

(2) Future Defense Forces

1) Role of the Defense Forces

In recognition of new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines defines the role of the defense forces as:

- i) effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies,
- ii) preparation to deal with full-scale invasion,
- iii) proactive efforts, on its own initiative, to improve the international security environment, on Japan own initiative and Japan will efficiently maintain the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in each of the areas.

NDPO 1995 clearly states the maintenance of each SDF posture. However, new security environment requires the development of defense capabilities so that Japan can effectively respond to various contingencies in accordance with their features, and the new SDF posture is formed in the process of joint operation to respond to each contingency rather than having each service of SDF to form its own posture. The National Defense Program Guidelines inclusively indicates the role and response to be conducted in each contingency and the concept of SDF posture in the "Role of the Defense Forces."



Personnel of GSDF 46th infantry regiment (Hiroshima) engaged in street fighting drill

a. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The idea behind responses to new threats and diverse situations presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows.

The new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and have potential for sudden occurrence, Japan will cope effectively with them by developing and developing highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to the characteristics of each contingency in accordance with the characteristic of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When such contingencies actually take place, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to contingencies in smooth and close collaboration with the police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and division of labor.

Major responses to the new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows¹³.

(a) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan has started the development of BMD system, for which the introduction was approved in December 2003, and in addition, will establish necessary system to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats against Japan with the efforts for BMD, together with the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

(b) Response to Attacks by Guerrillas or Special Operations Forces Attacks

Guerrillas and special forces attacks are difficult to predict, and we need to be prepared to deal with such attacks without delay and to prevent the expansion of such attacks. Therefore, Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure to effectively respond to the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of the defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner including swift concentration of the units.

(c) Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

Because of Japan's geographical features with many offshore islands, invasion of such islands is envisioned as a form of armed attacks against Japan.

In order to respond to such invasion, it is necessary to maintain a structure with capabilities to effectively deal with precise-guidance attacks by deploying the transport of units by sea and air swiftly.

(d) Patrol and Surveillance in Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

In order to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies, detecting the signal in early stage is extremely important for preventing the unwanted event as well as preventing the expansion of such event when it occurs. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains an important role of the SDF, and thus Japan will maintain the structures with warships, aircraft and other necessary assets.

Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly and adequately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning North Korean armed special-operations vessels and the submerged navigation within Japan's territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take adequate actions against armed special-operations vessels in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan's territorial waters.



Submarine Takashio under stream

(e) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters

Japan is under the conditions that are prone to natural disasters such as earthquake, typhoon, and volcanic eruption, and in the event of unconventional disasters such as nuclear disaster and terrorism, utilization of the SDF capabilities may be necessary.

In such circumstances, ensuring the security of the people is extremely important, and Japan will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan to deal swiftly with large-scale disasters and/or special-type disasters, where protection of life and property is needed.

b. Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion

While likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan is declining, the new defense capabilities are required to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies as well as proactive engagement on its own initiative in the efforts for improving the international security environment.

In recognition of such security environment, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that we will modify our current defense build-up concept that emphasized so-called Cold War type counter-armor warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will make a sweeping review to reduce personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with full-scale invasion.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense force is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up cannot be achieved in a short time, we will first secure the most fundamental portion of the defense force in order to prepare for full-scale invasion.

c. Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(a) Proactive Engagement on Its Own Initiative in the International Peace Cooperation Activities

In NDPO 1995, the role of defense capabilities was defined as "contributing to the development of stable security environment," and the SDF has participated in international peace cooperation activities including U.N. peacekeeping activities.

Based on the recognition that the situations such as to threaten peace and stability of the international community will directly affect the peace and security of Japan, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that we will proactively participate in such international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative, with the objective of further ensuring peace and security of Japan, rather than simply making "contributions" with passive attitude.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is very wide and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner as unified efforts with diplomatic exchange through various measures including not only the SDF but also civilian activities. Within the framework of the Government's total policy, the SDF must be engaged in international peace cooperation activities adequately using its self-sufficiency ability and organizational capabilities, and for this reason the SDF plans to establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, highly ready force posture for relevant units, transport and other required capabilities¹⁴.

In order to adequately participate in international peace cooperation activities, necessary arrangements will be made including the effort to properly embed these activities within the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.



C-130H aircraft standing-by at Komaki garrison

(b) Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges

Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in recognition of the fact that such efforts effectively contribute to our response to the changes in security environment and effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, the activities to contribute to peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the areas of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations including U.N.

2) Fundamental Measures for Our Defense Capabilities

Followings are specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines as the critical elements or realizing defense capabilities that can carry out the missions described above:

a. Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute the SDF's missions swiftly and effectively by responding to the new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture that originally operate all SDF services in unified manner from the beginning.

For the transition into such joint operational posture, establishment of the Joint Staff Office as assisting organization to the Director-General responsible for the SDF operations was incorporated in the National Defense Program Guidelines. While enhancing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff Office, the infrastructure for joint operations will be established in such areas as education and training, and intelligence and commu-

nications. In doing so, we will reexamine the current organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

b. Strengthening Intelligence capabilities

In order for the defense forces to function effectively with multiple functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government to retain and utilize advanced intelligence capabilities including the ability to identify indications of a contingency at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately.

Intelligence capabilities are not a simple supportive element, but should be positioned as an essential element in the defense system. For this reason, we will strengthen our advanced and diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports such capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

c. Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations following the progress of information and science technology should also be reflected adequately. In particular, advance command/communication systems and information communication network shall be established to develop reliable command and control system as well as speedy intelligence sharing systems, which are indispensable for joint operations described earlier, in tune with advanced information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

d. Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

In order to accomplish greater tasks with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit, cultivate, train and educate human resources to adequately cope with diversification and internationalization of the SDF's missions, and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment.

Research and education on security issues have been promoted and the human basis for security issues has been reinforced¹⁵.

(3) Specific Defense Posture

The National Defense Program Guidelines clarify specific systems for defense capabilities to fulfill the missions described above in attachment, and the following provides the overview.

1) Ground Self-Defense Force

a. Organization and Deployment of Strategic Basic Unit Corresponding to the New Security Environment

As regionally deployed units (strategic basic units), 8 divisions and 6 brigades equipped with responsiveness and high mobility are formed in preparation for effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies, which require timely actions but are difficult to predict the occurrence, and 8 divisions and 6 brigades will be placed in each of the 14 sections created with consideration given to Japan's geographical features with mountains, rivers and straits. (see Fig. 2-2-5)

b. Ensuring Personnel (Manpower)

(a) Shifting from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept, "Personnel (manpower)" oriented system will be built to enhance the response to the new threats, diverse contingencies such as attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters, and

Distribution of Divisions and its Concept in the National Defense Program Guidelines

- **Modernized Readiness Divisions and Brigades**
Units formed and placed with focus on responsiveness and mobility with efficiently arranged heavy equipments such as tanks and artillery to allow fast and effective response to the new threats and diverse situations.
- **Modernized Comprehensive Divisions and Brigades**
Units formed and placed with focus on total balance to enable response to all situations from the response to the new threats and diverse situations to the response to full-scale invasion in the future.




Fig. 2-2-5

Changes in the Number of SDF Personnel, Battle Tanks, and Main Artilleries




Fig. 2-2-6

others, as well as to international peace cooperation activities.

(b) To secure effective response capability by ensuring actual number of people, Regular Personnel will be increased from 145,000 in NDPO 1995 to 148,000.

(c) On the other hand, main equipments of tanks and artilleries will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicle for artilleries.

c. New Organization of Central Readiness Group and International Activity Education Unit

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies

when they occur, the Central Readiness Group will be newly organized consisting with Mobile Operation Units and various specialized units. Within this group, the International Activity Education Unit will be newly organized to engage in international peace cooperation activities proactively on its own initiative. (See Figs. 2-2-5 and 2-2-6)

2) Maritime Self-Defense Force

a. The Posture of New Destroyer Unit for Realizing Response with Improved Effectiveness

In order to secure many well-trained destroyers with limited number of destroyers and to respond to various contingencies without delay, destroyer units will be arranged with flexibility in accordance with the level of training rather than the conventional fixed arrangement.

Units for mobile operations units will be consolidated to 8 divisions (1 division consisting of 4 vessels) to be able to respond to contingencies swiftly and continuously, and units for regional district units will be changed to allocate 1 unit to each of the 5 security areas to reflect the current security environment.

b. Posture of Submarine Unit Focusing on the Response to the New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The unit will continue to possess 16 submarines (Units are consolidated from 6 divisions (2 to 3 vessels in a division) to 4 divisions (4 vessels in a division)) as such posture that realizes information gathering for detecting the indication of the new threats and diverse contingencies.

c. Improving the Efficiency of Combat Aircraft Unit

Through the integration and improvement of efficiency while ensuring the surveillance system for surrounding sea, responsiveness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including warning patrol aircraft, minesweeping and transport helicopters) is reduced from approximately 170 from 150 aircraft.




Fig. 2-2-7

Fig. 2-2-8

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft unit, successor aircraft of P-3C with improved performance will be introduced, and the current 8 squadrons will be consolidated to 4 squadrons for better efficiency. Helicopter unit will be consolidated to 5 squadrons by operating all the helicopters basically by vessel-based, from a viewpoint of efficient operation. (See Figs. 2-2-7 and 2-2-8).


3) Air Self-Defense Force

a. Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

The Fighter Aircraft Unit will remain as major unit in order to take appropriate actions in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, but the number of fighter aircraft will be changed from approximately 300 to 260 aircraft by

considering the decline of the possibility of full-scale invasion of Japan through the improvement of efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft including fighters is changed from approximately 400 to 350 aircraft to reflect, for example, the downsizing of Air Reconnaissance Unit.



(Reference) Changes in the number of emergency takeoffs

S62	63	H1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
848	879	812	604	488	331	311	263	166	234
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
160	220	154	155	151	188	158	141	229	

Number of fighters with F-15 equivalent capabilities in surrounding nations

	1996	2000	2003	2005
China Su-27, Su-30MKK	37	65	158	331
Far East region of Russia Su-27, Mig-29, 31	125	100	222	242



Source: Military Balance, etc.

Fig. 2-2-9




Fig. 2-2-10

b. Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order to transport defense forces with mobility to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established, and the next transport aircraft (C-X) with transport and aviation performance superior to the current aircraft will be prepared.

c. Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized into 2 groups from 1 group with NDPO 1995 through functional separation into E-767 units and E-2C units. (See Figs. 2-2-9 and 2-2-10)

4) Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)¹⁶

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the Self-Defense Forces must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it was judged that making efforts for attaining understanding for the BMD system inside and outside of Japan is important by clarifying the system as specific as possible to ensure transparency. To that end, with respect to the detailed posture of the BMD system, the table specifies the Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense as breakdown figures of key equipment for the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: 4) and major units of the ASDF (Air warning and control unit: 7 warning groups and 4 warning squadrons, Surface-to-air guided missile unit: 3 groups) (See Fig. 2-2-11)

Comparison of NDPO Attachment Tables

Section		NDPO 1976	NDPO 1995	National Defense Program Guidelines
Ground Self-Defense Force	Regular numbers Regular SDF personnel Ready reserve personnel	180,000	160,000 145,000 15,000	155,000 148,000 7,000
	Regionally deployed unit	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
	Mobile operations unit	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Group
	Surface-to-air guided missile unit	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Main artilleries Tank Main artillery	— —	Approx. 900 Approx. 900	Approx. 600 Approx. 600
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major units	Destroyer unit (for mobile operations) Destroyer unit (for regional district unit) Submarine unit Minesweeper unit Patrol aircraft unit	4 flotillas (Regional district unit) 10 divisions 6 divisions 2 flotillas (Ground) 16 squadrons	4 flotillas (Regional district unit) 7 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla (Ground) 13 squadrons
	Main artilleries	Destroyer Submarine Combat aircraft	Approx. 60 vessels 16 vessels Approx. 220	47 vessels 16 vessels Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major units	Air warning and control unit Fighter aircraft unit Interceptor unit Support fighter unit Air reconnaissance unit Air transport unit Aerial refueling/transport unit Surface-to-air guided missile unit	28 warning groups — 1 squadron 10 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons — 6 groups	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron 9 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons — 6 groups
	Main artilleries	Combat aircraft Fighter	Approx. 430 Approx. 350	Approx. 400 Approx. 300
	Main artilleries and major units available for defending ballistic missiles	Aegis-equipped destroyer	—	4 vessels
		Air warning and control unit	—	7 warning groups
		Surface-to-air guided missile unit	—	4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Fig. 2-2-11