

Reference 1. Post-World War II Armed Conflicts

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	Civil War in China	1945–49	Chinese Nationalist Party vs. Chinese Communist Party	Unification of China by the Chinese Communist Party following direct confrontation with the Nationalist Party
	Indonesian Revolution	1945–49	The Netherlands vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Netherlands
	First Indochina War	1946–54	France vs. Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam)	Armed conflict for the emancipation of the Vietnamese from France
	First India-Pakistan War	1947–49	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the sovereignty of Kashmir following independence
	Malayan Emergency	1948–57	United Kingdom vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of British-controlled Malayan states
	Malayan Emergency	1957–60	Federation of Malaya vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of states of the Federation of Malaya
	Korean War	1950–53	Republic of Korea, United States and others (United Nations) vs. North Korea and China	Attempt by North Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula through force of arms
	Bombardment of Quemoy Island and Matsu Island	1954–78	Taiwan vs. China	Bombardment and propaganda war for Quemoy Island and Matsu Island
	Civil War in Laos	1959–75	Government of Laos (rightist and centrist factions) vs. Pathet Lao (leftist faction) and North Viet Nam	Conflict between Government of Laos and North Viet Nam-backed Pathet Lao forces
	Tibetan Uprising	1959	Pro-Dalai Lama faction vs. Government of China	Uprising of the pro-Dalai Lama faction over the Tibetan problems
	China-Indian Border Conflict	1959–62	India vs. China	Border dispute
	Viet Nam War	1960–75	South Viet Nam, United States and others vs. North Viet Nam and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front	Conflict between U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government forces and North Vietnamese forces cooperating with the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front
	Goa Conflict	1961	India vs. Portugal	Annexation by India of Portuguese colonies, including Goa
	West Irian Campaign	1961–62	Indonesia vs. the Netherlands	Conflict over the possession of western New Guinea
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Philippines	Conflict over the possession of North Borneo
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's policy of confrontation against the formation of the federation of Malaysia
	Second India-Pakistan War	1965–66	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict surrounding the jurisdiction of Kashmir
	China-Soviet Border Dispute	1969	China vs. Soviet Union	Clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on Damansky Island and in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
	Civil War in Cambodia	1970–75	Government of Cambodia vs. Khmer National United Front	Civil war between the Cambodian government (Lon Nol faction) and the Khmer National Unity Front (Sihanouk faction and the Khmer Rouge)
	Third India-Pakistan War	1971	India and Bangladesh vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan)
	Conflict over the Paracels	1974	South Viet Nam vs. China	Conflict surrounding possession of the Paracels
	Civil War in Timor	1975–78	Pro-Indonesia faction and Indonesian militias vs. the Independence Now! faction (leftist faction)	Civil war following Portugal's decolonization policy
	Viet Nam-Cambodia Conflict	1977–91	Viet Nam vs. Cambodia	Border dispute between Viet Nam and Cambodia, and Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	China-Viet Nam Conflict	1979	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict with China against Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia
	Spratly Island Conflict	1988	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict over the possession of the Spratly Islands
	Tajikistan Conflict	1992–97	Government of Tajikistan vs. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO)	Conflict following civil war in 1992 between Islamic armed groups, which fled to Afghan territory, and the Government of Tajikistan at the border zone between Tajikistan and Afghanistan—peace treaty signed in June 1997
	Cambodia Conflict	1997–98	Then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh's forces vs. Second Prime Minister Hun Sen's forces	Armed conflict between forces for then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh holding the government leadership and forces for Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir Regions	1999	India vs. Islamic Armed Forces	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir regions (Kargil) between armed groups infiltrating from Pakistan and the Indian Army
Middle East/North Africa	First Middle East War	1948–49	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq	Arab countries' attempt to deny the independence of Israel
	Algerian War	1954–62	Government of France vs. Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN)	Algerian conflict seeking independence from France
	Cyprus Conflict	1955–59	Government of the U.K. vs. National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA)	Attempt by people of Greek lineage to dispel British control and emancipate Cyprus
	Second Middle East War	1956	U.K., France, Israel vs. Egypt	Conflict between Egypt and the U.K. and France surrounding the Suez Canal—Israel sides with the U.K. and France
	Dispatch of Troops to Lebanon	1958	Government of Lebanon and the U.S. vs. Lebanese rebels	Revolt against the attempted resumption of office by Christian President Camille Chamoun; the U.S. dispatches troops to Lebanon at the request of the Government of Lebanon
	Dispatch of Troops to Kuwait	1961	Kuwait and the U.K. vs. Iraq	Dispatch of troops by the U.K. to Kuwait to counter Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait
	Civil War in Yemen	1962–69	Government of Yemen and Egypt vs. Yemeni Royalist faction	Royalist faction's struggle against the Republican regime
	Civil War in Cyprus	1963–64	Government of Cyprus and Greece vs. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey	Turkish Cypriots revolt against Greek Cypriots' strengthening of power
	Algeria-Morocco Border Dispute	1963–88	Algeria vs. Morocco	Conflict over possession of border zone
	Third Middle East War	1967	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria and Jordan	Conflict over the continuation of Israel's independence
	Fourth Middle East War	1973	Israel vs. Egypt and Syria	Conflict involving Egypt and Syria to restore the land occupied by Israel in the Third Middle East War
	Western Sahara Conflict	1973–	Governments of Morocco and Mauritania (in 1978, Mauritania concluded a peace accord with the Polisario Liberation Front) vs. Polisario Liberation Front (supported by Algeria)	Conflict surrounding the sovereignty of Western Sahara following Spain's withdrawal from the region—in August 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree to settle sovereignty by referendum (referendum not since held). In September 1997, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree in principle on the issues hampering the implementation of the 1988 agreement.
	Cyprus Conflict	1974–	Cyprus vs. Turkey	Turkish military intervention in order to protect inhabitants of Turkish lineage and prevent Cyprus from becoming part of Greece through the ousting of centrist President Makarios
	Conflict between North and South Yemen	1978–79	North Yemen vs. South Yemen and groups opposing the Government of North Yemen	Conflict in border zone between government forces and anti-government groups, including Yemen National Liberation Front, and South Yemeni forces

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Middle East/North Africa	Afghanistan Conflict	1979–89	Kharmal regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Kharmal and anti-Soviet forces; after May 1986, Najibullah regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Soviet and anti-Najibullah forces	Armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where there had been continued domestic uprisings against land reforms and other policies by the Taraki and Amin regimes. — In February 1989, Soviet withdrawal is completed.
	Iran-Iraq War	1980–88	Iran vs. Iraq	Conflict over the right to possess the border river—cease-fire reached in August 1988.
	Civil War in Lebanon	1975–91	Christian rightist faction (supported by Israel and Iraq) vs. Arab Deterrent Force (Syrian forces) and Islamic leftist faction	Intervention by Syria in a dispute between right-wing Christians and left-wing Muslims. —In 1989, the Taif Agreement (Charter of National Reconciliation) was made and in 1991 the civil war ended.
	Invasion of Lebanon	1982	Israel vs. PLO and Syria	Israeli forces invade Lebanon to crush the PLO (withdrawal completed in 2000)
	Civil War in Sudan	1983–	Sudanese central government vs. anti-government forces, including the Sudanese People's Liberation Army—details are unknown due to splits within the armed forces	Started with the conflict in which southern anti-government forces oppose a policy by the Sudanese central government to Arabize three southern states
	Civil War in Afghanistan	1989–2001	In and after February 1989, the Najibullah regime vs. anti-Najibullah government forces; in and after June 1992, Rabbani regime vs. anti-Rabbani government forces; in and after September 1996, Taliban regime vs. anti-Taliban government forces	The civil war continued even after the Soviet Union withdrew its forces, but in 2001 the war ended following the collapse of the Taliban administration.
	Gulf War	1990–91	Iraq vs. Kuwait, U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.	Iraq invades Kuwait; 28 countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., send Armed Forces acting on U.N. resolutions. —Truce is formally established in April 1991.
	Civil War in Yemen	1994	Political leaders of the former North, led by President Saleh, vs. political leaders of the former South, led by Vice President Beydo	Confrontation between leaders of the former North and South over post-unification political operation of the country intensifies and escalates into a civil war between armies supporting the former North and those supporting the former South. —Civil war ends when the Northern Army gains control of Aden.
	Military Campaign in Afghanistan	October 2001–	Taliban, Al Qaeda vs. American, British, French, Canadian, Australian and other nations and anti-Taliban forces including the Northern Alliance	Military campaign by U.S., U.K., Northern Alliance and others to eliminate Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., and the Taliban, which harbored Al Qaeda, from Afghanistan —In December 2001 Kandahar falls. Campaign to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda is still underway.
	Military operations in Iraq	March 2003–	Iraq vs. the United States, the United Kingdom, etc.	Exercise of force against the Hussein administration unwilling to cooperate in inspections for weapons of mass destruction by the U.S., the U.K. and other countries
Central and South Africa	Congo Conflict	1960–63	Government of Congo vs. secessionist faction and Belgium	Revolt by a secessionist independence faction against the continuation of Congolese unification: the country maintains unity through U.N. mediation efforts
	Chad-Libya Conflict	1960–94	Chad vs. Libya	Conflict between Chad and Libya regarding confrontation between tribes over political power and possession of the Aozou district—in May 1994, Libyan troops withdraw completely from the Aozou district
	Civil War in Ethiopia	1962–93	Government of Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF)	Conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and anti-government forces demanding the independence of Eritrea and Tigre—Eritrea attains independence in May 1993.

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Central and South Africa	South Rhodesian Dispute	1965–79	South Rhodesian government vs. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe African People' s Union (ZAPU)	Conflict between the white Smith regime and black guerrilla organizations
	Civil War in Nigeria	1967–70	Government of Nigeria vs. Biafra	Conflict involving a revolutionary secessionist faction opposed to maintaining Nigerian unity
	Namibian Independence Dispute	1975–90	Government of South Africa vs. Southwest African People' s Organization (SWAPO)	Confrontation between SWAPO, seeking Namibia' s independence, and the Government of South Africa
	Civil War in Angola	1975–91	Movement of People for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) vs. Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—FNLA weakens after Angola' s independence	Conflict among liberation groups following Angola' s independence from Portugal in November 1975
	Civil War in Mozambique	1975–91	Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) vs. Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)	Conflict between FRELIMO government forces, which had taken a socialist line since Mozambique' s independence from Portugal in 1975, and RENAMO, backed by South Africa
	Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict	1977–78	Ethiopia vs. West Somalia Liberation Front and Somalia	Conflict over the Ogaden region
	Civil War in Somalia	1988–	Barre Administration vs. anti-government forces—later, fighting among more than two armed factions	Fighting between the Barre Administration and anti-government guerrilla forces intensifies in the north, then spreads throughout the country; conflict escalates into a civil war among more than two armed factions
	Civil War in Liberia	1989–2003	Doe government of Liberia vs. National Patriotic Front Line (NPFL)—later, fighting among more than two armed factions	Armed fighting develops between the Doe Administration of Liberia and the NPFL and grows complex, resulting in a civil war between more than two contending forces, and NPFL Chairman Taylor is elected president. However, fighting with opposition forces continues. August 2003 Peace agreement signed
	Civil War in Rwanda	1990–94	Government of Rwanda vs. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)	Conflict between Hutu-led Government and Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front
	Civil War in Zaire	1996–97	Mobutu Administration vs. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), etc.	Armed uprising by Banyamlenge of the Tutsi tribe in eastern Zaire leads to civil war between the dictatorial government of President Mobutu Sese Seko and forces opposed to the Government. —In May 1997, the ADFL declares the country' s name to be changed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.
	Sierra Leone Conflict	1997–98	Army Front Revolutionary Congress (AFRC) vs. the West African Peach Monitoring Force (ECOMOG), etc.	Conflict arises between the AFRC Administration, established through a coup d' etat by junior officers, and Nigeria and ECOMOG, who seek the restoration of civil administration—in May 1998, President Kabbah returns
	Civil War in the Republic of Congo	1997	Government forces vs. faction of previous president (supported by Angola)	Clash over presidential elections between faction supporting President Lissouba (government Army) and faction backing former president Sassou Nguesso (private Army). —In October 1997, Sassou Nguesso is reinstated as president.
	Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict	1998–2000	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	Conflict over the yet-to-be-established border between the two countries—both sides accepted a cease-fire agreement in June 2000
	Civil War in Guinea Bissau	1998–	Government forces vs. faction of former Chief of Staff	Conflict between faction supporting the President and faction supporting the former Chief of Staff
	Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo	1998–99	Kabila Administration (supported by Angola, etc.) vs. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and anti-government forces (supported by Rwanda, etc.)	Conflict between government forces led by President Laurent Kabila and anti-Government forces, brought on by Hutu-Tutsi antagonism; neighboring countries become involved and the conflict widens. —A cease-fire agreement was established for the conflict in August 1999.

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Central and South Africa	Civil War in Sierra Leone	1998–99	West African Peace Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) vs. Reform Unification Front (RUF)	Conflict between Nigerian-led ECOMOG, supporting the Government, and RUF, an anti-government force formed by soldiers loyal to the former military administration. —A peace agreement was established between the Government and RUF in July 1997.
	Civil War in Angola	1998–2002	Government forces vs. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Conflict between government forces and the anti-government forces of UNITA. —A cease-fire agreement was signed by both parties in March 2002.
	Civil War in Ivory Coast	September 2002–July 2003	Government of Ivory Coast vs. Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI), etc.	An uprising by military personnel refusing to retire led to a civil war. July 2003 End of the civil war declared
Europe	Civil War in Greece	1946–49	Government of Greece vs. People's National Army of Liberation (ELAS)	Guerrilla warfare utilizing mountain regions conducted by the Communist Party leading opposition forces
	Berlin Blockade	1948–49	U.K., U.S. and France vs. the Soviet Union	Conflict over the Soviet Union blocking off traffic routes into West Berlin
	Hungarian Revolution	1956	Government of Hungary and the Soviet Union vs. Hungarian democratic faction	Movement against intervention by the Soviet Union in ethnic revolutionary movement of the Hungarian people
	Czech Incident	1968	Czechoslovakia vs. five members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, including the Soviet Union	Armed intervention to prevent the liberation of Czechoslovakia
	Conflict in Northern Ireland	1969–98	Catholic extremists vs. Protestant extremists	Conflict over improving the status of minority Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland and granting Northern Ireland independence—peace agreement reached in 1998
	Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	1988–	Azerbaijan vs. Armenian Armed Forces	Armed clashes with Azerbaijan, in which Armenian residents in the Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region have been demanding their return to Armenia
	Collapse of Romanian Regime	1989	Government of President Nicolae Ceaucescu backed by the military forces and secret police vs. pro-democracy groups supported by the people's army	Pro-democracy groups and the people's army, supporting the citizens, toppled the Government of President Ceaucescu, which pursued dictatorial and repressive policies.
	Abkhazia Conflict	1991–	Abkhazia vs. Georgia	Armed conflict between the territory of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, which has declared its independence as the "Republic of Abkhazia," and the Government of Georgia
	Civil War in Slovenia	1991	Slovenia vs. forces of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Conflict between Slovenia, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and federal forces intervening to stop the Slovenian movement—a cease-fire was established in July 1991
	Civil war in Croatia	1991–95	Croatia vs. forces of the Government of the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbian forces	Conflict between Croatia, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and federal forces intervening to stop the Croatian movement. Civil war with Serbian armed forces persists even after disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. —In November 1995, a peace treaty is signed.
	Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992–95	Muslim government (armed) forces and Croatian forces vs. Serbian forces	Power struggle among three ethnic groups—Muslims, Serbians and Croats—sparked by the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. —In December 1995, a peace treaty is signed.
	Chechen Conflict	1994–96 1999–	Government of Russia vs. Chechen armed groups	Conflict between armed groups in the Chechen Republic, seeking independence from Russia, and the Russian government, trying to prevent them. —In 1996, a cease-fire agreement is reached. Armed clashes since 1999.

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Europe	Kosovo Conflict	1998–99	Government of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Government of the Serb Republic vs. Albanian armed groups	Conflict between Albanian armed groups, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic, trying to prevent them. Acceptance by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia of a peace proposal initiated by the U.S., Europe and Russia in 1999.
Americas	Counterrevolution in Guatemala	1954	Government of Guatemala vs. counterrevolutionaries	Conservative forces opposing land reforms by the Government topple the Government in a coup d' etat
	Revolution in Cuba	1956–59	Battista Administration vs. anti-government forces	Anti-government forces toppled a Battista regime which had lost popular support because of its ruthlessly suppressive policies
	Bay of Pigs Invasion	1961	Government of Cuba vs. Cuban defectors	Cuban defectors based in the U.S. invade Cuba and are defeated
	Cuban Missile Crisis	1962	U.S. vs. Soviet Union and Cuba	Crisis develops after the U.S. confirms the transport of Soviet mid-range missiles to Cuba
	Revolt in Venezuela	1962–63	Government of Venezuela vs. rebels	Revolt by communists, MIR, etc., against moderate administration making social reforms
	Civil War in Dominican Republic	1965	Government of the Dominican Republic and U.S. vs. rebels	Revolt by young Army officers seeking restoration of constitutional law escalates into civil war; U.S. forces and peacekeeping forces of the Organization of American States intervene
	Civil War in Nicaragua	1979–90	Government of Nicaragua vs. anti-government forces	After revolt and establishment of regime by Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), anti-regime forces (Contras) opposing the regime's increasingly leftist orientation wage guerrilla warfare
	Civil War in El Salvador	1979–92	Government of El Salvador vs. anti-government forces	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) wages guerrilla warfare aimed at bringing down the Government
	Falkland (Malvinas) Islands Conflict	1982	U.K. vs. Argentina	Military clash between the U.K. and Argentina over territorial claim to Falkland (Malvinas) Islands
	Dispatch of Troops to Grenada	1983	Grenada rebels vs. U.S., Jamaica, Barbados and Eastern Caribbean States	As a measure toward collective security based on the Treaty for Establishment of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, member states send troops. In response to a request for aid, the U.S. and other states also dispatch troops to Grenada.
	Dispatch of Troops to Panama	1989	U.S. vs. Panama	Confrontation between Supreme Commander Manuel Noriega—holder of actual power in the Government of Panama—and the U.S.

Reference 2. Major Nuclear Forces

		U.S.	Russia	U.K.	France	China
Missiles	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)	550 Minuteman III: 500 Peacekeeper: 50	506 SS-18: 86 SS-19: 100 SS-25: 270 SS-27: 50	—	—	26DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-9): 6
	IRBMs MRBMs	—	—	—	—	55 DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 DF-4 (CSS-3): 20 DF-21 (CSS-5): 33
	SRBM	—	—	—	—	725
	Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)	432 Trident C-4: 144 Trident D-5: 288 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 14)	252 SS-N-18: 96 SS-N-20: 60 SS-N-23: 96 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 15)	58 Trident D-5: 58 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	64 M-45: 64 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 1)
Long-distance (strategic) bombers		114 B-2: 20 B-52: 94	80 Tu-95 (Bear): 64 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16	—	—	—

Source: *Military Balance 2006*, etc.

Reference 3. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Item	Country	Name	Maximum Range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
ICBM	U.S.	Minuteman III	13,000	MIRV (170 KT or 335-350 KT x3)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
		Peacekeeper	9,600	MIRV (300-475 KT x 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-18	10,200–15,000	MIRV (1.3 MT x 8, 500-550 KT x 10 or 500-750 KT x 10) or Single (24 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-19	9,000–10,000	MIRV (550 KT x 6 or 500-750 KT x 6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-24	10,000	MIRV (550 KT x 10)	Inertial + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage solid (Discontinued)
		SS-25	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + Computer control	Three-stage solid
		SS-27	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + GLONASS	Three-stage solid
	China	DF-5 (CSS-4)	12,000–13,000	Single (4 MT) or MIRV (150-350 KT x 4-6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-31 (CSS-9)	8,000–14,000	Single (1 MT) or MIRV (20-150 KT x 3-5)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT x 8 or 475 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-N-18	6,500–8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (500 KT x 3 or 100 KT x 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT x 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT x 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
	U.K.	Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT x 8 or 475 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	France	M-4	4,000–5,000	MRV (150 KT x 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
		M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT x 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
	China	JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150–2,500	Single (20-500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
IRBM MRBM	China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,650–2,800	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	One-stage liquid
		DF-4 (CSS-3)	4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-21 (CSS-5)	2,150–2,500	Single (20-500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Radar	Two-stage solid

Item	Country	Name	Maximum Range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280–530	Single (2 KT–20 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT)	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched
	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500–3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched

Sources: *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, etc.*

Reference 4. List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

1. Completed U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

(As of the end of May 2006)

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Area of Deployment
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Nov.'56-Jun.'67	Suez Canal Zone, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Jun.'58-Dec.'58	Lebanon-Syria border
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Jul.'60-Jun.'64	Congo
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)	Oct.'62-Apr.'63	West Irian
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	Jul.'63-Sep.'64	Yemen
Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	May '65-Oct.'66	Dominican Republic
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	Sep.'65-Mar.'66	India-Pakistan border
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Oct.'73-Jul.'79	Suez Canal zone, Sinai Peninsula
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	May '88-Mar.'90	Afghanistan-Pakistan border
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Aug.'88-Feb.'91	Iran-Iraq border
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Jan.'89-May '91	Angola
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Apr.'89-Mar.'90	Namibia
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Nov.'89-Jan.'92	Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	Apr.'91-Oct.'03	Iraq, Kuwait
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	May '91-Feb.'95	Angola
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	Jul.'91-Apr.'95	El Salvador
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Oct.'91-Mar.'92	Cambodia
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Mar.'92-Dec.'95	Mar.'92-Mar.'95 Former Yugoslavia Mar.'95-Dec.'95 Bosnia-Herzegovina
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Mar.'92-Sep.'93	Cambodia
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Apr.'92-Mar.'93	Somalia
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Dec.'92-Dec.'94	Mozambique
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Mar.'93-Mar.'95	Somalia
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Jun.'93-Sep.'94	Uganda
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Sep.'93-Sep.'97	Liberia
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Sep.'93-Jun.'96	Haiti
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Oct.'93-Mar.'96	Rwanda
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May '94-Jun.'94	Liberia-Chad border
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	Dec.'94-May '00	Tajikistan
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Feb.'95-Jun.'97	Angola
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)	Mar.'95-Jan.'96	Croatia
United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	Mar.'95-Feb.'99	Macedonia
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	Dec.'95-Dec.'02	Bosnia and Herzegovina
United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	Jan.'96-Jan.'98	Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Croatia)
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	Jan.'96-Dec.'02	Prevlaka Peninsula (Croatia)
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	Jul.'96-Jul.'97	Haiti
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	Jan.'97-May'97	Guatemala
United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola (MONUA)	Jun.'97-Feb.'99	Angola
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	Aug.'97-Nov.'97	Haiti

(As of the end of May 2006)

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Area of Deployment
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	Dec.'97-Mar.'00	Haiti
United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)	Jan.'98-Oct.'98	Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Croatia)
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Apr.'98-Fed.'00	Central Africa
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Jul.'98-Oct.'99	Sierra Leone
United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Oct.'99-May'02	East Timor
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Jul.'98-Dec.'05	Sierra Leone
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	May '02-May'05	East Timor

Notes: 1. Source: United Nations materials, etc.
 2. UNAMIC was later absorbed by UNTAC.

2. Peacekeeping Operations Currently in Progress

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Scale of Operation	Area of Deployment
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	Jun.1948–	154	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, etc.
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Jan.1949–	43	Jammu and Kashmir, India-Pakistan cease-fire zone
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Mar.1964–	928	Cyprus
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Jun.1974–	1,033	Golan Heights (Syria)
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Mar.1978–	1,991	Southern Lebanon
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Apr.1991–	225	Western Sahara
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	Aug.1993–	131	Abkhazia (Georgia)
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	Jun.1999–	2,171	Kosovo
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov.1999–	17,490	Democratic Republic of the Congo and capital cities of neighboring countries
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Jul.2000–	3,373	Ethiopia-Eritrea border
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Sep.2003–	15,891	Liberia
United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr.2004–	7,601	Cote d'Ivoire
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Jun.2004–	8,770	Haiti
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	Jun.2004–	3,556	Burundi
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar.2005–	9,265	Sudan

Note: "Scale of Operation" indicates the number of troops engaged in activities as of the end of April 2006.

Reference 5. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or region	Ground forces (10,000 persons)	Country or region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of vessels	Country or region	Number of combat aircraft
China	160	United States	571.1	1,120	United States	3,560 *
India	110	Russia	211.0	870	China	3,530 *
North Korea	100	China	107.5	780	Russia	2,320 *
Republic of Korea	56	United Kingdom	88.0	240	India	990 *
Pakistan	55	France	39.3	250	Syria	630
United States	49	India	34.8	150	Egypt	630 *
Viet Nam	41	Turkey	21.1	200	Republic of Korea	600 *
Turkey	40	Taiwan	20.5	340	North Korea	590
Russia	40	Spain	20.3	130	Turkey	540
Iran	35	Germany	20.0	140	Taiwan	530 *
Myanmar	35	Italy	18.4	170	Israel	440
Egypt	34	Indonesia	18.1	180	Pakistan	430 *
Indonesia	23	Brazil	17.9	120	Germany	430 *
Syria	20	Australia	15.2	80	France	420 *
Taiwan	20	Republic of Korea	13.5	180	Ukraine	380
Japan	14.8	Japan	42.8	150	Japan	440

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces was taken from *Military Balance 2006* and other sources, and data on naval forces was taken from *Jane's Fighting Ships 2005-2006* and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2005, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).

3. Of the combat aircraft, the asterisk denotes inclusion of air force, naval and marine combat aircraft.

4. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 6. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)




Country or Region	Military Service System	Regulars (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	155		96
Russia	Conscription/Volunteer	103		2000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	22		24
France	Volunteer	25		2
Germany	Conscription	28		35
Italy	Volunteer	19		6
India	Volunteer	133		116
China	Conscription	226		80
North Korea	Conscription	110		65
Republic of Korea	Conscription	69		450
Egypt	Conscription	47		48
Israel	Conscription	17		41
Japan	Volunteer	Army	14.8	3.4 (0.6)
		Navy	4.5	0.1
		Air Force	4.6	0.08

Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2006 and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY2005. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.

3. Russia has made the shift from a conscription to voluntary system a top priority issue.

Reference 7. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan



Note: Data taken from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

Reference 8. Written Answers to the Questions by Representatives Seiichi Inaba on the Constitution, International Law and the Right of Collective Self-Defense (submitted on May 29, 1981)—Excerpt—

The relationship between the right of collective self-defense, Article 9 of the Constitution, and international law is not necessarily explicit. Since the situation at hand requires the elucidation of this relationship, the following questions were submitted.

1. Unified definition as a Cabinet
2. It is beyond doubt that as a sovereign state, Japan has the right of self-defense under existing international law; however, is the right of collective self-defense included herein?
3. Does the Constitution ban the right of collective self-defense and if it is banned, in which article is that stipulated?
4. Is the collective self-defense not being implemented from a policy standpoint and not from the fact that it is banned?
5. Realistically, does Japan face disadvantages in national defense due to the fact that it does not have the right of collective self-defense?

Answers to 1 through 5

Under international law, it is understood that a state has the right of collective self-defense, that is, the right to use force to stop an Armed Attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.

In addition, Japan views the exercise of the right of self-defense within the limit of minimum necessary level for the defense of the nation, and therefore, the Constitution's preclusion of the right to exercise the right of collective self-defense does not generate disadvantages.

Reference 9. Written Answers to the Questions by Representative Takako Doi on the Basic National Policies upon the Inauguration of the Koizumi Cabinet (submitted on May 8, 2001)—Excerpt—

In order to know Prime Minister Koizumi's views on basic national policies upon the inauguration of his Cabinet, I would like to ask the following questions. His views pertaining to each of the following questions are not clear from his remarks before taking the office as well as those made during the Presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party and his inauguration press conference, and cannot be left unclear since they affect Japanese policies fundamentally.

1. Mr. Koizumi, with regard to the right of collective self-defense, expressed that it should be studied to allow the exercise of that right by changing the past constitutional interpretation. What is the past constitutional interpretation by the Government? Does the Government think that the exercise of the right of the collective self-defense can be allowed by changing the constitutional interpretation? I here seek again the unified view of the Koizumi Cabinet.

Answer to 1.

The Government believes, as in the past, that it is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.

Given the fact that the Constitution is the foundation of Japanese legal order and that an accumulation of Diet debates over more than 50 years exists on this particular Article 9, the Government believes that it should be fully judicious to change the interpretation of the Article.

On the other hand, it is important to have a wide range of discussion on constitutional issues, taking developments in society into consideration, and it is believed that studies on the issues of the right of collective self-defense from various perspectives are not prohibited.

Reference 10. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.

In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

- (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
- (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

Reference 11. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005—

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

I. Purpose

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

IV. Future Defense Forces

V. Additional Elements for Consideration Attached Table

I. Purpose

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005-." The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures."

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment.

Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and

cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.

North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.
4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defensive defense policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts,

Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner--the United States--Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

(3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY1996-" (The Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities").

In developing Japan's defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in "situations in areas surrounding Japan"; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization--the United Nations--to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical

characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant

units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issue, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.

- (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.
 - (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing life-cycle cost, including purchase price, of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resource in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological base, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.
 - (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.
2. These National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

(Attached Table)

The following posture will be established in order to make Japan's new defense forces multi-functional, flexible and effective, and able to undertake diverse roles as discussed above (IV).

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel Regular Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)		155,000 148,000 7,000
	Major Units	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armed division Central Readiness Group
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Major Equipment	Tanks Main Artillery	Approx. 600 Approx. 600
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) Destroyer Units (regional district units) Submarine Units Minesweeper Unit Patrol Aircraft Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 16 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Unit Air Transport Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	Approx. 350 Approx. 260 ¹
Assets for Ballistic Missile Defense ²	Major Equipment	Aegis-equipped Destroyers	4
	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Notes: 1. The number already included in total figure for combat aircraft, above

2. The numbers of units and equipment are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

Reference 12. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-2009)

I. Policies for the Program

From FY2005 to FY2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. Hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities"), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion.
2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.
3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S. based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Group that administrates and operates units for nation-

wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of the FY2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY2009.

4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.
5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed with two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

III. Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

(1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot Surface-to-Air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the U.S., and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and to start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles.

The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, The GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker-transport aircrafts (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircrafts that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircrafts, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircrafts (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new

patrol aircrafts that will replace P-3Cs; and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircrafts (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

(5) Response to Large-scale and/or Special-type Disasters

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

2. Preparations to Deal with Large-scale Invasion of Japan

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a large-scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircrafts, fighters, and so on.

3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activity

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co- training/exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bi-lateral or multi-lateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and co-exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (UN).

4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

(1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to create a new joint staff organization and reorganize service Staff Office as mentioned in section II 2 above, the GDJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercise, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence section such as Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircrafts.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicle of high altitude and endurance.

(3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

a. Strengthening command and control capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence in unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

b. Promoting research and development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicle, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the mean time, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the U.S. and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Enhancement of measures for personnel, education and training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of the personnel. The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increase of young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhance education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society, and take necessary measures.

b. Promotion of research and education regarding security issues

The GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

5. Measures to Support Defense Capability

(1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb life-cycle-cost of equipments including cost of procurement, with a concrete target to achieve. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing the efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.

(2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Societies

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as police, fire department, the Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local societies with the Citizen's Protection Law on its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and keep strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the US Force in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training

Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.

3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The GOJ will strengthen Japan-US bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.

4. Equipment and Technology Exchanges

The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the U.S. in the area of equipment and technology.

5. Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective

The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

6. Enhancement of Japan-U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security

The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as war against terrorism and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

V. Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

VI. Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yens at the prices of FY2005.
2. In the annual budget-formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond an unforeseeable situation in future, extra budget, besides the defense related-expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the

limit of 100 billion yens on condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve.

The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the "Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet in January 24, 1987).

3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years from now, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in the technologies such as information and communication technology and Japan's fiscal condition.

VII. Others

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account security environment and technological trend at the time.
2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks Artillery (excluding mortar) Armored vehicles Combat helicopters (AH-64D) Transport helicopters (CH-47JA) Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	49 vehicles 38 vehicles 104 vehicles 7 craft 11 craft 8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of AEGIS system equipped Destroyers Submarines Others Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage) New fixed-wing patrol aircraft Patrol helicopters (SH-60K) Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 ships 5 ships 4 ships 11 ships 20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons) 4 craft 23 craft 3 craft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided patriot missiles Modernization of fighters (F-15) Fighters(F-2) New fighters New transport aircraft Transport helicopters (CH-47J) Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	2 groups & for education, etc. 26 craft 22 craft 7 craft 8 craft 4 craft 1 craft

Reference 13. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

1. The Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (the new NDPG) and the "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY2005-FY2009" at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today's security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other

various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan's future security and defense.

3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan's vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place. The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea line of communication.

The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces--the ultimate guarantee of its national security--should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological,

chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerges, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Since, in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.

6. We will continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY2005-FY2009" was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately ¥24,240 billion measured in constant FY 2004 yen.
10. The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY2006

1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY2005	Budget for FY2006	Note
1. Effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies			
(1) Response to ballistic missile attacks	119,842	139,879	Maintenance of new warning control and surveillance radars (FPS-XX), Japan-U.S. joint development of interceptive missiles with improved capabilities for BMD, etc.
(2) Counterattacks against guerillas and special operations units	84,060	84,515	Development of mobile surveillance radars (8 units), new short-range surveillance equipment (11 units), biological detection vehicles (2 units), chemical protection vehicles (2 units), NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc.
(3) Response to submarines and armed special-operations vessels in the surrounding sea areas	7,558	8,151	Maintenance of bistatic signal processing devices for P-3C (2 units) and improved DIFAR buoys for P-3C (256 units), research in the anti-submarine Morse missiles, development of new anti-submarine torpedo, etc.
(4) Response to large-scale and particular disasters	71,790	62,522	Improvement of life saving systems, CH-47J (1 unit), UH-60J (2 units), etc.
2. Efforts for a peaceful and stable international society including Japan	10,403	7,109	Education on international activities and PR facilities, promotion of international peace cooperation activities, efforts toward security dialogues/mutual defense talks, arms control and disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
3. Strengthening of joint operation posture	90	345	Implementation of joint trainings and enhancement of joint operation infrastructure
4. Establishment of a more advanced information communication network	211,493	196,165	Maintenance of Common Operating Environment (COE), development of data communication capabilities with the Japan Coast Guard
5. Response to progress of military technology applications	175,452	165,922	Development of P-X and C-X, air-to-air small targets, etc.
6. Improvement of personnel and education/training measures			Improvement of family quarters (larger than 55 m ²) and discontinuation of salary charts for director generals
(1) Promotion of personnel measures			
(a) Improvement of living-related facilities and working environment	71,752	52,093	
(b) Quality-of-life measures and reemployment support	68,550	68,051	
(2) Enhancement of education and training (expenses for education and training fuel, repair, etc.)	846,933	899,984	
7. Hygiene (including enhancement of measures regarding medical officers)	40,665	29,766	Opening of the SDF district hospitals to public, promotion of research in defense medicine, investigation of possibilities to change the length of nurse training program to 4 years
8. Stable improvement of defense capability (main equipment)	714,094	730,975	Modernized upgrade for battle tanks (11 units), artilleries (7 units), destroyers (DDH: 1 unit), fighters (F-2: 5 units, F-15 (2 units), etc.

Note: 1. Amounts are pursuant to contracts (the same applies to the table below).

2. There is some overlap of mutually related operations in terms of "Response to various situations."

2. Enhancement of Equipment

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2006 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-90 tank	11	8,811	0	8,811
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	20	2,421	0	2,421
Type-99 155 mm self-propelled howitzer	7	6,694	0	6,694
Type-87 reconnaissance and control vehicle	3	720	0	720
Chemical protection vehicle	2	354	0	354
Light armored mobile vehicle	180	5,550	0	5,550
Other		5,906	19	5,886
Total		30,456	19	30,436

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2006 Budget	Future Obligation
Guided Missiles				
Equipment and material for improvement of surface-to-air missile (Hawk)	—	2,285	36	2,249
Surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	8,568	637	7,931
Improving capabilities for surface-to-air missile (Patriot) (including the acquisition of PAC-3 missile)	1 group for anti-aircraft	63,598	40	63,558
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	1 company	20,269	0	20,269
Equipment for improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	1 set	4,741	0	4,741
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	4 sets	3,128	0	3,128
Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile	15 sets	234	0	234
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile	—	2,853	0	2,853
Type-96 multi-purpose missile	1 set	3,348	0	3,348
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	48 sets	3,074	0	3,074
Other		0	0	0
Total		112,098	713	111,385
Aircraft				
GADF				
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	2	4,839	0	4,839
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	1	5,039	0	5,039
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	4	4,383	0	4,383
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	1	6,102	0	6,102
Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	1	10,528	5	10,524
Subtotal	9	30,892	5	30,887
MSDF				
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	3	21,070	16	21,054
Primary trainer (T-5)	1	367	0	367
Improvements of electronic intelligence aircraft (EP-3)	(1)	5,148	0	5,148
Subtotal	4	26,584	16	26,569
ASDF				
Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	(2)	13,077	1,081	11,996
Combat aircraft (F-2)	5	66,761	13	66,748
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	1	3,683	—	3,682
Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	1	6,085	414	5,670
Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	2	11,880	20	11,860
Primary trainer (T-7)	3	756	3	753
Improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C)	(0.5)	1,077	39	1,038
Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	(4)	16,228	406	15,822
Subtotal		119,547	1,976	117,569
Total	12	177,023	1,997	175,025
Vessels				
Destroyer (DDH)	1	97,513	227	97,286
Submarine (SS)	1	56,231	126	56,105
Mainesweeper (MSC)	1	15,789	19	15,769
Replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer	(2)	893	259	634
Functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer (including the acquisition of SM-3 missile)	(1)	30,694	3,676	27,018
Total	3	201,120	4,306	196,813

Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.

2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.

3. The figures for the surface-to-air missile (Patriot) are the expenses needed for the maintenance/deployment of missiles for firing.

4. The figures for the Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile include the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile for the helicopter.

5. The figures for the Type-88 surface-to-ship missile are the expenses needed for the improvement of the training missile.

6. The amount listed for combat helicopters (AH-64D) includes the costs needed to maintain fire control radars.

7. Figures for the modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15), improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) and improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767) are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY2005 since these are a part of the work to improve the aircraft in use at present. The figures for improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) include the craft repair expense.

8. The figures for replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer and functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY2005 since these are a part of the work to improve aircraft currently in use.


Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY2006

Item		Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY2005	FY2006
Ground Self-Defense Force	Type-89 rifle	Gun	7,084	6,064
	5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	343	348
	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	80
	Type-87 anti-tank missile launcher	Set	10	5
	81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	12	9
	120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	6	4
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	7	7
	Type-90 tank	Vehicle	12	11
	Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	160	180
	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	15	20
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	1	3
	Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-78 snowmobile	Vehicle	15	12
	Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	2	2
	Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	157	164
	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	2
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	1	1
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	Aircraft	3	4
	Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	1	1
	Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	Aircraft	2	1
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	2	1
	Improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	1	1
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	4	4
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile	Set	15	—
	Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	2	1
	Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	36	48
Maritime Self-Defense Force	13,500-ton destroyer	Vessel	—	1
	2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	1	1
	570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	1	1
	980-ton multi-purpose support ship	Vessel	2	—
	Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	Aircraft	7	3
	Rescue amphibian (US-2)	Aircraft	1	—
	Primary trainer (T-5)	Aircraft	—	1
	Improvements of electronic intelligence aircraft (EP-3)	Aircraft	1	1
	Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	Vessel	3	2
	Repair of destroyers equipped with the Aegis system	Vessel	1	1


	Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY2005	FY2006
Air Self-Defense Force	Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	4	2
	Combat aircraft (F-2)	Aircraft	5	5
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	Aircraft	—	1
	Tanker aircraft (KC-767)	Aircraft	1	—
	Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	Aircraft	1	1
	Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	Aircraft	2	2
	Primary trainer (T-7)	Aircraft	3	3
	Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)	Aircraft	2	0.5
	Improvements in radar function of early warning aircraft (E-767)	Aircraft	4	4
	Improvements in reconnaissance function of reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4E)	Aircraft	1	—
	Improvements of special transport aircraft	Aircraft	2	—
	Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot	Group of items	Equivalent to 1 (for training)	1
	Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	8	8

Reference 16. Shift in the Number of Major Equipment Units (except tanks, destroyers, and fighters)

(1) Shift in the number of major artillery equipment



(2) Shift in the number of patrol helicopters



Note: The numbers include those for modified helicopters.

Reference 17. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

Number Owned

(As of March 31, 2006)

Type	Approximate Number Owned
Recoilless guns	3,140
Mortars	2,000
Field artillery	720
Rocket launchers, etc.	1,670
Anti-aircraft machine guns	110
Tanks	950
Armored vehicles	950

Note: All figures except for that of armored vehicles include self-propelled guns.

Performance Specifications (1)

Item	Diameter (mm)	Total Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Overall Height (m)	Weight (kg)
84-mm recoilless gun	84	1.1	0.32	0.43	16
81-mm mortar L16	81	1.3	0.88	1.23	38
155-mm howitzer FH70	155	12.4	7.7	2.2	9,600
Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155	11.3	3.2	4.3	40,000
203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203	10.3	3.2	3.1	28,500
Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35	7.99	3.2	3.3	38,000

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit.

Performance Specifications (2)

Item	Total Vehicle Weight (t)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity (people)	Major Mounted Artillery
Type-90 tank	Approx. 50	70	3	120-mm anti-tank gun
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Approx. 15	100	10	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher
Type-89 armored combat vehicle	Approx. 27	70	10	35-mm machine gun
Type-82 command and communication vehicle	Approx. 14	100	8	12.7-mm heavy machine gun
Type-87 reconnaissance and warning vehicle	Approx. 15	100	5	25-mm machine gun

Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, With Performance Specifications and Data

Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2006)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	53	205
Submarine	16	42
Mine warfare ship	31	27
Patrol combatant craft	9	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	29	123
Total	151	428

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 AEGIS system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapons system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Short-range SAM system × 1 set Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set
Minesweeper (Ocean)	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Minesweeper (Coastal)	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1 SSM system × 1 set
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.

Reference 19. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2006)

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	9	290	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and reconnaissance	6	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	84	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	140	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	22	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H/J	Utility	158	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	53	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	26	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	96	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, four-engines
		SH-60J	Patrol	89	150	3	15	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	SH-60K	Patrol	8	140	4	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	10	160	7	22	6	Turboshaft, triple engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Combat	203	2.5 mach	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-4EJ	Combat	91	2.2 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		F-1	Combat	7	1.6 mach	1	18	8	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-2A/B	Combat	68	2 mach	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, one-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	27	2.2 mach/ 1.8 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		C-1	Transport	26	440	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engines
		C-130H	Transport	16	340	5 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, four-engines
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	0.8 mach	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	17	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

- Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2006.
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
3. F-4EJs include 84 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

Reference 20. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2006)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Anti-aircraft	Patriot	ASDF	Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Pre-program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDf	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDf/ MSDF/ ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)	GSDf	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx. 630	Approx. 4.5	Approx. 34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx. 710	Approx. 4.7	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx. 89	Approx. 2.9	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx. 91	Approx. 3.0	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx. 220	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
Anti-ship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDf	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx. 520	Approx. 3.9	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)	MSDF	Approx. 510	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)	ASDF	Approx. 600	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx. 530	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Anti-tank	Type-64 anti-tank missile	GSDf	Approx. 16	Approx. 1.0	Approx. 12	Wire guidance
	Type-87 anti-tank missile		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.1	Approx. 11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx. 11	Approx. 0.9	Approx. 12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx. 18	Approx. 1.2	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Anti-landing craft and anti-tank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDf	Approx. 33	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx. 59	Approx. 2.0	Approx. 16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Helfire	MSDF	Approx. 48	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 18	Laser homing

Reference 21. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Forecast) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense- related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	-0.8	8,107	-2.8	1,349	-3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	-0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	-2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
1996	4,960,000	751,049	5.8	431,409	2.4	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45	11.2
1997	5,158,000	773,900	3.0	438,067	1.5	49,414 49,475	1.98 2.1	0.958 0.959	6.39 6.39	11.3 11.3
1998	5,197,000	776,692	0.4	445,362	1.7	49,290 49,397	-0.3 -0.2	0.948 0.950	6.35 6.36	11.1 11.1
1999	4,963,000	818,601	5.4	468,878	5.3	49,201 49,322	-0.2 -0.2	0.991 0.994	6.01 6.03	10.5 10.5
2000	4,989,000	849,871	3.8	480,914	2.6	49,218 49,358	0.0 0.1	0.987 0.989	5.79 5.81	10.2 10.3
2001	5,186,000	826,524	-2.7	486,589	1.2	49,388 49,553	0.3 0.4	0.952 0.956	5.98 6.00	10.1 10.2
2002	4,962,000	812,300	-1.7	475,472	-2.3	49,395 49,560	0.0 0.0	0.995 0.999	6.08 6.10	10.4 10.4
2003	4,986,000	817,891	0.7	475,922	0.1	49,265 49,530	-0.3 -0.1	0.988 0.993	6.02 6.06	10.4 10.4
2004	5,006,000	821,109	0.4	476,320	0.1	48,764 49,030	-1.0 -1.0	0.974 0.979	5.94 5.97	10.2 10.3
2005	5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	-0.7	48,301 48,564	-1.0 -1.0	0.944 0.949	5.88 5.91	10.2 10.3
2006	5,139,000	796,860	-3.0	463,660	-1.9	47,906 48,139	-0.8 -0.9	0.932 0.937	6.01 6.04	10.3 10.4

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 22. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal Year \ Item	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
1955	9,915	1,349	13.6	1,043	10.5	1,308	13.2	1,635	16.5
1965	36,581	3,014	8.2	5,183	14.2	4,751	13.0	7,333	20.0
1975	212,888	13,273	6.2	39,282	18.5	25,921	12.2	29,120	13.7
1985	524,996	31,371	5.98	95,740	18.2	48,409	9.2	63,689	12.1
1995	709,871	47,236	6.7	139,368	19.6	60,765	8.6	92,413	13.0
1996	751,049	48,455	6.5	143,014	19.0	62,270	8.3	96,210	12.8
1997	773,900	49,414 49,475	6.4 6.4	145,650	18.8	63,436	8.2	97,490	12.6
1998	776,692	49,290 49,397	6.3 6.4	148,598	19.1	63,457	8.2	89,891	11.6
1999	818,601	49,201 49,322	6.0 6.0	161,123	19.7	64,632	7.9	94,338	11.5
2000	849,871	49,218 49,358	5.8 5.8	167,666	19.7	65,285	7.7	94,340	11.1
2001	826,524	49,388 49,553	6.0 6.0	176,156	21.7	66,472	8.0	94,335	11.6
2002	812,300	49,395 49,560	6.1 6.1	182,795	22.5	66,998	8.2	84,239	10.4
2003	817,891	49,265 49,530	6.0 6.1	189,907	23.2	64,712	7.9	80,971	9.9
2004	821,109	48,764 49,030	5.9 6.0	197,970	24.1	61,330	7.5	78,159	9.5
2005	821,829	48,301 48,564	5.9 5.9	203,808	24.8	57,235	7.0	75,310	9.2
2006	796,860	47,906 48,139	6.0 6.0	205,739	25.8	52,671	6.6	72,015	9.0

- Notes: 1. In this table, figures related to FY1995 and thereafter were rearranged on the FY2001 budget basis for the convenience of comparison. However, figures related to FY2001 have been rearranged on the FY2002 budget basis for the convenience of comparison with FY2002.
2. Public works expenses for FY1995 and thereafter include the amount of money from revenues other than the sale of relevant stocks for loanfinanced public construction projects implemented by FY1991 under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital," and also the amount of money to be paid or subsidized by the Government at the time of repayment of loans for public construction projects under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital."
3. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 23. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	Fiscal Year	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		21,260	43.0 43.0	21,739	44.1 44.0	21,674	44.1 43.9	22,034	44.8 44.6	22,269	45.1 44.9
Materials		28,154 28,215	57.0 57.0	27,551 27,657	55.9 56.0	27,527 27,648	55.9 56.1	27,183 27,324	55.2 55.4	27,119 27,284	54.9 55.1
Equipment acquisition		9,347	18.9 18.9	9,442	19.2 19.1	9,629	19.6 19.5	9,141	18.6 18.5	9,178	18.6 18.5
R&D		1,605	3.2 3.2	1,277	2.6 2.6	1,307	2.7 2.6	1,205	2.4 2.4	1,353	2.7 2.7
Facility improvement		2,194	4.4 4.4	1,897	3.8 3.8	1,822	3.7 3.7	1,687	3.4 3.4	1,598	3.2 3.2
Maintenance		8,929	18.1 18.0	9,015	18.3 18.2	8,601	17.5 17.4	8,906	18.1 18.0	8,865	18.0 17.9
Base countermeasures		5,384	10.9 10.9	5,206	10.6 10.5	5,402	11.0 11.0	5,447	11.1 11.0	5,326	10.8 10.7
The cost for SACO-related projects		61	0 0.1	107	0 0.2	121	0 0.2	140	0 0.3	165	0 0.3
Others		696	1.4 1.4	714	1.4 1.4	765	1.6 1.6	797	1.6 1.6	798	1.6 1.6
Total		49,414 49,475	100.0	49,290 49,397	100.0	49,201 49,322	100.0	49,218 49,358	100.0	49,388 49,553	100.0

Item	Fiscal Year	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		22,273	45.1 44.9	22,188	45.0 44.8	21,654	44.4 44.2	21,562	44.6 44.4	21,337	44.6 44.3
Materials		27,122 27,287	54.9 55.1	27,077 27,342	55.0 55.2	27,110 27,376	55.6 55.8	26,739 27,002	55.4 55.6	26,570 26,803	55.4 55.7
Equipment acquisition		9,206	18.6 18.6	9,028	18.3 18.2	8,806	18.1 18.0	9,000	18.6 18.5	8,594	17.9 17.9
R&D		1,277	2.6 2.6	1,470	3.0 3.0	1,707	3.5 3.5	1,316	2.7 2.7	1,714	3.6 3.6
Facility improvement		1,570	3.2 3.2	1,528	3.1 3.1	1,442	3.0 2.9	1,386	2.9 2.9	1,150	2.4 2.4
Maintenance		9,065	18.4 18.3	9,075	18.4 18.3	9,175	18.8 18.7	9,177	19.0 18.9	9,405	19.6 19.5
Base countermeasures		5,189	10.5 10.5	5,151	10.5 10.4	5,094	10.4 10.4	4,973	10.3 10.2	4,879	10.2 10.1
The cost for SACO-related projects		165	0 0.3	265	0 0.5	266	0 0.5	263	0 0.5	233	0 0.5
Others		815	1.6 1.6	825	1.7 1.7	885	1.8 1.8	887	1.8 1.8	827	1.7 1.7
Total		49,395 49,560	100.0	49,265 49,530	100.0	48,764 49,030	100.0	48,301 48,564	100.0	47,906 48,139	100.0

- Notes: 1. Equipment acquisition expenditures include the purchase of armed vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
2. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing and training.
3. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
4. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 24. Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006(Provisional Translation)

(Cabinet decision on July 7, 2006)

Section 4. Securement of Safe and Comfortable Life and Realization of Flexible and Diverse Society

4. Measures against Risks in Daily Life

(International efforts, response to terrorist attacks, etc.)

- National defense will be pursued by maintaining and enforcing the effective schemes based on the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after Fiscal 2005 and other policies as in the past, so that the Government of Japan (GOJ) can ensure the peace and security of Japan and peace and stability of the international community.
- Based on the Governmental Measures concerning the Structural Review of U.S. Forces in Japan, etc., (Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006), the GOJ will take necessary measures to appropriately and promptly pursue realignment-related measures, including in legislative and budget aspects, and the whole government will make further efforts for cost reduction and rationalization to respond to the stringent fiscal conditions, the defense expenses also will experience more radical measures for rationalization and efficiency improvement so that the GOJ can operate defense forces in a efficient manner. The Mid-term Defense Program will be promptly reviewed once the estimation for the whole expenses necessary for the realignment-related measures is determined.

Appendix: Defense-related Expenses

- The GOJ will make efforts for efficient maintenance of defense forces by pursuing further rationalization and efficiency improvement based on the Governmental Measures concerning the Structural Review of U.S. Forces in Japan (Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006), etc., while also taking necessary measures to implement the Mid-term Defense Program: Fiscal 2005 to Fiscal 2009 (Cabinet decision on December 10, 2004) base on the same Cabinet decision.
- Based on these measures, reduction of the defense-related expenses will be pursued in a largest scale ever, despite the difficult circumstances where increase of costs for labor and provisions as well as financial responsibility for the U.S. forces realignment is expected. The nominal growth rate of the defense expenses, including the labor cost, will be maintained at 0% or lower in the national budget (general accounts) for the next five years. The cost reduction will be pursued with a focus on the following items:
 - Reduction of SDF personnel through reform of the total labor cost, etc.
 - Efficiency improvement and rationalization of procurement of the equipment and stock parts for the three forces.
 - Budget reduction (including the achievement of the targeted reduction rate of the total costs for public works-15% reduction in five years, while taking enough consideration on the unique features of the defense facilities) through total prevention of reoccurrence of bid rigging.
 - Review of necessities of the stationing expenses for U.S. forces in Japan.
 - Fundamental review of the measures for the areas surrounding the bases.
 - Expenses for the realignment of the U.S. forces will be examined in the process of compiling the budget for each fiscal year, and necessary measures will be taken, if it is anticipated that appropriate and prompt implementation of the measures taken to reduce the financial burden on the local governments by the U.S. forces alignment within the above mentioned reduction targets is hindered,

even after radical rationalization and efficiency improvement measures are taken on the existing budget.

- Even when the achievement of the targeted nominal growth rate of 0% or lower on the existing defense-related expenses is difficult due to the economic, social and other conditions, we will maintain our basic policy to pursue further radical rationalization and efficiency improvement measures to follow the above mentioned Cabinet decisions in order to at least accelerate the rate of expense reduction in the past while taking the relationship with the economic growth rate into consideration.

Reference 25. Trend of Defense Expenditures in Major Countries

Country \ Fiscal Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Japan (100 million yen)	49,395 49,560 0.0% 0.0%	49,265 49,530 -0.3% -0.1%	48,764 49,030 -1.0% -1.0%	48,301 48,564 -1.0% -1.0%	47,906 48,139 -0.8% -0.9%
U.S. (US\$1 million)	331,951 14.3%	387,319 16.7%	436,521 12.7%	474,163 8.6%	512,053 8.0%
U.K. (GBP1 million)	27,334 4.7%	29,338 7.3%	29,524 0.6%	29,153 -1.3%	— —
Germany (DM1 million/€1 million)	23,622 -1.4%	24,379 3.2%	24,250 -0.5%	24,040 -0.9%	— —
France (FF1 million/€1 million)	28,911 0.4%	31,070 7.5%	32,402 4.3%	32,920 1.6%	— —
Russia (RR100 million)	2,841.578 32.4%	3,603.256 26.8%	4,187.183 16.2%	5,311.392 26.8%	6,660.266 25.4%
China (100 million yuan)	1,684 19.4%	1,853 10.0%	2,100 13.3%	2,447 16.5%	2,807 14.7%

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.

3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY2007

4. *UK Defense Statistics* was used as a source for U.K. figures. According to this source, the United Kingdom changed its budget calculation method in 2001 and has published its expenditures based on resource accounting, making it difficult to compare figures after 2001 with those before 2000. (In the text, this is indicated by the phrase "cannot be compared.")

5. Figures for Germany, France, and Italy in and after 2002 are in millions of euros.

6. Figures for Russia have been converted into the indicated unit after the 1998 currency redenomination.

7. Data for China was reported by the National People's Congress treasurer. For the National Defense Budget 2002 and 2004, China's fiscal report stated national defense expenditures would increase "7.6% by 25.2 billion yuan" and "1.6% by 21.83 billion yuan," respectively. The total expenditures, however, have not been revealed. As there may be a discrepancy in the calculation made on the figures in the said report based on the FY2001 and FY2003 defense budgets, calculations are made based on the assumed actual expenditure amounts in 2001 and 2003, respectively (unpublished).

8. According to tables and analyses in part two of *Military Balance 2006* outlining an international comparison of defense spending and military strength, defense expenditures for FY2004 were: U.S. \$455,908 million, U.K. \$50,120 million, Germany \$37,790 million, France \$52,704 million, Russia \$61,500 million, China \$84,303 million and Japan \$45,152 million.

9. As for the figures for Japan, the upper figures do not include the cost for SACO-related projects (16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.