MEMORANDUM FOR

Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina 29152-5000
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-5000
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, FPO AE 09501-6008
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii 96861-5001
Commander, Special Operations Command Central, MacDill AFB, Florida 33621-5101
Commander, Joint Forces Command, 1562 Mitscher Ave., Suite 200 Norfolk, Virginia 23511-2488

SUBJECT: Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03

REF: DoD Instruction 6055.7, 3 Oct 00, Subject: Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping

1. The Report of Investigation (ROI) with Addendum was prepared in substantial compliance with the reference and is approved. The findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, opinions as to the cause of the incident, and contributing factors are approved.

2. The ROI recommends re-examination of joint doctrine as it relates to Type 3 CAS control. Accordingly, the report is referred to the Commander in Chief, USJFCOM for action as he deems appropriate.

3. The Report’s recommended corrective actions are forwarded for evaluation and such action as you deem appropriate. Additionally, the following actions will be taken.

   a. All component commanders will establish procedures for safeguarding evidence when a potential friendly fire incident occurs where a follow-on investigation is likely. In this case, there was immediate recognition that a friendly fire incident may have occurred. Yet the Head’s Up Display (HUD) tapes were not secured for future review by the Investigation
SUBJECT: Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 03

Board. While failure to safeguard the tapes did not contribute to the incident, it did hamper investigative efforts.

b. Commander, US Central Command Air Forces and Commander, U.S. Army Forces Central Command will review the information contained in the Report, section 5, paragraph c.(1)(d) and in the Addendum to the Report, section 5, to determine whether currently deployedIFF visual systems and indicators may be more effectively employed.

c. Commander, Marine Corps Central Command will consider possible interim options to address the impact of the shortage of trained FACs in similar combat environments.

d. The Board recommended that the Marine Corps consider appropriate administrative or disciplinary action against the Bravo Company FAC. While I approve the recommendation, I defer to the Commander, Marine Corps Central Command concerning what action, if any, should be taken. Additionally, I recommend that the MARCENT Commander review the conduct of the Bravo Company Commander in conjunction with his evaluation of actions of the FAC.

4. Do not release any portion of the report or make any public comments regarding the report until after next-of-kin and notifications to the injured Marines have been made. USCENTCOM will make a public release regarding the report after such notifications have been made. All requests concerning the report made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and/or Privacy Act should be forwarded to USCENTCOM FOIA Manager.

5. All other inquiries concerning this investigation should be referred to Colonel[redacted]USCENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate, [redacted]

Encl

John P. Abizaid
General, USA
Unclassified Executive Summary

On 23 March 03, 1st Battalion 2nd Marine Regiment was assigned the mission of securing two bridges over the Euphrates River (the southern bridge) and Saddam Canal (the northern bridge) in An Nasiriyah. These bridges led to a critical intersection, which was also to be seized.

The Battalion consisted of Team TANK, which lead the way, followed by Team MECH (Bravo Company-task organized as two tank platoons and a mechanized rifle platoon), the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.

As this offensive began, Team TANK engaged in protracted combat operations. As a result, they had to break off to refuel in the rear.

After Team TANK withdrew, Team MECH was designated as the lead. Bravo Company’s offensive led them across the southern bridge. Bravo Company then maneuvered off the main road, to avoid the threat associated with “Ambush Alley,” and into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance. The Forward Command Post element, in trace of Bravo Company, also got stuck. During this maneuvering, Alpha Company secured the southern bridge and maintained a defensive posture at that location.

As these forces entered the city, their situational awareness became clouded due to deviations from the planned scheme of maneuver, the urban environment, and problematic communication links.

Because of communications problems throughout the Battalion, Charlie Company thought Bravo Company had pushed straight up Ambush Alley, through the city, and seized the northern bridge. Accordingly, Charlie Company crossed the southern bridge and started to maneuver through Ambush Alley to the northern bridge. In the course of this maneuver, Charlie Company began to take heavy fire. Additionally, unbeknownst to either Charlie Company or Bravo Company, this maneuver put Charlie Company in the lead.

Charlie Company proceeded just north of the northern bridge and seized it. Then, realizing they were in the lead, the Charlie Company Commander called the battalion commander, located with the Forward Command Post, to notify him of their position and that they had taken the objective.
After a brief lull in enemy fire, Charlie Company again began taking heavy enemy fire from artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mortar and small arms.

At approximately the same time, the Air Officer, located with the Forward Command Post, called the Bravo Company Forward Air Controller (FAC), requesting close air support (CAS) to combat the enemy forces attacking their location.

A two-ship formation of A-10 aircraft responded to the call. Based on the information he possessed concerning the scheme of maneuver, the Bravo Company Commander, collocated with the FAC, identified their company as the lead element. Therefore, believing that only enemy forces were ahead, the Bravo Company Commander cleared the FAC to engage the enemy targets north of the canal.

The A-10s targeted what turned out to be Charlie Company ground assets, making multiple passes against them. Eventually, the A-10s were informed to cease fire, which they did.

Eighteen Marines were killed during this engagement. The evidence, primarily witness statements and/or forensic reports, indicates that eight Marines were killed due solely to enemy fire. The intensity of the enemy fire, combined with friendly fire, makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of fires that killed the other 10 Marines.

During this same period, 17 Marines were wounded in action; 13 solely by enemy fire and one by distinct rounds of enemy and friendly fire. Three Marines, one of which had a prior distinct injury from enemy fire, were simultaneously hit by enemy and friendly fire, the intensity of which makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of those injuries.
On 23 March 03, 1st Battalion 2nd Marine Regiment was assigned the mission of securing two bridges on Highway 8 over the Euphrates River (the southern bridge) and Saddam Canal (the northern bridge) in An Nasiriyah. These bridges led to a critical intersection, which was also to be seized.

The Battalion consisted of Team TANK, which lead the way, followed by Team MECH (Bravo Company-task organized as two tank platoons and a mechanized rifle platoon), the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.

As this offensive began, Team TANK engaged in protracted combat operations. As a result, they had to break off to refuel in the rear.

After Team TANK withdrew, Team MECH (Bravo Company) was designated as the lead. Bravo Company’s offensive led them across the southern bridge. Bravo Company then maneuvered off the main road, to avoid the threat associated with “Ambush Alley,” and into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance. The Forward Command Post element, in trace of Bravo Company, also got stuck. During this maneuvering, Alpha Company secured the southern bridge and maintained a defensive posture at that location.

As these forces entered the city, their situational awareness became clouded due to deviations from the planned scheme of maneuver, the urban environment, and problematic communication links.

Because of communications problems throughout the Battalion, Charlie Company, comprised of..., thought Bravo Company had pushed straight up Ambush Alley, through the city, and seized the northern bridge. Accordingly, Charlie Company crossed the southern bridge and started to maneuver through Ambush Alley to the northern bridge. In the course of this maneuver, Charlie Company began to take heavy fire. Additionally, unbeknownst to either Charlie Company or Bravo Company, this maneuver put Charlie Company in the lead.

Charlie Company proceeded just north of the northern bridge and seized it. Then, realizing they were in the lead, the Charlie Company Commander called the battalion commander, located with the Forward Command Post, to notify him of their position and that they had taken the objective.
After a brief lull in the enemy fire, Charlie Company again began taking heavy enemy fire from artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mortar and small arms fire.

At approximately the same time, the Air Officer, located with the Forward Command Post, called the Bravo Company Forward Air Controller (FAC), call sign MOUTH, requesting close air support (CAS) to combat the enemy forces attacking their location.

A two-ship formation of A-10 aircraft, call sign GYRATE 73, responded to the call.

The Bravo Company Commander, collocated with the FAC, directed the FAC to engage the targets north of the canal. The A-10s spotted a burning vehicle (thought to be an enemy vehicle, but turned out to be a damaged Charlie Company amphibious assault vehicle) north of the northern bridge and reported it to the FAC, who could see the smoke and verified that it was in the target area. The A-10s noticed multiple other vehicles in this area and reported them believing them to be hostile.

The FAC was not able to see the A-10s or a specific target. Therefore, he confirmed the target location with the A-10s and attempted to verify the location of the lead element with the Bravo Company Commander. Although the Company Commander attempted to verify the friendly forces' positions, he was unsuccessful. Based on the information he possessed concerning the scheme of maneuver, the Bravo Company Commander identified their company as the lead element and, therefore, believing that only enemy forces were ahead, he cleared the target for fire. No additional authorization was sought. The FAC informed the A-10s that there were no friendly forces north of the bridge and they were cleared to engage.

The A-10s targeted what turned out to be Charlie Company assets, making multiple passes against them. Eventually, the A-10s were told to cease fire, which they did.

Eighteen Marines were killed during this engagement. The evidence, primarily witness statements and/or forensic reports, indicates that eight Marines were killed due solely to enemy fire. The intensity of the enemy fire, combined with friendly
fire, makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of fires that killed the other 10 Marines.

During this same period, 17 Marines were wounded in action; 13 solely by enemy fire and one by distinct rounds of enemy and friendly fire. The three other Marines, one of which had a prior distinct injury from enemy fire, were simultaneously hit by enemy and friendly fire, the intensity of which makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of those injuries.
MEMORANDUM FOR USCENTCOM/CS
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BLVD
MACDILL AFB FL 33621-5101

FROM: USCENTAF/CD
524 SHAW DRIVE, STE 200
SHAW AFB SC 29152-5029


1. I have reviewed the addendum to the FFIB report referenced above and concur with the Board’s additional findings. The addendum to the report is attached for your approval.

2. The Board has made every reasonable effort to address those additional concerns identified in your 26 Aug 03 message. The original Board members and augmentees added from the Marine Corps examined all available evidence in the course of their investigation to address the matters raised in your request for additional inquiry. As might be expected, additional information has surfaced since the original report resulting in new findings; but overall the Board’s conclusions remain unchanged. Should you have additional concerns regarding the Board’s addendum, please contact my Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel [redacted] at DSN [redacted].

ALLEN G. PECK
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commander
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, US CENTRAL COMMAND

FROM: COMUSCENTAF
524 Shaw Drive
Shaw AFB SC 29152-5029


REF: (U) USCENTCOM FWD message DTG 280609Z MAR 03, subject: Friendly Fire Incident

1. (U) The USCENTCOM FWD message referenced above directed CFACC to conduct an investigation into the above referenced suspected friendly fire incident. That report has been completed and is forwarded to USCENTCOM in accordance with the tasking message.

2. (U) The investigating board concluded that the primary cause of the incident was a lack of coordination regarding the location of friendly forces due to a number of contributing factors. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the board.

3. (U) The investigating board suggests in the report that disciplinary action may be appropriate concerning the ground forward air controller’s actions (GFAC). In that the GFAC was assigned to a Marine unit, I recommend CENTCOM forward this report to MARCENT for review, and action as appropriate.

4. (U) Questions concerning this response may be directed to the USCENTAF POC, Col [redacted], the USCENTAF Staff Judge Advocate. He may be reached DSN at [redacted] or via e-mail at [redacted].

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

Attachment
USCENTAF Friendly Fire Investigation Board Report (S)

This document [redacted] when separated from attachments
USCENTAF
FRIENDLY FIRE
INVESTIGATION BOARD

A-10 – MARINE
FRIENDLY FIRE INCIDENT

AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
23 MARCH 2003

COPY 3 of 8

ADDENDUM TO THE FINAL REPORT

INVESTIGATION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

BOARD PRESIDENT: Brigadier General William F. Hodgkins, USAF

Conducted IAW DOD Instruction 6055.7
A-10 – Marine Corps
Friendly Fire Incident
Near An Nasiriyah, Iraq
23 March 2003
Addendum to the Report

1. (U) Authority, Purpose, and Circumstances for this Addendum.

   a. (U) Authority.

   (U) Major General R. Steven Whitcomb, USA, Office of the Chief of Staff for United
   States Central Command (USCENTCOM), on behalf of the Commander, USCENTCOM,
   directed the Commander, United States Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) to provide
   additional information as required to the questions posed in his memorandum. 1 Lieutenant
   General Walter E. Buchanan III, USAF, Commander, USCENTAF directed Major General
   William F. Hodgkins, USAF, Friendly Fire Incident Board President, to reconvene those portions
   of this Board’s membership needed to provide clarification to the issues raised by
   USCENTCOM. 2

   The members that were ordered to return were:

   Major General William F. Hodgkins, USAF
   Colonel [redacted], USMC
   Colonel [redacted], USAF, MC, SFS
   Commander [redacted], USNR
   Major [redacted], USAF
   Captain [redacted], USAF
   Technical Sergeant [redacted], USAF

   Board President
   Marine Corps Advisor
   Medical Advisor
   Administrative Assistant to
   The Board President
   Legal Advisor
   A-10 Pilot Advisor
   Chief, Recorder

   In addition to these recalled members, the following members were added to the Board: 3

   Lieutenant Colonel [redacted], USMC
   Major [redacted], USAF, MC, FS
   Major [redacted], USMC
   Major [redacted], USMC
   Chief Warrant Officer 3 [redacted], USMC

   Marine Corps Legal Advisor
   Forensic Pathologist Advisor
   Communications Advisor
   FAC Advisor
   Infantry Weapons Advisor

   b. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this Addendum is to provide further clarifying information
   on the 23 March 2003 friendly fire incident for the Commander, USCENTCOM. Additionally,

1 Tab A-B-3
2 Tab A-B-5
3 Tab A-A-3
the reconvened Board identified and clarified issues and discrepancies between the original Board Report and a later USMC-conducted investigation of the circumstances of this incident. The USMC conducted the investigation on board the USS Ponce (18 May – 16 June 2003) while 1st Bn, 2nd Marine Regt was returning to the US from Iraq. The USMC investigation did not have access to the initial FFIB report, as it had not been released by CENTCOM. Upon reconvening, the USCENTCOM-directed FFIB had access to the second USMC investigation as well as additional information not available at the time of the initial FFIB in April 2003. As a result, the Board was able to provide a more complete picture of the events of the incident.

c. (U) Circumstances. The Board originally submitted its report to the Commander, USCENTAF, in early May 2003. At that time, Charlie Company (1st Bn, 2nd Marine Regt) was still involved in combat operations; the Killed in Action (KIA) and Wounded in Action (WIA) had been medically evacuated to various locations around the world; the Board was unable to contact or interview the WIAS; and the Board did not have access to the damaged/destroyed Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV), the incident site in An Nasiriyah, or forensics evidence. As such, the Board had to rely predominately on the pilot statements and witness testimony (taken by the Boards’ Marine Corps advisor under combat conditions in Iraq) to determine causes (friendly or hostile fire) of the KIA and WIA in the incident. Since the time the Board submitted the Report to USCENTAF, forensics examinations and testing has been conducted; the USMC conducted a second inquiry into the incident; and the FFIB has been able to interview additional personnel (to include incident WIA’s) that were not available when the FFIB first convened. The following discussion of casualty information involves two primary situations: the friendly and hostile fire taken by Charlie Company in their position just north of the Saddam Canal bridge; and the friendly and hostile fire taken by a part of Charlie Company on and just south of the Saddam Canal bridge while attempting to evacuate casualties from their position north of the bridge back into the city. During the entire friendly fire sequence, Charlie Company was also under intense rocket propelled grenade, mortar, artillery, heavy machine gun and small arms fire by the Iraqi forces.

2. (U) Clarify Casualty Information.

a. (U) Replacement of Page 1 and 2 of the Report. In the FFIB initial report, it was indicated on page 2, paragraph 1d that “Witness statements and testimony indicate that the majority of casualties were most likely caused by friendly fire.” Considering information made available upon reconvening, this is no longer the Board’s opinion. Based on pilot testimony during the initial investigation, it was the opinion of the Board that GYRATE 73 flight fired 2 AGM-65 Maverick missiles destroying two AAVs in a column of five that were returning south into the city. However, at the time of the initial investigation, the Board could not determine exactly which or how many Marines were in each of these vehicles. Knowing that there were a number of Marines in the AAV’s, the Board concluded in the Report that these Marines were most likely killed or wounded by friendly fire. Subsequent investigations by the USMC and this Board now lead to the conclusion that AAV 208 was the only AAV hit by a Maverick missile.

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4 Tab A-B
5 Tab A-B-3, Question 1a
6 Tab G-24 and 58-59
7 These AAVs are now known to be 206 and 208
The Board also determined that AAV 208 received intense enemy fire during the same time frame as the Maverick impact. The Board is unable to determine the sequence of fires, friendly and enemy, that lead to the destruction of AAV 208. Consequently, the Board cannot conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, what killed each Marine on board AAV 208. Given this conclusion and due to the fact that paragraph 1d of the Report is now known to be in error, the Board replaced page 1 and 2 of the Report. Specifically, the Board changed the last two sentences of paragraph 1d(1) to now read “18 Marines were killed and 17 wounded in the battle; however, the FFIIB has not been able to determine the source of fire that killed 10 and wounded 3 of these Marines. Based on information available, it is the Board’s opinion that one Marine was wounded in action as a result of friendly fire.” Finally, while the Board did not remove pages Tab E-9 – 10 (pilot testimony) from the initial report, those pages do not support the Board’s revised conclusions on this issue. Tab A-C of this Addendum contains the supporting documentation. As a result, if Tab E of the Report is publicly released, Tab A-C of this Addendum must also be released.

b. (U) Killed In Action (KIA).

(1) (U) In the initial Report, The Board noted that it believed 6 Marines were KIA by friendly fire.\(^8\) Considering information made available for this Addendum, that conclusion is no longer the opinion of the Board. Based on the information now available, it is the opinion of the Board that there were 18 Marines killed in action during the time frame in which Gyrate 73 flight was in the area. Of those 18 Marines, it is the opinion of the Board that enemy fire killed 8 Marines.\(^9\) Due to the mixture of intense enemy fire, combined with friendly fire from Gyrate 73 flight, the Board is unable to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, which type of fire killed the remaining 10 Marines.

(2) (U) Of these 10 KIA, 9 were in Charlie Company AAV 208 when it was destroyed just south of the northern bridge while moving south back into the city.\(^10\) The evidence now available to the Board indicates that AAV 208 was catastrophically destroyed by both hostile and friendly fire.\(^11\) Given the chaotic environment at the time of the incident, and after reviewing pictures of AAV 208 (post incident), along with witness testimony and forensic reports, it is not possible for the Board to determine by clear and convincing evidence the exact sequence that munitions hit the vehicle, which munitions killed Marines, or in what specific sequence of hits the Marines may have died.

(3) (U) The 10th Marine KIA was in AAV 203 while it was north of the Saddam Canal bridge.\(^12\) It is the Board’s conclusion, based on additional evidence and testimony, that AAV 203 was hit by both hostile and friendly fire. Based on the information now available, the Board is unable to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if this Marine died by enemy or friendly fire.

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\(^8\) Tab E-9  
\(^9\) Tab A-C-11 - 12, lines 1-8  
\(^10\) Tab A-C-12, lines 9-16, and 18  
\(^11\) Tab A-C-37 - 48, pictures of AAV 208  
\(^12\) Tab A-C-12, line 17
c. (U) Wounded In Action (WIA).

(1) (U) Based on all the information now available, it is the opinion of the Board that there were 17 Marines wounded in action during the time frame in which Gyrate 73 flight was in the area. In the initial Report, the Board identified an additional 5 Marines as being WIA on 23 March 2003. Further investigation indicates that these 5 Marines were either not involved in the part of the battle in which GYRATE 73 flight was on station or were not WIA on 23 March 2003. It is the Board’s opinion that of the 17 Marines involved in the part of the battle in which GYRATE 73 participated, 15 Marines were wounded by enemy fire.

(2) (U) Five of these Marines were WIA near AAV 201 when it was north of the Saddam Canal bridge. Eyewitness testimony indicates that these Marines were struck by A-10 30mm gunfire; however, it is the opinion of the Board that, by clear and convincing evidence, they were hit by enemy fire. This conclusion is based on the forensic analysis done on the metal fragments collected from 2 out of the 5 WIA Marines, as well as the autopsy report and analysis of metal fragments collected from the Marine KIA near AAV 201. The test results and analysis concluded that the metal fragments removed from 2 of the WIA and the 1 KIA near AAV 201 did not match the metallurgical composition of the munitions onboard the A-10.

(3) (U) Additionally, it appears that another Marine received separate wounds from both enemy and friendly fire. Also, a Marine on AAV 208 sustained a wound by enemy fire and then suffered a subsequent wound the origins of which the Board cannot determine.

(4) (U) Lastly, 2 Marines suffered wounds, the origin of which the Board cannot determine. One of these Marines was on AAV 208 when he got wounded, the second Marine was on AAV 203. As discussed in paragraph 2b above, the Board is unable to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, what caused the injuries to the individuals in these vehicles due to the fact that each of these AAV’s received both hostile and friendly fire.

3. (U) USMC Preliminary Inquiry Report Referenced in the Report at Tab J-12 and 26. This report can be found at Tab A-F-3 of this Addendum.


13 Tab A-C-15, lines 36-40
14 Tab A-C-13 - 14 lines 19-33. This count includes one Marine we think was also wounded by friendly fire and one Marine that we can’t determine what type of fire caused his second wound. Tab A-C-13 - 14, lines 19 and 33.
15 Tab A-C-13 - 14, lines 20, 26, 27, 30, 32
16 Tab A-C-13 - 14, lines 26, 30
17 Tab A-C-11, line 4
18 Tab A-G-3
19 Tab A-C-13, line 19. All the Board has to base this assertion on is this Marine’s own testimony and the eyewitness testimony of another Marine. Tab J-159.
20 Tab A-C-14, line 33
21 Tab A-C-14, lines 34, 35
22 Tab A-C-14, line 35
23 Tab A-C-14, line 34
24 Tab A-B-4, Question 1b
a. (U) It is the opinion of the Board that Marine Corps ground radio equipment is adequate for most combat environments. However, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines was forced to operate in a dense urban environment and was affected by several circumstances, which greatly impacted their ability to command and control the engagement. These circumstances included line of sight obstructions, malfunctioning equipment, battle damage, and lack of training on recently fielded blue force situational awareness systems.

b. (U) It is the opinion of the Board that the most significant communications factor contributing to the incident resulted from the battalion forward’s command and control AAV becoming disabled under high voltage power lines. At this location, electromagnetic interference affected all radios rendering communications ineffective. Had the AAV been able to move rapidly to a different location, communications would have most likely improved and permitted the battalion’s battle staff to gain and maintain situational awareness and control of the engagement, possibly mitigating or preventing the incident.

5. (U)

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25 Tab A-B-4, Question 1c
26 Tab A-D
27 Tab A-B-4, Question 1d
28 Tab N-5, para 3.D.1
29 Tab D-5, lines 544-545
30 Tab A-H-12, slide 55
31 Pilot Advisor was stationed at Al Jaber AB during this time period.

A-5
6. (U) Impact of Not Having A Forward Air Controller (FAC) Assigned to Charlie Company.\textsuperscript{34} If a FAC had been located with Charlie Company, assuming his communications equipment was working properly, it is likely that the friendly fire incident would either have been mitigated or completely avoided.

   a. (U) It is a reasonable assumption that a Charlie Company assigned FAC would have been in control of Gyrate 73 flight once Charlie Company moved to its position north of the Saddam canal. He would most likely have communicated with these aircraft directly on Guard channel prior to MOUTH; or would likely have taken positive control from MOUTH on the battalion’s tactical air direction (TAD) net, tactical air control party (TACP) local net, or by relay through Gyrate 73 prior to MOUTH initiating their attack.

   b. (U) Even if a hypothetical FAC located with Charlie Company had not initiated a request for close air support (CAS), it is likely that he would have monitored GYRATE 73 flight’s conversation with MOUTH on the primary TAD and/or observed the A-10s overhead. Once hearing this conversation or observing GYRATE 73 flight, he would most likely have interjected himself into the control process; thereby possibly preempting the A-10 attack on Charlie Company.

   c. (U) Should the hypothetical FAC have failed to contact GYRATE 73 flight prior to their first run, he most likely would have done so as soon as he recognized or heard his company was being engaged by GYRATE 73 flight. While this might not have prevented the initial friendly fire engagement, it could have possibly stopped some or all of the subsequent friendly fire engagements.

7. (U) Personnel Not Identified as WIA in the Report.\textsuperscript{35} This issue is addressed in paragraph 2b above.

\textsuperscript{32} Tab A-H-12, slide 56
\textsuperscript{33} Tab G-26 and 57
\textsuperscript{34} Tab A-B-4, Question 1e
\textsuperscript{35} Tab A-B-4, Question 1f
8. (U) **Board President’s Comments.** The Board considered substantial new information and evidence which helped to clarify the Board’s original findings for this Addendum. However, there is no change to the conclusions made with regard to the cause of the incident or the recommendations made in the original FFIB Report. The primary focus of the reconvened Board was to further address the causes, either friendly or hostile fire, of the WIA/KIA from this incident. The primary evidence was information contained in the second USMC inquiry at Tab A-F-7, interviews of the WIA that were not able to be conducted at the time of the original FFIB investigation, forensics evidence not available at the time of the original FFIB investigation, and metal composition analysis of the fragmentation removed from some of the WIA/KIA. The obvious benefit of the evidence considered from forensics/pathology reports and scientific analysis of metal fragmentation is that it presents empirical data not subject to variables that may be inherent in witness testimony. Beyond the clarification of the cause of the WIA/KIA in the incident, the additional focus of the reconvened Board and this Addendum was to address the questions posed by USCENTCOM on ground communication systems, FAC assignment, and combat identification systems. Again, there is no new evidence that has been considered by the Board, or presentation of additional information provided with regard to USCENTCOM follow-up questions addressed in this Addendum, that have resulted in any change to the recommendations made in the original FFIB report.

WILLIAM F. HODGKINS  
Major General, USAF  
Friendly Fire Investigation Board President

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Tab A-H: USCENTAF Counter-Fratricide Briefing
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UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES (USCENTAF)
SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH CAROLINA

SPECIAL ORDER: AB-7

DATE 21 OCT 2003

Pursuant to authority contained in Special Order AB-20, Department of the Air Force, dated 6 April 2003, and Special Order AB-24, dated 17 April 2003, the following individuals are added and appointed to this investigation convened by Special Orders AB-20 and AB-24, this Component Command, dated 6 April 2003 and 17 April 2003, respectively.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED], USMC
Marine Corps Legal Advisor

MAJOR [REDACTED], USAF
Forensic Pathologist Advisor

MAJOR [REDACTED], USMC
Communications Advisor

MAJOR [REDACTED], USMC
FAC Advisor

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 [REDACTED], USMC
Infantry Weapons Advisor

II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Camp Lejeune, NC
OFFICE, CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, DC
2nd MARINE DIVISION
Camp Lejeune, NC
II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Camp Lejeune, NC
2nd MARINE REGIMENT
Camp Lejuene, NC

WALTER E. BUCHANAN III
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

FOR THE COMMANDER

ALLEN G. PECK
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commander

Distribution:
1-CENTAF
1-ACC/JA
1-Each Member

A-A-3

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A-A-4

UNCLASSIFIED
Tab A-A

Order Appointing Additional FFIB Members

Special Order AB-7.................................................................A-A-3
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MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AIR FORCES, SOUTH CAROLINA 29152-5000

SUBJECT: Investigation of Suspected Friendly Fire Incident Near An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 2003

REF: (a) Message 280609Z 03, Subject: Friendly Fire Incident

1. (U) In accordance with reference (a), reference (b) was completed and forwarded to CDRUSCENTCOM for review and approval. To complete the review additional information is required.

   a. (U) Tab E (Casualty Information) opines that a majority of the deaths/injuries were due to friendly fire. However, the memorandum contradicts this by identifying 6 of 18 deaths and 5 of 19 wounded as due to friendly fire - not a majority. To help resolve this discrepancy and aid in complete disclosure to the next-of-kin:

      (1) (U) Attempt by all reasonably available means to identify whether each KIA was killed by enemy or friendly fire. Statements included in the report may warrant further clarification; some references to unidentified Marines were made without inquiring further if names could be provided. Although some witness reports did identify those likely killed by friendly fire, for those not so identified a means of determination of death should be pursued. Forensics reports, where applicable, may be of assistance; as well as additional interviews with other members of the unit.

      (2) (U) Attempt by all reasonably available means to identify whether each WIA was wounded by enemy or friendly fire. Statements included in the report may warrant further clarification due to references to unidentified Marines that were hurt. Statements should be obtained from those WIA who are able to indicate their perception as to what occurred.
Statements of individuals listed as WIA may be obtained telephonically. Medical reports may also be helpful.

b. (U) The report indicates that a preliminary inquiry conducted by the Marine Corps (J-12, J-26). That document should be included in the report.

c. [Redacted] 
The report should include a recommendation as to whether ground communication systems were adequate or changes should be considered.

d. [Redacted]

e. (U) The report should assess the impact, if any, of having a FAC assigned to Charlie Company and whether this contributed to the incident.

f. (U) LCpl [Redacted]’s testimony indicates he was WIA during the time in question. He is not on the list provided at E-10. Verify his status and include as necessary.

2. (U) Speedy resolution of these issues is in the best interests of the command and those involved, therefore this information is to be forwarded to CDRCENTCOM thru CCJA NLT 15 August. Requests for extension may be requested thru CCJA, Maj [Redacted] DSN [Redacted]

R. STEVEN WHITCOMB
Major General, USA

A-B-4
MEMORANDUM FOR BOARD PRESIDENT, MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM HODGKINS

FROM: USCENTAF/CC
524 Shaw Drive Suite 200
Shaw AFB, SC 29152

SUBJECT: Reconvening Investigation to Clarify Specific Matters

1. (U) I have received your final report of investigation concerning the 23 March 2003 friendly fire incident in which a U.S. A-10 aircraft fired upon a Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle that was under enemy fire. After consultation with HQ USCENTCOM, you are hereby directed to reconvene as the Friendly Fire Investigation Board, utilizing those Board technical advisors you deem necessary to assist you, to specifically provide clarification of the following matters:

   a. (U) Tab E of the report (Casualty Information) opines that a majority of the deaths/injuries were due to friendly fire. However, the memorandum contradicts this by identifying 6 of 18 deaths and 5 of 19 wounded as due to friendly fire – not a majority. To help resolve this discrepancy and aid in complete disclosure to the next-of-kin:

      (1) (U) Attempt by all reasonably available means to identify whether each KIA was killed by enemy or friendly fire. Statements included in the report may warrant further clarification; some references to unidentified Marines were made without inquiring further if names could be provided. Although some witness reports did identify those likely killed by friendly fire, for those not so identified a means of determination of death should be pursued. Forensics reports, where applicable, may be of assistance; as well as additional interviews with other members of the unit.

      (2) (U) Attempt by all reasonably available means to identify whether each WIA was wounded by enemy or friendly fire. Statements included in the report may warrant further clarification due to references to unidentified Marines that were hurt. Statements should be obtained from those WIA who are able to indicate their perception as to what occurred. Statements of individuals listed as WIA may be obtained telephonically. Medical reports may also be helpful.

   b. (U) The report indicates that a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Marine Corps (J-12, J-26). That document should be included with your report.

   c. The report should include a
recommendation as to whether ground communication systems were adequate or whether changes should be considered.

d. [Blacked out]

e. (U) The report should assess the impact, if any, of having a FAC assigned to Charlie Company and whether this contributed to the incident.

f. (U) LCpl [Blacked out]'s testimony indicates he was WIA during the time in question. He is not on the list provided at tab E-10. Verify his status and include as necessary.

2. (U) You are to prepare an addendum to your final report of investigation that addresses each of these issues. Your report should not contain classified materials unless absolutely necessary. Additionally, you may request the assistance of technical advisers from CENTAF or other components that you deem necessary to assist you in this effort. I would appreciate receiving your completed addendum report by 7 November 2003. If you require assistance, please contact Colonel [Blacked out] or Major [Blacked out] at DSN [Blacked out]

[Signature]

WALTER E. BUCHANAN III
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

cc: USCENTCOM/CS

A-B-6
Tab A-C

KIA and WIA Analysis

Medical and Infantry Weapons Advisor’s Memo .................... A-C-3
Spreadsheet Listing of KIA and WIA................................. A-C-11
Photos of AAV 201 ......................................................... A-C-17
Photos of AAV 203 .......................................................... A-C-21
Photos of AAV 206 .......................................................... A-C-34
Photos of AAV 208 .......................................................... A-C-37
Photos of AAV 211 .......................................................... A-C-49
23 October 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. HODGKINS

FROM: Medical Advisor and Infantry Weapons Advisor

SUBJECT: Detailed Explanation of Killed and Wounded in Action

1. Killed in action by Enemy Fire:

a. Sgt Bitz was the section chief of AAV’s C209, C210, and C211. South of the Euphrates River Bridge, Sgt Bitz’ vehicle, AAV C209 broke down with mechanical difficulties. After conducting a (Bump Plan) moving the Marines from C209 to C210 and C211, Sgt Bitz took command of AAV 211. While making their initial push through An Nasiriyah, C211 was hit by enemy RPGs. The Marines aboard evacuated the AAV (Sgt Bitz was not injured from this RPG attack). Sgt Bitz, after getting off of his now burning vehicle, picked up a rifle and started fighting as an infantryman with Charlie Company’s third platoon. While at the Northern Bridge over the Saddam Canal, as he was returning to get back on the AAV’s, he was wounded by an undeterminable source. Sgt Bitz was then loaded on to AAV 206. AAV 206 was subsequently hit by enemy fire (RPGs) south of the Saddam Canal Bridge mortally wounding Sgt Bitz. This conclusion is based upon, witness testimony (PFC (name), 1st Sgt (name), Cpl (name), 2dLt (name)), review of photographs of the scene, the autopsy report from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), as well as the location of the catastrophic hit.

b. LCpl Buesing was assigned to the Mortar section; he was killed by enemy fire (indirect fire) while he was engaging the enemy with his mortar on the Northeast side of the road, north of the Saddam Canal bridge. This conclusion is based upon the forensic pathologist’s (Major (name)) presentation, witness testimony (1stLt (name), 1st Sgt (name), SSgt (name)) and the forensic examination of the metal fragments recovered from the body.

c. Cpl Chanawongse was a crewman on AAV C208; he was killed by enemy indirect fire on the Northeast side of the road, north of the Saddam Canal Bridge as he was carrying ammo to other Marines. This conclusion is based upon witness testimony (LCpl (name), Cpl (name)).

d. LCpl Fribley was a rifleman assigned to 3d Platoon. As he was moving back towards the AAV’s from west to east, he was killed by enemy fire. Forensic evidence indicates that LCpl Fribley was hit in the lower back by fragmentation moving at a low velocity. This conclusion is based on the autopsy, conducted by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and on the testing of the metal fragments that were removed from his body. This fragmentation was determined by forensic testing to not be 30mm or MK-82 ordnance, and therefore not from the
A-10. This contradicts several witnesses testimony indicating that LCpl Fribley was killed by the A-10 (statements by 2dLt, GySgt, Cpl, Cpl, LCpl, Cpl, LCpl, LCpl, however, extensive forensic testing conducted by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center on the metal fragments recovered from LCpl Fribley clearly indicate that the metal fragments found did not originate from U.S. ordnance.

e. LCpl Gonzalez was assigned to the Mortar section; he was killed by (enemy) penetrating projectile wound to the head, as well as, sustaining blast injury to his legs from indirect enemy fire, north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This conclusion is based upon the autopsy report, and Major presentation regarding the characterization of his wounds.

g. 1st Lt Pokorney was the Artillery Liaison Officer for Charlie Company; he was killed by enemy indirect fire north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This conclusion is based upon the forensic pathologist’s presentation and the forensic examination of the metal fragments recovered from LCpl, who was killed in the same blast that killed GySgt Jordan as well as statements from 1st Lt and 1st Sgt.

h. LCpl Slocum, a rifleman assigned to 1st Platoon, he was in AAV C206, which was struck by enemy RPGs well south of the Saddam Canal near Alpha Company’s position by the Southern Euphrates River Bridge. The enemy RPGs that struck AAV C206 at the Southern Euphrates River Bridge killed LCpl Slocum. This opinion is based upon witness statements (PFC, Cpl, and Cpl and the autopsy report, provided by Major the forensic pathologist.

2. Wounded by Enemy Fire:

a. Sgt, was a Machine-gun Section Leader assigned to 3d Platoon, who was initially in AAV C211. As Charlie Company was making its initial push through the city between the Southern Euphrates River Bridge and the Northern Saddam Canal Bridge, C211 was hit by enemy RPG fire which wounded Sgt. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Sgt was initially wounded by enemy fire while going through the city between the southern and northern bridges. Also, based on further testimony, in our opinion, Sgt was subsequently wounded again during a strafing run by an A-10. This opinion is based on Sgt statement and the eye witness account of Capt.

b. Cpl was a rifleman assigned to Charlie Company. While moving back to re-embark on AAV’s he was wounded on the northwest side of the road, north of the northern bridge. It is our opinion that Cpl Carl was wounded by enemy fire. This opinion is based upon the forensic analysis done on the fragmentation collected from LCpl Fribley and LCpl Witness
statements provided by 2dLt, Cpl, Cpl, LCpl, LCpl and PFC state that all these Marines were struck at the same time. Fragmentation from 2dLt, LCpl, and LCpl Fribley, which was analyzed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center was not consistent with U.S. munitions. The fragments collected from 2dLt could not be conclusively analyzed.

c. LCpl was a mortar man assigned to the weapons platoon of Charlie Company. During subsequent movement from the west side of the road north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, he was hit by indirect enemy fire. It is our opinion, based on all available information that LCpl was hit by indirect enemy fire north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This opinion is based upon witness statements (SSgt and Cpl).

d. LCpl was a riflemen assigned to 3d Platoon; he was initially in AAV C211. As Charlie Company was making its initial push through the city between the Southern Euphrates River Bridge and the Northern Saddam Canal Bridge, C211 was hit by enemy RPG fire which wounded LCpl. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl was wounded by enemy fire while going through the city between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon telephonic statement, that he was wounded by enemy fire while initially going through the city in track C211.

e. Cpl was a riflemen assigned to 3d Platoon, he was initially in AAV C211. As Charlie Company was making its initial push through the city between the Southern Euphrates River Bridge and the Northern Saddam Canal Bridge, C211 was hit by enemy RPG fire which wounded Cpl. It is our opinion, based on all available information that Cpl was wounded by enemy fire while going through the city between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon eye witness statements (2dLt and 1st Sgt).

f. Cpl was a team leader assigned to Charlie Company. Cpl embarked on C206 for security of the wounded. During the movement south back through the city, C206 was hit by enemy RPGs. Cpl was wounded in C206 from the RPG hits. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Cpl was wounded by enemy fire while traveling back through the city between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on statement that he was wounded by enemy fire while traveling south of the northern bridge on AAV C206.

g. LCpl was a rifleman assigned to 3d Platoon, he was initially in AAV C211. As Charlie Company was making its initial push through the city between the Southern Euphrates River Bridge and the Northern Saddam Canal Bridge, C211 was hit by enemy RPG fire which wounded LCpl. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl was wounded by enemy fire while going through the city between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon witness statements (2dLt and Sgt).

h. LCpl was a riflemen assigned to Charlie Company. While moving back to reembark on AAV's he was wounded on the northwest side of the road, north of the northern bridge. It is our opinion that LCpl was wounded by enemy fire. This opinion is based
upon the forensic analysis done on the fragmentation he provided to the board that was subsequently analyzed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center.

i. PFC [redacted] was a rifleman assigned to Charlie Company. While moving back to re-embark on AAV’s he was wounded on the northwest side of the road, north of the northern bridge. It is our opinion that LCpl [redacted] was wounded by enemy fire. This opinion is based upon the forensic analysis done on the fragmentation collected from LCpl Fribley and LCpl [redacted]. Witness statements provided by 2dLt [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], LCpl [redacted], PFC [redacted], and PFC [redacted] state that all these Marines were struck at the same time. Fragmentation from LCpl [redacted] and LCpl Fribley, which was analyzed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center was not consistent with U.S. munitions.

j. Cpl [redacted] was a rifleman assigned to 3d Platoon, he was initially in AAV C211. As Charlie Company was making its initial push through the city between the Southern Euphrates River Bridge and the Northern Saddam Canal Bridge, C211 was hit by enemy RPG fire which wounded Cpl [redacted]. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Cpl [redacted] was wounded by enemy fire while going through the city between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon witness statements (Lt [redacted], 1ST Sgt [redacted] and Sgt [redacted]).

k. 1st Lt [redacted] was the Weapons Platoon Commander with Charlie Company. While directing the fire of the Mortar section; he was wounded by enemy indirect fire on the northeast side of the road, north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that 1st Lt [redacted] was wounded by enemy indirect fire and direct fire north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This opinion is based on Lt [redacted] own statement and witness statements (GySgt [redacted] and 1ST Sgt [redacted]).

l. 2d Lt [redacted] was the Platoon Commander for 3d Platoon, Charlie Company. While moving back to re-embark on AAV’s he was wounded on the northwest side of the road, north of the northern bridge. It is our opinion that 2d Lt [redacted] was wounded by enemy fire. This opinion is based upon the forensic analysis done on the fragmentation collected from 2d Lt [redacted] LCpl Fribley and LCpl [redacted], which was analyzed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center. The fragments recovered from LCpl [redacted] and LCpl Fribley was not consistent with U.S. munitions. The fragments collected from 2dLt [redacted] could not be conclusively analyzed, due to the multitude of different substances in the specimen that could be consistent with Iraqi and U.S. ordnance. Additionally, the minute sample size did not allow for conclusive analysis.

m. LCpl [redacted] was a crewman on C206. During the movement south through the city to evacuate casualties, RPG’s hit C206. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl [redacted] was wounded by enemy fire between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon LCpl [redacted] own account that he was wounded by enemy fire while traveling south of the northern bridge in AAV C206.
n. LCpl [redacted] was a rifleman assigned to Charlie Company. While moving back to re-embark on AAV’s he was wounded on the northwest side of the road, north of the northern bridge. It is our opinion that LCpl [redacted] was wounded by enemy fire. This opinion is based upon the forensic analysis done on the fragmentation collected from LCpl Fribley and LCpl [redacted]. Witness statements provided by 2dLt [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], LCpl [redacted], and PFC [redacted] state that all these Marines were struck at the same time. Fragmentation from 2dLt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], and LCpl Fribley, which was analyzed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, National Laboratory Center was not consistent with U.S. munitions.

o. Cpl [redacted] was the vehicle commander for AAV C208. During the initial movement to the northeastern side of the Saddam Canal Bridge, Cpl [redacted] was wounded by enemy indirect fire. Subsequently, during the movement to evacuate casualties south into the city, C208 was hit again by undeterminable fire, again wounding Cpl [redacted]. It is our opinion, based on all available information that Cpl [redacted] was wounded initially by enemy indirect fire and subsequently wounded again by an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based upon Cpl [redacted] statement, that he was wounded initially north of the northern bridge and subsequently wounded again while traveling south of the northern bridge. Witness statements of AAV C208 are from Sgt [redacted] and LCpl [redacted].

3. Killed in Action (indeterminable source):

a. LCpl Blair was a LAAD gunner attached to Charlie Company. On the northeast side of the bridge LCpl Blair’s helmet was recovered [redacted]. LCpl Blair’s remains were subsequently found in the wreckage of AAV C208. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl Blair was killed by fire from an indeterminable source. This opinion is based on eye witness statements (Sgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], and LCpl [redacted]) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

b. PFC Burkett was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. During the initial engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, PFC Burkett was wounded by enemy indirect fire. PFC Burkett was subsequently evacuated south in AAV C208. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that PFC Burkett was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], and LCpl [redacted]) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

c. LCpl Cline, Jr. was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. LCpl Cline, Jr., subsequently boarded AAV C208 to provide security for the wounded being evacuated south.
During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl Cline, Jr. was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt _____, LCpl _____, Cpl _____ and LCpl _____) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

d. Cpl Garibay was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. During the initial engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, Cpl Garibay was wounded by enemy indirect fire. Cpl Garibay was subsequently evacuated south in AAV C208. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Cpl Garibay was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on eye witness statements (Sgt _____, LCpl _____, Cpl _____ and LCpl _____) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

e. Pvt Gifford was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. During the initial engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, Pvt Gifford was wounded by enemy indirect fire. Pvt Gifford was subsequently evacuated south in AAV C208. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Pvt Gifford was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt _____, LCpl _____, Cpl _____ and LCpl _____) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

f. PFC Hutchings was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. PFC Hutchings subsequently boarded AAV C208 to provide security for the wounded being evacuated south. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that PFC Hutchings was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt _____, LCpl _____, Cpl _____ and LCpl _____) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

g. Cpl Nixon was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. Cpl Nixon subsequently boarded AAV C208 to provide security for the wounded being evacuated south. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the
destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Cpl Nixon was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], and LCpl [redacted]) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

h. Sgt Reiss was assigned as a squad leader with Charlie Company in AAV C206. During the initial engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, Sgt Reiss was wounded by enemy indirect fire. Sgt Reiss was subsequently being evacuated south in AAV C208. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Sgt Reiss was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], and LCpl [redacted]) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

i. Cpl Rosaker was assigned as a team leader with Charlie Company. During the engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, the vehicle Cpl Rosaker was in was hit by 30mm fire from an A-10. AAV C203 was also hit by enemy indirect or direct fire, which damaged the vehicle as well. During this time Cpl Rosaker was mortally wounded. Subsequent interviews were conflicting as to the fire that actually hit Cpl Rosaker as well as the pathology report. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that Cpl Rosaker was killed by fire from an indeterminable source north of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This opinion is based on witness statements (Lt [redacted], 1stSgt [redacted], SSgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], LCpl [redacted], PFC [redacted], PFC [redacted], and Sgt [redacted]) and results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

j. LCpl Williams was assigned to the mortar section of Charlie Company. LCpl Williams subsequently boarded AAV C208 to provide security for the wounded being evacuated south. During this movement AAV C208 was hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which catastrophically destroyed the vehicle. The board was unable to determine by clear and convincing evidence, the exact sequence of fires that led to the destruction of this vehicle. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that PFC [redacted] was killed by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on witness statements (Sgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], and LCpl [redacted]) and the results of the autopsy accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

4. Wounded in Action (indeterminable source):

a. LCpl [redacted] was assigned as a rifleman with Charlie Company. During the engagement north of the Saddam Canal Bridge, the vehicle that LCpl [redacted] was in, was hit by 30mm fire
from an A-10. AAV C203 was also hit by enemy indirect or direct fire, which also damaged the vehicle. During this time LCpl [redacted] was wounded. Medical records indicate he was wounded by an RPG. Subsequent interviews were conflicting as to the fire that actually hit LCpl [redacted].

It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl [redacted] was injured by fire from an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges. This opinion is based on eye witness statements (LCpl [redacted], 1stSgt [redacted], SSgt [redacted], LCpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], Cpl [redacted], LCpl [redacted], PFC [redacted], PFC [redacted], and Sgt [redacted]) and results of the autopsy on Cpl Rosaker accomplished by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

b. LCpl [redacted] was a vehicle crewman on AAV C208. During the movement to evacuate casualties south into the city, AAV C208 was simultaneously hit by both intense enemy fire and friendly fire, wounding LCpl [redacted]. It is our opinion, based on all available information, that LCpl [redacted] was wounded by an indeterminable source between the southern and northern bridges.
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**KIA/WIA Matrix**
- Friendly vs Enemy Fire
- U.S.A.F. A-10 - U.S.M.C. - Friendly Fire Incident
# U.S.A.F. A-10 -- U.S.M.C. Friendly Fire Incident

**Friendly vs Enemy Fire**

**KIA/WIA Matrix**

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"F" = Friendly  "E" = Enemy  "U" = Unknown
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*"F" = Friendly  "E" = Enemy  "U" = Unknown*
Communications System Adequacy Analysis

Communications Advisor’s Memo ............................................... A-D-3
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LCPL Y was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the crew chief on AAV C201 on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq. I was driving the track. We went through the city and across Saddam Canal Bridge. We stopped 150 yards to the west side of the road north of the burning track on the north side of the Saddam Canal Bridge.

In relation to AAV C203 it was to our right about 25 meters away. We were facing east. I could see enemy fire—small arms, RPGs, mortars, 14 or 12.7 mm machine gun fire from different directions.

We were hit by 2 RPGs. We got a hole through the road wheels. No mortar hits. I have pictures...there is a 1/2 inch hole in the AAV.

We were receiving fire from the city and barracks. Mortars were coming from...looking south, they were coming from west and east side, where the little hills were to the southwest. None of my crew was hit by enemy fire.

We were monitoring Battalion NET, Company NET, TAC 1 and 2 and the platoon frequency.

I saw the A-10 hit LCPL Friby, C Company 1st platoon, I think he had a CPL with him. They were coming east. I turned around in seat and yelled for them to get in. The cargo hatch had a hinge shot off and someone was trying to close it. They were coming in through the back hatch.

The A-10 was doing a West to East run directly over us. They strafed the vehicle from front to back. Four hits on my track were from the A-10.

Looking into the back area (troop compartment) I heard noise but didn’t see sparks. I was facing in the opposite direction. I saw no sparks flying near Friby. I don’t remember if I heard the A-10 gun before or after Friby got hit. I saw rounds keep going and tearing up the ground.

When we left with the casualties we were heading south with the hatches closed. As we were going back over the bridge, track C208 was in front of us. C208 was approximately 15 meters in front of us. We were going approximately 25 MPH. C208 was directly in front of our track. We were on a four-lane road on the left side going south when C208 got hit. I saw a white flash and the track flew a foot and a half off the ground. The side blew out. Every one in the back blew out of it.

When they got hit I immediately drove to the right to pass them, then came around left with my track C201, then lost steering around his right side. I heard 60 mm mortars blowing up in their cases on C208. That went on for about an hour.

I saw an Iraqi with an RPG but he got hit before he could fire. I have no idea what hit C208. It looked like the fire came through cargo hatches from the top. I couldn’t hear any aircraft noises with my hatch buttoned on my track and engines going. I believe the back ramp was up on C208 when we drove by.
We were hit in C201 coming across the bridge. Machine gun pits were everywhere. Enemy fire was coming from south side of canal.

An A-10 round took out the transmission oil cooler on my track C201. The round came through the front center. I believe that happened north of the bridge. The capacity of the oil cooler is approximately 18 gallons and all the fluid leaked out.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at ___________, on ___________ 2003.

LCPL C, CO 2D AABN, 2D MARDIV
SSgt [redacted] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the platoon sergeant and in the troop commanders hatch of track C203 on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

At northern T intersection there was smoke from a mortar shooting. We started firing 50 cal machinegun fire; about 200-400 rounds. The smoke plumes stopped, we were out of rounds and were trying to reload. Mortar fires were now closing in within 200 meters.

A-10s did a North-South run, from right to left. L/Cpl [redacted] was standing on deck facing deck facing west inside track. I didn’t see him when he was wounded. He had shrapnel wound on his right triceps. 120mm mortar fire was still coming in—bracketing us.

Indirect fire coming was coming closer to us from the north. I personally saw Cpl Rosacker hit. Cpl Rosacker was located two feet from front on the port/left side of track C203 which was facing north. The round hit Rosacker and he went down. I saw dirt come up on rounds that hit dirt. One hit hatch then bounced off the track and into the track into pieces from what the Marines in the back told me. (Jacketing around the round.)

We closed the hatches and got indirect fire again. The track (C203) lost hydraulics, no steering, no brakes. We backed up closer to irrigation ditches. We were hit three more times.

I was the last one out of the track when we got out of C203. I checked Rosaker; he was gone. I had to leave him.

After we went back to get our gear, I had brass in my pack and sleeping bag, they were shredded.

FAX NUMBER TO BATTALION: DSN [redacted]

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at GMT 5/4/17, on 21 OCT 2003.

SSGT
C Co, 1/2 2d MarDiv

A-E-5
SUMMARIZED INTERVIEW WITH SGT

SGT was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the vehicle commander for track AAV C203 on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

We pushed past track C211 which was burning once we got across the Saddam Canal Bridge heading north. We pulled over to the west side of the road with the track pointing northeast and started engaging the big building at the T intersection.

We were under enemy fire when we first arrived. Small arms fire at first then arty and mortar fire. We were engaging targets to the north. I heard the A-10 but didn't recognize the sound. I saw the A-10. It was flying NW, I'm not sure of the direction. I heard the sound of the gun before we were hit. I heard it 2 or 3 more times. I felt heat on the back of my neck. I was knocked to the deck—I was threw around quite a bit.

A few minutes later we were receiving indirect fire. I saw sparks, like a Fourth of July sparkler. I shut the hatch three quarters not knowing what it was. We were still engaging the building to the NE.

I didn't see CPL Rosaker get hit, but I knew when he was hit from the Marines in the back. I don't know what hit him, only that it was something big. He was open from front to back.

I haven't spoken to but he was wounded at the same time CPL Rosaker was hit.

The track was all scorched inside. Everything in back was burnt. The port cargo hatch had a hole in it. I have a photo showing it. It was circled in red and said radiation. It was exactly like the hole in the turret. We had the cargo hatch down. I couldn't tell if they were shrapnel hits. The hole was centered in the hatch but a bit more toward the back of the hatch.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at MEF SSA, on 21 Ock 03 2003.

Co C, 2d AABn, 2d MarDiv

A-E-7
Cpl [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the crew chief of track AAV C208, the mortar track on 23 March 2003, at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

I observed Cpl Chanewangue hit on the north side of the Saddam Canal Bridge. I also saw a couple of other Marines get hit north of the bridge, but did not know who they were.

As we came across the bridge we were receiving enemy fire. We were engaging targets in buildings toward the west. We took enemy mortar rounds. Our track took five hits. I heard them landing all around us.

Lt [REDACTED] came to the back and told us to pick up the wounded and move the track. We didn't get orders to move over the NET. Our Comm was not working. We observed other vehicles moving south. That is when we started moving.

The top cargo hatches of our track were closed. They were open going over the bridge the first time, but they closed them once the mortar rounds started. There were approximately 96 rounds of 40mm ammo and approximately 200 rounds of 50cal ammo in the up-gun station. There was a lot of other ammo stored behind me including mortar rounds and small arms ammo in the rear troop compartment.

I didn't see anything as we crossed back (south) over the bridge. I was down in the turret looking through portals. We were engaging west to the Martyr's district area. It was not effective as we were moving at approximately 30MPH. There was a huge explosion and everything went black. When I got out of the right side of the vehicle the entire track was on fire. We were still being engaged by small arms fire from the buildings to the west (Martyrs District). The side of the track still looked like a track.

Prior to the explosion, on the north side of the bridge I received shrapnel to the [REDACTED] from enemy fire. The [REDACTED].

On the south of the bridge there was small arms fire coming from top of the building to the west.

I don't remember what position our track was in. It was a huge explosion. The entire track rocked. I felt the vehicle go into the air. I felt the back end lift and then come to a complete stop. Cpl Chenawangue... he was already a KIA. Four or five Marines were already wounded, with the remainder of the mortar squad were all right. One of the WIsAs was walking, the rest were carried on.

I remember seeing an A-10 (over the bridge) when we were on the north side of the Saddam Canal Bridge. I saw them fly by once. I heard people on the NET trying to make it stop.

I didn't see flares. I saw no smoke or star clusters. They made one pass, and then I was down in the turret engaging.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED], on [REDACTED] October 2003.

CPL
H&S Co, 2d AABn, 2d MarDiv (current unit)
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF CPL [REDACTED]

CPL [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was in track C203 initially. I was probably three feet from CPL Rosaker when he was hit. I was outside of the track at that time. There was an explosion when something hit the outside of the track. There were white sparks and then the left side of the track blew out. There was metal flying from inside the track. I did not see A-10s and can’t remember hearing their guns.

I believe fragments from the track hit Rosaker. Cpl Rosaker’s body was positioned with his back to the left wall and faced to the right side. After the first blast he dropped back in and was hit inside. We had 7.62mm and 5.56 on the left side, with AT-4s and 40mm grenades toward my end in track C203.

There were mortar rounds hitting on the other side of the bridge and small arms fire over our heads. I did not see any RPGs. I didn’t feel the track rock at the time of the explosion. There was about a one-minute interval between the explosion occurring on the outside of the track and the explosion inside.

There was no mortar fire until we moved out. My Fire Team (LCPL [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]) and I disembarked C203 after the explosion. Sgt Bitz received shrapnel in his lower back but was still walking.

Then I got in C206 with my fire team and headed south across the Saddam Canal Bridge. The top doors of the track were not latched and open slightly. We were hit again approximately 30 minutes after getting in, but I don’t remember.

I was knocked out when the top of the track fell on top of me. I was told that 2 RPGs and a mortar hit at the same time in the back of the track. Slocum and [REDACTED] were beside me. Slocum and Bitz were KIA in this blast.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at 2 MEF SSA 4/125, on 10/21/2003.

[REDACTED], CPL
C Co, 1/2 2d MarDiv

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED], on [REDACTED] 2003.

A-E-11
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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF SGT [REDACTED]

SGT [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was in track AAV C203 with Charlie Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

I did not see CPL Rosaker get hit. I heard the gun from the A-10, 3 times. A round entered the vehicle after I heard the sound of the gun. Two minutes after we got out of the vehicle I saw a mortar hit the top of the AAV.

At least one of the top hatches was open.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED], [REDACTED] A, on 23 MAR 2003.

[REDACTED], SGT. USMC
/C Co., 1/2, 2d MarDiv

A-E-13
Intentionally Left Blank
LCPL [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was in track AAV C211 on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq. We were hit initially coming through town. That RPG wounded CPL [REDACTED], Pvt [REDACTED], Cpl [REDACTED], and Sgt [REDACTED].

The track was on fire. I got out and jumped off the left side of the road and went across the irrigation canal. Mortars were dropping on us at the time. I saw A-10s to the west dropping rounds (bombs) over there. I could see the explosions from that.

We continued moving down the road trying to find another track. The A-10s came in from the east firing on us at which time I was hit on the face by shrapnel. LCpl Fribley was killed by the A-10 and Cpl [REDACTED] was wounded. While I was in C201, an RPG hit us in the front of the track. We got the door closed. The top door above wouldn’t close.

We were under mortar fire with shrapnel coming through the top door. As we were going over bridge we received fire from our right side. The track went off the left side of the road. When we got to the house, I was security on the roof. I was pointed west and shooting across the road.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED], on OCT 21, 2003.

C Co, 1/2 2d MarDiv

A-E-15
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF SSG

SSG[redacted] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

We took mortar tubes south engaging mortar positions in the city. I was north of Lt Pokorney on the road. I heard the gun (A-10), looked south and saw him[redacted]

We displaced the mortar section then split because of the RPGs. Indirect fire was coming in at the same time. There was heavy caliber machine gun fire (14.5 on pump house) from the south, across the bridge in the city.

As we were going back across road, shrapnel hit LCPL Espinosa-Garcia in the [redacted]

I heard the A-10 gun about 7 times...there were multiple runs. I was 60 yards north of GySgt[redacted] position which was on the east side of the road just north of the Saddam Canal Bridge.

Mortar fire was consistent until the last RPG volley. I saw no explosions around Lt Pokorney at the time he was hit. I saw tracers hitting but not on Lt Pokorney.

We were under indirect fire from commandos (60mm mortars). 120mm mortars,arty, everything. They were not accurate at all. They were bracketing. RPGs got our position.

The berm was directly to west where the RPGs were coming from that direction (in front of berm.)

I couldn't see the infantry (1st, 2nd, and 3rd platoon)...and I had no radio contact with them.

I don't remember rockets coming from A-10s. I watched the tracks go back south over the bridge. I didn't see or hear explosions while they were crossing.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at ________________________, on 22 Oct 2003.

[Redacted]

PLATOON SGT'S CRS (910) 449-0529 or

A-E-17
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF SGT [REDACTED]

SGT [REDACTED], 2d Marine Division, 2d Amphibious Assault Battalion, was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the lead section leader in track AAV C201 with Charlie Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

After we'd crossed the northern bridge, our track was north west of C211, which was burning. I was in the up guns weapons station. The front of the track was pointing NE.

There was a heavy artillery barrage coming from north and west, from the woods to the west, and 120 mm mortar to the south.

We were receiving small arms fire. I saw enemy personnel to the north by the berm line. There was sniper fire from the village to the east, approximately 200-300 meters away.

12.7 mm machine gun fire was from west, which was impacting track C210. Fires were in and around us all the time.

On the north side, C203 was facing N/NE. We were 50 meters to the north of C203. I saw C203 get hit. I don’t know what hit it. Both tracks were blown off of it, and the hull hit the ground. I don’t know what hit it, but it was something big. C203 was moving and on top of the road when it got hit. There was just machine gun fire prior to that.

I was outside vehicle on the west side of C203 and I saw the A-10 flying around. I heard the gun. I did not see the A-10 fire.

A 30mm round went through turret and into the engine. I was facing NE. The round came in from SE.

I saw LCpl Fribley get hit. My vehicle got hit prior to C203 getting hit. It was approximately 15 minutes before.

I heard the gun from the A-10 a number of times. I didn’t see the A-10 make runs on anyone. C206 and C208 were in front of me. We lost comm after mortar hits.

When we went back across the bridge heading south, C207 and C210 were behind me. The marching order going back across the bridge was C206, C208, C201, C210, and C207. I saw 4 or 5 sets of 4 big dust clouds right before bridge. [REDACTED] from C208 hit my vehicle.

We lost steering in C201 and bailed out. C206 and C208 are hit within 10 seconds of each other. I didn’t think anyone had survived in C208. I thought what hit C208 and C206 was indirect fire. I saw a line of 4 or 5 sets of 4 big dust clouds hit. When C208 got hit, I saw it go up in the air. It had huge holes in the side.

We drove around 208 to the left. I ducked back down inside the turret because of tremendous heat.

A-E-19
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LCPL [REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was in track AAV C203 with Charlie Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

SSGT [REDACTED] was in the TC hatch on the left side. CPL Rosaker was to my immediate right.

CPL [REDACTED] Fire Team was providing security outside the track. They then got back in the track. The back ramp was up with the hatch closed. The left side top hatch was open. I was standing on the bench looking out.

We were receiving indirect fire. I saw Marines rushing toward a wooded area. I was shooting into the woods for support. I leaned down and looked over my left shoulder. We heard the sound of the gun. There was a very loud explosion with sparks. CPL Rosaker and I tried to close the hatch.

I was trying to turn around and talk to [REDACTED] I heard the A-10, saw sparks and then an explosion. My right triceps was wounded. I was med-evaced to Kuwaiti hospital.

The explosion seemed like it went off outside and inside. I had burns on both arms. I don’t remember seeing any holes inside vehicle.

The ammo we had in the track included 240, M-16s, 7.62mm, 5.56mm, AT-4s, and 50 cal.

When Rosaker went down his body was in front (left) by the TC hatch.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED] 1930 [REDACTED], on 10-21-2003.

C Co, 1/2 2d MarDiv

LEPL, USMC

A-E-21
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LT

2dLT was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the 3rd Platoon Rifle Platoon Commander with Charlie Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq.

I am attaching a diagram I have drawn depicting relative positions of myself, other Marines, and tracks involved in the incident we are talking about.

The burning track, C211, was mine. The track to the north was SSGT (C203.) There were at least 4 tracks in that area. There were more Marines behind the ones I’ve depicted on the diagram.

We were receiving indirect fires, artillery, mortars, and small arms fire.

Artillery was close on the east side of the road. When we were to the west, there was artillery there to the west. The small arms fire was from the southwest. We received sporadic fire from the north by the T-intersection. Artillery was coming from the city. I saw the smoke from artillery Variable Time from the city. You could tell the direction the fire was coming from by the plume of smoke.

The small canal that parallels the north-south road was located just to the west side of the last man depicted on my diagram.

I estimate the distance between myself and the last Marine behind me (there were probably another seven Marines behind the last one I’ve drawn on the diagram) to be approximately 30 meters.

The A-10 was running W to E. I was running to the track to see what was going on, and that’s when we got strafed. We got hit and then heard the A-10’s guns. We were strafed several times after that. I heard the crackling of rounds hitting the deck and then heard the gun.

I didn’t see any explosions or flashing. I was taking cover. I felt heat and dirt kicking up around me. I got hit in the side. I was previously strafed by an A-10 during Desert Storm so I know what it sounds like.

I could hear Marines yelling that they were hit. I yelled to another track for them to call the air off. I also told them to put red star clusters in the air, they did so soon afterwards. We started loading wounded onto the track. We put casualties on the track depicted SE on the diagram.

LCpl Fribley was carrying a SAW, flack, helmet deuce gear and no pack. His flak vest was and he was killed instantly. When we loaded him onto the track his helmet and flak vest fell off. His trousers were coming off. His ass-pack wasn’t there any more. We found none of his gear after that. He was wearing grenades in his front two chest pouches.

As we were loading the A-10 continued to strafe. I didn’t see CPL Rosaker’s track get hit, but I saw the ground to the south get kicked up from the strafe.
There was heavy machine gun fire from the southwest, which was sporadic. Heavy machine gun fire was possibly coming from the other side of the canal.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at __MEF SJA___, on __22 OCT__ 2003.

2dLT, USMC
A Co, XO 1/2 2d MarDiv

A-E-24
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SADAM CANNAL

NOT SURE OF EXACT POSITIONS, BUT WERE ALL HIT ON SAME STRAFE.

LCPL

SGT BITZ

CPL

DIRECTION OF ALL MARINES ON FOOT WAS EAST

1. LT

2. LCPL FRIELEY

3. CPL

DIRECTION OF FIRST STRAFE WAS W TO EAST

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UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF SSGT [Redacted]

SSGT [Redacted] came in to II MEF, SJA and wrote the following statement:

On 23 March while getting medevaced for shrapnel wounds from the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) my CO, Captain [Redacted] came to the track that I was in to try and get all the wounded out. The track was disabled while going across the road. I slid down the berm and Pvt [Redacted] told me to watch out I looked back and seen the A-10. Everything seemed to be moving in slow motion I saw the rounds coming when I tried to roll out of the way unsuccessfully I was hit by the 30mm depleted uranium round (DU) it had removed approx. femoral fracture and shattered pelvis. I currently have [Redacted] repair all fractures this is what I recall from 23 March.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [Redacted] on 23 October 2003.

SSGT, USMC
C Co. 1/2, 2d MarDiv
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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF LCPL [REDACTED]

LCPL [REDACTED] 2d Marine Division, 2d Amphibious Assault Battalion, was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the driver of track C208 on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah, Iraq. I received a wound to the back of my head and minor cuts when going back south to the city.

On north side of the bridge we pulled off to the east of the road. C211, the track that was burning was to my left. We had mortar guys in the track. We had MK19 and 50cal, 60mm mortars, HEDP, white phosphorous mortar rounds in the vehicle....A lot, both sides were taken up.

The vehicle commander, CPL [REDACTED] was engaging to the east. We lost comm.. CPL told me to turn toward west. We started getting hit with mortar rounds. The mortar guys were getting hit at the same time.

CPL Chenawangue... was...he was running ammo from one side of the road to the other. I heard an explosion. I jumped out of the track and saw all the wounded. Most that were put in back of track were wounded. I looked back and there were Marines still climbing in. The back ramp never opened.

Going back over the bridge (to the south), I think we were the first track. We were still receiving small arms fire. Did not see RPGs while going over the bridge. We received fire from both sides going across the bridge. I could hear clanging. Just past the bridge I felt the track rocked and lifted. It felt like the explosion was from the top but behind us.

I remember nothing between jumping out of track and being in the house. The track was on the right side of the road going over the bridge.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at [REDACTED], on 20 OCTOBER 2003.
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CPL [redacted] was interviewed via telephone, was sworn, and testified substantially as follows:

I was the crew commander on track C206 on 23 March 2003 at Al Nasiriyah, Iraq. I was in the up gun weapons station. The tracks herringboned on north side of bridge. We were on the right side. The Marines disembarked. We turned the track around to face the city where we thought the fire was coming from. Behind me was the company GySgt and the First Sergeant's vehicle. C212 was behind us.

We were taking enemy fire. I couldn't see. I think mortars. We took 2 or 3 direct hits.

On north side, we pulled up to C201 and C203's location. We were hit and lost comm.... We kept getting hit. We went to the other side of the road. I disembarked to see what we were supposed to do...there was no comm.

We put 3 Marines in the back of the track. SGT Bitz was wounded. Walking but he appeared to be in shock. I received shrapnel in my right ankle leg and arm from enemy fire on the north side of the bridge.

I did not see the A-10 and did not hear the gun. LTC told us to push back. I got back in the track to head south. The turret had been hit and our weapons disabled. I was in the TC messing with the comm. The TC hatch was open. It'd been hit. The back ramp was closed.

While we were going south we stopped one time before the bridge and told 3 Marines to get in the track (while still on the north side.)

As we were going over the bridge we were hit by something that rocked the whole track, fluids were leaking out. We got hit again. We had multiple hits between the two bridges. First right as we were going over the bridge, and the track rocked to the right. The second hit was on top at the back of the ramp. The driver was LCPL [redacted]. I got out of the track on the TC side.

We had 50cal and 40mm rounds and possibly small arms ammo on the track. We had no C-4 and no mortar rounds.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at II MEF SSA on 24 OCT 2003.

CPL
C Co, 2d AABn, 2d MarDiv
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Tab A-F

USMC Preliminary Inquiry Reports

Major [redacted]'s Report ........................................... A-F-3
CWO3 [redacted] Report, dtd 13 Jun 03 ............. A-F-7
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From: Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Task Force Tarawa  
To: Commanding General, Task Force Tarawa  

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE POSSIBLE ATTACK BY A U. S.  
AIR FORCE A-10 THUNDERBOLT ON CHARLIE COMPANY, 1ST  
BATTALION, 2D MARINES AT AN NASIRYA, IRAQ ON 23 MARCH  
2003  

Ref: (a) JAGMAN 0204  

1. This reports completion of the preliminary inquiry  
conducted in accordance with reference (a) into the possible  
attack by a U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt on Charlie Company,  
1st Battalion, 2d Marines on 23 March 2003 at An Nasirya, Iraq.  

2. Personnel contacted:  
   a. Major [REDACTED] USMC, Senior Air Director,  
      Air Support Element, Task Force Tarawa.  
   b. Captain [REDACTED] USMC S-3A, 1st Battalion,  
      2d Marines.  
   c. Captain [REDACTED] USMC, Air Officer, 1st  
      Battalion, 2d Marines.  
   d. Captain [REDACTED] USMC, Weapons Company  
      Commander, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.  
   e. Captain [REDACTED] USMC, Forward Air  
      Controller, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.  
   f. Gunnery Sergeant [REDACTED] USMC, Company  
      Gunnery Sergeant, C Company, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines.  

3. Materials reviewed: None.  

4. Summary of findings.  
   a. On 23 March 2003, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines attacked
along Route 8 in order to seize the eastern bridges across the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal at An Nasirya, Iraq. The Battalion’s plan called for Alpha Company to secure the southern bridge with Bravo Company leading the attack north to secure the bridge across the Saddam Canal, followed by Charlie Company. The companies were mounted on AAVP-7A1’s (Assault Amphibian Vehicles). Shortly after crossing the Euphrates, Bravo Company maneuvered east in order to avoid incoming fire and became stuck in the vicinity of grid PV38R 2135. The command was given for Charlie Company to take the lead. At approximately 1100z, Charlie Company (12 AAVP-7A1’s and 3 HMMWV’s) crossed the northern bridge and began to dismount the infantry in vicinity of grid PV38R 221386. During the assault, the company received RPG, ATGM, artillery and mortar fire, along with eight passes by a U.S. Air Force A-10. Charlie Company lost at least 9 KIA and 7 AAVP-7A1’s during the assault.

b. Major [REDACTED] At 1105z on 23 March 2003, the Direct Air Support Center informed Task Force Tarawa that an A-10 (JODA-61) was in-bound. Task Force Tarawa informed 2d Marines. JODA-61 did not check-in or check-out with Task Force Tarawa. At 1147z, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines reported mass casualties and need for air support to transport the casualties.

c. Captain [REDACTED]; Captain [REDACTED]; Captain [REDACTED]: Air support for the attack was to be all on-call, immediate. The Battalion Air Officer’s air radio was damaged south of An Nasirya and he was unable to communicate with any higher units. The Air Officer informed his Forward Air Controllers (FAC), one with Alpha Company and one with Bravo Company to work air assets as best they could. There was no FAC with Charlie Company. The Battalion Fire Support Coordinator and Air Officer (co-located) were unable to establish contact with the companies until after Charlie Company’s assault on the northern bridge. The Battalion S-3 heard calls from Charlie Company to stop the air strikes and relayed the call to 2d Marines.

d. Captain [REDACTED]: The FAC with Bravo Company, who had been located several thousand meters to the rear of Charlie Company’s position, approached the Investigating Officer and stated that he had seen “too many people crucified on CNN” and did not want to make a statement without first speaking to a lawyer. He stated that he would write down his
account of what happened and send it to a trusted friend in the United States to hold, in case he was killed. The FAC was emotionally distraught and asked the Investigating Officer how many Marines had been killed by the air strike.

e. Gunnery Sergeant [REDACTED]: The Charlie Company Gunnery Sergeant was in a HMMWV at the rear of the column as it crossed the bridge. The Company was under attack from mortar and artillery fire when it reached the northern side of the bridge and dismounted the infantry. He spotted an aircraft rolling in from east to west. The aircraft fired its cannon and dropped what is believed to have been ROCKEYE munitions onto Charlie Company’s position. The aircraft was recognized as an A-10 Thunderbolt. The aircraft made a total of eight passes on Charlie Company’s position, all from east to west. Immediately, On the fourth pass, and the A-10 deployed its flares. Gunnery Sergeant [REDACTED] was maneuvering his Marines from one side of the berm to the other to avoid the artillery and aircraft as it rolled in. He saw munitions from the aircraft strike three of his Marines. Following the attack, several holes and projectiles believed to be from a 30mm weapon were found in Charlie Company’s vehicles.

5. Additional information. The AAV Platoon Sergeant, Gunnery Sergeant [REDACTED] /USMC, may be able to provide further amplifying details, but was not contacted due to operational commitments. A disk containing digital pictures of some of Charlie Company’s vehicles will be compiled and forwarded to the I MEF SJA.

6. Recommendation: A formal investigation should be convened.
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST BATTALION 2D MARINES
2D MARINE REGIMENT, 2D MARINE DIVISION
PSC BOX 20093
CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 28542-0093

From: CWO3
To: Commanding Officer, First Battalion, Second Marines

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARINES KILLED IN ACTION ON 23 MARCH 2003 DURING COMBAT ACTIONS IN AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ

Ref: (a) JAGMAN Section 0204.

Encl: (1) Appointment Letter dtd 12 June
(2) Statement from GySgt
(3) Statement from Cpl
(4) Statement from Cpl
(5) Statement from 2d Lt
(6) Statement from Cpl
(7) Statement from LCpl
(8) Statement from LCpl
(9) Statement from 2d Lt
(10) Statement from SSgt
(11) Statement from 1st Lt
(12) Statement from LCpl
(13) Statement from Cpl
(14) Statement from PFC
(15) Statement from Cpl
(16) Statement from Cpl
(17) Statement from SSgt
(18) Statement from Cpl
(19) Statement from LCpl
(20) Statement from PFC
(21) Statement from LCpl
(22) Statement from LCpl
(23) Statement from LCpl
(24) Statement from Cpl
(25) Statement from Maj
(26) Diagram of vehicles labeled with who was in each when it was destroyed.
SUBJ: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARINES KILLED IN ACTION ON 23 MARCH 2003 DURING COMBAT ACTIONS IN AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ

1. This reports completion of the preliminary inquiry conducted in accordance with reference (a) into the circumstances surrounding the Marines killed in action on 23 March 2003 during combat operations in An Nasiriyah, Iraq.


3. Materials reviewed:

(a) Personal assessment of damage done to AAV #’s 201, 203, and 211 conducted by CWO3 Dunfee and AAV mechanics during recovery operations.

(b) Statements from mechanics on damage observed during recovery operations on AAV #’s 201, 203, and 206.

(c) Statements from Marines involved; Gysgt, A Co. AAV’s, Cpl A Co. AAV’s, SSGT C Co. 1st Plt. Sgt., PFC, C Co. 1st Plt., LCpl, C Co. 1st Plt., LCpl, C Co. 1st Plt., PFC, C Co. 1st Plt., LCpl, C Co. 1st Plt., LCpl, C Co. 1st Plt., Cpl, C Co. 1st Plt., 2d Lt., C Co. 1st Plt., Cpl, C Co. Hq Plt., LCpl, C Co. 3rd Plt., LCpl, C Co. 3rd Plt., Cpl, C Co. 3rd Plt., Sgt III, C Co. 3rd Plt., SSgt, C Co. Wpns Plt., Cpl, C Co. Wpns Plt., 1st Lt, C Co. Wpns Plt., 2d Lt, C Co. 2d Plt., LCpl, A Co. AAV’s, HA A Co. AAV’s, LCpl, A Co. AAV’s, Capt A Co. AAV’s, LCpl, A Co. AAV’s, Capt C Co. Commander, Sgt C Co. Hq Plt., Major 1st Bn 2d Marines X.O.
4. Findings of Fact:

a. AAV numbers 201 and 203 were hit by a large caliber munition that entered the vehicle from the top indicating that it came from a high. (Encls 2,3).

b. AAV number 206 was hit by a large caliber munition from a high angle as well as being catastrophically destroyed later by at least 4 RPG hits to the rear troop compartment in the vicinity of A Company on the southern side of An Nasiriyah by the Euphrates River (Encls 2, 3, 14, 15,16).

c. Vehicle #'s 201, 203, and 206 were later dismantled and tested for radiation using a Geiger counter by the NBC Officer and were confirmed to have radiated from the site of the embedded rounds (Encls 2, 3).

d. An A-10 did make multiple strafing runs on C Co- north of the Saddam Canal Bridge (Encls 4,5 6,7,8,9,18,19,21).

e. LCpl David K. Fribley was hit and mortally wounded during a strafing run by an A-10 Warthog (Encls 4,5 6,7,8,9).

f. Cpl , 2d Lt , Sgt , 30 mm rounds during the same strafing run by the A-10 that mortally wounded LCpl Fribley (Encls 5,6,7,8,9).

g. Cpl Randal K. Rosaker was mortally wounded and LCpl was wounded on the north side of the Saddam Canal Bridge by an explosion of an unknown type in AAV # 203 (Encls 16,17,18,19,20,21).

h. Cpl Kemaphoom A. Chanawongae, LCpl Brian R. Buesing, Cpl Jorge A. Gonzalez, 1st Lt Frederick E. Pokorney, , and GySgt Phillip A. Jordan.
Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARINES KILLED IN ACTION ON 23 MARCH 2003 DURING COMBAT ACTIONS IN AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ

were mortally wounded on the north side of the Saddam Canal Bridge by enemy fire (Encls 10,11,12,13).

i. Cpl Jose A. Garibay, LCpl Michael J. Williams, PFC Tamaria D. Burkett, Pvt Jonathan L. Gifford, Cpl Patrick R. Nixon, LCpl Donald J. Cline JR, PFC Nolan R. Hutchings, LCpl Thomas Blair, and Sgt Brendon C. Reiss were mortally wounded while traveling south through the city of An Nasiriyah on AAV # 208 when the vehicle was hit by fire (Encls 10,12).

j. Sgt Michael E. Bitz, and LCpl Thomas Slocum were mortally wounded while traveling south through the city of An Nasiriyah on AAV # 206 when the vehicle was struck by multiple RPG's in the vicinity of A Company's position (Encl's 14,15,16).

5. Opinions:

a. LCpl Brian R. Buesing, GySgt Phillip A. Jordan, and Cpl Kemaphoom A. Chanawongae were mortally wounded by a mass firing of RPG's. This opinion is based on the statements from 1st Lt, LCpl, and the verbal interview and statement from SSgt in this same blast 1st Lt Cpl Jorge A. Gonzalez, PVT Jonathan L. Gifford, Cpl Jose A. Garibay, and PFC Tamaria D. Burkett were wounded. Cpl Gonzalez's subsequent death can neither be confirmed from his initial wounding or a subsequent fatal wound caused by something else. Cpl does say however that he appeared to have been hit by an RPG or mortar, which would coincide with Lt's statement describing the wounds were not received from friendly fire. (Findings of Fact; Encl's 10,11,12,13)

b. PVT Jonathan L. Gifford (WIA), PFC Tamaria D. Burkett (WIA), Cpl Jose A. Garibay (WIA), LCpl Thomas Blair (WIA), LCpl Michael J. Williams, Cpl Patrick R. Nixon, LCpl Donald J. Cline JR, PFC Nolan R. Hutchings, and Sgt Brendon C. Reiss (WIA) and Cpl Kemaphoom A. Chanawongae (KIA) were all loaded onto AAV # 208. The driver of 208 was L/Cpl and the vehicle commander was Cpl. As 208 was moving through the city of An Nasiriyah it was hit by an RPG or like weapon which mortally wounded all but two crewmen (LCpl and Cpl). (Finding of Fact; Encl's 10,11,12)
c. 1st Lt Frederick E. Pokorney was hit and mortally wounded by a large caliber munition, possibly an RPG. Based on the interview with SSgt [redacted] and his eyewitness account of Lt Pokorney's mortal wounding, there were no sparks or tracers around him. 1st Lt [redacted] statement says that the same RPG's that killed LCpl Buesing and GySgt Jordan killed 1st Lt Pokorney. This would indicate that it was not from the A-10's 30mm fire. Lt Pokorney's remains were recovered by 1st Sgt [redacted] and based on his description of the area there were no gauge marks or holes in or around the hard surface road where he was found. If Lt Pokorney had been hit by the A-10's 30mm fire it would have been from a high angle, which would have left some type of damage to the hard surface road where his body was recovered. The actual cause of Lt Pokorney's death is undeterminable but based off of the evidence it was not from the A-10. (Findings of Fact; Encl's 10 and 11)

d. Cpl Randal K. Rosaker and LCpl [redacted] were in AAV # 203. This vehicle was damaged by fire from 30mm hits to the front right side. There were two hits and they were both beside the TC up-gun turret. There was also damage to the right front side of the vehicle that looked like a large caliber munition had glanced off of it (larger than 30mm). Based off of the statements from the Marines that were in the vehicle when it was hit, most describe Cpl Rosaker as being hit by a round and LCpl [redacted] being wounded by that same round. The most descriptive statement was from SSgt [redacted] who describes a flash and loud explosion with Cpl Rosaker being thrown to the deck of the AAV, and that he could feel the heat on his legs. The 30mm rounds that struck this vehicle were too far forward to have affected either Marine. In fact the Vehicle Commander was the most likely Marine in the up-gun weapon station to have been wounded or killed based on the path the rounds took, however he was not injured. The inside of the vehicle, upon inspection was scorched but not burned indicating something powder burned or flash burned it. The vehicle was strewn with unexploded 40mm ammunition and gear. It is possible that a 40mm round was sympathetically detonated and Cpl Rosaker took the largest portion of that blast, killing him instantly and wounding LCpl [redacted]. It is undetermined however what exactly caused Cpl Rosakers' mortal wounding. The A-10 fire did hit this vehicle but could not have hit this Marine without leaving another hole in the rear of the vehicle. (Findings of Fact; Encl's 2,3,16,17,18,19,20,21)
Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARINES KILLED IN ACTION ON 23 MARCH 2003 DURING COMBAT ACTIONS IN AN NASIRIYAH, IRAQ

e. The A-10 undoubtedly caused casualties within Charlie Company. It did cause damage to three of the vehicles and mortally wounded one Marine as well as wounded five others, possibly more. This cannot be positively confirmed based on the evidence. The A-10 did not however cause all of C Companies casualties or deaths. (Findings of Fact; Encl’s 2-24)

f. Charlie Company came into an enemy engagement area with pre-planned fires including indirect mortar fires, RPG fires, 57mm recoilless rifle fires, artillery fires, as well as small arms fires. There were also two ZPU-2’s (one under the Saddam Canal bridge that did damage while firing up to the south eastern portion of the bridge). The second ZPU-2 was on an elevated position (a pump house on the south western side of the Saddam Canal Bridge) that was perfectly situated to pour devastating fires on vehicle’s or troops north and south of the bridge.

g. In subsequent actions by 1st Bn 2d Marines, large stocks of 120mm mortar, 82mm mortar, 60mm mortar, 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition as well as countless RPG’s were captured and destroyed. To the northwest of C Company’s positions on 23 March, 105mm artillery pieces were discovered, three of which had been re-oriented to the southeast directly pointing towards the northern portion of the Saddam Canal Bridge. This artillery battery was subsequently hit by rotary wing air on 24 March and one tube (which was still operable) was destroyed by EOD on 28 March.

h. On the south side of the Saddam Canal Bridge, weapons destroyed and/or captured included RPG launchers, two ZPU-2 14.5mm Anti-Aircraft guns, three 57mm recoilless rifles, four 120mm mortar tubes, and three 82mm mortar tubes. There were subsequently found, numerous AK-47’s, an RPK medium machine gun and thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition (7.62X39 and 7.62X54).

i. Clearly, based on eyewitness accounts and the enemy weapons systems and munitions destroyed or captured, C Company was being hit by a coordinated defensive fire plan. AAV’s # 211, 212, 208, and 206 were hit by anti-armour type weapons most likely RPG’s or 57mm recoilless rifle fires based off of damage assessment by mechanics and eyewitness accounts.

j. The aircraft was not cleared to fire on anything south of the Saddam Canal Bridge, which should exclude all the vehicles and
casualties south of the Saddam Canal. The A-10 was not cleared to drop cluster munitions and if he had, there was no evidence of any UXO cluster munitions found in any portion of the battlefield around C Company. It did not appear that MK-82's were dropped on C Company, due to the evidence not being there in the form of a large hole in the deck or massive casualties based on the proximity of the Marines to each other and the effects of that bomb. There was a small compound to direct west of the cross road well north of C Company that had been hit by a large bomb, most likely air delivered, that destroyed a vehicle with 120mm mortar rounds in it and a building the vehicle was parked next to. C Company's position on the evening of 23 March was in very close proximity to this compound and no other air was called on this position. This all leads to evidence that there were no bombs dropped on Charlie Company but there most certainly were gun runs with 30mm fires.

(Findings of Fact; Encl's 1-24)

6. Recommendations:

a. Further investigation.

b. There was a friendly fire incident involving the A-10, which killed at least one Marine and wounded at least five Marines, possibly others.

c. Disciplinary action may be taken based on further scientific forensic investigations being done to determine the exact cause of death. If the aircraft dropped cluster munitions, which he was not cleared to do and if it can be determined that the aircraft continued to engage targets south of the Saddam Canal.
I Gysgt [redacted] am making this statement on what I saw between March 26th and through April 5th on the North West side of Amsariv.

March 26th C-201 was recovered from the North side of the city. When I first seen it, I noticed that the cabin had been on fire and there was a lot of UXO in the cabin. The track of the vehicle was off. After further inspection I discovered two DU round holes in the Starboard side of the vehicle. One round penetrated the tower converter and the other the transmission oil cooler. When the transmission oil cooler was hit with the DU round it caused the coolant to slowly mix with the transmission oil. The DU round that hit the tower converter caused minimal damage.

In my opinion This vehicle C-201 was still operational until the components of the transmission were hit by the DU rounds. The NBC officer came over to the site and confirmed that radiation was present in the transmission of C-201.

C-206 was the next vehicle. I inspected the whole back of the cabin was blown apart. One DU round was found in the transmission oil cooler. The pervasion of the cabin blowing up caused a few coolant lines to separate. The NBC officer confirmed radiation in the DU round sight.
The NBC officer tested each DU round and found radiation at both ones.

C-203 was the next vehicle inspected. Overall, this vehicle was in good condition. The Iraqis stripped out the cabin of all electrical and bolted on items. The transmission oil cooler was hit with a depleted uranium round. This caused transmission to lose oil and coolant. This was the only damage to this vehicle that I could find, without the DU round entering the power plant this vehicle would have been operational. The round was tested and radiation was found by the NBC officer.
As Crew Chief of the AAVR1A1 for A CO 2nd AABN, I was involved in the Salvage / Recovery operation on 206, 207, and 201 (specifically, transmissions and engines). All three vehicles were rendered inoperable on March 23rd. Headquarters Platoon, A CO, 2nd AABN was attempting to rebuild 201, out of the three downed vehicles. This rebuild operation began on March 28 and ended on March 30, when an NBC specialist came from Regiment and tested for radiation. The Geiger test came up positive, and the rebuild operation did not continue.

206 (Crew Chief was CPL [redacted]) suffered massive damage to the troop compartment. Both the center and right cargo hatch were bent into the troop compartment, and the aft portion of both cargo hatches were sheared off the aft of the vehicle, and the ramp could not be raised. What made the vehicle completely inoperable was the hole in the transmission oil cooler (located on the right/aft side of the transmission). This hole caused a massive coolant leak which would cause a vehicle to quickly overheat, rendering the vehicle inoperable. Of the other parts of the vehicle to be damaged, the turret suffered multiple impacts. The six and 8 o'clock position visionals were cracked, and the vision block for the sights on the turret was destroyed. There was a large hole through the plenum (front) and it was warped beyond repair.

The front of the vehicle has four holes in it. Two hit right above the port side of the bow plane actuating cylinder, two hit the bow plane.

201 (Vehicle Commander Sgt [redacted])

Crew Chief CPL [redacted] suffered the

203 (CREW CHIEF SGT [REDACTED]) HAD THE SAME PROBLEM AS 206: A ROUND SLASHED OPEN THE
TRANSMISSION OIL COOLER - The round came from above. The vehicle (5.6 cc) and slashed down at 45° angle. It cut through the skin of the transmission oil cooler, and ripped open the first layer of rods in the bundle. This would cause the same coolant loss as 206. NBC came to our pause on April 1st and did a radiation test. It came up positive, when they tested the projectile still lodged in the transmission oil cooler. Along with this, 203 had a large dent on the starboard rowboat.

UNCLASSIFIED

A-F-19

ENC 3b
TRANSMISSION

OIL COOLER

PROJECTILE

FOUND AT

BOTTOM

OF GASH

CARGO AREA

HATCH

INTER HATCH ED IN, LEFT

H STILL OPENED

VISION BLOCK BROKEN

1" HOLE BIGGER THAN AVERAGE IMPACT
LOTS OF SMALL HITS

HALF OF HEAD BLOWN OFF

/front

Four impacts on 206

UNCLASSIFIED
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003?

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac?

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)?

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle).

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

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Cpl Friby was at the north side of the bridge deployed with his platoon to the west of the road. When everyone was trying to find a track to get into, I saw Friby running towards the back door of a track (track 201). A line of A-10 fire went off and knocked him down to the ground. He collapsed. Cpl 201 and Lt ran over and put him in the back of my track.

I was in one of the tracks that was taking marines south through the city.

Yes, I was in the back of my track.

Nobody

Friby was put on 201

Once Friby was put on the track we headed south and got stuck in the city. The fire we were taking was too heavy to pull him out so when we were evacuated out of the city we had to leave his body there.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003? Platoon Commander

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed? (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)?

LCPL Feibley

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. 600m North of Sadam Canal on the Western Side of Route 7 directly behind Track 201.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? Yes, I was in the TC hatch of Track 201.

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? N/A

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on? (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle). Track 201

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).

See Reverse Side

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 03/06/11

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Track #401 was strafed several times by a large MG per machine gun approximately 20-30 meters after Company C's attack. The Northern L/CPL Friebley is killed by the second strafe. L/CPL Friebley (Now IA) was led onto track #201 at this point and taken back through the city, orientation.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23rd of March 2003? SAW Gunner

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? LCPL (First Name), CPL (First Name), CPL (First Name), LCPL (First Name), LT (First Name) and myself, and PFC (First Name)

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. South of the Saddam Canal on the east side of the road and North of the Saddam Canal West side of the road.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties?

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on? (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle). I only know that LCPL (First Name) was at that track where the casualties were taken to South side of the road.

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate). I was in track C211 heading North down ambush aisle. Shots were fired from the side streets. We returned fire. We then were hit by an RPG with caught our track on fire. That's when CPL (First Name), CPL (First Name) and PFC (First Name)

Signature: [Redacted]
Date: 03/06/10

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just north of the Saddam Canal and unloaded quickly. Since I no longer had my 7.62mg SAW, I carried Sgt. John after him being blinded back south towards 1st Sgt. Fred's track. I gave him to Doc 495. I ran back and grabbed CPL John. Put him over my shoulder and while taking direct fire ran him over to the same track as I did Sgt. Torres. I gave him to Doc Speranza.

LT John, myself, CPL John, LCPL John, LCPL John, and LCPL Fredly crossed the ambush site heading west to see if there was any other casualties. There wasn't. Just a few marines taking cover. Minutes later our track C201 was hit hard by mortars. Then they started to adjust on us. We all pick up and ran about 150 meters north. We saw track C201 and another waiting as we started to approach track C201 the A-10 came down and fired on us. Put John in LCPL Fredly's John. Hit CPL John in the leg. Hit LT John in the arm and in the face. After being fired upon, we loaded everyone except LT John and LCPL John and headed back south towards the city. While moving south of the Saddam Canal we were then attacked again. Our track was hit several times by RPGs and the A-10. The track hit a pole. All the marines except LCPL Fredly's body got out and took cover in a building close by. CPL John prepared a casualty collection point in one of the rooms. About 2 hours later a convoy of<h2>hummers</h2> and ambulances came up and we loaded the casualties. Then we returned everyone that was still in the building jumped in a vehicle. We were then taken north of the Saddam Canal on the east side of the road where the rest of the company was at.
1. What billet were you holding on the 23d of March 2003? Assistant Automatic Easleman

2. Which Marine or Marines did you personally observe get hit that were wounded/killed (Some Marines were wounded first and then subsequently killed during their Medevac, describe only those Marines that ultimately were KIA)? LCpl [redacted] 

3. Describe the location to the best of your recollection of where the Marine was wounded or killed. North & South of Saddam Canal.

4. Were you involved with the Medevac? Yes

5. Did you go back across the bridge with the casualties? If so in what capacity did you go back (i.e. driver, vehicle crewmen, etc)? No

6. Who told you to go back with the casualties? [redacted]

7. Do you remember what vehicle you put the Marine/Marines on (Put the vehicle number down if you know it, if not put the location of the vehicle). LCpl Fabley #201, LCpl [redacted] #201, LCpl [redacted] #201

8. In your own words describe what happened (Only put down facts do not speculate).
   Track #1 was struck by an RPG south of Saddam Canal. This resulted in the death of LCpl [redacted] to LCpl [redacted] legs, the wound to LCpl [redacted] foot and LCpl [redacted] concussion & broken leg. Sgt [redacted] eye sight was also [redacted]
   Signature: [redacted]
   Date: 03/05/11

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