Chapter 4

The Relationship of Joint And Army Force Planning

Joint matters are defined as “…matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:

- National Military Strategy
- strategic planning and contingency planning; and
- command and control of combat operations under unified command.”

Section I
Introduction

4–1. Chapter content.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act profoundly changed the relationships among the Services and with the organizations of the OSD, the Combatant Commands and the JCS. This chapter addresses the processes used within the DOD, the JCS, the combatant commands, and the Army to determine the force levels required to meet the U.S. national security objectives and military strategy and to fulfill Combatant Command force requirements. These processes also determine the capabilities that need to be resourced by the Services’ programs within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) (see para 4–13 and Chapter 9) and provide the basis for the DOD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) (see para 9–12).

4–2. The joint strategic planning system (JSPS).

The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the Combatant Commanders, carries out the responsibilities required by Title 10, USC. The CJCS statutory responsibilities include: assisting the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advising the SecDef on programming priorities; preparing strategic plans; and advising the SecDef on the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Services and DOD’s combat support agencies. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive process providing supporting military advice to the PPBS and the strategic guidance for use in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JSPS provides the venue for the CJCS to review the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives. At the same time JSPS accounts for a resource limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the SecDef (Figure 4–1).
4–3. Joint requirements oversight council (JROC) and joint warfighting capability assessments (JWCA) (see para 4–12).

As the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, the CJCS is responsible for the assessment of military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure that the nation effectively leverages joint Service and Defense agency capabilities while minimizing their limitations. Such assessments involve readiness requirements and improving joint military capabilities. The JROC, which oversees the activities of the JWCA process, provides recommendations to the CJCS on the content of the planning and programming advice documents. The JWCA are continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services, OSD, defense agencies, and others. The JROC and JWCA will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

4–4. Army participation in joint planning and resourcing processes.

The Army participates fully in the strategic planning and resource processes. The ARSTAF supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in the role as a member of the JCS, by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. The ARSTAF supports the VCSA, in the role as a member of the JROC, by direct participation in the JWCA process. The ARSTAF supports the SECARMY, as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) (see para 9–15), by participating in JSPS and JROC/JWCA, and by performing additional analyses as required in support of the development of the DPG.

4–5. JOPES

a. JOPES provides the procedural foundation for an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving, and publishing OPLANs. This operational planning process concerns the deployment and employment of current forces, and not the identification of future force requirements. The latter is part of the force planning/development process. (See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of JOPES.)

b. The Army supplement to JOPES is the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). AMOPES provides the structure and process for Army participation in JOPES, as well as serving other purposes. (See Chapter 6 for further discussion of JOPES and AMOPES.)

Section II
Joint strategic planning system (JSPS)

4–6. JSPS overview.

While the emphasis of this text is on the Army management systems, it is first necessary to understand the relationship of DOD, the JCS, and the Combatant Commands to the Army force planning process.

a. The CJCS is charged with preparing strategic plans and with assisting the President and the SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSPS, as prescribed by CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A, provides the framework for strategic planning and formulating strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins the process to create the forces whose capabilities are apportioned to combatant commands for their planning.

b. Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning is primarily the responsibility of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J–5, and the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J–8. They use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD and Federal agencies, Combatant Commands, and the Services to assist in formulating policy, developing strategy, and providing force planning guidance. Primary responsibility for the management of JOPES, to include the review and approval of operations plans, resides with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J–7, and Operations Directorate, J–3.

c. The JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which documents or products (assessments/studies) are produced to provide this formal direction. Some of these are developed concurrently and others are dependent on each other. Key components of the JSPS include continuous strategic assessments, strategic direction of the Armed Forces, strategic plans, and programming advice to the SecDef.

4–7. Strategic direction.

a. Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services. Drawing from the strategic guidance contained in the President’s NSS and the guidance provided by the SecDef, the CJCS develops a NMS describing how the military element of power supports national security objectives.

b. Through the guidance provided by the nation’s civilian leaders in the NSS, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and other major policy documents, the CJCS and the other members of the JCS establish a common focal point, planning horizons, and critical assumptions necessary for the articulation of a strategic vision, strategies, goals,
missions, objectives, plans, policies, requirements, and programmed resources. This strategic direction consists of the following three documents:

(1) **Chairman’s Guidance (CG).** CG provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors required in the development of future strategies and plans in the JSPS. CG may or may not be promulgated as a separate document. When not a separate document the CG serves as an integral part of the strategy development process. CG may be established pursuant to the conduct of a Joint Strategy Review (JSR) (see para 4–10b and 9–40a), to be described later, the preparation of a Joint vision, the drafting of a new NMS, or provided separately.

(2) **The Joint Vision.** The Joint Vision provides long-range vision and a common focal point for future planning. The vision recommends concepts for operating within the projected security environment. It provides a conceptual template for follow-on service and Combatant Command visions while recognizing the unique aspects of warfighting embodied in each organization’s core competencies. The Joint Vision provides a means to study the implications of emerging threats, technologies, and global changes and their effects on joint doctrine, future force structures, requirements, and capabilities.

(3) **National Military Strategy (NMS).** The NMS is a principal document by which the CJCS fulfills the obligation of providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. Deriving overall security policy guidance from the President’s NSS, the NMS defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS describes the strategic landscape and includes a discussion of the potential threats and risks. It also provides strategic direction for the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Joint Planning Document (JPD) (see para 4–9c and 9–41).

4–8. **Joint strategic capabilities plan (JSCP).**

The JSPS fulfills the Chairman’s formal responsibility to prepare strategic plans by means of the JSCP. The purpose of the JSCP is to provide guidance to the combatant commanders and service chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate operation and engagement planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community (JPEC) (see para 6–3f and 6–7d) within a coherent and focused framework. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources to Combatant Commanders. The resulting plans therefore support and implement the objectives of the NMS.

a. The **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)** is the statutory guidance required every two years, but can be provided more frequently, from the SecDef to the CJCS. The SecDef issues the guidance with the approval of the President after consulting with the CJCS. The CPG is focused on guidance contained in the DPG and the NSS, and is the principal source document for the JSCP.

b. The JSCP tasks the Combatant Commanders to develop deliberate plans, including operations plans (OPLANs), CONPLANs, functional plans, and Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). The JSCP provides specific theater guidance on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater contingency activities that are needed to shape the theater security environment in peacetime. From this guidance, combatant commanders develop TSCPs for peacetime cooperation. These plans provide combatant commander’s intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve objectives over the FYDP. Combatant Commanders may integrate the elements of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) into overall theater strategic plans.

c. The JSCP apportions, for planning, the major combat forces, strategic lift, and pre-positioned assets expected to be available for both Active and Reserve Component (RC) forces. The Combatant Commander may then incorporate these forces in their respective plans. The JSCP also contains an intelligence assessment addressing the global threat environment as well as the probability of selected smaller-scale contingencies in various countries throughout the world. Supplemental instructions on a wide variety of specified functional areas to execute these plans are published separately from the JSCP and provide further planning guidance in these functional areas.

4–9. **Planning and programming advice.**

a. **Role of Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

(1) The JCS has the statutory responsibility to “advise and make recommendations to the SecDef with respect to the requirements of the Combatant Commanders”. Based on the strategic planning priorities, objectives and future capabilities outlined in the Joint Vision and the NMS, the CJCS provides this advice during the preparation of the DPG. The DPG represents the culmination of the planning phase of the PPBS and guides the programming efforts of the Services and other subordinate organizations or agencies of the DOD. In order to satisfy all planning and policy responsibilities, it is important that the strategy, plans, and concepts developed within the JSPS are supported by a programmatic system that identifies, budgets for, and acquires the needed capabilities.

(2) Validation of operational concepts is the job of strategists, planners, and tacticians. Programmers develop, produce, and acquire the equipment and systems necessary to achieve capabilities, and execute plans and strategies to validate operational concepts and their associated capabilities. Strategy and programs must be continually reviewed to be sure that the strategies adopted are supportable and that the programs complement the strategy and plans.

b. **Role of the Chairman.**
How the Army Runs

1. The JPD, Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) together make up the Chairman’s planning and programmatic advice to the SecDef. The JPD represents the earliest formal authoritative planning and broad programming advice to the Secretary as the process of developing the DPG begins.

2. The CPR, which is personal correspondence between the CJCS and SecDef, provides more specificity on programs of greatest concern to the Chairman much later in the DPG process. Finally, building on the information developed in both the JPD and CPR preparation process and after review the Service POMs, the CPA provides the Chairman’s assessment of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency programs and where applicable, provides recommendations to the SecDef on specific alternative program and budget proposals based upon an assessment of current and future joint warfighting requirements.

3. **Joint Planning Document (JPD).**

   (1) The JPD consists of a cover letter and several chapters. The JPD is prepared and submitted six months in advance of the scheduled publication of the DPG. Each Joint Staff Director sponsor of a JWCA prepares the corresponding or related JPD chapter in coordination with the Services, Combatant Commands, and appropriate Defense agencies.

   (2) As a whole, the JPD reflects the Chairman’s planning guidance based on the Joint Vision and strategic objectives outlined in the NMS and JSCP. It also highlights shortfalls between combatant commander’s requirements and resources previously programmed; develops long-term acquisition policy and intelligence projections; highlights selected objectives for priority S&T investments; and reflects operational vulnerabilities out to a common planning horizon and investment strategies for new operational concepts.

4. **Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR).** The CPR provides the Chairman’s personal recommendations to the SecDef for consideration in the DPG, reflecting the Chairman’s view of programs important for improving joint capabilities. The CPR development process considers the initial input provided in the JPD and may expand, refine, or modify programming priorities contained in the JPD, focusing on recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements within DOD resource constraints and acceptable risks. The JWCA process and subsequent briefings to the JROC, combined with the deliberations of the JROC and visits to Combatant Commanders, provide a forum to discuss program recommendations. The CPR draft is vetted with the Combatant Commander, Service Chiefs, and J-Director. The Chairman considers the comments from these senior leaders as he personally finalizes the CPR.

5. **Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).** The CPA contains the Chairman’s alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for the SecDef’s consideration in refining the defense program and budget. The Chairman reviews the POMs of the Services and appropriate agencies of the DOD and the preliminary program decisions made regarding the Defense Program. The CPA, delivered near the end of the program review cycle, provides the Chairman’s assessment of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency POMs, as defined in the most recent program-ming cycle. The CPA also includes an evaluation of the extent to which the POMs conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and the Combatant Commander’s requirements. Again, the JWCA process and subsequent briefings to the JROC, combined with the JROC’s deliberations and visits to Combatant Commanders, provide a forum to discuss program assessments that ultimately are vetted and appear in the CPA.

6. **Summary.** The SecDef prepares the DPG to establish the planning and programming priorities of the DOD. The Chairman uses the NMS, JPD and CPR to communicate advice on these priorities and uses the CPA to assist in evaluating compliance and consistency with the guidance, as he evaluates the Service support of Combatant Commanders’ requirements.

4–10. **Strategic assessments**

   a. **The Chairman and assessments.** The Chairman is responsible for performing ongoing assessments supporting the development of strategic advice and assistance to the President and SecDef. Specifically, the Chairman is responsible for assessing the: ability of the NMS to achieve national security objectives; ability of the strategic and theater plans to accomplish the components of the NMS; capabilities of the Armed Forces to accomplish the tasks and requirements of the strategic plans; and capabilities of the Armed Forces and allied forces as compared to those of potential adversaries. Assessments provided in the JSPS include the JSR and the Joint Net Assessment (JNA) process.

   b. **Joint Strategy Review (JSR).**

      (1) The JSR provides the primary means for the CJCS to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. The JSR process continuously gathers information through an examination of current, emerging, and future issues related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions.

      (2) This analysis provides a basis for changes to the Joint Vision and the NMS. The JSR analysis provides a strategic framework for the Chairman’s advice on critical defense issues. The JSR validates a common set of planning assumptions and provides a common reference point used by other Joint Staff processes such as the JWCA.

      (3) The JSR is a continuous process used to develop strategic military planning advice and assessments. JSR working groups, composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and supported by the Defense agencies, study the strategic environment out to a common planning horizon or they may study specific
areas of concern identified by the Chairman. The JSR produces periodic JSR issue papers if there are significant changes and usually an annual JSR report.

(4) The JSR annual report provides a framework for the Chairman’s strategic military advice. It includes an assessment of the strategic environment, national security objectives, and strategic priorities covering a long-term (10 to 20 years) review window. It reports changes in the strategic environment that are significant enough to warrant senior leadership review. The report highlights the threat assessment and issues from JSR issue papers, their impact on the NMS, and provides the Chairman with options and a recommendation. The Chairman’s endorsement of a course of action constitutes guidance to update, change, or retain the current NMS and or Joint Vision. When appropriate, formal revisions are made to Joint Vision or the NMS in lieu of publishing a formal JSR report.

c. Joint Net Assessment (JNA).

(1) The Chairman is responsible for assessing current capabilities of U.S. Forces and their allies and comparing them with the capabilities of potential adversaries. The JNA process provides the mechanism to assess strengths and deficiencies and their effect on U.S. forces’ capability to meet national security objectives. In addition, strengths and deficiencies are assessed in terms of their affect on strategic plans. This assessment is conducted with the full participation of the Combatant Commanders and the Services. The JNA process provides a strategic-level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.

(2) As a minimum, the JNA process develops a net assessment every four years (quadrennial assessment). This net assessment, based on a risk evaluation force, projects U.S. and allied capabilities against those capabilities that would reasonably be available to potential adversaries. This quadrennial assessment is provided to the SecDef and supports the assessment of current strategy and the development of alternative force structures and strategies.

(3) In the event of significant changes in the national security environment, emerging threats, or at the direction of the President or SecDef, the JNA process assesses the capabilities of the current force structure and compares them to the capabilities of potential adversaries. This assessment supports the ongoing JSR process and provides the necessary evaluation of U.S. forces’ capability to achieve current NMS objectives.

4–11. The joint requirements oversight council (JROC).

a. By statute the CJCS is responsible to chair the JROC, and the functions of the JROC chairman may only be delegated to the Vice CJCS (VCJCS). Other members of the JROC are selected by the CJCS after consultation with the SecDef, who are in the grade of General and Admiral that are recommended by their military Departments. In addition, Combatant Commanders have a standing invitation to attend JROC sessions as desired. Historically, the JROC has consisted of the VCJCS, the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Since 1994, the CJCS expanded the authority of the JROC to assist in building senior military consensus across a range of issues across four broad functional areas. These functional areas are capabilities, assessments, joint integration, and resources (Figure 4–2).
b. The JROC has continued to broaden its strategic focus to include providing top down guidance in defining military capabilities from a joint perspective and integrating this advice within the planning, programming and budgeting process. The JROC oversees the requirements generation process for major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) as specified in CJCSI 3170.01 and DOD 5000.1. Additionally, JROC activity has been increasingly focused on dialogue with Combatant Commanders on warfighting requirements. The JROC established JWCA in 1994 as a tool to improve analysis and assessment capabilities to enhance joint operations. These assessment teams have been reorganized several times in the recent past. The current organization covers the following five critical warfare areas: Force Application, Command and Control, Protection, Focused Logistics, and Battlespace Awareness. (See Figure 4–3). Finally, the JROC continues to maintain its direct integration in PPBS. Significant effort is involved in the production of two JSPS documents, the CPR and CPA, both discussed earlier in the section on JSPS.
c. To assist the integration and coordination effort of the JWCA, the JROC initially created the JROC Review Board (JRB). In 1999, the JRB officially changed its title to Joint Requirements Board but its function remains unchanged. The JRB consists of the Director, J8, and the appropriate Service-designated general officer or admiral representatives. The JRB assists the JROC in overseeing the requirements generation process and the JWCA process. The JRB reviews JWCA insights, findings, recommendations, and provides both guidance and direction.

d. To prepare the JRB and the JROC for their roles, a Joint Requirements Panel (JRP) was formed. This panel is comprised of the O-6 level JROC action officers from each of the Services and the Joint Staff, and is chaired by the Deputy Director, J-8. JRP members serve as the primary advisors to their Services’ JRB/JROC principals and integrate Service participation in JWCA studies and assessments.

e. The JROC and the associated JWCAAs continue to evolve in the first part of the decade of 2000 to be more focused on strategic issues and concepts. As example of this strategic focus and desire to directly influence future systems and capabilities, the JROC and JWCAAs have become more involved in developing Operational Concepts and Operational Architectures, as well as developing strategic guidance to influence transformation. The overall intent is to provide more upfront guidance to ensure capabilities and systems are "born joint".

4–12. Joint warfighting capability assessments (JWCA).
JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff Directorate (Director), examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness. The teams consist of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, Services, OSD, DOD agencies, and others as deemed necessary. JWCA issues are presented to the JRP for initial issue review, to the JRB for further issue development, and then to the JROC for final recommendation to the CJCS. Through this process the JROC then is instrumental in helping the CJCS forge consensus and examine alternatives.

Section III
Planning and resourcing

4–13. DOD planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).
a. PPBS is a cyclic process containing three interrelated phases: planning, programming, and budgeting (Figure 4–4). The process provides for decision-making on future programs and permits prior decisions to be examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat, political, economic, technological, and resources), and for the time period being addressed.
b. PPBS is the formal resource management system for developing and maintaining the FYDP. It progresses from the articulation of the military strategy to defining the organizations, training, and forces to support that strategy. During the planning phase, the SecDef provides policy direction, program guidance, and fiscal controls for the remainder of the PPBS cycle.

c. The planning phase of PPBS culminates with the issuance of the DPG. The DPG contains planning and programming guidance to the Services and the Defense agencies for the conduct of force planning and program development. The DPG identifies the major challenges and opportunities bearing on America’s security and prosperity, outlines the force structure and modernization priorities best suited to implement the NMS, and establishes policies in a host of other areas from counter-proliferation initiatives to defense manpower and infrastructure. It establishes overall resource priorities and provides specific programming guidance.

d. Summary. The DPG is the OSD guidance document for providing policy and direction for program development. It is the link between planning and programming. The DPG is developed with input from the Services, Defense agencies, CJCS, and Combatant Commands and is published in the March/April timeframe every even year, with odd year updates. This document provides guidance for the development of a specific POM period. The guidance covers the six (6) year period of the POM/Budget Estimates Submission (BES). (See Chapter 9 for a complete discussion of PPBS/PPBES.)

4–14. The Army planning system

a. System overview.

(1) The Army planning system is designed to meet the demands of JSPS, JROC/JWCA, JOPES, and PPBS. Through the JSPS and the JROC/JWCA processes, the Army provides its input to the documents, which present the advice of the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the Combatant Commanders, to the SecDef and the President.

(2) The Army PPBES initiates Army planning system (Figure 4–4). (The Army has chosen to add an E to the process acronym to emphasize the execution phase.) This planning system addresses the development of defense policies and the military strategy for attainment of national security objectives and policies. It determines force requirements and objectives, and establishes guidance for the allocation of resources for the execution of Army roles and functions in support of national objectives. It provides the forum within which the Army conducts all planning, except operational (contingency) planning which is performed by the Combatant Commanders with CJCS guidance and
Service assistance. The Army’s PPBES planning phase supports the DOD PPBS programming phase and the JSPS. It also provides guidance for the subsequent phases of the Army PPBES. Planning is defined as the continuing process by which the Army establishes and revises its goals or requirements and attainable objectives, chooses from among alternative courses of action, and determines and allocates its resources (manpower and dollars) to achieve the chosen course of action. The value of comprehensive planning comes from providing an integrated decision structure for an organization as a whole.

(3) Adequate planning requires “causative thinking”—a way and means of making events happen to shape the future of an organization instead of adapting to a future that unfolds from “blind forces.” Planning is experimenting with ideas that represent the resources of an organization without risking those resources. It is designed to reduce risk by simplifying and ordering as much information as possible upon which to make a decision. It includes the development of options.

(4) The Army planning system includes strategic planning and force planning for both requirements and objectives. Strategic planning is the development of national defense policy, national military objectives, and the NMS. Strategic planning provides direct support (DS) to the DOD PPBS and JSPS, while concurrently supporting the Army PPBES. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. Army planning includes the identification of the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy, and provision of a framework for effective management of DOD resources towards successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations.

(5) The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3 is responsible on the ARSTAF for Army planning, focal point for requirements, and prioritization of resources. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8 is responsible for the Army program and the materiel integration. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 is responsible for the development of threat estimates. ARSTAF functional proponents are each responsible for supporting this planning and programming. Staff support is essential to ensure the accuracy of macro-level resource projections. Staff participation in Joint actions is also a major and continuous planning activity. The DCS, G–3 is the principal advisor to the CSA on joint matters. DCS, G–8 is the principal advisor to CSA on joint materiel requirement matters, doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel-personnel and facilities integration. Each ARSTAF agency head is responsible, within the agency’s staff area of responsibility, for advising the CSA, through the DCS, G–3, on all matters of joint interest and necessary actions resulting from CJCS decisions.

(6) Army planning for the PPBES focuses on the policy and programming guidance determined during DPG development, and force and program recommendations established during NMS, JPD, and CPR development. The Army planning process provides the systematic means to develop guidance for program and budget development. Conceptually, this process is a generalized risk assessment management model that supports the senior leadership of the Army in decisions on resource allocation for the Army. Through this planning process known as TAA, the Army captures combat requirements (MTOE/ITOE), generates force requirements (TDA), and resources all components of the force (MTOE/TDA). The CSA, major commands, and ACCs develop force requirements and compete them with other requirements during the TAA process. TAA has the goal of providing the Combatant Commanders with the proper force structure to execute the NMS and DPG tasks. Army force requirements translate JSPS, CJCS advice and recommendations, and DOD guidance and objectives into Army force structure (See Figure 4–5).

![Figure 4-5. Army force requirements](image-url)
b. The Army Plan (TAP).
(1) TAP was revised in format and content in 2000. It combined the planning horizon of the former TAP with that of the former Army long range planning guidance (ALRPG), resulting in a comprehensive single source planning document. TAP focuses primarily on the program years plus ten years. It presents comprehensive and cohesive strategic, mid-term planning, and programming guidance that addresses the Army’s enduring core competency over the full sixteen year time period. The Army’s core competency is currently defined as: Soldiers and leaders, and those who support them, prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations throughout the entire spectrum of military operations in any environment that requires land force capabilities.

(2) TAP sets the azimuth and provides a focused and consistent theme for developing the program and budget. TAP starts with the enduring core competency (i.e., ends) and translates it into capabilities (i.e., ways for accomplishing the ends), which ultimately produce the program and budget (i.e., means). This systematic approach provides a coherent context for developing, explaining, and defending the Army’s programs and budgets. Explaining the Army’s budget effectively is essential to obtaining appropriations and authorizations that provide the means to move along the azimuth to the future.

(3) In order to accomplish the goals described above, TAP does the following:
   (a) Outlines and integrates NSS, NMS, and DPG for the Army.
   (b) Introduces mid-range planning objectives and capability requirements from long range plans.
   (c) Links programming guidance to mid-range planning objectives and capabilities.
   (d) Summarizes the existing view of the current force, the guidance on for the DPG/NMS force, and the projected force ten years beyond.
   (e) States the Army’s priorities within expected resource levels.
   (f) Provides early direction to programming and budgeting.

(4) In addition, the revised TAP possesses the following characteristics:
   (a) A continuum from strategic direction, through planning capabilities, to programming guidance.
   (b) A planning section that addresses operational capabilities, i.e., what the Army will require to achieve its core competency.
   (c) A working sessions at the two-star level for finalizing the strategic guidance; at the action officer level by Secretariat and ARSTAF planners for creating the operational capabilities-based planning guidance; and at the action officer level by the programmers for revising the programming guidance.

(5) The strategic guidance focuses on the long term and where the Army leadership wishes to go. The planning guidance describes the mid-term and the kinds of capabilities needed. The programming guidance addresses the near-to mid-term and how we get there from here. Common themes are shared from strategic guidance, through planning capabilities, to the programming means. TAP systematically links the guidance together through the common themes.

(6) TAP provides the primary guidance for developing the POM and for documenting the program and budget baseline. Equally important, it provides a common foundation for defending the Army program and budget. Finally, TAP provides a common starting point for all other Army strategic functional plans.

(7) TAP is organized into three principal sections:
   (a) Section I, Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) (see para 9–45), provides strategic, long-term planning guidance to the rest of TAP, other Army strategic planning documents, and the Army as a whole. It replaces the ALRPG. ASPG provides the senior leadership’s vision for the Army, derived from an in-depth assessment of the current and emerging geostrategic environments. The vision is a consensus of the Army operational and institutional capabilities required in the future and provides the overarching goals and objectives that must be attained. Within this vision is a general description of the transformation strategy and the enablers that will assist in achieving strategic goals and objectives.
   (b) Section II, Army Planning Guidance, focuses on the ways of accomplishing the core competency. In order to do this, seven mission areas have been identified which reflect the broad activities the Army will have to perform now and in the future. Mission areas are further organized into a series of operational tasks that identify the key objectives necessary to accomplish the missions. For each operational task, a series of operational capabilities, with performance standards, are identified. These focus on what it will take to accomplish the parent operational task (i.e., what capabilities are essential for accomplishing the objective). The combination of operational capabilities and performance standards will provide the programmers with information on what is required and how much of it is required from an operational point of view. Planners now have a process and a product for expressing operational requirements to programmers at the DA level.
   (c) Section III, Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM), maintains the continuum of guidance from strategic planning to mid-term planning, and finally to programming guidance. It provides the specific direction for building the POM and is described further in Chapter 9.

(8) In summary, TAP identifies capabilities to sustain the Army’s core competency over the planning horizon. It
relates the capabilities to DOD planning guidance and the Army’s strategic planning. TAP provides programmers and
budgeters with insights to consider alternative means and to relate their decisions to planning guidance.

c. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). AMOPES provides the interface
between Combatant Commanders’ plans for utilization and deployment of army forces and Army plans for providing
mobilized forces and resources. It also serves as the Army supplement to the JSCP. AMOPES Volume II provides
guidance to ARSTAF agencies, Army commands, and Army components of Combatant Commands for the employ-
ment and/or support of army forces in the near-term period. It reflects specific tasks and capabilities attainable within
existing programs and budget limitations. It also documents the army forces available to execute contingency plans;
presents the mobilization schedule and major combat forces together with planned availability for deployment of these
forces; sets priorities for apportionment of combat support and combat service support units; presents joint strategic
concepts; assigns tasks to commanders of MACOMs; provides personnel, intelligence, and logistics guidance; provides
guidance for development of plans with and without mobilization; and provides guidance required to plan for
mobilization of units and individuals to meet established force requirements in the event of the need to expand the
Active Army (AA). (Refer to Chapter 6 for more detail on AMOPES.)

Section IV
The force requirements process


a. In studying force planning, it is necessary to understand the approach used within the DOD (including the Joint
Staff and the Services) in determining the proper size forces the nation should have. This macro “force sizing” is an
integral part of PPBES, which allocates limited resources and adheres to the PPBS schedule and discipline. As in all
other aspects of the PPBES, the guidance received from OSD plays an important part. The JCS considers the previous
DPG, National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSS, CPG, and other pertinent policy information issued by the
Administration, when providing advice in the form of the NMS, JPD, and CPR for use in the development of the DPG.

b. The force requirements process is not solely an Army process but rather is accomplished by all the Services,
usually in concert with one another but sometimes unilaterally. It is a process inextricably linked with the DOD PPBS.
Force requirements must be based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, this process
begins with the articulation of national interests and objectives by the political leadership and the formulation of a
NSS. Guided by the NSS, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the CJCS develops a recommended NMS that
is provided to the SecDef and to the President. Using the capabilities identified in the NMS as a basis and taking into
account the threat and, where appropriate, the externally-imposed constraints (dollars, manpower, equipment, industrial
capacity, technology, etc.), the force sizing process is begun.

c. The evolution of the force results from a sequence of actions, which progressively refine initial estimates.
Beginning with the force capabilities required in the NMS and progressing to the current force, one sees an increas-
ingly detailed definition of force structure components and increasingly definitive resource guidance. As the resource
constraints increase, the forces become progressively smaller and the amount of risk inherent in strategy execution
increases (Figure 4–6).

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Figure 4–6. Force development stages

How the Army Runs

   a. The military required capabilities in the NMS were derived and directly influenced by the DOD Quadrennial Review (QDR). The DOD QDR is a congressionally mandated process required of every new administration. Congress made the QDR a permanent requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2000.

   b. The QDR process began in 1997. This earlier review was comprehensive review of the nations defense needs from 1997 to 2015, encompassing potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR was intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program. The review was a collaborative effort between OSD and the Joint Staff, with extensive participation from the Services and the Combatant Commands.

   c. The QDR 2001 shifted defense planning from a “threat based” model to a “capabilities based” model for the future. The model focuses on the how an adversary might fight rather than whom the adversary might be and where the next war might occur. The review recognized the need to identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare. Adopting the “capabilities based” model requires that the nation maintain it military advantage in key areas while developing new areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to adversaries.

   d. The QDR 2001 resulted in a strategy built around four key goals: assuring allies and friends; dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary. To achieve these goals the new force-sizing construct, which specifically shapes forces to:

      (1) Defend the United States.
      (2) Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions.
      (3) Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one or those conflicts - including the possibility of regime change or occupation.
      (4) Conduct a limited number of smaller - scale contingency operations.
      (5) DOD will maintain sufficient force generation capability and strategic reserve to mitigate risk.

   e. The QDR of September 2001 had a major impact on the DPG force structure analysis do to the lack of a current NSS and NMS. In fact the QDR force fulfilled the role of the NMS force in recent DPG formulations. Characteristics of the DPG/NMS Force are:

      • Minimum force necessary to carry out NMS at some level of military risk
      • Developed through the QDR process
      • Fiscally impacted
      • Fully supported
      • Fully strucutred
      • Benchmark for assessing program force risk

4–17. Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Force

   a. The POM force is based on the DPG/NMS force, and must be responsive to the OSD sizing and structuring scenario. In the case of the Army, using major combat forces established in the DPG/NMS force, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the achievable manning, equipment, and modernization levels for the major combat units. For the Army, once the DPG/NMS force has been determined (mission forces), the combat support and combat service support units (supporting forces) required to support the force in combat are determined using the TAA process. The TAA takes the major divisional and nondivisional combat forces of the DPG/NMS force and identifies (or develops) the necessary supporting forces required to support deployed major combat units. This provides a basis for examining trade-offs between types of units and assessing risk when shortfalls occur in the program. Considerable data are amassed on the contribution various units make towards the combat effectiveness of the Army, and these data are used in assessing trade-offs as the structure of the POM force is determined. (TAA is discussed in Chapter 5). Similarly, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the amount and location of stockpiles and other logistical functions that can be programmed to support the POM force. This information is also incorporated in the trade-off analysis. The POM Force is —

      • Based on the DPG/NMS Force
      • Responsive to OSD sizing and structuring
      • Resource constrained based on OSD projections
      • An analysis two to six years into the future
      • A careful balance between resource availability and force capability

   b. As a consequence of the numerous analyses mentioned, a POM force is determined which is a delicate balance
between resource availability and force capability. A Service’s POM presents its programs for achieving objectives in the areas of forces, manpower, equipment, materiel acquisition, and logistic support within constraints specified by the SecDef.

4–18. **Budget Force**

a. The Budget Force is that force and its associated capabilities which would be achieved if the budget requests were fully appropriated. The capabilities of the Budget Force can be slightly less or more than the POM force, and it has an accordingly different associated risk. The Budget Force is drawn from the first two years of the POM.

b. The Budget Force includes the force and its associated capabilities that would be achieved if the budget were fully executed. It is drawn from the first two years of the six-year defense program and is a different capability than the program force. Accordingly, it has higher risk than the program force if resources are decreasing and a lower risk if resources are increasing.

4–19. **Current Force**

a. The Current Force is that force and its associated capabilities that is in being today. It is the force that reflects real-time readiness conditions. The Current Force also represents the latest adjustments to the Budget Force based on congressional resource appropriations and command priorities and decisions. When more constraints are applied to it than the budget force, it manifests a different level of risk.

b. The Current Force includes the force and its associated capabilities that are in being today and reflects real-time readiness conditions. It represents the latest adjustments to the budget force based Congressional resources and command priorities and decisions. It may or may not be less capable than the budget force and there is a possibility of higher risk if resources are reduced.

**Section V**

**The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**

4–20. **JOPES.**

a. The objective of JOPES is the timely development of effective OPLANs throughout the Combatant Commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPES facilitates CICS review of OPLANs, incorporates automatic data-processing techniques and interchange of data, standardizes OPLANs, and provides for reporting any force shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process.

b. JOPES establishes a comprehensive set of procedures to be used in both deliberate and crisis action planning of joint military operations and, to the extent possible, in combined operations. Planning in JOPES begins with the assignment of missions and publication of other data to Combatant Commanders in the JSCP. (Refer to Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of JOPES deliberate and crisis action planning processes and procedure.)

c. Clearly, all aspects of an OPLAN are of interest to the participating Service(s). Some are singled out here since they impact so heavily on the Army’s force-structuring process and ultimate assignment of priorities for unit deployment and levels of readiness (Figure 4–7). It is during the plan development phase that the Combatant Commands time-phased force lists are provided by component/subordinate commanders to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. Planning for deployment is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment and is key to the supported commander’s concept of operations. It is based on Joint and Service doctrine, guidance, review, and the availability of forces. While this planning is ultimately integrated by the supported joint commander or the Combatant Commander, the component commanders develop detailed lists of combat and support forces to be employed in accomplishing the assigned tasks, including the required closure time of forces (as specified in the supported commander’s concept of deployment) to be deployed to the area of operations. This phase concludes with the production of the supported commander’s time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD includes assigned forces, augmentation forces, resupply, replacements, and supporting forces, which are to be deployed to the area of operations and forces stationed within the area of operations. The TPFDD is built by each Combatant Command and refined in detail by various participants to ensure the feasibility and acceptability of the data. The TPFDD is then made accessible to planners throughout the joint military community on the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

d. Closely related to planning for the major forces is determining the overall transportation and sustainment requirements with the proper sequencing to support the combat forces. This entails computation of support requirements based upon Service planning guidance and the time phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander’s overall concept. Most critical to the process is the proper assignment of air or sea mode to time-phased requirements to ensure optimum use of mobility/transportation assets.

e. Another significant consideration of the whole process is the identification of shortfalls and associated risks. Coordination with and between all commands and agencies concerned is essential to make the detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls or limiting factors. When a plan has been approved, subordinate and supporting commands and Services must update/modify force and resupply requirements and identify units in light of real-world
asset availability/readiness. They must also consistently address the basic execution planning tasks: identification of forces required, designation of units, determination of movement requirements to include actual resupply, and planning the movements of forces and supplies.

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**4–21. Combatant Commands.**

a. Combatant Commands provide for the integrated effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations and for the projection of U.S. military power in support of U.S. national policies. They are established by the President through the SecDef with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the document that establishes the Combatant Commands.

b. The chain of command extends from the President to the SecDef to the commanders of the Combatant Commands. Forces are assigned under the authority of the SecDef. A Combatant Command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services. Combatant Commanders have full command of those forces assigned.

c. The Combatant Command, and the command and communication relationships are indicated in Figure 4–8.
(1) USJFCOM is responsible for transformation, experimentation, joint training, interoperability and force provision as outline in the UCP. USJFCOM is the “transformation laboratory” of the United States military that serves to enhance the Unified Commanders’ capabilities to implement that strategy. USJFCOM develops future concepts, test these concepts through rigorous experimentation, educate joint leaders, train joint forces, and make recommendations on how the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines can better integrate their warfighting capabilities.

(2) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility includes 25 culturally and economically diverse nations located throughout the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, and Northern Red Sea regions, as well as the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. The addition of the five Central Asian States has brought new challenges and opportunities to USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility. The Central Asian nations include Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

(3) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is responsible for the U.S. contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see 20–23g) and for commanding U.S. forces assigned to Europe. Its area of responsibility includes six countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union, portions of the Middle East, most of the African states bordering on the Mediterranean, and Africa south of the Sahara. The Command USEUCOM is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

(4) U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is responsible for defense of the United States from attacks through the Pacific Ocean, and for U.S. defense interests in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.

(5) U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCCOM) exercises COCOM of all CONUS-based special operations forces (SOF). The missions of USSOCCOM are to: prepare assigned forces to carry out special operations (SO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) missions as required; plan for and conduct SO in support of United States national security objectives; provide SOF to other Combatant Commanders when directed; and recommend to CJCS strategy and doctrine for joint employment of SOF. Major units include: Army Special Forces, Rangers, special operations aviation, PSYOP, and CA units; Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) and special boat units; and Air Force special operations squadrons. USSOCCOM is unique in that USCINCSOC is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for Major Force Program 11, Special Operations Forces.

(6) USOUTHCOM area of responsibility includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico; the waters adjacent to Central and South America; the Caribbean Sea, its 12 island nations and European territories; the Gulf of Mexico; and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. It encompasses 32 countries (19 in Central and South America and 12 in the Caribbean) and covers about 15.6 million square miles. USOUTHCOM shapes the environment within its area of responsibility by conducting theater engagement and counter drug activities in order to promote democracy, stability and collective approaches to threats to regional security; when required responds unilaterally or multilaterally to crises that threaten regional stability or national interests, and prepares to meet future hemispheric challenges.

(7) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for providing global air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives in peace and war. Its component commands are the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the MTMC.

(8) U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) provides full-spectrum global strike, coordinated space and information operations capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security objectives. Provide operational space support, integrated missile defense, global C4ISR and specialized planning expertise to the joint warfighter. USSTRATCOM is the command and control center for U.S. strategic forces and controls military space operations, computer network operations, information operations, strategic warning and intelligence assessments as well as global strategic planning. The command is responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional attacks. The command is charged with deterring and defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

(9) U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) mission is homeland defense and civil support, specifically: conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or SecDef, provide MACA including consequence management operations. USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President.

4–22. Relationship of the chairman of the JCS (CJCS) to combatant commanders.

The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 specifies that the SecDef may assign to the CJCS responsibility for overseeing the activities of the Combatant Commanders. The UCP directs that communications between the Combatant Commanders and the President or SecDef shall be transmitted through the CJCS, unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. These two directives place the CJCS in a unique and pivotal position. However, such
Section VI
Summary and references

4–23. Summary

4–24. References