Section 1. Issues in the International Community

1. International Terrorism

1) Overview

The 9-11 attacks that took place five years ago prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the US and other countries.

In the invasion of Afghanistan launched by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9-11 attacks, many of the leaders in Al Qaeda, who had directed the 9-11 attacks, and the Taliban, who had harbored Al Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and remnants of their respective organizations are believed still to be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and both U.S. and Pakistani forces are engaged in clearing operations. Countries have banded together in an international coalition, committing not only military forces but also diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence and economic resources, but terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world.

International terrorist organizations have been organizing cells in a more decentralized fashion, while local terrorist organizations and individuals sympathetic to their ideology have been carrying out terrorist activities on their own or in concert with these international terrorist organizations. Police investigations have revealed, for example, that the July 2005 subway and bus suicide bomb attacks in London (U.K.) were not carried out by foreign terrorists but rather by the sons of Muslim immigrants born and raised in the U.K.[6] The suicide bomb attack against an US military convoy near Baghdad, Iraq on November 9, 2005 was also discovered to have been carried out by the Belgian wife of a Middle Eastern man.

Modern terrorism is thus proliferating worldwide, adopting unconventional patterns and seriously impacting both international politics and the lives of average citizens.

In light of the present situation, many countries in Europe and elsewhere have enacted stronger counterterrorism measures, including domestic counterterrorism laws, since the London terror attacks. Among the harsher steps taken by the Russian government, for instance, was the passage of a revised Counterterrorism Law in March 2006 that authorized the downing or sinking of a passenger aircraft or ship hijacked by a terrorist organization and posing a threat to strategic facilities.[7]

Counterterrorism measures are also being implemented through multinational frameworks such as the UN, the G8, and regional cooperation organizations. More specifically, various efforts are being made such as ensuring stability and supplying recovery/reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, enhancing systems for exchanging counterterrorism intelligence, reinforcing international legal frameworks to sternly punish terrorists, cutting off terrorist funding and strengthening air security including the prevention of hijacking, strengthening immigration controls, taking more effective approaches to ensure the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting countries whose counterterrorism measures are inadequate to enhance their capabilities, and taking steps to reduce or eliminate poverty, economic and social disparities and unfairness in developing countries.

2) Fight against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan

The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, shortly after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. In the Arabian Sea, naval vessels from various countries have endeavored to keep these terrorists from escaping by sea and to prevent the proliferation of terrorism from Afghanistan.

Seeing that Afghanistan had successfully completed the post-civil war peace process outlined in the Bonn

Agreement of December 2001, the international community came together in the London Conference on Afghanistan, a conference of donor countries providing assistance to Afghanistan held at the end of January 2006, to promote further reconstruction in that country and to secure international assistance. The participants in this Conference drafted and signed the Afghanistan Compact[8].

In the meantime, various countries have been cooperating toward reconstruction centering on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to bring stability to people's lives and help the nation recover.

U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[9] have organized combined military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to improve security so that the Afghan central government can extend its influence throughout the country and international assistance activities can be implemented. In addition, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Project for soldiers belonging to armed military factions has for the most part been completed, with the reintegration process concluded in June 2006.

3) Terrorist Attacks around the World

Since Saddam Hussein's regime was brought down by U.S. and U.K. military operations in 2003, it seems that terrorists are flowing into Iraq due to the deteriorated security and insufficient border controls, and numerous terrorist attacks have taken place on almost a daily basis, targeting not only U.S. and other soldiers but also general Iraqi citizens and foreign civilians. Incidents stemming from sectarian rivalries have taken place across Iraq, sparked by the February 2006 bomb attack on a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government consequently endeavored to restore public order by imposing a curfew in Baghdad and environs. Although the situation did calm down as a result, the possibility of future terrorist attacks aimed at fanning sectarian and ethnic rivalries cannot be dismissed, and the security situation in Iraq merits continued attention.

Major Terrorism Incidents in the World (July 2005-June 2006)



*excluding Iraq and Afghanistan

Fig. 1-1-1

Terrorist attacks have also continued in countries near Iraq. In July 2005, bombs set off nearly simultaneously in a resort hotel and two other locations in Sharm El-Sheikh, a resort area in the south of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, killed more than 80 people. In November 2005, three Western hotels in Jordan's capital of Amman were bombed and more than 50 people killed.

Southeast Asia ranks alongside Iraq and its neighbors as an area subject to large-scale terrorist attacks. In October 2005, a terrorist attack involving multiple bombings on the Indonesian island of Bali, including one at a restaurant frequented by foreigners, killed more than 20 people, including one Japanese national. Indonesia has suffered major terrorist attacks every year since 2002[10]. Since 2004, southern Thailand has also witnessed frequent attacks by Muslim militants against military and security forces.

In South Asia, an October 2005 bomb attack in a market near a Christian church in New Delhi, India claimed more than 50 lives, and there have been many terrorist attacks attributed to Muslim terrorist organizations opposed to India's presence in Kashmir. In a terrorist attack in August 2005 in Bangladesh, bombs were detonated nearly simultaneously in about 480 locations throughout the country, killing two and wounding many others. Although each of the explosions was relatively small, the synchronization and nationwide extent of the bombings has led some to suggest these crimes were not carried out by a local terrorist organization on its own but rather with the involvement of a sizeable international terrorist organization. However, clear evidence of such involvement has yet to be confirmed.

In Russia, Chechen separatists seeking independence from Russia have remained active, and have been blamed for an October 2005 attack in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in southern Russia that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 civilians and separatists.

2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The use of weapons of mass destruction - such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - would lead to indiscriminate massacre and injury as well as serious pollution to extensive areas. For this reason, the transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, there have been growing fears that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom deterrence works less effectively, will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

1) Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War between the US and the USSR, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that there was a risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[11] of 1968 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966[12] from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations.[13]

Under the NPT, signed by 189 countries, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are now permitted to have nuclear weapons. While some countries that had nuclear weapons

abandoned them and became signatories of this treaty,[14] some countries still refuse to sign this treaty.[15] Thus, in addition to the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons, there are other countries that are suspected of possessing or having developed nuclear weapons.

2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

It is easy to manufacture biological and chemical weapons at a relatively low cost. Because most of the materials, equipment, and technology that are needed to manufacture them can be used for both military and civilian purposes, disguising them is easy. This makes biological and chemical weapons attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack.[16]

Biological weapons are characterized as follows: i) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, ii) there is usually an incubation period of a few days from exposure to onset, iii) their use is hard to detect, iv) even the threat of use can create great psychological pressure, and v) heavy casualties can be caused depending on circumstances and the type of weapon.[17]

As for chemical weapons, asphyxiants such as phosgene were known during World War I. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas as an erosion agent and tabun and sarin as nerve agents[18] against Iran. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds.[19] Other chemical weapons include VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.[20]

North Korea is one country seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack that took place in Japan in 1995, and mail in the United States containing anthrax bacillus in 2001 and ricin in February 2004, respectively showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage in cities if terrorists use them.

3) Ballistic Missiles, etc.

Ballistic missiles can carry heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of projecting weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed. No states have completed full spectrum deployment of an effective system of defense against ballistic missiles at this moment.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand. The deployment of ballistic missiles could further exacerbate tension in a region where armed antagonism exists, and could destabilize that region. A country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention is now increasingly being paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because it is comparatively easy for terrorists to procure them. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect once it is launched and in flight[21]. Because cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, a terrorist can hide one in a ship and secretly approach a target. If a cruise missile carries a weapon of mass destruction, its threat would be enormous.

4) Risk of Transfer or Proliferation

Weapons that are purchased or developed by a country originally for its own defense purposes can be easily exported or transferred if the country succeeds in manufacturing them itself. For example, certain states that do not consider political risks are transferring weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces. These states that seek weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk. Because governance is poor in such countries, terrorist organizations are reported to be active. Therefore, the chance of actual use

of weapons of mass destruction may be high in these states.

In addition, since it is unlikely that such states can effectively manage the related technology and substances, there is a high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states to other countries. Even without this technology, there is the risk that a terrorist will use a dirty bomb[22] as a means of attack simply by acquiring a radioactive substance.

All countries have expressed concerns about the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities. Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, deciding that all states should adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws that prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery thereof, as well as refrain from assisting such non-state actors. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in April 2005.

Activities related to weapons of mass destruction were secretly pursued in some countries. Such activities have come to light since 2002, revealing the fact that nuclear weapon technologies have been proliferated and transferred. On the other hand, the international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries involved with such weapons, leading some of them to accept inspections by international institutions or to abandon further programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan seems to have launched its nuclear development program in the 1970s to vie with the neighboring nuclear power of India. Research laboratories headed by Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, who once worked for uranium enrichment facilities in the Netherlands, played a major role in developing and operating uranium enrichment facilities in Pakistan and directed a successful nuclear test in 1998. Suspicious technology transfers concerning uranium enrichment from Pakistan to Iran and Libya were revealed in 2003. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, has been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists for personal gain. These transfers have been shown to have been secretly conducted using global networks involving Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and in May 2004 a man regarded as Dr. A.Q. Khan's right hand in these networks was arrested in Malaysia.[23] IAEA Director-General Mohammad El Baradei has stated that this network spans more than 30 countries[24].

The IAEA and individual countries continue to uncover the truth about this network but they have not yet been able to assemble a complete picture, and the Pakistani government has not permitted outside interviews with Dr. A.Q. Khan.

According to a U.S. announcement, North Korea admitted the existence of its uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons when then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited there in October 2002. North Korea is now suspected of pursuing not only a plutonium-based but also a uranium-based nuclear weapons development program.

Further, ballistic missiles have significantly proliferated or been transferred. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess them. Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea's No-Dong missile[25]. In Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with the technological assistance of North Korea were reportedly disclosed[26]. It is reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 2001[27].

5) Suspicions of Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development

Since the 1970s, Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that this plant was to be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, it reported that Iran was secretly constructing a large-scale uranium enrichment facility, and subsequent IAEA inspections revealed that Iran had engaged in the enrichment of uranium and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons without notifying the IAEA, in violation of the IAEA's safeguards agreement[28]. This aroused suspicions in other countries that Iran was developing nuclear weapons under the guise of this peaceful energy program, and the IAEA Board of Governors has thus far adopted multiple resolutions critical of Iran. Exercising initiative to resolve the issue, the EU-3 (the UK, France, and Germany) held discussions with Iran via an independent route in hopes of resolving this issue; an accord (Paris Accord) was reached in November 2004 on halting uranium enrichment and all other nuclear-related activities, and Iran accordingly ceased its nuclear-related activities.

In August 2005, Iran decided restarting uranium conversion activities as the preliminary stage to uranium enrichment, and the newly inaugurated Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected a Long-Term Agreement proposal[29] presented by the EU-3 and reverted to a hard-line posture. The IAEA in September 2005 consequently adopted a resolution critical of Iran suggesting that the matter might be turned over to the U.N. Security Council, but no response was forthcoming from Iran.

Russia, which was establishing closer ties with Iran via the construction of a light-water reactor power plant, put forth a compromise proposal in October 2005 for uranium fuel to be enriched in Russia for use in Iran's nuclear power plants. Europe and the U.S. accepted Russia's proposal but continued discussions between Iran and Russia on this proposal did not result in an agreement.

In January 2006, Iran announced that it was preparing to restart its uranium enrichment activities in the context of resuming research and development on nuclear fuel technology. The IAEA then convened an emergency Board of Governors meeting in February that by a majority vote adopted a resolution to report the issue to the U.N. Security Council. On March 29 the UN Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and other development activities, but on April 11 Iran announced that it had successfully achieved low-grade (3.5%) uranium enrichment[30] and stuck to its policy to continue uranium enrichment activities[31].

At present, the international community keeps close watch on Iran's response to the package deal proposed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany. This package deal includes rewards if Iran stops uranium enrichment activities and at the same time suggests the possibility of sanctions unless the nation does not. At the end of May, the United States suggested that if Iran froze enrichment-related activities and accepted negotiations in good faith, the U.S. as well as EU3 were ready to come to the negotiating table with Iran.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Nuclear Weapons and Reactors

One of the important tasks of the international community is to solve nuclear problems of North Korea and Iran. This column will explain nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors which are central to these nuclear problems.

(1) Raw Materials for Nuclear Weapons [1]: Uranium and Plutonium

Nuclear weapons utilize enormous energy that is released when atoms are fissioned by the irradiation of neutrons. Therefore, the manufacture of nuclear weapons requires the acquisition of fissionable materials. Main fissionable materials include uranium and plutonium.

Natural uranium is divided into fissionable uranium 235 and non-fissionable uranium 238[2]. Because uranium 235 accounts for approximately 0.7% only of natural uranium, the process of extracting uranium 235 from natural uranium (so-called "enrichment") is necessary for uranium to be useable as raw materials for nuclear weapons. In general, this process requires a large-scale enrichment plant consisting of several thousands of centrifugal separators[3] which are connected with each other. At the enrichment plant, the content of uranium 235 is enriched to the level of weapon-grade (90% or higher).

On the other hand, plutonium doesn't exist naturally. Plutonium is artificially produced by irradiating uranium 238 with neutrons and letting it absorb neutrons. A nuclear reactor for power generation generates electricity by irradiating uranium fuel rods with neutrons and using the resultant fission energy of uranium 235. In this process, large quantities of uranium 238 contained in fuel rods absorb neutrons, which then leads to generation of plutonium as byproducts. Thus, used fuel rods contain uranium 235, uranium 238 and plutonium. Plutonium can be extracted by applying chemical treatment to used fuel rods at a reprocessing plant.

Neutrons are important because they can trigger nuclear fission and maintain fission chain reaction. Whenever uranium 235 is fissioned, approximately 2.5 neutrons are discharged on average. Whenever plutonium is fissioned, approximately 2.8 neutrons are discharged on average. Therefore, plutonium is more suitable for downsizing nuclear weapons than uranium is. At present, most of the nuclear weapons in the world is plutonium-based.

(2) Types of Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Suspicion in Iran and North Korea

Nuclear reactors for power generation are divided into graphite-moderated, heavy-water and light-water reactors depending on the type of moderator used[4]. Graphite-moderated and heavy-water rectors use natural uranium as fuels, while light-water reactors use low-enriched uranium (the content of uranium 235 is enriched to 3-5%) as fuels. Therefore, the operation of light-water reactors requires the acquisition of low-enriched uranium. Low-enriched uranium may be produced domestically or imported. If low-enriched uranium is produced domestically, it is important to distinguish the use of the enrichment plant: either civilian or military use.

Under the "Agreed Framework" between North Korea and the United States in 1994, North Korea abandoned its desire to develop domestically manufactured graphite-moderated reactors that are more appropriate for producing plutonium than light-water reactors on condition that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will provide North Korea with light-water reactors. As a result, a suspicion of development of plutonium-based nuclear weapons in North Korea has come to a tentative solution. In the case of light-water reactors, it is considered to be easier to prevent the manufacture of

nuclear weapons than the case of graphite-moderated reactors for the following two reasons: (1) low-enriched uranium has to be imported, and therefore monitoring would be easier; and (2) a nuclear reactor has to suspend operation when fuel rods are replaced, and therefore monitoring of used fuel rods containing plutonium would be easier. Then, North Korea planned to import low-enriched uranium for light-water reactors. However, a suspicion arose that the country tried to import raw materials for centrifugal separators. This is the reason that North Korea is suspected of developing uranium-based nuclear weapons. (Refer to Section 2 of this chapter.)

On the other hand, Iran is trying to establish indigenous technological bases for uranium enrichment, purportedly in order to manufacture low-enriched uranium needed for operating light-water reactors now under construction in Iran. However, Iran is suspected of developing uranium-based nuclear weapons for a reason that the country has conducted uranium enrichment without producing a notice to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 2002. Iran is also constructing heavy-water reactors. Therefore, Iran is suspected of developing plutonium-based nuclear weapons for the following two reasons: (1) the reason why the country needs both light-water and heavy-water reactors is not clear; and (2) like graphite-moderated reactors, heavy-water reactors are more appropriate for producing plutonium than light-water reactors.

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1) Nuclear weapons are divided into nuclear fission and fusion weapons. In this column, the former is taken up.
2) An atomic nucleus of uranium 235 has 92 protons and 143 neutrons, while that of uranium 238 has 92 protons and 146 neutrons. Therefore, the latter is heavier than the former.
3) A facility that separates uranium 235 from uranium 238 by utilizing the difference of mass between uranium 235 and uranium 238 and centrifugal force.
4) This is a substance to slow down speeding neutrons inside a reactor. If the speed of neutrons is excessive, nuclear explosion may take place.

3. Situation of Iraq

1) Security Situation after Establishment of Iraqi Transitional Government

Multinational forces and Iraq security forces have been subjected to attacks primarily in the Sunni Triangle[32] and some parts of northern Iraq even since the Iraqi Transitional Government was established on April 2005. Although the level of danger differs by region, the security situation in Iraq remains tense in general. Remnants of the former regime and Islamic extremists from outside Iraq appear to be engaged in terrorist activities not only to impress the people both inside and outside the country on the inability of the Iraqi government to govern and the failure of the multinational forces to maintain order, but also to bring about political disorder by inciting sectarian and ethnic violence.

Attacks against multinational forces by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks against civilians by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) continue to occur, although most of them are limited in the Sunni Triangle. The February 2006 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq has spurred sectarian violence throughout Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government endeavored to restore public order, for instance, by imposing a curfew on Baghdad and its environs. Although the situation did settle down as a result, the possibility of terrorist attacks to increase in sectarian and ethnic rivalries cannot be ruled out in the wake of the establishment of constitutionally elected government. Therefore, close attention should be paid to the security situation in Iraq.

2) Security Measures by Iraqi Security Forces and Multinational Forces

Since spring of last year the Iraqi Government has conducted security operations with multinational forces in Baghdad and other areas to sweep up insurgents and discover weapons caches. Especially on the Euphrates River valley and parts of the northern Iraq like Tal Afar, Iraqi security forces have continually conducted relatively large-scale offensive operations against insurgents and terrorists with multinational forces.

It is in these efforts that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who had conducted numerous terrorist attacks, was killed by air strikes of multinational forces this June.

To support the Iraqi government in restoring security, multinational forces are pursuing an integrated strategy along political, economic supports as well as security steps. "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," published by the U.S. in November 2005, advocates that, while the more Iraqi should be included in the political process, multinational forces carry out the offensive operations with the Iraqi security forces in order to clear the areas in which Islamic extremists with no intention of participating in the political process are based, and thereafter make efforts to restore order by reconstruction supports and adequate presence of Iraqi security forces. In implementing this strategy, multinational forces are supposed to build capabilities of Iraqi security forces to take responsibilities of maintaining security.

Since the summer of 2005, the Joint Commission to Transfer Security Responsibility,[33] comprising senior officials from the Iraqi government and the multinational forces, has held discussions on the conditions for the transfer of security responsibility from the multinational forces to the Iraqi security forces. The underlying assumption is that the multinational forces must continue their mission until the Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining public security on their own, at which point the activities of the multinational forces will be concluded. Accordingly, the multinational forces cannot set any clear deadline by which they will terminate their activities. Should local circumstances improve, through improvement in the political situation and the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, the number of multinational forces is likely to change.

3) The Security Situation in the Governorate of Al Muthanna

The security situation of Al Muthanna province, southeast Iraq, where the Ground SDF helps Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction activities, remains relatively stable and calm compared to other regions of Iraq both the October 2005 national referendum on the draft constitution and the December 2005 National Assembly elections were carried out successfully without any significant incidents in the province.

However, there have been a total of 13 indirect fire attacks against the Ground SDF camp in Samawah (two in April 2004, four in August, two in October, one in January 2005, one in July, one in November, one in December, and one in March 2006 [as of the end of June 2006]). In June 2005, a GDSF vehicle was damaged by an IED within the city of As Samawah, but there have been few attacks recently on multinational forces in Al Muthanna Province. Nevertheless, there is no denying the possibility that attacks could occur hereafter in the province.

British troops had been responsible for maintaining security in Al Muthanna province since the Dutch troops handed over the command in March 2005. With British troops, Australian forces had stationed to maintain security and train Iraqi security forces in this province since May 2005. With support of the British

and Australian forces, the Iraqi security forces in Al Muthanna Province have steadily improved their ability to maintain security, as seen in the successful conclusion of the two National Assembly elections and a national referendum conducted last year. The Iraqi government decided in June that Al Muthanna province would be the first province of the Iraq's 18 provinces to be fully transferred in terms of security responsibility. This demonstrates the success of coalition's efforts.

Political Process of Iraq



Fig. 1-1-2

Countries that Dispatch Forces to Iraq and their Areas of Operation (as of end of June 2006)



Fig. 1-1-3