information management specialist at the chancery to assist the consular section and the cashing unit until a full-time specialist is assigned.	01. BBG did not use funds to enhance dissemination of reports as expected and therefore, funding plan not completed. 02. BBG partially met the principal requirements of the interagency agreement: setting up a Radio Sawa stringer network in Iraq, broadcasting humanitarian programming, and initiating audience research. 03. BBG did not provide periodic performance reports or purchase specific equipment.
DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-53	12/01/2004	Review of Off-Site Support to Embassy Baghdad	N/A	None	N/A
DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-57	03/01/2005	Review of Staffing Embassy Baghdad	N/A	None	N/A
DoS-OIG	ISP-IOO-05-61	07/01/2005	Review of Staffing Process at Embassy Baghdad's New Embassy Compound	None	None	None

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
DoS-OIG	ISP-IQO-06-01	10/01/2005	Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad	01. OIG surveyed U.S.-funded rule-of-law programs in Iraq to determine how effectively the programs address these multiple components of Iraq's justice sector.	01. Embassy Baghdad, in coordination with the Bureaus of Human Resources, Near Eastern Affairs, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should designate a senior officer to be the rule-of-law coordinator with DGHR, NEA, and INL. 02. Embassy Baghdad should designate the rule-of-law coordinator as the clearinghouse for current developments in rule of law in Iraq, with responsibility for periodic reporting on the status of rule-of-law activities, including those undertaken by Coalition members, for use by the Chief of Mission and officials in Iraq and the United States. (Action: Embassy Baghdad) (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the DoS IG website: <a href="http://www.state.gov">http://www.state.gov</a> )	01. A fully integrated approach to justice-sector reform in Iraq is essential and does not exist at present. An approved, integrated, adjustable strategic plan would sharpen the debate and shape the thoughts of policymakers for each stage of the process.
DoS-OIG	IT-IQO-05-04	05/01/2005	Survey of Iraq IT Waivers	None	None	None
DoS-OIG	IT-IQO-05-06	08/01/2005	Embassy Baghdad Communications Security Evaluation	None	None	None
GAO	GAO-03-1088	09/01/2003	MILITARY OPERATIONS Fiscal Year 2003 Obligations Are Substantial, but May Result in Less Obligations Than Expected	01. To examine the adequacy of funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), we reviewed: The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request for supplemental appropriations. 02. Applicable laws and accompanying reports appropriating funds for GWOT. 03. DoD reports on the obligation of funds.	01. GAO recommends that the Department of Defense (DOD) take several actions to ensure that the fiscal year 2003 funds appropriated for GWOT are fully utilized, including that the Secretary of Defense review the services' spending plans before transferring additional funds from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to ensure the funds will be obligated as planned. GAO also suggests that, given the results of this review, Congress not provide the \$1.4 billion requested by the President for DOD in fiscal year 2004 for continued support of Operations Desert Spring and Northern and Southern Watch since DOD canceled them.	01. While funds obligated by DOD for GWOT, including the war with Iraq, in fiscal year 2003 are substantial, about \$39 billion through June 2003, the funds appropriated by Congress appear to be sufficient for fiscal year 2003, and some of the services may not obligate all of the funds they were appropriated for fiscal year 2003.
GAO	GAO-03-792R	05/15/2003	Rebuilding Iraq	01. Based on others studies, Asks questions as to the oversight of Iraq Reconstruction.	None	N/A
GAO	GAO-04-1006	09/14/2004	Foreign Regimes' Assets: The US Faces Challenges in Recovering Assets, but Has Mechanisms That Could Guide Future Assets	01. This report describes the approach the U.S. government uses to recover foreign regimes' assets. 02. Examines the challenges the United States faces in recovering foreign regimes' assets. 03. Examines the mechanisms the United States has used to recover Iraqi assets and their applicability to future efforts.	01. The Departments of the Treasury and State should work with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to improve the accuracy and completeness of account identifying information needed by financial institutions to identify and freeze assets of foreign regimes. 02. The Department of the Treasury should seek legislative authority, if necessary, to enhance OFAC's ability to ensure financial institution compliance with sanctions by allowing financial regulators to share complete information from their examinations with OFAC. 03. The Departments of the Treasury and State should develop and document a compilation of lessons learned from the current effort to recover Iraq's assets that could assist in appropriately institutionalizing and leveraging all mechanisms available for future efforts.	01. U.S. agencies may not be able to readily obtain accurate and complete information on targeted entities, such as the spelling of names, addresses, and dates of birth. Financial institutions can also lack complete identifying information on their clients. 02. The laws of some foreign governments complicate the ability of overseas branches of U.S. financial institutions to comply with OFAC regulations. In these situations, the U.S. government encourages the relevant foreign governments to allow U.S. financial institutions to freeze or transfer assets in a manner consistent with U.S. law or Treasury issues a license to allow U.S. financial institutions to comply with local laws. 03. OFAC's ability to monitor financial institutions' compliance with its regulations is limited because it relies on financial regulators to monitor financial institutions' OFAC compliance programs.

**ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES**

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-04-1031	09/01/2004	MILITARY PERSONNEL: DoD Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and Demobilization Issues	01. This review specifically examined the extent to which: DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority and personnel policies affect reserve force availability. 2. The Army was able to execute its mobilization and demobilization plans efficiently. 3. DoD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces.	01. GAO recommends that DoD develop a strategic framework with personnel policies linked to human capital goals, update planning assumptions, determine the most efficient mobilization support options, update health guidance, set a timeline for submitting health assessments electronically, and improve medical oversight.	01. DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. 02. The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel.
GAO	GAO-04-305R	12/18/2003	Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Briefing)	01. To study a number of issues related to logistics support to deployed forces.	None	01. Although major combat operations during the initial phases of OIF were successful, our preliminary work indicated that there were substantial logistics support problems in the OIF theater.
GAO	GAO-04-484	04/01/2004	OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved	01. GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this report, GAO assesses: The timeliness of mail delivery to and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 02. How mail delivery issues and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991. 03. Efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future contingencies.	01. GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense: implement a new system to accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times 2. Consolidate lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and develop and implement a specific course of action to resolve them.	01. The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DoD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. 02. In general, DoD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual delivery times. 03. GAO conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served in theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale.
GAO	GAO-04-559	04/01/2004	State Dept. Issues affecting Iraq National Congress	01. GAO was asked to review the history of the Department of State's funding of INCSF broadcasting activities 02. The key issues affecting State's funding decisions.	None	01. Through their inability to work together to restart Liberty TV, State and INCSF missed a chance to reach the Iraqi people at critical times prior to and during the March 2003 war in Iraq.
GAO	GAO-04-562T	03/24/2004	MILITARY PREPOSITIONING Observations on Army and Marine Corps Programs During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Beyond (Testimony)	01. This testimony describes: The performance and availability of Army and Marine Corps prepositioned equipment and supplies to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 02. Current status of the stocks and plans to reconstitute them. 03. Key issues facing the military as it reshapes these programs to support DoD's force transformation efforts.	None	01. The importance of prepositioned stocks was dramatically illustrated during OIF. While they faced some challenges, the Army and Marine Corps relied heavily on prepositioned combat equipment and supplies to decisively defeat the Iraqi military. They both reported that prepositioned stocks were a key factor in the success of OIF. 02. Much of the prepositioned equipment is still being used to support continuing operations in Iraq. 03. In the near term, the Army and Marines must necessarily focus on supporting ongoing OIF operations. While waiting to reconstitute its program, the Army also has an opportunity to address shortfalls and modernize remaining stocks.
GAO	GAO-04-579T	03/18/2004	Recovering Iraq's Assets: Preliminary Observations on US Efforts and Challenges	IWA	None	N/A

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-04-605	06/01/2004	Rebuilding Iraq - Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges	01. GAO determined whether agencies had complied with competition requirements in awarding new contracts and issuing task orders and evaluated agencies' initial efforts in carrying out contract administration tasks.	01. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following four actions: Review the out-of-scope task orders for Iraqi media and subject matter experts issued by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington and take any necessary remedial actions. 02. Ensure that any future task orders under the LOGCAP contract for Iraq reconstruction activities are within the scope of that contract. 03. Address and resolve all outstanding issues in connection with the pending Justifications and Approvals for the contracts and related task orders used by the Army Corps of Engineers to restore Iraq's electricity infrastructure. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a> )	01. Agencies used sole-source or limited competition approaches to issue new reconstruction contracts, and when doing so, generally complied with applicable laws and regulations. 02. Agencies did not, however, always comply with requirements when issuing task orders under existing contracts.
GAO	GAO-04-651T	04/07/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program	01. GAO reports on its estimates of the revenue diverted from the program. 02. Provides preliminary observations on the program's administration. 03. Describes some challenges in its transfer to the CPA. 04. Discusses the challenges Iraq faces as it assumes program responsibility.	None	01. Inadequate oversight and corruption in the Oil for Food Program raise concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to import and distribute Oil for Food commodities and manage at least \$32 billion in expected donor reconstruction funds.
GAO	GAO-04-668	05/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS DoD's Fiscal Year 2003 Funding and Reported Obligations in Support of the Global War on Terrorism	01. This report continues the review of fiscal year 2003 by analyzing obligations reported in support of the Global War on Terrorism and reviews whether the amount of funding received by the military services was adequate to cover DoD's obligations for the war from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003. GAO will also review the war's reported obligations and funding for fiscal year 2004.	None	01. In fiscal year 2003, DoD reported obligations of more than \$61 billion in support of the Global War on Terrorism. 02. GAO's analysis of the obligation data showed that 64 percent of fiscal year 2003 obligations reported for the war on terrorism went for Operation Iraqi Freedom. 03. Among the DoD components, the Army had the most obligations (46 percent); and among appropriation accounts the operation and maintenance account had the highest level of reported obligations (71 percent).
GAO	GAO-04-730T	04/28/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Management and Oversight of the Oil for Food Program	01. GAO reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions. 02. Provides observations on program administration. 03. Describes the challenges facing the CPA and the Iraqi government in administering remaining contracts. 04. Discusses potential issues for further investigation.	None	01. Summaries of internal audit reports pointed to some concerns regarding procurement, coordination, monitoring, and oversight and concluded that OIP had generally responded to audit recommendations.
GAO	GAO-04-746R	05/25/2004	Report on Iraq Transitional Law	01. Review the following: The time frames and Iraqi governmental structures established by the transitional law. 02. Arrangements in the law for the U.S.-led multinational force, Iraqi security forces, and militias. 03. Mechanisms in the law for resolving disputes over property and territories within Iraq.	None	01. The transitional law does not specify how the interim government is to be formed or structured, but states that the interim government will govern in accordance with an annex to be developed. 02. The transitional law contains some provisions addressing two of the key challenges facing the interim and transitional governments—maintaining a unified Iraq and ensuring its security—but many issues remain open.



ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-04-831R	05/27/2004	Financial Services: Post-hearing Questions Regarding Recovering Foreign Regimes' Assets (Testimony)	N/A	None	N/A
GAO	GAO-04-854	07/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS DoD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight	01. As requested, GAO assessed DoD's planning in its use of logistics support contracts in contingency operations; determined whether DoD has had contract oversight processes that are adequate to ensure that quality services were provided in an economical and efficient manner. 02. Assessed the extent to which DoD provided trained personnel qualified to oversee its contractors.	01. Emphasize to the heads of DOD components the need to comply with guidance to identify operational requirements that are to be provided by contractors early in the planning process and involve the contractor in the planning, where practicable. If security concerns prevent the involvement of the contractor, direct that unclassified statements of work be developed and provided to the contractor. 02. Direct the service secretaries to establish teams of subject matter experts who will periodically travel to locations where contractor services are being provided by logistics support contracts to evaluate and make recommendations on (1) the appropriateness of the services being provided, (2) the level of services being provided, and (3) the economy and efficiency with which the services are being provided. 03. Implement a department-wide lessons learned program that will capture the experiences of others who have used logistics support contracts. This system should include lessons learned from operations as well as lessons learned and best practices documented by DOD's audit agencies. 04. Develop and implement training courses for commanding officers and other senior leaders who are deploying to locations with contractor support. Such training should provide information on the role of commanders and others in the contracting process. Specifically, the training should provide instruction on (1) developing and documenting requirements, (2) ensuring that contractors perform in a cost-effective manner, and (3) assessing contractors' performance. The training should also include information on the limits of commanders' authority vis-à-vis contractors and include information on the roles and responsibilities of DCMA and other oversight agencies.	01. The effectiveness of DoD's planning to use the logistics support contracts during contingency operations varies widely between the commands that use them and the contracts themselves. 02. DoD's contract oversight processes were generally good, although there is room for improvement. 03. DoD did not have sufficient numbers of trained personnel in place to provide effective oversight of its logistics support contractors.
GAO	GAO-04-869T	06/15/2004	Contract Management: Contracting for Iraq Reconstruction and Global Logistics Support (Testimony)	N/A	01. We made several recommendations to the Secretary of the Army, including reviewing out-of-scope task orders to address outstanding issues and take appropriate actions, as necessary. 02. We also recommended that the Secretary of Defense evaluate the lessons learned in Iraq and develop a strategy for assuring that adequate acquisition staff and other resources can be made available in a timely manner.	N/A
GAO	GAO-04-880T	06/16/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Iraq's Food Security	01. GAO reports on its estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions. 02. Provides observations on program administration. 3. Describes the current and future challenges in achieving food security	None	01. Evolving policy and implementation decisions on the food distribution system and the worsening security situation have affected the movement of food commodities within Iraq.

# APPENDIX F

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
44	GAO-04-902R	06/01/2004	Rebuilding Iraq - Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues	01. This report focuses on issues associated with resources, security, governance, and essential services.	None	01. Several key challenges will affect the political transition, the pace and cost of reconstruction, and the type of assistance provided by the international community. These include the unstable security environment, the evolving capacity of the Iraqi institutions to govern and secure the country, the availability and coordination of international assistance, and the need for adequate oversight. 02. Given the instability and uncertainty in Iraq, there are also questions about what options and contingency plans are being developed to address these ongoing and future challenges.
45	GAO-04-915	07/01/2004	MILITARY OPERATIONS Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War on Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DoD to Shift Funds from Other Uses	01. GAO reviewed the adequacy of current funding for fiscal year 2004 war-related activities. 02. Actions DoD is undertaking to cover anticipated shortfalls, if any. 03. GAO is also making observations on efforts to require greater accountability to the Congress on the use of funds appropriated to DoD for contingency operations.	01. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD cost reporting guidance so that large amounts of obligations are not shown in miscellaneous categories.	01. GAO's analysis suggests that anticipated costs will exceed the supplemental funding provided for the war by about \$12.3 billion for the current fiscal year. 02. DoD and the services are taking a variety of actions to cover anticipated shortfalls in their war-related funding. These actions include taking steps to reduce costs, transferring funds among appropriations accounts, and deferring some planned activities to use those funds to support the war. 03. GAO's past work has shown that current cost reporting includes large amounts of funds that have been reported as obligated in miscellaneous categories and thus provide little insight on how those funds have been spent.
46	GAO-04-953T	07/08/2004	UNITED NATIONS Observations on the Oil for Food Program and Areas for Further Investigation	01. GAO reports on estimates of the illegal revenue acquired by the former Iraqi regime in violation of UN sanctions 02. Provides some observations on the administration of the program. 03. Suggests areas for additional analysis and summarizes the status of several ongoing investigations.	None	01. Ongoing investigations of the Oil for Food Program may wish to further examine how the structure of the program enabled the Iraqi government to obtain illegal revenues, the role of member states in monitoring and enforcing the sanctions, actions taken to reduce oil smuggling, and the responsibilities and procedures for assessing price reasonableness in commodity contracts.
47	GAO-05-120	11/01/2004	DEFENSE HEALTH CARE Force Health Protection and Surveillance Policy Compliance Was Mixed, but Appears Better for Recent Deployments	01. GAO was asked in November 2003 to also determine the extent to which the services met DoD's policies for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and, where applicable, compare results with OEF/OIG. 02. What steps DoD has taken to establish a quality assurance program to ensure that the military services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies.	None	01. Overall compliance with DoD's force health protection and surveillance policies for servicemembers that deployed in support of OIF varied by service, installation, and policy requirement. 02. Overall, Army and Air Force compliance for sampled servicemembers for OIF appears much better compared to OEF and OIG. 03. The Marine Corps installations examined generally had lower levels of compliance than the other services; however, GAO did not review medical records from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG. 04. In January 2004, DoD established an overall deployment quality assurance program for ensuring that the services comply with force health protection and surveillance policies, and implementation of the program is ongoing from the Marines or Navy for OEF and OIG.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-05-125	02/01/2005	MILITARY PAY Gaps in Pay and Benefits Create Financial Hardships for Injured Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers	01. Provide perspective on the nature of pay deficiencies in the key areas of overall environment and management controls, processes, and systems. 02. GAO also assessed whether recent actions the Army has taken to address these problems will offer effective and lasting solutions.	01. GAO makes 20 recommendations for immediate actions including (1) establishing comprehensive policies and procedures, (2) providing adequate infrastructure and resources, and (3) making process improvements to compensate for inadequate, stovepiped systems. 02. In addition, GAO recommends 2 actions, as part of longer term system improvement initiatives, to integrate the Army's order writing, pay, personnel, and medical eligibility systems.	01. Injured and ill Reserve component soldiers—who are entitled to extend their active duty service to receive medical treatment—have been inappropriately removed from active duty status in the automated systems that control pay and access to medical care. 02. The Army's process for extending active duty orders for injured soldiers lacks an adequate control environment and management controls.
GAO	GAO-05-201	04/01/2005	INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING Problems with DoD's and Interior's Orders to Support Military Operations	01. We reviewed the process that the Department of Defense (DoD) used to acquire interrogation and certain other services through the Department of the Interior to support military operations in Iraq. On behalf of DoD, Interior issued 11 task orders, valued at over \$66 million, on an existing contract.	01. A number of corrective actions are already underway, such as clarifying policies and adding training requirements. GAO makes recommendations on steps that Interior and DoD should take to further refine their efforts.	01. DoD, faced with an urgent need for interrogation and other services in support of military operations in Iraq, turned to the Department of the Interior for contracting assistance. Numerous breakdowns occurred in the issuance and administration of the orders for these services. 02. A lack of effective management controls—in particular insufficient management oversight and a lack of adequate training—led to the breakdowns. 03. In response to the above concerns, Interior and DoD have taken actions to strengthen management controls.
GAO	GAO-05-233	02/01/2005	Progress in Implementing the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA)	01. GAO was asked to report on progress in implementing SARA's provisions.	None	01. Just over a year after the enactment of SARA, progress made on regulations, guidance, and other implementing actions varies. 02. While nearly all the key provisions of SARA are being implemented, some provisions are further along than others.
GAO	GAO-05-275	04/01/2005	DEFENSE LOGISTICS Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations	01. Assessing what supply shortages were experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq between October 2002 and September 2004 and what impact the shortages had on their operations. 02. What primary deficiencies in the supply system contributed to any identified supply shortages. 03. What actions DoD has taken to improve the timely availability of supplies for current and future operations.	01. This report contains several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense directing that actions, such as ensuring the accuracy of Army war reserve requirements and developing and exercising deployable distribution capabilities, be taken to improve DoD's system for supplying items to U.S. forces.	01. U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO reviewed. 02. The documented impact of these shortages varied between combat units. 03. GAO identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to shortages of the reviewed items, including inaccurate Army war reserve spare parts requirements and ineffective distribution.
GAO	GAO-05-280R	04/29/2005	Defense Base Act Insurance	01. The objectives of our review were to: identify the cost to the U.S. government of insurance coverage purchased under DBA. 02. To assess the act's implementation.	None	01. It is difficult to determine whether all DBA insurance is purchased in a cost-effective manner or if agencies' implementation challenges hinder their effectiveness in providing workers' compensation coverage under DBA. 02. Lack of reliable information on numbers of contractors and cost of DBA insurance restricts the ability of agencies to make informed decisions on purchasing strategies for DBA. 03. Additionally, confusion over when DBA applies and difficulty in enforcing DBA and processing claims remain largely unresolved problems, despite actions taken by agencies. 04. Finally, new challenges, such as growing numbers of contractors, have arisen since 1941, when DBA was passed.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
53	GAO-05-293	05/01/2005	DEFENSE MANAGEMENT Processes to Estimate and Track Equipment Reconstitution Costs Can Be Improved	01. GAO reviewed this process for the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget to determine the extent to which the process produced reliable estimates of reconstitution requirements in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget. 02. Whether DoD is accurately tracking and reporting reconstitution costs.	None	01. DoD's two-phased process to develop its fiscal year 2004 equipment reconstitution cost estimates contained weaknesses that produced errors which may result in misstatements of future-year reconstitution cost requirements. 02. The model DoD used to estimate costs in the first phase of the process generated unreliable estimates DoD has not accurately tracked and reported its equipment reconstitution cost because the services are unable to segregate equipment reconstitution from other maintenance requirements as required.
54	GAO-05-328	03/17/2005	Defense Logistics - High Level DoD Coordination is Needed to Further Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract	01. This report assesses the extent to which the Army is taking action to improve the management and oversight of LOGCAP and whether further opportunities for using this contract effectively exist.	01. To make more effective use of LOGCAP we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: - Designate a LOGCAP coordinator with the authority to participate in deliberations and advocate for the most effective and efficient use of the LOGCAP contract. Areas where we believe this coordinator should provide oversight include (1) reviewing planning for the use of LOGCAP to ensure it is in accordance with Army doctrine and guidance; (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a> )	01. First, although DoD continues to agree with our July 2004 recommendation to create teams of subject matter experts to review contract activities for economy and efficiency, it has not done so yet because the need to respond to statutory requirements took precedence. 02. The second area needing attention is the coordination of contract activities between DoD components involved with using LOGCAP.
55	GAO-05-346T	02/15/2005	UNITED NATIONS Oil for Food Program Audits	01. GAO provides information on United Nations' Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) background, structure, and resources. 02. Highlights the findings of the internal audit reports. 03. Discusses limitations on the audits' coverage.	None	01. OIOS' audits and summary reports revealed deficiencies in the management and internal controls of the Oil for Food Program. However, OIOS did not examine certain headquarters functions—particularly OIP's oversight of the contracts for central and southern Iraq that accounted for 59 percent or almost \$40 billion in Oil for Food proceeds. 02. UN management and the Office of the Iraq Program prevented OIOS from reporting its audit results directly to the Security Council.
56	GAO-05-392T	03/02/2005	UNITED NATIONS Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results	01. GAO provides observations on areas for UN reform based on our 2004 report and our continuing review of the Oil for Food program, including our analysis of internal audit reports and other documents.	None	01. The United Nations needs sustained oversight at all levels of the organization to achieve lasting results on its reform agenda. 02. At the program level, management reviews that compare actual performance to expected results are critical elements of effective oversight and accountability. 03. A strong internal audit function provides additional oversight and accountability through independent assessments of UN activities, as demonstrated by audits of the UN Oil for Food program.
57	GAO-05-431T	03/14/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police	01. GAO provides preliminary observations on the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces. 02. The data on the status of forces. 03. Challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces.	None	01. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. 02. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-05-680R	06/27/2005	Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas	<p>01. This report discusses the extent to which OSD has provided sufficient guidance to overseas regional commands to meet the reporting requirements contained in congressional mandates and as suggested by GAO</p> <p>02. Overseas regional commands complied with the reporting requirements and in doing so, provided information in a complete, clear, and consistent manner</p> <p>03. Whether improvements in guidance and reporting were needed.</p>	<p>01. We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that are intended to make future comprehensive master plans more complete, clear, and consistent to facilitate annual review and oversight by Congress and other users of the plans.</p>	<p>01. The scope of OSD's guidance issued to date generally exceeded the reporting requirements established by Congress for the comprehensive master plans and included most additional reporting elements previously recommended by us, except for residual value.</p> <p>02. The overseas regional commands generally complied with the reporting requirements defined by OSD, and by extension of Congress, but varied in the extent to which they provided complete, clear, and consistent information in their master plans.</p>
GAO	GAO-05-737	07/28/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed To Improve Use of Private Security Providers	<p>01. GAO evaluated the extent to which U.S. agencies and contractors acquired security services from private providers,</p> <p>02. The U.S. military and private security providers developed a working relationship, and</p> <p>03. U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts.</p>	<p>01. To assist contractors operating in hostile environments in obtaining security services required to ensure successful contract execution, we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, explore options that would enable contractors to obtain such services quickly and efficiently. Such options may include, for example, identifying minimum standards for private security personnel qualifications, training requirements and other key performance characteristics that private security personnel should possess; establishing qualified vendor lists; and/or establishing contracting vehicles which contractors could be authorized to use.</p> <p>02. To ensure that MNF-I has a clear understanding of the reasons for blue on white violence, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command, to direct the Commander, MNF-I, to further assess all of the blue on white incidents to determine if the procedures outlined in the December 2004 order are sufficient. Furthermore, if the procedures have not proven to be effective, we recommend that the Commander, MNF-I, develop additional procedures to protect both U.S. military forces and private security providers.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. Overall, GAO found that contractors replaced their initial security providers on more than half the 2003 contracts it reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including the absence of useful agency guidance.</p> <p>02. Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling reconstruction efforts, neither the Department of State, nor DOD nor the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have complete data on the costs of using private security providers.</p> <p>03. GAO found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security-related equipment accounted for more than 15 percent of contract costs on 8 of the 15 reconstruction contracts it reviewed.</p>
GAO	GAO-05-775	08/11/2005	Defense Logistics: DOD Has Begun to Improve Supply Distribution Operations, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain These Efforts	<p>01. DoD has undertaken logistics improvement initiatives, but has not achieved a logistics system responsive to the asymmetric threat DoD now faces. Prior logistics transformation efforts lacked an overarching plan to tie numerous service initiatives to DoD's strategic logistics objectives.</p> <p>1. To what extent has DoD defined the desired end state for its initiatives and identified goals, resources, and timeframes?</p> <p>02. How successful have logistics initiatives been to date and what are the challenges/barriers for broader implementation?</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some objectives have been left out. To view the complete set of objectives, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: Clarify the responsibilities, accountability, and authority between the DPO and Defense Logistics Executive;</p> <p>02. Issue a directive to institute these clarifications;</p> <p>03. Direct that improvements be made in DOD's logistics transformation strategy; and</p> <p>04. Address underfunding of new communications and tracking systems.</p>	<p>01. Although DOD has made progress in addressing supply distribution problems, the department's ability to make coordinated, systemic improvements that cut across the multiple organizations involved in the distribution system is stymied because of problems in defining who has accountability and authority for making such improvements and because the current strategy to transform logistics does not provide a clear vision to guide and synchronize future distribution and synchronization future distribution improvement efforts.</p> <p>02. Two of DOD's five distribution initiatives GAO reviewed have been successful enough to warrant application to future operations, but the future of the other three is less certain because they lack funding or other support.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
61	GAO-05-79	01/01/2005	ARMY NATIONAL GUARD Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers	<p>01. GAO was asked to determine: The impact of the recent increased operational tempo on the process used to reimburse Army Guard soldiers for travel expenses and the effect that travel reimbursement problems have had on soldiers and their families.</p> <p>02. The adequacy of the overall design of controls over the processes, human capital, and automated systems relied on for Army Guard travel reimbursements.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some objectives have been left out. To view the complete set of objectives, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>	<p>01. GAO makes 23 recommendations to address Army Guard travel reimbursement weaknesses in the areas of process, human capital, and systems.</p> <p>02. GAO also recommends that DOD ensure that its longer term system improvement efforts include complete and lasting solutions to the identified weaknesses.</p>	<p>01. Mobilized Army Guard soldiers have experienced significant problems getting accurate, timely, and consistent reimbursements for out-of-pocket travel expenses.</p> <p>02. Guard soldiers in our case study units reported a number of problems they and their families endured due to delayed or unpaid travel reimbursements, including debts on their personal credit cards, trouble paying their monthly bills, and inability to make child support payments.</p> <p>03. With respect to human capital, GAO found a lack of oversight and accountability and inadequate training.</p>
62	GAO-05-872	09/07/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities	<p>01. Assessment of U.S. activities in the water and sanitation sector including the funding and status of U.S. activities.</p> <p>02. U.S. efforts to measure progress, the factors affecting the implementation of reconstruction activities, and</p> <p>04. the sustainability of U.S. - funded projects.</p>	<p>01. Secretary of State should establish and monitor improved indicators and measures that assess how U.S. efforts are improving water and sanitation services in Iraq and</p> <p>02. Work with Iraqi ministries to assess and obtain the resources needed to operate and maintain facilities.</p>	<p>01. State has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but the lack of sound performance data and measures for the water and sanitation sector present challenges in determining the impact of U.S. projects.</p> <p>02. USAID-funded surveys report that Iraqis experience low levels of access and satisfaction with water and sanitation services.</p> <p>03. Poor security and management challenges have adversely affected the U.S. water and sanitation reconstruction program, leading to project delays and increased costs.</p> <p>04. Other factors that impede progress and increase cost include lack of agreement on project scope, staffing turnover, inflation, unanticipated site conditions, and uncertain ownership of project sites.</p>
63	GAO-05-876	07/28/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction	<p>01. Report provides information on the funding applied to the reconstruction effort and</p> <p>02. U.S. activities and progress made in the oil, power, water, and health sectors and key challenges that these sectors face.</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>01. The U.S. has completed projects in Iraq that have helped to restore basic services, such as rehabilitating oil wells and refineries, increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring water treatment plants, and reestablishing Iraqi basic health care services.</p> <p>02. Reconstruction efforts continue to face challenges such as rebuilding in an insecure environment, ensuring the sustainability of completed projects, and measuring program results.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
GAO	GAO-05-882	09/21/2005	Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to Improve the Reliability of Cost Data and Provide Additional Guidance to Control Costs	<p>01. Assess whether DoD's reported war costs are based on reliable data.</p> <p>02. The extent to which DoD's existing financial management policy is applicable to war spending, and</p> <p>03. Whether DoD has implemented cost controls as operations mature.</p>	<p>01. Undertake a series of steps to ensure that reported GWOT costs are reliable.</p> <p>02. Expand its financial management regulation for contingency operations to include contingencies as large as GWOT, and</p> <p>03. Establish guidelines to control costs.</p>	<p>01. GAO found numerous problems in DoD's processes for recording and reporting costs for GWOT; raising significant concerns about the overall reliability of DoD's reported cost data.</p> <p>02. Further complicating the data reliability issue is the fact that DoD has not updated its policy to address GWOT spending.</p> <p>03. While individual commands have taken steps to control costs and DoD policy generally advises its officials of their financial management responsibilities to ensure the prudent use of contingency funding, DoD has not established guidelines that would require all commands involved in GWOT to take steps to control costs and to keep DoD informed of those steps and their success.</p>
GAO	GAO-05-932R	09/07/2005	Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections	<p>01. Report provides information on U.S. assistance to Iraq for the elections and</p> <p>02. Improvements in the elections process that participating organizations identified for future elections.</p>	None	<p>01. Conference participants identified elections management, media involvement in the elections process, and voter education as areas needing improvement.</p> <p>02. In addition, participants suggested that the IECI develop a way to address regional differences in voter education.</p>
GAO	GAO-06-179T	10/18/2005	REBUILDING IRAQ: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress	<p>01. In this testimony, GAO discusses: The funding used to rebuild and stabilize Iraq</p> <p>02. The challenges that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts.</p>	None	<p>01. The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq: The security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts.</p> <p>02. Inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts.</p> <p>03. The U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq's ability to maintain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors.</p>
GAO	GAO-06-428T	02/08/2006	Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges	<p>01. To discuss the challenges that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts</p> <p>02. To discuss the challenges that the Iraqi government faces in financing future requirements.</p>	<p>01. Secretary of State address this issue of measuring progress and impact in the water and sanitation sector.</p>	<p>01. The security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and progressively draw down U.S. forces. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces. In addition, the security situation has affected the cost and schedule of rebuilding efforts. The State Department has reported that security costs represent 16 to 22 percent of the overall costs of major infrastructure projects.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the GAO website: <a href="http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html">http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/pastweek.html</a>)</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
68	SIGIR 04-001	06/25/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority Coordination of Donated Funds	01. Determine whether the CPA processes by which reconstruction priorities are established and approved provide adequate transparency and coordination in the allocation of donated funds to the reconstruction of Iraq.	01. We recommend the CPAs Senior Advisor coordinate with the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation to document procedures to identify and track projects to be funded from donated funds, account for donated equipment and material, and submit quarterly updates on the progress of projects financed with donated funds. 02. We also recommend the CPA Senior Advisor coordinate with the CPA Program Management Office to develop and document a Memorandum of Understanding that describes how the offices will share information on reconstruction projects.	01. No process developed for tracking or coordinating internationally funded projects w/other CPA reconstruction efforts. 02. There was little guidance provided to the Iraq Ministries on maintaining adequate supporting documentation that describe the reconstruction efforts to be funded from donated funds.
69	SIGIR 04-002	06/25/2004	Management of Personnel Assigned to the CPA in Baghdad	01. Determine whether CPA had control over and insight into the number of civilians assigned to CPA in Baghdad, including both U.S. Government and contractor personnel and whether there were lessons to be learned from CPA's management of civilian personnel in a post-war coalition environment.	None	01. CPA/HRM-Forward did not have accurate account of civilian personnel assigned to its operations. 02. Factors inhibiting accurate information A. existence of multiple entry POE into CPA Baghdad, B. failure of organizations within CPA to follow published procedures regarding in/out-processing, C. short-term nature of assignments, D absence of interlinked civilian personnel database.
70	SIGIR 04-003	06/25/2004	Federal Deployment Center Forward Operations at the Kuwait Hilton	01. Determine whether the CPA efficiently and effectively operated FDC-Forward. Specifically, objectives were to: Determine whether FDC-Forward met the purpose for which it was established by Department of Army Execution Order 02. Established policy to limit the use of FDC-Forward facility to authorized personnel.	01. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff require the Administration Contract Officer (ACO) to conduct a detailed review of contractor cost reports. 02. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate living quarters for the Director, RSO&I from an individual room in the main hotel to a room in a villa, saving \$101,000 annually. 03. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate the medical and equipment issue functions from the office locations in the main hotel to a room in a villa saving \$171,000 annually. 04. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate Contractor employees supporting the CPA from individual rooms in the main hotel to rooms in a villa saving over \$2,853,000 annually. 05. We recommend that the CPA Deputy Chief of Staff relocate the FDC briefings, administrative office of the Director RSO&I, and the contractor's Material Control office from the main hotel to a room in a villa saving, at least, \$323,000 annually. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audit/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audit/Default.aspx</a> )	01. FDC-Forward met purpose established by DAEO. 02. No CPA policy existed for usage leading to inefficient use of CPA resources. Specifically, CPA failed to: A. Provide adequate oversight of operations to ensure cost limited to authorized users, B. established defined policy/identifying persons eligible to use FDC facilities.
71	SIGIR 04-004	07/28/2004	Task Orders Awarded by AFCEE in Support of CPA (Procure)	01. Evaluate policies and procedures used by the CPA, the CPA Program Management Office (PMO), and AFCEE to award Iraqi reconstruction task orders under the AFCEE Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. Specifically, we evaluated those policies and procedures associated with acquisition planning, source selection, use of free and open competition, and contract negotiation.	01. The CPAs successor agency with responsibility for reconstruction of Iraq should execute a Memorandum of Agreement with AFCEE to clarify the scope of projects that AFCEE is expected to support. The MOA should specify contractor requirements (such as small or minority businesses) and define mutual contract administration responsibilities. As necessary, the MOA should be updated so that it accurately reflects the business relationship between the CPAs successor and AFCEE.	01. AFCEE's role has expanded beyond the original role envisioned by DoD and the CPA which was the urgent reconstruction supporting the New Iraqi Army (\$238.6M). 02. AFCEE has awarded \$439M task orders supporting NIA and also awarded 3 T/Os (\$42M) unrelated to NIA support.
72	SIGIR 04-005	07/23/2004	Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts	01. Evaluate procedures used when awarding sector contracts. Specifically, evaluate whether competitive procedures used to award contracts to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure.	None	01. Except that competition generally limited to designated countries, DoD Components used competitive procedures required by FAR to award Design-Build contracts for each sector.



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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
73	SIGIR 04-006	07/21/2004	Corporate Governance for Contractors Performing Iraq Reconstruction Efforts	01. Determine adequacy and effectiveness of corporate self-governance programs of contractors awarded contracts on task orders funded by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Defense and Reconstruction of Iraq.	None	01. Review of five major contracts reveal that viable programs exist at each of those contractors.
74	SIGIR 04-007	07/26/2004	Oil For Food Cash Controls for the Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq	01. Determine if CPA established and implemented appropriate policies and procedures for accounting, controlling, and monitoring the transfer of \$1.5B in cash to the Kurdish Regional Government as part of OFF program.	01. We recommend that the Deputy General of the Office of Project Coordination obtain, review, validate, and approve cash transfer procedures for the use of local foreign-national couriers before contracting for those types of services.	01. CPA did establish and implement appropriate policies and procedures for accounting, controlling and monitoring transfer of cash to the Kurdish Govt. 02. However, CPA did not obtain, validate, review, and approve cash transfer procedures for using foreign-national couriers to transfer cash w/in Erbil.
75	SIGIR 04-008	07/30/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority Control Over Seized and Vested Assets	01. Determine whether the CPA implemented effective safeguards to ensure accountability and control for the seized and vested assets. Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether the CPA had adequate and effective policies and procedures in place to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the management of seized and vested funds; in the allocation, distribution, and controls of Iraqi non-cash assets; and whether all seized and vested assets were used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.	01. The Facilities Management Office review all outstanding receipts for borrowed assets and determine where the assets are located. Ensure that the personnel signed as being responsible for the assets have not redeployed and that the locations of the assets are known. 02. The Facilities Management Office provide the Ministry of Culture with hand receipts for seized assets signed out by individuals or organizations. 03. The Comptroller's office ensure seized and vested payment files contain documentation approving the use and disbursement of funds.	01. Facilities Management Office personnel did not adequately manage, secure, and safeguard non-cash assets in compliance w/CPA established policies and procedures. Inventory was not performed to determine non-cash assets in CPA custody.
76	SIGIR 04-009	07/28/2004	CPA Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over DFI	01. Determine whether CPA instituted and used appropriate policies and procedures in accounting for, handling, monitoring and controlling cash.	01. We recommend that the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, require the Comptroller to establish adequate internal controls including: 1. Implement a single set of existing standards such as the DoD FMR to control the use of DFI. 02. Standardize the requirements for clearing the funds. 03. Establish oversight of the division level agents. 04. Provide clear guidance on CERP and R3P Fund accountability. 05. Implement consistency between guidance and agent appointment letters.	01. CPA created policies that did not establish effective funds control and accountability over \$600M in DFI funds held as cash. Specifically: Proper cash accountability was not maintained. 02. Physical security was inadequate. 03. Fund agent records were not complete. 04. Fund managers' responsibilities and liabilities were not properly assigned.
77	SIGIR 04-011	07/26/2004	Control of Material Assets of the CPA in Baghdad	01. Evaluate the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and property accountability measures used to account for and control material at CPA branch offices, headquarters, and warehouse locations.	01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq ensure an accurate property control system analysis is performed after ongoing corrective actions are completed. 01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq conduct a thorough review of Coalition Provisional Authority property in Baghdad, Iraq to locate the missing property. Upon completion of the review, the Defense Contract Management Agency should seek to recover the cost of missing equipment from the responsible personnel. Further, the Defense Contract Management Agency should initiate appropriate recovery actions from Kellogg Brown & Root, if it failed to fulfill its contractual obligations.	01. Inadequate / missing property accounting procedures in place. Specifically, KBR could not account for 34% of property items surveyed. Furthermore 6.9% of property items on hand were not recorded on hand receipts and 28.8% hand receipts were either not on file or had not been prepared. 02. KBR did not effectively manage government property as it did not properly control CPA property items and its property records were not sufficiently accurate or available to account for CPA equipment items. 03. Project that property valued at more than \$18.6M was not accurately accounted for.

# APPENDIX F

## ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
78	SIGIR 04-013	07/27/2004	Coalition Provisional Authority's Contracting Processes Leading Up To and Including Contract Award	01. Evaluate the procedures used by the CPA Contracting Activity to award contracts. Specifically, evaluate policies and procedures associated with acquisition planning, source selection, use of competition, and contract negotiations.	01. We recommended the Head of Contracting Activity request the Defense Contract Audit Agency perform a post-award audit of contract DABV01-03-C-0015, the National Currency Exchange Program.	01. Contract files were missing and/or incomplete. 02. Contract officers did not always ensure that contractor prices were fair and reasonable, contractors were capable of meeting delivery schedules, and payments were made in accordance with contract requirements. CPA Contracting Activity did not issue standard operating procedures or develop an effective contract review, tracking, and monitoring system. 03. CPA not able to accurately report number of contracts actually awarded and inability to demonstrate the transparency required of the CPA when it awarded contracts using DFI funds.
79	SIGIR 05-001	10/22/2004	CPA Control of Appropriated Funds	01. Examine whether processes used to identify, review, and validate requirements were reasonable and supportable.	None	01. CPA had adequate controls to identify, review, and validate the proposed uses of appropriated funds for its operational requirements and that those funds were approved for the purposes intended.
80	SIGIR 05-002	10/25/2004	Final Accountability and Control of Materiel Assets of the CPA Kuwait	01. Evaluate the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and property accountability measures used to account for and control materiel at CPA branch offices, headquarters, and warehouse locations.	01. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq; Reevaluate the Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III property control system to determine that procedures exist to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of the system and have been properly implemented. If not, identify corrective actions to be taken by Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., and suspend approval of the system until those corrective actions have been implemented. 02. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq; Ensure an accurate property control system analysis is performed after ongoing corrective actions are completed. 03. We recommend the Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency, Iraq; Conduct a thorough review of Coalition Provisional Authority property in Kuwait and Iraq to locate the unaccounted for or missing property. Upon completion of the review, the Defense Contract Management Agency should seek to recover the cost of missing equipment from the responsible personnel. Further, the Defense Contract Management Agency should initiate appropriate recovery actions from Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., if it failed to fulfill its contractual obligations.	01. IG projected that KBR could not account for 42.8% of property items valued at more than \$3.7M. Cause: KBR did not effectively manage government property. Specifically, KBR did not properly control CPA property items. KBR records were not sufficiently accurate or available. As a result, we projected that property valued at more than \$1.1 million was not accurately accounted for or was missing.
81	SIGIR 05-003	11/23/2004	Final Memo Report-Task Order 0044	01. Determine whether CPA management efficiently and effectively managed the LOGCAP III contract to provide for logistics and life support for personnel assigned to the CPA mission.	None	01. The ACO did not receive sufficient or reliable cost information to effectively manage TO 0044 02. The lack of certified billing or cost and schedule reporting systems hampered the ACO from effectively monitoring contract costs. 03. Due to the lack of contractor provided detailed cost information to support actual expenses incurred, resource managers were unable to accurately forecast funding requirements to complete TO 0044.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
SIGIR	05-004	01/30/2005	Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the NBP	01. Determine whether the CPA established and implemented adequate managerial, financial, and contractual controls over DFI disbursements provided to interim Iraqi ministries through the national budget process.	None	01. The CPA provided less than adequate controls for approximately \$8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process. Specifically, the CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner. Consequently, there was no assurance the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 1483.
SIGIR	05-005	04/20/2005	Compliance with Contract No. W91150-04-C-0003 Awarded to Aegis Defence Services Limited	01. Determine whether the contractor is complying with the terms of the contract. Specifically, determine whether the contractor is providing adequate services, valid documentation, and proper invoices as required in the contract.	01. We recommend that the Director, Project and Contracting Office - Iraq, ensure that Aegis Defence Services Limited is in compliance with the terms and conditions of Contract No. W91150-04-C-0003. 02. Ensure that all documentation discrepancies are identified and corrected and specifically require that Aegis Defence Services Limited provide documentation showing that all personnel that have been issued weapons are currently qualified to use the weapons and that all Iraqi national personnel are properly screened to ensure that they pose no internal security threat. 03. Reevaluate the contract requirements for hostage rescue incidents, chemical and biological warfare countermeasures, and the establishment of 18 regional operations centers. 04. Modify the contract immediately to reflect any changes to requirements in the contract terms. 05. Modify the contract award amounts immediately for any modifications issued that reduce the contract requirements. 06. Assess the performance of Aegis Defence Services Limited, review the invoices submitted to date, and ensure that payments were not made for contracted services not performed. 07. Establish and maintain an effective contract administration program for the contract.	01. Aegis did not fully comply with all requirements in five areas of the contract. Specifically, Aegis did not provide sufficient documentation to show that all of its employees who were issued weapons were qualified to use those weapons or that its Iraqi employees were properly vetted to ensure they did not pose an internal security threat. 02. Also, Aegis was not fully performing several specific responsibilities required by the contract in the areas of personal security detail qualifications, regional operations centers, and security escorts and movement control. 03. Further, we identified deficiencies in the monitoring of the contract by the Project and Contracting Office (PCO).
SIGIR	05-006	04/30/2005	Control of Cash Provided to South Central Iraq	01. Determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.	01. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group - Central, require these actions of the Development Fund for Iraq Account Manager: Scrutinize, verify, and investigate Statements of Agent Officer's Account maintained to identify statement errors, omissions, inaccuracies, and incompleteness. 02. Ensure that the Statement of Agent Officer's Account documentation is used for recording all transfers of cash between agents and the total amount of money provided to Division Level Agents. 03. Initiate actions to resolve instances of noncompliance. 04. Direct Field Paying Agents to present required documentation to the Division Level Agents every 30 days and clear their cash accounts and direct Division Level Agents to present required documentation to the Development Fund for Iraq Account Manager every 30 days and clear their cash accounts only after all required documentation has been reviewed and verified. 05. Issue and maintain required appointment letters for all paying agents that include pecuniary liability language. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. The DFI Account Manager's office did not maintain full control and accountability for approximately \$119.9 million of DFI cash issued to South-Central Region paying agents in support of RRRP projects. 02. South-Central Region paying agents and the DFI Account Manager cannot properly account for or support \$96.6 million in cash and receipts.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
85	SIGIR	05-007	04/30/2005	Administration of IRRF Contract Files	01. Evaluate whether contracts awarded by the PCO for Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts contain adequately prepared statements of work, clearly negotiated contract terms, and specific contract deliverables.	01. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq, or Director, Project and Contracting Office, respectively, ensure that hardcopy and electronic contract files are properly maintained to attain availability, completeness, consistency, and reliability of the files. 02. Develop and implement transitional operating procedures to ensure the efficient transition of contract files between departing and successor contracting officers. 03. Establish a public email account to enable multiple contracting officers to electronically access contract solicitation information. 04. Ensure that a reliable network server provides access to electronically filed contract documentation, and for transmitting and receiving email communications. 05. Implement the Standard Procurement System for automated contract administration capability. 06. Prepare administrative contract modifications to correct duplicate contract award numbers. 07. Verify and correct all instances of deficiencies detected as a result of the audit, paying specific attention to database errors such as the identification of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and non-Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funded contracts.	01. The 37 contracts and associated contract files reviewed at PCO CA, valued at more than \$184 million, were not being adequately maintained to fully support transactions relating to the performance of contract administration processes. 02. Further, the PCO CA could not produce 21 percent, or 10 of the 48 randomly selected contract files for review.
86	SIGIR	05-008	04/30/2005	Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq	01. Determine whether the PCO complied with the Minister of Finance, Iraqi Interim Government, memorandum, Administration of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)-Funded Contracts, June 15, 2004. Specifically, determine whether the Director, PCO, effectively implemented the assigned responsibilities under the Memorandum to monitor and confirm contract performance, certify and/or make payments, and administer contracts or grants funded with monies from the DFI.	01. We recommend that the Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy Baghdad and Commander, Multi-National Force - Iraq: Define and assign the Project and Contracting Office and Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller roles, responsibilities, and methods to effectively manage and accurately determine the current value of obligations, payments, and unpaid obligations for Development Fund for Iraq contracts. 02. Direct the assessment of comptroller and financial management tasks to determine if existing functions could incorporate or support management responsibilities for the Development Fund for Iraq. At a minimum, establish government or contractor positions to perform accounts payable tasks for Development Fund for Iraq funds to include maintaining a history of individual payments and current contract balances by individual contract. 03. Provide the Project and Contracting Office and the Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller with automated accounting and contracting systems to maintain accounting, disbursing, and contract records for the Development Fund for Iraq. A centralized database or system should be acquired and used to assemble and maintain accurate and reliable historical records. 04. We recommend that The Director, Project and Contracting Office, and the Joint Area Support Group-Central Comptroller develop and coordinate standard procedures, controls, and organizational functions needed to maintain Development Fund for Iraq records, paying particular attention to the necessary controls and adequate documentation needed to effectively monitor and administer contracts funded by the Development Fund for Iraq. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. The PCO did not fully comply with the requirements described in the memorandum from the Iraqi Interim Government Minister of Finance to the Director, PMO, to monitor DFI contract administration. 02. The PCO and the JASG-C Comptroller could not accurately identify the current value of obligations, payments, and unpaid obligations for DFI contracts. However, cash payments appeared to be made in a timely manner. 03. Additionally, the PCO lacked the necessary controls and adequate documentation to effectively perform its responsibilities to monitor and administer contracts funded by the DFI.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
SIGIR	05-009	07/08/2005	Reconciliation of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on Contracts After June 28, 2004 (Memo)	<p>01. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether contracts awarded after June 28, 2004, and identified as funded by the DFI, were actually funded by the DFI or were instead funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF).</p> <p>02. A secondary objective was to report to the fund managers the necessary actions that may be needed to correct the obligation amounts, the current data files, and other actions as appropriate.</p>	None	<p>01. We concluded that the 48 contracts reviewed disclosed no instances of incorrect obligations of DFI funds. In 39 contracts, the obligations of DFI occurred before June 28, 2004. Obligations for the remaining 9 contracts did not cite DFI funds but rather U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress. The obligation documents for the 6 contracts identified as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq cited Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds and the other 3 contracts cited the IRRF as the source of the funding.</p> <p>02. We also concluded that the JCC-1 current contract data files were not accurate and not adequately supported. Our review showed that 48 of the 69 contracts contained data entry errors in documenting the date of the contract award or the source of the funding.</p> <p>03. There were 21 contracts that could not be located.</p>
SIGIR	05-010	07/26/2005	Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office - Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq on the Audit of the Award Fee Process	<p>01. Our over-arching objective is to determine whether award fees are adequately reviewed, properly approved, and awarded according to established standards.</p>	<p>01. The PCO-I and the JCC-I have been proactive in implementing corrective actions.</p> <p>02. Opportunity to leverage award fee pool by applying an alternate methodology (e.g. Cubic scale) to determine award fees. That encourages contractors to demonstrate quality efforts toward accomplishing the tasks and functions cited in the contract to reward performance excellence</p> <p>03. Document appointments in the contract files made for the AFEF Chairperson, the AFEF board members, and performance monitors.</p> <p>04. Comply with the award fee plan to ensure that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- monthly assessments are performed</li> <li>- self-assessments are obtained from the contractors, where required</li> <li>- meetings with the contractors to discuss the monthly evaluations are documented</li> </ul> <p>05. Centralize all award fee documentation.</p>	<p>01. Evaluation criteria was subjective with few metrics being used. Defined metrics would include specified time periods, acceptable error rates, etc.</p> <p>02. The effect of stated evaluation criteria without established definable metrics could result in over-inflated contractor performance evaluations.</p>
SIGIR	05-011	07/26/2005	Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	<p>01. The specific objective of this first audit in this series was to determine whether those information systems and the data contained in those systems used by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and the Project and Contracting Office to monitor Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects were adequately reliable and sufficiently coordinated among those organizations to ensure the accurate, complete, and timely reporting to senior government officials and the Congress on the use of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funds.</p>	<p>01. We recommend that the Director, Project and Contracting Office: a. Complete the integration of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System database with the Project and Contracting Office Oracle Project Accounting interface. b. Finalize and update, on a project-by-project basis, the current and best estimate of costs required to complete each project.</p> <p>02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office require that current and best estimate for cost-to-complete information be provided for inclusion in the Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a>)</p>	<p>01. The Section 2207 Report for April 2005, compiled by the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, did not meet the congressionally mandated requirement to include estimates, on a project-by-project basis, of the costs required to complete each project.</p> <p>02. The accuracy of the \$7.9 billion of Department of Defense obligations reported on the Secretary of the Army Report issued March 27, 2005, could not be verified.</p>
SIGIR	05-012	07/22/2005	Policies and Procedures Used for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Management - Construction Quality Assurance	<p>01. The objective of this audit was to identify the policies, procedures, and internal controls established by U.S. government organizations for monitoring and reviewing Iraq reconstruction projects.</p>	None	<p>01. The Project and Contracting Office and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the two major organizations involved in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund projects, have issued written policies and procedures for establishing and managing construction quality management programs for reconstruction projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
91	SIGIR 05-013	09/09/2005	Controls over Equipment Acquired by Security Contractors	01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether controls over equipment acquired by security contractors were established, implemented, and are effective. Specifically, we proposed to examine selected contracts to determine whether requirements for the acquisition of equipment were valid, adequately supported, properly approved, and the equipment was accounted for and safeguarded. During the course of our audit, we narrowed the scope of the audit to focus on property accountability.	None	01. We determined that the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) had established contract procedures regarding government property in July 2004. 02. Additionally, we determined that the JCC-IA government property administrator reinforced the need for the application of these procedures in letters to contracting chiefs in September 2004.
92	SIGIR 05-014	10/13/2005	Management of Commander's Emergency Response Program For Fiscal Year 2004	01. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate the adequacy of controls over Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Specifically, SIGIR sought to determine whether: 1. Fund allocation procedures were adequate 2. Funds were used for intended purposes 3. Financial records were accurately maintained and supported.	None	01. SIGIR concluded that, while CERP-appropriated funds were properly used for their intended purposes, overall controls over CERP processes required improvement. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Department of Defense (DoD) controls over the distribution of appropriated funds were not consistently followed, and the required tracking documents were not consistently used to ensure accountability of projects.
93	SIGIR 05-015	10/25/2005	Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq	01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) cash assets and expenditures.	01. We recommend that the United States Ambassador to Iraq determine the party responsible for collecting the overpaid grant amounts and direct the responsible individual to take action to seek reimbursement for the overpaid grant amounts. 02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure proper authorization and oversight of the grant approval and administrative processes for all existing and future grants. 03. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan require contracting officers, for all existing and future grants: a. Follow the Department of Defense 3210.6-R, Grants and Agreements, for the award and administration of grants b. Require grant recipients to provide receipts for all expenditures c. Require monthly reports from the grant recipients detailing expenditures and achievements d. Ensure regular site-visits to the grant recipient location e. Require reports at the end of the grant to assess the performance of the grantee and to document the outcome of the grant in relation to the grant goals. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. SIGIR found that South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the CPA, did not effectively manage 74 grants awarded through the Rapid Regional Response Program (R3P) amounting to \$20.8 million. 02. SIGIR could not determine how grant recipients actually used the cash that South-Central Region distributed through the R3P. 03. Based on the documentation examined during the review, SIGIR concluded that the South-Central Region failed to manage its R3P grant program.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
SIGIR	05-016	10/26/2005	Management of the Contracts and Grants Used To Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy	01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.	01. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure that established policies and procedures for authorizing, awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained. 02. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan: a. Ensure that established policies and procedures for awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed. b. Ensure that established policies and procedures for monitoring contract and grant performance are effectively implemented and followed. c. Ensure that purchased equipment is delivered and construction is completed. d. Maintain complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants. 03. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central, ensure that established policies and procedures for disbursing funds obtained through the Development Fund for Iraq for contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed, that funds are disbursed for intended purposes, and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.	01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of CPA, did not comply with applicable guidance and did not properly manage approximately \$7.3 million of R3P funds.
SIGIR	05-017	10/25/2005	Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction	01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether award fees provided to contractors performing IRRF-funded projects are adequately reviewed, properly approved, sufficiently substantiated, and awarded according to established standards.	01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan: Ensure that the appointments of the members of the Award Fee Evaluation Board, specifically the Chairperson of the board, the board members (both voting and non-voting), and the contract performance monitors are documented. 02. Continue to revise award fee plans to more clearly identify the specific award fee evaluation criteria for assessing contractor performance by providing clearer metrics and more quantifiable criteria that permit better performance evaluations. 03. Continue to review and modify the current contracts to utilize a method of applying the award fee to provide additional incentive for contractors to achieve quality results. 04. Ensure that the Award Fee Determination Officer's and the Award Fee Evaluation Board's recommendations and determinations are fully documented as to their rationale.	01. After reviewing the award fee files, SIGIR found that the Award Fee Evaluation Board recommendations and determinations of fees were not documented in sufficient detail to show that the integrity of the award fee determination process had been maintained. Thus, the documentation SIGIR reviewed in contract files was insufficient to substantiate the award fees that were approved.
SIGIR	05-018	10/21/2005	Acquisition of Armored Vehicles Purchased Through Contract W914NS-05-M-1189	01. Determine whether adequate procurement practices were used to acquire armored vehicles. 02. Determine whether the government received appropriate value for the money spent.	01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq: Ensure that requirements are appropriately and accurately defined to procurement officers, including the technical specifications, during the acquisition process. 02. Obtain an independent inspection of the condition of the vehicles to determine whether those vehicles are non-conforming to the contract's terms and specifications. 3. Obtain legal advice to determine what actions are available should the vehicles be found to be non-conforming to the contract's terms and specifications. 04. Locate the missing vehicle and have it inspected for conformance to the contract's terms and specifications.	01. SIGIR concluded that MNSTC-I purchased seven armored Mercedes-Benz vehicles that did not have the required level of armored protection. 02. In addition, MNSTC-I could not locate one of the vehicles after delivery was made. Thus SIGIR concluded that MNSTC-I may have paid \$945,000 for armored vehicles that will not meet the purpose intended and may not be available for use.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
97	SIGIR 05-019	09/30/2005	Attestation Engagement Report Concerning the Award of Non Competitive Contract DACA63-03-D-0005 to Kellogg, Brown and Root Services, Inc.	<p>01. The overall objectives of this attestation engagement were to determine whether adequate documentation existed that: A non-competitive contract was justified; 02. A fair and reasonable price was obtained; 03. The contracting official had the authority to enter into a non-competitive contract; 04. Goods and services received and paid for under the contract were the goods and services provided for in the contract; and 05. The total amount of disbursements under the contract did not exceed the total contract amount.</p>	None	<p>01. The non-competitive award of contract number DACA63-03-D-0005 to Brown, and Root Services, a division of Kellogg, Brown and Root, was properly justified. 02. The contract is a cost-plus award-fee (CPAF) indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. Final determination of fair and reasonable price is not made until the final incurred cost audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. 03. The only individual authorized by United States Code, Title 41, Section 253 to approve non-competitive contracting actions in excess of \$50 million is the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). The Justification and Approval for the contract was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). 04. The goods and services received and paid for with DFI funds under the contract were the goods and services provided for in the contract. 05. The total amount of DFI fund disbursements under the contract did not exceed the total amount obligated for the contract.</p>
98	SIGIR 05-020	10/26/2005	Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micropurchases Used To Rehabilitate the Karbala Library	<p>01. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures.</p>	<p>01. We recommend that the United States Ambassador to Iraq recover specifically the \$154,000 in rescinded grant funds remaining on deposit, any other funds related to the rescinded grant, and funds that exceeded the contracted amount and return the recovered funds to the Iraqi government. 02. We recommend that the Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, ensure that established policies and procedures for authorizing, awarding, and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained. 03. We recommend that the Commanding General Joint Contracting Command- Iraq/Afghanistan: a. Ensure that established policies and procedures for awarding and consolidating contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed. b. Ensure that established policies and procedures for monitoring contract and grant performance are effectively implemented and followed. c. Ensure that repairs were completed, purchased equipment and services were delivered, and work was performed. d. Maintain complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants. 4. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central, ensure that established policies and procedures for disbursing funds obtained through the Development Fund for Iraq for contracts and grants are effectively implemented and followed, that funds are disbursed for intended purposes, and that complete files to support transactions made for contracts and grants are maintained.</p>	<p>01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of the CPA, did not comply with applicable guidance and did not properly manage R3P funds provided through 5 contracts, 1 grant, and 33 micro-purchase contracts used to rehabilitate the Library.</p>



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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
99	SIGIR 05-021	10/24/2005	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs -- Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting	01. The objective of this audit was to determine the adequacy of procedures and processes used to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF funds.	01. We recommend that the Director of the IRMO formalize its cost-to-complete action plan by issuing a formal policy that finalizes consistent procedures across all supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the cost-to-complete information required by Section 2207 of Public Law 108-106.	01. IRMO has made important progress in securing improved reporting on cost-to-complete data and has an action plan in place to provide such data on a continuing basis.
100	SIGIR 05-022	10/24/2005	Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs	01. Did the U.S. organizations responsible for managing the IRRF establish adequate plans and programs for the transition and sustainment of construction and non-construction projects? 02. Did these organizations establish the budgets, funding sources, and detailed transitional guidelines necessary to ensure that adequate training, materials, and supplies are provided to the Iraqi government and its citizens to enable them to perform operations and maintenance on construction and non-construction projects placed under their control?	01. We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, in coordination with the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, direct the new sustainment office to take these actions: Formulate and implement a plan, with clear goals and objectives for the sustainment of IRRF projects. 02. Work with the Director of IRMO and the Senior Sector Leads to determine the capacity of the Iraq government to maintain the IRRF projects. 03. Develop supportable cost estimates for sustaining Iraqi infrastructure for both the near- and long-term and to develop a proposed funding plan that supports these estimates. 04. Review any guidance that the Iraq government's leadership is receiving on sustainment, determine its adequacy, and shore up any shortfalls.	01. SIGIR found that IRMO has made progress in identifying and addressing the challenges of sustaining IRRF projects, which directly affects the larger challenge of sustaining a democratic and viable government in Iraq. 02. There is a growing recognition that the Iraqi government is not yet ready to take over the management and funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects. 03. In addition, U.S. funding for sustainment is limited, and the amounts budgeted by the Iraqi government do not appear to be sufficient to ensure sustainment of completed reconstruction projects. (Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )
101	SIGIR 05-023		Audit of the U. S. Reconstruction Gap in Iraq	01. The overall objective of this audit is to determine: How were the plans and expectations for the IRRF carried out? 02. How effective were the U.S. government agencies in carrying out those plans and meeting the expectations? 03. SIGIR will also attempt to identify any causes that diverted execution of those plans and what the U.S. government did in response.	01. We recommend that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq recover specifically the \$571,823 that was overpaid on 11 contracts; 02. We recommend that the Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/Afghanistan establish adequate and required documentation to record the receipt and disposal of all purchased property; 03. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Area Support Group - Central, require paying agents to obtain proper contract approval documentation prior to making disbursements.	01. South-Central Region personnel, under the direction of Coalition Provisional Authority, did not effectively manage 907 contracts and 1212 micro-purchase contracts awarded through the Rapid Regional Response Program in the amount of \$88.1million; 02. 4 projects, using 20 contracts (2.2%) and several contract modifications, totaling approximately \$9.1 million, appeared to have had the requirements split to keep the contract awards under the \$500,000 approval threshold to circumvent the required reviews; 03. 158 contracts (17.4%), totaling approximately \$16.3 million, were either not competitively awarded or lacked documentation that showed a competitive process had taken place and 26 contract files (3%), totaling approximately \$2.6 million, did not contain a signed contract; 04. 11 contracts (1.2%), totaling more than \$5.6 million, were issued without proper authorization and 38 contracts (4.2%), totaling approximately \$7 million, were awarded after the transfer of responsibility for the Development Fund for Iraq to the Iraqi government on June 28, 2004.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
102	SIGIR-05-024	01/23/2006	Management of the Mansuriya Electrical Reconstruction Project	<p>01. To evaluate the effectiveness of project management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative contracting officers.</p> <p>02. To assess the management control over the project by USAID and the IRMO.</p>		<p>01. The Mansuriya Project resulted from the February 2004 task order, issued by the CPA-PMO, in response to a request by the Iraq Ministry of Electricity. The task order directed USAID to proceed with development and construction of electrical generation facilities in the area of Baghdad, Iraq. The approved estimated direct cost of the resulting Mansuriya Project job order was \$381.3 million. The project was subsequently cancelled with the final job order direct costs currently estimated to be \$62.7 million as of December 22, 2005.</p>
103	SIGIR-05-025	01/23/2006	Management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2005	<p>01. Implemented controls to effectively manage FY 2005 CERP projects, funds, and records</p> <p>02. Effectively coordinated CERP projects where appropriate, with DoS and USAID to optimize available resources for the sustainment of projects and the reconstruction of Iraq.</p>	<p>01. Conduct a thorough examination of all FY 2005 CERP funds and projects to account for project status reporting errors. In addition, if it is determined that funds were inappropriately obligated against the FY 2005 appropriation, MNF-I should initiate a de-obligation from FY2005 funds and re-obligate projects with the appropriate funds.</p> <p>02. Conduct a quarterly review of the CERP to ensure the data contained within its project tracking tool is valid and is as consistent as possible with the data for project obligations in Army financial systems.</p> <p>03. Clarify and enforce existing guidance on the collection of required project records. MNF-I should conduct quarterly review of project records to improve the management of project files. MNF-I should also consider developing a plan to provide training for all current and future MNF-I units on project documentation requirements and how to maintain and store these records.</p> <p>04. Formalize the process of coordinating CERP projects with the DoS and the USAID where the CERP is used in conjunction with other reconstruction programs, particularly those projects that are of strategic importance.</p> <p>05. Coordinate plans and funding for the sustainment of large CERP construction projects; and projects that have strategic value with the DoS.</p>	<p>01. MNF-I utilized several processes to improve the management of the CERP in FY 2005. Specifically, MNF-I, a. Implemented three processes within its chain of command to effectively align CERP projects with the strategic objectives of its Campaign Plan b. Required all subordinate units to report the status of projects and funds twice a month to MNC-I, and for MNC-I to consolidate these reports and provide them to MNF-I c. Centralized the collection and management of project records at MNC-I, and required the MSCs to turn in their records for completed projects at the end of each month</p> <p>02. MNF-I's actions to effectively coordinate CERP projects with DoS and USAID varied in FY 2005. The primary methods of coordinating the CERP with DoS and USAID took place in the weekly Coordinated Embassy Reconstruction Team meeting in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.</p>
104	SIGIR-05-026	01/27/2006	Fact Sheet on the Use of the \$50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	<p>01. To determine whether the \$50 million appropriated by Congress was used appropriately and in an efficient and effective manner.</p>		<p>01. \$50 million was initially apportioned by the OMB to DoD as Operating Expenses of the Coalition Provisional Authority</p> <p>02. The Department of the Army obligated \$26.2 million in FY 04 under the sub-account Reporting and made disbursements of \$9.2 million in FY 2004 and \$9.7 million in FY 2005, with the remaining \$7.3 million remaining obligated for additional disbursements under the Reporting sub-account requirement.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a>)</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
SIGIR	SIGIR-05-027	01/27/2006	Methodologies For Reporting Cost-To-Complete Estimates	01. To determine the adequacy of methodologies used to estimate and report the costs to complete for projects funded with IRRF.	01. Director, IRMO, required to take the following actions: a. Formalize its cost-to-complete action plan by issuing a formal policy to finalize consistent procedures across all supporting IRRF organizations for the collection and compilation of the costs-to-complete information. B. In the next DoS Section 2207 Report, provide data to Congress on the adequacy of cost-to-complete methodologies in the other sectors. 02. Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, require the GRD-PCO sector management to: a. Finalize the draft of official written guidance covering the methodology, including roles and responsibilities, for generating cost-to-complete report. B. Ensure that the decision not to use computer modeling in the calculation of cost-to-complete is updated and reflected in all current and future guidance C. Develop a thorough review process to eliminate errors in the reporting spreadsheet. The review process should be written into the guidance. D. Create and maintain a permanent central file to document the calculation of estimates-at-completion (EAC) by project. The requirement to create and maintain the central file should be written into the guidance. E. Develop policies to define significant scope changes. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the SIGIR website: <a href="http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx">http://www.sigir.mil/audits/Default.aspx</a> )	01. For the DoD, GRD-PCO and MNSTC-I, as well as the USAID failed to estimate and report reliable and transparent cost-to-complete information for IRRF projects - F&T sector. MNSTC-I did not submit a report for the September 30, 2005, PAR, and GRD-PCO and USAID submitted reports with errors that were significant enough to undermine users' confidence in the reporting.
SIGIR	SIGIR-05-028	01/24/2006	GRD-PCO Management Of The Transfer Of IRRF-Funded Assets To The Iraqi Government	01. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organization responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the of dollars worth of assets purchased, renovated and constructed with IRRF funds to the Government of Iraq and its citizens.	01. We recommend that the Commanding General, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers direct the GRD-PCO, in coordination with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, to complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Government of Iraq.	01. Effective asset recognition and transfer requires that assets be properly accepted by the U.S. government, accounted for, and then formally transferred to the Government of Iraq. PCO-GRD officials told us they are in the process of developing, in coordination with the IRMO and others, a common process and policy facilitating the transfer of assets to the Government of Iraq and estimate that these policies and plans will be completed by March 31, 2006, contingent upon the Government of Iraq's participation and concurrence.
SIGIR	SIGIR-05-029	01/26/2006	Challenges Faced In Carrying Out Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund Activities	01. Determine the effectiveness of U.S. agencies in carrying out plans for Iraq reconstruction activities 02. Identify the reasons, if any, for changes in plans.	None	01. Challenges in Implementing the IRRF Program: 1) Security costs have been higher than anticipated. 2) Strategy changes have had a large impact on Iraq plans, 3) The need for large-scale sustainment activities was not foreseen, 4) Some IRRF administrative expenses were not considered in initial plans, 5) Initial plans were imprecise. 02. Measures for Determining Project Impact: 1) Significant funding change means that many of the originally planned projects will not be completed. 2) Lack of detailed and accurate baseline data on the actual status of the sectors prior to the start of reconstruction activity.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
108	SIGIR-06-002	02/03/2006	Prompt Payment Act: Analysis Of Expenditures Made From The Iraq Relief And Reconstruction Fund	01. The objective of this audit was to determine whether expenditures by U.S. government organizations responsible for the management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund were made in compliance with the Prompt Payment Act and other applicable policies and regulations.	01. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) identify and monitor interest penalty payments from Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to ensure that Army organizations managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund funds consistently meet established Army goals.	01. During fiscal year 2005, approximately \$1.4 million in interest penalty payments were made by the Army against IRRF disbursements of about \$5.275 billion made by DoD organizations because of late payment of contractor invoices 02. Army managers did not place sufficient emphasis on the identification and resolution of problems associated with high interest penalty payments; particularly the late receipt of required supporting documentation for the payment of invoices provided by the PCO-GRD, a subordinate command of the USACE, or certain vendors 03. Interest penalties paid to contractors from the IRRF appropriation reduced, dollar-for-dollar, the availability of funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq and for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
109	Treasury OIG	03/23/2006	Review of Treasury Activities for Iraq Reconstruction	01. Identify Treasury activities and funding involving Iraq relief and reconstruction. 02. Determine the completeness and accuracy of the information provided by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in its reports to SIGIR regarding its activities for Iraq reconstruction.	01. Treasury provides technical assistance and support to modernize the Iraq banking system. 02. The financial information provided by Treasury to SIGIR fairly presented the fund-use status of the reconstruction activities: Treasury obligated \$32.9 million out of \$35.1 million apportioned to the reconstruction programs, and disbursed \$26.3 million as of February 28, 2006.	01. Treasury provides technical assistance and support to modernize the Iraq banking system. 02. The financial information provided by Treasury to SIGIR fairly presented the fund-use status of the reconstruction activities: Treasury obligated \$32.9 million out of \$35.1 million apportioned to the reconstruction programs, and disbursed \$26.3 million as of February 28, 2006.
110	USAAA A-2004-0305-FFG	05/18/2004	Time Sensitive Report, Audit of Vested and Seized Assets, Operation Iraqi Freedom	01. Audit concerning accountability over non-cash assets. Specifically: Were adequate procedures and controls in place and operating to properly secure and account for vested and seized assets in a manner consistent with appropriated fund accounting. 02. Did adequate audit trails exist to support on hand balance of vested and seized asset account.	None	01. Serious problems exist with accountability and security of non-cash seized assets: CPA did not maintain adequate controls to ensure accountability. 02. DoD guidance regarding accountability of seized assets not followed.
111	USAAA ANVL A-2004-0438-	08/12/2004	Definitization of Task Orders for LOGCAP	01. Evaluate overall management of contracts under LOGCAP. Specifically, evaluate timeliness of definitization of task orders under LOGCAP.	01. Take actions, as appropriate, to pressure the contractor to meet the contract target dates for the submission of cost proposals and for the definitization of task orders. For example: - Consider the possibility of withholding payments to the contractor until the contractor submits qualifying cost proposals to the Definitization Office. - Reiterate the need to the contractor to hire more personnel to prepare and submit the qualifying cost proposals on time.	01. Concluded definitization of TOs for Contract Number DAAA09-02-D-0007 was not timely. 02. Establishment of the definitization office greatly improved the controls. 03. However, the process of the contractor submitting the cost proposals needed to be improved.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS	
112	USAAA	A-2005-0043-ALE	11/24/2004	LOGCAP Kuwait	<p>01. To evaluate the overall management of the LOGCAP contract.</p> <p>02. To evaluate the procedures in place to control costs under LOGCAP contracts.</p> <p>03. To evaluate the management of assets used in conjunction with LOGCAP contracts—assets contractors acquired and assets the government provided to contractors.</p>	<p>01. Have the program management office issue instructions for performance-based statements of work to the LOGCAP Support Unit in Southwest Asia. Make sure the instructions include specific guidance for preparing performance requirement summaries and performance assessment plans. Also, determine how Defense Contract Management Agency is developing its performance assessment plans to make sure customer requirements are satisfied.</p> <p>02. Direct the Program Management Office and the procuring contracting officer to reinforce the reporting requirements on each subsequent statement of work and to review and use the reports as intended.</p> <p>03. Delegate administrative contract authority to Defense Contract Management Agency with the contractor's notice to proceed, as appropriate at the time of the task order award.</p> <p>04. Develop goals and objectives as well as standing operating procedures that identify roles and responsibilities and provide meaningful instructions for contingency operations. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the USAAA website: <a href="http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaweb/">http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaaweb/</a>)</p>	<p>01. The contract for LOGCAP needed better management.</p> <p>02. Controls over contract costs needed improvement during task order planning. Costs could have been reduced by at least \$40M.</p> <p>03. The Army didn't fully account for more than \$77 million worth of government-furnished property used in conjunction with the contract.</p>
113	USAAA	A-2005-0078-FFG	03/02/2005	Coalition Provisional Authority Travel Procedures	<p>01. Were appropriate management controls over the travel process from order generation to voucher settlement in place and operating.</p> <p>02. Were fund control procedures adequate to ensure obligations were complete and accurate, and disbursements were made in a timely manner to clear unliquidated obligations.</p> <p>03. Did the plan to transition the travel functions of the CPA Representative to other agencies on June 30, 2004 provide sufficient detail and coverage to minimize any disruption in support to CPA personnel and to close out open actions.</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>01. Management controls not always in place/operating.</p> <p>02. Identified 3 control weaknesses related to travel voucher processing.</p> <p>03. Fund control procedures not adequate to ensure complete and accurate accounting records for obligations and disbursements. Accounting records were incomplete / contained errors.</p> <p>04. Transition plan was prepared and in sufficient detail.</p>
114	USAAA	A-2005-0095-FFG	02/16/2005	Vested & Seized Assets, Operation Iraqi Freedom	<p>01. Were adequate procedures and controls in place and operating to properly secure and account for vested and seized assets.</p> <p>02. Did adequate audit trails exist to support the onhand balance of the vested and seized asset accounts.</p>	<p>01. Incorporate the 31 July 2003 memorandum on procedures for vested and seized assets as a permanent part of the DOD Financial Management Regulation to ensure guidance will be available for future contingency operations.</p> <p>02. Develop a standing operating procedure for filing documents in theater that lists all required documents that must be retained to support disbursement transactions.</p> <p>03. Establish controls and procedures to maintain a suitable area for retaining all required supporting documentation for disbursement transactions.</p> <p>04. Make sure that all disbursement vouchers for transactions using vested and seized assets are scanned and sent to Defense Finance and Accounting Service—Rome on a daily basis.</p>	<p>01. USA did properly secure and account for seized cash and metal bars.</p> <p>02. CPA did not maintain adequate controls over non-cash belongings.</p> <p>03. Adequate audit trails did not exist.</p>

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
115	USAAA A-2005-0173-ALE	05/02/2005	Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund	01. Were funds for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund received, accounted for, and reported in accordance with applicable laws and regulations? 02. Were disbursements consistent with the intent of the charter or implementing guidance?	01. We recommended that MNSTC-I: issue command policy designating authorized approving officials for purchase requests and commitments. 02. Deobligate funding for an armor vehicle panel project, valued at \$59,000, funded through the Quick Response Fund. 03. Coordinate with the 336th Finance Brigade to reconcile disbursements monthly. 04. Establish an internal auditor position within the command group reporting directly to the commanding general. 05. Update the standing operating procedures to require the maintenance of all supporting documentation (such as purchase requests, contracts, receiving reports, and vouchers) in program project files.	01. Yes. Overall, MNSTC-I's J8 Comptroller administered funds according to applicable guidance in the form of fragmentary orders, standing operating procedures, laws, and regulations. 02. Yes. Overall, disbursements were processed consistent with funding guidance.
116	USAAA A-2005-0194-ALA	05/26/2005	Project Management Support of Iraq Reconstruction PCO	01. The overall objective is to determine if the Army and the PCO have put controls in place to mitigate business processes in place to mitigate previously identified high-risk areas.	01. We recommended the Director, Project and Contracting Office: Make sure all DoD-managed contracts awarded with FY 04 RRF are loaded into the Standard Procurement System and tie to the Corps' system. 02. Receive and distribute all FY 04 IRRF DOD funding. 03. Develop metrics for measuring program status by projects and sectors. 04. Monitor deinitiation schedule slippages and coordinate with sector program managers to identify available remedies. 05. Obtain a legal review of the linear responsibilities matrix to make sure contractor tasks aren't inherently governmental functions. 06. Obtain a legal review of the corporate affiliations of the seven support contractors and design-build contractors to determine if a conflict of interest exists. 07. Modify the award fee plans to clarify the evaluation criteria, eliminate the rollover provision, add metrics, and eliminate "good faith effort".	01. We found that the Army and the PCO have put many controls in place to mitigate previously identified high-risk areas. However, additional actions are needed to strengthen controls. 02. Although the PCO established controls for monitoring and measuring obligations, additional controls were needed to account for all DoD obligations, and to measure the progress of the FY 04 IRRF program. 03. The PCO established controls to help deinitiate contracts in a timely manner, but those controls weren't fully effective. 04. The PCO's controls for using program management support contractors were generally effective, but additional controls were needed to reduce the risk associated with (i) contractors performing inherently governmental functions, (ii) real or perceived conflicts of interests with contractors overseeing contractors, and (iii) award fee plans.
117	USAAA A-2005-0332-ALE	09/30/2005	Follow-up of Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) and Quick Response Fund (QRF)	01. Were funds for the Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund received, accounted for, and reported in accordance with applicable laws and regulations? 02. Were projects managed, completed, and funds disbursed consistent with the charter or implementing guidance? 03. Did Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement the recommendations from the prior report and did the corrective actions fix the problem? 04. Did Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement an effective follow-up system for tracking the implementation of corrective actions until full completion?	01. We recommended that MNSTC-I: Require J-7 Engineers to review all Quick Response Fund construction projects or the reasonableness of costs before the J-8 Comptroller approves the projects. 02. Reduce three purchase requests by about \$537,000. 03. Establish proponents for management oversight over projects for both programs, review projects each month, and adjust the projects as needed. 04. Review the validity of all open projects for both programs and cancel those found to be invalid. 05. Reconcile the Developmental Fund for Iraq and the Iraq Army Funds (Seized Assets). Report discrepancies to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.	01. The Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) received, accounted for, and reported funds according to applicable laws, regulations, and guidance. Commanders' Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund projects met the intent of program guidance. 02. Command personnel demonstrated adequate oversight over administrative processes and processed cash disbursements properly for both programs. 03. However, MNSTC-I needed to ensure that its personnel reviewed Quick Response Fund projects for reasonableness and tracked the status of military interdepartmental purchase requests.

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AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
USAAA	A-2006-0046-ALLA	01/31/2006	Audit of Fund Accountability for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund-2 (IRRF2)	<p>01. Did the PCO's financial management system and processes have the controls needed to make sure commitments, obligations, and disbursements were accurately recorded?</p> <p>02. Did the PCO have adequate controls in place to make sure operating costs were properly recorded?</p>	<p>01. Determine the status of funds distributed to other Federal activities and establish written procedures for maintaining visibility of these funds.</p> <p>02. Review Accounts Payable reports and follow up on outstanding invoices and receiving reports.</p> <p>03. Require the Finance Director to conduct triannual reviews in accordance with the Financial Management Regulation, and provide a signed confirmation statement.</p> <p>04. Maintain documentation that fully supports operating budget line item estimates.</p> <p>05. Improve and formalize the process of recording operating costs.</p> <p>06. Reconcile the payroll expenses charged to the operating budget.</p> <p>07. Perform monthly fund status reviews of each operating cost's budget line item and reallocate any excess funds. Reallocate the \$12.4 million in unused civilian payroll budget to the unfinanced security requirement.</p>	<p>01. The PCO's financial management system and processes were generally effective for ensuring the accurate recording of commitments, obligations, and disbursements. However, control weaknesses existed related to handling Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) and nonconstruction contract payments, and performing fund status reviews.</p> <p>02. While we found that the PCO generally had adequate controls to ensure operating costs were properly recorded, we did identify some areas needing improvement.</p>
USAAA	A-2006-0047-ALL	01/11/2006	Base Closure Process in the Iraq Area of Operations	<p>01. Our audit objective for this audit report was to determine if the Corps had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure that appropriate documentation is prepared and funding requirements are evaluated when closing forward operating bases within the Iraq area of operations.</p>	<p>01. Consider establishing a full-time team staffed with representatives from the appropriate Corps staff sections whose sole purpose is to monitor base closings and resolve day-to-day issues.</p>	<p>01. During our audit, the Corps was implementing its base closing policies and procedures. The recent closings were mainly small bases that didn't require extensive planning or funding to close. The Corps recognized that upcoming base closings would involve significantly larger bases and would require greater planning and contractor assistance. As a result, the Corps was refining already established procedures to ensure efficient closings in the future.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the USAAA website: <a href="http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaavweb/">http://www.hqda.army.mil/aaavweb/</a>)</p>
USAAA	A-2006-0081-ALL	03/17/2006	Unliquidated Obligations, Audit of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom	<p>01. The objective addressed in this report was to review obligations recorded under task order 59 of the current LOGCAP contract to determine whether any obligated funds could be deobligated and made available for other uses.</p>	<p>01. For the Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq; for the Commander, Multi-National Corps Iraq; and for the Commander, U.S. Army Field Support Command: Obtain the list of all costs approved, but not yet incurred by the contractor (These costs are listed in the Estimate to Complete column of the contractor's cost report.) Conduct a coordinated review of these requirements to ensure the requirements are still valid.</p> <p>02. For the Commander, U.S. Army Field Support Command: Request the Defense Contract Audit Agency to evaluate the policies, procedures, and accuracy of the contractor's biweekly cost report.</p>	<p>01. Based on the process used to obligate funds to fund work ordered under task order 59, we identified no funds that were available for deobligation and available for other uses. Specifically command obligated funds for this task order incrementally on an as needed basis. As a result, the amount of funds obligated closely approximated the funds expended to date for work performed under the task order. Based on our review of available information, it appears about \$644 million will need to be obligated to complete work under this task order a significant amount of which was unknown to the Army until the contractor submitted its most recent cost report. We believe the Army needs better visibility over the contractor's current and planned expenditures. We plan to address this issue in a separate report on program management.</p>

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
121	USAAA A-2006-0090-ALE	03/31/2006	Follow-up Audit II of the Commander's Emergency Response Program and Quick Response Fund	01. To determine whether projects managed, completed, and funds disbursed were consistent with the charter or implementing guidance. 02. To determine whether the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq implement: (1) The recommendations from the prior report and did the corrective actions fix the problem; (2) An effective follow-up system for tracking the implementation of corrective actions until full completion.	01. Direct the J-8 Comptroller to review the monthly procurement logs and contact the field contracting officers when the required information isn't provided for assigned projects. Command should decommit and deobligate project funding if requirements are no longer required. 02. Request a workload study for the J-8 Comptroller's Office and field contracting officers to determine if the organization is adequately staffed to perform mission.	01. MNSTC-I, through its J-8 Comptroller managed, completed, and disbursed funding for CERP and QRF projects. Commands actions were consistent with the charter and implementing guidance for meeting the humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements of the Iraqi people and for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. 02. MNSTC-I implemented the recommendations, and the corrective actions it took fixed the conditions identified in the prior report.
122	USAID-OIG A-000-04-003-P	05/19/2004	Capping Report on Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Phase I Contracts	01. Did USAID comply with federal regulations in awarding the Iraq contracts. 02. What improvements can be made to the process.	01. We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Management instruct the Office of Procurement to develop a standardized illustrative budget, including standardized line item definitions, to be used in its requests for proposals and to require the use of this standardized format in the cost proposals submitted to USAID by its offerors. 02. We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Management instruct the Office of Procurement to: (a) develop and implement a standard checklist of significant documentation and procurement steps for contracts awarded using other than full and open competition, and (b) develop a policy to maintain and update the checklist on a recurring basis.	01. Inadequate documentation of market research relating to available/qualified contractors. 02. Failure to obtain and document legal analysis regarding possible conflict of interest with contractors. 03. Failure to notify and debrief non-award bidders. 04. Failure to document mitigation of unfair competitive advantage.
123	USAID-OIG A-000-04-004-P	09/23/2004	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding the Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract.	None	01. For the areas reviewed, we determined that USAID complied with applicable federal regulations in awarding the Iraq Basic Education Phase II Contract.
124	USAID-OIG A-267-05-005-P	01/06/2005	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Fed. Regulations in Awarding the Contract to Kroll Security Services Inc.	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding the contract for security service in Iraq.	01. We recommend that USAID's Chief Acquisition Officer issue a notice reminding all Bureau of Management, Office of Acquisition and Assistance personnel that adequate and complete documentation must be prepared and retained in all procurements when using less than full and open competition. This documentation should adequately explain the contractor selection and why multiple contractors could not or were not considered for the procurement. 02. We recommend that USAID's Chief Acquisition Officer issue a notice to all Bureau of Management, Office of Acquisition and Assistance personnel reminding them that procurements for USAID activities are subject to all federal procurement requirements. Specifically, the reminder should cover the proper preparation of letter contracts in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation along with examples of fully compliant letter contracts prepared in the past by USAID. (Due to space constraints, some recommendations have been left out. To view the complete set of recommendations, please access the official document found on the USAID website: <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/">http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/</a> )	01. USAID did not adequately document use of less than full/open competition. 02. Obtained security services using letter contract that did not meet FAR requirements. 03. Incurred multiple potential funds control violations. 04. Purchased armored vehicles that did not meet USG armoring standards.
125	USAID-OIG E-266-04-001-P	03/19/2004	Audit of USAID's Results Data for Its Education Activities in Iraq	01. Has USAID accurately reported data and results for its education activities in Iraq.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop procedures to verify data included in reports prior to the issuance of the reports to ensure the data reported is accurate.	01. The data was reported inaccurately (education activities).



ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-002-P	06/03/2004	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Infrastructure Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program	01. Are USAID/Iraq's infrastructure and rehabilitation activities performed by Bechtel on schedule to achieve planned outputs.	01. Establish procedures ensuring that Bechtel National, Inc. submit an environmental review, and where applicable, an environmental assessment, with each request for the issuance of a job order, or that USAID/Iraq obtain a formal written determination exempting the program activities from USAID's environmental procedures, and obtain an acceptable environmental review for the existing job orders for which one is required. 02. Develop and document procedures to ensure that a job order specific plan is submitted and approved, for each job order requiring one, prior to the commencement of construction, and obtain an acceptable job order specific plan for the eight job orders for which a job order specific plan was not prepared. 03. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop documented procedures which address the handling of charges in excess of the job order approved amount. 04. We recommend that USAID/Iraq complete and implement job order closeout procedures to close out job orders in a timely manner.	01. Mission's management controls related to infrastructure rehabilitation projects need improvements. 02. Inadequate environmental reviews prior to start of construction. 03. Job order specific plans (JOSPs) not submitted as required. 04. Completed job orders not closed.
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-003-P	08/06/2004	Audit of USAID's Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding Phase II Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contracts	01. Did USAID comply with FAR in awarding Iraq Phase II Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contracts.	None	01. For the areas reviewed, we determined that USAID complied with applicable federal regulations in awarding the Iraq Phase II Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Program Advisors and Oversight Contract.
USAID-OIG	E-266-04-004-P	09/20/2004	Audit of USAID's Iraq's Economic Reform Program	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Economic reform program achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq implement USAID's documentation management procedures requiring decisions impacting on the design and status of activities to be officially documented in the activity file. 02. We recommend that, for future contracting actions under the Economic Reform Program, USAID/Iraq develop procedures to ensure that contractors furnish monthly financial reports that present a breakdown of the actual level of effort billed for the month by activity.	01. Mission needs to improve record keeping procedures for documenting actions, decisions, status. 02. Mission needs to revise contractor reporting requirements.
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-001-P	01/31/2005	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Action Program	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Community Action Program achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop and implement a plan of action to improve the integrity of the data in the Community Action Programs Project List in order for it to be a more effective monitoring tool and a more accurate and reliable data source for reporting purposes.	01. CAP achieved intended outputs, but internal controls need to be strengthened to improve CAP monitoring and reporting processes.
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-002-P	02/28/2005	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Health System Strengthening Contract Activities	01. Did USAID/Iraq's Health System Strengthening Contract achieve intended outputs.	01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq develop written procedures covering the review and approval of contractor and Cognizant Technical Officer requests for modifications to future health sector contracts to ensure timely and efficacious disposition of these requests.	01. Activities under this contract did not achieve intended objectives. 02. Contractor did not effectively manage program to ensure activities were completed as scheduled and deliverables effectively produced. 03. Reduction in contractor's cost-ceiling prompted contractor to curtail/cancel activities. 04. Mission needs to improve process for reviewing/approving requests for contract modifications.

ALL COMPLETED AUDITS BY ALL AGENCIES

AGENCY	REPORT NUMBER	DATE	REPORT TITLE	OBJECTIVES	RECOMMENDATIONS	FINDINGS
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-003-P	06/29/2005	Iraq's Electrical Generation Activities	<p>01. Are USAID/Iraq's electrical power sector projects achieving their planned outputs.</p> <p>02. Is USAID/Iraq addressing institutional capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's electrical power sector infrastructure.</p>	<p>01. The OIG recommended that USAID develop a multi-year strategy of activities to strengthen the ME's institutional capacity to operate and maintain this infrastructure</p>	<p>01. USAID's electrical power sector projects were not always achieving their intended outputs.</p> <p>02. Of the 22 projects reviewed, 7 (3%) had not or were not achieving their intended outputs for reasons beyond USAID's control.</p> <p>03. Two of the seven projects were impacted by the U.S. government's earlier efforts to reprogram government-wide infrastructure funding from the electrical sector to security and other priority areas, resulting in the cancellation of the two projects.</p> <p>(Due to space constraints, some findings have been left out. To view the complete set of findings, please access the official document found on the USAID website: <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/">http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/</a>)</p>
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-004-P	06/30/2005	Iraq's Water/Sanitation Activities	<p>01. Are USAID/Iraq's water and sanitation rehabilitation projects achieving their planned outputs.</p> <p>02. Is USAID/Iraq addressing institutional capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's water and sanitation sector infrastructure.</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>01. The audit found that the water and sanitation rehabilitation projects were achieving intended outputs with some exceptions.</p> <p>02. Of the 34 projects reviewed, 30 projects (88%) achieved or were achieving their intended outputs while 4 projects (12%) were not because of security conditions, access to project site problems, and lack of local government cooperation which were beyond the control of the USAID and its implementing partners.</p> <p>03. The USAID addressed the issue of capacity-building in its projects to rebuild and rehabilitate Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure through the provision of training and operation manuals.</p>
USAID-OIG	E-267-05-005-P	09/27/2005	USAID/Iraq's Cash Control Procedures	<p>01. Did USAID/Iraq manage its cashing operations in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures?</p> <p>02. Did USAID/Iraq properly calculate and disburse cash payroll payments to its foreign service national work force in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures?</p>	<p>01. We recommend that USAID/Iraq finalize and implement its draft policy requiring regional offices to accept, in writing, petty cash funds delivered to them by the Mission's cashier's office.</p>	<p>01. With one exception, USAID/Iraq managed its cashing operations in accordance with established regulations, policies, and procedures.</p> <p>02. USAID/Iraq properly calculated and disbursed cash payroll payments to its foreign service national (FSN) workforce for the period of January 1 to May 31, 2005.</p>
USAID-OIG	E-267-06-002-P	02/16/2006	Audit of USAID/Iraq's Non-Expendable Property	<p>01. To determine if USAID/Iraq managed its non-expendable property in accordance with Agency guidelines.</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>01. USAID/Iraq property valued at \$23.5 million in its nonexpendable property database was not managed in accordance with USAID guidance</p> <p>02. The audit could not verify that a projected \$21.3 million was correctly valued in the database, nor the existence of a projected \$2.9 million in nonexpendable property included in the database</p> <p>03. Mission vehicles valued at \$2.3 million were not properly safeguarded</p>