Sitting in the rear seat, Lt. [redacted], Cpl. [redacted], Lpl. [redacted], Lpl. [redacted] were struck by secondary fragments from the same source. That source being an 810 Warthog which had strafed our position a number of times. Lpl. Fribley, Lt. [redacted], Cpl. [redacted], Lpl. [redacted] and Lpl. [redacted] were all injured on the west side of the road north of the Saddam Canal. Cpl. [redacted], Cpl. [redacted], Sgt. [redacted], Lpl. [redacted] were injured by the blast from the RPG that struck 201, receding 3/4 of the way through the City South of Saddam Canal. Lt. [redacted] himself loaded Lpl. Fribley onto track 201 along with Cpl. [redacted], Lpl. [redacted] & Lpl. [redacted]. This took place North of Saddam Canal on the west side of the road at the same pos that we were struck by the 810.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003? **Rifleman**

2. Which Marine or Marines did you **personnally** observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? **CPL Friel**

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. Moving to the north bridge **CPL, CPL, SGT** They were wounded by a RPG that hit our truck.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? **N/A**

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? **N/A**

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? **N/A**

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle). **First Sgt**

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

**Signature:**
**Date:** 06/10/03

**Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and **Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.**

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.**

A-F-29
loosing to the north bridge our trac was hit with an RPG. They were wounded. The track stoped, took out the wounded and left the track. Put them on first, Sgt [redacted] took track. They moved to west side of the road and started moving north, while moving taken mortar's and A10 fire. As we were moving north, we started to move east toward FLT's track. Right when I got inside of the track the A10 started to fire. Sgt [redacted] and CPL [redacted] were wounded and CPL [redacted] took a bullet round to his back, myself and CPL [redacted] and [redacted] who got into a different track. Track 201 started moving to the north bridge and it was taken out. All of the marines were into a house on the east side of the road. The wounded CPL [redacted] and CPL [redacted] were inside the house. The injured were loaded up on to a track and most of the other marines that were inside the house. The other marines were picked up by hummers and taken to the other side of the north bridge.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003? **PLT CMDR**

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? **NO**

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? **N/A**

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

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**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.**

A-F-31
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on? (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Signature: ______________________
Date: 2003 06 11

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** This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
The road from East to West. His plane went down, but there was no explosion of any kind around him and it happened while the A-10 was taking a run from North to South. He was later helicoptered out.

PL [redacted] was hit while crossing the road from West to East by shrapnel. He was on the North side of the North Bridge. He was later medevac by helo.

CPL Nixon, PFC Hutchings, PFC Burkett, PVT Gifford were in track 208 while going back through the city. I saw all four get on the truck while on the North side of the bridge which was track 208 motor track. It was hit while going back through the city and everyone in the back was killed instantly.

Sgt Jordan, PFC Buesing, and CPL Gonzales were hit on the North side of the North Bridge. All three bodies laid beside one another and all had [redacted] All three bodies were medevac by helo.

UNCLASSIFIED
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

   Weapons Platoon Commander, Company C

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

   WIA – Garibay, Gifford, Burkett, Gonzalez
   KIA – Jordan, Pokorney, Buesing

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

   Garibay, Gifford, Burkett and Gonzalez were wounded 100 meters north of the Sadaam Canal on the east side of the road about 10 meters off the road. Pokorney, Jordan and Buesing were killed by a mortar/rpg round in the same location by the same round that wounded the above mentioned Marines.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

   NO

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

   NO

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

   N/A

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on? (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
   We got off the tracks north of the north bridge. 60mm mortars got fire capped. FiST team had no comm, so I gave Lt Pokorney coordinated where to call in missions over Bn Tac. I then started spotting for my 60mm mortars. I moved Cpl Garibay's mortar and crew down towards the canal about 100 meters north of the north bridge on the east side of the road. SSgt Jordan helped carry ammo to this position. We got the gun firing under moderate to heavy RPG fire in our vicinity. Lt Pokorney came over to the position to tell me he got 2 missions sent out over Bn Tac for arty. A few seconds later a round hit our position (mortar or RPG) and killed PFC Buesing, SSgt Jordan and Lt Pokorney instantly. Myself, Cpl Garibay, Cpl Gonzalez, LCpl Burkett, and Pvt Gifford were all wounded by the round. I told Garibay to stay put because I did not know how bad they were hurt. I then started to run to our mortar track (C208) to get help when another explosion wounded me in the face. I got up from that and told Cpl C208's vehicle commander to follow me back to the casualties. When I got out of his track I did not see my other two mortars. The only people I saw were my casualties and a few bodies prone down by the canal. I ran back to Cpl Garibay with the track following and told him to start loading the wounded up and that I was going to the canal for help. I also told him if I did not make it back to get on the track and go back south through the city to find the BAS somewhere south of ambush alley. I left them as the track stopped at their position to go find help to load the track. I never made it back to there position because they loaded up and went south.

Signature
Date:

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**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?
   Answer: Crewchief on Mortars Vehicle.

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?
   Answer: I observed the mortar platoon get hit. No one Marine specifically, until I jumped off the track and saw all the wounded.

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.
   Answer: Cpl Chanotongse was killed on the north side of the bridge.
   Sgt. Reese was wounded on the north side of the bridge.
   Pfc Burkett was wounded on the north side of bridge.
   Pvt. Gifford was wounded on the north side of the bridge.
   LCpl Williams; LCpl Kline; Pvt Hutchings, Cpl Garibay, and Cpl Nixon, were killed when the track exploded between the north and south bridges.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?
   Answer: yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?
   Answer: Yes I was the driver of the mortars AAV # C208

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?
7. Do you remember a vehicle you put the Marine/Mari on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

Answer: I put Sgt Reiss, PFC Burkett, Cpl Chanowongse, and Pvt Gifford on my AAV.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Answer: Once we crossed the bridge the Mortar platoon set up and started firing. My vehicle changed positions and started engaging to the west. That's when the mortar platoon was hit by enemy fire. I jumped out of the track and picked up Cpl Chanowongse and put him in the track. Cpl Garibay, LCpl Klien, and LCpl Williams helped me with Sgt Reese, PFC Burkett and PVT Gifford. I got back in the drivers station and we got hit with two more rounds. I looked back toward the back hatch and saw LCpl Williams, Cpl Gariby, and LCpl Klien and Cpl Nixon jump in the back. That's when Cpl... told me to go so we followed a group of tracks back through the city. In that group was C201, c206, C210, C207, and our track C208. Then I remember a big explosion and white light. I don't remember too much after that. I remember jumping our of the track.

I can't say anything about Pvt Hutchings. I never say him but SSgt said he jumped onto my AAV also.

Signature:
Date:

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**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?
   Squad leader/gunner

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/ killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?
   Cpl Gonzalez

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.
   Approximately 150 meters North of the North Bridge

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?
   No

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?
   No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?
   N/A

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
   Cpl [redacted], was put on a track, but not by me

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
   We had been firing Mortars, approx. 150 meters North of the bridge then displaced to the other side of the road. Cpl [redacted] was hit when an RPG or Indirect fire impacted close to him. I saw Cpl Gonzalez when I cross back across the road and proceeded South. It appear he had been hit by an RPG or Mortar.

Signature: [redacted]
Date: 030611

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**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003? A Gunner (249 saw).

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. South of Al Nasariyah N. Bridge.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? Yes, I was a Marine trapped in a track taking fire from RPG and small arms.

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not the location of the vehicle). We were all on track 206.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

I jumped out of track 203 into track 206 and my memory is fogged after 1 RPG explosion.

Signature: ____________________________
Date: 03-06-11

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**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003? Rifleman

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? LCPL Slocum

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. Somewhere in the city heading south

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? No

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Signature: [Blank]
Date: 030611

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
in the city I do not know where was hit by machine gun fire, then by five RPGs. One of those killed LCPL Shcum, along with an AVU Marine who I do not know his name, but he was a Sergeant.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/ killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 03/06/11

**Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.**

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.**
AFFIRMATIVE REPORT. ZT-1 FIRE TEAM GOT OUT TO FIND A CONTACT. ZT-1 GOT ON TRACK 6. ZT-6 WENT BACK SOUTH THROUGH THE CITY AND GOT HIT BY A COUPLE RPG's. ONE OF THEM KILLED LCPL. SLOCUM, AND ANOTHER AVN SGT.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?
   C CO 1ST PLT 6GT

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personnally observe get hit that were
   wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed
   during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?
   CPL ROSACKER / LCPL

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was
   wounded or killed. Inside Track 203 approx 600 m North of the
   North bridge west of the MSR 10 on facing east.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? NO

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did
   you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? NO

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? N/A

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle
   number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
   CPL ROSACKER was killed in track 203 and was pulled out by another
   company and thrown out by hero.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Signature:
Date: 030601

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please
print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a
court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.

UNCLASSIFIED
.50 cal M2. Indirect fire was closing on our position. I turned to order the air secure in and hatches closed. CPL Rosacker was standing air security. As I turned I saw a flash and CPL Rosacker was thrown into the track. There was also a loud explosion from within the AAV and I could feel the heat on my legs. We closed the hatches and were immediately hit with indirect fire. We attempted to move the track to avoid any more hits, when we realised the track’s hydraulics were shot, thus no steering. We backed the track up and it was hit again by bombs/bullets. I ordered the Marines out of the track. Two Marines helped CPL onto another track. The rest of the Marines were told to take cover in the small canals to the west. CPL Rosacker was hit in the lower abdomen and we checked for vitals and he had no pulse. The ramp was still up and there was no way for us to pull him from the track. I was last to leave the track. Less than five seconds after I exited, the track was hit by indirect fire and I was blown to the ground. CPL Rosacker was not removed from the track until the indirect and A-10 fire ceased.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?
   
   Squad Leader 2nd Squad

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?
   
   Cpl Rosacker and LCpl [Redacted]

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. North of the Saadam Canal, West side of the road, inside track 203

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?
   
   No

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?
   
   No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
   
   LCpl [Redacted] was put into track 201

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
   
   Back

Signature: [Redacted]

Date: 030611

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**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
OPED TO PROVIDE SECURITY. PULLING OFF THE WEST SIDE OF THE ROAD WITH THE REST OF 1ST PL. WE CONDUCTED A SHORT SECURITY HALT OF ABOUT 10 MIN. THE FIRETEAM GOT BACK IN AND SHORTLY AFTER THE ROOF OF THE TRACK WAS HIT BY EITHER THE AIO OR INDIRECT FIRE. THE ROUNDS RICOCHETED INTO THE TRACK WOUNDING LCPL D AND TAKING THE LIFE OF CPL ROSACKER.

---

TRACK 201

TRACK 202

TRACK 203

LT. SEALY

N. BRIDGE

SADAM

CANAL

A-F-49

UNCLASSIFIED
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003?  
Rifleman

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed? (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. North of the footbridge about 200 m from 203

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?  
No

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? N/A

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on? (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).  
N/A

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

   We were north of the bridge taking small arms and mortars. Then took fire from an A-10. Killing Rosacker and wounding Hoff. Tried to help both Marines to the best of our ability. Evacuated the track, other Marines were helping the WIA and KIA

Signature:  
Date: 03/06/01

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
Cpl. Kesarwe got hit with EFP on an A-10 wing tip. Both Kesarwe and the other LSO were both on their second tour of duty. They were both shot in the leg. The second LSO was also hit in the leg.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003? A Gunnery

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? CPL Rosacker KIA

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. North of the Bridge by 500 meters west of the road in Amtrack 204

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle). Amtrack #201

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

A round came in the top of the track hit CPL Rosacker and killed. CPL Rosacker I did first aid on CPL Rosacker and I moved him to track 201.

Signature: [redacted]
Date: 03/11

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.

A-F-52

(ENCL 20)
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003? Fire TEAM LEADER.

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? ROSACKER.

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. IN 2ND SQUD TRACK SOUTH OF THE BRIDGE.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? NO.

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? NO.

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

   CPL ROSACKER AND CPL [REDACTED] WERE ON AIR SECURITY IN THE TRACKS AND THEY GOT HIT BY A-10 SOUTH OF THE BRIDGE.

Signature: [REDACTED]
Date: 030611

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned in to me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

   Answer: AAV Crewmen

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

   Answer: I didn't see the Marines get killed but I saw their bodies - Sgt. Bitz

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

   Answer: In an AAV driving south back through the city of An Nasiriya, Iraq.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

   Answer: yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

   Answer: Driver of C206

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

   Answer: C206 Just north of the first bridge in Nasiriya (south bridge)

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
Answer: After getting hit by enemy mortars and being fired upon by the Air Force, my AAV drove back through the city with 8 Marines. 3 of them crew members. Half way back through the city we were hit hard which disabled the vehicle and eventually dying north of the south bridge. Sgt Bitz and another Marine were killed but I don’t know his name.

Signature:
Date:

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

   Answer: Crewmen on C206

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

   Answer: Sgt. Bitz

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

   Answer: In between the south and the north bridge, in the middle of the city heading toward the south bridge.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

   Answer: Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

   Answer: Yes, Cpl[REDACTED] and Sgt Bitz were injured at the time. I was in the rear of the AAV.

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
Answer: Sgt. Bitz was put on 206 when we were still in the field right before we went back over the bridge.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

Answer: We went over the south bridge into Nasiriyah, taking small arms fire untill we went over the north bridge ans set into our defence. About 10 minutes later, we started to take on mortars, we got hit a couple of times, and then started to go back over the north bridge back into town.

We then stopped and picked up some Marines, Sgt Bitz and 4 grunts. We then started back toward town, we made it about half way thorough town and then we got hit with something hard which killed Sgt. Bitz. The track kept moving and stopped right before the south bridge at A.C.O.'s position. The tracks that went back toward the south bridge were 205, 201, 206, 207, 208 and 210. Out of these tracks 205, 207, 210 made it through without getting blown up.

Signature:
Date:

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?
   Answer: Assistant Section Leader/Crewchief of C203

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?
   Answer: I saw one Marine get hit but don't know who he was.

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.
   Answer: Just a few feet north of my tract. (300 meters north of the bridge)

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?
   Answer: Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?
   Answer: No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).
   Answer: A Marine was just behind a vehicle but I don't remember which one it was.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
UNCLASSIFIED

Answer: After the south bridge we started taking fire from both sides of the road. The infantry started returning fire from then. I did the same.

Once across the north bridge, we took off to the sides of the road where we had better defelade and returned fire. My track was hit for the first time with indirect and they were yelling we have casualties. The call came across a little later to bring casualties back over the bridge. As I started to take off, I made it to the middle of the road where my vehicle was immobilized except for reverse so we backed up into our previous position. The ramp was stuck, when my driver said that to me I jumped out opened the back hatch and got the Marines out. That's when the Marine got hit. I helped put his remains in a vehicle (unidentified) and went and found a position with some cover. Once the indirect and most of the small arms fire stopped I went back to my vehicle where I thought my driver was wounded. Cpl Rosacker was in the vehicle (KIA) so we attempted to pull him out. Then took more small arms fire. Finally we got back in there and pulled him out. We walked around covering bodies with ponchos. Then collected the survivors up for accountability and pushed north.

Signature:
Date: 13 June, 2003

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

Answer: Platoon Corpsman

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

Answer: None

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

N/A

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

Answer: Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

Answer: Yes in AAV # C205

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

Answer: C205

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
Answer: To the best of my recollection we crossed the first bridge and started taking small arms fire. We moved some more and next thing I remember was they needed me at tract C211. They had 5 wounded Marines. Me and another corpsman HM3 did some quick assessment and first and and loaded them up on C212. After a few minutes I administered morphine to Marines at 1327. Next think I remember was getting told we have more casualties adn they needed me at track 202. I looked at the 3rd class and didn’t want to go so I jumped out the track and began to run to where I thought C202 was. Running down the line I saw 3 dead but never saw them get hit. After not finding C202 I ran back to C212. I loaded up and we started taking mortar rounds. After a big explosion, which later was told to us was an RPG hit the tranny, I decided to get my patients out of the track and get them to a more secure location. After of loading Cpl and Cpl noticed the track C212 started to move forward. I drug my patients to a little ditch. Finially SSgt and Cpl pulled up in C205. We loaded up my patients and (Sgt was not a patient he also from 212) and I took off. We went over the bridges passed the city. We ended up at 2/8’s BAS position and off loaded the patients. Then we went back to meet up with the rest of the company.

Signature:
Date:

** Fill this out completely on either a computer or printed on legal size paper and Please print as neatly as possible. Your statement is a legal document and can be used in a court of law.

**This questionnaire must be turned into me No Later Than the 11th of June 2003.
I CPL [REDACTED] WITNESSED THE FOLLOWING EVENTS ON MARCH 23, 2003 WHILE SERVING WITH 1ST BN 227th MARINES ATTACHED TO C COMPANY IN AND AROUND AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ. I WAS RIDING IN TRACK 201 WITH 1ST PL 1ST SQD VEHICLE COMPANY 2ND LT SUMNER.

AFTER PUSHING NORTH OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND HERBING BOXING ON THE SIDE OF THE ROAD NORTH OF THE CITY AND NORTH OF THE BRIDGE I TOOK MY POSITION WITH MY A-GUNNER ON TOP OF MY TRACK IN ORDER TO SEARCH FOR ENEMY VEHICLES. THE MARINES INSIDE THE TRACKS ON MY SIDE OF THE ROAD BEGAN RUSHING ACROSS A FIELD UNDER SPARROW ENEMY FIRE. THERE WAS ENEMY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD, WE COULD SEE THEM TO THE EAST AND FIRE COMING FROM THE WEST. WE SEEMED TO HAVE EVERYTHING UNDER CONTROL UNTIL AN EXPLOSION HITS RIGHT NEXT TO A TRACK ON THE ROAD THEN ANOTHER CLOSED ONE FOLLOWED BY A STEEL ON STEEL THEN TWO MORE ALL ON LINE COMING TOWARDS MY TRACK. I HEARD AN EAR PIERCING SCREAM RIGHT BEFORE THE BOMBS HIT THE DECK. I JUMPED OFF THE TOP OF MY TRACK INTO MEDIUM TERRAIN UNTIL IT STOPPED MOMENTS LATER. I THEN GOT BACK INTO THE TRACK AND BACK ON TOP AGAIN TO ASSIST THE TRACK GUNNER WITH SOME BULBS IN DEAD SPACE. I HEARD A GUNFIRE BEHIND ME SO I TURNED AROUND LOOKED UP AND SAW A PLANE COMING AT ME SO I DUGS INSIDE THE TRACK WITH MY A-GUNNER THEN THE TOP OVER KILLED WITH RED SPARKS. IT WAS THEN MARINES BEGAN RUNNING BACK TO THE TRACK AND CRAWLING IN THROUGH THE SHINING DOOR WHICH WOULDNT CLOSE.

IT WAS THE L/CPL FISBY WAS SHOT MULTIPLE TIMES THROUGH THE EAST. THERE WAS GRUNBLING AT THE SAME TIME FOLLOWED BY MORE SPARKS AND CPL [REDACTED] GRABBING HIS ARM THOUGH HE WAS ONLY WOUNDED.

WE DECIDED TO MOVE BACK THROUGH THE CITY TO MEET UP WITH THE MAIN. I FELT US MOVING AND LOTS OF EXPLOSIONS, MORE SPARKS THE TRACK WAS GETTING ROUGH UNTIL FINALLY IT STOPPED AND THEY STOOD OUT WE ALL BAIL TO ANY WAY WE COULD. I WAS LAST, THE TRACK WAS EMPTY THAT I SAW, AS I SET FOOT IN THE STREET I SAW ONE OF THE MEN IN THE SQUAD GOING OVER A BEND WELL, AS I WENT TO FOLLOW I HEARD SOMETHING CALL FOR HELP AS I TURNED TO RETRIEVE HIM A TRACK BEHIND US EXPLODED.

A-F-64
I'm not sure whether it was already hit or not but it looked bad. I grabbed the Marine out of the street and took refuge in a building while two other Marines helped me drag the wounded, etc. to safety. The squad set up in that building and the casualties were cared for by Cpl [redacted] and myself. Cpl [redacted] and [redacted] were brought in also with head wounds. The Marines said they were from the tank that exploded. I saw no more of the plane and the enemy we encountered while in the building were using small arms and RPG's. We were later recovered by Tank Desert Knight and CAT.

These statements are true to the best of my knowledge based on memory of my personal experiences alone.

Signed [redacted] LSTC
Tab A-G

Forensics Analysis Memos

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PFC Friby’s Environmental and Toxicologic Results . A-G-13
Intentionally Left Blank
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Administrative Assistant to the Board President

SUBJECT: Laboratory Analysis of Specimen Fragments

A request for analysis of metal fragments recovered from the remains of LCpl. David K. Fribley; LCpl. Brian R. Buesing; and 2LT Frederick E. Pokorney, who were killed in action, (KIA), as well as fragments recovered from 2Lt. [redacted] and Cpl. [redacted] who were wounded in action, (WIA), was made of the United States Treasury Department, Bureau Of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms, National Laboratory Center, (National Laboratory Center), in Beltsville, MD., by this FFIB.

The fragments from 2Lt. [redacted] and Cpl. [redacted] were transmitted to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, (AFIP), in Rockville Center, MD, on Monday, 20 October 2003. These specimens, together with the specimens recovered by the AFIP from PFC Fribley, LCpl. Buesing, and 2LT Pokorney, were transported from the AFIP, on Monday 20 October 2003, to the National Laboratory Center for analysis. A comparison with known materials contained in the munitions utilized by the USAF A-10s, which were operating in the area of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, on 23 March 2003, was conducted by the National Laboratory Center.

The National Laboratory Center worked in concert with the US Army Research and Development Engineering Center (ARDEC), Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, in identifying the materials that were components of the munitions utilized by the USAF Aircraft in the areas in which the above cited US Marine personnel were located when they were wounded or killed. These munitions included: 30 MM API- (DEPLETED URANIUM-DU) rounds; 30 MM HEI rounds; and MK-82 bombs.

It was the determination by the National Laboratory Center that the specimen fragments identified as being recovered from Fribley, Buesing and Pokorney did not match the material composition in the munitions that was identified as being used by the USAF A-10 Aircraft. The testing included analysis of metal content, radioactivity, and explosive residue.

With respect to the specimen fragments obtained from 2Lt. [redacted], it was not able to be determined if the subject fragments were from munitions used by a USAF A-10, enemy munitions, or material from an object in close proximity that the munitions might have impacted.
All subject specimens will be returned to the AFIP from the National Laboratory Center. A final report of Laboratory Examination will be compiled by the National Laboratory Center and forwarded to CENTAF for inclusion with the FFIB Report.

[Redacted]

CDR [Redacted] USNR
Administrative Assistant to the Board President
BOMB GP 500LB MK82 MOD1

FUZE WELL (FWD)
SUBPENSION LUG WELLS
FUZE WELL (REAR)

BOMB BODY
FUZE CONDUIT
EXPLOSIVE CHARGE
SHIPPING CAP

( NOTE: PRESENCE OF SUBPENSION LUGS DETERMINED BY NSN )

A-G-5

http://206.37.241...0/diagrams/1325E480.gif

10/21/2003
MIDAS: Munition

Nominee Name: BOMB GP 500LB MK82 MOD1
NSN: 1325002944152
DOIND: E480
Drawing #: 1380901-1
Family: HBD
Reported weight: 517 LB
Specification: MIL-B-82548

Detailed Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Search Structure:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key: M Munition  C Component  P Part  E Part Material  B Bulk Material  X Compound</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- [ ] BOMB GP 500LB MK82 MOD1 (1380901-1)
- [ ] TRITON/ - L 192 LB
- [ ] BODY ASY BOMB GP 500LB MK82 MOD1 EMPTY (1380545 (OD))
- [ ] PLUG BASE (4902487) 6.486 LB
- [ ] PLUG SHIPPING NOSE & BASE (2518425-1) 0.312 LB
- [ ] PLUG SHIPPING INSERT (2519634) 0.042 LB
- [ ] O-RING (1380545*R1) 0
- [ ] TUBE CHARGING (1212113) 0.2751 LB
- [ ] ALT TUBE CHARGING (1212113) 0.2751 LB
- [ ] ALT TUBE CHARGING (1212113) 0.2751 LB
- [ ] PLUG TAPERED (4902068) 0
- [ ] ALT PLUG TAPERED (923A5108) 0
- [ ] SETS CREW (MS51964-69) 59.2329 GR
- [ ] SETS CREW FULL DOG (4902485) 6.6629 GM
- [ ] SCREW CAP (MS18997-76) 0
- [ ] RETAINER FUZE LINER AFT (4902493) 1.271 LB
- [ ] ALT. RETAINER FUZE LINER AFT (4902493) 1.271 LB
- [ ] GASKET (1123625) 0.7662 GM
- [ ] WASHER LOCK SPRING (MS35336-4G) 29.32 GR
- [ ] SHIP ING CAP (1212105(OD)) 4.375 LB
- [ ] ALT. SHIPING CAP (1212105) 4.375 LB
- [ ] BODY BOMB ASSY (1380547 (OD))
- [ ] C. SING BOMB BODY (1380548) 301 LB
- [ ] STEEL
- [ ] IRON (7439-80-5) (99%)
- [ ] MANGANESE (7439-96-5) (0.4%)
- [ ] CARBON (7440-44-0) (0.1%)
- [ ] SULFUR (7778-34-9) (0.05%)
- [ ] PHOSPHORUS (7773-14-0) (0.04%)
- [ ] ZN PHOSPHATE
- [ ] ZINC PHOSPHATE (7779-90-0) (99%)
- BITUMINOUS COMPOUND
- PRIMER ZN
- SEALING COMPOUND (4902444)
- SEALING COMPOUND
- ASPHALTIC COMPOUND
- SILICONE COMPOUND
- GREASE
- ANTI-SEIZE COMPOUND (4902445)
- ENAMEL OD
- ENAMEL YLW
- STENCIL INK YLW
- INSERTING ADAPTER BOMB BODY (1252565) 12.8031 LB
- INSERT SUSPENSION LUG (1212112(OD)) 2.323 LB
- INSERT FWD (1380230(OD)) 8.21 LB
- FUZE LINER ASSY AFT (4902494-1)
- FUZE LINER ASSY AFT (4902494-2)
- FUZE LINER ASSY FWD (4902495-1)
- FUZE LINER ASSY FWD (4902495-2)
- Sulfur (7704-34-0) (0.05%)
- Phosphorus (7723-14-0) (0.04%)
- Zn Phosphate
- (ALT) Fe Phosphate
- (ALT) Fe Phosphate
- Lacquer
- Zn Chromate
- (ALT) Primer
- Primer
- Sealing Compound
- (ALT) Sealing Compound
- Stencil Ink
- (ALT) Stencil Ink
- Rotating Band (7500399-1) 0.1472 oz
- Plastic/Nylon
- Uze PD 505A3 (7258863)
Here are the results we sent to environmental path

> ----Original Message-----
> From: [Redacted]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2003 2:13 PM
> To: [Redacted]
> Subject: FW: AFIP case [Redacted]
> Importance: High
>
> Mrs. [Redacted] and I have collected and reviewed scanning electron microscopy data with energy-dispersive X-ray analysis (SEM/EDXA) for the metal fragment you sent. The primary component of the sample and the only metal we found is IRON. OXYGEN was found in regions where there was visual (reddish-brown) evidence of oxidation, and in a few regions of the sample there was also a small amount of SULFUR. The formation of iron sulfide is a known physiological response to the presence of iron in tissue.

> The specimen was examined as received, then it was filed to expose inner surfaces for analysis, and the filings were also collected and analyzed. The results were the same for all three preparations - the only metal found was iron.

> The sensitivity of the SEM/EDXA system is such that we should have been able to locate and identify other metals in concentrations well below 1%, if they exist in the specimen. We can perform the same tests on any other specimens that you have if you think it would be fruitful to do so.

> If you have any questions, please contact me (202-782-2835 or kalasinv@afip.osd.mil). We have saved data files if you need hard copies of the results.

> Thank you.

> Ph.D., Chief
> Division of Environmental Toxicology
> Department of Environmental and Toxicologic Pathology
> AFIP
Intentionally Left Blank
Tab A-H

USCENTAF Counter-Fratricide Briefing

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EXEMPT
UNDER
FOIA
USCENTAF
FRIENDLY FIRE
INVESTIGATION BOARD

A-10 – MARINE
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT
AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
23 MARCH 2003

COPY 2 of 8

FINAL REPORT
INVESTIGATION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

BOARD PRESIDENT: Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, USAF
Conducted IAW DOD Instruction 6055.7
A-10 – MARINE CORPS
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT
NEAR AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
23 MARCH 2003

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAV</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Vehicle</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Airspace Coordination Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTO</td>
<td>Air Force Technical Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control</td>
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<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<td>Coalition Forces Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
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<td>CRM</td>
<td>Crew Resources Management Reconnaissance (Tracked)</td>
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<td>Expeditionary Fighter Squadron</td>
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<td>Forward Air Controller-Airborne</td>
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<td>FLOT</td>
<td>Forward Line of Own Troops</td>
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<td>Fighter Squadron</td>
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<td>GOB</td>
<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
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<td>HUD</td>
<td>Head Up Display</td>
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<td>Identify</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVO</td>
<td>In the Vicinity Of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terminal Attack Controller (also known as GFAC)</td>
</tr>
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<td>L</td>
<td>Local Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>MPC</td>
<td>Mission Planning Cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSL</td>
<td>Mean Sea Level</td>
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<td>Near Infra-Red Beacon (Vehicle)</td>
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<td>NOTAM</td>
<td>Notice to Airmen</td>
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<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
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<td>TCTO</td>
<td>Time Compliance Technical Order</td>
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<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>Z</td>
<td>Zulu or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)</td>
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A-10 – MARINE CORPS
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT
NEAR AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
23 MARCH 2003

INVESTIGATION, SUMMARY OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS

1. (U) AUTHORITY, PURPOSE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES

   a. (U) Authority.¹

      (U) On 28 March 2003, General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, United States Central Command, directed that a friendly fire investigation be convened in accordance with Department of Defense Instruction 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Recordkeeping, to determine the facts and circumstances of a 23 March 2003 incident involving a pair of United States Air Force A-10 aircraft that attacked a United States Marine Corps company near An Nasiriyah, Iraq. General Franks directed that Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces, appoint members and convene the investigation board. Lieutenant General Moseley appointed Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, United States Air Force, as the Board President of the friendly fire investigation. In addition, Lieutenant General Moseley appointed technical advisors and support personnel to serve on the Board from the USAF, USMC, and USN.

      Formally titled the Friendly Fire Investigation Board (FFIB), membership included:

      Brigadier General USAF
      Colonel USMC
      Colonel USAF, MC, SFS
      Commander USNR
      Major USAF
      Captain USAF
      Captain USAF
      SMSgt USAF (ANG)
      Technical Sergeant USAF
      Technical Sergeant USAF

      Board President
      Marine Corps Advisor
      Medical Advisor
      Administrative Assistant to the Board President
      Legal Advisor
      A-10 Pilot Advisor
      Human Factors Advisor
      A-10 Maintenance Advisor
      Chief, Recorder
      Recorder

   b. (U) Purpose.

      (U) In accordance with Department of Defense Instruction 6055.7, Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Recordkeeping, paragraph E4.7, all Combatant Commanders (including the Commander, United States Central Command) must convene a legal investigation

¹Tab A and B.
to examine the facts and circumstances of all friendly fire incidents. "Friendly fire" is defined as, "A circumstance in which members of a U.S. or friendly military force are mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action by U.S. or friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force." Legal investigations are used to examine all the facts and circumstances surrounding a friendly fire incident and to obtain and preserve evidence for use in potential litigation, claims, disciplinary actions, or adverse administrative actions. When released, this report is available for public dissemination under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 United States Code § 552, and Department of Defense Regulation 5400.7, Department of Defense Freedom of Information Act Program.

c. **(U) Limiting Factors.**

(U) The Investigation Board did not have the A-10 head up display (HUD) tapes (audio and video) from GYRATE 73 flight available to help reconstruct the facts of the incident. This was due to the fact that it was not until 28 March that the friendly fire incident on 23 March was reported by the Marine units in the field to CENTAF/CENTCOM, and as a result, the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing (332 AEW) did not preserve the tapes as evidence. Given this, the Board relied solely on witness testimony in order to conduct the investigation and document the report. It should also be noted that witness testimony of Marine ground personnel had to be conducted in Iraq under combat conditions almost three weeks after the incident took place. The incident pilots were not interviewed until a month after the incident. The delay between the incident and the interviews was due to the date the FFIB was directed to be convened by CENTCOM, 28 March 2003, and then assembled at Al Jaber Air Base, 8 April 2003. Additionally, the Board President was directed to conduct an investigation on an A-10 and UK Reconnaissance Patrol friendly fire incident first, which was completed on 24 April, then investigate the A-10 and USMC incident.

d. **(U) Executive Summary.**

1. **(U) At approximately 1100Z on 23 March 2003,** Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, Regimental Combat Team 2, Task Force Tarawa, was attacked by a pair of United States Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II fighter aircraft on and just north of the Highway 8 bridge across the Saddam Canal in An Nasiriyah, Iraq. A USMC Forward Air Controller (FAC) gave the pilots Type 3 control and informed them that friendly forces were deconflicted from that target area. 18 Marines were killed and 17 wounded in the engagement; however, the FFIB has not been able to determine the source of fire that killed 10 and wounded 3 of these Marines. Based on information available, it is the Board's opinion that one Marine was wounded in action as a result of friendly fire.

2. **(S) GYRATE 73,** was the lead aircraft in a flight of two A-10s from Al Jaber Air Base Kuwait. The flight was tasked as a two-ship for an on-call close air support (XCAS) mission. Each aircraft carried The aircraft were tasked on ATO Q, mission number

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2 Tab P-3
3 Tab O-3
MOUTH was a FAC-supporting Team Mech, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, Regimental Combat Team 2, Task Force Tarawa. 1st Battalion 2nd Marines was conducting an operation with the rest of the Battalion to seize bridges on Highway 8 over the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal in An Nasiriyah, Iraq.
2. (U) BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

a. (U) OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).\(^6\)

(1) (U) In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and in response to Iraq's use of military force to repress ethnic and religious minorities, the Coalition established no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq to protect the minority populations and ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. The no-fly zone missions are code named Operations NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH (ONW and OSW). Air forces from the U.S. and other coalition nations have provided continuous air enforcement of these no-fly zones since 1991.

(2) (U) On 19 March 2003, the OSW and ONW missions ended when the United States and coalition partners launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), a military campaign designed to locate and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's regime.

(3) OIF Operational Environment, 23 March 2003.

(a) (U) Iraqi forces possessed significant arms with which to threaten US troops. Artillery included several mortar and gun systems of various caliber, including 120MM. The Iraqis also possessed a large number of new and vintage former Soviet Union designed tanks. Dismounted soldiers employed rocket propelled grenades (RPG) and a wide variety of small arms.

(b) (U) Iraqi forces also possessed extensive stores of surface-to-air threat systems. In addition to small arms carried by Iraqi ground troops, Iraq possessed radar SAM systems, infra-red SAM systems, optical AAA, and radar aimed AAA. These systems posed a significant threat to coalition aircraft operating in the area of responsibility (AOR).

b. (U) Incident Air and Ground Operations Units.

(1) (U) Incident U.S. Forces

(a) (U) The incident A-10 pilots belonged to the 103rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron (103 EFS), which is composed of aircraft, pilots and support personnel from the 103rd Fighter Squadron (103 FS), 111th Fighter Wing (111 FW), Pennsylvania Air National Guard. The 103 FS flies and maintains the A-10 multi-role fighter aircraft. The A-10 is capable of being equipped and operated for air-to-ground missions. In March 2003, the 103 FS deployed aircraft, pilots, mechanics, and support personnel to Southwest Asia to form the 103 EFS in support of OSW.\(^7\)

(b) (U) The 103 EFS was attached to the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing (332

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\(^6\) Information in this section was obtained via informal interviews with 332 AEW leadership and personal knowledge of the Board’s A-10 Pilot Advisor who had flown in OIF.

\(^7\) Information in this paragraph was obtained via informal interviews with 103 EFS and 332 AEW leadership.
AEW), which is an expeditionary unit based in Southwest Asia. The 332 AEW consists of a small number of one-year permanent party personnel, including the wing commander, and a number of operational and support expeditionary groups and squadrons. On 23 March 2003, there were seven flying squadrons assigned to the 332 AEW: four U.S. Air Force A-10 squadrons, a UH-60 rescue squadron, a C-130 rescue squadron and an F-16 squadron.  

The incident FAC and Marine personnel were part of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, which was comprised of three line companies; Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie; one weapons company; a Headquarters and Service Company; and reinforced with Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Tanks, and Alpha Company 2nd Assault Amphibian Vehicle Battalion (AAV Bn). The Battalion Commander had cross-attached units between Alpha Company 8th Tanks and Bravo Company to form a Team Mech and a Team Tank. This gave 1st Battalion 2nd Marines 4 maneuver companies: Team Tank, Team Mech (Bravo Company), Alpha Company and Charlie Company.  

The 1st Battalion 2nd Marines were a part of Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT 2) under Task Force Tarawa. RCT 2 was a task organized Marine Corps Division formed around the 2nd Marine Corps Division. It's major component commands were the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion 8th Tanks. Regimental Combat Team 2 was part of Task Force (TF) Tarawa, a task organized Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The 2nd MEB, based out of Camp Lejeune, N.C. served as the Headquarters component of TF Tarawa. The other major component commands that comprised TF Tarawa were the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC), and the 24th MEU (SOC).  

(2) (U) Iraqi Forces In and Around An Nasiriyah

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8 Information in this paragraph was obtained via informal interviews with 332 AEW leadership.
9 Tab M-3
10 Tab M-3
11 Tab J-48 - 50, 83 - 87
c. (U) Command and Control.

(a) (U) For Operation Iraqi Freedom a CAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) was written using the guidance contained in: 1) the unclassified Joint Publication 3-09.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), Final Coordination 28 August 2002; 2) the unclassified USCENTCOM Concept of Operations for Joint Fires, 10 November 1999; and 3) the unclassified USCENTAF CAS CAO SOP, 12 July 2001. In accordance with this CAS CONOPS, FACs employ three different types of CAS control when working with attack aircraft: Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3. Type 1 CAS is the most closely controlled, while Type 3 is the least. From the CONOPS:

- Type 1 Control requires the JTAC [Joint Terminal Attack Controller, also known as FAC] to visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target under attack. Type 1 is the default method of control.

- Type 2 Control occurs when either visual acquisition of the attacking aircraft or the target at weapons release is not possible, or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/launch (night, adverse weather, high threat tactics, high altitude and standoff weapons employment).

- Type 3 Control is used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide. When commanders authorize Type 3 control, JTACs grant a “blanket” weapons release clearance to an aircraft or flight attacking a target or targets which meet the prescribed restrictions set by the JTAC.\(^{13}\)

(b) Tab A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 19 (Fire Support) to Annex C (operations) of the Battalions Operations Order contained specific guidance with regards to Terminal Control Procedures to be utilized by FACs in the control of aircraft conducting Close Air Support (CAS).\(^{14}\) The Battalions Operations Order, including the Air Fire Plan, was verbally briefed to all of the Battalion Officers and staff. The Battalion Air Officer was present as well as two of the three FACs. The FAC for Team Tank joined the Battalion late and was subsequently verbally briefed on Terminal Control Procedures by the Battalion Air Officer. The Battalion Commander, in his testimony, expressed that he felt most comfortable with \[\text{Redacted}\] since that was how his unit had primarily trained.

\(^{12}\) Tab J-41 – 42
\(^{13}\) Tab S-4
\(^{14}\) Tab M-13
3. (U) CREW QUALIFICATIONS

a. (U) Background Information on Pilots.

(1) (U) Both incident pilots are experienced A-10 instructor pilots. GYRATE 73 has flown the A-10 for 16 years and has approximately 2,200 total flying hours: 1,950 hours in the A-10 and 250 hours in the OV-10. He has deployed to OSW on four separate occasions, the last of which led up to the beginning of OIF hostilites. GYRATE 73 flew approximately five OIF missions prior to the incident.

(2) (U) GYRATE 74 has flown the A-10 for 12 years and has approximately 2,300 hours in the A-10. He has deployed to OSW on three separate occasions, the last of which led up to the beginning of OIF hostilities. GYRATE 74 flew approximately 4 OIF missions prior to the incident.

(3) (U) In addition to normal aircrew training, the 332 AEW had complied with an anti-fratricide briefing program IAW CENTCOM/CENTAF requirements. Both incident pilots had completed this training.

(4) (U) Both pilots were medically qualified for flying duties and had current flight physicals at the time of the incident.

b. (U) Background Information on the FAC.

(U) The incident Marine FAC (MOUTH) has controlled CAS since February of 2001, after completing the FAC-A syllabus. As a FAC-A, he has approximately 40 airborne controls. He is a graduate of the USMC Weapons and Tactics School (MAWTS-1) as a F-18D Weapons System Officer. MOUTH has been a FAC since October 2002 after completing the Tactical Air Control Party Course at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic. As a FAC, he has approximately 25 controls. OIF is MOUTH’s first combat experience.

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16 Tabs C-3 and G-5 – 6
17 Tabs C-25 and G – 36 – 37
18 Tab E-3 – 5
19 Tab H-23 – 24
4. (U) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(U) Note: A regional overview map for orientation purposes is located at Figure 1. A map of the incident area in and around An Nasiriyah is located at Figure 2. Additionally, an expanded narrative of the incident taken from collective testimony is at Tab L.

a. (U) Key Events.

(1) On the morning of 23 Mar 03, USMC Task Force Tarawa began an offensive operation in and around the city of An Nasiriyah. The main focus of Task Force Tarawa’s operation centered on 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines. This Battalion consisted of four company-size maneuver units: Team Tank, Team Mech, Alpha Company, and Charlie Company. The Battalion had three main objectives: to seize the southern Highway 8 bridge (over the Euphrates River), to seize the northern Highway 8 bridge (over the Saddam Canal), and to seize the main Highway 8 intersection north of the Saddam Canal. Team Tank was supposed to lead the advance, but had to withdraw to the rear and refuel due to protracted combat early in the operation. Team Mech then lead the offensive and crossed the Euphrates River under fire. Team Mech maneuvered to the eastern section of town where muddy conditions halted their advance. Alpha Company seized the southern bridge and maintained a defensive posture at the bridge. The enemy engaged both Companies with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms. Charlie Company then crossed the southern bridge and, losing sight of Team Mech, proceeded directly for the northern bridge through a section of town known as “Ambush Alley.” Neither Alpha Company nor Team Mech were aware that Charlie Company had just passed Team Mech and became the lead element.

(2) (U) Charlie Company did not have a FAC, but all three other companies had FACs assigned. The Battalion Air Officer directed Team Mech’s FAC, MOUTH, to call on Guard for close air support (CAS). GYRATE 73 flight, a two-ship of A-10s near An Nasiriyah, responded to the call. Team Mech’s company commander directed MOUTH to employ the aircraft north of the Saddam Canal. Following approximately 10-15 minutes of coordination with GYRATE 73 flight, MOUTH directed the fighters to work north of the Saddam Canal, an area MOUTH believed to be clear of friendly forces.

(4) (U) By this time, Charlie Company had crossed the northern bridge and established a position north of the Saddam Canal. Charlie Company called the Battalion Commander and

Tab J-40
Tab J-91
Tab J-93
Tab H-31
Tab J-152 – 154
Tab J-109
Tab J-142
Tabs G-46 and H-32
informed him of their position.\textsuperscript{28} The Battalion Commander relayed this information to higher headquarters.\textsuperscript{29}

(3) (U) GYRATE 73 flight spotted a burning vehicle north of the canal (actually a Charlie Company AAV that had been hit by an Iraqi RPG) and reported the position to MOUTH. MOUTH could see the smoke and verified it was rising from the target area. GYRATE 73 also noticed approximately 9 more vehicles in the vicinity, consisting of white pickup trucks and "cab-over," flatbed trucks. He passed the coordinates of the vehicles to MOUTH.\textsuperscript{30} After checking the location and confirming with his Company Commander that Team Mech was the lead element, MOUTH informed GYRATE that there were no friendlies north of the canal and cleared GYRATE 73 flight to engage the targets. MOUTH cleared GYRATE 73 flight to employ under Type 3 CAS.

(5) (U) GYRATE 73 flight made multiple passes against the vehicles. During the engagement, the flight noticed approximately four vehicles traveling south toward the northern bridge. The pilots successfully engaged two of these vehicles with AGM-65 Mavericks as the vehicles reached the south side of the bridge. During subsequent passes, MOUTH aborted the flight due to the possibility of friendly forces in the area. GYRATE 73 flight immediately ceased the engagement and awaited confirmation. Eventually GYRATE 73 flight departed for Al Jaber Air Base due to a low fuel state.

(6) (U) Upon later investigation, ground forces confirmed that GYRATE 73 flight had actually engaged Charlie Company. In addition, ground forces also determined that the two vehicles destroyed on the south side of the bridge were AAVs carrying Charlie Company’s medevacs. During the battle, 18 marines died and 19 were wounded from a combination of A-10 and enemy fire.\textsuperscript{33}

b. (U) Post-Incident Medical Response.

(1) (U) On 23 March 2003 Charlie Company followed Team Mech over the southern bridge at An Nasiriyah. Charlie Company was mounted in Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV). The stretch of the Main Supply Route (MSR), which ran between the southern bridge and the northern bridge ran through the downtown built up area that was nicknamed "Ambush Alley." As Charlie Company proceeded north, they were taking a lot of small arms, mortar and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fires. Just before Charlie Company’s caravan of 11 AAVs\textsuperscript{34} and 3 High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) crossed the northern bridge, one AAV got hit by RPG’s setting it on fire. The Marines managed to cross the northern bridge around 1230L.

\textsuperscript{28} Tab J-61 – 62 and 154
\textsuperscript{29} Tab J-62
\textsuperscript{30} Tabs G-17 and H-32
\textsuperscript{31} Tab M-13
\textsuperscript{32} Tab H-32
\textsuperscript{33} Tab E-9
\textsuperscript{34} Tab J-170
hours that day and proceeded 100-500 meters before pulling out take cover and assess their wounded.35

(2) (U) The east side of the MSR was bounded by a berm and the west side by a small ditch beyond which lay another berm. The damaged AAV dropped its ramp and wounded Marines spilled out. The driver of the AAV took a few steps before collapsing and dying.

(3) (U) During this time the Marines were still being targeted by small arms, artillery, mortars and RPG fires from multiple unidentified locations.

(4) (U) The 1st Sgt was in charge of the last AAV in the caravan, the medical evacuation vehicle. He stopped, got out and together with his corpsman began triaging and collecting casualties into his AAV.

(5) (U) They collected 5 casualties before calling for an urgent helicopter medical evacuation, but realized the level of fires would preclude immediate response. While studying his map for grid coordinates, his AAV was hit by an RPG and some mortars, disabling it.

(6) (U) The 1st Sgt and his helper took their 5 casualties from his disabled AAV and placed them on the east side of the road up against the berm. His plan was to wait for the Battalion to send medevac assets as he realized the AAV’s didn’t stand a chance in the withering fires. He enlisted the aid of another Marine to remove more wounded Marines out of their AAV’s and bring them across to the east side of the road.

(7) (U) At this time, 2 more Marines were hit by an RPG. The 1st Sgt took these 2 newly injured Marines and placed them on the west side of the road, leaving them with a Marine and the corpsman.

(8) (U) The 1st Sgt walked over to a mortar position where 3 Marines were shooting mortars. He spoke briefly with one, and was kneeling down beside the Marine, when the Marine working with the corpsman called to him about an injured Marines’ condition.

(9) (U) The 1st Sgt got up and walked back towards the bridge approximately 50-75 yards away. He had walked about 40 yards when he heard the A-10 and looked up. The first pass of the A-10 killed the Marine with which the 1st Sgt had been conversing just minutes before, and after the A-10’s second pass, all 3 Marines at the mortar position lay dead on the ground.

(10) (U) The 1st Sgt gathered up several bodies out of the line of fire and covered them with ponchos.

(11) (U) He later collected 2 more casualties. At this point some disagreement concerning the disposition of the casualties ensued with several Marines gathering casualties up and deciding to place them in 4 functioning AAV’s. This group then proceeded to cross the northern bridge headed south, and two of them were engaged by the A-10’s with catastrophic results.

35 Tab J-205
c. (U) Recovery of Deceased Marines.

(1) Two of the 4 AAV's that attempted to cross the northern bridge heading south made it safely across. Some deceased Marines were in these vehicles. Subsequently, over the course of the next week, several more deceased Marines were recovered and sent to the mortuary facility at Dover AFB.\(^{36}\)

(2) The destroyed AAV's were recovered, searched, and further remains located and sent to Dover for further identification.\(^{37}\) One deceased Marine was recovered during the successful rescue of PFC\(\text{[redacted]}\) in 1 Apr 03.\(^{38}\)

d. (U) Property Damage.

(U) There were up to seven vehicles destroyed and/or damaged during the engagement. The FFIB was only able to positively determine that two of those vehicles were destroyed by the friendly fire.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{36}\) Tabs J-13

\(^{37}\) Tab E-9

\(^{38}\) Tab E-14

\(^{39}\) Tab U-3
5. **ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS**

(U) This section provides the significant facts gleaned from the investigation along with their analysis and resulting FFIB conclusions. It is subdivided into three categories: (1) areas determined to be non-factors in the incident and do not warrant further discussion; (2) areas that are determined to be non-factors in the incident, but warrant discussion; and (3) areas determined to be the factors contributing to this incident.

a. **Areas Determined To Be Non-Factors and Not Warranting Discussion.**

(1) (U) Operations environment.

(U) The FFIB examined the following as related to flight operations and found them to be non-factors in this incident:

- 103 EFS Operational Environment
- FAC Currency and Qualifications
- Additional Duties
- Operations Tempo
- Pilot Currency and Qualifications
- FCIF Program
- Weather and NOTAMs

(2) (U) Ground Systems (FAC)

(U) The FFIB did not examine the FAC’s vehicle or communications systems due to the combat environment. In the FAC’s statement, he did not mention any malfunctions of his equipment.

(3) (U) Maintenance.

(U) The FFIB examined the following maintenance practices and found them to be non-factors in this incident:

- Preventative/Routine Maintenance
- TCTO Compliance

(4) (U) Human Factors.

(U) The FFIB examined the following human factors and found them to be non-factors in this incident for the aircrew:

- Crew Coordination
- Inadequate Facilities
- (Living/Dining/Exercise)
- Cockpit/Crew Resource Management
- In-Flight Analysis
- Acute Fatigue
- Crew Rest

(U) The FFIB examined the following human factors and found them to be non-factors in this incident for the FAC:
b. (U) Areas Determined To Be Non-Factors But Warranting Discussion.

(1) (U) Operations.

(a) (U) GYRATE 73 Flights' HUD Tapes - GYRATE 73 stated that he turned in his HUD flight tape to the Intelligence debriefer for the mission, who would normally turn the tapes over to the Targets Section for disposition or return to the flying unit. 40 The FFIB's A-10 Pilot Advisor went to the unit Targets and Intelligence Sections to look for the tape. He was unable to find the tape, or a record of the tape being processed. As a result, the FFIB was unable to recover the tape or have access to its' contents for purposes of the investigation. 41

(U) GYRATE 74 stated that he did not turn his tape over to the Intelligence debriefer, but kept the tape himself for later review. He stated that some time after 23 Mar he inadvertently reused the tape and taped over the contents of the 23 Mar mission. 42 The FFIB was unable to recover GYRATE 74's tape.

(U) CONCLUSION: The missing flight tapes did not contribute to this incident, however, lack of the HUD tapes as an aid to reconstruction of the incident hampered the FFIB's investigation effort.

(b) (U) 332 AEW Response to the Possible Friendly Fire Incident. GYRATE 74 stated that during the ground debrief of the incident mission, he called the ground liaison officer (GLO) to see if he had heard about a possible friendly fire incident. 43 The Board spoke with two of the 332 AEW GLOs. One of the GLOs testified he had not spoken with the flight. 44 The other GLO did remember the flight contacting him. This GLO told the flight that there had been no information of a friendly fire incident on the "Net" and if an incident had occurred, they would have known about it before they landed from the mission. 45 There is no indication that a possible friendly fire was brought to wing or squadron leadership's attention, therefore, there was no effort made to preserve evidence relative to the mission other than normal intelligence and flight debriefing.

(U) CONCLUSION: The lack of 332 AEW response to the possible friendly fire incident resulted from lack of any confirmation that GYRATE could determine, that a friendly fire incident took place. The FFIB could not determine a hypothetical AEW response if the pilots had informed the chain of command of the initial concern, but most likely, the Wing would have at a minimum, retained the HUD tapes until further inquiries could be made. Lack of further immediate response by the 332 AEW was not a factor in this incident.

40 Tabs G-30 and K-38.
41 Tab O-5
42 Tab G-67
43 Tab G-65
44 Tab K-22
45 Tab K-27
(c) **Target Identification.** The pilots did not identify the vehicles in the target area as US Marine vehicles. MOUTH recalls telling the pilots they would be operating under Type 3 control.\(^ {46}\) A Cobra pilot working in the area also recalls hearing this radio call,\(^ {47}\) but neither member of GYRATE 73 flight remembers hearing this radio call.\(^ {48}\) The pilots called “In, hot” on some, if not all, of their passes.\(^ {49}\) MOUTH understood this to be inconsistent with Type 3 CAS, but responded with “cleared hot” to ensure the pilots released weapons.\(^ {50}\) The board believes that GYRATE 73 flight thought they were operating under Type 2 control, and that they believed the FAC had satisfied Positive Identification (PID).\(^ {51}\) In addition, the FAC provided a de-confliction line, the canal, between enemy and friendly.\(^ {52}\) The pilots understood that there were no friendly vehicles north of the canal. The pilots also noticed some US helicopters exiting the area at approximately the same time that a vehicle north of the canal exploded, concluding that the helicopters had attacked the vehicle.\(^ {53}\) Given the threat situation in Iraq, and specifically the An Nasiriyah area, GYRATE 73 flight elected to maintain higher altitudes for holding and weapons employment.\(^ {54}\) By maintaining higher altitudes, the pilots were not in an optimal position to recognize the vehicles as friendly.

**CONCLUSION:** Pilot target identification was not a factor in this incident because the pilots understood the reported disposition of friendly forces and believed they were operating under Type 2 CAS.\(^ {55}\) Furthermore, the pilots honored the threats and maintained higher altitudes, which precluded accurate target identification.

(d) **(U) Supervision/Leadership.** The FFIB investigated sufficiency of the incident pilots supervisory chain of command up to the Wing Commander. Supervision and leadership exercised firm, positive command and control of deployed personnel and all aspects of operations. There were no breaks in continuity of supervision on the incident pilots since arriving in theater. Additionally, the FAC’s chain of command up to the Battalion Commander were interviewed and were found to have exercised positive command and control and effective leadership under the most trying of conditions.

**CONCLUSION:** Supervision/leadership were not a factor in this incident.

(2) **(U) Maintenance.**

**Maintenance.**

The following maintenance factors were investigated and found to be non-factors; however, the information warranted discussion and analysis.
(a) (U) **UHF/VHF Radios.**

(U) Effective communication between the two incident aircraft and FAC was crucial during the events that led up to the friendly fire incident. The UHF radio is used between the aircraft and the FAC and the VHF radio is used for inter-flight communication. The incident aircraft’s Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 781 records were reviewed for the presence of aircraft communication problems. During this review, as well as the incident pilot interviews, the Board determined that the UHF/VHF radio systems were operating properly at the time of the incident. Given the combat environment, the Board was unable to examine the FAC radios.

(U) **CONCLUSION:** The Aircraft’s UHF/VHF radios were not a factor in this incident.

(b) (U) **Avionics.**

(U) The FFIB wanted to ensure any problems or malfunctions of the incident aircraft avionics systems were not distracting the pilots to a degree to cause task saturation. The incident aircraft’s AFTO 781 records were reviewed for the presence of aircraft avionic problems. During this review it was determined that neither incident aircraft had a history of avionics problems and the avionic systems were operating properly at the time of the incident.

(U) **CONCLUSION:** The Aircraft’s Avionics systems were not a factor in this incident.

(3) (U) **Human Factors.**

(a) (U) **Chronic Fatigue** – Defined: *Factor when the individual has the type of exhaustion resulting from an inadequate recovery from successive periods of acute or transient fatigue that degrade crew performance.* There was concern that given the operational tempo of combat, coupled with around-the-clock aircraft launches, chronic sleep debt could accrue. Interviews with the incident pilots, other pilots, and the review of operational scheduling show this not to be a factor. The pilots stated that they had no problems sleeping in the “hard billets” (trailers) provided. Additionally, the incident pilots had maintained the same schedule for weeks prior to the incident, and pilot rest was not compromised. The pilots and their roommates were all on the same schedule as well.

(U) Fatigue was also considered in the case of MOUTH. MOUTH, as well as the other Marines, had been in field conditions. While fatigue was most likely present, it was not a factor in the mishap. Marines in conditions similar to those field conditions experienced prior to the incident. Additionally, neither MOUTH, nor any of the other personnel assigned to the unit had stated a complaint of chronic fatigue.

(U) **CONCLUSION:** The human factor of Chronic Fatigue was not a factor in this incident.

(b) (U) **Excessive Motivation to Succeed** – Defined: *Factor when the individual is preoccupied with success to the exclusion of other mission factors leading to unsafe acts.* In this incident, GYRATE 73 flight was not found to have any predisposition with releasing weapons
above those normally experienced. There was no squadron challenge to the use of weapons on every sortie, in fact, quite the contrary. Squadron members were briefed to do their jobs just as they had trained, and to return with everyone safe. No personal, peer, or supervisory pressure was noted for pilots to produce "kill results".

(U) CONCLUSION: The human factor of Excessive Motivation to Succeed on the part of the aircrew was not a factor in this incident.

(c) (U) Circadian Rhythm Desynchrony — Defined: Factor when the individual is in a state in which the body's "normal" 24-hour rhythmic biological cycle (circadian rhythm) is disturbed. GYRATE 73 had been in the AOR for multiple weeks prior to the incident. GYRATE 74 had been in the AOR for approximately 14 days prior to the incident. This amount of time does allow for adequate acclimatization to new time zones. This ability to acclimatize was additionally enhanced by the pilots remaining on the same work schedule from the time of arrival in the AOR, until the time of the incident.

(U) CONCLUSION: The human factor of Circadian Rhythm Desynchrony was not a factor in this incident.

(4) (U) Unresolved Conflicting Testimony.

(a) (U) AAA Fire. GYRATE 73 flight's MISREP indicated they took AAA fire. The pilots testified that the MISREP contained several inaccuracies, including the portion concerning AAA. In their testimony, they stated that they did not see any AAA during the incident. MOUTH and several COBRA pilots in the area indicated they heard a radio call concerning the need to suppress AAA, believing GYRATE 73 flight initiated this call. Another Cobra pilot operating in the area at the time of the incident indicated he had received AAA and small arms fire. He further indicated that he reported this information several times to the FAC. This pilot also testified that he never heard GYRATE 73 flight mention AAA.

(U) CONCLUSION: The Board was unable to resolve these conflicts in testimony.

(b) (U) Aborts. MOUTH testified that he aborted the flight in three separate instances. The first abort was so MOUTH could check on friendly forces in the area, the second abort was called to realign the flight's run-in heading, and the final abort to cease the attack. He further indicated the pilots aborted on each one. The pilots testified that they only heard the abort call that ceased the engagement. A Cobra pilot also testified that he did not hear any abort calls during the time of the incident.

(U) CONCLUSION: The Board was unable to resolve these conflicts in testimony.

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55 Tab O-4
56 Tab G-26 and 63
57 Tab H-32 - 33 and K-19
58 Tab K-11
59 Tab H-13 - 19
60 Tab G-28 and 62
61 Tab K-11
(c) (U) **Ordnance.** GYRATE 73 flight’s MISREP states that they expended a total of 6 MK82s. 62 GYRATE 73 testified that he and GYRATE 74 each dropped 4 MK82s for a total of 8. 63 GYRATE 74 testified he dropped 4 MK82s. 64 One section of the MISREP stated that the flight expended 4 AGM-65 Mavericks, while another section indicated that they expended 3 Mavericks. 65 Both pilots stated that they only expended 3 Mavericks. 66 Flight line weapons logs indicate that the flight actually expended 8 MK82s and 3 Mavericks. 67

**(U) CONCLUSION:** The Board concluded that the MISREP was inaccurate and that the flight actually expended a total of 8 MK82s and 3 AGM-65s during the incident.

c. (U) Areas Determined To Be Factors or Possible Factors Contributing to this Incident.

(1) (U) Operations.

(U) This section discusses the operational factors, conditions, procedures and events that the FFIB found to be contributory towards the incident.

(a) (U) **Disruptions to the Ground Maneuver Plan.** In several instances during the battle, the Battalion had to deviate from its planned scheme of maneuver. The enemy, terrain, and duration of battle caused significant disruption to the Battalion’s initial plan.

i. (U) The Battalion encountered an Army unit south of the town. The Iraqis had attacked this unit, damaging several vehicles and inflicting several casualties. Efforts to assist this unit caused the tanks, which were leading the assault, to run low on fuel and return to the rear. As a result, the Battalion Commander placed Team Mech in the lead.

ii. (U) The resolve of Iraqi troops caused Team Mech to follow a planned maneuver to the eastern side of An Nasiriyah, and away from “Ambush Alley,” the most direct route to the northern bridge. Several of Team Mech’s vehicles sank in mud, stopping the advance short of the northern bridge.

iii. (U) By the time Charlie Company crossed the Euphrates River, they could no longer see Team Mech, which was supposed to lead them to the northern bridge. The buildings in the town obstructed the view between the two companies. Charlie Company was also unable to communicate with Team Mech. Assuming Team Mech pushed directly through “Ambush Alley,” Charlie Company’s commander decided to “follow.” This decision allowed Charlie Company to inadvertently pass Team Mech and cross the northern bridge alone. Team Mech, MOUTH’s company, was not aware of this.

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62 Tab O-3 – 4
63 Tab G-22
64 Tab G-62
65 Tab O-3 – 4
66 Tab G-32 and 77 – 78
67 Tab D-5
iv. (U) Due to the information they possessed, Team Mech believed they were the forward-most friendly forces. Team Mech’s commander and MOUTH elected to use Type 3 control to employ fixed-wing CAS north of the Saddam Canal, where they believed no friendly forces were located.

CONCLUSION: Because of significant obstacles encountered during battle, unit commanders were forced to make decisions that branched from the original plan and ultimately led to an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the status of friendly forces.

(b) (U) Communication.

The Investigation Board found the following communication factors to be contributing to the incident.

i. (U) Excessive Communications. In the hours leading up to the incident, there was a large volume of radio calls on the command net. The Battalion was primarily using one frequency. The combination of coordination of efforts and maneuver, reports of contact, calls for medical evacuation, and position reports created a saturation level over the command net in which troops could not guarantee successful transmission or reception of messages.68

ii. (U) Urban Environment. From the time that Team Mech crossed the Euphrates River and maneuvered into the eastern section of An Nasiriyah, they were in an urban area. Their location effectively placed buildings between them and both Alpha and Charlie companies. The buildings caused a problem in Line-of-Sight (LOS), complicating the successful transmission and reception of radio messages.69

iii. [FAC Communication. Due to the high volume of radio traffic and the Air Officer’s recurring radio malfunctions, Mouth believed he would not be able to successfully communicate with Battalion command. He elected not to request the required approval to employ the A-10s via Type 3 CAS. Instead, he chose to guide his actions by commander’s intent, rather than the letter of the Operational Order.70

(U) CONCLUSION: Radio malfunctions, LOS obstruction, and high communications volume led the FAC to believe he would not be able to effectively communicate with Battalion Command and to ultimately decide not to attempt to request approval for Type 3 CAS.

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68 References made throughout the interviews in Tab J
69 Figure 1 and References made throughout the interviews in Tab J
70 Tab H-33
Type 3 CAS: In MOUTH’s statement, and as indicated by numerous other witnesses, communication with Battalion Command was problematic. At some point the air officer got through and stated “MOUTH, I need you to get on guard and get any air support you can get.” This radio communication did not indicate that MOUTH was authorized to employ Type 3 CAS. Additionally, MOUTH was told by his Company Commander that as soon as he could get A-10 support, he wanted MOUTH to start working north of the bridge.” While the Company Commander gave this order and knew that MOUTH was going to run Type 3 CAS, neither the Company Commander nor MOUTH got proper authorization to use Type 3 CAS from Battalion Command. As a result of the poor communications with Battalion Command, MOUTH indicated in his statement he did not want the Company Commander to have to stop the column in the middle of an ambush to get the proper authorization. He felt there was not enough time to try and find a clear channel to Battalion Command. Further, he felt that by employing Type 3 CAS, he was supporting the commander’s intent.

(U) While the FFIB fully understands the extenuating circumstances behind the FAC’s decision, MOUTH should have attempted to obtain the proper authority for Type 3 CAS. If he had succeeded, he would have most likely been informed that there were friendly forces north of the Saddam Canal.

(U) CONCLUSION. The decision not to request and get proper approval to use Type 3 CAS exceeded the FAC’s authority.

(U) CONCLUSION: The ineffectiveness of doctrinal visual signals contributed to this incident.

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71 Tab H-30 - 33 and references made throughout the interviews in Tab J
72 Tab H-32
73 Tabs H-33, J-142 - 143 and M-13
74 Tab H-33
75 Tab J-44 - 46, and 154
76 Tabs M-17 and R:3
77 Tab G-26 and G-63
79 Tab J-166, 199, 213, 221, 233 - 234, 248, and 255.
80 Tab G-26, and 62 - 63
The fact that pilots did not observe the expended se-fire signals did not contribute to the friendly fire occurrence, but contributed to the severity of the incident.

(2) (U) Human Factors.

(a) (U) Acute Fatigue – Defined: Factor when the individual has the type of exhaustion associated with physical or mental activity between two regular sleep periods which degrade performance. MOUTH, as well as the other Marines, had been engaged in combat for multiple hours prior to the incident. The mental and physical stresses of combat over time degraded the performance capabilities of all the Marines. The degradation is both physical (ability to perform tasks quickly), and mental (ability to make clear decisions in a timely manner).

(U) CONCLUSION: Acute fatigue on behalf of the FAC and Marine Command and Control contributed to the incident.

(b) Task Misprioritization – Defined: Factor when the individual does not organize, based on accepted prioritization techniques, the tasks needed to manage the immediate situation as perceived by the individual. MOUTH is presented with multiple tasks to accomplish in a compressed amount of time. After calling on guard for CAS assets, the A-10’s check in with him. The A-10’s report that they loitered for approximately 15 minutes while establishing visual contact with MOUTH. During this time, MOUTH never attempted to contact Battalion Command for approval of Type 3 CAS, which was required. Battalion Command did know that Charlie Company had proceeded to a position north of the bridge.

(U) CONCLUSIONS: Task misprioritization is present and contributed to the incident.

(c) (U) “Fog of War” – Described: The term “fog of war” has no clear definition, however the concept has been utilized for centuries during warfare. The “fog of war” is actually a conglomeration of many human factors encompassing operational, logistical, physiological, psychological, and psychosocial areas. These areas combine to provide an overall umbrella of confusion on the battlefield. Decision-making during “fog of war” relies primarily upon training and assumptions. Many overriding reasons are associated with this limit of decision-making. First, the ability to gain reliable information in a timely manner is limited. Part of this is due to the operational limitations of communications equipment. Additionally, there is a limitation of the volume of information that personnel can process. Technology has improved the ability for troops to communicate on the battlefield, however it has not achieved a perfectly clear picture. Also, some information received may not be clear or correct information, which can lead to troops making incorrect decisions. Coupled with this is the fact that decision-making inherently contains emotion. While directly engaging enemy forces, sensory overload often occurs, such as feelings of fear, anxiety, apprehension, and anger.

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11 Tab G-12 – 14 and 46
12 Tabs H-33 and J-64

23
(U) While trying to make decisions during the stress of combat, personnel also encounter temporal distortion. Temporal distortion is an inaccurate ability to judge the passage of time. This inability may compress time ("time flies"), or it may expand time (time moves very slowly). A person attending to multiple tasks often has no accurate perception of elapsed time. More critical or demanding tasks compound this problem.

(U) In close combat, decisions must be made immediately, and the outcome weighs on troops surviving hostile engagements. Multiple decisions must be made in a time-critical manner and are often based on information that is limited or may not be accurate, as mentioned above. Additionally, the emotion of taking direct fire and the anxiety of other friendly forces taking fire begin to cloud the accurate picture of the battlefield.

(U) CONCLUSION: The "fog of war" directly contributed to the FAC and Marine Command and Control decision-making.
6. FINDINGS

Finding 1: Early morning on 23 March 2003, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines, on order from Task Force Tarawa, launched an operation in and around the city of An Nasiriyah, Iraq, to seize three objectives: A bridge over the Euphrates River south of the city; a bridge over the Saddam Canal north of the city; and a key MSR intersection north of the Saddam Canal bridge.

(U) Finding 2: The 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines were organized into four companies for the operation: Alpha Company, Team Mech (Bravo Company), Charlie Company, and Team Tank.

(U) Finding 3: Alpha Company, Team Tank and Team Mech had FACs assigned. Charlie Company did not have a FAC assigned. The incident FAC, call sign MOUTH, was assigned to Team Mech.

(U) Finding 4: Standing orders from the Battalion Commander authorized the FACs to employ Type 1 and Type 2 CAS with approval of the Battalion Fire Support Coordinator. Approval authority to employ CAS assets under Type 3 control had to be requested from the Battalion Commander, who held that authority as an anti-fratricide measure.

(U) Finding 5: On 23 March 2003, the OIF daily ATO tasked GYRATE 73, a flight of two A-10s, to provide on-call CAS in a specified kill box.

(U) Finding 6: GYRATE 73 flight took off late in the morning on 23 March 2003, proceeded to an air refueling track for refueling, and was enroute to their assigned area when they responded to a radio call on UHF Guard frequency from a FAC in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah, call sign MOUTH, requesting immediate air support for troops in contact.

(U) Finding 7: Once initial radio contact was established between GYRATE 73 and MOUTH, about 10-15 minutes lapsed while GYRATE 73 attempted to gain battle space awareness and to establish visual references with MOUTH.

(U) Finding 8: The Commander of Team Mech, based on his assessment of being the lead battalion element, with all companies located south of the Saddam Canal, directed MOUTH to start working GYRATE flight on targets north of the canal.

(U) Finding 9: GYRATE 73 found targets (vehicles) just north of the Saddam Canal bridge centered around a burning vehicle and passed the grid coordinates of the target to MOUTH. MOUTH confirmed the targets were valid targets and further instructed GYRATE 73 that there were no friendly forces north of the Saddam Canal.

(U) Finding 10: At the time of the coordination on the targets just north of the Saddam Canal between MOUTH and GYRATE 73, Charlie Company had in fact seized the Saddam Canal bridge and was located just to its north, and was engaged with Iraqi forces. This fact was not known to MOUTH, or his Company Commander from their position with Team Mech.
BOARD PRESIDENT'S OPINION: CAUSE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT

a. The Friendly Fire Investigation Board found by clear and convincing conclusion through witness testimony that the cause of this friendly fire incident on 23 March 2003 was the violation by the FAC, call sign MOUTH, of the Commander, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines standing order that approval authority for Type 3 CAS control of CAS assets rested only with the Battalion Commander. It is noteworthy that part of the intent of the standing order specifically stating authority levels for different types of CAS control, was the Battalion Commander’s concern for avoiding fratricide. MOUTH's decision to engage GYRATE 73 on the targets north of the Saddam Canal bridge under Type 3 CAS control, on his own authority, directly resulted in the tragic deaths of US Marines by A-10 fires.

b. While there were many mitigating and extenuating circumstances that went into the decision by MOUTH, the fact is that if he had taken the time to contact Battalion Command for proper approval for Type 3 CAS, he most likely would have learned that Charlie Company had crossed the Saddam Canal bridge, and in this case he would not have been given the authority to employ the A-10s under Type 3 control, therefore, the friendly fire incident most likely would not have occurred. Further, even if he had not been able to contact Battalion Command, but had adhered to the standing order, he still would not have employed the A-10s on the targets north of the Saddam Canal bridge regardless of his own situational awareness or sense of urgency, and the friendly fire incident would not have occurred. It is notable that after the battle, when the Battalion Commander realized the details of the action by MOUTH, that he did not lose confidence in the abilities of this Marine. MOUTH was put back into the fight by the Battalion Commander in the ensuing days of heavy action, until recalled by the FFIB. He performed admirably and with bravery. Also notable is that MOUTH, even after advisement of his rights, cooperated completely and forthrightly with the FFIB.

c. (U) This incident was a very regrettable tragedy that resulted in the deaths and injury of many brave Marines. The A-10 pilots involved in the incident were not found by the FFIB to have acted with negligence, any violation of procedures, or with reckless disregard. The ground commanders were not found to have acted with negligence, clear violation of procedures or orders, or reckless disregard. The FAC did not act with negligence or reckless disregard of the consequences of his actions, in fact, based on his awareness of the battle space, he was acting in what he perceived to be in the best interest of saving lives of his fellow Marines. However, it is indisputable that the clear violation of a standing order by the FAC, despite his commendable motivation, directly caused the incident to occur.
2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE/DISCIPLINARY ACTION

a. (U) I recommend that the United States Marine Corps consider appropriate administrative or disciplinary action against Captain [redacted], the incident FAC, for his actions on 23 March 2003 near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, that were in violation of standing orders, and which led to the deaths and injuries to Marines on the battlefield as a result of friendly fire.

b. (U) I do not recommend any action be considered or taken against any of the Commanders or personnel of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines for their actions, other than the FAC, Captain [redacted].

c. (U) I do not recommend any action be considered or taken against the incident A-10 pilots.

3. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) Criteria for Type 3 CAS control should be re-examined in Joint Pub 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). Specifically, the Joint Pub 3-09.3 definition of Type 3 CAS states, “Type 3 Control is used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attacks impose low risk of fratricide.” It would appear, however, that the majority of fratricide incidents, both in training and combat, occur under Type 3 CAS control. This disconnect between the defined context of Type 3 CAS control and the incidents that have occurred in practical application requires further study and resolution.

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.7 contains the direction followed by CENTCOM in initiating the friendly fire investigation conducted in this incident. However, there is no guidance on Board procedures in the DoDI, nor is there amplifying guidance in any Joint Publications available to assist a FFIB in procedures to follow in conducting an investigation or documenting its’ results. Accordingly, procedures used will generally follow the respective Board Presidents’ individual service procedures for accident investigations as a template for conducting and documenting a friendly fire investigation. For friendly fire incidents in Joint Operations, there is a need for a Joint Publication to address this shortfall that should provide specific guidance for the conduct of a friendly fire investigation, as well as provide a standardized template for the boards’ report, and a legal framework under which the board functions.

(U) At an appropriate Joint level, it is strongly recommended that after the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and when all friendly fire incidents have been investigated, that the details of the incidents and the lessons learned be put into a format that can be disseminated and briefed, on a mandatory basis, to the appropriate audience. It is imperative that the lessons learned from these collective friendly fire incidents not be lost to those who will benefit most, or be left on a shelf to collect dust.

WILLIAM F. HODGKINS
Brigadier General, USAF
Friendly Fire Investigation Board President
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USCENTAF Orders Appointing FFIB Members

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A-1
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Pursuant to DoD Instruction 6055.7, and by delegation of authority from the Commander, United States Central Command, the following individuals are appointed to investigate a suspected friendly fire incident that occurred on or about 23 March 2003, along Route 8 across the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal at An Nasirya, Iraq, in which a U.S. A-10 aircraft fired upon a Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle that was also under enemy fire.

The investigation will, in accordance with paragraph E4.6 of the reference, inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding the suspected friendly fire incident and will obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, and adverse administrative actions. The investigation will include findings of fact, opinions and recommendations to include the cause of the incident and resulting deaths, injury and damage. Further, the investigation will make an assessment as to any fault or neglect and make recommendations concerning corrective measures and disciplinary actions, as appropriate. The manner and conduct of the board will be as directed by the board chair.

All board members will assist in completing this investigation. Pursuant to Article 136, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 United States Code Section 936, and relevant Service relevant Service Regulations, active duty United States military members appointed to the Investigation Board are authorized to administer oaths. Unless otherwise directed by the convening or higher authority, investigative duties will take precedence until this investigation is complete and the board is adjourned. A written report will be submitted to me no later than 25 April 2003, unless an extension is granted.

With the concurrence of their commanders, the following personnel are detailed to the investigation:

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS, Deputy Commander,
Board President
Combined Air Operations
Center 7, Air South, Strategic
Command Europe, NATO,
Larissa, Greece

HQ MARINE FORCES
Manama, Bahrain

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES (CENTAF)
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH CAROLINA

SPECIAL ORDER: AB-20

DATE 6 April 2003

COLONEL [REDACTED]
Marine Forces Advisor
CAPTAIN
A-10 Advisor

MAJOR
United States Legal Advisor

TECHNICAL SERGEANT
Board Administrator

[Signature]

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Distribution:
- CENTAF
- ACC/JA
- Each Member
Pursuant to authority contained in Special Order AB-20, Department of the Air Force, dated 6 April 2003, the following individuals are added and appointed to this investigation convened by Special Order AB-20, this Component Command, dated 6 April 2003.

**COLONEL**

**Medical Advisor**

**CENTAF-PSAB/JA**

**Prince Sultan Air Base, KSA**

**COMMANDER**

**USNR**

**Administrative Assistant to the Board President**

**NATO, Larissa, Greece**

**CAPTAIN**

**USAF**

**Human Factors Advisor**

**363 EMDG**

**Prince Sultan Air Base, KSA**

**SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT**

**USAF (ANG) 332 AEW**

**A-10 Maintenance Advisor**

**Al Jaber Air Base**

**TECHNICAL SERGEANT**

**USAF**

**Recorder**

**332 AEW/JA Assistant**

**Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait**

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**T. MICHAEL MOSELEY**

Lieutenant General, USAF

Commander

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Distribution:

1. CENTAF

1. ACC/JA

1. Each Member
TAB B
Tab B

USCENTCOM Message Ordering an Investigation

Friendly Fire Incident Message........................................ B-3
Declassification Message ................................................... B-5
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SUBJECT: FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

REF: DOC/DODI 6055.7

AMPHIBIOUS INVESTIGATION, REPORTING, AND RECORD KEEPING

1. CONSISTENT WITH THE REFERENCE, USCENTCOM DIRECTS CFACC TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION INTO A SUSPECTED FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT THAT OCCURRED O/A 24 MARCH 2003 IN THE VICINITY OF AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ, IN WHICH A U.S. A-10 AIRCRAFT FIRED UPON A MARINE HMMWV.

2. THE INVESTIGATION WILL INQUIRE INTO ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SUSPECTED FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT AND WILL OBTAIN AND PRESERVE ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE FOR USE IN LITIGATION, CLAIMS, DISCIPLINARY ACTION, AND ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS. THE INVESTIGATION WILL INCLUDE FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCLUDE THE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT AND RESULTING DEATHS, INJURY AND DAMAGE. FURTHER,

PAGE 02 RUCADHQ2086 SECRET
THE INVESTIGATION WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO ANY FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CORRECTIVE MEASURES AND DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, AS APPROPRIATE. ALL PHYSICAL EVIDENCE (E.G., AIRCRAFT VIDEO AND AUDIO RECORDINGS) WILL BE IMMEDIATELY SECURED, PRESERVED, AND PROVIDED TO THE INVESTIGATING BOARD UPON REQUEST.

3. THE INVESTIGATION REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO USCENTCOM NLT 30 APRIL 2003. ANY REQUESTS FOR EXTENSION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO USCENTCOM FWD, ATTN: CCJA, IN WRITING PRIOR TO THIS DATE.

4. FUNDING. USCENTCOM WILL NOT PROVIDE FUNDING FOR THIS EFFORT.

5. POC. USCENTCOM S1A, CAPT [REDACTED] (ALL SMALL CASE).

CLASSIFIED BY: R. STEVEN WHITCOMB, MAJOR GENERAL, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF
REASON: 1.5(A)
DECLASSIFY ON: 24 MAR 2013
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CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJA//

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CFLCC DOHA KUWAIT KU

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SUBJ: DECLASSIFICATION OF MESSAGES (U)//

REF/A/MSG/USCENTCOM-FWD/290734Z MAR 03//
AMPN/FRIENDLY FIRE MESSAGE (S)//

REF/B/MSG/USCENTCOM-FWD/280609Z MAR 03//
AMPN/FRIENDLY FIRE MESSAGE (S)/Login

1. (U) REFERENCED MESSAGES ARE HEREBY DECLASSIFIED.
2. (U) POC. USCENTCOM SJA, CAPT

USCENTCOM FWD, DSN [REDACTED] (ALL SMALL CASE).

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