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Executive Report
JSOU First Annual Symposium
2-5 May 2006
Hurlburt Field, FL
Joint Special Operations University
and the Strategic Studies Department

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about Joint Special Operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and Special Operations Forces’ students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is a subordinate organization of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of the Joint Special Operations University is to educate SOF executive, senior and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of Special Operations Forces and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM mission and these operational priorities:

- Preempting global terrorist and CBRNE threats
- Enhancing homeland security
- Performing unconventional warfare and serving as a conventional force multiplier in conflict against state adversaries
- Conducting proactive stability operations
- Executing small-scale contingencies

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Executive Report

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2004–2005 JSOU/NDIA Essays, April 2005
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Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning
2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006
Foreword

This report provides a summary of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) first annual symposium. The symposium theme was “Countering Global Insurgency,” the choice based on its relevancy to the ongoing worldwide conflict and recently published results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Feedback from participants was overwhelmingly positive, and we believe the symposium was a great success. Noteworthy is that the symposium was an academic forum. The views of the participants are their own and do not represent the U.S. Government or their respective organizations.

The most powerful symposium theme is the perspective that we need to focus on the goals of our opponents and not their tactics. What is it that our opponents want? Terrorism is one of the tactics they use, but Osama bin Laden and his cohorts are not nihilists solely interested in destroying the world or their society. Their agenda, though it is destructive and antithetical to our concept of liberal democracy, is broader than terrorism for terrorism’s sake. This perspective leads into the associated thought that we must look at the conflict from our opponents’ perspective. How do they view the conflict? How are they organized to best achieve their goals?

Once we develop a better and more in-depth understanding of our opponents, we must analyze how we are organized and assess whether it is effective given the type of conflict and the makeup of our opponent. We also need to evaluate the applicability of using traditional counterinsurgency strategies in fighting the current conflict. Do we need to modify or develop new strategies in order to prevail? Are the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the international community, and our critical international partner nations organized in an efficient and effective manner to prosecute this conflict? The symposium did not answer definitively these questions, but it did provide a forum to further their discussion.

By analyzing both our opponents and ourselves, we can build an effective strategy to defeat our enemies. Using a term from the QDR, we are in a “Long War,” and we must understand all the dimensions and factors within the conflict. The Countering Global Insurgency symposium added significantly to the dialogue and understanding of the current conflict.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
Symposium Agenda

Tuesday, 2 May  Pre-Symposium JSOU Fellows Meeting

Wednesday, 3 May

0830-0930 Keynote address: LTG William G. Boykin, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support

1000-1115 Keynote address (and discussion): Mr. Wade Ishimoto, senior advisor to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

1130-1300 Luncheon speaker: Mr. Ralph Peters, retired military intelligence officer, essayist, and novelist, the most recent being a Stackpole publication, *Never Quit the Fight*

1315-1645 Panel 1, *Counterinsurgency*, and discussion

Moderator: Mr. James A. Bates, JSOU Unconventional Warfare Studies coordinator

Panelists:

Colonel Joseph D. Celeski (USA, Ret.), former Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force commander in Afghanistan

Mr. Chris Mason, former policy officer with Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group at U.S. Department of State and political officer on the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Paktika Province, Afghanistan

Dr. David Kilcullen, chief strategist in Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

Dr. Tom Marks, National Defense University Counterterrorism Fellows Program

Thursday, 4 May

0810-1115 Panel 2, *Countering Terrorist Networks*, and discussion

Moderator: Dr. Robert G. Spulak, Jr., manager of Strategic Studies Department at Sandia National Laboratories
Panelists:

Dr. James JF Forest, director of Terrorism Studies and assistant professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy

Dr. Jonathan David Farley, professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University

Dr. Jessica Glicken Turnley, president of Galisteo Consulting Group, Inc., Albuquerque and member of Defense Intelligence Agency Advisory Board

1130-1300 Luncheon speaker: Captain Dick Couch (USN, Ret.), novelist with former Underwater Demolition, SEAL, and CIA service; most recent book, *Down Range*

1315-1615 Panel 3, *International Dimensions*, and discussion
Moderator: Mr. Scott W. Moore, JSOU Strategic Education coordinator

Panelists:

Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (USA, Ret.), founding director of the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The Fletcher School, Tufts University and former chair of the department of Social Sciences and founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point

Dr. George Emile Irani, senior project manager (Africa and Middle East) for Toledo International Center for Peace, Madrid, Spain

Dr. Sebestyen Gorka, executive director of Institute for Transnational Democracy and International Security, Hungary and author of more than 80 published pieces regarding terrorism, Central European reform, and organized crime

Major Thomas Copinger-Symes, principal desk officer in the Directorate of Counterterrorism and U.K. Operations in U.K. Ministry of Defense, which includes responsibility for strategic planning in support of other agencies—for example, the Center for Special Operations (CSO) at the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

**Friday, 5 May**

0830-1145 USSOCOM CSO Update (classified)
Key Insights

- The term “terrorism” is often a barrier to understanding in our present fight because we fail to distinguish adequately between the method (i.e., tactic) and logic of action.

- An insurgency is defined as an “organized movement,” and terrorism is a weapon often used by insurgents to achieve their goals, the overarching goal being to obtain legitimacy as a movement.

- Each different type of insurgency requires different countermeasures. The counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches of the 1960s cannot simply be templated; many traditional COIN approaches can be counterproductive.

- What we are doing today is not exactly COIN, but COIN is the closest model for what we are facing.

- We need to explore all “Long War” attributes and capabilities we can bring to the strategic level—alliances, international policing and law enforcement, preventative foreign internal defense (FID), interagency and international assets.

- Insurgency is a war of ideas, not of people. Seldom, if ever, has a country defeated an insurgency by killing insurgents.

- Two typical organizational types constrain and drive behavior within the global insurgency: rule-based (bureaucracies) and relationship-based (networks). At the operational and strategic levels of analysis, organizational structure is very important. While employing international networks to counter the Al Qaeda terrorist network, SOF strategists should know that one cannot task a true network—that is, networks must be persuaded.
Introduction

The Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida) inaugural symposium 2-5 May 2006—Countering Global Insurgency—attracted 122 participants. The event was designed to present and discuss relevant issues to the special operations community with perspectives from experts on the theme. A vigorous dialogue was maintained throughout the symposium, giving participants much to consider as they returned to their organizations to continue working the issues.

The symposium was framed by two keynote speakers, addressing global insurgency versus Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), criticality of partner nations to assist in fighting asymmetric threats, and the views of senior leaders in Washington. Three panels provided the substance and framework for the discussions and official perspectives for a way ahead. In addition, two eminent authors, Mr. Ralph Peters and Captain Dick Couch (U.S. Navy, Ret.), offered perspectives on the symposium theme and other relevant topics during less formal lunchtime discussions.

This report summarizes the high points of the keynote addresses, panel discussions, and luncheon speakers in order to stimulate the thinking of national security professionals and leaders of special operations forces (SOF) who could not attend the symposium. JSOU would like to thank all who participated in this year’s event and is confident that participation was professionally rewarding for all.

JSOU president, Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem, opened the symposium with the USSOCOM perspective. He brought several issues that the USSOCOM commander and his staff are addressing, such as identifying the current threat and its capabilities, the goals of the adversary, and how to deny the enemy’s achievement of these goals. His remarks included a brief discussion of the future of SOF and areas that the USSOCOM staff is working to posture SOF for the upcoming decade and beyond.
Lieutenant General William Boykin, Keynote Address

From the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, General Boykin spoke to symposium participants, beginning by qualifying his remarks as personal opinion and not that of the federal government. He then offered his view on the differences between terrorism and insurgency. An insurgency is defined as an “organized movement,” and terrorism is a weapon often used by insurgents to achieve their goals, the overarching goal being to obtain legitimacy as a movement. Combating terrorism requires a primarily military approach, but a counterinsurgency effort requires a holistic approach, using every one of the elements of national power. Perhaps the key element where the adversary has a distinct advantage is in the information operations arena, as demonstrated by the use of the Internet and the Middle East news networks such as Al Jazeera.

In the second part of his address, General Boykin spoke about some current issues facing parts of the intelligence community. The National Security Act of 1947 established the intelligence structure for the U.S. government, which remained basically unchanged until 2004. New legislation in 2004 better addressed the asymmetric threats faced by the U.S. and provided a framework for improved cooperation between the stakeholders in the intelligence community. Several initiatives are being implemented or developed with respect to Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence structure. Among these are the launching of two important studies to improve intelligence capability of the DoD, training and fielding of numerous tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams in the Army and Marine Corps, and building the intelligence fusion capability among the 26 member-nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, efforts towards “operationalizing intelligence” are producing real effects. The conduct of intelligence operations is a new concept, aided by establishing a Joint Intelligence Operations Center...
(JIOC) in each combatant command; developing intelligence campaign plans integrated with operational plans; and by more general purpose forces, developing a “bottoms up” approach to intelligence collection, similar to the techniques applied by SOF. In response to field commanders requesting more actionable intelligence, General Boykin stated, “Take action, you’ll get intelligence.”

**Mr. Wade Ishimoto, Keynote Address**

Like General Boykin, Mr. Ishimoto qualified his remarks as personal opinion and not that of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). His address focused on three topics:

a. Answer to the question, What are we fighting

b. Dissection of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism document published in February 2003

c. Two new DoD initiatives discussing stability operations and threat finance.

Immediately after 11 September 2001, the government had problems defining and analyzing the current threats as panic ensued. Terrorism is not the end game; the toppling of the U.S. and other nations’ governments is the end game. We should be concerned with many ongoing insurgencies all over the world, several in our own hemisphere. Insurgents in many cases are using the concept of interlocking directorates, talking and banding together in an effort to achieve their goals. These types of threats cannot be defeated by military solutions alone; all elements of national power must be harnessed if we are to be victorious. We cannot simply “throw money” at this threat. An important part of the approach to enhancing our efforts against the current threat is to “train for the known, educate for the unknown” (source, General Peter J. Schoomaker).

A review of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism offered insights into the goals and objectives section of the document. Where you find terrorism in the document, you can replace it with insurgency, Mr. Ishimoto suggested. Similarly, where you find terrorist, you can replace it with insurgent. As stated in the strategy, the goals remain:

a. Defeat terrorists and their organizations.

b. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists.
c. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.

d. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

The key elements to achieving the first goal are twofold: share intelligence information and improve our information operations capability. We are sharing intelligence between U.S. government agencies and between our partner nations better than ever before; however, we must set specific objectives in the information operations arena and work hard to gain an advantage in this area. With respect to the second goal, geography favors the adversary in most regions of the world. Insurgents can and do find sanctuary in bordering countries of Afghanistan and Iraq and will continue to do so. A positive step to deter this activity is the training and advising of partner nation police forces, which has reaped benefits in several countries, notably Iraq. Again, our information operations activity is a key element for achieving the goal of denying sponsorship and support of the insurgents. An objective tied to this goal is to “strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism,” the elements of which include “working with willing and able states, enabling weak states, persuading weak states, and compelling unwilling states.” The last element implies the use of military force and should not be undertaken at the expense of the other three elements.

Underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit have been reduced by several initiatives. Mr. Ishimoto related several examples in the Pacific and European command theaters, both by working with partner nations, training, and fighting the war of wills/ideas. Again, information operations play a critical role in these continuing efforts. As for the final goal, Mr. Ishimoto related that we as a nation must apply risk management to protecting the populace, property, and interests as well as the protection of U.S. democratic principles. We simply cannot protect everything, he advised.

The third component of Mr. Ishimoto’s speech dealt with the requirement and approval to build and improve capacity to conduct stability operations. This DoD directive has critical, far-reaching implications within DoD and also to interagency partners. We have seen the fruits of this directive in stability operations in Iraq.
The DoD directive regarding threat finance focuses primarily on the military’s tasks in identifying, collecting intelligence, and interdicting threat financial networks. This initiative also has important interagency implications and concentrates on cyberspace, global reach. It is also one of many efforts complementing the National Strategy addressed above. Mr. Ishimoto also discussed the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program as one of many efforts to interact with partner nations that looks promising for significant results with relatively small resourcing requirements.

**Panel 1, Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

*Moderator: Mr. Jim Bates*

Countering global insurgency must be a collective U.S. National Interagency construct that is shaped by the diplomatic, economic, legal, informational, intelligence and military elements of national power for the Long War. The U.S. should apply the following DoD engagement strategy:

a. U.S. support to insurgencies will deter, disrupt, undermine, neutralize, and/or replace regimes that sponsor, support, and give sanctuary to transnational and traditional insurgents.

b. U.S. support to our allies Host Nation (HN) Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy Plans must utilize Security Assistance (SA) and apply the principles of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) by properly executing the three phases of FID: indirect, direct, and combat operations.

c. The principal tool HNs utilize in their IDAD strategy is COIN. The U.S. must provide the appropriate advisers and trainers (interagency and DoD) that understand the principles and engagement strategy of SA, FID, IDAD; think like the insurgents; and have the capabilities to help the HN formulate and execute a IDAD Strategy Plan to deter, disrupt, undermine, neutralize, and ultimately destroy the insurgents.
Col. Joe Celeski (USA, Ret.)—Strategic Aspects of COIN

Col. Celeski relates the strategic aspects to specific desired actions:

- Enhance our strategic level of understanding in analyzing insurgency; we already are adept at operational and tactical levels, but strategic “art” on this form of warfare is missing.
- Avoid relegating COIN to low-intensity conflict (LIC) or military operations other than war (MOOTW) and thereby inhibiting understanding the strategic aspects of this form of warfare.
- Establish a Center of Excellence that promotes strategic level thinking and develops strategic leadership for this form of warfare.
- Consider the correct strategic concepts that we want to adopt within the context of global insurgency; from these concepts will flow the correct alignment of strategic resources and assets. Otherwise, we will have a strategic mismatch.
- Ensure organizations are strategically aligned for countering the global insurgency (i.e., U.S. Air Force and Navy).
- Explore all Long War attributes and capabilities we can bring to the strategic level—alliances, international policing and law enforcement, preventative FID, interagency and international assets.
- Prioritize our efforts in line with national strategy and goals for the U.S. over the next 50 years—adopt a long-term strategic outlook.

Mr. Chris Mason—Generational Warfare

Mr. Mason defines insurgency as a war of ideas, not of people. Seldom, if ever, has a country defeated an insurgency by killing insurgents. However, while the U.S. military speaks to ideas (e.g., rural development, rural security, and cultural awareness), the mindset on the ground remains firmly entrenched in the primacy of the kill or capture mission—killing people, not ideas. Examples are the fate of the disbanded Provisional Response Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan—the low priority of their vestigial Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) elements for assets—inattention to cultural, language training, and the continuing focus on battalion-level “sweep” operations.
The U.S. thinks in terms of “shaping operations for 4 months, decisive operations for 4 months, and Phase IV operations for 4 months.” In contrast the Taliban is thinking in terms of “shaping operations for 50 years, decisive operations for 40 years, and Phase IV operations forever.” Specifically, the Taliban embody the classic strategy of the flea: “To kill the dog, make it chase a thousand little flea bites around and around until it drops from exhaustion.” And as if supportive, that’s exactly what the U.S. is doing—the Taliban has succeeded in getting the U.S. to fight the war using the Taliban’s game plan.

The Taliban could easily lose 20,000 men a year (killed in action) for 10 years without the slightest operational impact. The Soviets killing nearly a million Pashtuns did not slow down the Mujahideen. The Taliban will happily sacrifice 35 or 50 insurgents in a village in order to provoke collateral damage that costs U.S. support of the entire village for 100 years, exactly the same tactics used against the Soviets.

In just 3 years, the Taliban insurgency has regained significant political control of four Afghan provinces—Zabol, Oruzgan, Dai Kundi, and Ghazni—and their strength is growing. If the U.S. does not transform the way it thinks, trains, and fights, the U.S. will lose the Long War.

*Dr. David Kilcullen—Countering Global Insurgency*

Dr. Kilcullen views Al Qaeda as a grass-roots movement seeking to change the status quo through violence, subversion, terrorism, and open warfare. Because this description better fits an insurgency (rather than classical terrorism) paradigm, COIN approaches may be more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory.

Being a *global* insurgency (not a campaign in a single country or district), traditional 1960s COIN approaches cannot simply be templated. In particular, the effects of globalized media and transnational threat linkages make many traditional COIN approaches counterproductive. Consequently, we need “Counterinsurgency Redux”—a re-thought of COIN for globalized conditions. Based on this analysis, Dr. Kilcullen proposes considering a strategy of “disaggregation” that seeks to dismantle or break the links in the global insurgency. The result would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war.
Dr. Tom Marks—Revolution in Revolution: Insurgency in Global Insurgency

Dr. Marks sees the term “terrorism” as often a barrier to understanding in our present fight, because we fail to distinguish adequately between the method (i.e., tactic) and logic (i.e., strategic category) of action. Critical distinction is that insurgents have and seek to expand their mass base, thereby construct a counter state (i.e., clandestine infrastructure). Pure terrorism seeks to attack the innocent.

Insurgencies, of course, seek a proper mix in their use of “weapons systems” with terror being just one possibility. In the present age of globalism, however, local insurgencies have increasingly adopted terror as a strategy. It is their continued links with a mass base that distinguish them from pure terrorists. What we face as our foremost foe, in fighting global insurgency, are terrorist groups that have their origins and maintain links with local and regional insurgencies using opportunities provided by globalism to strike against their “far enemies”—especially the U.S.

While the Salafists may be our principal foe, we overlook at our peril the reemergence of left-wing impulse. Maoist movements, for instance, are a serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia and South Asia. The perception is that the U.S. is the premier foe and the leading enemy of humanity. We see local instances of the two major enemy groups making common cause (e.g., in the Philippines, where the Maoists and the Islamists have conducted at least some joint training).

Local insurgencies are, for the U.S., theaters in the new global struggle, but we labor under serious misconceptions concerning insurgencies. The misconceptions include the following:

a. Misrepresenting the essentially political nature of insurgency, allowing the kinetic component to dominate our response, regardless of our verbiage to the contrary

b. Misunderstanding that insurgencies are dynamic, taking on different characters (and different numbers of insurgent groups) depending upon the moment

c. Failing to give proper respect to the doctrinal underpinnings of insurgent action, ignoring what they say, write, and do.
Proper COIN response remains what it has always been—that is, get in place that which is correct (addresses the linchpins of the insurgency) and is sustainable (as defined by you), then play for the breaks. COIN strategy attacks insurgent strategy. COIN operational art develops concepts that address the fundamental components of insurgent strategy. COIN tactics dominate human terrain. Strategically, the issue in COIN is always legitimacy. Operationally, the focus of all campaign construction is the neutralization of the insurgent counter state. Tactically, all politics are local; nothing is possible without local security.

The vehicle for accomplishment is “the grid,” dividing up the problem physically, conceptually, and functionally to divide and seal off the battle space; determine tasks; assign responsibilities; establish coordination; dominate the population; safeguard critical infrastructure; strike insurgent units, networks, and bases; and win the hearts and minds of the populace (i.e., address the roots of the problem).

Panel 2, Countering Terrorist Networks

Moderator: Dr. Robert Spulak

A panel on “countering terrorist networks” supposes that we are fighting terrorists who are organized into networks. Not surprisingly, the consensus of the previous panel was that we are facing a global insurgency. The question of whether to call the enemy “terrorists” or “insurgents” is still open for discussion, but first, What about networks? We have heard that the insurgents are organized into cells and that “it takes a cell to fight a cell.” In the past we have also been told, by John Arquilla and others, that it takes a network to fight a network.

The idea of networks has become pervasive in modern military thought. In many ways all our potential enemies are thought of as networks. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) mission (as shown on their Web site) is to provide “combatant commands, Joint Staff, and other customers with responsive, effects-based, precision targeting options for selected networks and nodes in order to carry out national security and military strategies of the United States during peace, crisis, and war.”

We are also encouraged to view our military forces as networks. Part of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” was to leverage
information technologies for allowing our forces to fight more effectively as networks. *Network-centric warfare* is defined (promising much) as “an information-superiority enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”

Viewing terrorist enemies as networks is natural, in part, because we identify threats as individual terrorists and need to describe how they operate together to perform terrorist acts. The unclassified National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) explicitly identifies our enemies as networks. The NMSP-WOT consistently uses the term “network” to describe the *nature of the enemy* as well as their survivability, critical vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and key resources.

Whether terrorists or a global insurgency, the first goal of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is to “defeat terrorists and their organizations.” And our task, according to Dr. Kilcullen, is to take out the global leadership. Is the global leadership a *network*? In response, Panel 2 addressed several important questions:

a. Is knowledge of the organization of terrorists the critical factor (e.g., relative to identification of individual terrorists or their capabilities)? That is, does it matter a great deal whether they are a network or some other kind of organization? Can you attack an organization, *per se*?

b. Can we know how the terrorists are organized in enough detail to matter? Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations seem to be difficult to penetrate. And in John Keegan’s book, *Intelligence and War*, he concludes, “Even real-time intelligence is never real enough. Only force finally counts.”

c. What is a network? How does it differ from other organizations?

d. Are terrorists really networks or is a network an abstract structure we are imposing on them? Is it useful?

e. How do you analyze and attack a network (or other organization)? Why is attacking a network different from attacking forces organized in any other way? How do you predict and measure the effectiveness of an attack against a network?
In the computer world, network connections rely on common languages (protocols) to establish levels of trust in the integrity of financial and information transactions. These protocols ensure that what is sent from one location in the network is received unaltered in another location of the network. There are additional dimensions of trust, such as an understanding that the sender and recipient are who they claim to be, financial transactions are secure, and “nobody is listening or watching” to what you are doing online.

The protocols of human networks also exist; trust is established by various social mechanisms (e.g., family, neighborhood, tribe, and clan) and shared beliefs (e.g., religion and academic discipline). Trust is a vital component to any organization, including networked organizations. For the global Islamic insurgency network, trusted relationships are established via common ideology, shared experience, religious knowledge (in addition to the social mechanisms described above); in essence, we must gain a comprehensive understanding of the different protocols that represent the various levels of trust within this network.

In the computer world, hackers (a number of them highly-skilled teenagers) attack networks by infiltrating and corrupting nodes and protocols. If you attack the network nodes, you get one kind of result (e.g., if you attack amazon.com, people will just go to barnesandnoble.com). But if you can corrupt/damage the protocols, you can impact the entire network (hence why Microsoft Internet Explorer and other browser vulnerabilities are so critical and have to constantly update your software). Overall, if you diminish the ability of the network to support critical transactions, people will find the network less valuable; thus, it may be useful to adopt the hackers’ strategies and tactics against terrorist networks.

Human networks have vulnerabilities that can be exploited, bonds of trust that can be broken in order to degrade the network capabilities. We should focus on issues of preference divergence rather than ideology (e.g., strategic and tactical directions, financial accountability, and methods and responsibilities for maintaining network security). We should also increase levels of suspicion and mistrust in the network (e.g., make funds “disappear” for no reason, then have
a big-screen TV conspicuously delivered to the family of someone responsible for financial transactions) and discredit perceptions of good (e.g., competence, trustworthiness) of key members. In summary, while identifying and apprehending network nodes (individual terrorists) are still important, we must act as follows:

a. Degrade the integrity of their networks.

b. Diminish the capability (e.g., of reliable communication, financial transactions, command and control, and operational security).

c. Exploit the agency problems (e.g., divergence of preferences over ideology, direction of strategy; information, funding, and the authority and credibility with respect to the use of violence to achieve goals) and discredit the belief systems and values (i.e., corrupt the protocols) that bind the nodes together (e.g., demonstrate hypocrisy and misinterpretations of the Koran—i.e., info ops).

d. Avoid doing things that strengthen their network bonds.

Dr. Jonathan David Farley—Breaking Terrorist Cells

Dr. Farley discussed how mathematics can be used as a tool to understand the effectiveness of attacks against terrorist cells by disconnecting command and control from top to bottom. His discussion was based on his published work in this area, including “Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making),” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:399–411, 2003.

The primary example of mathematical analysis that Dr. Farley discussed was graph theory, where terrorist organizations are modeled as graphs with individuals as nodes and their connections as edges. Among other things, mathematics can be used to estimate the probability that the removal of a certain number of nodes (terrorists) will create a cut set that eliminates the ability of all the terrorists to communicate with the leadership. Dr. Farley also discussed the application of other mathematical techniques for guiding the use of resources against terrorist organizations and was candid about the real-world limitations of mathematical analysis. Overall, Dr. Farley’s presentation stimulated good discussion about the effectiveness of modeling terrorist organizations and the application and limitations of mathematical analysis.
Dr. Jessica Turnley—Countering Terrorist Networks: The Role of Organizational Structure

As an anthropologist, Dr. Turnley shared that an organization is a group of people with a common purpose where collectivity is more than just connectivity. A common purpose makes a qualitative difference, and organizational structure is the pattern(s) of connections among the group of people with a common purpose.

Two typical organizational types constrain and drive behavior within the global insurgency (and while no organization is purely one or the other, all organizations exist somewhere between the two):

a. Rule-based (bureaucracies) have actors that exist independent of the organization, and there is a high division of labor. These organizations are heavily process-oriented, focused on formalism (rules and administration), and concerned with reliability. Loyalty is given to processes and offices, not persons, and the organizations exist over time.

b. Relationship-based (networks) have actors that are defined by the relationships, and there is a low division of labor. Because loyalty is given to persons, networks are one-dimensional descriptions of multi-dimensional phenomena. In addition, they are ephemeral but do not address the dynamics of change.

The table below compares the two archetypical organizations and gives some implications for action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Characteristic</th>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>Implications for Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rule-Based</td>
<td>Networked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of significance</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and authority</td>
<td>Derived from location of function</td>
<td>Derived from characteristics of individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of solidarity (how individuals invest in group)</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Tends to depend upon achieved characteristics</td>
<td>Tends to depend upon ascribes characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics of change</td>
<td>Inherent in the rules</td>
<td>Exogenous to the network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on this analysis, we can make an operational assessment of networks. With respect to offensive characteristics, networks can exhibit a swarming capability and thus a common purpose can develop. On one hand, swarming can “emerge,” and no resources are diverted to organizational development. On the other hand, swarms can be difficult to control and manage. Networks have a low division of labor. This distributed functionality makes the destruction of a function difficult; networks have the ability to rapidly “repair” the network by replacing individuals, but it is also difficult to perform complicated tasks requiring high levels of specialized knowledge and extensive coordination.

With respect to the effectiveness of a network structure to defend an organization, the low division of labor reduces vulnerability to [functional] decapitation and contributes the potential for quick action as command decisions are made locally. On the other hand, the network structure reduces the certainty of command and increases reliance on key individuals. Networks also allow actor self-definition through multiple channels. Redundant information channels allow rapid redefinition of communication channels based on need and the ability to quickly “repair” or construct new networks. But role choice freedom can reduce responsiveness to a common purpose. The low division of labor increases information flow since everyone is a collector and analyst, but it creates the potential for fragmentation of information.

Networks can contribute to speed of action, again through the low division of labor and increased information flow, but the low division of labor also leads to the lack of repositories of deep, specialized knowledge. Actor self-definition through multiple channels also leads to increased speed since the multiplicity of operational networks allows rapid redefinition of communication and other channels based on need but leads to a lack of predictability and reliability of response. In addition, networks have the ability to grow through addition of “modules,” which reduces recruitment time and leads to high situational knowledge. Again, however, the modularity leads to lack of control over subnetworks and high reliance on key individuals.
Networks can also be combat multipliers because of the ease of growth, where additions can lead to qualitative changes in capabilities. It is easy to add high levels of local knowledge. On the other hand, friction can arise from the lack of control over subnetworks and high reliance on key individuals. Networks contribute to mission flexibility because of the devolution of authority to the local level (nodes) allowing tailoring of missions to local conditions, but networks also have the potential for organizational fragmentation.

In summary, organizations are collections of connected people with a common purpose. The characteristics and attributes of structure (patterns of connection) do constrain and drive behavior in organizational contexts. Organizational structure may matter less at the tactical level; but at the operational and strategic level, organizational structure is very important.

**Panel 3, International Dimensions**

*Moderator: Mr. Scott Moore*

Until just recently, insurgencies have been regarded in doctrine as being national problems. Insurgency is defined as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.” The national response—counterinsurgency—is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” Fueling our post-9/11 strategic debate is the realization that the apparent global orchestration of terrorist activities by Al Qaeda and associated movements challenges the preeminence of the nation-state that has been the international norm since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

One could debate whether and to what extent the nation-state construct is truly at risk and under attack by terrorists and other non-state actors. Panel 3 was charged to accept that after 9/11 the U.S. Government with the help of international allies decided to send a message to the terrorists and to the sovereign nations of the world that terrorism is an unacceptable and illegitimate form of political violence that will no longer be tolerated.

In the foreword of the 2006 National Security Strategy, President Bush characterizes the strategic alternative for America as facing
“...a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear—isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment—appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities.... This Administration has chosen the path of confidence.... We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations.... We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”

The foreword closes with the President describing the second pillar of our National Security Strategy as “...confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies”...to face problems that reach across borders. He acknowledges the international dimensions of our strategy by stating, “Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.”

To lead effectively, the U.S. seeks to recognize and understand the relevant dimensions of the kind of war we are fighting. In the interest of stimulating a rich debate about the consequences of waging an international long war on terrorism, terrorists, or insurgents, Panel 3 addressed these key questions:

a. What are the international implications of the GWOT under U.S. leadership?

b. Does the threat from Al Qaeda and its associated movements qualify as a global insurgency, and if so, what are the lessons learned for countering insurgencies that are relevant to this global campaign?

c. Assuming that it is important for us to clearly define the threat as a prerequisite for developing and executing a strategy to counter it, what are the most important distinctions between counterterrorism (CT) and COIN strategy, and how do these distinctions change our actions?

d. Though admittedly difficult, and perhaps even unrealistic, there is much talk about the need for the U.S. to harness and focus all of the elements of U.S. national power in a concerted war effort against global terrorism. What can realistically be
done to harness and focus international power to wage and win the war?

e. The people are the prize in this conflict as the populace provides the basis for legitimacy and success for insurgents—terrorists or the Government(s)—but countering the threat from terrorists and insurgents is not a priority for most of the global populace. How can sovereign governments of the world win over their people without compromising either the war or the principles over which it is being fought?

Brigadier General Russ Howard (USA, Ret.)—Global Insurgency? GWOT?

The title of the symposium suggests that we are fighting a global insurgency against a networked enemy and therefore our actions should be guided by counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposition that the GWOT should be viewed as a “global insurgency” is misleading. Instead, there are several ongoing insurgencies that collectively have global impact. The typology outlining 14 different types of insurgencies (mostly from Dr. Steve Metz, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute) argues that four different types are ongoing in Iraq:

a. Anarchist conducted by international fighters
b. Traditionalist conducted by Sadr’s militia
c. Preservationist conducted by former Ba’athists
d. Commercial conducted by criminal elements in Iraq.

In the early stages of the GWOT, policy makers discounted the notion of insurgency because the “revolutionary insurgency” model familiar to them was not a factor. Then once policymakers realized that insurgency was a factor, they tried to counter it using “revolutionary insurgency” methods and failed. Each type of insurgency requires different countermeasures.

Brigadier General Howard also shared that the U.S. is not engaged in a GWOT, nor is the nation mobilized that way, citing World War II as the comparative model. Thirty six percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was directed toward that war effort, and 16.6 million men and women were in uniform when Japan surrendered. Presently, the U.S. devotes 4 percent of its GDP toward the war effort, and there are only 2 million men and women in uniform.
Alternatively, Dr. Irani argues that since September 2001, the U.S. has adopted a confrontational approach towards Arabs and Muslims. The trauma of the criminal and terrorist attack on the Twin Towers was used as justification to give free reign to the use of raw military power and heavy political intervention in the Middle East. The staging ground for this new policy was Afghanistan, a well-known base for Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. A traditional and sane U.S. concern for stability was quickly set aside to be replaced by a crusade towards democratization of Arabs and Muslims. The GWOT is a war on an abstraction that cannot be won by traditional military means.

Beneath the GWOT façade, we are witnessing an arm-wrestling match between the U.S. led by Britain and France on one hand; and Iran, Syria, and their allies on the other hand. In terms of international/multilateral cooperation to track and contain emerging threats, the situation is not too promising despite the mobilization of the “coalition of the willing” to fight the war in Iraq. The “willing” have seen their numbers dwindling as was dramatized, for instance, by the decision of Spain to remove its troops from Iraq.

In order to stabilize a fragile and unstable Middle East, much more sensitive attention must be paid to interrelated local and regional factors. The Middle East today is in transition. Western-inspired ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and nationalism have failed dismally. We are assisting in the formation of new, black-and-white Arab and Islamic identities based on reconstructed notions of history, religion, and culture coupled with a growing hatred of anything that has to do with the U.S. culture. For the remainder of this century, the U.S. and the West will have to figure out a viable modus vivendi with the Islamist forces that are slowly but surely gaining power (witness the wins of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas overwhelming victory in Palestine).
Having recharacterized the threat and the nature of our struggle in the Middle East, Dr. Irani concluded by offering his prescription for success:

a. The U.S. will have to seriously contribute to the resolution of the Palestinian Israeli conflict as a truly neutral party.

b. Gradually withdraw direct and active military presence and return to the benign and enlightened presence that characterized U.S. profiles in the past.

c. America ought to replace hegemonic designs with policies that are sensitive to societies who are in desperate search for their role in the global community.

d. As America’s ethnic composition is changing, U.S. foreign policy ought to reflect this change.

e. Return to the United Nations and the rule of international law, and work out a role for the Europeans in coordination with the various governments in the Arab and Islamic countries.

f. Lastly, discreetly encourage emerging civil societies in the Middle East—both secular and religious—to work together at defining what shape their societies will have in the future.

Dr. Seb Gorka—The International Dimensions of the Long War

There are those who would argue that while Al Qaeda is a murderous and deadly organization, it does not pose an overarching threat to the community of Western democratic nations. To these people, a key point must be made:

Al Qaeda, the most powerful terrorist group of the modern age (killing thousands in a matter of minutes) has achieved something that the Soviet Union never did—the mass murder of Americans (and other nationals) on U.S. soil and later Spain and the U.K.

And yes, while this mutation of the 1980s Mujahedeen movement does not possess regiments of T-82 tanks or batteries of SS-20 missiles, it is more disturbing than the USSR was in one key respect. For although Khrushchev may have rhetorically promised to “bury us,” he and his Kremlin successors never did in fact take the step against America and its allies. He and his administration
never initiated conflict because were fundamentally rational actors constrained and deterred by the thought of nuclear retaliation. In contrast, bin Laden is wholly different. He has declared repeatedly that he has the intention to use weapons of mass destruction as soon as he can acquire them. Against his ilk, deterrence policy has no hold.

To the question of whether or not the current conflict is to be understood as a global insurgency and how much can prior lessons of counterinsurgency help us to fight Al Qaeda, Dr. Gorka agreed with Dr. Kilcullen who said, “What we are doing today is not exactly COIN, but COIN is the closest model we have to the situation we are in fact facing.” As a result, the principles of counterinsurgency are most useful. Nevertheless we have to understand that we are not limited strictly to a counterinsurgency scenario because Al Qaeda is not limited to the nation-state envelope.

We need to be realistic about what can be achieved through public diplomacy and information policies as well as understanding exactly who the target audience of such campaigns truly are. The job of the people such as Karen Hughes, when addressing the populations that are potentially in agreement with bin Laden, or who are simply indifferent, should not in the first instance be to make America look good.

What we need today is to arrive at a theory of victory rather than reducing ourselves to relying on a strategy of tactics. We need to not only learn the lessons of prior insurgencies and terrorist campaigns but also practice them, and most importantly, we need to return to the basics and understand in its marrow the core principle that General Carl von Clausewitz left for us. When he discussed the connection between war and politics, his meaning was not as we often understand it today—that is, war is some isolated activity that occurs when politics runs out of options.

Clausewitz’s description of war as a “continuation of politics by other means” was nothing more than an illumination of the unity of both activities. While it may be trite to say that politics is war, what von Clausewitz really meant to emphasize is that war is politics and as such, victory will only come if we are clear about the desired political goal, and we will only achieve that goal if all the tools of politics, not just force, are deployed to that end.
Major Tom Copinger-Symes—Global Counterinsurgency or Global Counterterrorism: What’s in a Name?

In Major Copinger-Symes’s view, the GWOT is not an insurgency because the U.S. government is not threatened. True or not, the rest of the world thinks that the U.S. Department of Defense is running the war. Perhaps the U.S. is “sweating the small stuff,” asking rhetorically whether the margin of error lies in the difference between CT and COIN or in that we are not doing either of them very well?

Reviewing and comparing the British doctrinal principles of COIN versus CT, Major Copinger-Symes concluded that the enduring principles of COIN should apply to the GWOT. Those principles are as follows:

a. Ensure political primacy and a clear political aim.
b. Build coordinated government machinery.
c. Develop intelligence and information.
d. Neutralize the insurgent.
e. Plan for the long term.

Luncheon Speakers

Mr. Ralph Peters

Mr. Peters offered views on the current insurgency in Iraq and shared his knowledge of the region. He provided a description of the strategic setting in which the U.S. must operate to counter the global insurgency. Mr. Peters shared insights about the shattering of traditional societies and the resultant affect upon regional and global security. One outcome is the advent of the series of suicidal bombers who employ an imaginative precision weapons system as a religious act, thereby seizing international attention. Mr. Peters’ talk provoked a vigorous and challenging question-and-answer period concerning U.S. strategic approaches to countering terrorism.

Captain Dick Couch (U.S. Navy, Ret.)

Captain Couch highlighted the high state of SOF training and related how this innovative, realistic, and challenging training ensures success on the field and creates a mindset of confidence, competence, and commitment. Several vignettes were offered as sterling examples of the warrior ethos, learned in stressful training environments that
closely paralleled actual combat. Captain Couch praised this generation of special operations warriors, recognizing those participants in uniform at the outset for their service in Afghanistan and Iraq. He also provided views on the capabilities of coalition special operations.

**Summary/Next Steps**

The inaugural JSOU Symposium was a success from the standpoint of sharing information and insights from senior government officials and panelists. Participants gained an appreciation for the complexity of the threats we are facing and the ramifications of U.S. and partner nation courses of action against these complex threats. As with most events of this type, much was accomplished outside of the agenda activities as new relationships were forged. The challenge following this symposium is to answer the question, What is next? In response, JSOU is investigating appropriate topics and venues for next year’s symposium.

The JSOU summary of presentations and discussions provides the following benefits:

a. Serves as a record for those in attendance and a baseline for further discussion.

b. Informs those who could not participate about what transpired and join the dialogue among colleagues on topics covered.

c. Facilitates briefing senior SOF leaders about the topics and encourages them to consider key concepts as they develop future plans and operations.

JSOU appreciates the support of the Fellows and friends who contributed to the success of this symposium through their presentations and participation in the strategy debate.

**JSOU Symposium 2007**

The Joint Special Operations University will hold its next symposium 1-4 May 2007 at Hurlburt Field, Florida on issues of strategic importance to the special operations community.