Chapter 3

Army Organizational Structure

The resolution of Congress on 2 June 1782 clearly illustrates the concepts of civil control of military forces and the primacy of the Congress in the determination of the Army’s structure. That resolution resolved to discharge all remaining Continental Army troops from Federal service except 80 men. It further assigned the remaining men to “guard stores.” It established the Army’s force structure as:

- 25 privates at Fort Pitt
- 55 privates to be assigned at West Point and “other magazines”
- A “proportionate number of officers,” none above the rank of captain.

Section I

Introduction

3–1. Chapter content

a. The United States Army is a strategic instrument of national policy that has served our country well in peace and war for over two centuries. Additionally, the Department of the Army is separately organized under the SECARMY (10 USC 3011). This chapter provides a discussion on how the ultimate organizational design of the Army at a given point in time is the result of systematic approaches and conscious decisions on how the Army is to perform its doctrinal tasks and how it is to deal with its environment. AR 10–5, Headquarters, Department of the Army as supplemented by General Orders Number 3, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army, and AR 10–87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States, provide the official description of Army organization, as well as an understanding why the major components are arranged as they are, and why the units and subordinate units are linked together as they are. Such an insight is necessary for an understanding of how the Army operates as a system to carry out its Title 10 functions.

b. What follows is a discussion of the system through which the Army evolves into an organization of headquarters, staffs, commands, and functional units. In a manner of speaking, it provides background and theory to the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. Additionally, this and other chapters will discuss major realignments within Army organizations, which have taken place over the past 18 months.

3–2. The Army organizational system

a. The Army as an open organizational system.

(1) In terms of management theory, the Army can be considered an open organizational system with three distinct components: the production, combat, and integrating subsystems. Each of these has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources. Because of the size and complexity of the Army and its tasks, the organizational structure needed to accomplish these tasks requires a management approach that gives the Army as much flexibility as possible (given resources and mission requirements) while also maintaining the command and control relationship that is needed in the military. Although structured along the traditional classical organizational design, with the increased complexity of tasks being given to the Army today, a more fluid design is appropriate.

(2) This design is consistent with the Contingency Design Model which conceptually rests on the idea that to have an effective design for an organization there must be a “goodness of fit” between the structure and the conditions of the external environment of the organization. In essence, this design model recognizes that organizations like the Army exist as “open systems” and thus must be structured in such a way as to allow the system to address those external factors in an appropriate manner, not a one way fits all situations. To accomplish this, the Army organizational system is composed of a number of subsystems that feed into other systems where final decisions are made. In order to design the appropriate subsystem, it becomes necessary to understand the design concepts of differentiation and integration.

b. Differentiation and integration. Many organizations are designed along the lines of differentiation and integration. To better understand how this is accomplished in the Army, each of these concepts is discussed below. As a first step to accomplish this design, organizations need to scan their environment, both internally and externally, in order to best determine—

- The tasks to be accomplished.
- The resource constraints placed on the organization.
- The extent of coordination that is needed within the organization in order to make effective and efficient decisions.

(1) Differentiation.

(a) Organizations should be tailored in design to meet specific mission requirements. For example, to demonstrate a forward presence in an area of vital interest to U.S. security, such as Europe, and to enhance relations with our allies, the Army has organized U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Conversely, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command
USAREC was established to deal with the soldier acquisition task. To accommodate these different demands, the Army’s systemic organizational response must be different. USAREUR would be as ineffective recruiting in the continental United States (CONUS) as USAREC would be in dealing with the Army’s mission in Europe.

Therefore, task or functional specialization is both a dimension and a requirement of the structure of Army organizations. Such functions as personnel management, resource (funds and manpower) management, operations, intelligence and security, logistics, and research and development are found separately identified in both staffs and commands.

A major result of task specialization is that organizations tend to be designed and structured to fit the requirements of their sub-environments. Depending on the demands of the environment, organizations in one functional specialty tend to be differentiated from organizations in other specialties in the following manner:

- Missions,
- Orientation on time, i.e., a focus on short-term, mid-term, long-term results.
- Degree of formality of structure of organizations, i.e., rules, job descriptions, chain of command, adherence.
- Interpersonal orientation-ways of dealing with people, i.e., very mission-oriented vs. a concern for relationships with others.

Integration. The environments within which the Army competes require one principal output: mission-ready forces with a full range of operational capabilities. The Army is successful only to the extent that it produces such forces. These widely diverse environments also require a high degree of differentiation if the Army is to meet its requirements. These two environmental demands-output and high differentiation-must be reconciled and the Army must integrate many elements to produce mission-ready forces. One should expect that the greater the degree of differentiation in an organization, the more difficult it is to get the necessary coordination and interdependence or integration. There are three levels of complexity of integrative rules or processes, ranging from the simple to the highly complex. The use of each depends on the kind of integration desired.

(a) The simplest devices, which can be used to deal with more certain environments, are standard rules and procedures. Integration is achieved through procedures and direct interaction is normally not necessarily required between organizational units.

(b) Somewhat more complex is a plan or order. Interdependence is achieved through an operational plan or order in which the responsibility for and sequence of task accomplishment are specified.

(c) Third, and the most complex, is the process of mutual adjustment in which closely coordinated contact is required within the management hierarchy (or chain of command) and which also implies cross-functional teams or individual integrators. A good example of the last process is the battalion task-force approach to integrating tanks and infantry. A project management organization also exemplifies integration by mutual adjustment.

(d) Each of these devices is operating in any Army organization to some extent. Effective organizations facing more diverse environments will use all of these integrative processes.

Section II
The production subsystem

3–3. Statutory requirements
The Army’s fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation’s wars by establishing conditions for lasting peace through land force dominance. Laws further direct the Army to be organized and trained for prompt and sustained combat. Many other specific requirements are assigned by statute to the SECARMY and the ARSTAF. They include requirements to form organizations of men and women and machines “for the effective prosecution of war.”

3–4. Production of needed resources
The production subsystem is the cornerstone of the process. Its job is to secure from its resource environments the “raw materials” for its many production efforts: recruiting untrained people, searching for useable technology, and dealing with producers of outside goods and services. Its task, accomplished through its people and structure, is to convert the “raw materials” into the “intermediate goods” required by the combat system. To do this, the Army integrates doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTLM–PF) to produce the desired end state (see Chapter 5 for more details). Training centers and schools transform untrained people into tank crewmen, infantrymen, and mechanics. Schools convert ideas and knowledge into doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training methods for the use of the combat subsystem. Laboratories, arsenals, and procurement and test organizations convert technology and contractor effort into weapons systems and equipment for the combat subsystem. Other parts of the production subsystem provide such sustaining support to the whole organizational system as health care, commissary support, and other services. The production subsystem serves primarily to meet the needs of the combat subsystem.

a. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

(1) TRADOC is first of two major components of the production subsystem. TRADOC was created to fully
How the Army Runs

integrate the functions of the former Continental Army Command (CONARC) and Combat Development Command (CDC). With a capability of producing training, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and, at the same time, providing the required user representation in the materiel acquisition process TRADOC filled a shortfall in the Army’s production subsystem efficiency.

(2) In terms of differentiation, the task of producing training, doctrine, and the material acquisition interface required a different perception of objectives than did the force readiness tasks. One organization, the former CONARC, could not concentrate on the missions of both a major part of the combat subsystem and a major part of the production subsystem.

(3) The creation of TRADOC has resulted in the establishment of functionally oriented matrix-type organizations to accomplish the assigned mission of preparing the Army for war and being the architect of the Army of the future. This is done through concept and doctrine development, maintenance of the training system, the conduct of the combat development process, and the Army Transformation process.

b. Army Materiel Command (AMC). The second major component of the production subsystem is AMC. Taking combat development requirements and converting them into materiel solutions is one, but nonetheless a principal element of AMC. Production of weapons systems and other materiel is not simply a matter of developing, procuring and shipping the system to organizations. Most critical to any system’s combat readiness is the ability to repair and maintain the assets which organizations already possess. The provisioning of repair parts, diagnosing causes of failure and the development of correctional procedures or modifications are additional functions. Additionally, AMC is involved in the depot level rebuild of major items, the control of inventories of supplies, and the technical support provided through the logistics assistance program. Continuing support across the spectrum of operations plays a large role in maintaining combat readiness.

c. Installation operations.

(1) The integration of installation organization and operations into the Army’s overall organizational structure, in the 1980’s both as a home station and training base has proven to have a significant and positive affect on readiness. Installations must be organized for and capable of training, mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, supporting, recovering, and reconstituting assigned and mobilized operating forces. The traditional boundary between tactical and sustaining base activities must disappear as the installation power projection platforms assume an active role in the welfare of deploying operating forces.

(2) In consonance with The Army’s Transformation effort, the SECARMY directed the reorganization of The Army’s installation management structure. To comply with this mandate, The Army instituted the Transformation of Installation Management (TIM) program on October 1, 2002. As a result, The Army placed the management of Army installations under the Installation Management Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the ACSIM. Its mission is to provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of Soldiers, civilians and family members; improve infrastructure; and preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the migration of base operations (BASOPS) funds to other operational accounts below the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional installations to support evolving force structure and Army Transformation needs.

(3) This important task has a large influence on structure. The focus is the operations task. An installation is an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the DOD controlled by a permanently assigned Army unit or activity. The Army organizes installations for support using TOE, tables of distribution and allowance, and personnel resources documents. Activities on the installation receive installation support in accomplishing their missions. Examples of these are schools, hospitals, reserve component elements, and tactical headquarters and their subordinate units. Although this function is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 17, its organizational impact is pertinent here as well.

(4) Maintaining a position of full-spectrum dominance and overmatch against any threat requires a well-trained and ready force. A trained and ready force needs an installation that has a fully effective capability to train, launch, sustain, and reconstitute the force. The installation requires training and support facilities to deploy and recondition returning forces rapidly and to maintain the edge between contingency missions. It means providing the facilities and services that make the installation a home to the force.

(5) Installations are power projection platforms. They provide a home to the force and be resourced as a productive work and training site. This evolution of the installation’s role in the army structure and its placement in the Army’s organization has established it as a critical element of the Army.

d. Functional commands.

(1) Not only is the installation operations task common to both the combat and production subsystems, but parts of the installation operations function have become recognizable “specialty” commands - and therefore part of the production subsystem - providing their goods and services usually to both the combat and production subsystems. For example, U. S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) (see para 19–10) operates most Army medical activities in CONUS; U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) directs all criminal investigators.

(2) The principal reason for the establishment and continuation of functional commands is that the required degree of integration for the specialty functions differs from those functions, which have remained the responsibility of the
installation commander. Each of the specialty functions is a goods or service provider who can stand apart from the major mission of the installation, whether it is force readiness or training. Mission performance does not require that telephone service, or commissary operations, or medical care delivery is totally integrated with facilities or maintenance so that unit readiness or training objectives can be met. The same is not true of functions like maintenance or personnel support, which more directly affect installation goal achievement.

(3) Further, the conceptual model would suggest that achieving greater performance from these functions could best be accomplished by improving the degree of differentiation. The “functional” organizational model appears to do just that. The central control reinforces the commitment by the local agency to: high quality, efficient telephone service, and medical care, good commissary support, meeting recruiting objectives, carrying out engineer construction projects, by emphasizing the uniqueness of the function and demonstrating career paths for civilian employees.

e. HQDA support specialty commands. Another secondary category of organizations within the producer subsystem is the group of service producing, special-purpose organizations reporting to HQDA. This category includes, among others, the U.S. Human Resources Command (USAHRC) (see para 13–4c and 15–8d). It has tasks that do not require field units to produce the service, therefore it does not fall into the functional command category. USAHRC’s services are used by both the producer and combat subsystems, as well as HQDA. Because of its specialty tasks, such agencies are directly linked to the HQDA staff, yet they are not classified as extensions to the staff because their functions are operational, rather than policy. Most organizations operating in such manner are categorized as field operating agencies (FOAs). The list below provides an example of some of the HQDA FOAs and addresses realignments affecting these organization under announced realignment decisions.

• Inspector General Agency
• Army Audit Agency
• EEO Agency
• Cost & Economic Analysis
• CPO Center Mgt Agency
• Information Mgt Support
• EEO Compliance & Complaint
• Cost & Economic Analysis Ctr
• DA Review Boards
• Publishing Agency
• Army Broadcasting Service
• Force Mgt Support Agency
• PERSCOM
• Army Research Institute
• OPTEC
• Safety Center
• Comm & Family Spt Comd
• Army Claims Service
• Center for Army Analysis
• Military Police Support Agency
• Center of Military History

Section III
The combat subsystem

3–5. Products of the combat subsystem

The combat subsystem’s major task is to convert the Army’s intermediate products, obtained from the production subsystem, into mission-ready forces, that is, into units and organizations. Each element of its structure welds together individual soldiers, equipment, and procedures and produces combat readiness. The combat subsystem engages in a process of continued interaction with its resource environment, primarily the production and the integrating subsystems. Its task environment includes the enemy threat(s), the unified COCOMs, allied forces with whom it must deal, and, especially in peacetime, the OSD and the Congress.

3–6. The Army in the field

a. This category of the Army’s organizational structure consists of 16 MACOMs including some commands previously addressed under the production subsystem and installation operations. The Army’s designated MACOMs are the following:

• U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) (see para 7–31).
• Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
• U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).
• Army Materiel Command (AMC)
• Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
• Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA).
• U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC).
• U.S. Army South (USARSO).
• U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command.
• Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC).
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
• U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
• U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC).
• U.S. Army MEDCOM.
• U.S. Army Military District of Washington (MDW).
• U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) (see para 11–19a).

b. In some respects each command faces similar environments although they differ from each other in many ways. Several (FORSCOM, USAREUR, USARPAC, EUSA, USASOC, and USARSO) have the principal task of providing mission-ready land forces—the primary output of the Army. As a result, each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment.

Section IV
The integrating subsystem

3–7. Tasks of the integrating subsystem

a. The integrating subsystem ties all of the subordinate subsystems together for the Army as a whole. Its tasks are to decide what is to be “produced” or accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that the system performs as expected. It also acts as the source of funds for the subsystems, obtaining them from DOD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (see para 10–46), and the Congress.

b. In any large organization, the headquarters has the major function to see to it that the major tasks of the organization are accomplished. It is the most prominent integrating device in the organization. The challenge for the integrating subsystem is one of structuring the organization to accomplish the following tasks effectively:

• Determining the nature of demands and requirements (e.g., from OSD, Congress, the public, other Services, the nature of the threat).
• Charting a course for the Army.
• Securing the necessary resources (appropriations authority) for the Army.
• Allocating resources, responsibilities, objectives and performance requirements to the combat and production subsystem.
• Evaluating the performance of the subsystems’ organizations against the requirements.
• Bringing about change, whether evolutionary or revolutionary, in cases where performance does not meet present requirements, or the projected security needs of the nation.
• Transforming the Army to future force structure organizations in order to meet the National Security and national Military Strategies.

3–8. Differentiation and integration

The exercise of these functions calls for both a high degree of differentiation within the headquarters and many integrative devices. Each function must relate to a similar functional group in OSD, to some extent to interested committees in Congress, and to members of the same specialist community in the combat and production subsystems. Figure 3–1 reflects the current HQDA structure.
a. Achieving differentiation.

(1) Differentiation is achieved through the assignment of functional responsibilities to the HQDA directorates and the HQDA special and personal staff sections. It is within the directorates that assigned tasks such as recruiting, JCS planning, or budgeting can be dealt with; goals can be reasonably clear-cut; appropriate time dimensions exist; and the proper degree of formality of structure is established. The directorates possess knowledge and experience sufficient for most decisions that concern their task environments.

(2) It is important at HQDA that the requirements of particular environments be well understood. This includes both upward relationships—with OSD, OMB, and congressional committee staffers—and downward relationships with the major commands. The senior leadership of the Army has a large influence on goal-setting and performance evaluation for the whole functional or specialty community within the Army and a similar influence on getting the needed resources from OSD, OMB, and Congress.

b. Differentiation in HQDA.

(1) Part of the past debate on HQDA reorganization was the belief that the structure of HQDA actually complicates the achievement of the required differentiation and performance. The criticism focused on the functional parts of the Army Secretariat (ARSEC) and the ARSTAF directorates which seemed to be duplicating each other’s efforts or have overlapping responsibilities. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 required the integration of the two staffs into a single HQDA comprised of a Secretariat focused on managing the business of the Army and the Chief of Staff and deputy chiefs of staff responsible for planning, developing, executing, reviewing, and analyzing Army programs. Although it may first appear complicated, it does provide an organizational system to minimize sub-optimization while producing units with required differentiation, capable of being integrated into the roles, missions, and functions of the Army.

(2) The acquisition process provides a good HQDA example of the differentiation sought by Congress. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) (see para 9–8a) has now incorporated into the office, by law, the acquisition function assigned by Congress. The Assistant SECARMY (Acquisition and Logistics) has been appointed by the Secretary of Army to perform this function. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 13, the Army has transformed the way it conducts its contracting business. As an example, the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) now centralizes the Army’s previously decentralized installation and information technology (IT) contracting processes into one system. It is responsible for all contracts over $500K and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts, ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA supports Army Transformation efforts by aligning all base support contracting into a single organization that best supports installation management transformation. All of these initiatives use IT to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities. Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational support to the war fighting commands. The Army Contracting Agency and other contracting activities will continue to support small business awards in the outstanding manner it did in FY02.

c. Achieving integration.
(1) Integration is achieved in a formal series of meetings at the senior staff level within the ARSEC and ARSTAF. The heads of the staff agencies, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff themselves, have a principal integrating role-serving more as a corporate management committee, than as simply representatives of their own staff agencies. And there are also many task forces, working groups, and committees with membership from throughout the ARSEC and ARSTAF, which also serve as important knowledge-based integrators.

(2) Integration is also the primary function of the Army’s senior leadership: the SECARMY, Under Secretary, Chief of Staff, and VCSA. This group decides on management strategies: stability, modernization of equipment, and balance. These strategies, enunciated in the yearly Posture Statement, are unifying, integrating statements of objectives that relate directly to the dominant overall issue-maintaining mission-ready forces.

Section V
Summary and references

3–9. Summary

a. The United States Army Posture Statement for FY 2001, available through the U.S. Army home page (http://www.army.mil/aps/2003) provides a thorough discussion on the strategic role of the Army and the integration necessary to achieve combat ready units. The document acknowledges while helping to fight the Global War on Terrorism, The Army is in the midst of a profound transformation. Although change is a constant, continued readiness remains the Army’s challenge.

b. In this chapter, a foundation of understanding the theory of structural change in the Army was presented. The start point is our current National Security and Joint Military Strategies. Currently, Joint Vision 2020 (www.dtic.mil/jv2020.) provides the direction for change and The Army Vision (http://www.army.mil/vision) focuses that direction for the Army. The remainder of this text will address the systems that actually plan and execute this continuous process of change and growth.

3–10. References


c. Joint Publication 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

d. Army Regulation 10–5, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

e. Army Regulation 10–87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States.

f. Army Regulation 10–88, Field Operating Agencies, Office of the Chief of Staff.

g. General Orders Number 3 (GO 3), Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department of the Army.