Chapter 1

Introduction

“It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security... of the United States,... supporting the national objectives,... and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. (The Army) shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land...(and) is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated... mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”

10, United States Code, Section 3062

Section I
Fulfilling The Intent Of The Congress

1–1. Changing how we manage change

a. Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of Section 3062 of Title 10, United States Code (USC), is a formidable task. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly change to adapt to changing threats to the Nation’s security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country’s interests at home and abroad. The Army must be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions ranging from domestic disaster relief and homeland security (HLS) through peacekeeping and peacemaking to winning our nation’s wars. This requires the continual modernization and development across the Army’s Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains.

b. The military is at a historic moment; it is a time when a confluence of factors are relentlessly driving change. Foremost among these factors is the advent of the Information Age that has empowered rapid, and focused adaptation through the creation of learning organizations penetrating heretofore rigid hierarchies with almost limitless multi-echelon access and connectivity. This rapidly developing network centric mode of operation is bypassing layered bureaucratic systems and processes and allowing concurrent vertical and horizontal informal communications and access to near real-time task related information. Simultaneously, the accelerating development of revolutionary technologies with broad military applicability is continually improving precision, detection, range, lethality, navigation, situational awareness, and many more aspects of system and organizational performance. Finally, the strategic environment is providing the context for driving major changes in our armed forces. This context includes: the emergence of a more complex national security environment with diminishing protection afforded by geographic distances; a deteriorating international security environment caused by weak and failing states; the emergence and diffusion of power to non-state actors; and a global war against terrorism. These trends and others have caused the nature and location of conflicts to be unpredictable and created a broad spectrum of new threats within dynamic strategic and operational environments. The combination of these influences is forcing a transformation, not only in our new weapons systems and platforms, but also in the organizations, systems and processes used to develop and manage the Army. Consequently, the very systems that this book describes and explains are undergoing profound changes responding to both external and internal factors. Many of these organizations, systems and processes were undergoing dramatic changes as this text was being written.

c. Changing large organizations with well-developed cultures embedded in established hierarchical bureaucracies is incredibly difficult. The mere existence of functioning complex organizational systems and embedded processes tends to resist change. The Army’s systems and processes outlined herein are no exception. Within the current unprecedented organizational context, these processes can be more likely to impede than to facilitate change as the Army struggles to incorporate flexible and adaptive processes that will reduce the bureaucracy, inspire creativity and rapidly incorporate technological, cognitive, and organizational innovations. Nevertheless, the Army must continue to “run” even if with systems and processes in need of major revision. By describing these systems with this text, the US Army War College does not intend to advocate their continued use nor indirectly resist their modification or wholesale reform. Instead, the text is intended to be a reference for educating our leaders so that they may make informed decisions on how these organizations, systems, and processes work; hence how they can and should be changed to better serve our soldiers and our nation. This book should provide a basis of understanding that empowers continued change and the eventual transformation in “How the Army Runs.”

1–2. Managing The Army

a. The Army as an organization performs myriad functions within the framework of well-defined systems and processes to effect the changes that enhance its ability to accomplish its missions. Functions such as recruiting and accessing military and civilian manpower, providing individual and unit training and education, developing war fighting doctrine and requirements, designing and organizing units and activities, equipping and sustaining fielded
units, mobilizing and demobilizing Reserve Component units, stationing units, and deploying and redeploying forces are just a few of the many complex functions that the Army must address when accommodating change.

b. The Army’s institutionalized systems and processes address these and many other functions. Systems such as the civilian and military personnel management systems, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process (PPBE), and the Army Health Services System and processes such as combat development, force development, force integration, and materiel acquisition, are some examples of these. The Army’s capability to effect change in order to discharge its statutory obligations and effectively accomplish the complex missions assigned to its activities and organizations depends upon how well the functions that are performed by any one of these systems or processes are integrated with the functions performed by each of the other systems and processes.

c. Stated another way, the successful integration of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army and the subsequent sustainment of the force in a trained and ready posture requires the synchronization of many Army systems and processes. This needs to occur at many levels of leadership and management to perform the functions that are vital to enabling the Army to comply with the will of the congress and, most importantly, to fulfill our “nonnegotiable contract with the American people - fighting and winning our Nation’s wars” (Army Vision).

d. There is no better nor more recent example of why the Army must change to adapt to changing threats and missions, or of the complexities of effecting change, than the Army transformation effort that began in 1999 and that will continue through the full fielding of the Stryker Brigades, the modularity brigade reorganizations that are being developed and implemented within today’s divisions and the development of the future combat system.

Section II
Army Transformation

1–3. Background

a. In part to the response to the “confluence of factors” discussed above, the former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled a new strategic vision for the Army. On 12 October 1999, at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting, General Shinseki described the Army Vision and its plan to transform itself into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the entire spectrum of operations. The current CSA, General Peter J. Schoomaker has continued Army transformation on a fast pace and has stated:

“As long as the United States Army has existed we have transformed--and we always will. For four years under General Shinseki our Army has asked hard questions and made tough choices. We will continue to go where the answers to those questions take us. Our azimuth to the future is good. The Army must remain relevant and ready.”

b. The mission of the Army remains unchanged: To fight and win the Nation’s wars and to execute the national security strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). While the mission remains unchanged, the world remains a dangerous place at home and abroad with a growing array of potential threats to our national interests and the Army is fully engaged in combat and stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

1–4. The Army Vision

The Army Vision calls for a transformation to a force that will provide more strategic flexibility and dominate at every point across the full spectrum of operations. The goal is a force that will be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the current force. These characteristics stretch across all of The Army’s core competencies including: prompt response, forcible entry operations, and sustained land dominance.

1–5. Managing transformation

a. In transforming into the Future Force, The Army has many challenges:

(1) During transformation, The Army must maintain sufficient capability to overmatch near-term threats while sustaining the current technological superiority of our legacy forces through timely recapitalization while fully executing its stability and combat responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(2) The Army must not sacrifice dominance for responsiveness. While it is easy to increase responsiveness by developing marginal capabilities, The Army is committed to “no fair fights,” and will resolutely ensure the development and commitment of Army forces to decisively defeat any and all opponents.

b. The Army transformation is capabilities-based, which means that while capabilities have been identified they are not preordained and they can be further developed while transformation is occurring. At every step along the transformation path, the determination to move forward to the next stage will only be made after all of the necessary preconditions have been met. The primary condition that must be met at every step is to sustain the capabilities to meet the Nation’s immediate security requirements.

c. In the few short years since General Shinseki’s AUSA announcement, “transformation” initiatives have spread throughout DOD. Not surprisingly, DOD organizations and processes have been created to manage the transformation. In January 2002, the SecDef created a new Office of Force Transformation within OSD and appointed a Director with
the responsibility to evaluate the transformation activities of each military department, recommend steps for integrating the service initiatives and monitor ongoing research programs. These efforts were designed to better coordinate and synchronize service transformations and link the military transformation into the broad elements of national and departmental security. Similarly, the Joint Staff (JS) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) assumed greater functional and oversight roles in synchronizing service transformations with the formulation of Joint Operations Concepts and associated operating and enabling concepts associated with the joint operational framework, the conduct of joint experimentation and the development of “born joint” systems needed to effectively operate within a transformed joint force context on the future battlefield. Additionally, the 2003–2007 DPG required each service to “...prepare and update annually for review by the Secretary of Defense a Transformation Roadmap.” The purpose of the roadmaps is to specify service actions and timelines to develop Service-unique capabilities in support of DOD’s overarching six critical operational goals for force Transformation. Within this context, The Army’s on-going Transformation continues to evolve and be responsive to the Combatant Commanders and other services.

d. Correspondingly, the Army established additional transformation-unique standing and ad hoc organizations, committees, and processes to manage the transformation and produce a suite of analytic, managerial and computer tools to synchronize transformation efforts and drive decisions.

1. Established the Army Transformation Office to monitor and manage the Army Transformation effort.
2. Created the Objective Force-Task Force (OF–TF), (now called Future Force vice Objective Force) headed by a 3-star director, to integrate the Army’s main effort for an Objective Force capability this decade.
3. Designated a Lead Systems Integrator (SI) for the system of systems approach.
4. Formed a Joint Venture Directorate for Army/Joint concept development and experimentation.
5. Stood up a Brigade Coordination Cell at Fort Lewis to assist in the formation of the Stryker BCTs.
6. Dedicated resources that have produced modularity units of employment and units of execution as examples of organizational change and the Army has increased the number of brigades in its force structure.
7. Instituted a series of monthly four-star events (Requirements Review Council (RRC), OF–TF Reviews, CSA Video Conferences, and Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) Transformation Synchronization Meetings) as well as lower level three-star OF–TF Integration Staff Officer’s Council meetings and weekly Transformation Campaign Plan Battle Staff (COL/0–6 level) coordination meetings.
8. Wrote, published and periodically updates the Transformation Campaign Plan, the Army Strategic Campaign Plan, the Objective Force Campaign Plan, Army Experimentation Campaign Plan, Transformation Roadmap, supporting concept White Papers, Functional Plans and Annexes and the Transformation Execution Matrix.

e. The current graphic used by senior leaders to portray Army Transformation is in Figure 1–1 below. At the top is the objective to have fully networked battle command capabilities. At the center is the varied enhance capabilities the Army is currently working on to give the Army the enduring characteristics defined at the bottom. The time line is in a cloud, because these are an element of the unknown as to how long it will take and exactly what are the interim states as the current force transforms to the future force.
1–6. Army transformation and the force development process

a. The Army has been, and will continue to be, doctrine based during the transformation process. While doctrine specifies the “how” we will accomplish a mission with our current force structure, the Future Force concepts will remain well out in front of doctrine in describing the how the future force is expected to operate. Historically, material changes have required up to 15 to 17 years to develop and field. *The Army Vision* has established an accelerated material development and fielding process. This accelerated process establishes the goal of fielding new technologies to the genesis of the objective force beginning in eight to ten years. This is approximately one half of the time that has been the historical norm.

b. Equally as dramatic as the material modernization efforts, is the organizational redesign occurring during the transformation process. This redesign effort has been greatly accelerated as well. Organizational redesign historically requires between three to four years to accomplish. Most notable is the nearly instantaneous (approximately twelve months) force structure modifications made to the initial BCTs at Fort Lewis, Washington that provides both a near-term operational capability and will identify insights and refinements in the organization, training and doctrine for the follow-on interim and objective force organizations. Equally agile and fast paced has been the series of modularity studies that have fundamentally changed the brigade structure in the combat force structure and is now focused on combat service support force structure.

c. Doctrinal changes have historically required between two to four years to formalize and produce. During the transformation process the BCTs have changed the way the Army fights. Their efforts will be captured in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that will serve as the basis for further doctrinal development. Again, like material modernization and organization redesign, the doctrinal development timelines will be reduced on an order of magnitude of 50 percent that will result in the production of doctrinal products in one to two years.

d. The rapidity of change inherent in the ATCP will require intense and continuous management by force managers and leaders at all levels of the Army to minimize human and materiel costs and to ensure that the Army maintains its readiness to fight and win the Nation’s wars. In addition, lessons learned from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been incorporated within doctrine. The efforts to defeat the improvised explosive devise threat in Iraq have been noteworthy for its agility and responsiveness. Moreover, the transformation effort itself should yield valuable insights
into how the Army’s systems and processes can be streamlined and accelerated to further improve the ways in which the Army manages change.

Section III
Purpose, Scope, And Objectives Of This Text

1–7. Purpose

a. The purpose of this text is to provide a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command and management positions at the senior and strategic levels of leadership. It explains the relationships of the systems and processes that produce both future change and contribute to daily mission accomplishment. It is these systems and processes that will be taxed to their fullest capabilities and capacities during the execution of the ATCP.

b. While the principal use of this reference text is to support the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, there are additional objectives that serve broader purposes. These other objectives include its use by the following:

1) By nonresident students in meeting objectives of the USAWC Distance Education Program.

2) As a general reference for branch and service schools in the military education system.

3) As a primer for all who seek to better understand the Army’s organization and functions, and how its systems and processes relate.

c. The major focus of the text is on the United States Army; however the text also addresses how the Army interfaces with the Office of the Department of Defense, other Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the COCOMs.

1–8. Scope and objectives

a. This reference text supports the DCLM portion of the USAWC curriculum. Elihu Root founded the institution “not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” He charged the faculty with directing “the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander-in-Chief of all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement.” Much of that original emphasis remains in the current USAWC mission that includes preparing leaders to assume high-level leadership responsibilities and in the objectives of the DCLM program of instruction.

b. The DCLM presents that portion of the curriculum that promotes a better understanding of the theory and practice of command, leadership, and management in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the DA. Methods of instruction include faculty presentations, lectures, and discussions with distinguished academicians and prominent practitioners, seminar group discussions, case studies, independent reading, and practical exercises.

c. From 1977 to 1997, the primary reference text published by DCLM was entitled Army Command, Management, and Leadership: Theory and Practice. Because of the growing volume of discussion and information in the category of theory as well as the many changes that have occurred in Army organizations and systems since the end of the Cold War, the single theory and practice volume was replaced in 1997. The theory has been incorporated into a Course text that changes yearly. The current version of How the Army Runs, which is published biannually, is an outgrowth of this division. This text addresses the operation and relationships of the systems and processes that enable the Army to fulfill its roles and accomplish its missions.

Section IV
Text Organization And Relevance

1–9. Three part text

This text is organized into three parts:

a. A review of the Army as a system and processes.

b. A detailed examination of planning and structural processes, systems and subsystems; how they operate and how they relate to each other.

c. A review of management and management support systems.

1–10. The Army as a system

Chapter 2 addresses the Army as an organization and provides an overview of the systems and subsystems that affect its operations. Chapter 3 discusses Army structure (ARSTRUC). Chapters 4 and 5 identify the processes of strategic planning within a Joint context, force planning and design, determining manpower requirements, and developing the manpower management program. Chapter 6 deals with mobilization and deployment. Chapter 7 examines the role, structure, and status of the Reserve Components, and Chapter 8 provides a description of force readiness concepts, the system, and its reporting procedures.
1–11. Army systems and subsystems
The major and supporting systems of the Army are identified, described, and analyzed in the next section. Chapters 9 and 10 examine the Army’s resource management systems at Headquarters, DA, major command, and installation levels, and the interface with the DOD systems. Throughout, the interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Office of the JCS are examined. Chapters 11 and 12 describe the organizations, functions, policies, and procedures associated with research, development, and acquisition (RDA), and the logistics systems at HQDA and the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

1–12. Management and management support systems
Chapters 13 and 14 address the military and civilian personnel management systems. The remaining chapters through Chapter 23 examine Army training, information management systems, installation management, intelligence management, health services, legal affairs, civil functions, public affairs, and military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) (see Chapter 23).

1–13. Relevance
   a. This text is in consonance with the goals of the Army’s senior leadership, addressing the areas of readiness, people, materiel, strategic deployment, future development, and management. The published goals encompass specific objectives for the Army to be a full spectrum force, globally engaged, cost effective and changing to meet the Nation’s needs. This text is about the systems and processes that will enable the Army to remain as effective in service to the Nation in the future as it has been from Valley Forge to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the global war on terrorism yet undefined and beyond.

   b. It is hoped that students and practitioners of the military art who use this text will more fully appreciate the truth in the words of General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, Army, 1964–1968, who said—

   “The Army is like a funnel. At the top you pour in doctrine, resources, concepts, equipment, and facilities. And out at the bottom comes one lone soldier walking point.”

   c. It is in support of that combat soldier, serving at the cutting edge of freedom, that this reference text is written.