

## **Reference 26. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Joint Japan-U.S. Technical Research on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**

(December 25, 1998)

1. Today, on the approval by the Security Council, the government of Japan decided to launch on joint technical research with the United States of America on the Navy's Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) System starting on FY1999.
2. Given the trend of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles after the end of the cold war, the government considers that the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a crucial one for Japan's defense policies that rely on exclusively defense-oriented defense policy and that Japan should actively lead the issue of BMD. Thus, we have been making necessary studies discussions on the issue.
3. The government of Japan considers that launching joint Japan-U.S. technical research on NTWD is the most effective as well as most productive measures the government should take in the future and that such cooperation between Japan and the U.S. will contribute to the improvement of reliability of Japan-U.S. security arrangements.
4. While there is no doubt that the official interpretation of the Diet resolutions should be carried out by the Diet itself, the government of Japan takes position on the relevance of this matter with the Diet resolution on development and use of the outer space as follow. Considering the recent situation where ballistic missiles are on the trend of proliferation, and the fact that BMD system is a inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan, the government of Japan determines that active involvement of Japan in the BMD system agrees with the purport of the Diet resolution concerned and the basic policy of Japan as the peaceful nation, which the purport of the resolution relies on. Thereby the government also determines that the people will understand and support our decision.

It should be noted that the Diet resolution of September this year by the lower house regarding the ballistic missile launch by North Korea states: "The government will take every measure to ensure the safety of the people of the nation."

It should also be noted that technical transfer of weapons related to BMD will be carried out within the framework of the agreements on the technical transfer of the weapons to the U.S.

5. This resolution refers only to the technical research and not to the transition of the government action to the stages of development and/or deployment of such weapons, which should be determined separately. Such determination will be made upon thorough review of technical feasibility of the BMD and the visions of the Japan's defense policies in the future.

## **Reference 27. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.**

(Adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

### **(Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)**

1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001 to FY2005) (hereinafter "MTDP"), which was

adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that "necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility. As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and comprehensive operation of the existing Aegis system-equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is the inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with the Japan's exclusively defense-oriented defense policy. Consequently, the government of Japan determines to equip the nation with the same system.

### **(Review of Japan's Defense Capabilities)**

2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as various incidents that is likely to have negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter "the new threats, etc.") has been urgently needed for the international community. In order for peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

To this end, we will make effectual measures against the new threats, etc. according to the specific features of each of them while maintaining close cooperation with concerned agencies and local communities, further developing cooperative relationship with the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and other nations and international organizations concerned. At the same time, the government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to prepare for proactive and affirmative actions that are to be taken to protect peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belong. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large-scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue for the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multi-purpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical capabilities and intelligence capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipments and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

- (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Minister of State for Defense necessary for the operation of the Self Defense Forces that centers on the joint operation, will be formed.
- (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may taken in the events of new threats, etc.

- (3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take action that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.
- (4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.
  - a. Regarding the Ground Self Defense Forces, a defense build-up concept focused on the anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can be promptly respond to the new threats, etc. will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
  - b. Regarding the Maritime Self Defense Forces, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircrafts and other equipments will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
  - c. Regarding the Air Self Defense Forces, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircrafts and other equipments will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

### **(Defense-related Expenditures)**

- 3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipments of the Self Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, makes efforts to reduce the defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new mid-term defense program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

### **(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)**

- 4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new mid-term defense program, the government of Japan will formulate new defense program guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines from FY1996 (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for the Japan's defense forces, including the position of the Japan's Self Defense Forces in the activities to maintain peace and stability of the international community.

## **Reference 28. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures"**

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" at the Security Council and the Cabinet Council today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan's defense force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy, decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the U.S. as well as with the Japan's original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of these systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the U.S. on the primary deployment.
4. BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted under Defense Operations Order in Armed Attack Situation. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missile and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.
7. The Japan-U.S. Joint Technological Research Project currently undergoing is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptor. It remains important to carry on the Research Project in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

**Reference 29. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary  
"Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic  
Missile Defense"(Provisional Translation)**

(24 December, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today's Security Council and Cabinet Meeting, decided to initiate Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and implemented Japan-U.S. joint technical research since 1999 with the understanding that BMD system is the only and purely defensive measures, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research does not aim at the BMD system which Japan started to introduce since FY2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan's national defense.
3. "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-2009)" states" the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures". Based on the result of Japan-U.S. cooperative research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal pressures, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced SM-3 missile efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the cooperative development.
4. Regarding the relation with Three Principles on Arms Export, "Statement by The Chief Cabinet Secretary" for National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005-(approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states "if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan". We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the US for the Japan-U.S. cooperative development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase the international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting the cooperation in the areas of policy, operation and equipment / technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

## Reference 30. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister: (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of force (only if the case fulfills 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense)</li> <li>○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)</li> <li>○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)</li> </ul>
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1) (3) Additional requirements approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order [Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law]	When a defense operation order is expected under a tensed situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Prime Minister or official delegated authority by the Prime Minister; services— Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies—not required; services—required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law</li> <li>○ Provision of services as an action measure</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation etc. Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (see Note 2) (evacuation, crime prevention and control, entry, use of weapons) (all only when police officers are not present)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation from nearby people and ships)</li> </ul>
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons for guarding operations and suppression of disturbances</li> <li>○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard</li> </ul>
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons for guard operations and suppression of disturbances</li> </ul>
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of State for Defense will consult with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing the opinions of relevant prefectural governors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control; use of weapons)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons is permitted for the prevention of large scale destruction of guarding facilities</li> </ul>
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there is a particular need in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections and use of weapons, etc.)</li> </ul>
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc.	When it is anticipated that missiles are flying toward Japan and the measure is deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response guidelines approved by the Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons to destroy ballistic missiles, etc.</li> </ul>
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters (see Note 3)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense or party designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.; restricted to cases when no police officer is present)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation)</li> <li>○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)</li> </ul>
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> </ul>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)

(All authority referred to in the above table is provided for under the Self-Defense Forces Law)

- Notes: 1. Approval of the Prime Minister for rendering services for the construction of defense facilities and related defense activities should be mentioned on the Basic Response Plan and be presented to the Diet for approval. (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack)
2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials
3. Unit commanders may, in addition, dispatch units in the event of a fire or other disaster occurring in the vicinity of a Government office building, barracks or other facility of the Defense Agency (Article 83-3, known as neighboring dispatch).
4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary action."

## Reference 31. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Weapons by SDF Uniformed Officials and Units

Type of operation	Provision	Content
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	It is considered that the use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in the execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Defense operation	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.



Type of operation	Provision	Content
Civil Protection Dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves or other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 100-8 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law Transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.		SDF personnel engaged in overseas transportation duties may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel engaged in their duties, or Japanese nationals and foreign nationals to be transported. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, the said personnel may use their weapons within the extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain etc.

Type of operation	Provision	Content
Article 152, Prisoners of war Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel, and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc. as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 12, Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Cooperation and support activities		SDF personnel and others engaged in cooperation and support activities, etc. may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them on the scene, or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 17, Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, etc., may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, staff members of humanitarian or reconstruction assistance organizations in Iraq, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of Self-Defense officials. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

## Reference 32. Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the Civilians (Outline)

### Introduction

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in June 2003. The law stipulates basic response measures in the event of armed attacks against Japan from foreign countries. Enacted in June 2004 following the enactment of the situation law was the Civil Protection Law, which stipulates necessary measures to be taken to protect Civilians life, their bodies and their assets from armed attacks in situations including one in which Japan comes under armed attacks. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in December 2004. The national security goal set under the NDPO is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Under this background, basic guidelines are to be set based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law.

### Chapter 1 Basic Policy Concerning Implementation of Measures for Protecting Civilians

The state, local governments, designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions do their utmost in order to implement measures for protecting Civilians appropriately and expeditiously in line with the Civil Protection Law, other laws, basic guidelines, civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions while taking following points into consideration.

- 1) Respecting fundamental human rights, limiting the scope of restrictions on citizens' freedom and rights to minimum necessary levels, and implementing measures under fair and adequate procedures
- 2) Ensuring to take procedures and adequately managing documents to enable relief measures to be taken in an expeditious manner for protection of citizens' rights and profits
- 3) Providing citizens with accurate information on situations about armed attacks at an appropriate timing and in an appropriate manner
- 4) Ensuring to establish relations of mutual cooperation among the state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions, and ensuring to promote cooperation among local government, the Defense Agency and the SDF when taking measures including requesting SDF units to be dispatched to engage in civil protection activities
- 5) Implementing educational and enlightenment measures, improving activities by fire-fighting groups and voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations, and seeking citizens' support and cooperation in activities by volunteering groups
- 6) Respecting the independency of the Red Cross Society of Japan, giving special consideration to freedom of expression in speech and others by broadcasting business operators, and respecting the independency of designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions
- 7) When issuing warnings, guiding people for evacuation and engaging in rescue operations, special considerations are to be given to people needing special protection measures, such as aged people and handicapped people. When information is collected on the safety of foreign people, adequate measures are to be taken based on international laws concerning humanitarian protection.
- 8) Safety measures are to be implemented sufficiently for parties in charge of implementing civil protection steps, transportation services operators, people providing medical services, parties managing livelihood-related facilities and running livelihood-related facilities, and parties providing cooperation in implementation of civil protection measures.
- 9) Measures to revise initial instructions issued by the Prime Minister when governors of concerned

prefectures deem it impossible to implement measures being introduced based on the Prime Minister's instructions such as an instruction for evacuation

## **Chapter 2 Items Concerning Assumed Situations in which Japan Comes under Armed Attacks**

Assumed situations in which Japan comes under armed attacks cannot be defined in a uniformed manner. But such situations can be roughly categorized into four types. These situations are likely to occur in a compound manner. Characteristics of each type of situation are explained below.

- 1) Invasion via landing
  - Prior preparations against the invasion are possible. Advanced evacuation from expected battle areas is necessary.
  - Generally speaking, areas where civil protection measures are to be implemented are assumed to be wide.
- 2) Armed attacks by guerrillas and special forces
  - Activities by these forces cannot be forecast or detected in advance. Damage from attacks by these forces is assumed to occur in an instant manner.
  - Citizens are to be temporarily evacuated to indoor areas as an immediate step against the attack. Full-fledged evacuation is to follow with safety measures being taken by concerned institutions.
- 3) Attacks by ballistic missiles
  - Determining the missile's target area when it was fired is extremely difficult. A missile is to reach its target extremely quickly after it was fired.
  - It is important to try to localize the missile's damage area by providing information on the launch in a speedy manner. Evacuation is to be mainly in indoor areas.
- 4) Attacks via air
  - Bombing by airplanes makes it difficult for authorities to determine specific targets of the attack, which underlines the need for authorities to issue an instruction for outdoor evacuation in wide areas.

## **Chapter 3 Establishment of Implementation Posture**

- (1) The state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions are to establish a posture to implement civil protection measures in an appropriate and expeditious manner, including allocating clerical works to be assigned to divisions and bureaus of these parties and posting of employees of these parties for specific works under civil protection plans. The state and local governments are to take measures to foster human resources, including improving educational and training courses.

Local governments are to improve a system to implement civil protection measures while utilizing existing systems for disaster prevention. Prefectural governments, in particular, should strive to establish a posture in which their employees stand by around the clock so that they can respond the moment after the outbreak of an emergency situation, as well as establishing a disaster-prevention system. Municipalities should strive to strengthen an employee stand-by system in cooperation with local firefighters' groups formed on a permanent basis.

- (2) A special task force of the state and task forces of local governments are to promote cooperation in order to implement civil protection measures in a perfect manner.

The Prime Minister is to set up a special task force in an area concerned, when taking response measures in the local area is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a special task force created at a concerned prefectural government.

## Chapter 4 Items Concerning Measures for Protecting of Civilians

### 1. Measures Concerning Evacuation of Residents

- (1) A warning relating to the situation of armed attacks, a forecast on armed attacks and areas expected to come under imminent armed attacks is to be issued in document written as easily as possible and as compactly as possible. Such warning is to be notified to residents via public communications networks such as comprehensive administrative networks and regional satellite communications networks as well as disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by local municipalities. Sirens are to be used in principle so as to ensure that the warning can reach areas where armed attacks are deemed to be imminent or armed attacks are deemed as having occurred.

Municipalities are to ensure that the warning has reached all of households covered by the municipalities in cooperation with voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations and neighborhood associations. Special consideration is to be given so that aged people and handicapped people can be informed of the warning.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast the warning so as to convey the warning's content to households.

- (2) The task force chief is to instruct the governor of a concerned prefecture to take evacuation measures when evacuation of residents from specified areas is deemed necessary after situations surrounding the emergency are examined in a comprehensive manner.

When the instruction of evacuation measures becomes necessary beyond a certain prefecture, the task force chief is to instruct the state to take evacuation measures as the state's policy after hearing views and opinions from affected prefectures.

- (3) Following are points to be considered in the event of evacuation.

- In view of the fact that having a large number of residents in big cities evacuate to remote areas quickly during a short period of time is extremely difficult, governors of prefectures should strive to get information about available evacuation facilities and designate facilities that can sufficiently accommodate such residents while the task force chief should basically instruct affected residents to immediately evacuate to indoor facilities in their neighborhood, before issuing other instructions in response to new developments later.
- On the evacuation of people living in isolated islands, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is to provide necessary support by examining the availability of airplanes to be used in the event of an emergency, so as to smoothly airlift affected people in response to requests by concerned local governments.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, the task force chief is to instruct adequate evacuation measures in response to developments in the situation.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of SDF facilities and U.S. military facilities, the state and local governments are to keep close cooperation even during peacetime in order to ensure the use of evacuation facilities, evacuation routes and means to transport evacuees. The state is also to implement necessary coordination with local governments so that the governments can take measures to evacuate local residents in the event of armed attacks.
- On the evacuation of people living on peninsulas, mountainous areas and in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, governors of concerned prefectures, when issuing evacuation instructions, can recommend the use of self-owned vehicles as transportation means for evacuation after taking into consideration traffic situations of the regions.
- In cooperation with local governments, the state is to clarify points to be taken into account by Civilians in the event of evacuation and to disseminate these points to the people, depending

upon types of armed attacks including those by ballistic missiles.

- It is necessary to avoid guiding people to evacuate leeward in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and is important to have them put on hats and masks in evacuation to help reduce the skin's exposure to the contaminated air as much as possible. When human bodies are seen to be contaminated by radioactive iodine in the wake of nuclear weapons attacks, affected people are to be instructed to take agents to neutralize such iodine. When attacks by biological and chemical weapons are launched, affected people are to be instructed to leave the attacked areas or the sites immediately and evacuate to indoor rooms that are highly shielded against the air outside.

- (4) Governors of prefectures who have received evacuation instructions are to instruct affected people to evacuate immediately via mayors of municipalities. The governors are then to show major evacuation routes such as national roads and local roads, and cite available transportation means for evacuation such as railways and buses, after examining geographical features of each region. Local governments are to keep close contact with designated public transportation operators to ensure means to transport evacuees.

Mayors of municipalities are to have residents informed of the evacuation instruction, using disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by the municipalities and public relations vehicles.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the evacuation instruction in a prompt, accurate and compact manner.

- (5) When an instruction of evacuation is issued, mayors of municipalities are to devise evacuation-implementation measures in line with the civil protection plan and evacuation guidelines prepared in advance, and to guide people to safe places.

In order to adequately evacuate aged people and handicapped people, the mayors are to request those who run facilities that house such people to implement measures for their smooth evacuation in line with measures that would be taken in the case of fires and earthquakes.

If response measures by employees of the municipalities and local fire-fighting agencies alone are deemed to be insufficient, police officers, Japan Coast Guard officers or SDF officers are to be mobilized to smoothly evacuate affected people.

## 2. Measures Concerning Relief of Evacuees

- (1) Following the receipt of an instruction by the task force chief to give relief to evacuated people, governors of prefectures are to conduct relief operations that are deemed necessary, including provision of accommodation facilities, supplies of food stuffs and provision of money to buy daily necessities. The governors are to conduct these relief operations without receiving a relief instruction by the task force chief, if such operations are deemed to be necessary immediately. Special considerations are to be given in order to provide an adequate relief to aged people and handicapped people.
- (2) Prefectural governments are to establish shelters and manage these facilities in an adequate manner by ensuring to keep the evacuees' health conditions sound and maintain their privacy in the shelters.

Prefectural governments are, even during peacetime, to establish methods to supply and procure food, water and sleeping gear to be used in the event of armed attacks in line with methods that would be employed in the case of natural disasters.

The state is to supply pharmaceuticals, food stuffs, daily necessities and fuel, when necessary or in line with support requests from governors of concerned prefectures. The state is also to ensure

ways to supply such goods in cooperation with concerned industrial organizations. The state is to give special consideration to ensuring ways to supply food stuffs and daily necessities to people in isolated islands.

If necessary, concerned prefectures are to open emergency medical facilities in cases where a large number of citizens sustained injuries as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan. The prefectures are also to set up medical squads and dispatch qualified people to the squads. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and other ministries are to secure medical doctors and form their own medical teams, if necessary. The Defense Agency is to dispatch hygiene units to affected areas in response to requests from governors of concerned prefectures or the head of a special task force.

- (3) When a disaster stemming from an armed attack occurs, the state and prefectures will utilize medical supplies and medical equipment that have been stockpiled so that they could be used in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- (4) On medical activities in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is to instruct concerned Cabinet ministers to take necessary measures, including dispatch of emergency medical teams, and provision of medical supplies and medical equipment, in cooperation with concerned prefectural governments. In the event of attacks by biological weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary protection measures, including vaccination, to provide medical treatment to the victims and prevent the spread of the biological agents used in the attacks to other areas. In the event of attacks by chemical weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary measures, including neutralizing the contamination of the chemical agents used in the attacks as fast as possible.
- (5) On activities to collect information on the safety of citizens and provision of such information to other parties, consideration is to be given to the protection of personal information and freedom of press.

Heads of local governments are to collect and sort out information on the safety of citizens, including evacuees and people who have been admitted to hospital. Other administrative organizations are to help heads of local governments in collecting information on safety of citizens.

Upon receiving inquiries on the safety of citizens, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications or heads of local governments are to provide information on such safety unless the inquiries are deemed as being done for unduly purposes.

Designated administrative agencies, designated public institutions and other relevant organizations are to try to cooperate with heads of local governments in collecting information on the safety of citizens.

The Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and heads of local governments are to cooperate with the Red Cross Society of Japan in collecting and sorting out information on the safety of foreign people.

### 3. Response Measures Concerning Disasters Caused by the Armed Attacks

- (1) On response measures concerning disasters caused by the armed attacks against Japan, the state is to take necessary measures on its own while the head of a special task force is, if necessary, to immediately instruct governors of prefectures to implement these measures after explaining an implementation policy to the governors.

Governors of prefectures are to request the head of a special task force to take necessary measures, including dispatches of firefighters, police officers, Maritime Safety Agency officers and SDF units, if preventing disasters from armed attacks and reducing the damage from such attacks

by relevant prefectures alone are deemed difficult.

- (2) If emergency measures to prevent danger of citizens are deemed necessary, governments of concerned prefectures are to swiftly issue an emergency notice and, if necessary, take measures, including an issuance of an evacuation instruction and designation of dangerous areas.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the emergency notice swiftly.

- (3) Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities and relevant prefectures should ensure to get information on these facilities during peacetime.

Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities should keep contact with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the National Police Agency and the Maritime Safety Agency, and take note of special points to be considered to ensure the safety of each facility according to the characteristics and feature of each.

When taking measures to ensure the safety of certain livelihood-related facilities and their surrounding areas is deemed necessary, the Prime Minister is to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to strengthen security and take other measures including evacuation of citizens living in the areas, based on the government's basic response plan.

In the event of armed attacks being launched against Japan, governors of prefectures are to request public safety commissions of the prefectures to swiftly designate livelihood-related facilities where people are barred from entry. To be designated off-limit are facilities whose security, if not ensured, would cause significant damage to the surrounding areas, such as dams, nuclear power plants and stations handling a large amount of dangerous objects.

- (4) Following points need to be considered as ways to ensure the security of nuclear power plants in addition to taking measures which are usually meant to ensure the safety of a livelihood-related facility.

- When the leakage of radioactive substances is reported or the leakage of such substances is warned, the Prime Minister is to immediately set up a special local task force while ensuring safety in the affected area. In principle, such a special task force is to be headquartered in an off-the-site area. The task force is to organize a joint council with a concerned local government to work out measures against disasters stemming from armed attacks on nuclear power plants. The joint council is to be led by the head of the local task force.

- In the event of armed attacks, nuclear power plant operators are to immediately take necessary measures to halt the operation of nuclear power reactors. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to immediately order nuclear power plant operators to stop the operation of nuclear reactors located in areas covered by the warning. If a warning is issued without designating specific areas, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to order suspension of operation for nuclear reactors whose suspension is deemed necessary after the degree of danger and its specific content are examined. Nuclear power plant operators are to stop the operation of their reactors on their own decision if the situation is emergent. After relevant nuclear power reactors stop operating, the state and nuclear power plant operators are to take necessary measures to ensure power supply.

- (5) When disasters arise following armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is, based on the basic response plan, to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to swiftly collect information, launch operations to rescue victims, promptly identify objects that have caused the disaster, determine the contaminated area, and implement necessary measures to decontaminate the area and prevent the spread of the contamination. If the situation is emergent, the Prime



Minister is to ask for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures.

In response to these instructions by the Prime Minister and his request for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures, fire-fighting agencies, prefectural police authorities, the Maritime Safety Agency and the SDF are to implement necessary response measures. These response measures are to be implemented after necessary safety measures are taken, including the use of protection gear by those who are to engage in actual rescue and other operations. In the event of attacks by biological agents, response measures are to be taken after protection measures are implemented, including vaccination against the agents.

Information on the disaster is to be disseminated to citizens in order to prevent the citizens from going panic. In the event of attacks by biological agents, information on vaccination is to be disseminated to citizens while the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare is to instruct governors of relevant prefectures to have citizens vaccinated against the agents, if necessary.

The Governor of a concerned prefecture is to make coordination with governors of other prefectures and police authorities of concerned prefectures before introducing measures including barring citizens from entering certain buildings and imposing traffic restrictions.

When water used by citizens is contaminated as a result of attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare or governors of prefectural governments are, if necessary, to order water-supply parties to take measures, including limiting water supply.

- (6) If fire-fighting, rescue and fast-aid activities are deemed necessary in response to disasters stemming from armed attacks against Japan, the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency is to instruct governors of concerned prefectures or mayors of concerned municipalities to ensure that these activities can be conducted in an appropriate and expeditious manner.

If citizens are infected with biological agents used as weapons in armed attacks against Japan or they are feared to be infected with such agents, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is to designate the infection from the chemical agent as a designated infection and, if necessary, take measures under the Infectious Disease Law.

When a large amount of waste, such as rubble and debris, arises as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan, the Environment Ministry is to promptly dispose of such waste under exceptional rules set to govern waste disposal.

When protection of important cultural assets from possible damage following armed attacks is deemed particularly necessary, the Commissioner of the Cultural Affairs Agency is to order or recommend owners of the assets to take measures to change the assets' storage places, and to provide necessary support to the owners if they ask for such support.

#### 4. Points to be Considered Concerning Measures in General to Protect Civilians

- (1) Telecommunications carriers are to preferentially cater to important telecommunications needs by the state, local governments and designated public institutions to implement measures for civil protection in the wake of armed attacks against Japan.
- (2) In consultation with designated public institutions that serve as transportation operators, the state and local governments are to strive to ensure transportation of evacuees and emergency relief goods while taking into consideration safety issues involved.
- (3) In the event of armed attacks, police authorities of prefectural governments are to implement traffic restriction measures on general vehicles, including their being barred from using certain roads, in order to secure traffic routes for transporting evacuees and emergency relief goods.
- (4) Concerned local governments, in cooperation with relevant organizations, are to try to improve

systems to receive emergency relief goods from the general public and business corporations, and to distribute these goods to people needing them.

- (5) The state is to set standards and procedures for issuing Red Cross and other special badges to be used in emergency. Based on these standards and procedures, heads of designated administrative agencies and others are to devise necessary guidelines for specifically issuing such badges.

#### 5. Measures to Stabilize Civil Life

- (1) In order to stabilize Civil Life, the state and local governments are to take necessary measures, including helping stabilize prices of daily necessities, imposing moratorium on debt repayments, stabilizing the currency and monetary system, ensuring to offer school education and maintaining employment.
- (2) Local governments are to take necessary measures to ensure that water can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner. Designated public institutions are to implement necessary measures to ensure that electricity and gas can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner, ensure that civil passengers and cargo can be transported in an appropriate manner, ensure that telecommunications lines can be kept through such measures as installing emergency circuit lines and to ensure that mail and correspondence services can be maintained.
- (3) The state, local governments and designated public institutions are to begin quick restoration work for damaged facilities and equipment under their jurisdiction after ensuring to take safety measures involved in the work.

#### 6. Measures Concerning Reconstruction after Disasters from Armed Attacks

The state is to implement necessary measures for prompt restoration of facilities and services while examining their damage from armed attacks. The Government is to promptly take necessary steps to establish a legal framework to finance measures being implemented in the restoration work following armed attacks.

#### 7. Exercise and Stockpiling

- (1) The state and local governments should conduct practical training against armed attacks from foreign countries and evaluate results of the training. Designated public institutions should independently engage in training for civil protection while such institutions should encourage citizens to participate in training courses sponsored by the state or local governments. Training mentioned above is to be conducted in combination with disaster-prevention drills.
- (2) The state, local governments and designated public institutions should ensure to get accurate information about the amount of goods and materials being stockpiled against natural disasters, their specific kinds and where these goods are to be supplied in disasters so that these goods and materials can be also used for civil protection in the event of armed attacks against Japan.

The state should try to secure goods and materials that would become necessary in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, such as protective garment to be worn against chemical weapons, and special medicines to neutralize chemical agents, and also should try to improve a system to procure these goods and materials.

Local governments should establish a system to enable stockpiled anti-disaster goods and materials to be utilized in the event of armed attacks against Japan, and also should strive to establish a system to procure and stockpile goods and materials that would become particularly necessary in the event of such armed attacks.

## Chapter 5 Responses to Emergency Response Situations

- (1) Measures almost equal to civil protection measures that would be taken in the case of armed attacks

against Japan are to be implemented in the event of terrorist attacks against the country, which are seen as roughly equal to armed attacks. Therefore, the state of being attacked by terrorists is categorized as a situation that requires emergency response action, leading the Government to take emergency response protection measures. Following are situations that require emergency response action by the Government.

- 1) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities containing inherently dangerous substances  
(destruction of nuclear power plants and explosion of petrochemical complex facilities)
  - 2) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities accommodating a large number of people and against public transportation systems  
(explosion of terminal stations and railways)
  - 3) A situation in which an attack is launched using substances that are capable of injuring and killing a large number of people  
(indiscriminate sprinkling of anthrax and sarin)
  - 4) A situation in which an attack is launched using transportation systems as a way to destroy targets  
(suicidal terrorist attacks using civil airplanes)
- (2) When a special headquarters is set up to deal with situations requiring emergency response action, the state, led by the headquarters, is to do its utmost to implement emergency response protection measures in cooperation with local governments and designated public institutions.
- The Prime Minister is to establish a special task force in a certain local area if setting up such a task force there is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a prefectural task force.
- (3) Emergency response protection measures are to be taken basically in line with basic policies and civil-protection steps stipulated under Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 of the basic guidelines.
- The notification of warning and the scope of areas subject to such notification in the case of situations requiring emergency response measures are to be determined by the task force chief after the degree of the damage by the attack and the scope of geographical areas impacted by the attack are examined.

## Chapter 6 Procedures for Planning for Concerning Civil Protection

Civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions are to be devised or revised after views and opinions from wider quarters of society are heard. Designated public institutions are to ensure opportunities for hearing opinions from those who are engaging in work to devise civil protection plans.

## Reference 33. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Japan Defense Agency and Defense Facilities Administration Agency

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

### 1. Basic concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack disasters, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an

armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

2. Implementation framework

- a. An intra-agency coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.
- b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Minister of State for Defense shall give instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others. In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.).

3. Implementation procedures for civil protection measures

- a. If the Minister of State for Defense is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures.
- b. If the Minister of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is required, the Minister of State for Defense orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures.

4. Contents of civil protection measures executed by the SDF

a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF's posts and bases or on the premises of American military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation.

b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Defense Agency for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to armed attack disasters

The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and fire fighting), removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch).

5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content.

## Reference 34. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century (Provisional Translation)

(Tokyo, April 17, 1996)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the U.S. helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the U.S. are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.

2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

### The Regional Outlook

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute source of instability.

### The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the U.S. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

- (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense

capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security.

- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S.

The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

### **Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship**

- 5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

- (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.
- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the U.S.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.

- (d) Nothing the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter support (F-2).
  - (e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons for mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.
6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

## Regional Cooperation

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the U.S. in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the U.S. and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

## Global Cooperation

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the U.N. and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the U.N. and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

## **Conclusion**

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three legs of the Japan-U.S. relationship—security, political, and economic—are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

## **Reference 35. Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee**

(Washington, DC, February 19, 2005)

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

## **Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today**

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.
3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East—efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.
4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.
5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to



defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

### **Common Strategic Objectives**

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.
7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.
8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.
9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
  - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
  - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
  - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
  - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
  - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
  - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
  - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
  - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
  - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
  - Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
  - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
  - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.
11. Global common strategic objectives include:
  - Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the

international community.

- Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
- Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
- Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
- Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

### **Strengthening of U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation**

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.
16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

## Reference 36. U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future

(October 29, 2005)

### I. Overview

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

### II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

#### 1. Primary Areas

In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:

- Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;

- Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.

## 2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:

- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.
- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.

Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:

- Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.

In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

## 3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

#### 4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

- Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

- Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use

by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

- Improving Interoperability.

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S. forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

- Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.

- In particular, the U.S. plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.

- Additionally, both sides recognized that U.S. forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.

- Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.

Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations (see section below).

- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defense operations.

Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

### III. Force Posture Realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

#### 1. Guiding Precepts

In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

- The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
- Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.
- Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
- Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
- Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
- Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
- Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

#### 2. Recommendations for Realignment

Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

- Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination.

Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this center will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF.

- Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability.

The capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defense of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to U.S. facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored

- Collocation of Air Command and Control.

Japan's Air Defense Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defense command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and joint operations coordination center described above.

- Yokota Air Base and Air Space.

Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota air space will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the air space under U.S. control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.

- Missile Defense.

The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.

- Regional Realignment of U.S. Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response.

As part of its global posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

- Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that



any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

- Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:
  - Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel.
  - Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.
  - Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.
  - Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.
  - Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents.
- Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.)
- Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments:
  - With regards to the KC-130's, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.
  - Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for U.S. forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.
  - Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for U.S. forces.

- Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.
- Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3d Marine Division.
- The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the U.S. Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.
- Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The U.S. stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete program for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.
- Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the U.S. also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.
- Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.
- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station.

To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier and its airwing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.

- Relocation of Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.
- Adjustment of training airspace for all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.
- Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for U.S. naval aviation forces.
- Development of necessary facilities at the Maritime SDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft.

These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or U.S. C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase alliance capabilities and flexibility.

- Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.
- Training Relocation.

Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from U.S. air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.

- Efficient Use of Capacity at U.S. Facilities in Japan.

Opportunities to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at U.S. facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

## **Reference 37. United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement**

(May 1, 2006)

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security relationship at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region. This strong partnership is increasingly vital in meeting global challenges, and in promoting fundamental values shared by both nations, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The alliance has successfully adapted itself to changes in the regional and global security environment, and it must continue to evolve in depth and scope in order to address future challenges. To remain strong, this partnership must be reinforced by continued firm public support in both countries.

At today's meeting, the Ministers, sharing the view that new and emerging threats pose a common challenge that affects the security of nations worldwide, noted the increasingly close cooperation between their two countries on a broad array of issues. The Ministers confirmed their desire to expand that cooperation to ensure the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to play a vital role in enhancing regional and global peace and security. The Ministers noted the importance of U.S. and Japanese efforts to strengthen democracy in and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support reform efforts in the broader Middle East. They committed to work closely on efforts to convince Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation, and agreed on the need for concerted United Nations Security Council action.

As elsewhere in the world, the Asia-Pacific region faces persistent challenges that give rise to unpredictability and uncertainty. The Ministers reconfirmed a shared commitment to the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged North Korea to return expeditiously to the talks without preconditions, to

dismantle its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to cease all illicit and proliferation activities. They reaffirmed the importance of resolving regional disputes through diplomatic efforts, and called for greater transparency on the modernization of military capabilities in the region.

In this security environment, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to close cooperation in realizing the common strategic objectives the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) identified in February 2005. The Ministers stressed the imperative of strengthening and improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in such areas as ballistic missile defense, bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities, as well as the importance of improving interoperability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces, as outlined in the recommendations on bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities described in the October 2005 SCC document. In this context, the Ministers emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust alliance relationship, and to enhance the alliance's capability to respond to diverse challenges in the evolving regional and global security environment.

At the SCC meeting held today, the Ministers approved implementation details for the October 2005 realignment initiatives, which are described in today's SCC document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." The Ministers recognized that the implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. Recognizing the Government of Japan's coordination with local communities, the Ministers confirmed the feasibility of the realignment initiatives. Recognizing also that completion of these realignment initiatives is essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance transformation, the Ministers committed themselves to the timely and thorough implementation of the plan, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

## **Reference 38. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation**

(May 1, 2006)

### **Overview**

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs "to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006." This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

### **Finalization of Realignment Initiatives**

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will

finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

## Key Implementation Details

### 1. Realignment on Okinawa

#### (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not have a plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

#### (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3d Marine Division Headquarters, 3d Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

#### (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF

personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging area, to be constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for Ground SDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- Air SDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. Fiscal Year 2008. The headquarters of the Ground SDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
  - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2 ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagami-hara Housing Area.
  - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35 ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
  - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1 ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

### 3. Yokota Air Base and Air Space

- Air SDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan Fiscal Year 2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
  - Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - Develop procedures in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan Fiscal Year 2009.
  - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.

### 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni

- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
- Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
- The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
- U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
- Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in

- neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
- A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
  - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
  - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as Air SDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
  - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
  - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan Fiscal Year 2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan Fiscal Year 2006 can be developed.
  - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities - Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni - will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
  - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
  - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
  - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1-5 aircraft for the duration of 1-7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6-12 aircraft for 8-14 days at a time.
  - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
  - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

### **Reference 39. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others(Provisional Translation)**

(Cabinet Decision on May 30, 2006)

1. The governments of Japan and the U.S. government had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues



(hereinafter "realignment related measures") was approved.

2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is a core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured.

Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

3. The final report includes following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of Air SDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for the BMD at Air SDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings.

These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on timeframe for implementation presented in the final report.

4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government, therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan.

In addition, the government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas.

5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.
6. Based on such recognition, the government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance, the government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 2005 to FY 2009)" (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others.
7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa, and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far

regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner.

The government shall establish a consultative body together with the government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measure and regional development.

In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished.

However, in FY 2006, the projects based on the "II Regional Development" stipulated in the abovementioned government policy shall be implemented.

## **Reference 40. The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century**

(June 29, 2006)

President George W. Bush of the United States of America hosted Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan for an Official Visit to the White House on June 29, 2006, that celebrated their close personal friendship and the deep and increasing ties between the American and Japanese people.

The two leaders agreed that the U.S.-Japan partnership stands as one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history. They reviewed with great satisfaction the broadened and enhanced cooperation achieved in the alliance under their joint stewardship, and together heralded a new U.S.-Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation for the 21st Century.

### **1. The U.S.-Japan Alliance Based on Universal Values and Common Interests**

The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law. These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries.

The United States and Japan share interests in: winning the war on terrorism; maintaining regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security. It is these common values and common interests that form the basis for U.S.-Japan regional and global cooperation.

### **2. Bilateral Political, Security and Economic Cooperation**

The President and Prime Minister welcomed the tremendous progress in the U.S.-Japan security relationship achieved during their tenures. Bilateral security cooperation has deepened as a result of ballistic missile defense cooperation and legislation in Japan to deal with contingencies.

The two leaders welcomed the establishment of common strategic objectives of February 2005 as well as the conclusion of watershed agreements to transform the alliance for the future. These agreements, including the most significant realignment of U.S. and Japanese forces in decades, constitute historic steps forward that make the U.S. military presence more enduring and effective, and ensure the capabilities necessary for the alliance to cope with diverse challenges in the evolving security environments. The two leaders agreed that full and prompt implementation of these agreements

is necessary, not only for Japan and the United States, but also for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia's historic transformation is underway, creating a region that increasingly embraces the universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, market economy, and rule of law. The two leaders pledged to work together to shape and support this transformation. In this regard, the two nations will continue to work on common challenges in the region such as (a) promoting individual freedoms; (b) increasing transparency and confidence in the political, economic, and military fields; and (c) protecting human dignity, and resolving humanitarian and human rights problems including the abduction issue.

The two leaders affirmed that robust U.S.-Japan cooperation embraces the dynamism of China, and helps to maintain peace and tranquility in Northeast Asia. They reaffirmed the importance of advancing strategic dialogues with friends and allies in the region such as Australia. They called on North Korea to fulfill denuclearization pledges made in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and to continue to adhere to its missile test moratorium. They discussed the need for the few isolated regimes in the region to respect human rights and democratic principles including an inclusive political dialogue.

The two leaders reaffirmed their common efforts on a wide range of global activities including recent successes in the war on terrorism, support for the new government in Iraq, and cooperation on counterproliferation activities, including on Iran. The President praised Japan's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Japan's support provided to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

Mindful of Japan's significant role and contributions at the U.N., Japan and the United States will intensify their cooperation, and work together in realizing Japan's permanent membership at the Security Council.

They pledged to continue close cooperation under the Strategic Development Alliance and to work together on other global challenges such as capacity-building for natural disaster response and prevention and response to avian/pandemic influenza. They also agreed to work on the interrelated challenges of energy security, clean development, reducing pollution, and climate change.

Building upon the progress achieved over the last five years under the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth, the two leaders agreed to explore ways to further deepen the mutually-beneficial bilateral economic relationship as well as to enhance cooperation on regional and global economic issues.

Such an expanded partnership would include: promoting growth and economic reform; promoting and maintaining open markets; ensuring efficient movement of legitimate goods, services, people, and investments, while tackling threats from terrorism; strengthening intellectual property rights protection and enforcement; enhancing global energy security; and fostering transparent and favorable business climates in both countries.

The two leaders also affirmed their commitment to make a strong contribution to ensure a successful and ambitious outcome for the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations by the end of 2006 that opens markets and achieves a balanced outcome across the board. They expressed their determination to work together to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region.

The two leaders shared the view that the U.S.-Japan global alliance remains a constant and positive force. They shared the expectation that the U.S.-Japan friendship and global cooperation shall continue to grow stronger.

## Reference 41. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(September 23, 1997)

### I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an Armed Attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

### II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the U.S. will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

### III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the "National Defense Program Outline." In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

#### 1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

#### 2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in U.N. PKOs or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

#### 3. Bilateral Programs

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an Armed Attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

### **IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan**

Bilateral actions in response to an Armed Attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

When an Armed Attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an Armed Attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

#### 1. When an Armed Attack Against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering

and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an Armed Attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an Armed Attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

## 2. When an Armed Attack Against Japan Takes Place

### (1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

- (a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an Armed Attack against Japan as soon as possible. The U.S. will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the Armed Attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.
- (b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective Forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.
- (c) The U.S. will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

### (2) Concept of Operations

#### (a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attack against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

#### (b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

#### (c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type,

and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

- (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.
- (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The U.S. will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan; The U.S. will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel

as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

## **V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that Will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)**

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.



## (b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operation in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

## (c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arises with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

## (d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

## (2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

## (a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

## (b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

## (3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

## **VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines**

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the U.S. to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an Armed Attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including, SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

### **1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures**

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

#### **(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning**

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an Armed Attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an Armed Attack against Japan or when such a situation and an Armed Attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

#### **(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations**

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an Armed Attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative

measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an Armed Attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

## **VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines**

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The Schedule omitted: See p. 167.)

## Reference 42. Record of Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises in FY2005

### Joint Staff Office

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Japan-U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	February 20–March 3, 2006	Ichigaya garrison, Yokota Air Base, etc.	Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, internal bureaus of the Defense Agency, etc. About 1,350 personnel	USFJ Command, USFJ Armed Forces, etc. About 3,240 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

### GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Army level command post exercise	July 6–5, 2005	U.S. Air Force facilities in Hawaii	Ground Staff Office, etc. About 110 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps, etc. About 100 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training in the United States (US Army)	October 10–November 11, 2005	U.S. training area in Washington, etc.	Fuji School, etc. About 180 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps About 100 personnel	Training and exercises for tactics and combat practice for street warfare
(US Marine Corps)	January 3–February 3, 2006	U.S. training area in California, etc.	Western Army About 125 personnel	U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force About 100 personnel	Training and exercises for response to invasions on isolated islands
Army level command post exercise	January 23–February 4, 2006	Kengun garrison, etc.	Western Army, etc. About 4,400 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps, etc. About 1,300 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training	February 11–25, 2006	Iwate-san maneuver area, etc.	Northeastern Army, etc. About 300 personnel	25th Light Infantry Division About 200 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	February 19–March 3, 2006	Aibano maneuver area, Nihonbara maneuver area, etc.	Central Army, etc. About 350 personnel	4th Marine Division About 250 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	March 5–6, 2006	Yausubetsu maneuver area, etc.	Northern Army, etc. About 300 personnel	41st Infantry Brigade About 280 personnel	Training in joint operations

\* Guard operation training has also been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas since 2003.

### MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Anti-infiltration training	April 20–24, 2005	Sea area to the south-west of Kyushu	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: a few	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Minesweeping training	July 17–29, 2005	Mutsuwan Bay	Vessels: 23 Aircraft (total): 16	Aircraft (total): 1 Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 9	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Anti-infiltration training	October 3–8, 2005	Sea area surrounding Okinawa	Vessels: 5 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 10 Aircraft: a few	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Minesweeping training	October 3–8, 2005	Hyuganada Sea	Vessels: 28 Aircraft: 5	Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 6	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Medical training	October 26, 2005	Yokosuka Naval Base	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. About 80 personnel	U.S. Navy Hospital, Yokosuka About 100 personnel	Medical training in joint operations

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Minesweeping training	February 15–27, 2006	Suonada Sea	Vessels: 18 Aircraft: 15	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: 1 Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 19	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Training for guarding USFJ bases	March 13–15, 2006	Port of Yokosuka	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. About 320 personnel	US Navy Yokosuka Base units, etc.	Training in joint operations for guarding the base
Command post exercise	March 13–23, 2006	U.S. Naval College	Maritime Staff Office, etc. About 30 personnel	US Navy stationed in Japan, etc. About 40 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

## ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Air defense combat training Fighter training	May 9–17, 2005	Air area west of Akita and temporary air area for training	Northern Air Defense Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 48	35th Combat Air Wing, etc. Aircraft (total): 11	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Air defense training for guarding bases	May 25–July 3, 2005	Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and the surrounding air area	Air Defense Command Aircraft (total): 130	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 371	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training	June 3–10, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 20	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 14	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training Air defense combat training	June 30–July 8, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa and temporary air area for training	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 18	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 22	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training Air-to-ground firing and bombing practice	July 4–30, 2005	Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, the surrounding air base, and Farallon De Medinilla Air-to-Ground Firing Site	Air Defense Command Aircraft (total): 96	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 16	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Fighter training	October 3–7, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa and temporary air area for training	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 24	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 22	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Fighter training	November 7–16, 2005	Air area off Komatsu	Central Air Defense Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 95	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 111	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Rescue training	March 13–15, 2006	Sea and air areas surrounding Ukiharu Jima Island maneuver area, and international waters and air area above the international waters south-west of Naha	Air Rescue Wing Aircraft (total): 3	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 5	Training in joint operations and for improvement of rescue skills

## Reference 43. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

The export of "arms" needs a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)(Note) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

Note: Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

### 1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- (1) Communist Bloc countries;
- (2) countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or
- (3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

### 2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

#### (1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

- (i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.
- (ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles, shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
- (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."

#### (2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.
- (ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc. for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms."

Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No. 109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No. 197 to No. 205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No. 1."

## Reference 44. Outline of 23 Issues

(As of May 1, 2006)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remark
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc. for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(21. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(21. Waste incineration facility site (Kurahama))	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
		707	6	7	2	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>		16 facilities, 18 issues					
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendment agreed on April 22, 1999 and December 21, 2001 (to be returned upon formulation of the land utilization plan or reversion of southern part, whichever comes first)
Camp Zukeran	20. Awase golf course	47			◎		Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of golf course into Kadena Ammunition Storage Area; Construction work is underway on the relocation area.
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	21. Former Higashionna ammunition storage area	110	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (the remaining portion to be returned after relocation of ammunition storage and completion of relocation arrangement of Awase Golf Course)
Futemma Air Station	22. A strip of land along the eastside (Nakahara - Ginowan)	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendments agreed on April 22, 1999 and February 12, 2004 (another 5 year postponement requested from the local municipality due to formulation of the land utilization plan (2nd postponement: 10 years in total); Release due by the end of 2008)
	5 facilities, 5 issues	314	3	1	1	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the Area column, a value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle mark in the Classification column expediently indicates that a scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the Scope column were assigned only for classification purpose of 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the Classification column indicates issues in which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues in which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues in which release of facilities and areas was requested to the U.S. government by then Governor Nishime of Okinawa. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

## Reference 45. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Government of Japan and the U.S. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the U.S. at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Reports, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. Forces Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21% of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure the prompt and steady implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.



**Return Land:**

- Futenma Air Station—see attached
- Northern Training Area
 

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987 ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159 ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

  - Provide land area (approx. 38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
  - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area
 

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480 ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895 ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area
 

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60 ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site
 

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53 ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
 

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191 ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae
 

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99 ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station
 

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61 ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1 ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area
 

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3 ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port
 

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57 ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35 ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
 

Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in

housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83 ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35 ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

#### **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104  
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.
- Parachute drop training  
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads  
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

#### **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station  
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft  
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the U.S. has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base  
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base  
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station  
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

#### **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**

- Accident reports  
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.  
In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements  
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas

Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles

Implement the agreement of measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under Paragraph 6, Article 18 of the SOFA in the following manner:

- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement of quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. Forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

## **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)**

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

### **1. Introduction**

- (a) At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- (b) On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced

safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

- (c) The SCC will establish a bilateral Japan-U.S. working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of the work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
- (a) Pursue construction of the SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
  - (b) Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
  - (c) Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
  - (d) Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
  - (e) Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
- (a) Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
  - (b) To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
  - (c) The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
  - (d) The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform

security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

- (e) The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
  - (f) The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
- Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
- (a) Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the seabed.
  - (b) Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
  - (c) Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
- (a) The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
  - (b) The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation test and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
  - (c) The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

## **Reference 46. Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq**

(December 8, 2005)

### **1. Basic Principles**

On March 20 2003, the United States and other countries began to use force against Iraq as the last resort to remove the threat posed by Iraq against peace and security of the International community. Major combat operations in Iraq have ended, and the international community has been actively engaged in reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

That Iraq be rebuilt as a peaceful and democratic state while maintaining its sovereignty and territorial unity is of utmost importance not only for the people of Iraq and to peace and stability of the

Middle East, but also to securing peace and stability in the international community including Japan which depends on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its oil import.

Japan has thus taken the position that it will extend as much assistance as possible, on its own initiative and actively, taking into account the will of the international community expressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, so that Iraq will be reconstructed as early as possible by the people of Iraq themselves.

Under the conditions that Iraq restored its sovereignty and moves toward real restoration, which is mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 1546, Japan supported the efforts of Iraqi people and the international community, and enhanced its assistance so that rehabilitation of Iraq may progress steadily. The political process has moved forward, as seen in the adoption of a new constitution, and the Iraqi security force has taken root. Considering that the rehabilitation of Iraq is still midway and UN Security Council Resolution 1637 extending the authority of the multinational forces upon request of the Iraqi transition government was adopted, however, Japan should fulfill its duty as a member of the international community. As part of these efforts, activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and other response measures will be carried out based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Law No.137 of 2003, hereinafter referred to as the "Special Measures Law").

## 2. Matters Regarding Implementation of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

### (1) Basic Matters Regarding Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

Iraq, in the first place, was ravaged by a quarter century of oppressive rule, and development of its social infrastructure was delayed. Its government collapsed following the recent use of force. At present, its people are in a difficult situation, making the need for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance extremely profound. In particular, in the area of medical services, there are shortfalls regarding operation, maintenance and management of hospitals including insufficiency in medical equipment. Regarding supply of electricity and water, supply networks at the national level are not functioning sufficiently, making these major issues in certain regions.

Therefore, expeditious assistance in these and other areas are necessary. Furthermore, in addition to assistance to meet such short-term needs, assistance that would lead to a more full-fledged development of social infrastructure is also necessary.

In view of such a situation, Japan will conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as follows.

In order to smoothly conduct these activities, and to contribute to the stability and improvement of the lives of the people of Iraq, amongst others, the troops of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq will liaise closely with each other as well as with the overseas establishments concerned, and will collaborate on reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

As forming a good relationship with the local community is also highly important in delivering reconstruction assistance, officials to be dispatched by Japan, especially the troops of SDF will make as much effort as possible to this end in the area where their camp will be located.

### (2) Categories and Contents of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

#### A. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by the Troops of SDF

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the troops of SDF shall be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of

the activities to be conducted.

- (a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals, as well as to provide medical care to the local residents and others, depending on the situation.

- (b) Water Supply (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To purify water from rivers and other sources, and to distribute it to the residents of areas where there is a shortfall in daily water supply.

- (c) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities including Schools (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct repair work on public facilities such as schools, irrigation channels and roads.

- (d) Transportation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction related Goods and Others (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct transportation of materials such as those for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes and others by aircraft.

Also to conduct transportation of materials such as those for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes and others by vehicles and vessels insofar as it does not affect the activities listed from (a) to (c) above.

**B. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq**

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq will be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner with full assessment of the security situation, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted, and under the premise that the security of officials conducting the activity will be ensured.

- (a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals with the goal of rehabilitating the functions of major hospitals in Iraq, so as to improve the medical environment in the country.

- (b) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Facilities Necessary for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law)

To carry out such activities as installment of generators at public facilities including water purification plants in order to rehabilitate and maintain these public facilities.

- (c) Improvement in Irrigation (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct construction activities such as setting up water purification and supply equipment that can be maintained by the local residents themselves. These activities will be carried out after conducting a survey on the current situation of supply and sources of water, and with due consideration to coordination with water supply to be carried out by the troops of SDF described in paragraph A. (b) above.

(3) Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction are to be Implemented and the Designation of the Said Areas

A. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Troops of SDF Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Said Areas

- (a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the troops of SDF shall be implemented in areas where combat\* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the troops of SDF must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which the troops of SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Minister of State for Defense shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

\* act to kill a person and/or damage property in an international conflict; as defined in Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law.

- (b) The range of areas in which the troops of SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be the places and areas listed below as well as the following areas: places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and the place of the mission; places where personnel are boarded and disembarked; places where goods are loaded and unloaded or procured; areas where training concerning the activities of the troops is conducted; places where equipment is repaired; and areas of transit when moving between these places and areas.

In addition to the aforementioned, the members of SDF who conduct, as supplementary activities of the troops, intelligence gathering, communication and coordination activities, which are necessary for the safe and proper implementation of the activities of the troops, shall be able to perform their activities in the facilities of the coalition forces headquarters in Baghdad, the neighboring countries of Iraq and coastal states of the Persian Gulf, as well as the places and areas of transit when moving and communicating between the aforementioned places or areas, as well as between the aforementioned places or areas and the places or areas listed below.

- a) Medical Services, Water Supply and Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities such as Schools

Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

- b) Transportation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction related Goods and Other Goods

As for transportation by aircraft; airport facilities within Kuwait and Iraq (Basrah Airport, Baghdad Airport, Balad Airport, and Mosul Airport, and others)

As for ground transportation; Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

As for transportation by vessels; Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf

B. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Said Areas

- (a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support



Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq shall be implemented in areas where combat\* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Prime Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

- (b) The range of areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be the places and areas listed below as well as the following areas: places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and the places and areas listed below as well as the areas of transit when moving between these places or areas.

- a) Medical Services

- Hospitals and medical facilities in Iraq

- b) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Facilities Necessary for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

- Public facilities including water purification plants in Iraq

- Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

- (4) Size, Composition, Equipment, and Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Territories of Foreign Countries

- A. Size, Composition, and Equipment

- (a) Ground SDF Troops That Conduct the Medical Services, Water supply, and Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities such as Schools Listed from (2) A. (a) to (c)

The number of personnel in the troops shall be no greater than 600. When rotating the personnel, additional number of personnel may be added as necessary for the said rotation.

The troops shall be equipped with vehicles suitable for the activities listed from (2) A. (a) to (c), numbering no greater than 200 including bulldozers, wheeled armored personnel carriers, light armored mobile vehicles, and others, and as many pistols, rifles, machine guns, recoilless rifles, light anti-tank munitions as necessary for ensuring security depending on the size of the troops, and other equipment required for implementing their activities. When replacing the equipment, additional number of equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

- (b) Air SDF Troops That Conduct the Transportation, Supply, and Other Activities for the Ground SDF Troops as Stipulated in (a) and the Air Transportation of the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Related Goods and Others as Stipulated in (2) A. (d)

The troops shall consist of no greater than 8 transport aircraft and other aircraft suitable for transportation and the number of personnel shall be limited within the range necessary for the operation of these aircraft.

The troops shall be equipped with as many pistols, rifles, machine guns as necessary for ensuring security, and other equipment required for implementing their activities depending on the size of the troops. When replacing the equipment, additional number of

equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

- (c) Maritime SDF Troops That Conduct the Transportation, Supply, and Other Activities by Vessels for the Ground SDF Troops as Stipulated in (a)

The troops shall consist of no greater than 2 transport ships and other vessels suitable for transportation and 2 destroyers and the number of personnel shall be limited within the range necessary for the operation of these vessels.

The Troops shall possess other equipment necessary for the implementation of their activities.

B. Duration of Dispatch

The duration of dispatch shall be from December 15, 2003 to December 14, 2006.

During the above-mentioned period, the government will properly review the activities of the troops in consideration of: the progress of the political process in Iraq, such as the election of the national assembly and the establishment of a new government; security conditions, including the transfer of authority to maintain security to the Iraqi security forces; activities of the multinational forces performing duties in the province of Muthanna, including U.K. and Australian forces, and changes in the composition of these forces; and the progress of rehabilitation in the province.

- (5) Important Matters Regarding the Procurement of Goods Other Than Those Goods which are or Have been Utilized by the Relevant Administrative Agencies for Their Work or Operations with a View to Transferring Them to the United Nations and Others

The government shall procure the electric generators necessary for their installation to public facilities as well as water purification and supply facilities necessary for the improvement of irrigation that are to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

- (6) Other Important Matters Regarding the Implementation of the Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Including in designating the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance are to be conducted, and in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others.

B. Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as stipulated in (2) B. shall be implemented carefully and in a flexible manner during the necessary period that falls between December 15, 2003 and December 14, 2006, while assessing the security situation and paying due regard to ensuring security, including the form of implementation, location for accommodation of personnel, security arrangements, and equipment to be carried, and provided that security is ensured.

C. The government shall conduct necessary surveys concerning the development of Iraq's social infrastructure such as key industrial facilities and facilities related to daily life such as electricity power plants and cement plants, provided that security is ensured, and based on their results, endeavor to achieve rehabilitation and maintenance of these facilities through the activities of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

D. With respect to the implementation of the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (2) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

### 3. Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security

#### (1) Basic Matters Regarding the Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security, Categories and Contents of the Activities, Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which the Activities are to be Implemented, and the Designation of the Said Areas, as well as Size, Composition, Equipment and Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct the Activities in Territories of Foreign Countries

- A. Japan shall implement its response measures focusing on activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. On the other hand, in order to support the UN Member States' activities to restore security and stability in Iraq, the SDF troops that conduct the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as stipulated in 2 (4) A, may conduct medical services, transportation, storage of goods/stockpiling, communications, construction, repair/maintenance, supply and decontamination activities as stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law, insofar as it does not affect the accomplishment of their assigned activities.
- B. The range of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops shall be the same as that stipulated in 2 (3) A designated as the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by SDF troops as stipulated in 2 (4) A.

The SDF units' support activities for ensuring security shall be implemented in the areas where combat\* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the SDF troops must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which SDF troops conduct support activities for ensuring security within the range stated above, the Minister of State for Defense shall fully consider the contents of the activities, the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situations with special care.

#### (2) Other Important Matters Regarding Support Activities for Ensuring Security

- A. Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries, as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, including the designation of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security are to be conducted.
- B. With respect to the implementation of support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (1) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

### 4. Matters Regarding Coordination and Cooperation among the Relevant Administrative Agencies for the Implementation of Response Measures

To promote the response measures based on the Special Measures Law in a comprehensive and effective manner, and to ensure the safety of SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched under the said law, relevant administrative agencies, including the

Defense Agency/SDF, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall maintain close coordination and conduct necessary cooperation centering around the Cabinet Secretariat, including the matters listed below.

- (1) SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched, and relevant overseas establishments, will liaise closely with each other, including exchange of information necessary for carrying out the activities and ensuring security, and cooperate in working to deliver reconstruction assistance to Iraq.
- (2) The relevant administrative agencies shall closely communicate with each other concerning the overall situation of activities by other countries in the areas in which SDF troops or Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law and their vicinities, information on the security situation on the ground, and other necessary information for conducting the activities based on the said law and for ensuring safety, obtained through the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence.
- (3) The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall cooperate to the extent that it does not affect the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence when he (or she) is requested by the Prime Minister or the Minister of State for Defense to dispatch officials that have the skills and ability, among others, that are necessary to conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law, to transfer the control over the goods under his (or her) control and to cooperate by other means.
- (4) The Prime Minister shall endeavor to enlist a wide range of human resources in recruiting Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, with the cooperation of relevant administrative agencies, local governments or private organizations. The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall provide necessary cooperation in this regard.
- (5) The Heads of overseas establishments designated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall provide necessary cooperation for conducting the activities based on the Special Measures Law and for ensuring safety upon instructions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## **Reference 47. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq**

(Cabinet Understanding on June 18, 2004)

On June 8, 2004, Resolution 1546 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council. As provided in the Resolution, the occupation of Iraq will be terminated and its sovereignty will be fully restored on June 30.

Japan welcomes the full restoration of sovereignty of Iraq and the entering into a new phase toward full-fledged reconstruction.

Up until now, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan has been carrying out activities centering on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities for the people of Iraq, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and its Basic Plan in accordance with the Constitution of Japan. Its activities are highly appreciated in Iraq, and there is a strong expectation for the continuation of there activities after the restoration of Iraq.

In line with the unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution, which is based on the request of the Iraq Interim Government to the International Community for assistance including the continued presence of the

Multinational Force (MNF), and with the understanding that the reconstruction and stability of Iraq is important for the security and prosperity of Japan, the SDF will continue to carry out the above mentioned activities after the restoration of sovereignty.

In this respect, taking into account that the new Resolution clearly defines that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, as have been carried out by the SDF, are included in the tasks of the MNF, and upon sufficient deliberation within the Government on this matter, the Government has decided that the SDF will continue its activities henceforth within the MNF.

Beyond June 30, the SDF will be in the MNF and under the unified command of the MNF, and it will maintain communication and coordination between the command of the MNF. However, it will not be subject to the command of the MNF. The SDF will continue to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities etc., based on Japan's own judgement and under the Japanese national command, in a manner welcomed by the Iraq Interim Government. An understanding was reached on this point, between the government of Japan and the government of the U.S. and the U.K., which jointly proposed the draft Resolution, and which are core members of the MNF and its unified command.

The SDF will not be engaged in any activities that may be deemed as the use of force which is prohibited by the Constitution. It will continue its activities in so-called "non-combat areas" in accordance with the Special Measures Law, and its activities will not become an integral part of the use of force by other States.

As explained above, SDF's activities within the MNF will not alter the Government position regarding participation in so-called multinational forces in a manner considered to be impermissible in regard to the Constitution.

(Reference) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Cabinet Understanding on June 28, 2004)

The sovereignty was fully restored to Iraq on June 28, 2004. Therefore, the date, "June 30" being cited as the day to restore sovereignty to Iraq in the "Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq" (Cabinet Understanding of June 18, 2004) should be understood as "June 28."

#### **Reference 48. Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan on the Redeployment of Ground Self-Defense Force Troops from Samawah**

(June 20, 2006)

The Japanese Government decided today that it will redeploy the Ground Self-defense Force (GSDF) troops that have been engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Samawah, Iraq since the beginning of 2003, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq, judging that the objective of the GSDF's activities was now fulfilled. In addition, Japan decided to provide support for the UN's activities and the ongoing activities of the MNF, and has reached a decision to newly provide air-lift support to Baghdad and Erbil. In addition, after the redeployment of the GSDF, Japan will be providing assistance with a focus on the improvement of economic infrastructure through Yen loans, in coordination with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to be organized by the Multi-National Forces (MNF).

The international community has been unified in providing support for Iraq's reconstruction in order to assist the Iraqi people's efforts to reconstruct and rebuild their country. Japan for its part, has been steadily

assisting Iraq by combining the contribution by SDF personnel and Official Development Assistance (ODA), as a responsible member of the international community. With such support by the international community, the Iraqi political process has shown concrete progress. In December last year, the National Assembly elections were conducted. More recently, the new Iraqi Government was established. The process of transferring security responsibility to Iraq is moving forward. As seen in such developments, Iraq has taken the first full step to self-sustained reconstruction under the leadership of a democratic government.

In Al-Muthanna Province two and a half years of efforts by the GSDF troops in a wide range of areas including medical services, water provision and repair work on public infrastructure such as schools and roads, as well as Japanese ODA, have yielded visible results including rehabilitation and improvement of local infrastructure and creation of job opportunities. For example, all residents have gained access to basic medical care. In Samawah Maternity and Children Hospital, post-delivery mortality rate of newborns decreased to about one third of the rate in the first half of 2002. Improvements have been achieved in provision of water and educational environment. On employment, Japanese assistance, including repair work on public facilities by the SDF and job opportunity creation projects through ODA, created a maximum of approximately 6000 job opportunities per day, and a total of 1.56 million job opportunities. Furthermore, with Japanese ODA, construction work has started on a major power plant in Samawah. Once this plant is completed, a leap will be achieved in provision of electricity. In addition, the Government of Japan intends to continue providing reconstruction assistance to this region of Iraq, such as construction of bridges in Samawah, and irrigation projects in Al-Muthanna Province. Such reconstruction assistance projects have lead to high appreciation and confidence by the Iraqi Government and the local people.

It is time that the bilateral relationship between Japan and Iraq be transformed to a broader relationship with stronger political and economic relations. The Government of Japan will endeavor to ensure that the results of Japan's reconstruction assistance provided thus far will take root and will work to foster a broad and long-term partnership with Iraq.

The Iraqi Government fully agrees with Japan's basic policy towards reconstruction assistance for Iraq as mentioned above. The Government of Japan takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to the people and the government of Iraq that have warmly welcomed the GSDF troops as well as the relevant countries that have cooperated with the GSDF in Samawah, including the UK, Australia, the Netherlands and the US.

I ask for the Japanese people's understanding and support concerning the abovementioned decision by the Government of Japan.

## **Reference 49. Summary of the Basic Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

(April 21, 2006)

### **1. Basic Points**

The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001 were unforgivable acts against human kind as a whole. The whole world must join together to confront such acts.

With the recognition that international terrorism could also affect Japan, it is important for the Government to engage in cooperation and support activities as far as possible within the range permitted by the Constitution, taking a positive and active approach.

### **2. Cooperation and Support Activities**

- Type and contents of cooperation and support activities

- (1) Supply (supply of fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters by ships)
- (2) Transportation (transportation of fuel by vessels (if transport vessels are used, transportation of construction machinery and people, for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces), transport of people and materials by aircraft)
- (3) Other activities (repairs and maintenance, medical activities, sea port services (in Japan))
- Extent of the area for cooperation and support activities
  - (1) Supply and transportation by vessels
    - a. Japanese territories
    - b. Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf) and the related airspace
    - c. Diego Garcia Island and its territorial waters, air, and Australian territory
    - d. Territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries (however, if transport vessels are used, the territories of countries for transit and loading and unloading of construction machines and people for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces)
    - e. The seas between and airspace above two locations stipulated in a through d above, where the vessels pass
  - (2) Transportation by aircraft
    - a. Japanese territories
    - b. Guam Island, Diego Garcia Island, and their territorial seas and airspace
    - c. Territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries
    - d. The airspace between two locations stipulated in a to c above, where the aircraft passes
  - (3) Others
    - a. Repair and maintenance  
The Japanese territories, the areas for supply and transportation by vessels, as well as the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation for aircraft transport
    - b. Medical activities  
The Japanese territories, and the areas for actual supply and transportation by vessels
    - c. Seaport services  
The Japanese territories
- SDF units participating in cooperation and support activities in foreign territories
  - (1) Scale and composition
    - a. Supply and transportation by vessels  
The MSDF units (800 personnel or less; 1,600 personnel or less when changing shifts)  
For transportation by transport vessels, additional MSDF units can be deployed (400 personnel or less, including those onboard the accompanying destroyer).
    - b. Transportation by aircraft  
ASDF units (up to 180 personnel)
  - (2) Equipment
    - a. Vessels  
1 support vessels or less and 2 destroyers or less (2 support vessels or less and 4 destroyers or less when changing shifts)  
However, one transport vessel and one destroyer can be added respectively for

- transportation by transport vessels.
  - b. Aircraft
    - 6 transport aircraft and 2 multipurpose supporting aircraft, at maximum
  - c. Others
    - Pistols in a quantity equivalent to the number of SDF personnel in the ASDF unit in charge of transportation
- Dispatch period: November 20, 2001- November 1, 2006  
(However, transportation by transport vessels shall be conducted only once, during the period between December 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003.)
- Important matters for procurement and transfer of materials to foreign military forces  
The Government procures the fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters and water to be transferred to the U.S. forces and other foreign military forces.
- 3. Search and Rescue Activities  
If the SDF units participating in cooperation and support activities or assistance to affected people discover the victims of terrorist attacks or if the United States or other countries ask the Japanese Government for the search and rescue of the victims, the Government shall engage in search and rescue activities in the areas where Japan carries out such cooperation and support activities or assistance to affected people in the Indian Sea and the air above the Ocean.
- 4. Assistance to Affected People
  - Basic matters concerning assistance to affected people  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian aid organizations are engaged in assistance activities at refugee camps in Pakistan. The Government participates in this activity, taking such circumstances into account.  
  
As regards medical assistance in Pakistan, the Government cooperates and coordinates with Pakistan and the United Nations to facilitate specific adjustment and study as soon as possible, aiming at encouraging relevant administrative organizations to carry out this activity.  
  
For similar measures in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, consideration is underway with view of ongoing perspectives.
  - Types and contents of assistance to affected people  
Provision of the commodity supply to UNHCR upon its request
  - Extent of assistance to affected people
    - (1) The Japanese territories
    - (2) The Pakistani territories
    - (3) The Indian Ocean coast, and the territories of any countries of transit located between Japan and the Indian Ocean coast area
    - (4) The sea and airspace located between any of two points in (1), (2), and (3) above where the vessels pass
  - SDF units participating in assistance to affected people
    - (1) Scale and composition  
MSDF units comprising 120 personnel or less (except for personnel involved with the destroyer engaged in cooperation and support activities)
    - (2) Equipment  
1 minesweeper tender and 1 destroyer (the destroyer that is also engaged in cooperation and support activities)
  - Dispatch period: November 20, 2001-December 31, 2001